WHAT RUSSIA DID FOR VICTORY

By Sergei Kournakoff

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Sergei Kournakoff is one of the foremost military analysts to emerge from World War II. Unlike many armchair and air wave strategists, he is uniquely qualified as a writer on military theory and practice by his entire career and background. Formerly a cavalry officer in the Imperial Russian Army, he fought through World War I and the Russian Civil War (on the “White” side).

Kournakoff is the author of *Russia's Fighting Forces*, published by Duell, Sloan and Pearce and International Publishers, and of numerous articles on military matters which have appeared in *Soviet Russia Today* and a number of other magazines. He has won a wide reputation in the United States as a writer and lecturer on military problems as they enfolded in the crucible of the great war of liberation, and has called the turn on major military events with almost uncanny precision. On July 2, 1941, Sergei Kournakoff, in a speech at Madison Square Garden, said:

"Ten days ago Hitler hurled his Wehrmacht to eventual and total destruction."

Very few people agreed with him at the time.
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...SHALL THE BALANCE SHEET BE BALANCED?

"And the reasons for mourning in Denmark are the same as they are in Ohio,
And the cost is not figured in krone any more than it's measured in dollars.
They are, of course, the lesser entries in the book:
The amputated leg and the artificial eye have cost somebody something:
And the broken mind cannot be repaired by a pocketful of cash. Oh, no, no.
The quality of torture is never listed on the curb,
Nor the rate of grief computed on delicate scales. . . ."

* * *

"...Shall the balance sheet be balanced?
By whom? How?
No combination of savants and learned cogs, holes punched in cards and electric motors,
No brow containing Euclid, not even the serenest lores in consultation with each other,
Could be else than baffled by the simplest problem of the cost of hunger in a baby's bones."

—From ON A NOTE OF TRIUMPH
By Norman Corwin
NORMAN CORWIN is absolutely right. Right and dis­
couraging. Discouraging to the one who, like myself, has set himself the task to be the “learned cog” which will attempt to compute, albeit in the most general way, the military effort of the Soviet people and their armed forces.

The military effort of a people, especially a people who has felt the boot of the enemy on their soil, whose cities and villages have been transformed into little more than charred spots on the landscape and cherished memories on maps, whose sons and daughters have been killed and tortured, limbs cut off, minds set wandering—cannot be measured only in dollars, tons, miles and days.

The mourning of the wife or mother in Ohio, tear for tear, is the equivalent of the mourning of the wife or mother in Smolensk. But somehow mourning is more bearable when the boy’s room in the family nest is intact, when other mem­bers of the family are alive and well. Mourning the dead on a charred beam lying in melting snow in a place that was a village—is somehow less bearable. And then there is another thing, a thing which means little to the individual mourner, centered in his own grief, but which is important in the life of a nation or country: the number of mourning mothers and wives. While “holes punched in cards” cannot measure the grief of the individual, they can and must record the numbers.

Nothing expressed in tons, miles, days and dollars can give the whole picture of a country’s war effort, for sobs, spasms, pangs will be left uncounted, but the relative effort of each
country which took part in the anti-Hitler coalition can be expressed only in dry figures.

Expressing this relative, comparative effort is important. Not for the sake of glory and self-satisfaction, but for the sake of the soundness of the structure of peace which is being built now. The "engineers" who are doing the building must know the relative strength of the stones they are using for the arch of security, lest they use limestone for a key and shove the granite into a remote corner where it will be wasted.

The test by steel and fire, the trial by war provides the "engineers" with convincing data on the strength of the material at hand, for the stubborn facts of the battlefield cannot be faked. The dice of total war cannot be loaded. The truth comes out in the wash for all to see. However, in almost every country on five-sixths of the earth there are people who do not wish to see any social changes take place because they have a stake in the social status quo, people who by the same token do not wish a new society to succeed and who, therefore, try to obscure the vision of the people by belittling the astounding achievements of a truly planned society in this war. There are also those who have been beaten and who do not wish to acknowledge that they have been beaten to a great extent by a social system they hated most and swore to wipe off the face of the earth. Finally, there are those who simply want to flatter their national ego by strutting around, beating their chests and clamoring: "WE did it all."

The first category are the reactionaries, fascists, semi-fascists and para-fascists everywhere; the second are the Nazis; the third are not quite as dangerous (because they are primitive and naive)—the nationalists and chauvinists, the "we firsters" of many colors and flags. All these groups have one common political denominator—anti-Sovietism, mixed in some cases (as in the case of some British Tories), with long standing russophobia.

The anti-Soviet propaganda of these people has become crystallized in half a dozen basic slogans (which are being used with certain variations).
Here are these catch phrases:

The Imperial Russian Army in the First World War did better than the Red Army in the Second World War. The Tsar’s soldiers retreated only to the marshes of the Polessye while the Red soldiers were pressed back to the Volga and the Terek. Ergo—the Imperial Army was better and the Tsarist system was better.

* * *

The Red Army won because it had space and climate on its side.

* * *

The Red Army won because the Allied Air Forces bombed Germany into submission.

* * *

The Red Army won because it got its weapons through lend-lease.

* * *

The Red Army won because of the traditional “fatalistic” heroism of the Russian people who fought in spite of the Soviet regime, the communist leadership, etc.

* * *

The Red Army in fact did not win at all because it was the battle of Britain which saved the world. (Another variant is—El Elamein was the real turning point of the war; or, St. Lo was Germany’s Waterloo.)

* * *

Every thinking person understands the hollowness of these catch phrases, as well as their purpose (the purpose becomes clear when one notes that every Nazi general and bigwig who hastily fled westward in the corridor between the Oder and the Elbe, in April 1945, uses them), but the thinking non-military person must have the facts marshalled in order to puncture the hollow catch phrases with the pin of logic.
Many of the facts are not known yet. Many figures are incomplete at this time. But out of the great adding machine of the Second World War enough figures have emerged to see what's what.

I will try to present here the basic facts and figures pertaining to the effort of the Soviet Union in this war. For the sake of simplicity and to aid the memory of the reader, most data will be given in round figures. Let us add that this pamphlet is not an effort to show that the Soviet Union won the war alone. Most Soviet war leaders headed by Generalissimo Stalin have said that victory is a result of a common effort. In this effort the leading United Nations chipped in with their best. What I hope to demonstrate conclusively is that the Soviet effort was decisive and that Soviet power, in all its manifestations, played a decisive role in that effort.

**World War I and World War II**

Russia entered the First World War as a full-fledged military partner of France and England. In spite of certain differences between the social-political internal set-ups of England and France on one hand, and Tsarist Russia on the other, they were bound together by common imperialistic interests, interests which were being threatened by German imperialism. The latter, having embarked on an aggressive international policy at the end of the nineteenth century, intended to crush England and France and at least greatly weaken Russia by stripping her of the Ukraine, Poland, the Baltic countries and Finland.

Community of interests brought about the formation of the Entente. The latter was formed in stages: the Franco-Russian alliance dated from 1891, the Franco-British alliance from 1904, and the Russo-British understanding from 1907. Thus, when the war broke out in 1914, Russia had been in the so-called “western family” for seven years. Russia was not in the least isolated, either politically or psychologically.

The international position of the Soviet Union on the eve of World War II was diametrically opposite. The “latent war”
of European reaction against the U.S.S.R. had flared and smouldered intermittently between 1917 and 1941. In 1938 the Munich Pact, so often conveniently forgotten, had in fact cemented a pan-European coalition against the Soviet Union, including even the latter's ex-ally of 1935—France. The Soviet Union was literally alone. She did not even have her proverbial "only friend"—Montenegro—on her side. The imperial interests of the Anglo-French bloc and of the German bloc united them in their hatred of the socialist state.

The First World War had smouldered for years. The sides were lined up. There was no strategic surprise. There was no tactical surprise, because the assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand had given all concerned more than a month's warning. On the other hand, Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union, coming as it did in violation of a pact of non-aggression, without the slightest warning, achieved the initial tactical surprise so essential to the success of a lightning war.

Imperial Russia met Germany in 1914 on a frontier which had existed for generations, with a borderland fully fortified. The Soviet border of 1941 was of recent formation and had not been fully prepared for defense yet (although the extra strip of fighting space, some 175 miles wide, in Western Belorussia, the Western Ukraine, in the Baltic and in Bessarabia did play the salutary role of buffer. Even so, however, in 1914 the distance between the German border and Moscow, along the central Berlin-Moscow direction, was some 900 miles, while in 1941 it was only 650 miles.

On the flanks of the huge front, Russia's position in 1914 was incomparably more secure. In 1914, the nearest enemy to St. Petersburg was in East Prussia, 500 miles away. In 1941 the enemy was in Finland, only 100 miles away and would have been only 18 miles away had it not been for the preventive war against Finland, in 1939-1940.

In 1914 the nearest enemy was 250 miles from Odessa (in Hungary). In 1941 the enemy was only 120 miles away (in Rumania).

In 1914 Murmansk was absolutely safe (except for enemy submarines). In 1914, thanks to "dear little" Finland and the
occupation of Norway by the enemy, this only Soviet outlet to the West was under direct and severe attack.

In 1914 Japan was an ally of the Entente and Russia was able to move practically all her troops from the Far East to fight the Germans. This writer remembers witnessing the arrival of Far Eastern divisions in Poland after a train trip of ten weeks (in October, 1914). Japan supplied weapons and munitions to Russia. In 1941 the Soviet Union was compelled to keep a great army in the Far East because half of the Japanese army remained concentrated on the horseshoe border of Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Of course, this time Japan did not give the Soviet Union as much as a rifle cartridge.

While during World War I Turkey was fighting Russia, and while it remained outwardly neutral during World War II, the U.S.S.R. still had to keep troops on the Turkish border in 1941-45 because of the suspicious character of that neutrality.

The Central Powers in 1914 were considerably less strong than Hitler's Germany was in 1941, with almost all of Europe at her beck and call. All you have to do is compare the Germany-Austria-Hungary-Bulgaria-Turkey bloc with the Germany-Italy, Austria-Hungary-Rumania-Finland-Bulgaria-Slovakia-Croatia bloc, de facto allied with Spain, and controlling all the rest of continental Europe with its resources, productive capacity and millions of slave labor. Furthermore, in 1914 Germany was squeezed between two fronts right from the start, while up to June, 1944, Germany's control reached to the Atlantic Ocean with all that implies strategically.

And this brings us to the most important difference between Russia's strategic position in World War I and World War II.

The difference can be told in a very few words and with a handful of figures.

During the entire World War I a Western Front existed, and it was a "first front," not a "second front" in importance. But during three of the four years of World War II the Soviet Union fought Germany and German-controlled Europe alone.

Let us look at the deployment of forces on both fronts in 1914. This initial deployment gives a measures of the situation
which obtained throughout the whole course of that war (with only temporary changes).

The forces deployed in the initial stage of the war were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Western Front</th>
<th>Eastern Front</th>
<th>Central Powers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allies</td>
<td>Central Powers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 Inf. Div. (Fr. &amp; Br.)</td>
<td>86 Inf. Div. (German)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Cav. Div. (Fr. &amp; Br.)</td>
<td>10 Cav. Div. (German)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52½ Inf. Div. (Russian)</td>
<td>17 Inf. Div. (German)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Cav. Div. (Russian)</td>
<td>1 Cav. Div. (German)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be noted that the fire power of an Austro-Hungarian division was rated at about half of the power of a German division. Thus at the outset the Russian Army faced about the equivalent of 35 German Infantry and 12 Cavalry divisions while the French, Belgian and British faced 86 German Infantry and 10 Cavalry divisions. This, of course, was due to the so-called Schlieffen Plan according to which the Germans intended to crush France first and then turn on Russia.

The greatest German concentration in the East was effected in the campaign of 1915, but even then the Russian Army never faced more than half of the Central Powers' effectives.

At the end of the war when Russia was practically out, the Germans kept 20 per cent of their divisions in the East and 80 per cent in the West.

Thus, barring the time when Russia was temporarily eclipsed as a military power, the Russian Imperial Army had to face between 30 and 50 per cent of the enemy divisions.

The Eastern Front, barring its meanderings, was roughly 1,000 miles long from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The deepest enemy penetration (before 1918 when the Germans occupied the Ukraine and reached Rostov) was about 300 miles in the center.

The Russian Imperial Army won only one campaign. That was the Brussilov offensive in the summer of 1916. Even then, the operation, brilliantly successful, was robbed of real strategic results by the inept leadership of the Russian Su-
preme Command (nominally under the Tsar) which did not support General Brussilov's effort. The Russian Army won a number of tactical successes, some of them of great scope (such as the early Galician operation), but the war as a whole can be called a series of failures, some of them pre-eminently heroic (such as the invasion of East Prussia to save the Allies at the Marne). The result leaves no doubt: Russia was defeated and knocked out of the war. It must be added here that, contrary to popular opinion, the Russia revolution was hastened by military defeat, and not military defeat caused by the revolution.

The Allies lost 9,300,000 killed, missing and prisoners during World War I; of these Russia lost 4,200,000 (we do not count the wounded which were 12,800,000 and 5,000,000 respectively). Thus Russia lost less than half of what the other Allies did. This happened because the Russian Army throughout the war faced less enemies than her Allies did.

Let us add to this that Space, Mud and Traditional Russian Heroism were as much on the side of Russia in 1914-18 as they were in 1941-45, with all other strategic and political factors in her favor as compared to the U.S.S.R. And still Russia lost World War I and the U.S.S.R. won World War II.

We have compared in this chapter the initial political and strategic factors which shaped the course of World War I as far as Russia was concerned. We also mentioned the basic military facts and figures pertaining to Russia in World War I. The basic military facts concerning the U.S.S.R. in World War II will be the theme of the next chapter because they are too tremendous in scope to fit into a point-by-point comparison with the facts of World War I.

**Highlights of the Soviet-German War**

The Soviet-German War lasted 1,416 days and raged over a theater of approximately 1,250,000 square miles.

The German-Soviet front was never shorter than the distance between the shores of the Barents Sea and the Black Sea (except in the final stage when Finland was knocked out
and the front stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea). This distance, as the crow flies is 1,700 miles. It was the distance between the Soviet right-flank sentry on Cape Rybachi near Murmansk, and the left-flank sentry on Cape Khersonese, near Sevastopol.

In the late summer of 1942, when the front bulged eastward to touch Stalingrad and Grozny and the Soviet flank sentries stood on Cape Rybachi and on the ruins of the cement factory at Novorossisk, the front was roughly 2,700 miles long.

The line of the front did not budge in the extreme north; it swung 650 miles in the center, from Brest-Litovsk to Voronezh; it swung 1,000 miles in the south, from Przemysl in Galicia to Stalingrad on the Volga.

In this tremendous fighting space the Germans kept an average of 240 divisions fighting.

A rough comparison of the "volume of fighting" in the East and in the West would run something like this:

East—240 enemy divisions engaged during 47 months—\(11,280 \text{ mos/div.}\).*

West—70 enemy divisions engaged (France, Germany) during 11 months, plus 20 divisions (Africa, Italy) engaged during 36 months, plus 110 enemy divisions (Low Countries, France, 1940) engaged during 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) months—\(1,655 \text{ mos/div.}\).

Allowing for small or short-lived action like the "sitzkrieg" in 1939-40, Poland, Norway, Greece, East Africa, etc., it can be said that the rough ratio between the "volume of fighting" (expressed in "division-per-month" units) done by the Western Allies and by the Soviet Union is 7:45, or about 1:6\(\frac{1}{2}\).

This ratio is also borne out by the respective Allied casualties in the war against Germany. They run like this:

British Empire and U. S. killed, missing and prisoners: 1,100,000

Soviet Union, killed, missing and prisoners: 6,500,000

(estimated, see chapter on cost, p. 31)

* Mos/div. equals one division fighting one month.
Finally, if we compare the areas over which active land operations were conducted, we see roughly the following:

The Red Army fought over 750,000 square miles of territory when retreating eastward and over the same 750,000 square miles when advancing westward. In addition it fought over roughly 500,000 square miles of foreign lands (between April, 1944, and May, 1945). This is a total of about 2,000,000 square miles of fighting space.

The Anglo-American (and smaller Allied) armies in Europe and North Africa fought over an area of about 350,000 square miles (not counting the fighting of Polish troops in 1939 and the fighting of the French Army in 1940, but counting the marching and counter-marching of the British in the Libyan coastwise corridor).

All these calculations may seem to some rather mechanical. However, the fact that the three basic ratios—of volume of fighting expressed in duration of fighting and the number of enemy troops engaged, of area of fighting, and of losses incurred—all point to an over-all ratio of effort expressed in the symbol 1:6—shows that this ratio does express the true picture. The Soviet Union did roughly eighty-five per cent of the fighting against Germany and her satellites.

Having established the approximate figures pertaining to the width and length of the space within which so many Red Army men fought and gave their lives, let us examine the course of the war.

This course from the viewpoint of higher strategy can be divided into four periods: the first period lasted seven months, between the initial German attack and the end of the Battle of Moscow; the second lasted a year between the Battle of Moscow and the end of the Battle of Stalingrad; the third lasted six months between the Battle of Stalingrad and the end of the Battle of Kursk (the so-called Kursk Arc); the fourth lasted 21 months between the Battle of Kursk and the end of the final Battle of Berlin.

Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk are three strategic turning points of the war. Berlin is the pay-off.
THE FIRST PERIOD

Germany attacked the Soviet Union with close to 200 divisions, of which 175 were “pure German.” No other German troops were engaged anywhere except for the skirmishing in Libya by the British against three German divisions and a depleted Italian expeditionary force. British troops had pulled out of Greece in May. America was still virtually un­armed. Britain was slowly recovering from the so-called Battle of Britain. All Europe, with its 320,000,000 people and a yearly production of 50,000,000 tons of steel, was Hitler’s. The German Army could face eastward without hav­ing to look over its shoulder. World public opinion on June 21, 1941, was still babbling about “Communazism”; the Soviet Union was politically and militarily isolated.

The German High Command set itself the following strategic goal* (or objective): to destroy the Red Army within three months and to force the U.S.S.R. to capitulate before winter, 1941.

Territorially, the objective was: the capture of the Lenin­grad-Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov line, thus bringing about the utter paralysis of the Soviet transportation system.

The Red Army was to be destroyed west of that line, thus making it unnecessary for the German Army to extend its communications beyond the 600-mile mark (Brest-Litovsk–Moscow).

The attainment of that goal would have also cut the Mur­mansk route, made the Iranian route virtually impracticable, destroyed the Soviet Baltic Fleet, bottled up the Northern Fleet and made the Black Sea Fleet almost useless by depriving it of its main bases (at least, so the Germans thought).

Furthermore, the Soviet Union, deprived of 30 per cent of her population, of half of her food producing area, 40

* The term “strategic goal,” which will recur frequently in the forthcoming exposition, can be defined thus: the objective of a war, or military campaign, set by the High Command, the attainment of which must bring decisive results.
per cent of her coal, half of her steel and iron, was not expected by the Germans to be able to continue its resistance. The 200-odd German divisions plunged forward in one strategic echelon, blitz-fashion.

They beleaguered Leningrad, they took Kharkov, they captured Rostov (holding it for only a few days before being ejected), they reached the outskirts of Moscow.

Vast as the enemy armies attacking Leningrad, Kharkov and Rostov were, the direction of the main blow lay on the Brest-Litovsk-Moscow line. Here the blitz was stopped for the first time in September, east of Smolensk and two-thirds of the way to the main goal (i.e., Moscow). After that it never blitzed again. It was a decisive delay which threw the Germans two months off schedule. Instead of opening the Battle of Moscow in August the Germans were forced to start it in the beginning of October.

They concentrated fifty-one divisions, of which 13 were armored, for the attack on Moscow. Three quarters of a million men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 700 planes attacked a perimeter of 300 miles, forging a pair of pincers aimed at the capital. In that battle the Germans had a numerical superiority of 3:1 in tanks, 2:1 in planes, better than 2:1 in guns and 1½:1 in mortars.

At the eleventh hour the Soviet High Command, under Marshal Stalin, delivered a blow in the north which frustrated the German maneuver to cut the Murmansk railroad and besiege Leningrad instead of blockading it (which is more than a fine point), struck a blow in the south which recaptured Rostov and, finally, struck the big blow at the central grouping of the German 51 divisions, completely routing them and throwing them back as much as 250 miles in some sectors of the Moscow front.

Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov remained in Soviet hands, the Red Army was not only not destroyed, but on the offensive, Soviet industry by a “miracle” of organization had been largely moved from the war theatre hundreds (and more) miles to the east. Part of the population of the occupied territory became partisans, another part was evacuated.
The German Army had failed in the attainment of its strategic goal. It had failed with its *blitz*-method. Between November 16 and January 1, 1942, i.e., during the Battle of Moscow, the Germans had lost 2,200 tanks, 14,000 motor vehicles, 2,000 guns and 140,000 killed (which means certainly another 400,000 wounded). Fifty of their best divisions were shattered to the tune of 50 per cent losses.

Here are the results of the Battle of Moscow: it made the Germans fail of the strategic goal of their decisive campaign; it destroyed the legend of German invincibility; it inflicted terrible human and material losses on them; it actually killed the *blitz*; it saved the Soviet Union and thus the United Nations. After the Battle of Moscow, the Germans dared no longer thrust directly at the Soviet capital, but advanced in a roundabout maneuver, a maneuver which, by the summer of 1942, brought them to Stalingrad.

At the time of the Battle of Moscow the U.S.A.A.F. was not in action and the bombing of Europe by the R.A.F. was in its infancy. One hundred and fifty ton raids on Hamburg were still making headlines. The influence of such bombing on the campaign on the Soviet Front was practically nil. As to lend-lease, it was nothing more than a signed protocol, and a small one at that (one billion dollars—promised, but still undelivered).

Russian Winter helped because the Red Army was prepared for it (through training, clothing, special oils for motors, special weapons, special methods of transport) and the Germans were not.

Russian Space helped because it was well defended. Undefended space, passive space, does not help.

What decided the campaign was Soviet organization and discipline, military skill, superior military direction and "traditional" Russian courage with which the people had become imbued through education and their own experience and outlook.

As far as Germany, backed by all Europe, and the Soviet Union are concerned, the Battle of Moscow was purely a "man-to-man" affair, with the rest of the Allied world unable
to do much more than cheer. However, out of those cheers grew the great war-and-peace alliance of the Big Three. Thus, the Battle of Moscow actually won the war and saved humanity.

THE SECOND PERIOD

As has been shown above, the first period of the Soviet-German war, culminating in the gigantic Battle of Moscow, proved to be a German strategic, operational and tactical failure.

In view of the obvious potential superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition over Germany and her satellites, the Hitler bloc stood before ominous perspectives. A ring of land fronts, surrounding Germany, was the nightmare of the German High Command, which simply had to do something and use to the best advantage the time which was being afforded it by the unpreparedness of the Western Allies and the lack of strategic coordination between West and East. In the spring of 1942 nothing outside the Soviet front threatened the Wehrmacht, because the front in North Africa absorbed only between 3 and 6 German divisions and half a score Italian divisions of doubtful quality.

The Germans mustered an overwhelming majority of their forces and again struck at the Red Army in a desperate new attempt to crush the Red Army. The offensive, however, instead of developing between the Baltic and Black Seas as in 1941, was limited to the southern wing (roughly between Orel and the Black Sea). Of the available 256 German divisions the German High Command mustered 179 in the East plus 61 satellite divisions, or 240 in all. A front of 375 miles flared up in June, 1942, but only after the Germans had been delayed about two months by the epic defense of Sevastopol and by Marshal Timoshenko’s counterblow in the Izyum-Bervenkovsko sector.

Again, as in 1941, the Germans planned to advance in blitztempo: July 25—Stalingrad; August 15—Kuybyshev; September 10—Arzamas; October-November—the attack on Moscow from the east. Note that this time the Germans had to limit their
offensive to the southern one-third of the front, that they did not dare attack Moscow head-on, but had to pursue a round-about course and, finally, that their blitz remained on paper. They were late at Stalingrad and never reached any of their other objectives.

Aside from the maximum objective (capture of Moscow from the rear), the Germans had immediate goals of limited strategic importance: they intended to capture the entire Donetz industrial region, the wheat of the Don and Kuban, the oil of Maikop, Grozny and Baku. They were trying to cut the artery of the Volga and thus deprive the U.S.S.R. of Caucasian oil and of American materials being shipped via Iran up the Caspian and the Volga.

Stalingrad became the strategic center of gravity of the whole campaign, THE objective. It was also destined to become the "zenith" of the war.

The Germans threw a total of about 60 divisions into the Don–Volga Battle. It began in the end of August and lasted until the beginning of February.

It is not our intention to give even the most general description of this colossal battle about which volumes will be written. Suffice it to say that the Germans pushed a great spearhead to the Volga. This spearhead consisted of 22 of the best divisions Hitler had, a total of 330,000 men. When the Soviet double concentric pincers closed on November 24, 1942 (after five days of offensive operations), one-third of a million enemy troops were in the bag of a "super-Cannae" from which practically none escaped. ("Cannae" is a battle which Hannibal won over the Romans in 216 B.C. It is considered a classic of encirclement and annihilation.) The victory of Stalingrad was the signal for a series of Soviet offensive operations ranging from Leningrad (where the blockade was lifted) to the Sea of Azov.

Between November 19, 1942, and March 31, 1943, the Red Army liberated 185,000 square miles, retook a dozen of the most important German-held key strongholds, as well as thousands of towns and villages, and piled up the following trophies:
Planes .......... 3,600
Tanks .......... 4,520
Guns .......... 4,600
Trucks .........

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destroyed</th>
<th>Captured</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,520</td>
<td>4,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,600</td>
<td>15,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>123,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A total of 350,000 enemy soldiers were captured and 850,000 killed. Counting the inevitable amount of wounded, it may be said in the fall, winter and early spring campaigns of 1942-1943 the Red Army destroyed single-handedly an enemy army equivalent to the one which invaded the Lowlands and France in the summer of 1940 and conquered Western Europe in six weeks.

While the Battle of Stalingrad was raging, Allied troops landed in North Africa in an unprecedented armada of ships. The operation was a masterpiece of planning and execution. Far be it from this writer to claim that they should have landed in France instead of Africa. Military history will pass its verdict on this question when all the data are in. Nevertheless the fact remains that the Allied landing did not threaten the bulk of the German Army. It only put Rommel's half dozen German divisions in a trap, forcing them to pull out of El Alamein and speed back to Tunisia where they were battered into defeat, although not without a great effort.

In the fall of 1942 a pair of Axis pincers threatened the Middle East. Paulus was moving to the Volga and Rommel was moving to the Nile. However, it must be borne in mind that the arms of the pincers were very uneven: Paulus and the second strategic echelon backing him up between the Don and the Volga had 61 divisions, while Rommel had six German divisions and a handful of Italian divisions.

The Allied campaign in North Africa netted about 150,000 Axis troops (including probably most of the wounded who were captured in the Cap Bon trap). Concurrently, the campaign on the Soviet front netted 1,200,000 killed and captured alone.

The Germans did not achieve any of their strategic objectives and met with an unprecedented military disaster. After
Stalingrad the German Army never successfully went on the offensive on a strategic scale.

As an offensive machine the Wehrmacht was through for good. Thus, we see that Stalingrad and not El Alemain was the crucial battle of the war. In order to understand this just imagine Paulus victorious at Stalingrad with Rommel beaten at El Alemain. The U.S.S.R. (taking the extreme view) goes under and the Wehrmacht turns west in the Spring. What value would have attached to the Tunisian victory if Allied troops in Africa who had had a difficult time beating six German divisions and ten Italian divisions, suddenly had had to face in May, 1943, 250 German divisions along the Atlantic and Mediterranean "walls"?

Now imagine the opposite contingency and you will see that even a victorious Rommel could not have done anything decisive in Egypt with his handful of men if the Germans still had been thrown back from the Volga to the Donetz.

Stalingrad without the slightest doubt must be considered the hub of the war.

Let us turn to another aspect of the Stalingrad victory. Against the figures we quoted on German materiel captured by the Red Army, let us see how much lend-lease materiel had been delivered to the U.S.S.R. at the time of Stalingrad.

By December 31, 1942, the United States had sent to the U.S.S.R.: 2,600 planes; 3,200 tanks; 81,000 trucks (and other materials). Britain sent 2,600 tanks and 2,000 planes. It is known that the deliveries in November, 1942, were 13 times greater than those in January, 1942. On the other hand no material received after August could have possibly been used by the Russians at Stalingrad. Thus during the crucial battle doubtless much less stuff than the above totals was available to the Red Army.

As a matter of fact, Leland Stowe's testimony in his recent book They Shall Not Sleep is revealing. Mr. Stowe says that after early June no more convoys arrived in Murmansk until September (the first American train arrived in Teheran from the Gulf of Persia with war material for the Red Army only in March, 1943). On page 227 Mr. Stowe says:
As a matter of fact, Allied materials could not become of some decisive quantity in the Soviet Union until the end of 1942—after the decision at Stalingrad had already been settled.” (My emphasis—S. K.)

Writing of lend-lease help to the U.S.S.R., Prof. George B. Cressey, of the University of Syracuse, says: “It was Russian planning and Russian equipment which won the victories of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad.” (The Basis of Soviet Strength, page 247.)

It is interesting to note in connection with the “argument” about the respective importance of Stalingrad and El Alamein, that German tanks, painted sand-yellow for desert fighting appeared at Stalingrad, but no German tanks painted white for snow-fighting were ever seen at El Alamein.

As to the bombing of German-held Europe from the west at the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, it could not have helped much. Between the beginning of the war and May 25, 1943 (i.e., about four months after the end of the Battle of Stalingrad), the R.A.F. Bomber Command had dropped only 100,000 tons on Germany. The figure for the U.S.A.A.F. was certainly less. The total was probably about one-tenth of the total dropped on Germany from the west to the end of the war.

THE THIRD PERIOD

During the Battle of Stalingrad the Germans attempted to relieve their trapped Sixth Army Group with an attack by some eleven divisions from the southwest. The counter-blow was a ghastly failure.

During the third period of the war, preceding the Battle of Kursk, the Germans repeated that maneuver in February-March, south of the Donetz. Here they succeeded in stopping the Soviet offensive which was aiming at the elbow of the Dnepr and in saving their own troops in the Donetz Basin. This offensive between the Dnepr and Kharkov, in the early spring of 1943, was the last successful limited offensive of the German Army. It was successful in a strictly limited sense: it
saved the German troops in the Donbas from a huge trap, it permitted the Germans to hold and exploit the mines of the Donbas for another eight months (until September, 1943), it checked the Soviet offensive which had rolled uninterruptedly from Stalingrad almost to the Dnepr, a distance of roughly 400 miles in three months, it recaptured Kharkov. After that and up to the end of 1944 the Germans staged counter-blows on a smaller scale—at Uman, in the Ukraine; at Kiev; in Galicia; at Warsaw; in the Baltic region; at Avaranches, in Normandy, in the Belgian Bulge; at Budapest; but not one of them succeeded in delaying their opponents more than for a few weeks and most of them ended for the Germans in disaster. An analysis of these multiple operations of the Wehrmacht conclusively shows that after November 19, 1942, the German Army was not able successfully to take the offensive on a strategic scale. The three great German offensive blows were delivered roughly with two-and-a-half to three score divisions at a time, in 1941 (Moscow), in 1942 (Stalingrad), and in 1943 (Kursk-Orel); of these the latter was a complete failure as we shall see presently. The counter-blows we mentioned before were conducted by the Germans with an average of between 12 and 20 divisions and, therefore, cannot be considered of strategic scope. Three big offensives and a dozen offensive-defensive counter-blows—such are the highlights of the German operations in Europe after June 22, 1941. Of these fifteen operations, thirteen (three large ones and ten small ones) were directed against the Red Army and two small ones against the Western Allied armies. No German operation was successful after the Donetz local counter-blow in February, 1943 (I do not count a small and temporary success like Kasserine Pass, in Tunisia). This is important to remember in considering the last German strategic offensive attempt in the summer of 1943, around the Kursk Arc.

Concurrently with and immediately after Stalingrad, the Red Army had lifted the blockade of Leningrad, and had recaptured Rostov (which had been lost to the enemy for the second time in 1942). It had pushed a salient beyond Kursk between the German-held strongholds of Orel and Kharkov.
The Germans were afraid of this great salient which had been built up into a gigantic fortress (they were right because in fact the Kursk salient when it started rolling in early August, 1943, ended up 21 months later non-stop, 900 miles and 1,100 miles to the west, on the Elbe and the Muerz.)

The German High Command decided on a minimum and a maximum plan. Plan-minimum envisaged nipping off the Soviet salient at Kursk and the destruction of the Soviet armies concentrated there. Plan-maximum envisaged, in addition, a breakthrough of the Soviet front and a new march on Moscow.

Just before this offensive, the Germans, sensing that the Western Allies, Italy-bent, would not invade France, concentrated 207 German and 50 satellite divisions on the Soviet front. Just as the Western Allies were taking their first steps in Sicily, the storm broke over the Kursk salient.

Reviving the pincer-pattern, 17 armored divisions and 21 infantry and motorized divisions struck at the Kursk arc from both flanks (from Orel and from Belgorod). No such concentration of tanks had hitherto been assembled. (It was matched and bettered only by the Russians during the Oder breakthrough in April, 1945).

The German grand offensive lasted little more than two weeks and penetrated less than 20 miles in depth*. As the battle developed toward its climax, the Germans threw in one-fifth of the 250-odd divisions they had on the Eastern Front. A month after the start of the enemy offensive the Red Army had not only repelled it, but had captured Orel and Belgorod (the Western Allies captured Catania in Sicily on that very same day, August 5). The Germans on the Eastern Front had suffered in one month the following losses in men killed and captured (not counting the wounded), and materiel destroyed and captured:

| Men | 132,000 |
| Planes | 2,500 |

* Between July 5 and 14 the Germans lost 40,000 killed, 1,392 planes and 2,919 tanks.
The German front was broken through in the widest strategic sense of the word. The Soviet offensive spread from the Kursk bulge to the Dnepr and up and down its course, from the Smolensk Gap to the Black Sea. Generally speaking, after Kursk the Red Army never stopped anymore until it reached Berlin and Vienna, except to repel occasional German counter-thrusts and for regrouping. After Kursk, never was the entire Eastern front quiet again, not even during the floods of Spring (in March, April and May, 1944, the Red Army marched to the Carpathians and recaptured Odessa and Sevastopol). After its terrific defeat at Kursk the Wehrmacht could only retreat with occasional attempts at making a stand on such exceptionally advantageous defensive positions as the Dnepr, the Dnestr, the Vistula, the Danube and the Oder and in the Carpathians. In fact, the “march to the Spree” was on.

While the Battle of the Kursk Arc was developing (together with the subsequent Soviet offensive) and the Eastern Front was keeping some 250 enemy divisions busy, fighting on other fronts was engaging a score of enemy divisions in Sicily and Italy and another score or so in Yugoslavia. Thus, in the summer of 1943 the ratio between the “volume of fighting” on the Eastern Front and on all the other fronts of Europe was more than 6:1. This ratio will appear still more dramatic when one looks on the map at Sicily, Southern Italy and Yugoslavia on one hand and at the land mass between the Arctic Ocean and the Black Sea on the other.

Let us now look at the amount of lend-lease materials received by the U.S.S.R. up to the end of 1943, i.e., the stuff that was used by the Red Army during the campaigns of 1943 (we have already seen that nothing could have been used at Moscow and very little in the days of Stalingrad and the 1942-1943 winter).

FEA chief Leo T. Crowley reported in March, 1944 (New
York Times, March 12, 1944) that up to December, 1943, the U.S.S.R. had received lend-lease valued at $4,241,000,000, or slightly more than one quarter of the total amount lent and leased by the U.S.A. to Allied powers. This amount represented as far as munitions of war go, 7,800 planes, less than 5,000 tanks, 33,000 “jeeps,” 173,000 trucks, and other materials such as machines, food, special metals, etc. (This total by far did not reach the U.S.S.R. in time for the Battle of Kursk.)

It is enough to turn back to the statistics of Soviet materiel losses during the first two years of the war to realize that this was a small, though welcome, addition to the Soviet arsenal. (During the first two years of war, the Red Army lost 35,000 guns, 30,000 tanks and 23,000 planes and inflicted on the Germans the following losses: 56,500 guns, 42,400 tanks and 43,000 planes.)

THE FOURTH PERIOD

This is the period beginning after the Battle of the Kursk Arc and ending with the German capitulation at Berlin. Almost two years of fighting are lumped together into one “period,” by me, because the campaigns of these two years are characterized by one common feature: the Red Army was always on the offensive and the German Army was always on the defensive. This “Kursk-Berlin” period can be subdivided into two distinct phases: during the first period (August, 1943-June, 1944) the Red Army continued to fight the German Army virtually alone, thus rounding out almost three years during which the Western Allies fought only against minor enemy forces, while during the second phase the European war assumed its long-awaited two-front pattern.

Following the victory of Kursk-Orel-Kharkov, the Red Army offensive spread along the front and in one sweep reached and hurdled the lower half of the Dnepr and reached the upper Dnepr. In the Fall it cleared the Donetz Basin. In the winter it broke the Germans on the Leningrad front and reached the Narova and the Lake of Pskov. In
the Spring it reached the Dnestr and crossed into Rumania over the Prut and reached the Carpathians. It cleared the Crimea and recaptured Sevastopol. In early June it crushed Finland. Thus, by the time the Western Front was opened by the Western Allies on June 6, 1944, the Germans in the East had already lost everything they had been fighting for. They had been frustrated in the attainment of all their strategic goals in the U.S.S.R., both unlimited and limited.

During this phase, the Germans were keeping well over three-quarters of their divisions in the East because they well knew that the Western Allies were not ready to do anything except continue to fight the slogging campaign in Italy where they still faced the same twenty-odd enemy divisions, with the Yugoslav Army holding almost as many divisions with no tanks, a handful of planes, and no shipping to bring supplies.

During this phase of the war the aerial offensive against Germany from the West was only beginning to hamper the German industrial effort, but the Red Army could not possibly have felt its effects until the end of 1944 and the beginning of 1945, if then. I say "if then" because the study of the operations of the latter period (such as the Battle of the Vistula and the Battle of Hungary) shows very plainly that the Germans did not lack equipment. This is proved, among other things, by the fact that during their defensive counterblow near Budapest around Christmas time, 1944, they were able to squander as many as 200 tanks a day during more than a week. An army which feels the industrial pinch cannot afford such lavishness.

On March 7, 1944, we see a New York Times headline: "Air war at peak . . . loose 2,000 tons on German capital." On May 2, 1944—"81,400 tons hit Nazis in April." On June 2—"118,940 tons rained on Europe in May." July 3, 1944—"122,750 tons poured on the Germans in June."

Thus, from these figures we can draw the conclusion that of the roughly 1,500,000 tons dropped on Germany and Europe during the whole war (from the West) less than 500,000 tons were dropped during the time when the Red Army was retreating from the Bug to the Volga and advanc-
ing from the Volga to the Upper Dnepr and the Dnestr, almost reaching its pre-1939 border and crossing it at some points. In November, 1943, the RAF and the U.S. Eighth Air Force dropped 13,000 tons according to the New York Times, December 10, 1943; during August, September and October, 1943, the RAF and USAAF together dropped 70,000 tons; a number of other figures, such as a weight of 17,000 tons dropped during the “peak week” of February 13, 1944, as reported in the New York Times of May 6, 1945, all show that the really heavy bombing of Germany started after the Red Army had already set Germany on her heels by wresting from her all the fruits of her conquests in the East.

The tonnage of bombs dropped on German-held Europe from the west before D-Day (probably not more than half a million tons during roughly thirty months) is interesting to compare with the 66,000 tons of shells fired against the enemy by American forces during less than 3 months (82 days) on Okinawa. The area of Okinawa is less than 500 square miles. The area of German-held Europe was more than 1,000,000 square miles. Europe in two years got only eight times the explosives the pin-point of Okinawa got in 82 days.

The above figures conclusively prove the correctness of the statement by Soviet Professor S. Vishnev, who says (Soviet Information Bulletin, July 7, 1945): “Besides weapons and materiel, the Allies rendered economic support to the Red Army, weakening Germany’s war potential by blockade and aerial bombing. Germany’s industrial centers hit by the Allied Air Forces were largely reduced, but the effect was not felt by the Soviet Armies before 1944-1945.”

Thus, up to the end of the second phase of the Fourth Period, i.e., up to the moment of the commencement of the final drive from two sides, the Red Army had received only very scant assistance from any quarter and its emergence on a line running from Viborg to Narva, Gomel, Sarny, Czernowitz and Odessa must be credited overwhelmingly to the Soviet Union’s own war effort.
The two-front war against Germany began at long last on June 6, 1944. This last phase was to last for eleven months. The invasion of France was followed 17 days later by the Red Army offensive across the Upper Dnepr (the Battle of Belorussia). While the Western Allies were battling in the Cotentin Peninsula (the Battle of the Hedgerows), the Red Army crashed from the Dnepr to the Bug and Neman, to the near approaches to Riga, to the Upper Vistula, and to the San. At the time of the Allied breakthrough at St. Lo, in Normandy, the Red Army had cleared all Soviet territory except for the western half of the Baltic region and the southern part of Bessarabia.

The over-all line-up of enemy forces during this campaign was approximately this: 100 enemy divisions facing the Allies in Western Europe, Italy and Yugoslavia; at least 240 enemy divisions facing the Red Army on a curving 1,300-mile front from the mouth of the Narova (Gulf of Finland) to the mouth of the Dnestr (not counting the still active front in Lapland where action stopped only toward the end of October). The estimate of 240 enemy divisions operating on the Eastern Front in the summer of 1944 is based on the fact that the Germans themselves said they had 200 divisions between the Baltic and the Carpathians alone, as well as on the incontrovertible fact that in the battles of encirclement at Minsk (July) and Kishinev-Jassy (August), as well as in Kurland, the Germans lost close to 55 divisions encircled and annihilated, or blockaded and left to rot until they surrendered (in Latvia) in May, 1945.

After August 1, while the Allied armies were sweeping almost without opposition from St. Lo to the German border, the Red Army was fighting for every town and village, for every marshy little river right up to the border of East Prussia and Czechoslovakia. While the Allies fought a counterblow by six German divisions at Avranches, the Red Army warded off a counterblow by 30 German divisions before Warsaw.

As the Allies entered Paris amid cheers, the Red Army encircled, near Jassy, 15 German infantry divisions and several
Rumanian divisions and shattered seven German divisions which tried to break through to their encircled troops. The Germans lost, at Jassy, 106,000 prisoners with 13 generals, 830 tanks, 3,500 guns and 33,000 motor vehicles. This operation ushered in the brilliant march to Vienna which upset the entire German defense plan by attracting German strategic reserves to the southern wing of the front, and forcing them to weaken their Italian front by the withdrawal of several divisions which were rushed into Hungary.

In December, von Rundstedt began his ill-starred counter-offensive against the Allies in the “Belgian Bulge.” While this battle with 20 German divisions was raging, the Red Army was warding off a similar blow in the Budapest-Lake Balaton region. Rundstedt managed to escape from the Bulge with his best troops, but in Budapest almost a score of German and Hungarian divisions never got out of the trap.

While the Allied Armies were regrouping and recuperating from the Rundstedt blow, the Red Army opened its big winter offensive on the Vistula (Jan. 15, 1945), in East Prussia, and in Czechoslovakia.

When the Western Allies made their famous crossing of the Rhine, at Remagen (early March, 1945), the Red Army had already reached the Oder and was getting ready to strike at Vienna.

At last the pay-off was at hand.

In the West the Germans offered only sporadic, spotty and uncoordinated resistance to the Allied Armies. Up to April, 1945, any large movement of German troops took place usually from West to East. Now German divisions were scurrying westward . . . to surrender to the Americans and British.

While the Allies were marching, against little opposition, to the Elbe, the Red Army effected its massive breakthrough on the Oder (end of April) and began the battle of Berlin against 100-odd German divisions. Simultaneously, the East Prussian pocket was liquidated and the enemy defenses were broken through in Upper Silesia and in Austria.

The Red Army battered its way into Berlin a day before
the British entered Hamburg and three days before General Patton roared into Linz. During five days after the German capitulation (May 8), the Red Army fought a whole German army group across the western part of Czechoslovakia. The last shots of the war were fired on the Eastern Front on May 13, 1945.

The Cost

HUMAN LOSSES

Only the figures on American and British Empire losses have been made public. Taking only the killed, missing and prisoners, we see that U.S. losses are roughly 450,000 of which it is estimated that six-sevenths were incurred in the European-African theatre of war. Thus, in the war against Germany, American casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) are about 375,000 men.

British Empire casualties (killed, prisoners and missing both in the Armed Forces and civilians) are roughly 865,000, of which probably 700,000 were incurred in the war against Germany and her satellites. Thus the total of Western Allied casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) in the war against Germany is slightly more than 1,000,000 men.

Soviet military casualties have not been computed for the whole war. We know officially only that during the first three years of the war the Soviet Armed Forces lost (in killed, prisoners and missing) 5,300,000 men. Considering that during the fourth year of the war such gigantic battles as the Battle of Belorussia, Poland, the Danube, East Prussia and Germany were fought, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet casualties for the whole war are not far from 6.5 million men. Thus we have a ratio of 6.5:1 as between Anglo-American casualties and Soviet casualties.

As to casualties among the civilian population of the Soviet regions which were occupied by the Germans—“Thou alone, O Lord, knoweth their numbers.”
The total amount in lend-lease materials sent by the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. through to April 1, 1945 is as follows (in thousands of dollars):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance and ammunition</td>
<td>798,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft and parts</td>
<td>1,495,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks and parts</td>
<td>460,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles and parts</td>
<td>1,157,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watercraft</td>
<td>240,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All munitions</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,151,591</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum products</td>
<td>84,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial materials and products</td>
<td>2,700,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural products</td>
<td>1,473,003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,409,695</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This total of almost eight and one-half billion dollars represents, among other thing:

- Planes: 13,300
- Tanks: 6,800
- Tons of explosives: 312,000
- Motor vehicles of all types: 406,000

If one adds to this the lend-lease material received by the U.S.S.R. from or through Great Britain, the total will amount to $10,000,000,000.

The above figures have to be viewed against the background of other figures, such as the following:

- The U.S.A. spent on the war close to $300,000,000,000.
- Thus, even if one should include lend-lease from Britain, the U.S.S.R. received slightly more than three cents of every dollar spent on the war by the U.S.A.

According to the estimate of French Minister Pierre Cot, the U.S.S.R. spent the equivalent of 170,000,000,000 gold
dollars on the war against Germany. Thus, if we accept the figure (and it is more than plausible, if one takes into consideration the enormous amount of fighting done by the Red Army) we see that lend-lease equipment and materials amounted to less than 6 per cent of what the Soviet Union manufactured itself and used in the war.

It also must be considered that a substantial part of lend-lease went to the Soviet Far East to bolster the Far Eastern Red Armies for the eventual struggle against the Japanese Army. Thus, not all the munitions which were lent and leased to the U.S.S.R. went to the German front.

It must also be remembered that the above figures represent stuff delivered f.o.b. at American ports. How much stuff was sunk in the terrible run to Murmansk, especially in the early months, we don't know.

And here is another angle to the question: On the basis of Soviet material battle losses during the first three years of the war only (30,000 planes, 49,000 tanks and 48,000 guns), we can surmise that such Soviet losses for the whole war were no less than 35,000 planes, 60,000 tanks and 60,000 guns. Now, the Red Army obviously not only replaced its losses, but added to its equipment as compared with the first years of the war. Thus, taking the losses to be one-third of the stuff available at the time, we see that Soviet industry must have produced no less than four times the above figures of losses (inclusive of replacements) i.e., a total of some 140,000 planes, 240,000 tanks and 240,000 guns.

These figures are borne out by the following fragmentary data: one Soviet tank factory alone produced 35,000 tanks during the war; one factory alone built 15,000 planes; the Stalin Ordnance Works alone produced 95,000 guns of all calibres.

Looking at the lend-lease figures of materials shipped to the U.S.S.R. during the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad, we see that the amount could not have had an appreciable influence on their outcome. (Practically no materials had arrived during the Battle of Moscow. As to the battle of
Stalingrad, only about one-seventh of all lend-lease stuff had reached the U.S.S.R. at that time.)

At the time of the Battle of Kursk when the last German offensive attempt was shattered, the U.S.S.R. had been allotted only slightly more than $2,000,000,000 of stuff (the United Kingdom had already received two and one-half times that amount).

Thus we see very plainly that the decisive battles of Moscow and Stalingrad were won almost exclusively with Soviet stuff. The victory in the Battle of Kursk was made easier by lend-lease.

It must, of course, be understood that such inconspicuous lend-lease items as those entered as "miscellaneous" probably contain precious alloy metals, vitamins, or sulfa drugs, etc., whose value in the struggle cannot be measured in tons or dollars because they mean the saving of human lives through tougher tank armor, better diet, medication, etc.

In order to grasp the whole idea of lend-lease, one must understand its basic meaning: the U.S.A. in 1941, 1942, and even 1943, was not able to put enough trained men in the field to use all the stuff they could produce under the peaceful conditions prevailing in the U.S.A., with their immense resources and industrial establishments. It was natural then for the U.S.A. to give part of what it produced to those men who were on the spot, were trained to use the stuff and were in a position to use it to the best advantage.

Some of the stuff lent and leased was as important, to take a trivial and homely example, as a box of matches while camping. One man cut, trimmed and hauled the wood for the camp fire. Another brought the matches. True, it would have been possible to light the fire by rubbing sticks, but it would have taken so much longer. Without the 400,000 trucks and other vehicles received by the Red Army it would undoubtedly have moved slower. Without vitamins and lard it would have been weaker. Without sulfa drugs more men would have suffered more. And so on down the line.

Lend-lease was well given and well used. This means that
it was to the mutual advantage and all talk about "charity,"
or "ingratitude" is so much nonsense.

The object of talking about it at all, except for the record, is to show that on one hand lend-lease was highly important, on the other that the U.S.S.R. did not in the least "live on lend-lease only" because it produced, on its own resources, 90 per cent of some items, 75 per cent of others, 100 per cent of still others, probably an average of 95 per cent of all it used in this war (this estimate is based on the figures of the probable total cost of the war to the U.S.S.R. and on the value of lend-lease received).

I think that Generalissimo Stalin put the whole thing clearly when he said on June 12, 1945, in a message to President Truman:

"On the day of the third anniversary of the conclusion of the Soviet American agreement on the principles to be applied to mutual assistance in the conduct of the war against aggression, I beg you and the U.S. Government to accept this expression of gratitude from the Soviet Government and myself personally.

"This agreement, on the basis of which the U.S. throughout the whole war in Europe, through lend-lease, has been supplying the S.U. with arms, strategic materials and food, played an important part in and made a considerable contribution to the successful conclusion of the war against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany."

And Soviet People's Commissar of Finance Arseny Zverev said, in presenting the 1945 budget to the Supreme Soviet (Parliament):

"In making a preliminary review of the financing of the Red Army, we must remember the substantial assistance received in 1944 as well as during this year from our Allies, in the form of armaments, materiel and foodstuffs."

It would be unfair to deny that lend-lease assistance was "substantial," but it would be just as unfair to claim that it was these supplies, which, thrown into the scales, turned the balance in favor of Russia simply because the balance had
already been basically turned in the Battles of Moscow and Stalingrad.

Lend-lease to the U.S.S.R. did not win the war, but it speeded its victorious conclusion.

The Role of Air Power

In speaking of the role of air power in the war against Germany, it is impossible to omit the so-called Battle of Britain. Without in the least detracting from the staunchness and courage of the British people—qualities which are known all over the world—in a battle which made "so many owe so much to so few," this battle must be viewed in its true perspective. In the brilliant phrase of Churchill we find the very negation of the erroneous idea that the so-called Battle of Britain could have won the war. No handful of heroic young men can win a modern global war. What British resistance did was to prevent the war from being dragged out for many years longer than it did, but it did not win it for the simple reason that it could not win it.

The notion that Britain "stood alone" and repelled the Nazi flood from its shores also is erroneous. The myth of the German invasion attempts in the late summer of 1940 has been dispelled. The famous invasion barges photographed by British fliers in the mouth of the Schelde turned out to be only fifty in number and were hardly designed to carry the invasion. Another myth—the story of the wall of fire around Britain's shores burning to death the invasion ships and troops has also been exploded. Such a wall of fire was prepared and we even saw it in the movies in 1945, but no German invasion was burned in the purely experimental holocaust.

But the fact that the Germans did not invade Britain remains incontrovertible. Why didn't they do it?

History gives us an example and a parallel which is worth examining, but with all the caution with which historical parallels and "repetitions" should be approached.
In early 1805 Napoleon had collected an army of 130,000 and was building 2,000 special flat-bottomed boats for the invasion of England. All this was concentrated at the camp of Boulogne. The British and French fleets in those days played a part not unsimilar to that which aviation played in 1940. Some people think that it was the defeat of the French fleet under Villeneuve at Trafalgar by Nelson which saved England. But the fact is that Napoleon suddenly lifted his camp at Boulogne in the summer of 1805 (weeks before Trafalgar) and marched to the Danube and the victories of Elchingen, Ulm and Austerlitz. He turned his back on England in order to face the threat of the Austro-Russian coalition on the Danube.

Now, in 1940 the situation was not without parallel if one considers that precisely at the time when France was collapsing and Germany seemed free to turn its entire armed might against almost defenseless England, the Red Army advanced to the Baltic, to the border of East Prussia, to the Prut and the mouths of the Danube, taking up its “initial position” for the coming epic struggle against Germany and German-held Europe. Hitler read “the writing on the Eastern Wall.”

It is clear that this was the determining factor which made the modern “Napoleon” give up any idea of the invasion of England, and start preparing for his march to the East.

Thus, it is clear that England was not in the least “alone” in that summer of 1940. The fact that so many Englishmen did not know it makes their heroic struggle still more glorious in the eyes of the world. Between August 8 and October 31, 1940, the British fought off a part of the Luftwaffe (but not all of it because the rest was watching the eastern ramparts). The British lost one out of every five houses destroyed or damaged, they lost several thousand people. They downed 2,375 German planes and lost about 750 themselves. They lost 375 airmen killed. But their industries continued to grow and Britain emerged from the battle with a reorganized and rejuvenated army, because she had not been invaded and, except for the Channel Islands, no German foot was set on British soil. The key to that fact is to be found in Tallin,
Riga, Kaunas and Kishinev, into which the Red Army marched at that time.

I have shown in preceding chapters that the aerial assault on German-held Europe could not have had any appreciable influence on the land war on the Eastern Front either in 1941, 1942, or 1943. Thus, it is clear that the Soviet victories of Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and on the Dnepr were won without any appreciable assistance from the air power of the western Allies in a wide over-all sense (however, it is possible, of course, that, for example, a British air blow at the port of Rostock did hamper German communications on the Leningrad front for awhile). Now what about the campaigns of 1944? Were they materially assisted by Western air power?

Numerous highly paid pressure salesmen for aviation concerns, sanguine prime-ministers, certain enthusiastic air generals with a juvenile outlook on war, as well as numerous headline hunters have been trying ever since 1943 to sell the world the idea that air power, almost alone, was turning the trick.

Chief Air Marshal Harris said in 1943: “Every ton of bombs dropped on German industries will save the lives of ten United Nations soldiers when the invasion comes.” According to this statement, some fifteen million United Nations soldiers were saved by the bombing of Germany which is about twice the number they lost altogether, and about three times the number the western Allies put in the field. The absurdity of this assertion does not need any explanation.

Fawning and servile Nazi generals and industrialists, diplomats and even hausfraus, trying to ingratiate themselves with the Western conquerors at the expense of the Eastern conquerors, screamed, mumbled and whispered in a chorus: “You, Americans, won the war with your air power. We would never have been beaten if it were not for your bombers.”

On the other hand there are some factual statements and documents which throw a realistic light on the question of the role of strategic bombing on the German war effort during the years 1944 and 1945. Here are some of them:

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John McCormack of the New York Times reported from Nuernberg on April 30, 1945, that two industrialists of the gigantic Siemens-Schuckert Co. stated that their company's production reached its high peak in 1944.

In the preceding chapters we have shown that the Germans used military equipment with great lavishness as late as December, 1944 (at Budapest, for instance, and later on in East Prussia, in Poland, and on the Oder). Obviously they were not short of planes, tanks, guns, shells, steel, oil, etc.

However, such reasoning might not sound convincing to some.

Let us turn to various statements by Allied authorities who now see that the main difficulties confronting German industry are not so much plants and machines, but fuel and manpower.

For instance, Drew Middleton cabled to the New York Times (July 15, 1945), from Frankfort-on-the-Main:

"The factories, it will be argued, are, however, largely intact and capable of being rehabilitated into full production in the near future. This isn't so. Considered against the background of German economy today, they cannot be expected to return to production for years to come. For industry includes not only the plant and physical assets but fuel and labor as well. And in Germany today the two principal shortages are coal and manpower, shortages which cripple every part of German economy."

Before the end of the war, especially in 1944, these crippling factors operated only partially. On the other hand the fact that German factories are "largely intact" is confirmed. Coal became scarce when it was seized. Men became scarce when they were killed and captured.

However, the most convincing document is a statement by Senator Harley M. Kilgore (C. P. Trussell's Washington dispatch to the New York Times, August 8, 1945) in which he said that captured documents of the German Ministry of Armaments and War Production (the reports were captured in the spring of 1945) showed that "in 1944 three times as
many armored fighting vehicles, more than three times as many fighter-bombers and eight times as many night bombers had been produced as in 1942. In 1944 coal mining in Germany was only slightly lower than in 1942, crude steel only 11 per cent lower. Additional power plants were made available in 1944. By the autumn of 1944 sufficient reserves of material had been accumulated, with the result that, in spite of more difficult conditions in the basic industry the output of armaments could be maintained and in some cases even increased.

"Taking the basis of 100 per cent in 1942, hard coal production in 1943 increased by 8 per cent. It was 11 per cent less last year. The production of aluminum increased by 3 per cent in 1943, and in 1944 by 11 per cent more. If the production of powder in 1942 be considered 100 per cent, it increased in 1943 to 158 per cent and reached 171 per cent in 1944. Forty-five per cent more explosives was produced in 1943 and 75 per cent more in 1944 than in 1942."

Here are some facts submitted to the Kilgore Committee by investigators who have returned from Germany to report on the defeated nation's industrial capacity and the effects of air bombing:

1. Germany today has 4,000,000 tons of machine tools and a vast undamaged capacity of producing more.
2. The iron and steel industry, productive capacity 25,000,000 tons a year, can be restored with only minor repairs.
3. The great chemical and dye industry—including that part manufacturing explosives—is only slightly damaged.
4. The synthetic rubber industry can produce 10,000 tons a year.
5. If the war had lasted six months more the entire oil refining and storage industry would have been underground, safe from all bombing (this was before the atomic bomb was announced).

"The total German productive capacity affected by the bombing," sums up London's Tribune (July 20) "was about 20 per cent; less than half the earlier expert estimates by Bomber Command Public Relations."
"These are hard facts. They show that bombing did not win the war, contrary to what each and all of the captured German generals hastened to assure us.

"Bombing did contribute to final victory, but essentially so only when it was harmonized with land operations." (In Fact, August 20, 1945.)

Thus, we see that even in 1944 and in the beginning of 1945, strategic bombing did not reduce materially the power of Germany to resist and that the common victory of the Allies must be chiefly credited to the valor, skill and power of their armies. It follows from this, in the light of all the foregoing, that the Red Army carried the overwhelming burden of the war against Germany and her satellites from June 22, 1941, until June 6, 1944, or during almost three years. It carried the larger part of the burden from June, 1944, right up to V-E Day.

The Soviet Air Force

Soviet military doctrine never envisaged air power as something which could bring a decision by itself. The Soviet Air Force is closely integrated with and in the Army and Navy. Its main function was not strategic bombing, but close support of the land operations. The plane was not considered as a "thing in itself," but as a member of a close-knit team working on land, sea and in the air.

The record of the Soviet Air Force is nothing to be dismissed with a shrug. On the basis of the known figure of 60,000 German planes downed on the Eastern Front during the first three years of war, it is reasonable to assume that Soviet fliers and AA-defenses have disposed of approximately 80,000 German planes during the whole war.

Information about the work of the Soviet Air Force is fragmentary. But some of these fragments can give one an idea of what the Soviet fliers did.

For instance we know that in the Spring of 1943 Soviet fliers had to fight three large-scale air battles. The Germans massed 2,000 planes over the Kuban area, picked squadrons at that.
More than 100 air battles were fought here every day. Soviet fliers destroyed more than half of the enemy planes and maintained their initiative.

Just before the Battle of Kursk, the Germans launched massed air raids on Rostov, Kursk, Yaroslavl, Gorky and other cities. Kursk alone was raided repeatedly by 500-600 enemy bombers. All onslaughts were repelled with huge losses to the Germans.

During the Battle of Kursk itself, i.e., during its first days, more than 1,000 German planes were downed.

Right from the start of the Battle of Belorussia in the summer of 1944, the Luftwaffe was swept out of the skies by the Soviet fliers.

Soviet fliers and AA-defenses destroyed throughout the war an average of more than 50 German planes per day.

The Soviet Navy

The four years of struggle of the Soviet Navy in theatres so close to land differed markedly from classic naval wars. There were no grand naval battles between the main forces of the opposing fleets. Neither were there usual lulls in fighting which inevitably follow major engagements.

The Baltic, Black and Barents Seas extended along the 1,800-mile flanks of the vast land front where the outcome of the war was being decided. Naturally, operations at sea were subordinated to the objectives of the land front. The principal task of the Soviet Navy was to facilitate the operations of the army. The Germans on the other hand did not wish to risk their major naval units against the Soviet Navy because they intended to keep them intact for the future invasion of Britain, when victory over the U.S.S.R. had been won.

The Soviet Navy not only protected the communication lines to Murmansk as well as across the Black Sea, but it took part in countless amphibious operations. Its river flotillas did yeoman work hand in hand with the Red Army.

Just as in the case of the Soviet Air Force, there are no comprehensive data on the work of the Soviet Navy as yet.
However, fragmentary data are available and they give a fairly good idea of the whole.

In the summer of 1942 Soviet submarines sank more than 60 German transports in the Baltic (total displacement—500,000 tons).

During the five weeks preceding the ejection of the Germans from the Crimea, 200 German and Rumanian ships were sunk in the Black Sea.

In the four weeks preceding the ouster of the Germans from Lapland, more than 150 enemy vessels were sunk in the Far North.

In March, 1945, 350,000 tons of enemy shipping was sunk in the Baltic.

These figures show that the naval war in the East, though devoid of major naval battles, inflicted tremendous losses on the enemy and the Soviet Navy can match the Battle of the Atlantic with the long and gruelling Battles of the Barents, Baltic and Black Seas.

Summary

All of the foregoing has served to demonstrate the following truths:

1. The Soviet Union made the major contribution toward victory in World War II under incomparably more adverse external conditions than those under which Russia was defeated in World War I. Obviously, the explanation of this fact lies in the internal conditions of the country.

2. Russia had space at its command, in fact more space than the Soviet Union had (the central sector of the border of the Russian Empire in 1914 was some 250 miles farther from Moscow than the border of the U.S.S.R. was in 1941). As to the climate—snow, mud, frost, etc.—it can be said the climate of the Soviet Union is no different than the climate of Imperial Russia. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Red Army won its greatest victories in winter, summer, autumn and spring.
3. The decisive battles of the Soviet-German war, at Moscow and Stalingrad, were won without appreciable assistance either from the Western air war against Germany or from lend-lease. During the summer battles of 1943 both categories of help were only beginning to be felt. However, neither type of help became considerable until the fourth period of the war.

4. The Soviet people have paid the greatest price of all nations in blood, devastation and treasure. They could stand the price because of their internal organization. While Imperial Russia was growing weaker and weaker under the hammerblows of World War I, the Soviet Union was growing stronger and stronger in the war against Germany and its satellites. This radical and decisive difference cannot be credited to the "traditional" heroism of the Russian people, simply because this quality was inherently present in 1914.

5. The course of the war plainly shows that it was the Battle of Moscow which killed the blitz and the legend of German invincibility, and the Battle of Stalingrad which marked the end of German offensive power. It now remains to be seen what made this tremendous and brilliantly successful Soviet war effort possible.

The over-all plan of this effort was broadcast by Marshal of the Soviet Union Stalin in his radio address of July 3, 1941 (twelve days after the German attack). In this address, conceived in the darkest hours Russia had ever experienced, Marshal Stalin expressed the supreme confidence of the Soviet people in victory when he said "this (the German) army . . . can be smashed and will be smashed, as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm."

At the same time he proceeded, calmly and deliberately to outline the nation's plan of defense.

The concept of the People's War was expressed in the words: "Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people are rising in defense of their native land."

The concept of scorched earth was expressed in the words: "In case of forced retreat of Red Army units . . . the enemy
must not be left a single engine, a single railroad car, not a
single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. . . . All valuable
property . . . which cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed
without fail."

The plan for guerrilla (partisan) warfare in the enemy rear
was planned as follows:

"In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units, mounted
and on foot, must be formed, diversionist groups must be
organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment guerrilla
warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage
telephone and telegraph lines, to set fire to forests, stores and
transports."

The concept of the Great Patriotic War was expressed thus:

"This war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies; it is
also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the
German-fascist forces. The aim of this national war in defense
of our country . . . is not only elimination of the danger
hanging over our country, but also aid to all European
people groaning under the yoke of German fascism."

And, prophetically he declared:

"In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In this
great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe
and America. . . . Our war for the freedom of our country
will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and
America for their independence, for democratic liberties. . . ."

Finally, on popular levies to assist the Red Army in combat,
especially in the defense of great cities (such as Leningrad,
Odessa, Tula, Moscow, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Sevastopol):

". . . popular levies must be raised in every city which is
in danger of enemy invasion, all the working people must
be roused to defend our freedom, our honor, our country. . . ."

And on the leadership for this great effort:

"In order to insure rapid mobilization of all the forces of
the peoples of the U.S.S.R. . . . a State Committee of Defense
has been formed in whose hand the entire power of the State
has been vested. The State Committee of Defense has entered
on its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around the Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy, destroy the enemy and secure victory."

Here was the grandiose plan which made the Soviet war effort possible. Titanic effort is reflected in its every word. Take for instance the four simple words in the sentence about the destruction or evacuation of valuable property—"which cannot be withdrawn." But great industries were withdrawn and "put on wheels" in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in Leningrad, and the Donbas. They were moved in July and August, 1941, hundreds of (and even more than a thousand) miles to the east and set up in the wilderness with such dispatch that their military products—tanks, guns and planes made their appearance at the front in November, during the crucial Battle of Moscow. The men who set up these industries often lived in igloos and snow dugouts for weeks because the machine shops had to be set up before the dwellings for the men could be built.

Take, for instance, a tank factory evacuated in July, 1941, from the vicinity of Kharkov to somewhere around Nizhni-Taghil in the Urals. The distance by rail is more than 1,200 miles. The trip east over bombed rail lines, against the tide of general mobilization moving west, the setting up of factory buildings in the wilderness, the unspeakable conditions of cold and privation are an epic in themselves. And in spite of all that, tanks manufactured in the transplanted factory made their appearance in the Battle of Moscow, only four months later.

Perhaps the reader of this account will feel that in setting up the balance sheet of the war I did not give enough credit to the American-British Battle of the Atlantic. Of course, this battle was a miracle of organization, dogged determination, magnificent seamanship and all-around heroism, but isn't it balanced by the Battle of the Great Russian Plain in which whole industries moved eastward hundreds and thousands of miles and later their products moved back westward to the front? Only it was trains that moved instead of ships, with
men freezing in cabooses and on open platforms instead of on bridges and decks. Trains being bombed just as the ships were. The comparison would have been still more apt if the Allied convoys in the Atlantic had had to carry a lot of industries, say, from France in 1940 to Detroit, and then carry their products back to the European Front. The Battle of the Great Russian Plain was a two-way affair.

The famous Soviet weapons such as the rocket-gun “Katusha” (which later acquired quite a “family” in the persons of “Andryusha,” “Ivan the Terrible,” etc.), the new Stalin tank, the new fighters and “stormoviks” (attack planes), the antitank gun, were born in the darkest days of the war, under the indescribable conditions of the mass migration of heavy industry to the East.

Stupendous as these achievements are in themselves, the planning and controlling apparatus is still more stupendous. There is not the shadow of a doubt that all this was planned and controlled by the Communist Party and its leaders. It was the Communists who invariably provided the leadership in partisan warfare and were the mainspring of the total effort in the people’s war. They knew where they were going and that is why they came to victory, in spite of all adverse conditions and obstacles.

The industrial effort of the Soviet Union under the conditions described above can be fully appreciated by Americans reared in the tradition of American industrial achievement.

It is a different matter with the concept of the People’s War and Guerrilla War because America has never been invaded, at least for the last 175 years, and seven or eight generations of Americans never had the occasion to practice either type of warfare.

This writer feels that it is not within his modest means to describe fully the magnificent scope and meaning of Soviet Guerrilla warfare and People’s War—that defense in depth carried to its ultimate conclusion.

He therefore appends two Soviet accounts, one written by a Guerrilla chief, the other by an eye-witness of the People’s War. These two documents, which appear at the end of this
booklet, will tell at least part of the story much better than this writer ever could hope to do.

**Decision in the Far East**

The global war was bound to end globally. All the major Allied powers inevitably were to play a role in the Far Eastern decision. It had been clear ever since the day when the Soviet Union cancelled the Japanese concessions in Northern Sakhalin that the Red Army would take a hand in the conflict at the proper moment. Now Japan is, militarily speaking, through. Much has been said and written about the causes which precipitated the Japanese surrender.

Over-enthusiastic scientists, justly proud of their successes in unleashing atomic energy, claim that it was the atomic bomb which finally licked Japan.

Some air generals with a juvenile outlook on the facts of war and life assure the world that it was the superfortress which, basically, did the job.

Here again we have two variants of the old so-called “air-power-alone” theory. But the theory is no more convincing in Asia than it was in Europe.

It is true that new and powerful factors entered the war against Japan in such quick succession that it is not easy to decide which one of them was most instrumental in breaking Japan's "moral back."

Large scale bombing of Japan from the Marianas bases started in the Spring. Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet went on the rampage along the shores of Japan on July 10, and kept up a constant bombardment for three weeks. The atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8.

On the face of it, Japan surrendered only after the Soviet Union declared war. True, she had offered (tentatively) to surrender in mid-July, but somehow nothing came of it then.

Japan had built up a great continental military and industrial base in Manchuria. She most probably had hopes at least to prolong the war by holding out there even after Allied
landings in Japan were made. The military leadership of the United States was obviously figuring on that because as late as the first week in August there still was seemingly serious talk of the need of seven million American troops to subdue the Japanese army in Asia.

The entry of the Soviet Union into the fray made all this unnecessary. The ten-day whirlwind campaign of the three Far Eastern Soviet armies over a theatre of more than half a million square miles was a blow which knocked the props from under any Japanese idea of continuing resistance outside Japan itself.

The truth of the matter is that while Soviet military action in Manchuria shortened the war for the United States, so the brilliant three-year effort of the armed forces of the United States made the Soviet whirlwind tempo in Manchuria possible.

The main military factor, within the limits of the period of warfare in the Far East and in the Pacific, contributing to the defeat of Japan, was the dogged, efficient and heroic march of American forces from the International Dateline to the shores of Japan. The greater glory (if glory can be thus apportioned) goes to the United States Navy and its correlated branches of the service.

However, in considering the actions from Tarawa to Okinawa and from Guadalcanal to Borneo and Luzon, we should not forget the fact that all these countless hard-won enemy strongholds would have been garrisoned by the Japanese much more strongly, if the Soviet Union had not managed to keep about a million crack troops on the Manchu border throughout the European war (even when, in the life and death struggle before Moscow and Stalingrad, every single man counted) thus immobilizing a large Japanese army.

Here are some figures on the Japanese contingents in Manchuria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>10,500 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>65,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 1941</td>
<td>400,000 men</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Late 1941 (Battle of Moscow*) ……… 1,000,000 men
1,000 tanks
1,500 planes

Only in 1943-1944 did the Japanese forces in Manchuria decrease somewhat because the Japanese command realized that it was too late to attack the Soviet Union, but still too early for the Soviet Union to attack her. But the moment Germany surrendered, Japanese troops began to stream northward from China into Manchuria to face the threat of the Red Army thus enabling Chiang Kai-shek’s troops to win some local victories south of the Yangtze.

The question arises now as to why the Japanese did not attack the Soviet Union at the time of the Battle of Moscow or the Battle of Stalingrad? The answer is that they had received two painful lessons in 1938 and 1939 (at Changkufeng and at the Kalkin-Ghol) and had found out that their army could not stand up against the Red Army even under circumstances favorable to Japanese arms.

General (now Marshal) Zhukov had, in the summer of 1939 at Kalkin-Ghol, given the Japanese a foretaste of what was going to happen to them in the summer of 1945. The result was that ever since then the Japanese, while keeping more or less quiet in Manchuria, were compelled to divert to that potential front a great portion of their best troops from the struggle against the United States and Great Britain. Thus the contribution of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern war goes far beyond the actual fighting which took place after August 8, 1945. It antedates Pearl Harbor by almost three and one-half years.

This contribution should be viewed against the background of the terrific struggle of the Red Army against Germany. The ability to maintain a large and modern, almost self-sufficient establishment some 5,000 miles from the European front when every man and every gun were needed before Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad, is a great achievement in itself.

*At that time Japan kept in Manchuria half of her artillery, three-quarters of her cavalry and two-thirds of her tanks.
The guerrillas of the Ukraine had reason to be envious of their comrades in Byelorussia who were fighting the invaders. The vast forests and impassable swamps of Byelorussia were favorable arenas for partisan warfare. Every detachment and unit of the guerrillas there had its zone of action and a more or less stable base in the forests, to which it returned after an operation.

Steppes predominate in the Ukraine. Facilities for shelter are rare or non-existent. A blind emulation of the tactics used by the Byelorussian guerrillas would lead to futile losses. Other tactics had to be worked out. We discovered that the most effective method for us was a swift and complex maneuver, and we formed our striking units accordingly. Safety lay in the suddenness of our appearance, the brevity of blows dealt, and our swift withdrawal to great distances.

September 10, 1941 was a memorable day in my life. A peaceful civilian chairman of the City Soviet of Workers Deputies in the town of Putivl, Sumy Region, I made the decision to remain in the territory occupied by the Germans and to organize a guerrilla force.

My group at first included 13 people with whom I had worked at various times and whom I could trust. Two months passed in minor acts of diversion, a study of the enemy's tactics, and most of all in establishing contact with the population.

In guerrilla warfare the sympathy of the people and reliable and constant contact with them are everything. Such warfare is inconceivable without the support of the people; if the population is with you, then you are invincible, no matter how strong and well-armed the enemy may be. He who fails to understand this cannot understand the essence of our strength.
Certain of finding supporters everywhere, and having established close contact with reliable people in the towns and villages, our detachment grew rapidly. Without difficulty I increased the number of my fighting men to 2,500. More could have been added, but I did not consider this expedient. The larger the striking units, the more difficult it would be to maneuver, and the greater the tendency to diminish the pace of action.

Constantly in action against the enemy beyond his lines and in his hinterland, our detachment covered some 15,000 kilometers and several times forced such rivers as the Desna, Dnepr, Pripet, Prut and Dnestr. We moved on an average of 25 kilometers daily. This is no mean distance when one remembers that our men advanced only by night and on foot; our horses carried only the wounded and sick, ammunition and food.

We were well armed with tommy guns and machine guns, trench mortars and light cannon, including several 76-mm. guns. Like all guerrillas, we acquired our arms at the expense of the enemy.

I can say without exaggeration that we grew to be a terror to the Germans. After striking a sudden blow and routing one of the enemy garrisons, we would vanish as abruptly as we had appeared, burning the bridges behind us. The Germans would strike out in all directions, but within a short time we would hit them again, some 200 to 300 and even 500 kilometers from the former place.

Having acquired considerable battle experience in the war zone, we began operations in the remote rear of the enemy. Here are some examples:

In June, 1943, when the Red Army was fighting its historic battle at the Kursk bulge, we were engaged in an operation in the Rovensk Region, some 800 kilometers from the front. The Germans never expected us here. They had placed a price on my head long before, but now displayed incredible generosity. In their newspapers they published a notice that they would pay for my head 100,000 rubles in gold or bullion, as the murderer desired. This was a lot of money and I
couldn't help feeling a bit flattered. Not once, however, did the Germans catch me.

Finally they combed the Rovno forests in grand style. We had had similar experiences on no less than 30 previous occasions—and this time too we broke out of the encirclement. Pushing westward to surprise the Germans we penetrated to the oilfields of Drogobych, in the Carpathians. This was in July, 1943. While the Red Army was crushing the enemy's defenses at Sumy and Belgorod, we were destroying oilwells, cracking plants and pipe-lines in the Carpathians, a thousand kilometers from the front.

"Wieder Kovpak!" (Kovpak again!) screamed the German newspapers, and this time the enemy sent eight of his picked regiments and five battalions to intercept us at Drogobych. They planned to force us against the Carpathian heights. By a complex maneuver we evaded them and got away in an easterly direction to the Sluch River. True to our rules, our partisan units on their way inflicted heavy losses on the Germans. We approached our rendezvous in seven groups along a front of 200 kilometers.

All that could prove of value to the enemy was burned and destroyed.

There are some who say the successes of my detachment were gained by sheer luck. Luck has been with us at times, of course, but it is impossible to beat the enemy again and again by luck alone. Miracles don't happen in war. Those who are unable to fight well are soon abandoned by fortune. Guerrilla actions require creative skill. I remember one occasion when fortune seemed to smile exclusively upon the enemy. Pursuing us, the Germans closed in between the Dnepr and Pripet Rivers. Here they massed six infantry divisions and two tank regiments.

Superior in armaments, the enemy also outnumbered us 20 to one. We were pressed against the Pripet and harried from its surface by five armored tugs and 10 other well-armed ships. It seemed they had us—and the Germans no doubt anticipated the pleasure of an easy victory. Fierce fighting began, lasting for two days. The situation became puzzling:

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we were beating the Germans, instead of their beating us.

They were never given a chance to beat us. The trick was simple. Filtering through to the woods, we arose on the enemy’s flanks, struck suddenly, annihilated as many as we could, and vanished. While our tommy guns mowed the Germans down, now here and now there, our artillerymen gave their attention to the enemy boats, and our sappers built a floating bridge 240 meters long. Destroying the flotilla, we crossed the river and got away.

This engagement cost the Germans 1,100 dead officers and men. Our losses were one man killed and four wounded. This could scarcely be termed luck. The entire operation was well conceived and skilfully carried out.

My detachment during its period of action annihilated 18,000 German soldiers and officers—including three generals. We also burned 55,000 tons of oil cached by the Nazis, derailed many of their trains and wrecked many trucks loaded with war materials. Our losses have been comparatively small.

Still in action in the Carpathians, my men are adding to their list of victories day by day.

The following figures may give an idea of the scale of guerrilla actions in the Ukraine: The main detachments in the Ukraine, exclusive of communications groups and scouts in towns and villages, numbered 115,000 men. In all, this force annihilated 310,000 German soldiers and officers, wrecked 4,060 locomotives and 39,700 freight cars, and blew up or burned 6,693 trucks, 810 tanks and armored cars, 324 guns and 108 aircraft.

The German conquerors hoped to establish themselves firmly on the steppes of the Ukraine. They dreamed of colonizing this country of lush pastures where Ukrainian shepherd slaves would tend the splendid herds for them; of fertile fields where people would gather great harvests of wheat for them; of mines where subjugated people would dig coal and ores for their enslavers.

Things turned out differently, and this was due in a measure to the part played by the comrades-in-arms of the Red Army—the Ukrainian guerrillas.
THE ROAD THROUGH THE SWAMPS

By YURI NAGIBIN

The old man approached the colonel’s dugout by way of a secret forest path. Many of the trees had been hit by shells, and were exuding resin and transparent sap through their wounds. He watched a soldier fit some cups to a stricken birch, saw them fill rapidly with the clear sap, and silently approved of the Red Army’s thriftiness.

The colonel’s dugout was lit by a sooty kerosene lamp. There were two men inside—the colonel and his aide-de-camp. The colonel was bent over some papers. The other was playing a gramophone—the record was “The Blue Scarf.” He had stuffed the sleeve of his quilted jacket into the amplifier, so that the noise should not disturb the colonel.

But he was not even aware of the music. He was reading and re-reading the message that lay before him. It informed him that two truckloads of ammunition had got through to a group that had wedged its way far into the German lines. But the road was under fire. It was extremely doubtful how long it could be kept open.

The men, full of ardor after their successful breakthrough, were marking time and losing momentum. But the command could not supply enough sappers to lay another road. And in any case, where could another road be laid, when all around was impassable, sedge-grown swamp?

There was only one last hope—the villagers of Lyubino Polye, a little marshland settlement recently liberated from the Germans. And that was why the colonel had sent for the old man, the chairman of the village Soviet.

The colonel had grown very fond of the sturdy, clean people who inhabited these northern places. Taken unawares in their village by the Germans, they had not remained in their homes for a single day. The very first night of the occupation they had picked off the German sentry and gone off to the woods with their wives and children.
Even the cripples had crawled off with their fellow-villagers. The only traitor among the lot—one mangy sheep from an otherwise sound flock—had his fate decided for him by the men of Lyubino Polye, who stole into the village under the noses of the Germans, and did away with him in their own way.

The people of Lyubino Polye were capable and industrious. They knew the swamps, knew how to fight them. They knew how to build a house in the fenlands, how to lay a road or plan a park. They knew every mood of the swamps.

Furthermore, from ancient times they had been known for their excellent woodwork. They were cabinet-makers, carpenters, bridge-builders. It was said of them that they had stolen the soul of a tree, and that was how they knew all the secrets of wood.

It was part of the village tradition that the young men should specialize in carved cradles, things of wonder and delight. The wood they made those cradles from had a remarkable melodious quality, as though there were lute-strings in it, so that when the cradles rocked they sang of themselves and lulled the children to sleep.

In their later years, nearer to the twilight of their lives, the Lyubino Polye craftsmen turned to road-making and bridge-building, and in their old age, by tradition, they made only coffins. These coffins were dependable, solid affairs, which the people of the district ordered in advance.

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The old man spoke deliberately: "We've talked the matter over, Colonel, and you needn't worry. You don't need your sappers. They'll come in handy somewhere else. This road-building job is a simple matter for us."

"But surely you can't manage without help?" the colonel asked, amazed. "Will you really be able to do it on your own?"

"Well, not like sappers would do it, of course," said the old man with a discreet smile. "We may even do it a little better."

The colonel thought. Then he sighed. He stood up and spoke firmly. "Quite impossible, I'm afraid. The zone will be
under fire, and enough of your folk have been killed already in the guerrilla detachments."

"My dear boy, people are like corn. You can grow a whole field from a single grain. And we are fighting for life."

"Grandpa, I can't let you."

"Now you leave it to us. We'll build it on the quiet."

"But how can you hide what you're doing?"

"Come, come," grinned Grandpa. "Don't ask a craftsman to give away his secrets."

"Well," said the colonel, sitting down again. "I'm acting against my better judgment. How long will it take you?"

"Thirteen days."

"Beter make it three weeks."

"Thirteen days," insisted Grandpa. "The number thirteen is sacred in Lyubino Polye. We drive thirteen nails into each coffin lid. And the timber has to be treated for thirteen weeks before it can be used for ikons."

Next day five old men in white newly-washed homespun tunics set out along the road which led to the advanced group of Soviet forces, the vanguard that had wedged deep into the German lines. There was not a soul in sight. Only the wrecked trucks by the wayside belied the stillness.

To the left of the road there was a sniper-infested copse. To the left, also, the swamp was visible, an unhealthy bright green, with a bush here and there. The old men moved along a river-bank skirting the swamp. After about a mile they branched off, and four of them kneeled down and inspected the grass. Then they reported the result of their inspection to the fifth, Grandpa Kondratenkov, the oldest and most experienced of the party.

He was so ancient that he had forgotten his own age, nor was there anyone in the village who could enlighten him, for the oldest person remembered him first as a full-grown man with a tinge of gray in his beard.

"A likely spot," Makar Savelyich suggested.

"Mark it out, Makarushka," said Grandpa. "Mitrofanych, you hurry back to the village. Tell the men to say goodbye
to their womenfolk. Tell 'em they're going to live a military life from now on."

Four old men moved across the bright swamp toward the forest. In the forest they pulled their belts tighter and, hatchets in hand, strode off through the thickets to mark off trees, those that were straightest, and with the cleanest trunks.

"Don't take 'em too close together, boys," Grandpa warned. "Or the Germans in those tree-tops will notice the gaps."

By noon, the other old men of the village had reached the spot, and work proceeded apace.

After marking the necessary number of trees, the old men removed their padded jackets and lay down for a nap until the protective darkness fell. Then, when the moon appeared from behind the clouds, there was a dull tapping in the swampy wood by the river, as though huge woodpeckers with metal bills were pecking away at the trees.

Each tree was felled with three strokes: the first was an oblique one, and tore off a long strip of bark, as though preparing the tree for pain and death. The second stroke penetrated the tree to the very core. The third, dealt with the butt-end of the axe, severed the tree from its life-giving roots. The tree toppled to the ground, its leaves swishing sorrowfully through the branches of its neighbors.

Each tree was trimmed of its lower branches. Then the old men lashed the logs together in rafts.

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A week later the colonel sent his aide to see how the work was progressing, and to ask if the old men needed any help. But all he could get out of them were barely perceptible sly smiles. "Do you know what goes on top of the sub-flooring?" they asked. The aide looked blank. So they dismissed him politely. "Well, you really can't help us much, in that case."

"What goes on top of the sub-flooring!" shouted the colonel, when informed what they had said. "Why, man, the floor, of course! Oh, well, if they feel like joking, I suppose I needn't worry. Things must be getting along all right."

"Perhaps they are, perhaps they aren't," said the aide,
rather stiffly. "All I can say is I've never seen anyone build a road like that before."

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Next day the colonel himself rode down to the site. It was nothing like any road-building job he had ever seen. The swamp showed no mark of pickaxe or spade. Indeed, what could axe or spade have done in that spongy morass?

He began to wonder whether he had come to the right spot. Yes, it must be right. There, out of the forest, appeared the stately figure of Makar Savelyich, walking toward him across the swamp. The colonel had an impulse to give a warning shout, but checked himself when he saw how confidently the old man moved over the treacherous surface.

Makar Savelyich was as lean as a wolf in early spring, and the colonel asked him anxiously: "Are you getting anything to eat out here?"

"Two meals a day, and good hot food, too. What brings you along ahead of time, Colonel?"

"Why, I just wanted to see if there was anything you wanted," the colonel answered, afraid of offending the old man, "and to have a look around."

"You won't see anything here. The road is being laid through the forest. Look—there goes part of it now."

Eight old men had come out of the forest, carrying a wooden raft suspended on ropes. They looked rather like pallbearers with a hearse. They lowered the raft to the ground, and were followed by eight more old men with a similar contraption. The rafts were laid end to end. Then two of the men began to lash them together with some kind of cloth.

"Why, Makar Savelyich, they'll be sucked in by the swamp," the colonel said, distressed. "There are quagmires here you'd never get out of alive."

"Aye, aye, boy, so there are. Only not where we're laying the road. Just turn round and take a look over there, over the top of the grass, where it's longest. What can you see?"

"Grass, only green grass," the colonel replied, staring at the gently tossing surface.
"Have another look. Is it all green, or can you see a bit of yellow, as well?"

The colonel strained his eyes until he saw, or thought he saw, a sort of thin, yellowish stripe treadding the lush greenery.

"Yes, I see," he said.

"Well, that yellow tells you it's not real swamp. The tips of the grass are scorched by the sun. That means they get less moisture. Now real swamp grass is never like that. In a real swamp the sun never scorches the grass, no matter how hot it is, because the roots are resting in water below the surface. But here the roots are in firm ground, and there's less moisture. At first glance it looks like real swamp grass. But actually the soil is only damp near the surface, where the rain wets it. Underneath, it's quite hard and dry. You can rest supports on it. Let's have a look at the planks."

They moved toward the forest. In spite of the old man's reassurances, the colonel stepped along very gingerly, the ground beneath him swaying and bobbing as he moved.

Five or six rafts were lying on the ground, and the colonel noticed that the road they formed had began to curve, following the direction of the yellow-tipped grass.

The logs were nailed together on a cross-beam, and the finished rafts were laid on thick, transverse logs which held them clear of the ground. Makar Savelyich singled out a blade of grass with a dark brown tip from its hiding place between two sorry shoots of wild pea. Then he probed about in the soil for its root, and pulled it up. The root looked like a long, white worm. It was dry, and forked at the end. He held the root against one of the transverse logs. The thickness of the log and the length of the root were the same.

"Now, do you see? With these for sleepers, the road's as firm as a rock."

"I understand," replied the colonel respectfully.

"Aye, that's it," said the old man proudly. "Everything in nature's topsy-turvy with us."

"Take cover!" A ringing boyish voice broke the silence. The shout came from above, as if from a tree.
“My little grandson,” explained the old man. “He’s our spotter.” A pulsating roar burst on them from over the forest, and a Henschel dived low over the trees, almost grazing their crests. Then it soared above the swamp.

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The old men had already thrown a net of green grass over the rafts. The bomb fell about 300 yards from where they stood. A green fountain of grass and water, shaped like a poplar, spurted up and fell in a shower of spray.

“Restless devil, that one,” observed Makar Savelyich. “Comes over every day. He seems to smell the rat, but he doesn’t know quite where it is.”

The plane dropped another bomb and vanished behind the trees. Over the forest it released a third. A tree toppled over, splintered by the blast. A confused noise of shouts and curses followed. One of the old men ran out of the forest with a birch-bark pail, and hurried down to the river.

“What’s happened, Danilych?”

The colonel and Makar Savelyich rushed into the forest. Near the stricken tree lay Grandpa Kondratenkov, his face dark and dour. His friends stood around him in a circle.

“Almost knocked the wind out of me,” Grandpa gasped. “I feel quite empty inside, and as light as a feather.”

“Eat a bit of the soil, and you’ll feel heavier,” Makar Savelyich advised him.

They turned Grandpa over on his stomach. He pressed his mouth to the dark moist ground, churned up by the explosion.

“No good, boys,” he groaned. “Makarushka, I didn’t fasten the rope at the fifth lap. See you don’t forget it. Keep a bit more to the right of the stream, when you get deeper into the forest. The ground’s firmer.

“Don’t you worry about that, Grandpa,” soothed Makar Savelyich.

“I know, I know, Makarushka,” sighed the ancient. “But folk are so young, so spoiled. . . .” His voice was barely a whisper. Then he suddenly sat up. “I can’t die with everything in such a mess. Give me some water.”
They gave him some cold water from the stream. After swallowing some of it with difficulty, noisily, he got up. He swayed. Then, leaning forward slightly, he steadied himself on his wide-spread bandy legs, planted so firmly on the ground that he looked as if he had taken root in it.

"Hand over that brace, Danilych," he said, breathing heavily.

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On the thirteenth day, when the sun was well up in the sky, the chairman of the village Soviet appeared at the colonel's dugout and reported, military fashion, that the job was done. That evening there was a meeting, at which the colonel expressed the gratitude of the Red Army units which, thanks to the labors of Lyubino Polye, were able to launch an offensive against the enemy.

Next morning the first column of loaded trucks drove over the new road. The planks sighed heavily and sank to the level of the ground, squeezing moisture between the edges, and then settled down firmly, for all time.
NOTE

These are examples of the big and little things that went on for forty-seven months in the rear of the Wehrmacht and in the rear of the Red Army. These big and little things done by the people of the Soviet Union made it possible for the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force to do the seemingly impossible. From Generalissimo Stalin who inspired, directed and sustained the titanic effort, down to the last woodsman and partisan—the Soviet people dearly bought Russia’s share in our partnership of triumph. This brief and inadequate account is written lest that share and its price be forgotten and the Russian achievement obscured by the dazzling explosions of atomic bombs which, let us remember, occurred when the war had already been won and which, furthermore, will never be able to take the place of the effort of valiant peoples in their righteous struggle for freedom.

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