SPEECHES BY

A. Y. VYSHINSKY

ON MEASURES AGAINST THE THREAT OF
ANOTHER WAR AND FOR STRENGTHENING
PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP AMONG NATIONS

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A. Y. VYSHINSKY

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Delivered in the Political Committee at the Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly—January 12, 1952 and January 17, 1952

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Program of Measures
To Strengthen Peace

Draft Resolution Submitted by Soviet Delegation
to the Political Committee of the United Nations
January 12, 1952

1. The General Assembly declares that participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, as well as the establishment by some states, primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases on foreign territories, is incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

2. The General Assembly considers it necessary that: (a) the countries participating in the hostilities in Korea immediately cease fire, conclude an armistice and withdraw their troops from the 38th Parallel within 10 days; (b) all foreign troops and all foreign volunteer units be withdrawn from Korea within three months.

3. The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of peoples to be contrary to the conscience and honor of peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations, declares the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition, having in view that the prohibition of the atomic weapon will go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of international control.

The General Assembly instructs the Disarmament Commission to draw up and submit for the consideration of the
Security Council by June 1, 1952, a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure fulfillment of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the discontinuation of its production and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced and on the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the above convention.

4. The General Assembly recommends that the permanent members of the Security Council—the United States of America, Great Britain, France, China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—reduce the armaments and armed forces which they will have at the moment of the adoption of this decision by one-third in the course of one year, counted from the date of adoption of this decision.

5. The General Assembly recommends that immediately, and in any case not later than within a month after the General Assembly adopts decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and reduction of armaments and armed forces of the five Powers by one-third, all states submit full official data on their armaments and armed forces, including data on the atomic weapon and military bases on foreign territories. This data should be submitted as of the moment the General Assembly adopts the above decisions.

6. The General Assembly recommends the setting up of an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council, the function of which agency will be to control the implementation of the decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the verification of information submitted by states regarding their armaments and armed forces.

With the aim of establishing an appropriate system of guarantee of the observance of the Assembly's decisions on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments, the international control agency shall have the right to carry out inspection on a permanent basis without the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states.
7. The General Assembly urges the governments of all states, both members of the United Nations and those not members of the United Nations at present, to consider at a world conference the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments, as well as practical measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control, to ensure that this decision be observed.

It shall be recommended that the said world conference be convened as soon as possible, and in any case not later than July 15, 1952.

8. The General Assembly calls on the United States of America, Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union to conclude a pact of peace, uniting their efforts for the attainment of this lofty and noble goal.

The General Assembly also calls on all other peace-loving states to joint the pact of peace.
The item now on the agenda of the First Committee is the question "On Measures Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace and Friendship among Nations," included on the initiative of the delegation of the Soviet Union.

The very formulation of this question emphasizes its exceptional importance, particularly under such conditions as the present tension in international relations.

It is necessary to recall that at the very beginning of the current session the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted its proposals on this question and that the statements of our delegation and some other delegations at the Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, specifically those delegations cooperating with the Soviet Union, were, to a large extent, devoted to these proposals. These statements were made on November 8 and again on November 16, and at the same time additional proposals on this question were presented by us.

Two months have elapsed since then. During this period the First Committee has considered several items on the agenda of the General Assembly in which questions related to those which we are to discuss now under this item of the agenda were touched upon to some extent.

This is quite natural, since, strictly speaking, all the questions in the First Committee are in some way or other connected with this basic problem, the problem of eliminating the threat of another world war and strengthening peace and friendship among nations, a problem whose solution requires the drawing up of measures that are capable of ensuring the fulfillment of this task. During the discussion of the items on the agenda already dealt with by the First Committee, it was naturally impossible to avoid analyzing the present international situation and establishing the
causes of the unsatisfactory conditions in this realm. It was im-
possible to evade or refuse to make an attempt to outline the
means by which it would be possible to improve this situation in
accordance with the aforementioned purposes and tasks of the
United Nations.

But the questions formerly considered related to the subject
which we must examine at present and on which we must make
a decision during the discussion of item 6 of the agenda — that
is, today's agenda — were, in our opinion, despite all their im-
portance, only separate elements of this subject. In this case, how-
ever, the point in question is not one or another separate measure,
highly important as it may be, but a whole complex of measures
or questions which must be considered not only separately, but
certainly also in connection with each other, and in close connec-
tion at that. The connection between them, in the first place, is de-
termined by the community of aims and tasks that arise during
the discussion of each of these questions separately or of these
questions taken as a whole.

This precisely is the significance of the item "On Measures
Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace
and Friendship among Nations."

At the very beginning of the work of the present session of the
General Assembly the delegation of the Soviet Union pointed out
that at present the United Nations is confronted with a number
of important tasks and that the most important and urgent task
demanding our immediate decision was to eliminate the obstacles
which hamper the strengthening of peace and international co-
operation, to eliminate the threat of another world war. We point-
ed out even at that time that in the course of the preceding period,
since the end of the Fifth Session, the international situation had
become even more complicated both economically and politically.
This is proved by numerous irrefutable facts, although the govern-
ments of certain countries and the representatives of these coun-
tries in the United Nations, particularly those who bear responsi-
bility for the aggravation of the international situation during this
period, are trying to deny these facts or pretend not to notice them.
It must be said that the basic, primary and most important cause of the increasing aggravation of the international situation, of the ever growing tension in international relations, is the aggressive policy of the Atlantic bloc, headed by the United States, and also of a number of other countries which are compelled, under American pressure, to pursue the same policy, although they hope at the same time to derive economic and political gains for themselves from the implementation of this policy.

We have pointed to the inevitability of such consequences arising from the present situation when ever greater difficulties affecting, first of all and most of all, the broad sections of the population are created for the countries pursuing such a policy or finding themselves in the grip of such a policy. As is known, it is the population of these countries that bears the main burden of taxation and military budgets as a result of the policy of the armaments drive, increase of the armies, organization of new military bases and extension of the already existing ones, intensified production and accumulation of atomic weapons, and so on and so forth.

We have already touched upon these questions and given many facts testifying to the increasing process of the impairment of world economy, in particular the economies of such countries as Great Britain, France, Italy, Western Germany and many others.

Of late this process of deterioration of the economic situation in these countries has gone so far that mention must be made of the facts relating to this question in the discussion of today's item also. Nor is the United States of America an exception in this respect. Convincing evidence of this, for example, is the newly published fourth quarterly report to United States President Truman from Wilson, Director of the Office of so-called "Defense" Mobilization. It is evident from this report, for example, that military output in the United States of America is now approximately 2 billion dollars a month, i.e., three times what it was in 1950. This output includes: heavy and medium bombers, light and medium tanks, guns of all types, fire control systems, radar equipment, various types of guided missiles, rockets, modernized war-
ships and, of course, atomic energy products. Wilson's report points out, however, that this is only a beginning. Consequently a further increase in expenditures for military purposes must be expected. In this connection it must be mentioned that at the end of November of 1951, i.e., only two months ago, the same Wilson promised that military output would attain the highest level in the United States of America in 1953, when the monthly value of military output would amount to approximately 4 billion dollars.

Thus, not only do we now have a gigantic increase in expenditures for the implementation of the war program, for the production of arms, for an increase in the armed forces, for the organization of war bases of all types — land, naval and air bases — in various parts of the world, but an even greater increase in these expenditures is planned for the future. I will say right here that such a situation affects the vital interests of all countries. It affects the interests of the Soviet Union too, for it is known from the frank admissions of the United States leaders that these arms are being forged primarily against the Soviet Union. All peace-loving countries are naturally interested in whether military production is growing or not in a given country.

Judging by Wilson's report, one can affirm that in the United States the armaments drive is not only continuing, but that this drive is gaining steadily in intensity and increasing its frenzied pace. It is evident from Wilson's report that the United States Government promises to raise the level of expenditures for the implementation of its war program even higher. This circumstance is directly related to the question raised by the Soviet Union on measures against the threat of a new war and for strengthening peace and friendship among nations.

What is the situation in the United States now with regard to military measures for the preparation of a new war, preparation which is being conducted under cover of hypocritical talk about the so-called "defense of the North Atlantic area"? Of all these measures, paramount attention is being paid to strengthening the air force and to the drive for atomic arms production (atomic
artillery, tactical atomic weapons, etc.) The aircraft industry in America is now almost wholly devoted to military production. Within the past year it expanded 67 per cent in the United States. This is according to officially published American data which, as is known, is always understated. By the fourth quarter of 1951, by October, November, December, i.e., very recently, 35 per cent of the United States metal-working industry was devoted to the production of military goods. The planned increase in the use of steel for military production in the first quarter of 1952 exceeds the consumption of steel in the second quarter of 1950 by 600 per cent, and, as is evident from numerous facts, it promises to be increased even further by the end of 1952. The same situation exists with regard to the consumption of aluminum and copper for military purposes.

It is obvious from Wilson's report that in the current year the American people will experience an even greater shortage of civilian goods than last year in consequence of the war program, inasmuch as the quantity of materials allowed for the manufacture of consumer goods in the first quarter of 1952 has fallen sharply below the level of the last quarter of 1951.

All this is due to the growth of military production, which, in the United States, absorbs the amount of copper, aluminum and other materials of great importance to the national economy that were formerly used for civilian production and are now being used to implement the war program, to satisfy the military requirements.

It should be pointed out that such a situation is extremely profitable for the American monopolies engaged in military production. They are making fabulous profits. One may get an idea of this from the following facts: the profits of American monopolies, which in 1951 stood at the annual level of 46.2 billion dollars, had increased more than sevenfold as compared with the annual level of profits in the prewar year of 1939. Yet, at the same time the cost of living went up, taxes increased, the program for social services was curtailed, the quality of goods deteriorated, all of which affected the rest of the population materially, depressing
the people's already low standard of living.

As for the extent of the rise in the cost of living in the countries following in the wake of American policy, this may be seen from the example of France. Everyone sees how grave are the economic consequences of the incredibly frenzied armaments drive for a country where war measures swallow up an enormous amount of funds and resources, contributing to a rise, and moreover to a steadily mounting rise, in the cost of living and to deterioration of the population’s standard of living.

Any housewife can tell you about it better than I, for she goes to the market and sees these facts, very simple facts, comprehensible to everyone, which are a direct result of the policy formed in higher circles, a policy which very strongly affects the lower strata of the population, the overwhelming majority of the people.

According to the latest data of the United States Department of Labor, the cost of living in November was 88.6 per cent above the prewar level and 10.8 per cent above the level of June 1950, before the beginning of the American armed intervention in Korea.

At the end of November retail prices of food in the United States were 134.5 per cent above the prewar level and 15 per cent above the level of June 1950. It will not be superfluous to mention in this connection that in the same period prices have been systematically reduced in the Soviet Union, particularly the prices of consumer goods, and that this price reduction — and the very possibility of this price reduction — is a natural result of the superiority of the Soviet economic system over the economic system of the capitalist countries.

General unemployment can be observed in many industrial areas of the United States as a consequence of the curtailment of the production of consumer goods and the intensified speed-up system which flourishes in the United States of America, as in all capitalist countries. As the magazine *U. S. News & World Report* wrote on December 7, "Workers are being laid off in many industries, with textiles, apparel, and autos the worst sufferers. In 15
areas, unemployment is critical. In 93 other areas there are moderate surpluses of labor."

Surplus of labor is unemployment, when the supply of labor power exceeds what industry, agriculture and transport can absorb.

According to American data there are now more than 140,000 unemployed in the United States automobile industry for example. This figure is based on official data which, as is known, is understated in the statistics of that country.

As the *New York Times* of December 23, 1951, said a "gloomy new year" awaits 120,000 unemployed in Detroit. And this "gloomy new year" has arrived! The "new year" holds out no happier perspectives for Detroit and other United States industrial centers than the departed old year. The November issue of the *Citadel*, organ of the United Automobile Workers' Union at the Chrysler plants, points out that the number of unemployed in Detroit may reach 200,000 in the first half of the new year.

The latest official figures show that in October the number of totally unemployed in the United States was 1,616,000. This is only the totally unemployed. If one takes into account the "partially" employed, that is, people with some earnings (even a few hours per week) then the figure will rise to between 7 and 12 and even more million persons. According to official American data the number of totally unemployed and persons employed from one hour to 29 hours per week, as well as those registered as employed but not actually working, is 12,000,000 persons.

This is how matters stand with regard to unemployment in the United States. The position of the farmers is no better. This is evident from the fact that farmers' incomes, which amounted to 15 billion dollars in 1951, are much lower than farmers' incomes were in 1946-1949 when they exceeded 19.5 billion dollars, while the purchasing power of the dollar was, as everyone knows, much higher than it is now.

It is known that the United States ruling circles were very hopeful about 1950, particularly about the economic mobilization, but everything turned out contrary to the forecasts of the prophets. The "prosperity" which the United States Government foretold
proved, in the final count, to be nothing but an actual worsening of the conditions of the American people. Now, at the beginning of 1952, government officials in the United States are again making promises and assurances of an improvement in the economic situation in the Atlantic camp countries, pointing out — and this is precisely the conclusion upon which I shall now touch in this part of the question — that the expansion of arms production will bring economic prosperity. They vociferate assurances that an increase in arms production will improve the economic situation; they conduct propaganda under the official slogan "prosperity through rearmament."

This fallacious principle underlies the entire policy, not only the economic but also the general, and not only the general but also the foreign policy — which is what interests us most at present — of the Atlantic bloc countries, headed by the United States.

The fact that the proportions which the growth of military production is now assuming really preclude the prosperity of the country and the people can also be seen from the fact that in order to fully meet the requirements of the war industry for nickel, for example, civilian use of nickel has been virtually prohibited in 1952. The same can also be seen from the fact that after February all shipments of machine tools to firms not engaged in so-called "defense" will be forbidden.

Subordinating the entire economic life to a policy resting on the "situation of strength" principle, they are undermining the very foundations of civilian economy, the very possibility of economic prosperity in the country, if the prosperity of the country is not confused with the prosperity of monopolies which are battenning on war orders for the glory of the "situation of strength."

It is not fortuitous that in his report Wilson had to warn — I am quoting the corresponding part of this report — that the "inflationary outlook is still dominated by the continuing rise in defense expenditures." At the same time Wilson demanded a further increase in taxes.

Now these facts alone show not only that the armaments drive
can in no way promote prosperity, but that, on the contrary, countries carrying out this armaments drive are being more and more prostrated by economic difficulties, tremendous shortages in the everyday needs of the population of the respective countries, impoverishment, etc., with all the attendant consequences.

It should, of course, be perfectly clear that the prosperity of the population, the prosperity of a country, requires not an armaments drive program but a decisive rejection of the armaments drive program.

I shall say more about this later.

Acknowledging the curtailment of the civilian industries caused by the war program, Wilson pointed out that taxes in the United States have risen to grim proportions; they are nevertheless, he said, still insufficient to pay the bill for rearmament. Wilson denied that this will mean putting into effect the formula "guns instead of butter," but he admitted that this will be a case of, as he puts it, "guns with less butter" or "guns and margarine."

Is it possible, under such conditions, to say that a war program, an expansion of war production, promotes the prosperity of a country? It is possible, but only on condition that you consider margarine preferable to butter, and guns preferable even to margarine; in other words, only by keeping in mind that guns deprive the population not only of butter but even of margarine.

Accordingly, of course, the conclusion may be drawn on how to answer the question as to whether the war program leads to prosperity, or whether the war program, on the contrary, leads to impoverishment, to a deterioration of the economic situation of the country, with all the attendant consequences.

Wilson warns that when plants (he means new plants) are built and equipped and the labor is hired for them, guns will take first place, while the civilian branches of the economy will receive only the "leftovers" from the defense program.

We can see and we know what leftovers these may be if the defense program is the foundation of a country's entire economic policy. There will be no leftovers, or very, very few of them.

What does Mr. Wilson's statement mean, translated into the
language of the war program — and I refer to him because, it must be remembered, he is the Director of the Office of so-called "Defense" Mobilization, that is, essentially speaking, the director of the country's entire economic life, insofar as it is possible for a person to be who is answerable to the government, is entirely responsible to it and to the country for the branch of work entrusted to him — therefore what does Mr. Wilson's statement mean translated into the language of the war program? This is clear from Truman's message which we had the opportunity of studying a few days ago. This message indicates three aims: first, a broad and extremely rapid growth of armed forces and military aid to United States' allies; second, the quickest possible expansion of American war industry; and third, an increase in the productive capacity of the steel, aluminum, power, and other industries on which war production depends.

It is already clear from the above remarks of the President of the United States, indicating the three aims contained in the program outlined by Wilson, that the entire economy of the United States has been switched to war tracks, in other words, to the tracks of preparing another war.

That is why it is so timely to mention all this while we are discussing the question of measures which should be taken against this threat, against the threat of another war.

What sums does America expect to spend for the achievement of the three aims mentioned by the President of the United States? The following measures have been effected for achieving the aims outlined by the President of the United States: first, Congress appropriated 91.6 billion dollars — a record-breaking sum for peacetime — for the accomplishment of this program, of which 77.25 billion dollars are intended directly and specifically for military purposes.

These more than 77 billion dollars include almost 57 billion dollars for the requirements of the Defense Department for the current fiscal year which ends on June 30, 1952; more than 7 billion dollars for the so-called "mutual security" program; and more than 4 billion dollars for the construction of war bases in the
United States and abroad. As for the 7 billion dollars, this is the sum which includes the 100,000,000 dollars appropriated by the Act of October 10, 1951, for subversive, diversionary and terrorist activities of the United States against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

This shows the close connection between the question of the United States war program in general and the question of eliminating the threat of a new world war and strengthening friendly relations and peace among nations. For if 7 billion dollars are appropriated for the so-called "mutual security program," and this program includes 100,000,000 dollars for subversive activities against a number of countries, then how can one talk of friendship? Indeed, how, under such circumstances, can one say, as Mr. Lloyd said, that they are stretching out a hand to us and expect us to shake it? You are not "stretching out a hand" to us, as you say, gentlemen of the Atlantic bloc; it would be more correct to say not a hand, but arms in hand; moreover, in the other hand you simultaneously hold 100,000,000 dollars and stretch these dollars out to renegades whom you are organizing and inciting to fight against us, against the Soviet people!

We have already presented considerable proof of such a policy on the part of the Anglo-American bloc, which leaves no doubt whatever as to the insincerity and hypocrisy of the statements made by the representatives of this bloc about their striving for cooperation with the USSR, their alleged readiness to settle unsettled issues, "an extended hand," and so on, and so forth. All these statements are in sharp contrast to the real policy of this bloc and of the Governments of the United States, Britain and France, which play the leading part in this bloc.

I would like to tell Mr. Lloyd that we are already tired of all these perorations, this demagogy of their "heroes," who have become entangled in their own contradictions, who are outdoing themselves in the attempt to deceive public opinion. Each day brings us new facts that expose the aggressive aims of the American plans, founded on the maniacal idea of world domination which the American claimants to this domination do not want
to give up, notwithstanding the bitter lessons already received in this sphere by their predecessors, who also laid claim to world domination.

I do not see, however, any necessity at present for citing new facts in addition to the facts repeatedly presented which prove the aggressive substance of American foreign policy. I shall limit myself to characterizing the measures directed toward the above aim, among which an important place is held by the measures taken by the United States Government, on the one hand, to increase its own armed forces and, on the other hand, to increase the armed forces of its allies, as well as to knock together military blocs and to form armed forces of these blocs, whole armies, as, for example, the so-called "European Army."

As for the United States, its armed forces have grown considerably as a result of compulsory military service and mobilization of reserve units. According to the admission of Truman made in the message to Congress in April 1951, during the preceding 10 months the United States had more than doubled the numerical strength of its armed forces and in the next fiscal year intends to increase it further—to 3,500,000 men, not counting the 2,000,000 men in various military reserve formations and in the national guard units. Thus the Army of the United States, at this moment, already exceeds 5,000,000 men.

As can be seen from Truman's message to Congress this January, the increase in the armed forces of the United States to 3,500,000 men was effected long before the originally scheduled date. This is evidence of the acceleration of the expansion of the American army compared with the plans of last year. This fact alone speaks volumes.

Simultaneously, as can be seen from the figures of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President of the United States, the military expenditures of the United States likewise increased from the annual level of 28.3 billion dollars in 1950 to the annual level of 34.8 billion dollars during the second quarter of 1951 and to the level of 40.7 billion dollars during the third quarter. By the end of 1951 they had risen to the annual level of about 50
billion dollars, according to a report of the Associated Press. These include expenditures for armed forces, military aid to allies, work connected with atomic weapons and for stockpiling strategic raw materials. Huge sums are being spent on preparations for the most effective annihilation of millions of peaceful men and women who do not want war, do not strive for world domination, do not strive for the acquisition of colonies, who strive only to be left alone, so that they may lead their own lives, engage in peaceful labor and make progress in building their economy and their peaceful, cultured, happy life. At the same time these facts show what the policy that gears a peaceful economy to war is like.

It is known that the notorious doctrine of the "situation of strength" underlies the present course of United States foreign policy. Some delegates spoke here in praiseworthy terms of this doctrine, even, I would say, with enthusiasm. However, the experience of its application has already revealed its utter bankruptcy, the utter bankruptcy of this principle of the "situation of strength" upon which this doctrine relies.

What proof have we?

Allow me again to turn to facts. In the economic sphere matters ended in a crash, in failure, as a result of the application of the "Marshall plan," which was one of the forms for creating or reinforcing such a "situation of strength," the "Marshall plan" upon which such hopes were placed precisely in this sphere. I say "ended" because, as is known, on the night of December 31, the term of operation of the "Marshall plan" ended, and since that moment another measure known as the "mutual security agency" has come into force.

Everyone knows that the "Marshall plan" has not improved the position of the countries which accepted this plan and followed this path, becoming real "Marshallized" countries. The "Marshall plan" further worsened and aggravated the economic situation in these countries. One of the most striking signs of this at present is the crisis now experienced by the French, Belgian and other governments. In France this crisis was manifested in Pleven's government being refused the vote of confidence. The fall of
Pleven's cabinet, and this is clear to all, was, first and foremost, a result of the precarious economic position of France, which is a direct consequence of the negative influence of the "Marshall plan."

I consider it possible to touch on this question only in relation to foreign political events, in connection with the notorious principle of the "situation of strength" that they thought to bolster up with the "Marshall plan," which, however, failed. Not only the "Marshall plan" but also the principle of the "situation of strength" and the entire policy based on this principle is failing, and must inevitably end in utter failure. The "Marshall plan" has benefited only small privileged groups in the Marshallized countries and no one else. Wherever the "Marshall plan" was applied, it caused only damage to the population, economy and the entire country. And the consequences of the damage are gravely affecting these countries. The "Marshall plan," however, was merely an expression of the general trend of the United States foreign policy, of which we have already spoken.

In 1951 the situation in foreign policy proved to be no better than in the economic sphere, and the prospects for 1952 are not shaping up any better either.

In this connection I must touch upon the speech delivered by Mr. Acheson at a dinner on New Year's Eve at the Waldorf-Astoria in which the United States Secretary of State presented the situation in the so-called "North Atlantic area" in rose-colored lights, speaking of progress and increased economic prosperity in this area. All kinds of allegories are now in vogue. Last time I recalled the allegory used by Mr. Churchill with regard to Britain when he likened it to a train running downhill at a speed of 60 miles an hour. This time it was Mr. Acheson who used an allegory in his speech. This allegory is also worthy of attention. When he spoke of the situation in the so-called "North Atlantic area" he said: "Life in every form has cracked the shell that holds it, and is pushing up through the half-frozen earth . . . Over all hangs the threat of a late frost." So, I believe, it is here, i.e., in the so-called "North Atlantic area."
If we try to decipher the meaning of this allegory used by Mr. Acheson, it turns out, according to his admission, that in the “North Atlantic area” they are already “half-frozen” or “freezing.” On the other hand it turns out that the “threat of late frosts” overhangs this area. It turns out that matters are not so satisfactory if some shoots breaking through half-frozen soil are still threatened by frosts.

It is clear that this allegory represents a warning in a cautious form against any optimism about “prosperity,” “well-being” and other similarly pleasant words with which American politicians try to cover up the really unsatisfactory state of affairs in the economic and political situation of the so-called “North Atlantic area,” in other words, of the Atlantic bloc countries.

Speaking of the situation in Europe, having in mind the Western part of Europe, Mr. Acheson expressed satisfaction with the state of the so-called “defense” of Europe. But at the same time, while speaking of Europe, he did not conceal the fact that the grave economic and financial problems facing Europe loom as — here are Mr. Acheson’s own words — a “dark shadow . . . They represent a difficulty and a danger, for our European friends and for us.”

What have we here? It means that in Europe also matters are none too satisfactory because there are economic problems which loom as a “dark shadow.” If economic and financial problems stand as dark shadows over Europe, this means that matters are not at all satisfactory. We already know from Mr. Churchill’s speech that the financial situation in Britain is such that she is on the threshold of bankruptcy. This is what Mr. Churchill said.

What is the main task of the United States in Europe, in the opinion of United States Secretary of State Acheson? He replies to this question with two words: “arming Europe.” This means again: to produce as great an amount of arms as possible, to build up as large an armed force as possible, to create this notorious “situation of strength,” to pile up more and more armaments — this is what is needed for the United States and the entire world to attain “prosperity” and “well-being,” and in the meantime it must be stated that the situation in the United States and the
other countries within its sphere of influence is growing worse and worse; in the meantime there are forced admissions: "we are freezing," "half-frozen," "dark shadow," "train running toward an abyss," and so on, and so forth.

That is why the United States pays such attention to the "Schuman plan," the so-called European coal and steel pool, and the "Pleven plan," the European army and participation of the West German regular army in it. But essentially speaking, all these "dark shadows" and "grave economic and financial difficulties" are organically bound up with the "Schuman plan" and the "Pleven plan," with the rearmament of Western Germany and a great many analogous questions; moreover, these grave economic and financial difficulties are a direct consequence of all these plans.

Speaking of the Near and Middle East, Acheson found two countries which he declared "bright spots in the area" — these are Greece and Turkey. But aside from Turkey and Greece there are a number of other countries in this area of which Mr. Acheson did not take note. This is a large area with a great many countries which has for many years been attracting the attention of American and British monopolies. This area, according to Mr. Acheson's admission, is of tremendous importance for the United States because of its people, its resources, its strategic position and its important communications. It is known that precisely these circumstances prompted the attempts to subordinate these countries to Anglo-American influence, to turn these countries into a military base and bridgehead for carrying out aggressive plans with the help of that Middle Eastern Command which the United States, Britain, France and Turkey are trying to force upon these countries, with the help of the military measures which the governments of the above countries impose on the countries of the Near and Middle East with the demand that they be implemented, despite the protests of these countries against such measures. Mr. Acheson took note only of Greece and Turkey, thereby placing Greece and Turkey in a somewhat embarrassing position. Of course this is very pleasant for the representatives of Greece and Turkey present here, whom Mr. Acheson praised, whom he pat-
ronizingly slapped on the back, so to speak. In the other countries of the Near and Middle East Acheson sees nothing bright for the United States. What does this mean — that matters in the other countries of the Near and Middle East are not "bright"? What is it that disturbs Acheson and the Government of the United States? The failure of the American plan of the so-called Middle East military command. I shall limit myself to what has been said, inasmuch as we have already spoken in detail about this "plan" here. I shall only recall that speaking of the prospects for this area, Acheson said that in 1952 developments in the Near and Middle East will demand of the United States measures for "still further resources of leadership" and still greater willingness of the United States "to assume increasing responsibilities in this area."

We know what it means when the United States of America recalls its responsibility for one or another area of the world. This means no more and no less than this: since the entire policy of the United States is based on the "situation of strength," the United States, by assuming so-called "responsibility," covers up its striving to place such and such an area under its control, up to the point of occupying the area with its own armed forces and those of its allies. Otherwise how can you bear so-called "responsibility" with bare hands? This United States talk about "responsibility" is a prelude to military occupation! For the areas of the Near and Middle East this part of Acheson's speech is nothing but a reminder that the United States, bearing responsibility for these areas — incidentally it is not known who placed such a responsibility upon the United States — intends to take measures in order to be able to bear this so-called "responsibility."

Such "responsibility" of the United States for the Far Eastern area, as we know, caused the military events in Korea. The aggressive forces of the United States, we know, try to cover up with such "responsibility" their aggressive policy toward the People's Republic of China, on the one hand, and their patronage of the bankrupt Chiang Kai-shek brigands driven from China by the Chinese people, on the other hand.

The Far East is the third area of the world mentioned in this
speech by Acheson in defining the further trend of American foreign policy. In speaking of the war in Korea, imposed by the American interventionists on the Korean people, Acheson said: "The year's transformation in Korea has been great." The barbarous destruction of Korean towns and villages, mass murder of people, almost total annihilation of Korea's population in the area of hostilities and in the districts far from the front line on the territory of North Korea — this, it turns out, is the "great transformation," and the year when all this was taking place is described as the time when the "transformation in Korea has been great." Is it possible to imagine a greater travesty on words than in this instance?

Acheson at the same time cited the events in Korea as proof of the efficacy of "collective security." He described as "superb" the work of the American representatives in Panmunjom, which in reality, as is clear to the entire world, boils down to prolonging the armistice negotiations as long as possible, invariably complicating these negotiations by all kinds of unjust, groundless, arbitrary demands, whose presentation can be explained only by unwillingness to reach any kind of satisfactory settlement of the problems facing the negotiations commission in Korea and unwillingness to attain a successful consummation of the negotiations and a cessation of hostilities.

It is not surprising that in his New Year's speech Mr. Acheson had to admit that, as he said, "We do not yet know whether or when we shall have an end to the fighting in Korea." But this depends entirely upon the Government of the United States.

What has been said is sufficient to make us realize what the current year holds in store for the world — Europe, the Near and Middle East, the Far East and the United States itself — if the United States continues to follow the same path, the path of preparing and carrying out its aggressive plans for the sake of the narrow, selfish interests of the American monopolists.

The aggressive forces of these countries intend, however, to continue the present course of their foreign policy. They intend to adhere to this course despite the ever more resolute warnings
sounded from different sides in the United States and other Atlantic bloc countries. More and more political and civic leaders and representatives of business circles in the United States, Britain and France sound such warnings exposing the adventurist and bellicose nature of the aggressive forces in the above countries, forces whose policy leads to new dangers threatening peace and cooperation among nations.

The situation really warrants such warnings and such anxiety about the further development of events threatening peace.

Such is the international situation at present. What has been said seems enough to leave no doubt whatever of the need to take urgent measures to change this situation, eliminate the threat of another war and ensure peace and the security of nations. This is our duty, the duty of all peace-loving peoples, of all who, not in words, but in deeds, take a stand against the danger of another world war, all who fight for strengthening peace and friendship among nations.

The Soviet Union, consistently and invariably fighting for the establishment and consolidation of friendly relations with all peace-loving nations, invariably fighting for peace and against war since the first days of the Soviet State, cannot remain indifferent to the perfidious schemes of the aggressive circles of the United States, Britain, France and certain other countries which set up their Atlantic bloc, the bloc pursuing bellicose aims under the guidance of the United States, which utilizes for its own ends the financial, economic and political dependence of member countries of the Atlantic bloc upon it.

Earlier, at previous sessions, and at this session of the General Assembly, we pointed to the aggressive nature of the Atlantic bloc, which pursues aims that have nothing in common with the aims of the United Nations, a bloc founded on principles that likewise have nothing in common with the principles of the United Nations, a bloc that sets itself tasks which also obviously run counter to the tasks of the United Nations.

As early as January 1949 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in its statement on the North Atlantic pact pointed to the
specific features of this pact which leave no doubt whatever that its formation and program of activities are subordinated to carrying out the Anglo-American plans for world domination. Quite a number of events have occurred since then fully confirming the correctness of this assertion. These events have shown irrefutably that the North Atlantic pact was concluded and the Atlantic bloc formed in the interests of a narrow group of powers headed by the United States and Great Britain in order to make the policies of the governments of other countries which are submissive to or directly dependent upon them serve, in one form or another, the implementation of their aggressive aspirations.

At that time it was already perfectly evident, and subsequent events have fully confirmed this point, that the Western Union in Europe and the Inter-American grouping of states, as well as the pacts of the Mediterranean states, Scandinavian countries, the Southeast Asian countries, and other similar pacts which even then were being prepared, were closely connected with accomplishing the aims of the Atlantic bloc, which strives to realize the Anglo-American plans for establishing domination in Western Europe, in the North Atlantic area, in South America, in the Mediterranean, Asia, Africa—wherever, as it was pointed out in the above-mentioned statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the hands of American monopolies reach.

Present-day events confirm this again and again, revealing the aspirations of the Atlantic bloc and primarily those of the United States, Britain and France, for example, especially with regard to the countries of the Far, Near and Middle East.

The principles and aims of the United Nations do not require any elucidation on our part—they are clearly expressed in the Charter signed in San Francisco in June 1945. It is sufficient, however, just to compare these aims and tasks of the United Nations, as expressed in the United Nations Charter, with the activity of the Atlantic bloc—with its activity, first of all, with its plans, secret plans, and even those that have been made public—to become convinced of the complete incompatibility of participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and membership in the United Nations.
It is quite clear that membership in the United Nations is just as incompatible with the establishment of military, naval and air bases on foreign territories by certain states, the United States of America in the first place.

It should be absolutely indisputable that the foreign policy of the Atlantic bloc countries, the United States in the first place, bound up with the frenzied armaments drive and the stockpiling of atom bombs, that weapon of aggression, that bestial weapon of mass destruction of people, fully contradicts such aims of the United Nations as the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, and international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian nature.

It should be absolutely indisputable that as long as the war imposed on the Korean people rages in Korea any measures against the threat of another world war are impossible. It should be clear that the earliest cessation of hostilities in Korea is one of the major requisites for eliminating such a danger, as well as one of the major requisites for strengthening peace and the security of nations.

It is ridiculous and cynical to speak of one's striving to strengthen friendship among nations and to strengthen peace while doing nothing, while not wishing to lift a finger to help in the earliest possible completion of the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. We propose to render assistance in this important matter; the United States and the entire Atlantic bloc reject this and at the same time talk at length about peace and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question! Incidentally, now they are even ceasing their perorations on this subject, laying stress on the military aspect of the matter, on the point that the war itself must settle the issue! They pretend that they do not understand such a simple thing—do not understand that to eliminate the threat of another war it is necessary to put an end to the policy of conquest the United States is pursuing toward Korea, which has already been turned into an arena of war. In this war the American aggressors are pursuing aims that have nothing in common with the program
they announced for the unification and rehabilitation of Korea, the establishment of an independent Korean state.

We remember that as early as 1947 a special mission headed by General Wedemeyer, former commander of the American forces in China, visited Korea and submitted to President Truman recommendations whose substance was the proposal to convert Korea into a buffer state. This general, even at that time, insisted that the United States achieve the "permanent military neutralization of Korea" by occupying it. Wedemeyer asserted that it is "to United States strategic interests ... to ensure the permanent military neutralization of Korea."

The United States imperialist thesis with regard to Korea, advanced by Wedemeyer in 1947, was repeated the other day in an article by Walter Lippmann, the well-known American political columnist, who wrote in the New York Herald Tribune on December 31, 1951, only a few days ago, that what the Americans want in Korea "is not only the narrow zone between the two armies in the field but the recognition of the whole Korean peninsula as a buffer between the Great Powers."

It would be interesting to know what circles inspired this article of Lippmann's. Whose opinion does this bellicose columnist express in proposing to convert the entire Korean peninsula into a buffer under the chieftainship of the United States of America, recalling the thesis of the former commander of the American forces in China, General Wedemeyer, and advancing it as a principal tenet of the position of the United States on the "regulation" of the Korean question. The article by Lippmann, that mouthpiece of the American aggressive circles, is not accidental. It is evidently calculated to prepare American public opinion for fresh exertion on the other side in the Panmunjom negotiations, to further fan the chauvinist, militarist flame of the American reactionaries.

Such articles naturally can only be appraised as a desire to utilize the press for undermining the negotiations in Korea, as propaganda for the continuation of the war in Korea, as incitement of the American generals to obstinacy and inflexibility. This is what
really hampers all the attempts to bring the negotiations for the cessation of hostilities in Korea to a successful conclusion!

Referring to the Korean question, the delegates, mainly those of the United States and Britain, tried to assert here that there is some progress, though slow, as they said, in the Panmunjom negotiations for the cessation of hostilities. In reality these negotiations have made no progress at all. More than six months have elapsed since these negotiations were started on the initiative of the Soviet Union. The representatives of the command of the Korean People's Army and of the Chinese volunteers made a number of important proposals, which, if adopted, would have ensured a cease-fire and the establishment of peace in Korea. These proposals provided, as a first step toward terminating the bloodshed and destruction in Korea, that the commands of the belligerents issue cease-fire orders so that the land, naval and air forces of each side would discontinue bombing, blockade and reconnoitering activities against the other side. It was proposed that the areas evacuated by both sides be proclaimed a demilitarized zone in which neither side should maintain armed forces or conduct hostilities. Finally, to ensure the termination of the war in Korea and peaceful settlement of the Korean question, all foreign troops were to be withdrawn from Korea within the shortest possible time.

This proposal encountered the obstinate resistance of the American command. We all remember that the Soviet statement which initiated the negotiations in Kaesong said that "as a first step discussions should be started between the belligerents for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th Parallel." The American representatives, however, began the negotiations with objections to the adoption of the 38th Parallel as a line of demarcation for the establishment of an armistice, which was an obvious deviation from the basis on which the negotiations were begun. Proposing that the line of demarcation be established considerably north of the 38th Parallel and in a number of places even north of the front line held by the troops of the Korean People's Army, the American command
thus tried to take away from North Korea a large part of its territory, more than 13,000 square kilometers [5,000 square miles].

As a means of exerting pressure, the American command intensified the barbarous bombing of North Korean territory, its towns and inhabited localities having no military objectives, and initiated a whole series of provocations in the neutral zone of Kaesong, which was subjected to continuous fire from the air and raids by armed detachments of the South Korean troops subordinate to the American command.

The proposal for an immediate cease-fire has been consistently rejected by the American command. It is pointed out, by the American press too, that the part of North Korean territory of interest to the Americans is the area rich in tungsten deposits which are being intensively exploited by the American monopolists. It is this which, to a considerable degree, prevents the reaching of an agreement on an armistice in Korea. I do not know how true it is, but the American press reported that a firm which numbers the well-known John Foster Dulles among its chief shareholders is especially active in the area on which the United States particularly insists.

It is this latter circumstance—tungsten—that hampers to a considerable degree the achievement of agreement on an armistice in Korea. And this is not surprising, for in one case tungsten hinders the achievement of agreement on an armistice in Korea, in other cases oil creates a situation which makes relations in Iran increasingly tense.

In the Panmunjom negotiations, as is known, a number of important questions still remain unsettled. The negotiations have come to a deadlock on the question of the exchange of war prisoners because the American command submitted a demand, absolutely unreasonable and contradicting the elementary principles of international law, on the exchange of war prisoners on a one-to-one basis, while the Korean-Chinese side justly, and in accord with the principles of international law, proposes to carry through the exchange of war prisoners on an all-for-all basis.

Nor has agreement been reached on the question of the con-
struction of airfields by the Korean-Chinese side. On this point too the American command tries to impose unjust conditions on the Korean-Chinese side. The American command insists, as is known, that the Korean-Chinese side should neither build nor repair airfields and airfield facilities on its territory, except a limited number of airfields which will be allotted on the territory of North Korea for civilian use exclusively. The American command demands that the airfields which are being destroyed by the bombings of American aircraft should not be repaired. The bombing of Korean territory by the American command continues. How is it possible then to prohibit the repair of airfields which are being destroyed by the Americans and which are needed for the struggle against these bombings?

On the one hand, proposals to terminate hostilities are rejected, and on the other hand, it is said: "You dare not, you must not repair what we are destroying" (with regard to airfields).

These are absolutely preposterous demands; this is an absolutely wild formulation of the question.

Nor has agreement been reached on the question of convening a conference of responsible representatives of both sides to solve the question of the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea and questions bearing on the unification of Korea.

It is no wonder that in this too we have encountered the opposition of representatives of the American, British and certain other delegations to the question of Korea's unification being examined by the committee. It is known that the question of the reconstruction of Korea has been removed, on this pretext, sine die, according to the expression found for this occasion by Mr. El-Khoury, who thus unexpectedly, so to speak, rendered a service to these delegates. Is it surprising then that in Korea no agreement can be reached on elementary, I would say, humanitarian questions, when here the most humanitarian proposal—to help terminate the hostilities, to facilitate this—is met at dagger's point?

This proves once again how unjust was the removal of the question of Korea's independence from discussion by our committee and how right we were in insisting that if we were actually
to strive for peace then we could not, of course, evade the most sacred and most important duty of our organization—to take all measures to help terminate the hostilities in Korea. To extinguish the fire in Korea means to prevent the danger of a new hotbed of war appearing elsewhere.

But you gentlemen—members of the Atlantic bloc—have refused to do that. You have been so frightened by such a proposal that you have succeeded in getting excluded from the draft resolution of the Soviet Union, which was today put to the vote in the General Assembly, the instruction to the effect that when the special meeting of the Security Council convenes, it should first of all examine the question of facilitating the successful conclusion of the negotiations for terminating hostilities in Korea.

I still cannot understand the logic by which you are guided, when, on the one hand, you avow your aspirations for peace, your alleged hatred of war, and, on the other hand, you so lightly, I would even say recklessly, sweep aside the genuinely humanitarian, genuinely humane proposal to recommend that the Security Council help both sides in Korea to agree on the swiftest termination of hostilities on the basis of the negotiations now in progress there.

Availing myself of the opportunity, I must say that we leave the point on Korea in our proposal and consider that it is our duty once again to point out that it is really necessary to heed the voice, not only of the Soviet Union, not only the voice of our delegation, representing our great state, our great people, but also the voice of those 596,000,000 people who have signed the latest Appeal of the World Peace Council and who demand what we are defending here with such persistence, energy and conviction in the complete justice of our cause. Indeed, the main task at present is to extinguish the conflagration of war in Korea.

We are told: "This is your propaganda, these are your words, show us deeds." So, we want to show you deeds. We urge you to embark with us on a path which can really lead to the termination of war. But you reject this.

You say demagogically: "Say one word and the Koreans will terminate the war." But you yourself understand that this is
absolutely untrue. We can say to you with much better ground: “Let Ridgway say one word, simply issue an order to the soldiers under his command, and the war will end.”

And so we propose under our item 6 of today’s agenda—On Measures Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace and Friendship among Nations—discuss this question, too, once more!

We may be told: “Only the day before yesterday we rejected the proposal to discuss this question here. Why are you imposing it on us again?”

Yes, we are imposing it on you, and for a very simple reason, one that you should know. We are doing this because we want peace, we are doing this to prevent the outbreak of a new world war, we are doing this, lastly, because we know that people pursuing peace must try to extinguish every conflagration of war, in whatever part of the world it may have begun, and not kindle and fan the flames.

That is why we actually insist that the committee return to the discussion of this question, taking advantage of the fact that it is the second point of the draft resolution that we are submitting here for the committee’s consideration.

If we are mistaken in our criticism of your intentions and aspirations, which we characterize as warlike and aggressive, then prove this in deeds—and I will not be ashamed to retract our assertions. Show in deeds that you do not want the continuation of the war in Korea, that you are really stretching out a hand to us, as you said, but an honest hand, a hand of peace and friendship, and not of aggression and war. We know that when a hand holding a weapon is stretched out, the weapon must not be dropped from one’s own hands.

Can’t you understand, gentlemen, that without quickly settling the problem of the war in Korea it is useless to talk about your “collective measures” program and your program for armaments reduction, for a balanced reduction of armaments? It is useless because these programs will merely lie around in your archives like one of your decisions, and not only the decision, but the
very committee which you formed under the name "Interim Committee." You called it the "little assembly," and it was to have acted as some sort of rescue squad for the inactive Security Council. Where, alas, is this Interim Committee? Where is it?

For two years it has been doing nothing. Nothing is heard about it. No one even remembers it. What a "little assembly"! It is an assembly of the dead! And not a little assembly, but a big assembly of the little dead. That is what your Interim Committee is! Yet you have a resolution on this question. You were jubilant then. You even invited us to join this committee, you even reserved a seat for us in the committee in the hope, as you said then, that we would later understand the importance of this committee and take part in it. Just as Mr. Cohen, for example, spoke in the Assembly today, saying that they hoped that the Soviet Union would finally understand what a blessing the so-called "collective measures" are and would accept them! Vain expectations! We did not join and will not join the Interim Committee because it is dead, it smells of death, it smells of corpses. This committee of yours is decaying. Let it decay. No one needs it.

Yet there is a resolution on this question, a resolution in which you placed great hopes.

Permit me to express our profound conviction—not from the desire to teach you, far be it from us to hope for that—but merely to express our deep conviction that your resolutions which you have already adopted at this session on the so-called reduction of armaments, on so-called "collective measures"—that these are stillborn. What we propose, however, is a living undertaking. This undertaking—promotion of the quickest possible cessation of hostilities in Korea—is a living undertaking and it is our duty to assist in it if we do not want to become nothing but an instrument, a weapon of aggressive policy of some group of states.

Without settling the Korean problem it is difficult to expect a relaxation of international tension. Therefore, the solution of the Korean problem is an imperative necessity, and to promote the successful conclusion of negotiations for the cessation of hostili-
ties in Korea is the primary and most important duty of the United Nations.

* * *

We have already spoken of how the international situation is affected by the armaments drive and by the expansion and organization of new land, air and naval bases by the Atlantic bloc countries, primarily by the United States of America.

It is no secret that there are United States air and naval bases in existence and under construction in Western and Southern Europe, North Africa, in Asia Minor, in 19 countries in all. These countries are: Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, West Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium, Britain, France, Spain, Italy, French Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, the island of Malta, Greece, the island of Cyprus, Turkey, and Egypt.

To this should be added American bases in the Far East and in Asia, specifically in Japan, Korea, on Taiwan and in a number of other places.

Under law No. 155 of September 28, 1951, more than 2,167,000,000 dollars have been appropriated for the construction of military bases outside of the United States. As the United Press reported on November 1, 1951, the larger part of all the appropriations are for the creation of new and the expansion of existing military bases all over the world, including about 1 billion dollars for the creation of a "ring of secret airfields within easy range of Soviet Russia."

The construction of military bases on the territory of foreign states is also financed by funds allocated for military, technical and economic so-called "aid." These funds total 7,329,000,000 dollars.

As head of a department of the United States Defense Department O'Hara explained, "When bases are intended for American armed forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, they are included in the infrastructure program." "Infrastructure," in the new jargon of the Atlantic bloc leaders, means a system of bases in Western Europe being created by the combined efforts of all the members of this bloc.

Thus, under the guise of "aid" to other countries the United
States is building and expanding its own bases. This was openly stated by Brigadier General Olmstead, head of the United States Defense Department's Office of Military Assistance, at a meeting of the subcommittee on September 27, when he pointed out that the United States will contribute its share to the construction of "infrastructure" in the form of military and economic aid to other countries.

The United States has planned the expenditure of about 500,000,000 dollars for building bases in Europe in 1952. This includes bases in Turkey, France and French Morocco.

In addition, construction of bases financed by the occupied countries in payment of occupation expenses is planned. Speaking in Congress on October 10, Representative Scrivner said with reference to bases, "The Japanese were paying as a part of occupation costs a part of the cost of maintaining, constructing, and operating these installations." (See Congressional Record of October 10, 1951.)

In 1951 the construction of bases under the program of the so-called Western Union had already swallowed up about 100,000,000 dollars. Special mention should be made of the role assigned under this plan to England and the British Isles. According to press reports, by agreement between Britain and the United States, the British Isles are being converted into a huge aircraft carrier for jet bombers capable of flying in the stratosphere, which, in case of war could deliver atom bombs to the very heart of the Soviet Union. In this United Press report the word "deliver" is meant to cover up the brazen admission of the intention to drop these bombs on the appointed place.

Today there are about 20,000 American air force officers and men in Britain manning the six bomber and fighter bases that are now functioning. At present four new bases are under construction, and arrangements are being made for the transfer of British air force bases to the United States.

It is known that only recently the British Prime Minister declared that the most noteworthy step taken by the Labour Government with the support of the Conservatives was the establish-
ment of a huge and steadily growing air force base in eastern England intended for using atomic weapons against the Soviet Union. The object of Churchill's allegation about the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union was simply intended to cover up the real purposes of the establishment of such bases. The construction of war facilities in Japan is in full swing, and it is being effected at the expense of the Japanese Government and the Japanese building companies working under the supervision of American soldiers. Port Sasebo has already been converted into a strong naval base, which is a center of concentration and supply of American troops in Korea. Ships of the United States Seventh Fleet and most American and foreign ships operating in Korean waters are at present based in Sasebo. The American fleet is also making full use of the large Yokosuka naval base in Japan. Kobe is also being utilized for military purposes, the Americans in particular are using its warehouses for storing military cargoes intended for shipment to Korea. Extensive construction of military facilities is under way in the Japanese ports of Niigata, Pushiki, Nanao, Uruga and Maisura. American officers and army engineers are in charge of all the work.

According to press reports, the so-called "administrative agreement" includes a special section called "general rights" containing secret articles of the American-Japanese "security pact," signed at the beginning of September in San Francisco. These general rights leave no remnant even of such limited independence and sovereignty as Japan hitherto enjoyed. On the other hand they provide opportunities for, and fully ensure, the success of the construction of American military bases in Japan and the utilization of Japanese ships and transport in general at the absolutely uncontrolled discretion of the American military authorities.

We cannot overlook these facts, for all this is being done next door to the Soviet Union, next door to our friends in the Far East. And we cannot help being interested in this. It is not we who are building these bases, it is the Americans, together with the Japanese, who are building them, thus converting Japan into a bridgehead or, as the British Prime Minister said of England, an "aircraft carrier."
This is incompatible with the proposals for armaments reduction. Nothing is said there about bases, however. We now suggest that something be said about war bases; we raise again, with full determination, the question of the necessity of really reducing armaments and armed forces and eliminating the war bases on foreign territories; without this, of course, there can be no possibility at all of strengthening peace and eliminating the threat of war.

The United States does not miss a single opportunity for utilizing even the smallest of states for the purposes of preparing for war, of preparing an attack against other countries. Even the Dominican Republic proved a convenient partner for the United States, which signed a special agreement with it providing that a section of the proving grounds of the American air force stationed in Florida be located on the territory of this republic for testing guided missiles.

Denmark found itself in the same position. In northwestern Greenland, near the town of Thule, far beyond the Arctic Circle, the United States of America has built an air base which the Washington Post says will be "a new . . . powerful deterrent to communist aggression in Europe." This should be understood as meaning that the base in Greenland will serve as a springboard for an atomic attack against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

The Washington Post revealed this in its issue of October 13, 1951, in which it says outright that the air base built secretly by the Americans in northwestern Greenland was established "from which atomic bombing attacks could be launched against any major target in Russia . . .".

It is impossible to be more brazenly outspoken, it would seem!

These facts are convincing testimony to the feverish war preparations of the Atlantic bloc countries headed by the United States. These facts show that the scope of war preparations is growing larger every day and is even more severely straining international relations, taking no account of how this will affect the welfare of the population of the countries which have been and are being drawn into the orbit of this aggressive policy. Responsibility for this, of course, lies with those who are causing this strain by their
frenzied armaments drive, by continually organizing new bases and openly expanding the already existing naval and air bases, proclaiming their purpose with brazen outspokenness—the purpose of preparing an attack on the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies.

To this aggressive policy the Soviet Union opposes its policy of peace.

Along with reducing the armaments and armed forces of the five Great Powers by one-third within a period of one year from the day of the adoption of the decision in this matter, all states should present full official information on the state of their military bases on foreign territories, as well as information on the state of their armaments and armed forces, including information on atomic weapons. These are two important measures, the implementation of which would undoubtedly lessen international tension and help to eliminate the threat of a new world war and strengthen peace and friendship among nations.

As for the one-third reduction of the armaments and armed forces by the five permanent members of the Security Council, objections have already been raised with regard to this which boil down to the assertion that these measures can contribute nothing toward lessening international tension, for, if they are implemented, the existing proportion between the armed forces of the various states will remain the same. Moreover, they also urged that such a reduction would still leave the USSR in a privileged position, as it would retain its military superiority over the other countries.

We have already pointed out that such objections are beneath all criticism, primarily because the assertion concerning the USSR’s military superiority itself has no foundation at all. Moreover, it may be affirmed, as we have already pointed out, that the United States and other Atlantic bloc countries have larger armed forces than the Soviet Union. The armed forces of the United States, Britain and France are already several times as large as they were before the Second World War, in 1939, and more than twice as large as the Soviet Union’s armed forces.
It is known that at the appropriate time 33 service age groups were demobilized in the Soviet Union. This in itself is sufficiently convincing proof for all persons who understand anything about mobilization matters that a real reduction of armed forces, as compared with wartime, has been effected in the Soviet Union.

At the same time it is common knowledge that during the course of 1951 the United States armed forces were increased by more than 1,000,000 persons, as confirmed by United States President Truman in his message to Congress on January 9, 1952.

Rejecting our proposal for a one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments of the five permanent members of the Security Council, they do not want to take into account that the very fact of such a reduction, in contrast to the facts of the armaments drive and the steadily growing armed forces, must inevitably have tremendous moral and political influence on the nature of international relations, strengthening trust and eliminating mistrust and suspicion.

As for the alleged military inequality and necessity of establishing a so-called "balance of armed forces" to eliminate the dangerous state arising from this inequality, the facts of history are sufficiently convincing proof of the untenability of such reasoning. To this it should be added that, judging by the statements of all the authoritative leaders of the Atlantic bloc countries, the size of the armed forces of the United States, Britain, France and their allies is such as to make it senseless to affirm that it is necessary to increase the armed forces and armaments to a level which will make it possible to talk on an equal footing with other states about implementing the reduction of armed forces and armaments.

In his January message to Congress the United States President asserts that combined defense has become a reality in Europe, that the "free nations," as he puts it, "have created a real fighting force" and that "this force ... is already a real obstacle to any attempt by hostile forces to sweep across Europe to the Atlantic." The President needed to draw attention to this in order to explain why, at the current session of the General Assem-
bly, the United States, jointly with Britain and France, ventured to raise the question of armaments reduction, although as we know, this proposal does not really provide for an armaments reduction. Truman proclaimed this American proposal a "concrete practical disarmament proposal."

Thus, if the proposals submitted by the three Western Powers, headed by the United States, actually envisage a real reduction or, as Truman says, a "concrete practical disarmament proposal," then the problem of a "balance of power" is no longer of consequence and there is, therefore, no point in the arguments advanced against the adoption of the Soviet Union's proposal for a one-third reduction of armed forces and armaments and also for the convocation of a world disarmament conference of both United Nations members and non-members for the purposes indicated in the Soviet Union's draft resolution and by the date indicated in the Soviet Union's proposal.

Then what is the matter? If a force has already been created which makes it impossible for anyone to spread through Europe to the Atlantic with hostile intentions, then that means that the time has already come for a real reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Yet they propose that we restrict ourselves to a census, representing such a census as an armaments reduction.

Right now we propose that a date be set for the convocation of a world conference within the shortest possible time and, in any case, not later than July 15, 1952 (instead of June 1, 1952).

As a very important guarantee of the elimination of the threat of a new war and the strengthening of peace we proposed earlier and propose now the conclusion of a five-power pact of peace. At the same time we propose, as I have already said, the convocation of a world conference within the shortest possible time. We are told that the date we propose is unrealistic. We are prepared to alter this date and instead of June 1, 1952, to call such a conference on July 15, 1952, believing that this will allow plenty of time to make real preparations and hold such an important conference in an organized manner. We will have at our disposal part
of January, February, March, April, May, June and half of July—six months.

As a very important guarantee of eliminating the threat of another war we continue to insist on our proposal for the conclusion of a pact of peace by the five Powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union. The objections hitherto raised to the five-power pact of peace cannot be considered valid. It has been said, for example, that there is no necessity for such a pact, as the United Nations Charter constitutes an all-inclusive pact of peace. In addition to the Charter, however, there are other agreements intended to eliminate the menace of another war and directed against the threat of any aggression. Such are the agreements between the USSR and Britain and between the USSR and France. There are, however, a number of other multilateral treaties and agreements, concluded even after the United Nations was founded. Thus, there are no arguments worthy of any attention, nor can there be, against the proposal to conclude a pact of peace.

A question of exceptional significance is the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control. This question has already been discussed in the First Committee; nevertheless, I consider it necessary to make several remarks on this question.

In this question the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact that the General Assembly must immediately proclaim the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control to enforce this prohibition. We have in mind that the General Assembly must simultaneously instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for the consideration of the Security Council a draft convention envisaging measures guaranteeing the fulfillment of the General Assembly's decisions on prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its production, utilization exclusively for civilian purposes of the existing atom bombs, and the establishment of strict international control to enforce the above-mentioned convention.

This proposal aroused objections on the part of the three West-
ern Powers, which asserted that "until the system of control begins to function, prohibition cannot be enforced and remains illusory." They continue to persist in defending their proposal that the establishment of an international control system precede the declaration on prohibition of the atomic weapon. To facilitate the possibility of reaching an agreement on this question, we propose that in proclaiming the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and establishment of strict international control it should be stated that prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control will begin to operate simultaneously. This should eliminate all the above-mentioned objections with regard to what the Western Powers call the "illusory nature" of the Soviet Union's proposal for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and establishment of international control.

This proposal of ours undoubtedly opens the way to agreement on such an important question as the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of effective, strict international control to enforce this prohibition.

We insist that the General Assembly immediately proclaim the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control. But we agree that the prohibition of the atomic weapon will enter into force simultaneously with the beginning of the operation of the international control system.

With regard to the date for framing the convention, instead of February 1, the date that was acceptable in November, we propose June 1, 1952.

With regard to the nature of international control, in this case, too, we submit a proposal of very great significance. We propose that this control be "on a permanent basis." We have agreed to adopt this principle, formulating our proposal as follows: "With the aim of establishing an appropriate system of guarantee of the observance of the Assembly's decisions on prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armaments, the international control agency shall have the right to carry out inspection on a permanent basis without the right to interfere in the internal affairs of states."
Our proposal to proclaim the establishment of strict international control has also encountered the objections of the three Western Powers, which rejected this proposal as a mere declaration that will be of little significance if agreement is not reached beforehand on the precise nature of the control and if the control system does not begin to operate. With regard to control, the three Powers insisted that this control should not be limited to individual operations of inspection or verification and they attribute particular significance to the term "permanent inspection."

In conformity with this we have made the necessary alterations in our original draft proposal "On Measures Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace and Friendship among Nations," believing that the adoption of our draft resolution will be a very important step forward in solving the problems before us.
The debate "On Measures Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace and Friendship among Nations" has shown that a number of delegations are acting according to a carefully worked out tactical plan whose purpose is to thwart the serious and businesslike discussion of the proposals submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The nature and tone of these speeches, the arguments advanced, the trend of the criticism in the speeches of these delegates, the distribution of roles—all this reveals the existence of preliminary collusion, the aim of which is to avoid discussion of the substance of the draft resolution submitted by the USSR delegation on January 12, 1952.

Is not the existence of such a plot proved by the fact that the same questions were put to us by various delegations of the Atlantic bloc, questions which allegedly are not clear, cause doubt and require explanation? Is it accidental that the delegates of the United States, Britain, Canada, Bolivia and several other countries asked the same questions, as if by command: What does "go into effect" mean? How is "simultaneous" to be understood? What will the international control agency be like? Will it function on a permanent basis? And so on, and so forth.

The asking of these questions is in itself merely a method by which they try to avoid discussing the substance of the Soviet proposals and to shift them to the so-called Disarmament Commission on the pretext that precisely this commission must examine these matters.

That this is precisely the case is also evident from the fact that, having asked a number of questions, all these delegates declare to a man that it is impossible to consider these questions here in the committee, and that it is actually unnecessary to do so, since the Disarmament Commission has been formed. This was said outright by the delegates of the United States, Britain, Canada, France,
Bolivia, Brazil, and by other delegates, who suggested that this entire matter be referred to the Disarmament Commission for consideration.

It is evident that instead of discussing the substance of the Soviet Union’s proposals some delegates indulge in talk that has nothing to do with the item on the agenda, thus revealing the entire lack of interest in working out measures both to eliminate the threat of a new war and to strengthen peace and friendship among nations.

The patent existence of collusion also explains the slanderous lies and rude attacks against the Soviet Union, tediously repeated in the speeches of several delegates obviously with the object of troubling the waters as much as possible — it is easier, you see, to fish in troubled waters—in order to circumvent more conveniently the discussion of basic, important questions and to try to defraud public opinion by misrepresenting and even distorting facts.

In this respect several delegates broke all records, stooping to the most fantastic fabrications, shameful lies, and slander. The delegate of Haiti even went so far as to repeat a lot of absurdities about “Slav expansionism,” taking the liberty of making slanderous allusions to us and trying to vilify Soviet foreign policy. He permitted himself slanderous inventions with regard to the Soviet Union when talking of the military venture started by the Finnish fascists in 1939 against the USSR, daring to uphold here the shameful position of the inglorious League of Nations on this matter and ecstatically recalling his own work in that so-called international organization.

As a former member of the League of Nations, he knows very well, of course, that this venture was started precisely by the Finnish fascists, backed by strong patrons: Hitlerite Germany, on the one hand, and the League of Nations, on the other, with Hitler’s friends headed by Chamberlain and Daladier. He also knows that at that time the Finnish ruling circles were in alliance with the Hitlerites and let them use the territory of Finland as a springboard for an attack against the USSR. Nevertheless, he did not balk at slander and a flagrant distortion of facts, expecting in this
way to divert the committee's attention from discussion of the important matters before it.

It was with the same end in view evidently, that he repeated the slanderous gossip taken from the archives of the United States State Department, which late in January 1948 published a collection under the mysterious title "Nazi-Soviet Relations in 1939-1941." It was indisputably established at one time that by selecting all kinds of forged papers and documents allegedly from Hitler's diplomatic office, the American falsifiers of history who published this collection tried to slander the Soviet Union and lessen the international influence of the Soviet Union as a truly democratic and staunch fighter against aggressive and anti-democratic forces and as a consistent champion of peace.

This attempt of the State Department was exposed at that time. The slanderers were caught red-handed and pilloried.

But apparently these gentlemen's laurels give no rest to some delegates who are trying to set in motion here once again this American counterfeit in the hope that this will help to undermine the trust in the Soviet Union of millions upon millions of people, who rightly see in the USSR a consistent and staunch fighter against the threat of a new war, who see in it a champion of peace.

The delegate of Haiti repeated here the slander spread by the American falsifiers in 1948 with regard to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact. Of course, he could not help knowing the true facts about this matter. He knows, of course, that at that time the Second World War was imminent and that the Anglo-French bloc, behind which stood the United States, had been especially energetic in its efforts to isolate the Soviet Union and to encourage Hitlerite Germany to turn against the East, attacking Beck's Poland, to which this bloc had given a "guarantee," and against the Soviet Union; and that confronted with such a policy on the part of Britain and France, upheld by the United States, the Soviet Union had no choice but to accept the proposal for a pact, as this was the best of all possible ways out. This choice was a wise and farsighted step of Soviet foreign policy under those circumstances. This step of the Soviet Government predetermined to a
tremendous degree the favorable outcome of the Second World War for the Soviet Union and for all freedom-loving peoples, a war which ended in the rout of Hitlerite Germany, the decisive role having been played by the Soviet Union and its glorious armed forces.

It is not superfluous to mention that as far back as in 1934, Beck’s Poland, with Britain and France as its allies, concluded a treaty of non-aggression with the Germans, and that in 1938 Britain and France, which were the ruling powers in Europe, also concluded a treaty of non-aggression with the Hitlerites, publishing the Franco-Anglo-German declaration on non-aggression.

It is clear that the Haitian delegate’s nonsense about the Soviet-German pact of 1939 was an attempt to utilize every opportunity, including slander, to cover up somehow the policy of his masters, which is arousing indignation and protests on the part of all progressive mankind, all peace-loving peoples.

I permitted myself to take up part of the time with the speech of the Haitian delegate, not because this speech in itself deserves attention, but only to make clear the shameful role which this delegate and his ilk are playing in order to serve their influential patrons, who themselves have no respect for facts and prefer to deal with gossip and slander.

Nor did some other delegates from the same camp refrain from distorting facts and making insinuations.

The delegate from Peru advanced some sort of “theory” here that was strange, to say the least. The point of this “theory,” despite the Peruvian’s very confused explanations, was nevertheless clear. His declamations boil down to the assertion that the Soviet Union is bound by the very nature of things “to expand”—to expand its territory, to expand its influence on other countries—and it is the fate of the United States to “defend itself”—to take measures of some kind in order to overcome the “overwhelming pyramid of power,” in order to “defend itself,” as the Peruvian said, “against this power.” From this directly follows the conclusion: The Atlantic pact is a necessary act of self-defense, fully in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, which, as the
Peruvian delegate declared, are an expression of justice that is older than the Charter.

Feeling, apparently, that such a declamation cannot achieve its aim, the delegate of Peru fell back upon the prestige of the British Foreign Secretary and referred to his latest speech at Columbia University. He said that this speech was the most apt exposition of the Atlantic bloc's alleged peace policy and is a "most clear-cut and truthful appraisal of the Atlantic bloc's principles, aims and tasks." But if one examines Mr. Eden's speech, it is easy to see that everything Mr. Eden said about the Atlantic pact and the Atlantic bloc is merely a repetition and development of the American thesis of the so-called "situation of strength."

As for the Atlantic bloc, Mr. Eden affirmed in his Columbia University speech that the British Government would maintain its troops where they are now, as long as this is required in the interests of "Atlantic defense."

We already know that the aggressive aims of the Atlantic bloc are disguised by phrases about "defense." If Mr. Eden's speech is to be regarded as the most apt expression of the policy of the three Great Powers, as Mr. Belaunde said, then it is hardly possible to give better proof of the aggressive nature of the Atlantic bloc than the quotations cited from the above-mentioned speech.

The United States delegate asserted that it is the aim of the Atlantic bloc to prevent a third world war. But we see that the activities of the Atlantic bloc leaders—the United States, Britain and France—have already been marked by the unleashing of hostilities in the Far East, creating the danger and threat of a new world war.

In face of such facts, the attempts to depict the aggressive Atlantic bloc as an organization with the task of strengthening peace are entirely irresponsible and frivolous. Not limiting themselves, however, to talk of this kind, some delegates tried to prove, by making references to Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations Charter, that the Atlantic pact conforms to the Charter and that participation in the Atlantic bloc is compatible with membership
in the United Nations.

But is this so?

Far from it. This can easily be seen by attentively examining Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter, and also Article 53, which, even more convincingly than the former two articles, disproves the assertion that the Atlantic pact conforms to the United Nations Charter.

Article 51 speaks of the inherent right to individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the organization. It is known that no one has attacked any country of the Atlantic bloc and that there is no prospect of such an attack. There is no need to dwell on the empty phrases about the threat of such an attack on the part of the Soviet Union, since such fabrications have long since been refuted and exposed.

I have already recalled the case of Norway, which referred to apprehensions of some kind of unpleasantness on the part of the Soviet Union. When, however, the Soviet Government proposed that the Norwegian Government sign a non-aggression pact with it, the Norwegian Government rejected that proposal, but thereupon joined the Atlantic bloc.

Does this not mean that the Norwegian Government and the governments standing behind it apparently feared that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union might subsequently prevent Norway from playing the part which is assigned to it, and which was even then assigned to it, in connection with her joining the aggressive Atlantic bloc? Thus, not only the Norwegian Government, but also those who are its leaders, admitted that any non-aggression pact Norway may conclude with any country is incompatible with Norway’s participation in the Atlantic bloc. This means that non-aggression pacts are incompatible with the Atlantic pact and the Atlantic bloc.

References were made here to Article 52, which deals with regional arrangements. It is sufficient, however, to examine the boundaries of the so-called North Atlantic area to become convinced of the falsity of the references to the regional nature of this pact.
The North Atlantic pact is not a regional organization, because it is not confined to a part of the Atlantic but goes far beyond the bounds of this area. The boundaries of the so-called North Atlantic area run across West Germany, the Black Sea, the Philippines, and the Pacific Ocean and reach the Near and Middle East.

Thus the reference to Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter are utterly invalid. These references can only confirm, and they do confirm, that the Atlantic pact runs counter to Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter, its principles, aims and tasks.

Article 53 sets forth that no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures provided for pursuant to Article 107, which has in view the action of a government in relation to any state which during the Second World War was an enemy of any signatory of the United Nations Charter.

Please point out in the Atlantic pact an article, a paragraph, or even one word which meets this requirement of Article 53, in which there is the slightest reference to the fact that this enforcement action is to be taken by the Atlantic bloc upon authorization of the Security Council. You will not be able to do so, because the Atlantic pact does not contain even a hint of this important principle expressed so clearly and precisely in Article 53.

Article 5 of the Atlantic pact completely ignores Article 53 of the Charter, openly violating this article. Why, it is known that the Atlantic bloc has not received any powers from the Security Council to take any enforcement action, although its leaders are energetically preparing to take such action against states which are not members of this bloc.

Are not these facts sufficient to refute conclusively all claims that the Atlantic pact conforms to the Charter and is within the framework of the United Nations Charter? This is precisely so because it is, of course, utterly impossible to find any basis in the Charter for the Atlantic pact and for the activity of the Atlantic bloc. This is how matters stand from the legal standpoint. But the point is not in the legal aspect at all, the point is not in the
words, not the phrases borrowed by sponsors of the Atlantic pact from the Charter, in order to cover up the aggressive activity of the Atlantic bloc by these benign phrases.

They want to assure us that the Atlantic bloc is a veritable philanthropic society called upon to shower its largess upon mankind. But here, for example, is what can be read in the January 1952 issue of the magazine United Nations World. Max Beer, the magazine's correspondent at the United Nations, writes:

"The United States established the North Atlantic alliance (superseding temporarily the United Nations . . .) not generously to protect weaker states, but to make them strong enough to add to the American strength, to use their manpower, their resources, and their military bases."

This blasts to smithereens the legend about the aid the United States is allegedly rendering and intends to render to other, weaker states!

Characteristic also is the editorial in the Chicago Tribune of October 4, 1951, which says:

"This is a good time to recall that General MacArthur said it was 'pure nonsense' to assume that the United States is in any danger of conquest by Russia or any combination of powers. Admiral Fechteler, the chief of naval operations, is now on record to the same effect . . . That means that with far less money for defense than has been appropriated and probably without resort to the draft, this country can feel secure. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not needed for our safety." But Messrs. Gross and Lloyd and their friends are outdoing themselves to assure us that the "Atlantic organization" — this aggressive Atlantic bloc — has been set up with the sole purpose of ensuring the security of the United States!

Should not these facts suffice to cool somewhat the raptures and ardor of the admirers of the Atlantic bloc, who are sparing no effort to conceal from public opinion the aggressive nature of this pact and to deceive the people by covering up the abominably ugly features of this monstrosity with pompous phrases about defense, peace and cooperation?
Numerous facts show that the activity of the Atlantic bloc is aggressive and that the Atlantic bloc has nothing in common with the aims of the security of the United States; this is shown by the entire policy of the states which call the tune in the Atlantic bloc, a policy determining all their activities, as is well known to the entire world.

But what is the "Atlantic organization" needed for, if not for "security"? Why in that case does the United States spend such huge sums for the war program associated with the activity of the Atlantic bloc, a program so costly for American taxpayers? And the cost of this program is seen, for example, from Truman's January message to Congress in which he admitted, "with expenditures for security programs rising sharply, a dangerously large deficit of close to twice that size [i.e., the deficit of 1952] is estimated for the fiscal year 1953, if there is no additional taxation. Even with the additional taxes that I am recommending, the deficit will remain large, until the security program has passed its peak and tapers off, as we hope it can do in about two or three years."

Such are the prospects for 1953. And what are the prospects for 1952? Mr. Truman said about this, "A budget deficit of about 8 billion dollars is expected for the current fiscal year ending June 30, 1952. This is expected to be followed by a budget deficit approaching twice this size for the fiscal year 1953, unless further vigorous action to raise taxes is taken very soon."

And so, the deficit in the United States budget for two years will comprise 24 billion dollars.

What causes this huge deficit? Truman said: "The military program." What will this mean for the population? New burdens. In his message to Congress Truman says: "A heavy burden of additional taxes."

I considered it necessary to speak about all this here in order to show the source of the economic difficulties which the activity of the Atlantic bloc is causing in the countries belonging to this bloc and to show who is really responsible for the ever mounting hardships borne by the population of these countries. This was
necessary also in order to reveal the falsity and futility of the attempts to shift responsibility upon the Soviet Union for the situation that has arisen. This responsibility must be borne by the Atlantic bloc and the United States heading it.

And so, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not needed for the security of the United States. But once it exists it must stockpile armaments, it must act, and must boost its war program, it must keep up the war psychosis in society—it must do this. And it is doing this. We are told here: "Drop your dialectics." But our "dialectics" are correct dialectics. This is confirmed even by your authorities who have nothing to do with our "dialectics." Take, for example, the statement of the well-known Congressman Armstrong published in the Congressional Record of October 10, 1951. "Simply piling up weapons and doing nothing else," Armstrong said, "will result only in warfare with those atomic and hydrogen weapons... Never in all history," he said, "has an armament race brought peace, or secured any peace won, or furthered the interests of peace." This was said by Armstrong, a well-known person who can certainly be suspected neither of a communist way of life nor of a communist way of thinking—although, of course, your un-American activities committee is capable of suspecting anybody of anything.

For example, we were surprised to learn a few days ago that 38 senators had sent a request to the American Government that Mr. Jessup be recalled from here because he shows an "un-American way of thinking." However, everyone who has observed Jessup here knows perfectly well that he adheres to the extreme arch-American way of thinking. You see what a pass matters have reached!

Armstrong said further, "Let us recognize the one indisputable fact, that weapons are made only for use in military action."

In a statement printed on November 29, 1951, Gardner Cowles, publisher of the Des Moines Register said: "I cannot agree with the crazed Americans who believe that we should resort to war at the present time in the attempt to suppress communism. I doubt that communism could be destroyed by force of arms. I believe
that the sooner we Americans understand that the world cannot be refashioned after the American pattern by threats through American military power or by bribery with American dollars, the sooner we will work out a sound foreign policy." Is not this desire to resort to war in an attempt to suppress communism—is this not the aim of the Atlantic bloc? Is it not this which determines the aim of establishing the European alliance and the European Army with the incorporation of West German military units headed by Hitlerite revanchist generals? It is, and it is confirmed by the above-mentioned statements of prominent American political and public leaders who are as far from using "dialectics"—pernicious dialectics from the viewpoint of the United States State Department and the "Voice of America"—as heaven is from earth. And after this they tell us, and they want us, to give up asserting that the Atlantic bloc is an aggressive bloc; they want us to agree that it is compatible with our organization, that its activities are compatible with the principles of the Charter, which says that it is necessary to fight every attempt to restore militarism in certain countries, to fight all attempts to kindle the flames of war, to strive for peace, and for the consolidation of friendly relations among nations in solving all political, economic, social, cultural and other problems.

Clearly those who come out in support of the Atlantic pact do not see what is going on around them, what all sensible people point out; they do not see that the United States has become entangled in an insane policy of world supremacy, that it is the United States that must bear responsibility for the international situation that has arisen. The United States foreign policy causes that alarm in society, that tension which cannot continue endlessly, for when you draw a bowstring you must know that either the arrow will fly or the string will break.

Are these facts not enough to clear away all doubts that the policy of the United States, and of the Atlantic bloc which it directs, is a policy of war and not of peace, a policy of the wars already being waged in various parts of the world by the United States and other members of the Atlantic bloc?
We raised the question here of immediate cessation of hostilities in Korea. Attempts were made here to present the war in Korea as "defensive actions" of the United Nations against some sort of "aggression" from North Korea. In his speech the United States delegate repeated the hackneyed assertions already refuted dozens of times regarding the nature and causes of the Korean war and again declared, just as baldly as before, that the war began with an attack from North Korea. I would not touch upon this matter now if it were not for the insolence with which some gentlemen here tried to get away from this subject, advancing all sorts of formal and casuistic motives for the sole purpose of depicting the matter as being exactly the opposite of what it really is.

The United States delegate referred to the report of the Korean commission but he did not say what sort of commission this is. I do not mean the various individuals or the personal qualities of each of these individuals in general. It is known that this commission has a definite political task and that this political task determines its entire behavior. This commission was formed to effect a definite political program which boils down to one thing: under the guise of truthful information to submit data designed to justify the aggression of the Syngman Rhee puppet regime supported by the United States Government.

The United States delegate argued that according to this commission's report the war began with an attack from North Korea. But it is this very assertion of the commission that was refuted last year and the year before last. I say that it was refuted because at that time, when we put all this proof on the table, the United States and British delegates preferred to remain silent. Therefore, I cannot now ignore their inventions, their attempts to depict the matter as if it were not they who started this gory venture under the cover of the United Nations flag, to depict it as if they were performing the duty of United Nations members. They tried to assert that it is not they but the Korean people who are the "aggressors," although it is not the North Korean troops and Chinese volunteers who are in the United States, but, quite the contrary, the American troops who are in Korea.
Numerous facts prove that it was the United States that began and is now waging an aggressive war against the Korean people. These facts are worth mentioning. Here they are—only some of them:

On June 19, 1950, Syngman Rhee declared at the so-called National Assembly in Seoul, in the presence of Dulles: “If we cannot defend democracy in a cold war we will achieve victory in a hot war.” Is it not clear that this is a threat of war, a threat of an attack on North Korea?

In May 1950, Johnson, director of the Korean department of the United States Economic Cooperation Administration, declared in the Appropriations Committee of the American House of Representatives that the army of 100,000 men in South Korea, supplied with American equipment and trained by American military instructors, had completed its preparations and could start war at any moment. Not defend themselves, but start war! It was in this period that Syngman Rhee repeatedly declared that May and June 1950 would be the most critical months in the history of Korea.

In a letter to Syngman Rhee in June 1950, five days before the attack on North Korea, Dulles wrote: “I attach great significance to the decisive role which Korea could play in the great drama which is unfolding.”

Attention should be drawn to the fact that this was written five days before the South Korean troops attacked the Korean People’s Democratic Republic.

Kim I Sek, former Syngman Rhee Minister of the Interior, admitted that in January 1950 General Roberts, instructing the Syngman Rhee ministers, said: “The plan for the campaign against the North is decided upon.” Kim I Sek said further: “Although the attack will be started by us, nevertheless a pretext should be provided to have a just excuse. For this, most important is the report of the United Nations commission. The United Nations commission will naturally submit a report advantageous to the United States. But at the same time you too have to win the sympathy of the United Nations commission by paying attention to this question.”
There is an absolutely irrefutable document which exposes the true identity of the aggressors who unleashed the war against the Korean people. This document is the maps of the Syngman Rhee army’s general staff with exact markings of the location of the Syngman Rhee divisions, indicating the direction of the blows to be struck against North Korea when the order was given in due time by the command. The gentlemen from the American and British delegations prefer to keep quiet about all these facts and documents irrefutably proving that it was the United States that prepared and effected the attack on North Korea. And this is quite understandable: facts are stubborn things! These facts compel Messrs. the American interventionists and their friends to keep silent.

These facts, however, are multiplying. Here is another fact, fresh proof of the justice of the accusation that the United States attacked North Korea.

In December 1951 the magazine Cosmopolitan carried a big article by Major General Willoughby, former chief of the intelligence department of MacArthur’s headquarters, who admitted that one week before hostilities began the entire South Korean Army was ready for action, having taken appropriate positions along the 38th Parallel.

These facts, all these official documents, have up to now not been refuted by the representatives of the United States. Now, however, it is a matter of ceasing hostilities in Korea, assisting in the successful completion of the Panmunjom negotiations. We have seen what resistance the Anglo-American bloc has offered, and continues to offer, to this proposal of ours.

If one listens to the speeches made here by the representatives of the United States, Britain, the Philippines and other countries regarding the war in Korea, it becomes clear that they are by no means interested in the successful completion of the Panmunjom negotiations and that for this reason they refuse to render any assistance in this matter. They, moreover, deceive public opinion, assuring us, as was done yesterday, for example, by the representative of the United States, that few questions remain to be settled at
the Panmunjom negotiations and that these questions can be swiftly settled. Such a statement does not correspond to facts, however, and is fully refuted, for example, by the statement of General Van Fleet, Commander of the American Eighth Army in Korea, who, according to an Associated Press report of January 13, said that the armistice negotiations in Korea cause a feeling of "great disappointment." What have we here? Here in Paris the United States representative, speaking of the negotiations in Korea, asserts: "all's well," "little remains to be done and everything will be settled," while General Van Fleet, Commander of the Eighth Army in Korea, says that the state of negotiations "causes great disappointment." And the latter is apparently closer to the truth, because the absurd demands now presented by the American command to the other side cannot inspire any hope for the success of these negotiations.

The United States delegate said here that the American command in Korea would exert all its efforts to obtain an armistice, but he accompanied this statement with a number of reservations which bode no good for the success of the negotiations. He concluded his speech by saying: "We are anxious for negotiations to be conducted," he means negotiations in the United Nations. But he added: "We cannot discuss these problems with full responsibility while the military leaders are trying to reach a cease-fire agreement."

This, however, is thoroughly hypocritical and untrue, because the American military leaders are not trying to reach an agreement in Panmunjom. On the contrary, they are pleased with the developments in Korea; they are pleased that hostilities are in progress in Korea and that they are bringing calamities to the Korean people. This very same General Van Fleet, as reported by the Associated Press, said: "I am satisfied with the fact that the northern part of Korea is so badly destroyed that the Reds are short of food, clothing and shelter and the population of North Korea is in a rather critical state."

Do such statements harmonize with the statements of the United States representative to the United Nations regarding its alleged
desire to cease hostilities? No, they do not harmonize, they are absolutely not in harmony.

General Van Fleet's statement is the statement of an inveterate killer who finds satisfaction in hacking, stabbing, slashing, killing women, children, the aged, military men, civilians, peasants, workers, office employees, clergymen, doctors—anyone—destroying, demolishing cities, destroying the entire country. He rejoices at beholding torrents of blood. He says: "I am satisfied . . . ." This is the language of cannibals. This is the psychology of cannibals. And we are told that the United Nations must not interfere in this matter, that this may hinder the efforts the American "military leaders" are allegedly making to reach an agreement for ceasing hostilities in Korea. Do you mean the Van Fleets and the Ridgways are exerting such efforts? It is they who are commissioned "to reach an agreement" on ceasing hostilities in Korea, to bring the negotiations to a successful consummation! Only hypocrites can say that, hypocrites who want to cover up their disgraceful activities, which also disgrace the United Nations whose name they so cynically abuse!

Unfortunately, quite a few such pages have already been recorded in the annals of the United Nations. This is a new page. This is the preparation to reject Point 2 of our draft resolution calling for immediate cessation of hostilities, immediate conclusion of an armistice, withdrawal of troops from the 38th Parallel, withdrawal of all foreign troops and foreign volunteers from Korea. All this is being declined, rejected. All this is being covered up by pious, unctuous words, pharisaical unction. But the real face of those who now decide questions of war and peace in Korea, questions of armistice in Korea, is represented by those who already wallow knee-deep in blood, Van Fleet and his patrons—the War Department in Washington, the State Department and the American Government—with whose consent this General Van Fleet speaks and acts.

We must weigh all this in order to determine whether or not we are right when we state that the Atlantic bloc is an aggressive bloc, a nest of sinister aggressive forces, participation in which
is incompatible with membership in the United Nations.

We are told that the armistice in Korea depends only on the Soviet Union. They tell us: "Move a finger and the war will end."

This is a lie. This is base demagogy. We know that the negotiations are being prolonged by the American side! It is sufficient to recall the American terms for exchanging war prisoners—one for one—to make it clear who is prolonging the negotiations. We will remind you that the American command is trying to keep in captivity after the exchange of war prisoners more than 165,000 men out of the total of 176,000 such war prisoners. This is a travesty of international law, which demands the repatriation of war prisoners to the last man.

Is it possible to agree to an exchange according to the method proposed by the American command? Can even a small country like Korea agree to this even if such a demand is put forth by such a big country as the United States of America, by the entire Atlantic bloc which is seeking to strangle Korea? Of course it is impossible to agree to such a demand.

The demand to exchange war prisoners according to the "one-for-one" method flagrantly contradicts the generally recognized principles of international law. Did not the Government of the United States in 1932 sign the Geneva Convention of 1929 on war prisoners, and does not this convention contain Article 75 which states that the government of the belligerent side on signing an armistice is obliged to let the war prisoners go home, to repatriate them?

Does this article in the 1929 convention allow for the possibility of the demand now being put forth by the American generals during the negotiations in Korea—one for one? Did not the United States of America sign on August 12, 1949, the Geneva Convention on war prisoners which provides that war prisoners are to be released and repatriated immediately after the cessation of hostilities, and that only war prisoners against whom criminal proceedings have been initiated may be detained? Does not this convention bind the governments of the belligerents to find and ensure the repatriation even of servicemen of the other side who are in captivity
and are scattered throughout the country? Does not the United States Government know this convention which it signed? Has it forgotten this convention? It knows it but it does not want to implement it, because it generally tramples upon all international agreements if they become disadvantageous for it. And we are told with hypocritical indignation: “You must carry out international agreements.” But it does not itself carry out a single one of the major international agreements; specifically, it carries out neither the 1929 convention on war prisoners signed by it in Geneva nor the 1949 convention.

On whom, then, does the cessation of hostilities in Korea now depend?

It depends on those who advance absurd, illegal, unjust demands, contrary to international law and its principles and to the treaties based on this international law and these principles, demands such as the “one-for-one” exchange of war prisoners!

The United States Government tries to conceal its attempt to evade responsibility for dragging out the negotiations at Panmunjom by laying its own blame at someone else’s door. But this demagogic maneuver can neither deceive nor convince anyone. Its purpose is to conceal the dissatisfaction of broad sections of the American public with the war being waged in Korea; its purpose is to appease public opinion in the United States, where dissatisfaction with this war venture is growing steadily. This is natural, inasmuch as, aside from a narrow, comparatively small circle of people and those who get sops and crumbs that fall from their table, there are now few people in the United States who approve of this war. It is evident from the reports in part of the American press that discontent with this war is becoming increasingly widespread among the American people.

According to such a well-informed newspaper as the Wall Street Journal, Congressmen returning to Washington from their election districts speak of widespread discontent with this war among American voters. “The overwhelming majority of voters,” the Wall Street Journal writes, “are apparently worried by United States foreign policy
and do not understand where this policy is leading."

According to the same newspaper, even some of the Southern Congressmen who supported the war in Korea at the beginning now admit that the population in their election districts wants the Americans "to get out of Korea at once," as the newspaper put it.

Of course, at the same time opposite sentiments, fanned by war propaganda, the spread of war psychosis and similar measures, are growing in certain circles. But the above-mentioned facts speak for themselves, and these facts are worth pondering; this applies, first and foremost, to the representatives of the Atlantic bloc countries, and particularly to its American leaders.

* * *

PERCEIVING his own impotence and the futility of the attempts to demonstrate the peace-loving nature of the Atlantic bloc, and to veil the armaments drive in the countries of this bloc, the French delegate tried to divert attention by substituting one question for another.

He said, for instance, that our criticism of the Atlantic bloc and our assertion concerning the incompatibility of participation in the Atlantic bloc with membership in the United Nations is due to the Soviet Union's desire to "paralyze an agreement like the Atlantic pact."

But there is no need for us to do anything to paralyze this pact, since without our assistance this Atlantic pact and the Atlantic bloc are closer to paralysis every day because of the internal contradictions of the Atlantic bloc countries. Every day reveals these contradictions more glaringly. We saw this in Rome and in Paris, and quite recently in Washington in the fruitless talks between Truman and Churchill. There is no real community in this Atlantic camp, and there can be none, as everything in it is built upon ruthless competition, the insatiable desire of some to dominate others, the policy of dictatorship of the stronger and of entangling the weaker countries in a web of economic and financial dependence.

Naturally, no words, no florid phrases about "cooperation" and
“community” can hide these contradictions, let alone check their
development. The only purpose in all this demagogic phraseology
is to avoid discussing the basic question that interests us, to drown
the discussion of this question in empty talk.

It is not fortuitous that even the press which is not in the least
inclined to support or approve the Soviet proposals has to state that
the Westerners are trying to prevent a public discussion of the
Soviet proposals and are preparing, as Combat wrote on January
15, for example, “to drown in empty legal formulas the Soviet
proposal which could, in any case, serve as a basis for discussion
with the cards on the table.”

This excerpt confirms once again that the leading countries of
the Atlantic bloc, and primarily the United States, are alarmed
by the persistent demands of the peoples, of all peace-loving
countries, to put an end to this armaments drive, to this stock­
piling of atomic bombs, their demands for the adoption of a de­
cision on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, on
the establishment of strict international control with both these
measures going into effect simultaneously, on a real reduction of
armaments and armed forces and not a hypocritical, non-existent,
paper reduction as proposed by the United States, Britain and
France.

It is not surprising that the Soviet delegation’s most important
proposals concerning prohibition of the atomic bomb and estab­
lishment of international control were glossed over by the dele­
gates of the United States, Britain and France and several other
delegates from the same camp. These gentlemen hastily began
to invent all kinds of “arguments” and “reasons” to evade some­
how the discussion of the substance of our proposals. Not ven­
turing to do this openly, they hunted for pretexts and subterfuges,
found fault with everything even where no fault could possibly
be found and set all their diplomatic trickery in motion to conceal
somehow their refusal to support our proposals. Here we have a
real demonstration of samples of diplomatic faking!

The Brazilian delegate spoke of juggling, with reference to us.
I will not speak of the methods employed here by both the Brazil-
ian delegate and the delegates of the entire Anglo-American bloc as juggling. Everything they did here was faking; it might have been called circus sword swallowing which requires no skill, which requires only two things for success: sleight of hand and a credulous audience. In such a case speakers like the Brazilian delegate can hope for success. Concerning the draft resolution of the United States, Britain and France, it can be asserted with complete certainty that this draft is nothing but a brazen fake in big and important matters! Indeed, what is the value of this draft resolution submitted by the United States, Britain and France compared to our draft?

The meaning of this draft resolution, the object of which is to prevent the General Assembly from adopting a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish international control, can also be inferred from yesterday’s speech of the United States Secretary of State in Washington.

Mr. Acheson asserted that the aim of our draft resolution was clear. They, he said about us, are still trying to get the prohibition of atomic weapons on “paper” without giving any assurances regarding consent to any kind of effective control system which would enforce this prohibition.

Previously they told us that to proclaim prohibition of atomic weapons without establishing control is paper prohibition. Now they say that prohibition of atomic weapons simultaneously with establishment of international control is also paper prohibition. What, then, is genuine prohibition of atomic weapons? This, it seems, is what is envisaged by the “Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments” resolution in which, as everyone remembers, there is not a single word about prohibition of atomic weapons, except for a vague reference to the control agency’s task of working out proposals envisaging that the activities of this control agency may eventually lead to the prohibition of atomic weapons.

With regard to the Canadian delegate’s question as to whether we agree that the “system of international control and inspection should be permanent,” I must remark that since this question con-
cerns an international control agency it is pointless. It should be clear that when an agency is established and nothing is said about its being a temporary agency, then every sensible person should understand that it is to be permanent. As for inspection, in this too the Canadian delegate talks nonsense that gives him away hopelessly. Why, the second paragraph of Point 6 of our draft resolution clearly mentions inspection on a permanent basis. But why did the Canadian delegate and others not ask such questions of the sponsors of the three-power resolution—the United States, Britain, France—when they advanced their formula which they now admit to be identical in substance with our formula? Because, I shall reply, at that time you had no reason to trouble the waters with your questions. Now the occasion proves suitable. Of course one must always find a suitable time for fishing, particularly for fishing in troubled waters.

They wanted to know what "strict international control" means. I must say that I have no intention of satisfying the curiosity of these delegates. We are not in school, we are not school children, you are not teachers, not mentors, and I have no intention of rendering an account to you and explaining what one question or another means, particularly when you say with undisguised brazenness, pardon the expression, that you do not consider it necessary to examine this question here. I do not consider this fitting for our delegation.

If I do touch upon this question it is only to enable all who are really interested in the truth to see for themselves what our proposals mean and what your questions mean.

They ask what "strict international control" means. But we have spoken many times about the meaning of the system of control, which is altogether unlike the "Baruch plan" control.

Speaking of what is behind the American plans for "control" over the prohibition of atomic weapons, J. V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, pointed out as far back as in October 1951:

"American leaders also talk about 'control,' but their 'control' presumes not cessation, but continuation of the manufacture of
atomic weapons, and in quantities corresponding to the quantity of raw material at the disposal of the various countries. Consequently, American 'control' presumes not the prohibition, but the legalization and legitimization of the atomic weapon. This would give the warmongers legitimate right to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of civilians with atomic weapons. It will be easily understood that this is not control, but a travesty of control, which defrauds the peaceful aspirations of the peoples. Clearly, such 'control' cannot satisfy the peace-loving peoples, who demand prohibition of atomic weapons and discontinuance of their production."

As for the Soviet Union, as for our proposal to establish effective international control, it represents a whole complex of extremely important measures. These are:

First, inspection of all undertakings for producing atomic raw materials and atomic energy and verification of their accounts;

Second, verification of the existing stocks of atomic raw materials, supplies and semi-manufactures;

Third, study of the production operations in the volume required to control the utilization of atomic materials and atomic energy;

Fourth, supervision of the fulfillment of the established rules of technological control—not control in general, but technological control—and not only supervision of fulfillment, but also elaboration and the right to set rules of technological control for establishments processing atomic raw materials and all other establishments dealing with atomic materials.

That means that under our proposals the control agency may set technological rules, which it, the control agency, considers necessary, for any establishment dealing with atomic raw materials;

Fifth, the right to collect and sum up information about the extraction of atomic raw materials;

Sixth, the right to gather information about the production of atomic materials and atomic energy;

Seventh, in addition to ordinary inspection, the right to con-
duct special investigations in case there is suspicion of the violation of the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons, etc., etc.

Is this not enough to make clear the complete seriousness of the formulation of our proposal for international control, a formulation which can, I am deeply convinced, stand up to all honest and conscientious criticism? But, of course, it will not be able to stand up to unscrupulous criticism, because there is no guarantee of any kind against unscrupulousness. We have explained all this before. Still they ask us all kinds of questions, apparently out of idleness, because those who ask such questions may in some cases have more free time than they know how to kill. So they sit and invent such questions, trying to outdo the Wittiest of persons. They have plenty of time for that, as we can see. But they do not have enough time to think about and study properly the books to which they refer. The Haitian delegate, for instance, referred to a certain "18th century Russian writer" Leontiev, and even quoted him. But actually Leontiev was not a writer but a Moscow censor who, it is true, scribbled some cheap novels. Now he is being represented as the forefather of "Slav expansionism."

I am prepared to bet that the Haitian delegate has never read and never even seen the book by Leontiev, that he simply used the crib prepared for him by some willing provocateur. And there are such provocateurs, particularly when they are paid in dollars or pounds sterling—not in Haitian currency, of course.

For his part, the Canadian delegate, desiring to show his erudition and knowledge even of Marxist science, said that there was a "booklet," as he put it, entitled "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back." He was referring to the remarkable work by the great thinker Lenin called One Step Forward, Two Steps Back and not "Two Steps Forward, One Step Back," as the Canadian delegate called it. Clearly he has never read this book. You must agree that it is very difficult to conduct polite conversation with such opponents. It is difficult. Despite all my efforts to be polite in conformity with the taste of those who are dissatisfied with me, I cannot be tactful with such people, because really they are be-
having much too brazenly and insolently, thinking that they can get away with anything. They deserve to be shown up before the whole world with their forgeries and their false "erudition."

I must say a few words about the speech of Mr. Gross. I cannot conceal my surprise at all I heard here. I shall not dwell on this long because, essentially speaking, Gross talked about what we have already discussed before. But here is what is remarkable. He concluded by stating that the United States Government would submit "important proposals to the Disarmament Commission." That is what he said here. I was prepared to wait for these important proposals of the American Government with impatience. But, alas, disappointment was my lot.

I learned from Mr. Acheson's speech at the press conference in Washington yesterday that he, Acheson, had heard nothing and knew nothing about these "important proposals" which the American Government is allegedly preparing to submit to the Disarmament Commission.

Probably Mr. Gross is preparing these "important proposals" without telling Mr. Acheson. But is he perhaps not preparing them at all, only talking about them in order to block the road for the Soviet proposals? If Mr. Acheson is right, then it turns out that Gross has nothing in his hands. It turns out, Mr. Gross, that your superior disavows your statement of yesterday. It is clear that Gross' statement about important proposals which the United States Government is preparing to submit to the Disarmament Commission is meant for other purposes.

The delegates of the United States, Britain and France are simply striving to get our proposals transferred to the Disarmament Commission and to keep them from being examined in the Assembly.

My colleague, the head of the Ukrainian delegation, has already mentioned here that not long ago these same delegates strove energetically to prevent their proposals from being referred to the commission, and to have them considered here, in the committee and in the Assembly. Now, however, it seems their position is entirely different. When the "trio"—the United States, Britain
and France—wanted this they demanded that this resolution be examined here, and the reason they gave was that a "draft resolution cannot be submitted to the commission without instructions for guidance." Now we say:

Examine our proposal here.

They say:

"It should be submitted to the commission without instructions for guidance."

But it is, after all, impossible to conduct any joint work in such a manner. When it is to their advantage, they say one thing; and when it is not to their advantage, they say another. These are the morals of the Hottentots, expressed in the following formula: "If someone steals my wife, that is a crime. If I steal someone else's wife, that is a virtue."

It is impossible to come to an agreement with people who adhere to this kind of morality. All three declare that they will vote against discussing our draft resolution in the First Committee and in the General Assembly, seeking to have our draft resolution referred, by hook or by crook, to the commission of 12 "for study."

This alone reveals the actual intentions of the honorable trio who apply one yardstick to their proposals and another one to the Soviet proposals pertaining to one and the same question. This, however, is not morality; it is a method, it is a maneuver which a certain section of the Paris press described as a "classical method of procrastination." I would say a classical method, not of procrastination, but of thwarting our proposals; this is not only a method of procrastination, this is a method of misleading public opinion, before whom the representatives of the United States, Britain and France do not dare to speak openly in defense of their attitude and, fearing public censure, are trying to conceal their attitude from the peoples, not balking at distortion of facts, distortion of our stand.

It was indeed amusing to listen to such orators as Lloyd, Gross and Chauvel, who restricted themselves to hollow references to questions of no importance instead of speaking clearly and definitely on our proposal. This proposal is clear and definite. We
propose that the General Assembly proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control, with the view that this prohibition will go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of international control. Replacing one question with another, our critics said nothing about the substance. They restricted themselves to the remarks that "to submit these drafts is not sufficient to eliminate obstacles," without uttering a single word about the substance of our proposal, which, nevertheless, must eliminate and actually does eliminate such obstacles. There is only one obstacle it does not and cannot eliminate—the utter unwillingness of Messrs. the atom-mongers, the semi-honorable personages from the Atlantic bloc, to really prohibit atomic weapons and establish truly international control under any conditions. On this question these gentlemen are retreating all along the line, forgetting everything they said in the same First Committee when the question on the reduction of armaments and armed forces was under discussion.

Indeed, at that time they stubbornly tried to prove that proclamation by the General Assembly of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons without establishing international control or prior to the conclusion of a convention on the establishment of international control was unacceptable. On December 3, 1951, the French representative Moch said that "the USSR proposal for the prohibition of the atom bomb deprives France of guarantees under the present, tense situation" and that "France would agree to destroy atomic weapons if she had them, only if she were sure that the other states would simultaneously do the same." He added, however, that in his opinion there was no hope of success if the Soviet delegation was going to insist on prohibiting atomic weapons before any method of control is established. He added that he was nevertheless sure that a compromise was possible and that agreement could be reached concerning the two stages related to the proclamation of prohibition of atomic weapons and to the establishment of control. Adoption of a compromise decision would, in his opinion, lead to an early termination of the production of atomic weapons.
At the same meeting, Moch, who incidentally is not speaking here now apparently to avoid placing himself in the awkward position of refuting his own words — Moch said, “The USSR proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and discontinuation of their production, in the first place, with the introduction of control to follow could be accepted only if there was an atmosphere of complete mutual trust among the four Powers represented on the subcommittee. This is not so, and, therefore, to reach agreement it is necessary that the USSR stop insisting on this indispensable condition.”

Everybody now sees that we no longer insist on this condition. Everybody sees that our draft resolution submitted to the First Committee for consideration on January 12 enunciates the principle of the simultaneous going into effect of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control.

On December 6, the same Moch spoke of the possibility of finding “common ground for settling the question of simultaneousness.” He said that it would be possible to agree to a declaration on prohibition which would go into effect after the establishment of control. This is what the representative of France said at that time.

And what do we hear now? Now we hear something entirely different from the representative of France. What has happened?

At first one so-called representative of France comes and says one thing. Then he goes away. His place is taken by another so-called representative of France who says something directly opposite to what was said by the first one. Then he unfortunately does not go away; actually there is no point in his going away, because he does not contradict himself and the fact that he contradicts his predecessor, who also represented his government, is immaterial. All the more so since his government no longer exists. Finally we get something like black magic: somebody came, said something and left. Then another came, said something directly opposite without any embarrassment and is waiting to see what impression his refutation of his predecessor will make. And both
of them say: We appear here as representatives of the French Government, and not only the French but also the Governments of the United States and Britain. When I permitted myself to doubt this, someone from the Atlantic bloc said, "How can you doubt? He is a representative of the people!"

But we know what kind of people's representatives there may be as a result of all sorts of qualified elections and as a result of falsifications in such elections. You can read about this, for example, in the remarkable work of the British sociologist Bryce The American Commonwealth. You can see there the doings of those in the so-called "democratic" countries who seek to become "people's representatives."

The representative of the United States of America has been replaced on our committee. At first there was one representative, now there is another. True enough, he does not go away when it is necessary to renounce a position formerly taken. Not having the courage to change his position openly, however, he is trying to do it in a disguised form, but he does it very clumsily, and it can be said in all truth that this camouflage is a bit too thin.

But this, however, is not the point in question. The point in question is that all of them — the representatives of the United States of America, Great Britain and France — acting in accordance with one plan and in general concord, and appearing not only on behalf of one country but on behalf of all three countries, formerly took one stand, were aiming at one target: "It is impossible to prohibit atomic weapons," they cried with one voice, "without the existence of international control." "International control must be established, otherwise unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon will be a scrap of paper, a mere illusion."

They said: "First control, and then prohibition." They regarded as the chief fault of our position the fact that we were defending the formula: "First prohibition, and then control."

Now, making an effort in spite of everything, and not minding in the least being told that we proposed it in 1948 and in 1949 — we will not be at all disconcerted by this, because if
our proposals are good there is no sin in repeating them — but now we are proposing another formula, which says that the General Assembly must proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control, envisaging that the first and the second will go into effect simultaneously. Our present proposals are thus in no way a mere repetition of what we proposed in 1948 and 1949. We did not introduce proposals in 1948 for the simultaneous enforcement of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control. We proposed in 1949 that two conventions, one on prohibition of the atomic weapon and one on control over atomic energy, be drafted. Now we have submitted a proposal that the General Assembly immediately proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, envisaging that "prohibition of the atomic weapon will go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of international control."

Now that we say, "Prohibition and control will go into effect simultaneously, will go into operation simultaneously," we are not told, "Good, we accept this," and we are not told, "It is bad, we reject it," but we are asked, "What does 'go into effect' mean?"

But it should be clear to everyone that "will go into effect" means that they will begin to operate.

Even now, feeling that they would not be able to adhere to this point of view, they are advancing a new point of view, as you may have noticed. One of the delegates from their camp stated yesterday that it would be possible to prohibit atomic weapons only when it was established that the system of international control was operating effectively.

Is it difficult to understand what this means? Is it not clear that this is a loophole in order to say later, "Oh no, although there is control, although it operates, it is not effective?"

Such is the meaning of this "little amendment" concerning the "effectiveness" of control! We shall agree — this is how this amendment should be understood—to prohibit the atomic weapon simultaneously with the establishment of control but
only if you agree that the _effectiveness_ of control be established beforehand.

It should be mentioned in this connection that in 1949 Mr. Osborne, United States representative on the Atomic Energy Commission, argued that there could be no generally effective control.

Such "amendments" on effective control, however, can have but one purpose: to drown the question of the prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about the effectiveness of control.

At first we were asked, "Do you want to prohibit atomic weapons and introduce control later?" Now we say, "Prohibition and control are to be put into effect simultaneously." They do not answer us regarding this proposal but ask various questions, not wanting, moreover, to discuss them, and they allude to the "effectiveness" of the control as a new condition for the enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons. All this has but one aim: to prevent the prohibition of atomic weapons, to preclude all possibility of reaching agreement concerning the prohibition of atomic weapons. This is also reflected in the three-power resolution adopted by the Anglo-American group not long ago. This resolution does not set itself the task of prohibiting atomic weapons.

Before this, United States delegate Jessup said, with regard to our proposal, that the Assembly must proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control, since it cannot be demanded that anyone depend on an unsubstantiated promise that a given state will not manufacture new bombs and will not use those it already has.

He said that a declaration of the prohibition of atomic weapons will remain a prohibition on paper until an international system of control of production and stockpiling of fissionable material from which atomic bombs are manufactured goes into effect, and that only then will prohibition become a reality and will control be possible.

All three—the delegates of the United States, Britain and
France—strove persistently to create a situation under which prohibition of atomic weapons would be tied up with international control, finding, as Jessup said, its material expression in international control instead of in a "simple declaration" which they regarded as illusory if not based on international control.

Now everyone sees that the proposals of the USSR submitted to the First Committee on January 12 suggest a solution which cannot possibly be criticized on the ground that the proclamation of unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons is a mere declaration. In the attempt to undermine our proposal that the Assembly proclaim the prohibition of atomic weapons, they told us that no such proclamation is necessary because it is proposed that prohibition of atomic weapons and international control be put into effect simultaneously. There is no basis whatsoever for such reasoning. There can be no doubt that even the proclamation of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons by the General Assembly would itself have a tremendous favorable moral influence and cause tremendous political consequences of benefit to the cause of eliminating international tension and facilitating the efforts to eliminate the threat of a new war. Such a declaration on the part of the General Assembly would sober up, would have a curative effect on the minds of people who have been misled by aggressive and reactionary propaganda. If there is such a declaration by the General Assembly prohibiting atomic weapons and, therefore, condemning all propaganda in favor of atomic weapons, surely such incredible facts as the one reported in the French press today will be impossible. I am referring to the sale by the large Paris firm Bazar de l'Hôtel de Ville of the game "atomic bombing" with an advertising booklet which literally says the following:

"Children's magazines talk about the atomic bomb which dethroned the rifle and gun. Toys should also undergo a similar evolution. Now this new game shows the action of an atomic bomb depending on the importance of the objectives
hit, which are marked by figures in accordance with their military value.

The booklet includes a map supplement on which the "hit objectives" are marked. They are beginning to corrupt the children, developing a taste for the atomic weapon in them, envenoming their minds with the poison of atomic psychosis. Is this not the last stage of decline of so-called "European culture," European "civilization"? This is a result of the American example, an imitation of the so-called American way of life. Of course for France this is a beginning. However, facts of this kind are not an exception in the United States, for instance, where propaganda for war, specifically for atomic war, is assuming monstrous proportions and such fantastic forms as were demonstrated by the brutish personnel of the American magazine Collier’s, even though at the General Assembly in 1947 the United States delegate voted for the impermissibility of war propaganda.

That is why we say: It is necessary to prohibit atomic weapons right now, proclaiming this prohibition in the name of the General Assembly. Such a proclamation of the prohibition of atomic weapons cannot become a loophole of any kind, because it provides the condition that prohibition of atomic weapons should go into effect simultaneously with the establishment of control, making it completely possible always to ascertain how scrupulously this prohibition is being carried out.

Therefore the refusal to support our proposals is particularly harmful and dangerous. This refusal, however, is not unexpected.

As everyone remembers, we foresaw it in advance, pointing out that the basis of all differences of opinion with the Soviet Union in this matter is the inflexible and obstinate desire of the United States, with Britain and France supporting it, to thwart any agreement on the atomic question so that it may retain a free hand for stockpiling more and more atomic bombs in anticipation of the moment when they can be used against the Soviet Union and other peace-loving peoples.
Reference was made here to the resolution on so-called "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments" (Document A/2025). But as is obvious from the text of this resolution, and as the future work of the Disarmament Commission will undoubtedly confirm, this resolution provides no solution at all for the problem of the prohibition of atomic weapons. Therefore the proposal of the USSR on the necessity for the General Assembly to proclaim the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of control remains in full force.

An obstacle raised by the delegates of the United States, Britain and France was encountered on this path, however. We have demonstrated our willingness to eliminate this obstacle. We want to create a situation in which the proclamation of prohibition of atomic weapons would not be a loophole for those who, even after such proclamation of the prohibition of atomic weapons by the General Assembly, would want to abuse the trust of other states and would continue to manufacture atomic weapons while the other states, the honest states, having a scrupulous attitude toward the General Assembly's decision, would adhere to it strictly and really discontinue the further manufacture of atomic weapons. It is precisely this objective that is fully attained by the condition in the draft resolution of the USSR. As for international control, I would like to draw the attention of the committee to points 3 and 6 of the draft resolution, which speak of the establishment of international control on a permanent basis. This formula, "on a continuing basis," was also given by the three Powers in their draft on "Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of All Armed Forces and All Armaments."

Time and again Lloyd and Jessup declared that if the words "on a continuous basis" were included in our proposal, clarity would be achieved. Mr. Lloyd said he would consider that this point of the proposal coincides in the main with Points B and C of the original three-power draft resolution. The same assertion was made by Jessup, who said that effective inspection
presumes continuous inspection. He even said that "it is continuous inspection which is the only possible view."

He spoke of this many times and expressed his main idea—that control of atomic energy should be continuous—in various wordings. In his speech of December 11, 1951, in the First Committee, Lloyd depicted our position on the matter of prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control as having stages, the first stage being the Assembly's decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish international control; the second stage, working out a system of international control; and the third stage, establishment of a control agency. This, by the way, is an incorrect outline. Lloyd declared that such a system is unacceptable because the absence of control will give rise to a situation in which discontinuation of the manufacture of atomic bombs and utilization of atomic weapons will depend exclusively on the promises made by individual governments.

You should take a scrupulous attitude to the above-mentioned Soviet proposals, you should appraise them correctly and not be obstinate in insisting on your own position, which cannot be accepted because of its absolute untenability.

If the delegates of the United States, Britain and France continue to be obstinate and insist on their position "first control, and then prohibition" of atomic weapons and at the same time continue to insist that control be based on the Baruch plan, then there can be no doubt that such a position precludes every possibility of really reaching agreement on the question of prohibiting atomic weapons and establishing control over the observance of such prohibition.

By putting forward as a paramount demand the establishment of an international control system according to the Baruch plan, they have already predetermined the futility of all efforts to reach agreement in this way. To make agreement possible, the delegates of the United States, Britain and France must first renounce their sectarian attitude toward proposals of other countries, particularly when there are proposals such
as the one for the simultaneous introduction of prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control. A tunnel is dug from both ends. The efforts of both sides are necessary, otherwise no rapprochement is possible. We do not merely say this, we act accordingly.

It is impossible, of course, to overlook Mr. Lloyd's speech. His speech was especially intended to cover up the obvious refusal to meet the proposals of the USSR halfway, a refusal which characterizes the position of the British Government. In so doing Lloyd tried to say nothing definite, but this very indefiniteness clearly revealed the definitely negative attitude toward the draft resolution of the USSR. He started and finished with expressions of various doubts, not only with regard to separate words touching on basic questions of the draft resolution of the USSR, but also with regard to the draft as a whole. But the point is not at all in the meaning of some or other words but in the fact that, to his own surprise perhaps, Lloyd had to admit that our proposal providing for the simultaneous introduction of prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control is not in the interests of British policy.

Lloyd tried to find fault with everything. At the meeting of the subcommittee on December 5, 1951, Lloyd reproached us because the text of our amendment to the three-power draft resolution on the question of control omitted the words "on a continuous basis" and tried to get us to agree to put them in. He explained assiduously that rather than the word "permanent" he would prefer the word "continuous" to define the permanent (postoyanni)* character of the system and procedure permitting inspection at any time. It is clear that our proposal, which repeats this formula "on a continuous basis," requires no additional explanation, for Lloyd in any case, since he evidently understood its meaning perfectly when he defended this formula in the subcommittee. And now what?

*The words "permanent" and continuous" are both translated by the same word, "postoyanni," in the Russian.
Now he has found a pile of questions, a pile of doubts in this respect, too. He asked: Is such an apparatus supposed to exercise its powers of control only on so-called disclosed plants manufacturing armaments? Where is the inspecting apparatus to be located? And, as he said, other questions of the same type.

Lloyd has suddenly found all these questions so serious that there is no solution but to submit our proposals to the committee of 12 for careful study. Whom can such childish arguments mislead? But what seems to worry Lloyd most of all now is our formula about inspection on a continuous basis "without the right to intervene in the internal affairs of states." In this he perceives that "unpleasant moment," which is the source of his anxiety. One can understand the anxiety caused the British delegates by our proposal not to permit interference in the internal affairs of other states. This proposal is naturally an "unpleasant moment," as Lloyd put it, for those who are accustomed to act without restraint and put their feet on the table in foreign countries, as Messrs. the imperialists do. The reaction of the delegates from the countries of the imperialist camp to our proposal shows how important this proposal is.

That there is no lack of clarity at all on the question of non-interference in the internal affairs of states is evident, if only from the fact that this formula fully conforms to one of the most important principles of the United Nations, namely, the principle expressed in Article 2 Paragraph 7 of the Charter, which says: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . . ."

But perhaps this paragraph of the Charter too is not sufficiently clear to Mr. Lloyd and requires additional explanations of some kind?

Summing up the results of the four-day debates in the committee on the item "On Measures Against the Threat of Another War and for Strengthening Peace and Friendship among Nations," I must say that all the arguments of various delegates
in this respect criticizing our proposals in one way or another are nothing but a refusal to prohibit atomic weapons, for they make the prohibition of atomic weapons contingent not only upon the establishment of international control, which has already been solved — one may say, for our part at least — but also on the effectiveness of this control, of which I have already spoken and which, of course, simply means unwillingness to come to an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The proposals set forth in the Soviet delegation's draft resolution of January 12 are an important and serious step forward toward finding an answer to the question concerning measures to eliminate the threat of another war and to strengthen peace and friendship among nations. And that is why we insist on our eight points.

We insist that participation in the Atlantic bloc be recognized as incompatible with membership in the United Nations. We urge that the General Assembly recognize the necessity of discontinuing hostilities in Korea immediately and that with this purpose in view it adopt the measures indicated in our draft. We insist that the General Assembly proclaim the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control, envisaging that these will go into effect simultaneously. We propose that the General Assembly recommend that the five permanent members of the Security Council reduce their armaments and armed forces by one-third within the period of one year.

We propose that the General Assembly recommend that, after the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and reduction of armed forces by one-third is made, all states submit complete official information regarding the state of all their armaments and armed forces, including atomic weapons, and also information concerning military bases on foreign territories. We recommend that an international control agency be established with inspection on a permanent basis within the framework of the Security Council. We recommend the convocation of a world conference to examine the question of armament reduction. We recommend that the General Assembly urge the governments of the five Pow-
ers to conclude a pact of peace and also urge all other peace-loving states to join this pact. We are told: A five-power pact of peace is not necessary because there is the Charter, which is a pact of 60 powers. But if there is a pact of 60 powers why is the Atlantic pact necessary? Why is the European alliance necessary? Why is the Inter-American pact necessary? Why are the multitude of bilateral and multilateral pacts of all kinds necessary if there is a 60-power pact in the form of our Charter?

It is clear that this objection is simply a subterfuge with the purpose of preventing the conclusion of such an exceedingly important pact as an agreement by the five Great Powers to maintain peace. We continue to insist on this.

We are definitely convinced that the adoption of this real program of peace, which I have just mentioned in brief and which is expressed in our draft resolution, and the consistent implementation of all the points of this program by all peace-loving states would indeed ensure the elimination of the threat of a new world war and would strengthen peace and friendship among all nations.

All quotations in the preceding speeches have been retranslated from the Russian.
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