THE SOVIET POSITION
ON PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
AND INTERNATIONAL CONTROL
OF ATOMIC ENERGY

SPEECHES BY A. Y. VYSHINSKY
AT THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE
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Concerning Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon and International Control

Speech of November 10 before the Special Political Committee

On the Question of Atomic Energy

Speech of November 23 at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly

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A. Y. Vyshinsky
Speech of November 10, 1949 before the Special Political Committee

United States and Britain Sabotage the Decisions of the General Assembly

On our agenda is the Atomic Energy Commission's report dealing with one of the most important issues attracting the United Nations' attention. This question is already three years old. This length of time was enough to have decided it, but nevertheless it still remains undecided. And even more than that—it is at present no closer to solution than it was two or three years ago. And this, despite the number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during this period expressing in a clear-cut and precise manner the wholehearted aspiration of our organization that this question be decided by prohibiting the use of atomic energy for war purposes and by removing the atomic weapon from national armaments. One has to state that all these resolutions have turned out to be hollow declarations, that they are all void of practical importance, that they have been turned by the commanding bloc in the United Nations into empty scraps of paper.

The year that has elapsed since the third session of the General Assembly has not made any new contribution to the solution of the atomic problem. As we pointed out as long ago as the Paris session, the resolution of November 4, 1948 did not, nor could it, yield any results. In this sense, it may be said that the past year is a lost year as far as the issue in question is concerned. It may be presumed that this resolution had one object, that of covering up the refusal to carry out the principal resolutions of the General Assembly adopted on January 24 and December 14, 1946, resolutions whose historic significance must not of course be underestimated.

To prove this it will be sufficient to refer to point six of the December 14, 1946 resolution concerning the institution—within the framework of the Security Council which bears the main responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security—of an international agency to ensure the adoption of measures on prohibiting the use of atomic energy for military purposes, and the establishment of control over atomic energy to the extent necessary for ensuring its exclusive use for peaceful aims.

The General Assembly resolution of November 4 evades this question, or, to be more exact, buries this question. Moreover, it is not even a first-class, but a third-class burial. As foreseen by the Soviet delegation some time ago, the recommendations contained in the General Assembly resolution of November 4, 1948, on consultations among the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of establishing whether there was a basis for agreement on international control over atomic energy to ensure its exclusive use for peaceful purposes, proved to be unreal and incapable of lifting this important issue out of deadlock.

The reason for this should be clear: of the six permanent members of this Commission, five, by voting for the resolution of November 4, 1948, had in advance recognized the necessity of suspending altogether the work of the Commission, ascribing this to "there being no way out" and to the Commission's impotence in reconciling contradictions and differences that had appeared during its work.

This decision of the Atomic Energy Commission signified in essence the renunciation of all attempts to bring about the prohibition of the atomic weapon. This decision is directly and obviously contradictory to the resolutions of January 24 and December 14, 1946. This in fact was also indirectly recognized by the General Assembly which directed the commission to resume its meetings and to make a study of the remaining questions in its program, which the commission itself would deem practicable and useful.

By the time this resolution was adopted, no one could entertain any doubt that the consideration of secondary questions still pending in the program of the commission could not be of any essential significance, not to say of no significance at all.

However, the real facts surpassed the most pessimistic expectations, since the majority of this commission immediately returned to its former irreconcilable standpoint, showing once again the desire of the Anglo-American camp to frustrate the preparations
of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on control over the implementation of this prohibition. The so-called "resumption" of work of the Atomic Energy Commission consisted of a reiteration by the majority of this commission of the same theses in favor of the American plan for so-called international control.

All the proceedings at the meetings of the Atomic Energy Commission furnished further proof of the complete reluctance of the majority of this commission to take any step forward, proved that quite the contrary was the case, that its sole desire was to reduce the work of the commission to a mere formality, without even a hint of real readiness to give serious consideration to measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon, to measures for the establishment of really effective international control.

This manner of behavior of the Commission majority fully corresponded to the policy of the United States Government on the atomic question as expressed in the well-known speech delivered by the President of the United States on April 6, 1949, when he said that he would not hesitate in deciding to use the atomic bomb if the United States' welfare or the world democracies were at stake.

The significance of the second part of this statement, mentioning the reasons for which atom bombs would be dropped on some people's heads, is of course conditional, inasmuch as it is always possible to find a plausible excuse for the most improper action. Nevertheless, a fact is a fact, and it is a fact that high-placed persons in the USA were least of all inclined to consider the idea of prohibiting the use of the atom bomb, but, on the contrary, they were considering the idea of using the atom bomb at the appropriate moment without hesitation.

General Bradley, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: "In the military respect the North Atlantic Pact may become just as important for American security as the possession of atom bombs."

With such a stand there could not, naturally, be any hope that success would attend the work of the Commission called upon to work out measures for prohibiting the atomic weapon.

Nor was the 1948 session of the General Assembly able to advance this question. Moreover, taking an entirely uncritical view of the report submitted by the Atomic Energy Commission and confining itself to a simple endorsement of the general deduc-
tions and recommendations of this report—the object worked for and achieved by the Anglo-American bloc at the third session—the third session of the General Assembly thus relinquished all attempts to continue the work on the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon and establishment of international control.

Reluctance to bring about the prohibition of the atomic weapon is the principal reason which prompts the Government of the United States of America to hinder in every way the preparation of recommendations on the prohibition of the atomic weapon; true this reluctance is covered up by false phrases about anxiety at the impasse reached in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission; it is covered up by hypocritical wishes for consultations between the six permanent members of the commission for establishing whether there is a basis for agreement on international control over atomic energy, for ensuring its exclusive use for peaceful purposes, and for the removal of the atomic weapon from the national armaments.

The Anglo-American bloc, which forced this resolution upon the Assembly a year ago, was, of course, aware beforehand of the fact that the existing standpoints, very eloquently illustrated by the statements of very high-placed leaders of American politics, give no grounds whatever for the hope that this commission of six would succeed in finding such a basis as a result of its so-called consultations. Nevertheless, this resolution helped to mislead public opinion by creating the erroneous impression that the USA, Britain, and their followers are really anxious over the situation which developed on this question.

Now it is officially stated that the six permanent members of the Commission have failed to find a basis on which to solve the task facing them.

II

How the Anglo-American Bloc Distorts Facts

One cannot help noting that simultaneously with the presenta-
tion to the General Assembly of this Commission's preliminary report concerning consultations among the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission, five Commission members—the United States, Great Britain, France, China and Canada—hastened to publish their statement about these consultations.
In this statement they tendentiously set forth the substance of the differences that had sprung up between the Soviet Union and the five other permanent members of this Commission, and misrepresented the Soviet Union's stand, depicting it as if it had been the obstacle to reaching an agreement.

This statement of the five—I shall call it so for the sake of brevity—is calculated to shift on to the Soviet Union responsibility for the disruption of the work of the Atomic Energy Commission by misrepresenting the Soviet Union as an opponent of a ban on the atomic weapon and thus shifting the blame from the guilty to the innocent; it should be noted that this is the tried method of all falsifiers, of all those who are fond of fishing in muddy water.

The extent to which this statement gives a biased picture of the Soviet Union's position may be judged, for example, from the section of the five-Power statement entitled "Conclusions." In these "conclusions" the standpoint of the five Powers is represented literally as an angelic position. They, if you please, are upholding international security and international co-operation. They, the five Powers, are prepared to accept, according to this statement, the introduction of any "innovations" into the traditional procedure on international co-operation, on national sovereignty, and on economic organization wherever they may prove necessary for security. On the other hand, the standpoint of the Soviet Union is represented as a diabolic standpoint, painted in the blackest and ugliest colors. Hearing this quintet, it would appear that the Soviet Government refuses to take any measures that would ensure international co-operation and international security.

It is calumniously attributed to the Soviet Government that it "does not desire to take steps which may encroach on its strict practice of unhampered state sovereignty or hinder such practice." In these "conclusions" every word is either a distortion or a garbling or a falsification of facts.

Indeed, let us begin by considering the angelic standpoint of the five Powers. What were these angels proposing during the consultations? They maintain that they were proposing some kind of "innovations." In reality, they did not propose any "innovations" whatever, if we discount, of course, the innovation in the sphere of sovereignty, the demand for a categorical, complete, indisputable, and unconditional renunciation of all sovereignty. Indeed
such dictatorial demands cannot be regarded as some sort of an “innovation.” Nor is it possible to consider as “innovations” the old demands advanced time and time again by the British and American delegations and supported by some other delegations—the demands for the unconditional acceptance of the American plan of control, in disregard of the fact that this plan, as I have already mentioned, amounts to the complete denial of any state sovereignty.

The refusal of the Soviet representatives to accept such a plan, which would place under the will and arbitrariness of the so-called international control body the fate of any state and its economic and political independence, is depicted by this right honorable five as a refusal of international co-operation and a denial of international control over atomic energy.

During the so-called consultations the five Powers doggedly continued to impose the notorious Baruch Plan—invented, as is known, as far back as in 1946 and justly denounced by a number of prominent atomic scientists even two years ago, by scientists who can in no way be suspected of communism or of even the most remote association with communism.

In order to substantiate their version about some sort of “innovations” they found the need for a special statement by the Canadian representative who, on October 5 last, tried to prove that the American plan for so-called international control brought up before us—and which they are attempting to force upon us—is not a replica of the Baruch Plan, but that it greatly differs from that plan. This, of course, is an absurd discourse! All the main fundamental propositions of the original Baruch Plan remain unchanged to this day as if nothing had occurred since then requiring any alteration, requiring a reconsideration of the old standpoints by the authors of the American plan.

All the fundamental propositions of the Baruch Plan, beginning with the theory of stages and ending with the transfer to the international body of the property rights to all atomic raw materials and all atomic enterprises, remain unchanged in the new plan, in the so-called American plan which figures in the reports of the Atomic Energy Commission.

It is the same Acheson-Lilienthal-Baruch plan.

True, some kind of attempts are being made to cover up the
fangs and claws of this plan, and to replace some too cynical wordings by others not so odious and coarse.

Thus, for example, the provision specifying that the property rights to all the uranium and thorium stocks shall be transferred to the international body no matter where they may be situated is now formulated in more cautious terms—and this is the purpose of the French amendment—implying that it has in mind the transfer of the said materials into the possession of the international organ at the moment when these materials will be extracted from their natural depositories, i.e., when the ore will come out of the mines or of the adjoining ore-enriching plants.

The quintet agrees that the ore lodging somewhere at a depth of many thousands of meters should not be transferred to the possession of the international body, but should remain the property of the given state. But this quintet does not consent to the proposition that as soon as the ore appears on the surface it should be placed at the disposal of this state body, state authority, since immediately after it is raised from the mines this ore must become the property of the international control organ.

The essence of the matter clearly remains the same in both cases. The uranium and thorium ores become the property of the so-called international control organ. In order to cover up the too coarse frankness of the American imperialists, who are dreaming of taking the whole atomic production into their hands and of controlling the whole activity in this sphere throughout the world at their own discretion, the five Powers are trying to soften the formulations contained in the Atomic Energy Commission's reports, which speak about the notorious right of ownership of the so-called international control body. With these aims in view, they are staging a sort of masquerade: they are trying to substitute for the formula on the international control body's right of ownership of atomic raw materials and atomic energy plants the formula—"ownership by proxy" or "distribution by proxy."

But this alteration is purely verbal and in no way changes the essence of the matter, since ownership or distribution of atomic energy by proxy provides the control body with just such extensive powers as were provided under the first definition of property rights.

To render this camouflage more effective, the Canadian representative even attempted some criticism of the property rights
of the international control body provided for in the American plan. The preference which the five Powers are prepared to give to the formulation "ownership by proxy" as against the formulation "property rights," is motivated by the Canadian representative by the argument that to give the international body the authority to adopt decisions on the fundamental questions connected with the economic and other vital interests of a country would mean to invest this organ with a responsibility that could lead to unnecessary difficulties and confusion.

Thus, the Canadian representative, who decided to criticize the formulation of the right of property, makes a pretense at defending the economic and other vital interests of the states. In reality he camouflages his refusal to consider these interests, for, as I have already said, "ownership by proxy"—so-called "proxy"—in no way differs from ownership by "property rights."

III

United States Attempts to Use Its Control Plan for Masking the Refusal to Prohibit the Atomic Weapon

Here are two examples which in my opinion give an adequately clear and vivid illustration of the "innovations" allegedly contained in the plan of the Atomic Energy Commission, as distinct from the Baruch Plan.

Thus the conclusion may be drawn that the American plan for so-called international control remains the very same plan that it was three years ago, with all its fundamental defects owing to which, and this is something the sponsors of this plan themselves know very well, it is doomed to failure.

The question arises: How then can one explain the stubbornness with which the Anglo-American majority in the Commission supports this plan? Voices are already heard, and among them the voices of authoritative persons, experts in the field of atomic energy, declaring that this wild plan is precisely designed to impede the establishment of any control in general. Voices are heard—and one can judge of this by the American and British press, at least by a certain part of this press—declaring that this plan is simply a move in a chess game.

The critics of this plan among the atomic scientists already declare outright that this plan was thought up in the belief that
its rejection could be utilized as a pretext for a noisy anti-Soviet
campaign and for accusing the Soviet Union of a negative attitude
to this plan, as allegedly being the sole obstacle in the way of
achieving world peace. The critics, the number of whom is increas-
ing, at the present time—particularly in connection with such
an indisputable fact as that expressed in the announcement you all
know made by the Soviet Telegraph Agency on September 25 of
this year*—these critics are to an increasingly greater extent
indicating the real state of affairs behind this American plan. In
it, the critics of the American plan point out, its sponsors saw
"a very significant victory for American diplomacy."

This plan, despite its complete unacceptability to a number of
countries, which cannot be disregarded, is known to enjoy the full
support of top-ranking representatives of the United States. Let
us recall the recent statement of the President of the United States
that this plan "is the only plan meeting the technical require-
tments of control, making prohibition of the atomic weapon effective and
simultaneously assisting peaceful atomic energy development on the
basis of co-operation."

All this gives grounds for warranting well-founded assumptions
openly expressed in the press that the sponsors of the American
plan for so-called international control did not in fact reckon on
this plan serving as a basis for solving the question of the prohibi-
tion of the atomic weapon.

In this respect the illusion cherished by the American ruling
circles that the United States has a monopoly of atomic bomb
manufacture naturally played its role. This illusion was particularly
widespread in 1946, in the year the Baruch Plan was created—the
plan which at the present time too continues to reign over the minds
of these circles. The American press is openly stating that it was
expected at that time that the monopoly would exist for at least
several years. This assumption to a considerable extent influenced
the very nature of the American plan for so-called international
control.

At any rate it will be interesting to recall an article recently
published in the New Republic magazine in which one may read
the following: "... the monopoly concept explains the proviso

* TASS statement on atomic energy.
as to stages, the principle of which had been foreshadowed in the Truman-Atlee-King statement of November 15, 1945.”

This is correct. But this is also correct with regard to other main peculiarities of the American plan. The illusion of an American atomic bomb monopoly impelled the American ruling circles to create such a plan as could ensure the liquidation of all national rivalry in this sphere, in the sphere of the atomic weapon, if eventually some kind of international control nevertheless had to be established.

Illusions, however, are known to fade away, while facts remain. Now it is already clear to everyone that the illusion of an American atomic weapon monopoly has hopelessly vanished. At the same time the fact is likewise clear that another state also possesses the atomic bomb.

A careful analysis of the attitude of the ruling circles of the USA toward the Soviet proposals on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control shows that the efforts of the USA were concentrated not on overcoming the obstacles in this way, obstacles quite natural and inevitable in so new and complicated a matter as the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes and the establishment of control over the implementation of this prohibition. The efforts of the USA were employed at that time for piling up one difficulty upon another, for hindering in essence the practical realization of the General Assembly resolutions of January 24 and December 14, 1946, in which the General Assembly unanimously recognized in principle the necessity to exclude the possibility for using atomic energy for military purposes and for removing the atomic weapon from national armaments.

The arrangement proposed by the United States of America: “first control and then prohibition,” could mean nothing else than a refusal to prohibit the atomic weapon, although it was camouflaged by phrases and verbal recognition of the necessity for such a ban. It may be said that this line lives on and operates to this day.

At the third session of the General Assembly, in Paris, the Soviet Union consented to the simultaneous coming into effect, to the simultaneous conclusion of two conventions: on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on control.

The proposal of the Soviet Union to this effect was officially presented at the last session of the General Assembly, but it was
rejected; it proved unacceptable to the majority in the General Assembly, although it seems perfectly natural that it is possible to exercise control only over an already established fact, that in order to control the implementation of the ban on the production of the atomic weapon it would be necessary to prohibit the production of the atomic weapon to begin with. Nevertheless, disregarding the fact that any other view of the question would be entirely illogical and incorrect, the Soviet Government, desiring to remove the obstacles in the way of agreement in this important and responsible matter, agreed to propose the simultaneous conclusion and putting into effect of the two conventions—on prohibition and control.

Why was this proposal rejected by the majority? Why had the majority chosen to evade the issue, preferring to amuse itself by meaningless discussions or declarative phrases about the importance of agreement on a settlement of the atomic question for the benefit of mankind? And yet this settlement depends upon ourselves. All we have to do is to agree on the necessity of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, on the necessity for a convention on control over this prohibition, to agree that these two conventions should be simultaneously signed and brought into effect. But even this proposal of the Soviet Union proved unacceptable to the majority which tries at all costs, and I may say beforehand, tries unsuccessfully, to force upon the Soviet Union a worthless, falsified plan for so-called international control over atomic energy.

Instead of supporting this proposal on the simultaneous conclusion of the two conventions—on prohibition and control—a different question was raised, the question whether the Soviet Government agrees to accept the form of international control proposed in the American plan. Only a negative answer could naturally be and was given to this question. And I shall try briefly to explain the reason for it.

IV

Our Differences

The essence of the differences between the USSR and the USA on the atomic question has been repeatedly reported on in different organs: in commissions, sub-commissions, committees, sub-committees, groups, etc.
I believe it necessary to speak of it at present, because it is impossible not to do so, especially in view of the statement published by Canada, China, France, Great Britain, and the USA on consultations between the six permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission. It is necessary because this statement contains a falsified representation of a number of facts which thoroughly distort the essence of the differences existing between us, and, lastly, contains plainly slanderous remarks about the standpoint of the Soviet Union on the atomic question.

The cardinal principle upon which the entire American plan is based is formulated in the following way in the statement of the five Powers: "The five Powers remain convinced that... to ensure security the international control body must itself operate and administer dangerous installations and must possess dangerous atomic materials and installations for manufacturing or using dangerous quantities of such materials by proxy on behalf of member-states."

As I have already said, talk about "proxy," reference to "proxy," in no way changes the substance of the matter inasmuch as under this plan the international control agency is in fact provided with property rights.

This should be clear from the statement made by the representative of the United States, Mr. Osborn, at the 48th sitting of the Atomic Energy Commission on June 9, 1948, when replying to the third question put by the representative of the Soviet Union, he declared that "the international control body should have at its disposal all sources of atomic raw materials, nuclear fuel and dangerous installations entrusted to it by participating countries, and that participating states can have no right whatever to ownership or the right to take decisions on questions bearing upon atomic resources and atomic materials located on their territories."

The third report of the Atomic Energy Commission likewise emphasizes that only the international control body shall be vested with property rights to the primary material and nuclear fuel, moreover, these property rights imply the right to ownership, exploitation, and administration.

It follows from this and it is said so on page 11 of the third report, that:

"The control body shall be vested with property rights to all the primary materials from the moment of their extraction from
their natural deposits, and shall determine the degree of concentration required for taking over ownership of these primary materials."

This control organ and no other agency will determine in each case whether it shall directly own and manage the refineries of the primary materials and their exploitation, or issue licenses for their exploitation by the states on whose territories these factories are situated.

Moreover, in each case the separate countries shall have no right to adopt any decisions relating to the production or use of atomic energy. Not only dangerous, but also safe industrial enterprises connected with the production of atomic energy shall be placed at the complete disposal of this control organ, and this organ shall have the exclusive right to own all the nuclear fuel, regardless of its source of origin.

In the brief summary of the control plan submitted by the majority in the Atomic Energy Commission (contained in the third report of the Security Council of May 17, 1948), it is pointed out plainly that: "The development and use of atomic energy is in essence not the internal affair of individual countries but is primarily a matter of international import and influence."

Naturally, this entire plan does not stand up to criticism. If we dwell upon the last point, to the effect that the development and utilization of atomic energy are not actually the internal affairs of individual countries, this is refuted by a number of facts concerning events which have already taken place, despite the comparatively brief period—of a few years only—in my country, where atomic energy is being used precisely, and in very important economic undertakings both in scope and significance, in the interests of peaceful construction. Therefore, to say that the development and utilization of atomic energy have already ceased to be the internal affair of a country does not correspond to reality, although one cannot deny that the problem of the atomic weapon is of international importance.

From all the aforementioned facts the conclusion is drawn that "all the work in this field must be performed directly by the control organ on the basis of its authorized rights to the exploitation, management, and ownership, or by separate states only on the basis of the licenses issued by the control organ."

The American plan goes as far as to envisage the handing over
to the ownership of the international body likewise the chemical and iron and steel plants under the pretext that at this stage of manufacture the danger of concealment will be more serious than in previous stages.

This, gentlemen, is the fundamental question, the question precisely of the form of international control, of the principles which should and can furnish a basis for really strict international control which would ensure to the greatest possible degree the honest fulfillment of the corresponding convention on control which is to be signed and put into effect simultaneously with the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. But let us continue our excursion into this plan. A control body possessing the extensive rights with which it is vested under the American plan is also to be invested with extensive powers of control and inspection.

The American plan disregards everything. It openly demands recognition of the right of this international body to interfere in any sphere of the economic life of any state. Not only—and this I ask you to note—in that sphere which in some measure is linked with atomic production, but in any sphere.

The draft proposal of the five Powers points frankly to the right of this so-called international control organ to intervene not only in the activities of the national enterprises on atomic energy, but also in the “economic plans and in the private, public, and state relations in the different states.” (Report of the Atomic Energy Commission. Special Document No. 1, 1949, page 3 “Recommendations.”)

V

American Control Plan Deprives Science of its Freedom

Under the American plan the international body alone enjoys the exclusive right of conducting scientific investigation and work in the field of development and utilization of the atomic weapon and atomic energy. Point 3 in Chapter 2 of the report of the Atomic Energy Commission says plainly:

“Individual countries and persons shall be prohibited from conducting experiments which require or for which production is undertaken of nuclear fuel or radioactive isotopes in quantities and of a quality considered dangerous by the international body.” Hence, the point is not that these quantities may be objectively
dangerous; the point is that the international body will be author-
ized to recognize one or another quantity dangerous in order to
lay its hands on all the experimental work conducted in the field
of atomic energy.

It is thus clear that the object pursued by the majority of the
Atomic Energy Commission is not only to subordinate to this
control all the research in the field of atomic energy conducted in
any country, but also to place it at the disposal of this control
body which is to develop into some kind of gigantic world scien-
tific super-laboratory for studying and experimenting with atomic
energy, in order that not a single country using atomic energy for
peaceful purposes should have the right to poke its nose into this
scientific business.

In an article on the atomic armaments race versus control, pub-
lished recently in the Scientific American, Chester Barnard, a promi-
nent American, former member of the Lilienthal atomic group
and now president of The Rockefeller Foundation, said the follow-
ing about the American plan for so-called international control:
"If dispersal of the population is the only immediate means of
reducing vulnerability that we can hope for, then we should have
to carry the control of private lives to unheard-of lengths in this
country. . . . The defense measures that would be absolutely nec-
essary in the event of a protracted failure to get international
agreement would mean an intolerable central management of our
lives. Such control," says Barnard, "has already progressed to the
point where it threatens the freedom of science." And this is a
statement by one of the coauthors of the Baruch Plan.

I must recall that the memorandum submitted by British atomic
scientists two years ago pointed out that if the control body were
given full possession of the means of production in the field of
atomic energy in the ordinary sense of this word, that is on the
basis of property rights, this would give rise to difficulties, since
such an arrangement would give the atomic energy control body
the right to decide whether one or another country may build
power plants, and the right to prevent any country from using
the power produced by these plants, or to determine the condi-
tions for the supply of this power.

"This restriction," states the memorandum of the British scien-
tists, "would make it possible to intervene in the economic life
of every country to an extent unnecessary for preventing the use
of atomic energy for military purposes." Therefore, it is not a question of the right to intervene in the economic life of a country to prevent the use of atomic energy for military purposes, but of the right to intervene in the economic life of any country even in cases when it is not warranted by the necessity to struggle against the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

In the same memorandum, the British scientists mentioned the secret aims pursued by the organization of such international control.

Professor Blackett's book on the military and political consequences of atomic energy, cited time and time again, points out that as far as the USSR is concerned, this system of control would enable a so-called international control body to obtain "a fairly complete map of objectives in the USSR, even if the compilation of a review would not develop into a complete system of military and industrial espionage."

The memorandum states:

"The United States of America and other supporters of the Baruch Plan should be persuaded to formulate guarantees that would ensure conditions under which no inspection plan would develop into a thoroughly elaborated system of espionage."

This remark of the British scientists is adequate to give a clear idea of the real designation of the American draft plan for so-called international control over atomic energy. Can there really be a question of inspection, can there really be a question of international control if this body is invested with property rights and with unlimited authority in all matters relating to atomic energy!

Suffice it to say that the selection of personnel will rest with this body. The argument that this selection will be made on an international basis changes nothing in the real state of affairs, when the leading role in this international organ will be secured to the majority composed predominantly of members of anti-Soviet military and political blocs, such as the North Atlantic, West European, and similar blocs. It is to such an organ that attempts are being made to subordinate the country against whom these blocs are directed, against whom a black conspiracy for a new war is being schemed! One must truly lose all his senses to believe that a plan like this would be acceptable to the Soviet Union!

The control body envisioned in the American plan would put
into effect diverse measures connected with the inspection in any
country, moreover the decision on such an inspectional survey is
likewise left to the discretion of this body. This body will be
authorized to determine also the quotas for atomic energy pro-
duction for each state.

Such is so-called international control envisioned by the Ameri-
can plan described by Mr. Osborn, the US representative in the
Atomic Energy Commission, in an article published in *The New
York Times* on October 30, 1949, as a "great international co-
operative in the full sense of the word.” A fine co-operative!

The name co-operative does not correspond to the real nature
of this plan primarily because to a number of states, who com-
prise a fairly significant magnitude in international relations, this
plan is unacceptable for the aforementioned reasons, and, conse-
quently, the stubborn insistence on this very plan, which, more-
over, is without any grounds whatever represented as the best plan,
is indicative of an unrealistic approach to so important a problem
as the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the organization of
international control over the enforcement of this prohibition.

VI

Uselessness of the American Control Plan

Mr. Osborn himself had to admit that this notorious "inter-
national co-operative,” and the whole American control plan,
for that matter, does not exclude the possibility of such violation
of the agreement as the seizure of the atomic enterprises, refusal
to permit the international inspection of these enterprises, the
leakage of atomic energy for the illegal production of armaments,
etc., etc. Mr. Osborne himself allows for all this in this "inter-
national co-operative.” The American representative allows for these
occurrences also under the American control plan based on the
property rights of the control body to all the atomic raw materials
and atomic energy enterprises, as well as the allied enterprises.

And what will happen if under the circumstances, as authori-
tatively maintained by Mr. Osborne in this article in *The New
York Times*, these abuses will take place after the American control
scheme, represented as the only panacea against all violations and
abuses in the field of atomic energy, goes into effect?

Then, says Mr. Osborn with a shrug of his shoulders, other
countries will in their turn capture the enterprises, capture the nuclear fuel on their territories, and an atomic armaments race will begin all over again. And further down Mr. Osborn says:

"If any international body will possess and manage the enterprises, then the potential explosives may again be concentrated in the hands of the states through seizure if the situation proves almost hopeless."

Thus, in complete contradiction with his own conception, in utter denial of all his assumptions, Mr. Osborn says that not one of the people—I am citing his article—who in the past three years served as delegates in the Atomic Energy Commission, has ever thought it possible to prepare a plan for control acceptable to the whole world, the world as it is today, which would at the same time guarantee against the possible use of the atomic weapon in a long war.

This is what Mr. Osborn, the US representative and member of the Atomic Energy Commission, says of this American plan which is falling apart in his own hands the moment he ceases to be an American official and becomes an American journalist. Then he sees at once all these shady sides, all the white stitches in this so-called American plan, whose seams rip at the first impact of sound human reason. This conclusion stems directly from the statement of Mr. Osborn, the official advocate of the American plan here, in our midst, and in the United Nations in general. What conclusions then may be drawn from this?

Colossal stakes have been laid on each state renouncing its national independence for the sake of, as the authors of this American plan say, "the supreme weal"—that is, humanity's salvation from the horrors of atomic warfare. But does this correspond to the American plan, which is bound up with the violation of state sovereignty, with the withdrawal of atomic energy from use by individual states, with the bottling up of scientific research work in this line, and which will—no one can doubt this—throttle every opportunity of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes?

We in the Soviet Union utilize atomic energy, not in order to stockpile atomic bombs, although I am sure that when they are needed, if unfortunately this happens, there will be as many of them as necessary. We utilize atomic energy in accordance with our economic plans and our economic interests. We have har-
nessed atomic energy for the promotion of the great tasks of peaceful construction. We want to harness atomic energy to the great tasks of peaceful construction, to blast mountains, change the course of rivers, irrigate deserts, and lay out ever new paths to life where the human foot has not yet trod. This we do as masters of our land, according to our plan, and we are not obliged either to submit or render an account in this matter to any international body.

Efforts are now being made to disrupt all this by forcing upon us the plan for so-called international control; they want to disrupt it although they do not believe that the plan proposed by them can really bring the salvation of which they speak. If there is not a single person who thinks that this plan would bring salvation, that the control proposed by the American plan can save mankind from the horrors of an atomic war, as Mr. Osborne said, then where is the need for this plan, where is the need for all the sacrifices for the sake of this plan of which you are shouting and which you are demanding?

The main motive advanced in defense of the American control plan providing for the transfer of property rights to the control body consists in the assertion that control in any other case and under any other system of control and inspection will not be effective. The five-Power statement points out that the manufacture of nuclear fuel is so complicated that inspection cannot prevent concealment and that—I quote from this report—

"It would be . . . impossible to check the actual amounts of atomic materials inside piles or reactors against the amounts shown in the records."

Criticizing the USSR's proposals providing for periodic inspection of atomic energy generating plants, etc., the five-Power representatives declare that one system of inspection would not suffice, and that therefore it is necessary to hand over all atomic raw materials and atomic plants to the ownership of the international control body.

But the aforementioned confession made, incidentally perhaps, by one of the supporters of the American plan proves that the transfer to an international control body of property rights to atomic raw materials and atomic energy plants would not provide proper guarantees against potential abuse!

The five-Power statement says that the Soviet proposals "would
not only fail to provide the security required, but they would be so inadequate as to be dangerous." The five-Power representatives did not bother, however, to explain precisely the nature of the imperfection of the Soviet proposals. Is it periodical control? Is it control in the event of a doubt arising as to a decision of the international control body itself? Are these means inadequate? Is it the absence in this body of the right of veto which was the bugbear employed lately by many of the champions of this plan who maintain that the Soviet Union does not want to open the doors to inspection? But the Soviet Union understands inspection, not as some do who want to sit down at a table and put their feet on it. We reject such an attitude.

It must be said outright that all these arguments about the danger of the Soviet control plan are absolutely groundless. I want to refer to Mr. Chester Barnard who claims that "control of the atomic bomb might not be as difficult as that of other modes of warfare." I would like to emphasize that the supporters of this view, maintaining that the problem of atomic control is far simpler than, for instance, control of chemicals, are becoming more numerous. But there do exist conventions, do there not, prohibiting the utilization of poison gas without the enterprises manufacturing poison gas being transferred, on the basis of property rights, into the full ownership of any so-called international control body? Then why cannot the same procedure be adopted with regard to atomic energy—why cannot it be controlled without transferring the property rights to an international control body, if as atomic specialists say, control over atomic energy is simpler than over chemical production?

But one need not be a specialist to understand the justice of this argument, inasmuch as the sources of atomic raw materials are few—which means that it will be easier to control, since the production of atom bombs requires a tremendous amount of raw materials—and concealment will therefore be rendered difficult, because it is far more difficult to conceal many hundreds of tons of raw materials than to conceal some kilograms of these raw materials, especially so since, as one American journalist observed correctly, a bomb cannot be prepared somewhere in a back yard; a bomb must be produced in big and complicated plants.

All these facts taken together prove that control for preventing the production of atomic energy for military purposes is far easier
and practicable, more effective and possible, than control over any other armaments.

It therefore seems to me that Barnard's opinion is correct.

However, criticism of the American plan, which its sponsors are trying to foist upon us, is not exhausted by what I have said. I shall again mention Mr. Barnard, who admits that the American plan presumes that the United States might renounce possession of the atomic bomb on definite conditions—only after consideration of exhaustive and sincere guarantees that all countries would in the final account refuse to utilize a weapon based upon atomic energy. Mr. Barnard asks what this means, and replies: "This inevitably meant that other nations would have to relinquish, step by step and voluntarily, important elements of sovereignty in advance of the relinquishment of the bomb by the US." I continue to quote the very same Mr. Barnard: "It is hard to imagine conditions less favorable to successful negotiations by proud and equal nations."

Mr. Barnard admits—and this is his personal avowal published by the newspapers—that in 1946 it was already plain to him that the chances for the adoption of this American plan were very insignificant.

Why? His explanation is: because every country, including his own—the United States of America—would encounter extreme technical and popular difficulties in renouncing that considerable portion of its state sovereignty which would be demanded in connection with the adoption of the conceived pact.

VII

American Control Plan—Deceit of Nations

Moreover, it is seen from the report of the Atomic Energy Commission itself, drawn up by Mr. Acheson, Dr. Bush, Dr. Conant, Major General Groves, and Mr. McCloy, with the participation of a board of consultants composed of Mr. Barnard, Dr. Oppenheimer, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Winne, and presided over by Mr. Lilienthal, that decision of the question as to when America will discontinue production of atomic bombs will be dependent on considerations of supreme policy, as is said in this report, and would be made by the United States Government "under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world
situation." This is a highly important statement, revealing the true meaning of the entire American plan.

To make it more clear as to what precisely is in question, I shall continue to quote this foreword to the report of the Board of Consultants, presided over by Mr. Lilienthal and presented through Mr. Acheson and others to the then United States Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes. The foreword reads: "One of these decisions will be for what period of time the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. The plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. At some stage in the development of the plan this is required."—I am quoting this note—"But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be construed as meaning that this should or should not be done at the outset or at any specific time."

What does all this mean, I ask, if not that the authors of the American plan of so-called international control, headed by Mr. Acheson and Mr. Lilienthal, by proposing their plan of control over non-utilization of atomic energy for production of atomic bombs, did not in the least suppose that with the adoption of this plan the United States of America itself must discontinue production of atomic bombs? This is said outright in that note. That is the first point.

It means that the question as to when the United States will consider it possible to discontinue production of atomic bombs would be determined by the United States itself, despite the fact that the convention on international control, which must envisage prohibition of the utilization of atomic energy for military purposes, would have already gone into effect. This is the second point.

It means that such a decision (on discontinuation of the production of atomic bombs) need in no way pertain to the American plan for so-called control. This is the third point.

It means that inasmuch as the plan had not provided for the discontinuation of production of atomic bombs by the United States, but provided for control only at the stage of obtaining raw materials, only those countries will be subject to this control, which have not yet mastered production of atomic bombs, and that this plan will not concern the United States of America which
reckoned that it possessed the monopoly over the production of atomic bombs.

Thus, this plan for so-called international control contained no provisions for the cessation of the production of atom bombs in the USA, which is the most important requisite, leaving the decision of this question to the United States itself. This plan consequently amounted to an obvious fraud, to political trickery.

Is it not clear that under the circumstances there is no sense in general in conducting any discussions and disputes about all these possible cases of concealment and capture of enterprises. They are merely artificially excited disputes on various technical difficulties of inspection and control connected with the prohibition of the atomic weapon in general, etc., etc. It may be said that with the present level of science and engineering—at any rate, we can say it of the situation in the Soviet Union—the elimination of the potential technical difficulties connected with the prohibition of the atomic weapon and international control is not an insoluble problem. In this case, the property rights of the international control organ, as I tried to show in the foregoing, is incapable of solving this problem. And there is no necessity whatever for such a solution.

VIII

Sovereignty of Nations and United States Dreams for World Domination

This demand—to transfer to the international control organ property rights to all the world deposits of atomic energy, to all enterprises for processing atomic raw materials and all the allied enterprises and branches of industry—this demand can be explained by only one reason. And certainly, the delegate of the Philippines was wrong when he tried to prove here that the political approach allegedly plays no role here, and denied the political significance of the problem now before us, whereas its significance lies precisely in the political aspect because technically it is not an impossible task.

This demand can be explained only by political reasons, and precisely by the desire to lay hands upon the full might of this atomic energy and subsequently to regulate its use in favor of the interests of the so-called international control body in which
the representatives of the Anglo-American monopolies, or to put it more accurately, the American monopolies will have a majority.

This plan cannot be accepted, firstly, because it is not a plan for international control; it is a plan for American control; it is an American super-trust endeavoring—under the sign of an international body and under cover of the name of our UN—to capture control over all the world resources of atomic energy and over all the enterprises processing atomic energy.

As I have already said, the statement of the five Powers tries to distort the real attitude of the Soviet Union toward the question of sovereignty by alleging that the Soviet Government considers it impossible in general to agree to the slightest degree of international co-operation if state sovereignty is affected thereby. This is an obvious invention.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly pointed out that it is an absolute natural necessity in certain cases to limit to some extent, or in some part, state sovereignty on the basis of reciprocity and in the interests of international co-operation. The whole problem does not consist in the least in the denial of the natural and generally recognized fact that every agreement requires mutual limitations on the part of the contracting parties and that observation of this principle in international agreements is also inevitable. The matter at issue is the degree, the extent, the type of limitations of state sovereignty, the very limitation of which is possible only on the part of sovereign and equal states as parties. However, precisely this is passed over in silence by the champions of the American plan.

After all the aforesaid about this American plan, it should be clear that the matter at issue is not the relinquishing of some part of sovereignty, as is asserted by the representatives of the five Powers, but the total liquidation of state sovereignty as such of all the other states. The main provisions of the American plan—the property right of the international body to atomic raw materials and the atomic enterprises, and to allied branches of industry and national economy in general; the right of this body to intervene in concrete economic and financial plans of any country; the investment of this body with the authority to manage and direct all scientific research in the field of atomic energy, unlimited inspection with all sorts of aerial photographs, the maintenance of its own guards on the territories of sovereign states; definition
of the quotas in atomic energy production, etc, etc.—all this is adequate illustration of the big appetites of the American monopolists, who, under cover of the UN and all sorts of "international bodies," are in reality striving to secure domination over all the world resources of atomic energy, as well as over the development of the national economy of any country.

This is the root of matters, and this is the fundamental obstacle in the way of agreement on the basis of this American plan for so-called international control.

The fact that this plan is unacceptable should therefore be obvious. It is unacceptable from the viewpoint of the interests of the development of national economy, since its regulation is placed entirely in the hands of a so-called international control body and is completely removed from the jurisdiction of the respective state which alone is competent in the matter of the development of its country.

The great scientific discoveries connected with the splitting of the atom and the production and use of atomic energy can play an immeasurably significant role in raising the living standard of the peoples of the world and in promoting the development of culture and science for the benefit of all mankind. The role of atomic energy in economic development is tremendous. This alone shows what harm could be done by withdrawing this matter from the jurisdiction of sovereign states, of peace-loving states; what harm could be done by concentrating the right to regulate the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in the hands of some international body authorized to effect a "fair" allocation of atomic energy resources, as is envisioned by the American plan.

As for the Soviet Union, it is all the more unacceptable to it, since in Soviet national economy the power resources and atomic energy—now that we have it—play an exceptional role, one of special economic and cultural significance.

Until very recently a very important part in the stand of the American Government on the atomic question was played by the illusion of the monopoly over atomic energy, the belief in its, I should say, atomic superiority over the whole world. Hence, it seems to me, that superciliousness of the American Government in the consideration of this question and in the negotiations for settling the atomic question with its partners. It should be absolutely clear that now there are no grounds for this supercilious pose.
Nevertheless, there still are people in the USA who hope to preserve some remnants of its superiority through a race in the production of the atomic weapon, their calculations now being based on the quantity of atom bombs, on the hope that the Soviet Union will not succeed in overtaking, to say nothing of surpassing the USA in this field. It is, however, not excluded that they will miscalculate this time as well, just as they did with regard to the production of the first atom bomb in the Soviet Union. It is known that practical activities in this direction are conducted in the USA, as is evident from the shameful discussion held recently by the chiefs of the American Navy and the chiefs of the US Air Forces, when the most high-placed representatives of the United States armed forces spent weeks in discussing the best ways and methods of their application in order to cripple and kill as many millions of people as possible, to destroy the greatest possible number of cities and entire states.

Is it possible in this atmosphere to speak of any prohibition of the atom bomb by the circles of the USA which control the internal life in that country!

Under cover of preparation of all sorts of plans for control over atomic energy and all sorts of consultations on this question, the representatives of the five Powers, under the leadership of the USA, are in reality trying to utilize every day for increasing their stocks of the atomic weapon in the hope of securing quantitative superiority in the atomic weapon.

This recalls to my mind a clever remark made by an American journalist who said that “only a fool can think that an answer to the creation of Russian bombs can be given by doubling the output of our own atom bombs. A threat to shoot a man twice when he himself can shoot us is stupid arithmetic,” he said. And this is correct. Quantitative superiority in this matter is a doubtful superiority.

IX

The USSR Demands that the Atomic Weapon Be Banned, Strict International Control Be Established

The Soviet Government is continually striving for real and exhaustive measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and for the establishment, as was said by Generalissimo Stalin, of strict international control over the impermissibility of the utilization of
atomic energy for military purposes. Naturally, the first and most important step in this direction must be the prohibition of the atomic weapon, prohibition of all other basic armaments designated for the wholesale destruction of human life. No control plans with their notorious provisions for transferring to the control body the property rights, or the right to possess, or the right to allocate—call it what you please—will, nor can they, solve this problem.

As for the establishment of quotas of which the authors of the American plan are also dreaming, it should be borne in mind that the establishment of quotas in the field of atomic production before prohibiting the atomic weapon would be altogether senseless since the allocation of quotas does not cover the question of the use of atomic energy for military purposes. And all the attempts to substitute the question of the allocation of quotas for the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon should therefore be rejected.

The proposals of the Soviet Union of June 11, 1947, arise from the necessity for immediate and unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon. Prohibition of the atomic weapon is an integral part of the peace program which is pursued and defended by the Soviet Union, and which the Government of the USSR has defended and is defending, irrespective of which side possesses the advantage in the actual correlation of forces, irrespective of whether or not the Soviet Union possesses the secret of the atomic weapon or the atomic weapon itself.

Proceeding from its principled position of defending peace, of strengthening the security of nations, from recognition of the incompatibility of utilization of the atomic weapon with membership in the United Nations, and from recognition of the fact that utilization of the atomic weapon contradicts the honor and conscience of nations, the Soviet Government has consistently over a number of years insisted, and insists now, on prohibition of the atomic weapon. It has urged and urges now immediate exclusion of this weapon of aggression and barbarism from national armaments.

The Soviet Government, despite its possession of the atomic weapon, adheres, and intends to adhere hereafter to its former position of urging unconditional prohibition of the employment of this weapon. The Soviet Government also maintains its former
stand with regard to control over the atomic weapon, believing that such control will be necessary for checking on fulfillment of the decision on the prohibition of production of the atomic weapon.

Proceeding from this principled stand, the Soviet Government as long as two years ago submitted a proposal on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on the establishment of strict international control. These proposals came up against the opposition of the majority of this Commission. But this will not deter us, the people of the Soviet Union, from a further irreconcilable fight for these proposals, which really bring salvation to humanity from the threat of a new monstrous, inhuman, atomic war.
Speech of November 23, 1949 at the Plenary Session of the General Assembly

It is necessary to recall once more the resolution of the General Assembly taken on January 24, 1946, which established a commission on the problems brought forth by the discovery of atomic energy. This resolution charged the aforementioned commission to proceed immediately with its work in order to make concrete proposals to the General Assembly on the question of atomic energy, specifically on the "removal of the atomic weapon and all other main types of armaments suitable for mass annihilation from national armaments," as well as on control over atomic energy within the bounds needed to ensure its utilization for peaceful purposes only.

In two months it will be four years since the adoption of this historic resolution, yet not one of these decisions of the General Assembly has so far been implemented.

No measures whatever for the removal of the atomic weapon from national armaments have been drafted, and naturally none have been adopted. No measures for control over atomic energy within the bounds needed only for peaceful purposes have been elaborated and consequently implemented. No measures of precaution and defense of states observing agreements from possible violations and evasions have been taken. This is a fact which deserves serious attention.

I

The Soviet Union Stands for the Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon, for Strict International Control

On its part the Soviet Union has done everything in its power to implement the decisions of the General Assembly in order really to rid mankind of the danger of mass annihilation by such means of warfare as the atomic weapon—a weapon of aggression whose employment outrages the conscience and insults the honor of peace-loving peoples.
The Soviet Union from the very outset proposed to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the manufacture and use of the atomic weapon based on the utilization of atomic energy for the purposes of mass annihilation.

On June 19, 1946, the USSR presented the appropriate draft convention to the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Kuomintang delegate stated in the Special Committee that a year had passed before the USSR introduced its proposals on inspection. He kept silent, however, about the fact that the proposals of June 19, 1946, envisaged severe punishment for the violators of this convention. This statement does not correspond to reality. But I do not intend to engage in polemics with this gentleman, first and foremost for the simple reason that it is not known whom he represents. It is known that on November 15, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic, Mr. Chou-En-lai, informed the Chairman of the General Assembly, Mr. Romulo, that the delegation headed by Chiang Ting-fu could not represent China and had no right to speak in the United Nations on behalf of the Chinese people.

The USSR delegation supports this statement and will not consider the Kuomintang delegation as the representative of China.

The document of the USSR of June 19, 1946, stressed once more that the Soviet Union lost no time in this matter, being aware of the exceptional importance of the earliest settlement of this issue. It was proposed in this convention that the contracting parties solemnly declare their unanimous decision to prohibit the manufacture and use of the atomic weapon and assume the following obligations:

(a) not to use the atomic weapon under any circumstances;
(b) to prohibit the manufacture and storing of the weapon based on the use of atomic energy;
(c) to destroy within three months, counting from the date when the present convention enters into force, the entire stock of ready and uncompleted output of atomic weapons.

The Soviet draft declared violation of the above obligations to be the gravest international crime against humanity and proposed to establish severe punishment for violation of this convention. Next the USSR proposed to take a decision that an "effective system of control over atomic energy should be realized on an international scale and established by a multilateral convention whose imple-
mentation is obligatory and should be effected within the framework of the Security Council."

The Soviet proposals introduced by the representative of the USSR on February 18, March 25, and June 3, 1947, pointed out that "the control agencies and the inspection agencies must carry out their control and inspection functions on the basis of their own regulations which must envisage the adoption of decisions in respective cases by a majority vote." This proposal of the USSR exposed the falsity of the assertions that the Soviet draft of control envisaged the use of the unanimity rule in voting which, as can be seen from the foregoing, does not correspond to reality and was used as a pretext for the procrastination and, in the final count, for thwarting the proposals to conclude a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Yet the United States delegate had no scruples in giving currency to this slander again in his speech in the ad hoc committee on November 11.

It should be recalled that as early as September 17, 1946, the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, in his answers to the questions of the Moscow correspondent of the London Sunday Times, Mr. Werth, pointed out that the atom bomb is not such a serious force as some politicians are inclined to consider it.

"Atom bombs," said J. V. Stalin, "are intended for intimidating the weak-nerved but they cannot decide the outcome of war since for this atom bombs are entirely insufficient. Of course, monopolistic possession of the secret of the atom bomb creates a menace, but against this there are at least two remedies: (a) monopolistic possession of the atom bomb cannot last long; (b) The use of the atom bomb will be prohibited."

On October 23, 1946, in reply to a question put by the president of the American United Press, Mr. Hugh Baillie, as to how atomic energy could best be controlled and whether this control should be established on an international basis, J. V. Stalin said that "strict international control is needed."

One has to examine these proposals carefully to see perfectly clearly how false and tendentious are the assertions of the opponents of these proposals who allege that the Soviet Union is against inspecting atomic energy enterprises, against giving access to any such enterprise to representatives of control and inspection, and so on.
Indeed, what tasks do the Soviet proposals put before atomic energy inspection? These are—

(1) Verification of the stocks of atomic raw materials, materials, and semi-manufactures;

(2) Collection and classification of data on the production of atomic raw materials and manufacture of atomic materials and atomic energy;

(3) The study of production operations in the scope necessary for control of the use of atomic materials and atomic energy. Supervision of the observance of the rules for technical exploitation prescribed by the control convention as well as elaboration of rules for technological control for these enterprises which the inspections have the right to prescribe to these enterprises;

(4) Periodic and special inspection of the activity of enterprises extracting atomic raw materials;

(5) Recommendation to governments on questions pertaining to production, storage, and use of atomic materials and atomic energy;


In conformity with these tasks the Soviet draft proposed to vest the international control commission with extraordinary broad powers and competence.

First of all, it is necessary to mention the right of the commission to have access to any enterprise for extracting, production, and storage of atomic raw material and materials, as well as for the exploitation of atomic energy.

II

The Anglo-American Bloc Seeks to Thwart the Soviet Proposals

The foes of the Soviet proposals seek in every way to pass these proposals in silence, spreading false statements alleging that the Soviet Union does not want to open the doors of its atomic enterprises. Yet paragraph 7a of the Soviet proposals contains the demand for ensuring the international control commission access to any atomic energy enterprise to fulfill the tasks of control and inspection entrusted to this commission.
As pointed out in paragraph 7 of the Soviet proposals, the international control commission is granted the right to acquaint itself with all the production processes of atomic energy enterprises on a scale necessary for this control; to make all kinds of weighing, measuring, and other analysis of atomic raw material, materials, and semi-manufactures; to demand from the government of any state various information and reports on the activity of the above enterprises and to verify them; to demand all kinds of explanations pertaining to the activity of atomic energy enterprises. It can give the governments recommendations on questions of production and use of atomic energy as well as submit for consideration of the Security Council recommendations regarding measures against the violators of the above conventions.

Upholding the right of each state to conduct scientific research in the field of atomic energy, the Soviet proposals at the same time subordinate this work to the action of the convention on prohibition of the atomic weapon and not permitting the use of atomic energy for military purposes. The proposals of the USSR of June 11, 1947, give the international control commission the opportunity to conduct scientific research in the field of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, stressing that one of the major tasks of the international control commission should be to ensure a broad exchange of information in this field among countries and to render necessary assistance through consultation to the signatories of the convention which may require such aid.

Such are the functions of international inspection outlined in the Soviet proposals, and they are fully sufficient for discharging the tasks of international control by the international control commission.

The enemies of the Soviet proposals tried to mislead public opinion with regard to the stand of the Soviet Union on the atomic energy issue. In August, 1947, the representative of Great Britain even submitted a special questionnaire in which, by a tendentious formulation of questions dealing with the separate proposals, an attempt was made to discredit these proposals. That attempt naturally failed. But this notwithstanding, insinuations regarding the Soviet proposals on inspection are still continuing, and underlying them are the same questions of the British delegate. Thus, for example, so far, the fire has been directed against the formula contained in the Soviet proposals on the periodic inspection of enter-
prises which extract atomic raw materials and produce atomic materials and atomic energy.

However, as long as two years ago the Soviet delegate, replying to a respective question of the representative of Great Britain, explained that periodic inspection envisages the inspection of all enterprises, beginning with mines and ending with plants producing nuclear fuel, not in definite periods established in advance, but depending on the need, by decision of the international control commission. (Reply to second question "B" 5/9/1947.)

It would seem to be clear that such a formulation of the question eliminates all danger of arbitrary action by certain states since the question of time when inspection is to be made, or the so-called periods of inspection, is fully in the hands of the international control agency. Nevertheless, we witnessed the attempts of certain delegates to criticize this formula of "periodic inspection" as allegedly restricting the right of the international control agency and giving the right to governments of separate countries, by reference to their sovereignty, not to allow inspection, irrespective of the decision of the international control agency. Such an attempt was made specifically in the ad hoc committee by the American Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Hickerson.

As for the statements about the ineffectiveness of periodic inspection, such statements do not hold up under criticism. As early as the first report of the Atomic Energy Commission to the Security Council in 1946, it was pointed out that the scientific facts at the disposal of the working committee give no grounds for assumption that effective control technically cannot be realized.

This report at the same time points out that if there were to be attempts to conceal materials, at the early stages of production or from hidden mines, for the manufacture of the atomic weapon, large and intricate installations would have to be exploited in secrecy for obtaining nuclear fuel. This would require the building of appropriate plants connected with big industrial operations and many kinds of unusual auxiliary activity which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to conceal from inspection.

The conclusion to which the committee arrived reads that "it would be extremely difficult to conduct secret exploitation of mines or concentration of uranium and thorium ores even if data about their geological deposits were not well-known in view of the large
quantities of material which must be processed and the general difficulties of concealing mining operations.

To bolster up the position of the opponents of the Soviet proposals, the five Powers, which published a statement on the atomic question on October 5 this year, referred to the fact that inspection cannot prevent concealment because it is impossible "to check the actual amounts of atomic materials inside piles or reactors against the amounts shown in the records." But the point is that under all systems of control, abuses and violations of the convention are not excluded. This was frankly admitted by the United States representative Osborn in an article published in *The New York Times*.

I twice pointed to this circumstance. Osborn maintained that even if all atomic materials and atomic enterprises were turned over to the international control agency, in whose hands would be concentrated entire control and inspection as envisaged by the Anglo-American plan, even in that case "potential explosives may again be concentrated in the hands of the states through seizure if the situation proves almost hopeless." The same should be said also of other methods for abuse and violation of the convention, including the concealment of atomic raw material for secret production of the atomic weapon. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that in all such cases no little part will be played by the personnel of the control machinery which, of course, will be subordinated to its administration. If one should consider possible abuses on the part of states, why then should one not consider possible abuses also on the part of the so-called international control agency, its administration, and its personnel, with whose help it is possible to act in any direction? We are far from such suspicions, but such suspicions are voiced by the sponsors of the American plan; they can in equal measure also be applied to the administration of the international control agency.

As for control of atomic energy in general, according to the statement of such an authoritative specialist in this field as the former member of Lilienthal's commission, now representative of The Rockefeller Foundation, Mr. Chester Barnard, control over the atom bomb cannot be as difficult as of other types of armaments. This standpoint finds its full justification in such objective facts as:

(a) A large quantity of raw materials is necessary for the production of the atom bomb, which thus renders difficult the concealment of war material and facilitates the discovery of such abuse;
(b) Large and intricate plants are necessary for the production of the atom bomb which also makes difficult the secret production of the atomic weapon and facilitates the disclosure of abuses in this respect too.

It is clear that references to greater difficulty of control over atomic energy than over any other enterprise manufacturing armaments are devoid of all grounds.

The Soviet Union insists on the need for prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing strict international control concluding for this purpose respective conventions or convention. It is also known that the Soviet Union, prior to the third session of the Assembly, upheld the need to *conclude, first of all*, a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. This is fully logical since control over the fulfillment of some kind of measure can be instituted only on the basis of such a measure. To control something that does not exist is tantamount to drawing water with a sieve.

The opponents of the Soviet proposal on the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, without reckoning with the logic of things, demand, however, the preliminary conclusion of a convention on control. The prohibition of the atomic weapon itself is made dependent by them on the system and forms of control, ignoring the circumstances that, on the contrary, the system and forms of control should correspond to the content of the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. However, in order to eliminate unnecessary obstacles in this matter, the Soviet Union agreed to the simultaneous conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on control.

But it is noteworthy that no sooner had the Soviet Union agreed to the simultaneous conclusion of both these conventions, then new objections were found. On November 9, this year, at a meeting of the Special Political Committee, the representative of Great Britain stated that the new Soviet proposal on the simultaneous conclusion of conventions for prohibition and control "is to no greater degree acceptable or feasible than its earlier demands for the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon, which were to be followed, after a certain indefinite time in the future, by the elaboration of the system of control." Such a statement gives away completely the opponents of the Soviet draft, proving once more that the United States and Great Britain, who head the resistance to the Soviet proposals, are not at all interested either in the prohibition
of the atomic weapon or in the establishment of control, that they are interested in diametrically the opposite.

And it is not fortuitous, gentlemen, that last year at a meeting of the Security Council the United States delegate, Professor Jessup, made a statement on the question of control over atomic energy which cannot be understood otherwise than as an ultimatum: either the American plan of control over atomic energy must be accepted or in general there would be no control whatever and the atomic armaments race would continue, and that no compromises were possible here. With such a formulation of the question, of course there can be no talk of consultation or any negotiations; or any prospect for agreement, because this is a dictate, this is an ultimatum, and the language of dictates and ultimatums is not used in conversation with the Soviet Union against whom this dictate-ultimatum was directed. At least, the Soviet Union will not permit anyone to talk to it in such a language.

III

The American Plan of Control Serves the Policy of World Domination by the United States

It is known that the Anglo-American camp insists on this plan invented in 1945 by the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal commission. This plan, however, has been sufficiently compromised, and it is no accident that a statement of the Canadian delegate appeared in which he proves that the present American plan allegedly differs considerably from the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan. It turns out that this plan now is very difficult to defend in its natural, naked form—it is necessary to cover it up in some way. And so the search for a covering begins, and this covering is found in the statements that this is no longer the same plan, that this is an entirely different plan, that it differs from the original Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan in such and such and such and such ways.

Nonsense, gentlemen, it in no way differs from the original plan. Some phrases have been replaced by other phrases. The sum and substance remained the same. The principles remained the same. The foundations remained the same. The entire plan remained the same as it was formulated when it was invented by Messrs. Acheson, Baruch, and Lilienthal. As we have already demonstrated more than once, this plan has nothing in common with the task of pro-
hibiting the atomic weapon and establishing international control. This is a plan of American policy for world domination. This plan was put forth at a time when the United States was the monopolist in the field of the atomic weapon and counted on keeping this monopoly for many years. It was from the standpoint of the interests of American monopolies that the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan was designed, which explains all its specific features, all its fallacies that made this plan unacceptable to other states. This must be said especially about the states which really strive for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control.

The main distinctive feature of the American control plan consists in the proposal to turn over all the atomic resources, all the enterprises for processing atomic materials, as well as all the allied enterprises and scientific research work at the exclusive disposal of the so-called international control agency on the basis of the rights of ownership. This plan leaves at the disposal of the states only secondary, small, so-called "non-dangerous" resources of atomic energy and enterprises. But even these enterprises are made fully dependent on the so-called international control agency.

However, the very definition of dangerous or non-dangerous enterprises, the definition of dangerous or non-dangerous quantities of atomic materials, according to the American draft of international control is left fully and completely to the discretion of the international control agency. This is stated directly in the second report of the Atomic Energy Commission.

We read in this report that "the criteria for defining dangerous and non-dangerous types of activity will change from time to time. It will be necessary to reckon with many factors, and in different enterprises these factors will be different. For this reason, it is necessary that the international agency, in defining what is dangerous and what is non-dangerous, should take into account the progress in science and engineering."

All such measures reduce to nought the sovereign rights of states, their state sovereignty. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that we, for a number of years, have been witnesses to the broad offensive of the Anglo-American bloc against the principle of state sovereignty, which is declared to be a "reactionary idea," a "survival of feudalism," an "old prejudice," and which has been degraded and humiliated to the utmost! It is not fortuitous because state sovereignty is a
serious obstacle to the achievement of world domination, which
does not brook independence and sovereignty of other countries,
states, and peoples!

Not fortuitous, therefore, is also the resistance which the Soviet
Union offers to this degradation and denial of state sovereignty.

Now there appears on the scene the question of quotas or ration-
ing in the use of atomic energy—this new violation, new attempt
to overthrow state sovereignty.

The second report of the Atomic Energy Commission pointed out
that the international control agency "should also be charged, in addi-
tion to its duties of administration, with the duties of taking and
applying decisions regarding quotas, provisions, and principles con-
tained in the treaty or convention and pertaining to the production,
distribution, and accumulation of stocks of nuclear fuel, as well as
the distribution and utilization of dangerous means of production
dealing with nuclear fuel."

Thus, the right to possess atomic energy or the deprivation of
this right is turned over fully to the so-called international control
agency. For this reason, all the reservations contained in the Amer-
ican plan about some kind of rights of ownership to atomic energy
of national states, lose all meaning. These reservations, as it will
be seen further, are designed solely to cover up the real substance
of the American plan, directed at making it easier for the United
States to take possession of all the world stocks of atomic raw ma-
terial, to facilitate its possibility to direct the further development
of atomic energy at its own discretion, regulating this development
as it will be dictated by the interests of the American monopolists.
It is hardly necessary to stress that such principles of so-called inter-
national control are incompatible with state sovereignty, that they
completely deny state sovereignty, depriving separate states of any
influence on the development of national economy, the foundation
of real state sovereignty.

We are told: "It means that you do not allow any infringement,
any restriction, any decrease in the rights of states even for the sake
of the supreme benefits of international co-operation."

We have already more than once replied to this utterly artificial
and thoughtless objection, and I must also here reply to such objec-
tions, because it is the foundation of international law that every
international agreement, no matter on what ground it may be or-
ganized, always means a certain restriction of the rights of a state.
But you compare this principle with what is being shoved on us as an international plan by the so-called American upholders of sovereignty. Here there is no room for talk about sovereignty of any kind. For the point at issue is not the partial restriction of certain sovereign rights but the complete denial of these sovereign rights. But in that case there is no longer any state because states should exercise and can exercise their sovereign will.

What sovereign will can there be when the entire national economy, the foundation of the sovereignty of every state is clamped into such a rigid vise? Without an independent state economy, without an independent economy of a country, there can be no state sovereignty whatever.

A country deprived of its economic independence is no longer a sovereign country. It is then the servant of someone else's will, while sovereignty means the sacred and independent will of a given people, a given country, a given state.

Let our opponents then at last understand that by objecting to our concept of sovereignty, by declaring it to be obsolete, outdated, reactionary, a feudal idea, essentially speaking denying sovereignty as such, they sacrifice their sovereignty, and we see this now in a number of examples.

What is the "Marshall Plan" if not the subordination to the United States of the sovereignty of all other states which placed this economic yoke on their necks?

But this is a special subject, and I shall not speak about it in order not to drag out my report. For us, sovereignty is sovereignty.

You can accept this plan, but you will then see its disastrous results for the economic, cultural development of your countries which you already feel as a result of the operation of the so-called "Marshall Plan." You understand it well, though you cannot, you are not in a position (at least, many of you—we understand you and sympathize with you) you cannot openly say it because you are bound, enmeshed by the golden dollar web of the American monopolies.

To cover up its real aims for world domination in the field of atomic energy, the American plan plays on the strings of internationalism, demagogically opposing international sentiments to nationalism and proclaiming state sovereignty to be a survival of feudalism and a reactionary idea in general. The United States, Great Britain, and their friends advertise in every way the American plan precisely as a plan of international order allegedly upholding "general
human” interests against the narrow interests of separate states which place their own welfare above the “supreme, common good.”

All these references to ideas and interests common to all mankind, to some sort of “internationalism,” are however, nothing else but a camouflage, an attempt to disguise the real substance of the American plan which, of course, has nothing in common with such lofty matters. The entire American plan of so-called international control is subordinated to one guiding principle—to secure in the international control agency the maximum influence of American monopolies, to make this agency the tool for realizing their policy, the tool for achieving their expansionist aims, the tool of the American policy of world domination! There can be no talk here whatever of the “spirit of internationalism.” This is a camouflaged American agency. This can be seen also from what the composition of the membership of this agency and its personnel will represent. The majority of this agency will consist of representatives who obey the American Government 100 per cent, of people in whose loyalty to the American policy there can be no doubt. We see confirmation of this every day and hour by the entire practice of the United Nations agencies!

As for the machinery of the international control agency, here, too, there is no ground for doubting that American influence would be ensured to a similar degree. Why, Mr. Baruch himself frankly admitted that the staff of the international agency must be selected according to the “principle of undoubted competence” and “as much as possible also according to the principle of international representation.”

This remark of Baruch, that in selecting employees of the international control agency preference would be given to “undoubted competence,” is sufficient to give one the idea as to who really would be selected. Mr. Baruch’s reservation that the principle of international representation will be observed “as much as possible” is also rather characteristic, and it seems to speak for itself.

With such a structure of the international control agency, with such a composition of members, its machinery, with such a role and degree of influence of the United States in this agency as envisaged by the American plan of this control system, there can be no talk of some kind of “spirit of internationalism” on which the initiators of the American plan so intensively speculate. This is not an international agency but an American agency. It is designed as an
American agency also from the standpoint of the aims which it was really called upon to realize under the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan accepted by the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission.

IV

The American Plan Opposes the Development of Production Of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes

While studying the materials of the Atomic Energy Commission, one is struck by the fact that these materials pay least attention of all to the need for combining the interests of international security—which first and foremost can be attained by the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for war purposes and which least of all interests the majority of the Atomic Energy Commission—with the interests of the development of production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. A careful study of the American proposals on atomic energy makes one think that this whole plan pursues one aim—to hinder at any cost the development of production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes in other countries and especially in the USSR. Is this not shown by the main principle of the American plan for the organization of international control, with the transfer to the ownership of the control agency of all atomic raw materials and enterprises for the production of atomic energy in case the non-dangerous volume of production is exceeded? Is this not shown also by the principle of leaving at the disposal of the separate states, and then only with permission of the international control agency on condition of so-called licensing, "non-dangerous" quantities of atomic material and "non-dangerous" enterprises, or the principle of establishment by the control agency of quotas of production of atomic energy for each state, which has nothing in common with the task of prohibiting the atomic weapon but on the other hand is fully suitable to bind hand and foot the development of production of atomic energy for peaceful economic purposes? Lastly, is this not shown also by the principle of so-called geographic—in substance military strategic—distribution of atomic enterprises, which has absolutely no regard for the interests and requirements of the national economy of each country? There is no need to stress that with such a policy there is also simultaneously accomplished the aim of weakening the industrial might of other states and, consequently, also of their defensive capacity. Yet the significance of
atomic energy in the development of peaceful industry and in general in the entire national economy is tremendous. The requirements of states for atomic energy for peaceful purposes are tremendous. Tremendous are the requirements for atomic energy for peaceful aims of the Soviet Union too; tremendous also are the achievements of the Soviet Union in the production of atomic energy.

This should be taken into account when discussing the question of so-called quotas or rationing, that is, placing one or another state on some kind of ration in the production of atomic energy and perhaps introducing a special ration system, as it was done when there was a shortage of bread, as it still exists in Britain as regards rationing of sugar, for instance.

And so some people want to place on a ration, to introduce this ration system also for the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

In this connection one cannot but recall that as early as in 1945, one of the biggest American scientists in physics and chemistry, the director of the scientific research laboratory of the General Electric Company, Irving Langmuir, who attended the session of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in Moscow, wrote in an article he published about the vast prospects for the development of the power industry in the USSR, that the USSR could surpass the United States in the production of atom bombs. Professor Langmuir is not making an unsubstantiated statement. He enumerates a number of advantages which would be on the side of the Soviet Union in such a competition. He lists among these advantages, the remarkable, as he says, incentive system which swiftly raises the productivity of industrial output; the absence of unemployment; the absence of strikes; the attachment to pure science and applied sciences and the profound faith in them; the existence of a plan for scientific work which greatly exceeds the plans of any other country.

Under such conditions, substantial achievements in the application of atomic energy in peaceful construction are unquestionable, as is unquestionable the tremendous interest of the Soviet State in the maximum development of the production and application of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. It is a different matter in the United States.

Judging by a number of facts, industrial and some scientific circles of the United States do not attach special importance to the
development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. Why, it is no secret that views are expressed among these circles by far not favoring the development of atomic energy, which industrial circles frequently regard even as an undesirable competitor. All facts show that in the United States less significance is attached to new sources of energy than to existing ones, considering fully sufficient the existing sources of power such as coal, oil and water, inasmuch as the utilization of coal, oil, and hydropower resources of the country yields a high output of power per capita, in view of which a further increase of this output apparently seems superfluous.

"We do in fact find clear evidence that some, at any rate, of the public utility interests in America, are far from being enthusiastic about the development of atomic power," Professor Blackett writes.*

Blackett cites as proof of this point the fact that the evidence submitted before the Senate Committee by the Association of Edison Illuminating Companies expressed the view that "never at any time has America suffered from a deficiency in the supply of power available, and further, that the coal and water power resources of the country are ample for centuries to come." (Blackett, page 102.)

Characteristic, also, is the article published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in August, 1947, which stated the following:

"If and when the Soviet Union arrives at this stage, it may begin to dawn on her why some scientists in America—without being in the service of vested coal or oil interests—have suggested limitation of production of atomic fuels to a level excluding large-scale power production."

One can also refer to the professor of law of Harvard University, David Cavers, who stated that neither "the public, or indeed many of its leaders, are aware of the great gain to security which would result from forbidding the use of atomic energy until relations of greater trust and amity have been established among nations."

Professor Oppenheimer, on his part, considers that atomic energy for concrete needs could be applied some 10 or 20 years from now, but adds that it would be from "30 to 50 years before much increase could be effected in the general power resources of the world."

It is known that the American Atomic Energy Commission in its report to Congress on January 31, 1948, wrote: "Assuming even a most favorable technical development, we do not see how it
would be possible to have any considerable portion of the present
power supply of the world derived from nuclear fuels before the
end of the expiration of 20 years."

Such statements undoubtedly reveal the degree of interest of the
United States in the use of development of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes.

The trend of the American plan of so-called international control
toward the strategic aspect also explains why this plan does not
reckon with the distinctive economic features and the interests of
the economic development of separate countries.

V

The American Plan of So-called International Control
Is a Military Strategic Plan

As can be seen from the second report of the Atomic Energy Com-
mmission to the Security Council, this plan provides for the re-
ponsibility of international control to distribute production and
other facilities involving dangerous quantities of nuclear fuel, basic
substances, and raw materials according to the principle of geographic
distribution, having in view not to permit the possibility "of certain
countries gaining military advantages by capturing existing storages
and facilities within their territories or on adjacent territories."

As we see, in settling such an important task as the geographic
distribution of atomic enterprises and respective storages, the econ-
omic requirements, needs, and interests of countries are absolutely
not taken into account. This can be seen, for example, from the
document which, to a certain degree, inspired the authors of the
Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan. I have in view the report to the
Secretary of War of the United States by the Committee on Social
and Political Implications, headed by Professor James Franck, which
was set up by the Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago. This report
was prepared in June, 1945, and was published in the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists of May, 1946.

In the section of this report devoted to the methods of inter-
national control, the author pointed out that the "first and perhaps
the simplest method, was the rationing of raw materials, first of all
uranium ore. The production of explosive substances begins with
the processing of a large quantity of uranium in large enterprises
for splitting isotopes or in huge uranium reactors. The amounts of
ore taken out of the ground at different locations could be controlled by resident agents of the international control board, and each nation could be allotted only an amount which would make large-scale separation of fissionable isotopes impossible."

"Such a limitation," the author adds, "would have the drawbacks of making impossible also the development of nuclear power for peacetime purposes."

If one turns from Franck's report in June, 1945, to the report of the consultative committee published by the State Department in March, 1946, and then to the American plan itself, one can easily become convinced of the community of principles underlying both the reports which do not reckon with the fact that their realization will make impossible or, in any case, extremely hamper the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

Here is the reactionary substance of this plan which seeks to raise an insurmountable barrier on the path of scientific progress, technical progress, economic progress of any country and the interests of all mankind. And this plan is now being passed off here as some kind of "supreme weal" for the sake of which we are urged to sacrifice state sovereignty.

This is characteristic of almost all American proposals on the control of atomic energy. This was, as Professor Blackett maintains, "one of the reasons why negotiations on control have landed at present in an impasse."

One cannot but note that in the report of Professor Franck quoted above, it was pointed out that "one of the essential conditions for the effective system of guarantees must be that the plan, if it is carried out will provide security; but such that if it fails or the international situation collapses, any nation such as the United States will be in a relatively secure position, compared with any other nation."

Undoubtedly this object would also be served by the principle of control by stages as well as by the principle of allotting quotas for the production and utilization of atomic energy. Both these principles undoubtedly are aimed precisely at preserving for the United States what J. Franck calls a safe position as compared with any other country.

As regards the principle of control by stages, much has already been spoken about it, and I see no necessity for adding anything to what has been said.
I will only say that the American plan, establishing control by stages, proceeds from the premise that in such a situation the United States will for a certain time, and perhaps for a long time, remain outside of international control. Control by stages is at the same time an expression of inequality in the relations among the participants in the convention for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and control over atomic energy.

It is not fortuitous that the report stresses: "The major activity of the Authority must be directed to obtaining cognizance and control of raw material. The raw materials control" the report continues, "will bring the Authority face to face with problems of question of access, which is both a technical and political problem."

At the same time, the American plan does not give anything in exchange to other countries that have not as yet crossed the threshold of this initial stage. True, the report speaks of the possibility of obtaining valuable technical information. But this question has not been elaborated at all, and for this reason is of no real significance. As a result, at the early stages of its implementation, the American plan undoubtedly would not give any substantial advantages to other countries except the United States. Moreover, the commission could at any time establish that one or another country did not fulfill its obligations under the first stage of the implementation of the control plan and could take a decision to abstain from carrying out the subsequent stages of the plan.

Undoubtedly this testifies also to such a major shortcoming of the American plan as one-sided control convenient for the United States and utterly unacceptable to other countries.

As for the system of quotas, it is characteristic that quotas according to the American plan should be fixed in conformity with the general principle that "comparable national resources must be proportionately expended throughout the world."

Such a principle does not reckon either with the economic or in general with the state interests and specific feature of a given country. Such a principle being applied in practice may lead to an artificial restriction of the development of a national economy using atomic energy, which, it goes without saying, cannot but have a most negative effect on the life of the entire country, the entire state, on the well-being of the people.

The principle of quotas is worthless also because it has no bearing
whatever on the main problem facing the United Nations, namely, the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression, which was and is the main aim of the policy of the USSR and other peace-loving peoples.

The proposal to establish quotas for the production and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes cannot be regarded otherwise than as a means for detracting the attention of the peoples from this, our main task.

And for this reason the Soviet delegation cannot agree to this principle and, consequently, also to the American plan of so-called international control, in which this principle plays a paramount part.

Such is the American plan of so-called international control. This plan, as shown above, which is directed at securing the military strategic interests of the United States has nothing in common with such an important epoch-making task as the prohibition of production of the atomic weapon. In this respect no doubt is left by the letter of Messrs. Acheson, Vannevar Bush, James B. Conant, John J. McCloy, and Major-General Groves, dated March 17, 1946, and addressed to Byrnes, which literally said the following:

"The second matter relates to the assumption or transfer of authority over physical things. Here also the plan permits of progress by stages beginning in the field of raw material production, progressing to that of industrial production, and going on to the control of explosives.

"The development of detailed proposals for such scheduling will require further study and much technical competence and staff. It will be guided, of course, by basic decisions of high policy. One of these decisions will be for what period of time the United States will continue the manufacture of bombs. The plan does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency. At some stage in the development of the plan this is required. But neither the plan nor our transmittal of it should be construed as meaning that this should or should not be done at the outset or at any specific time. That decision, whenever made, will involve considerations of the highest policy affecting our security, and must be made by our government under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation."
The American Plan Threatens International Security

The American plan of so-called international control envisages punishment for violation of the rules regulating the production and use of atomic energy fixed by the international agency. The American plan of international control naturally provides for implicit subordination to the rules which would be established by this agency for the production, storage, and use of atomic energy. This refers in equal measure also to the observance of quotas, deviation from which is qualified as violation of the terms provided by international control that must also entail the application of respective sanctions.

Authorities in the field of the atomic problem point out that large-scale production of energy will almost always be regarded as dangerous from the standpoint of the American plan and will always be considered as a violation of the terms of control. However, the production of energy on a larger scale than envisaged by the international control agency can always occur in countries where there are all the requisites for mighty progress on the basis of the latest achievements of science, engineering, and practical experience which breaks all standards and all bounds.

From the standpoint of the American plan this will be a violation of the terms of control, and by decision of the majority of the international control agency such a country could be accused of ill-willed interference in the activity of the agency with immediate imposition of corresponding punishment.

Such an assumption may seem incredible, but it is a fact that the universally known Mr. Bullitt went to such lengths as to declare the plan of the Soviet Union to increase the production of steel in the USSR up to 60,000,000 tons annually to be a manifestation of Soviet aggressive imperialism, demanding the exertion of appropriate military influence on the USSR. For this reason it is not precluded that if in the international control agency there will be a majority of such Bullitts or even persons like him, they would try to use this agency as an instrument for curbing Soviet "imperialism."

This is a dangerous aspect of the American plan advertised as a program for "social improvement." The opponents of the Soviet proposals point out that these proposals cannot assure effective
control, and by creating the illusion of such control constitute, therefore, dangerous proposals. This is certainly a malicious invention. But if one is to speak of dangerous proposals then this should be fully ascribed precisely to the American plan for so-called international control.

Now it is not difficult to see that the real danger to the cause of peace is constituted precisely by the American plan for so-called international control, a plan which is drawn up in such a manner as to guarantee for the United States an obedient majority in the international control agency, which, as we have seen earlier, is not difficult to achieve, so as to have the total possibility by means of this majority to obtain at its complete, uncontrolled disposal all world stocks of atomic raw material, all the enterprises processing this raw material and all related enterprises, so as to be able to regulate and, in case of necessity, to restrict or to prevent altogether the development of the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on the excuse that the production of atomic energy on such a scale is dangerous and jeopardizes universal peace.

This is an insidious plan, drawn up with a view to the possibility of deceiving public opinion by camouflageing the aggressive purposes underlying this plan with false pacifist phrases and references to "spirit of internationalism," to "supreme weal," to "supreme interests of entire humanity."

The bitterness and the utilization of all and every most unscrupulous and shady means which are put into play by the adversaries of the Soviet proposals, who go to any length in defending the American plan, are natural.

One cannot but point out also that the American plan, demanding uncontrolled inspection of any part of the territory of every party to future so-called control, and specifically giving the inspectorate the broad possibility for surveying the resources of atomic energy raw material in any country, would enable the so-called international control agency to have a rather complete target map of every country and to set up a broad network of military and industrial espionage.

"In the present situation in the world, with America in possession of a stock of atomic bombs and explicitly espousing their use as a normal means of war, the Soviet military authorities would rightly consider that secrecy about the exact locations of military
and industrial plants and even of new industrial areas would be a considerable military asset."

After expressing these considerations, Professor Blackett gives an excerpt from Shulman's book *Defeat in the West*, quoting the following statement of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt about the campaigning in Russia: "I realized soon after the attack was begun that everything that had been written about Russia was nonsense. The maps we were given were all wrong. The roads that were marked nice and red and thick on the map turned out to be tracks, and what were tracks on the map became first-class roads. Even railways which were to be used by us simply didn't exist. Or a map would indicate that there was nothing in the area, and suddenly we would be confronted with an American-type town with factory buildings and all the rest of it."

This historical reference speaks for itself.

Such is the plan of so-called international control, the plan which is presented as a program for saving humanity, allegedly imbued with the "spirit of internationalism," and aspiring to assure beneficence to the peoples the world over. Actually, this is not an international plan of control. This is an American plan for creating, under the guise of an international control agency, an American supertrust intended for putting in the possession and under the control of American monopolies all the world resources of atomic energy, all the enterprises producing atomic energy, as well as the enterprises of allied industries.

VII

To Prohibit the Atomic Weapon, to Establish Strict International Control

Ever since this plan appeared, the Soviet Union has considered it its duty to expose the real substance of this plan, to disclose the deception of world public opinion which is being prepared, and thus eliminate the danger of the conversion of the international agency, called upon to guard peace, into a tool of war.

The Soviet Union adhered to its stand demanding the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the fulfillment of this prohibition, even when it had not yet possessed the atomic weapon.
The Soviet Union adheres to the same position at present also when it has the atomic weapon at its disposal.

A few words must be said about the draft resolution submitted to the General Assembly for consideration by Canada and France. This draft blindly follows the Atomic Energy Commission's reports based on the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan with some alterations of a non-principled nature. The draft resolution of Canada and France adopted by a majority of Committee No. 1 absolutely incorrectly points out that mankind will remain in danger until control over the development of atomic energy production and its management remain in the hands of individual states. This is wrong inasmuch as the proposals of the Soviet Union on the establishment of strict international control and corresponding international inspection eliminate these dangers. On the contrary, as we have pointed out earlier, such dangers could not be avoided if the American plan for so-called international control were adopted.

In the same connection a few words must be said about the unacceptability of another paragraph (paragraph 69) of the Franco-Canadian draft which calls on all governments to submit to international control in a form envisaged by the American plan.

Unacceptable, also, is that paragraph (paragraph 8) of the Franco-Canadian draft which contains a direct encroachment on state sovereignty under the mask of interests of universal security and peace.

It should be noted that paragraph 8 of the Franco-Canadian draft of November 12 represents an amended original draft of this paragraph which contained the frank recommendations to states that they renounce the exercise of their sovereign rights in connection with control over atomic energy. As a result of the criticism and rebuff with which this formulation met on the part of a number of delegations, and primarily on the part of the USSR and the People's Democracies, the Franco-Canadian authors, behind whose back, as is clear to all of us, stand the United States and Great Britain, had to retreat and to present a somewhat milder formulation. But this formulation does not change the substance of the matter implying the same renunciation of sovereign rights to which not one single state prizing its independence can agree.

Otherwise this resolution represents a meaningless accumulation of separate wishes which render this draft even less acceptable.
Even when this resolution touches upon the question of prohibition of the atomic weapon it does this so irresolutely that paragraph 2 dealing with this question turns out to be deprived of any serious meaning. The resolution of France and Canada does not go beyond a mere expression of the wish to do everything possible for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. But the atomic weapon should be simply prohibited, the atomic weapon should be simply banned.

The Soviet delegation submitted its own draft resolution pointing out that not one of the tasks set before the Atomic Energy Commission by the General Assembly's decisions of January 24 and December 14, 1946, has thus far been solved, and that responsibility for this fully rests with the Governments of the United States and Great Britain who systematically oppose in the commission the adoption of agreed upon decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over atomic energy so as to prevent its utilization for war purposes.

The draft resolution of the USSR also states that consultations among the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission did not contribute to the solution of the aforementioned tasks, since during the consultations the United States and Great Britain continued to defend proposals essentially contradicting the task of the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over atomic energy so that its utilization for war purposes be prevented.

However, attaching exceptional importance to the achievement of agreement and the successful implementation of the General Assembly's decisions of January 24 and December 14, 1946, the draft resolution of the USSR provides that the Atomic Energy Commission be instructed to resume its work and to start drafting a convention immediately on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and a convention on control over atomic energy so that both conventions be concluded and put into effect simultaneously.

Such a resolution, if adopted by the General Assembly, must become a new stimulus for continuing the efforts aimed at reaching an agreement regarding the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the fulfillment of this prohibition, must facilitate success in the work of the Atomic Energy Commission, encouraging the latter to overcome the difficulties in this work and to achieve the prohibition of the atomic...
weapon, the utilization of which runs counter to the honor and conscience of the people.

The USSR delegation appeals to all the delegations interested in the actual strengthening of peace and international security, calling upon them to support the Soviet draft resolution, proposing to make further efforts in this respect in the interests of entire humanity—to prohibit the atomic weapon and to establish strict international control.