GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE DOCUMENTS

GERMAN POLICY IN TURKEY
(1941-1943)

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE
Moscow 1948
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A collection of German Foreign Office documents, now in the possession of the Archives Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., relating to German policy in Turkey in the years 1941-1943. The translations have been made from the original German.

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PAPEN TO RIBBENTROP

TELEGRAM

Ankara, May 14, 1941
Received: May 14, 1941, 20 h. 22 m.
No. 552
Transmitted to the special train,
May 14, No. 1523

The Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs

The one hour's audience with the President was marked by the utmost cordiality. He requested me to tell the Führer that he was deeply impressed with the contents of the letter and that he fully reciprocates the confidence and friendship its lines convey.

Flight Captain Nein is bringing a detailed report of the results of the conversation.

The President is prepared to conclude a treaty which will ensure the re-establishment of the old friendly relations. He said that if Germany is prepared not to enter into any engagements directed against Turkey with any power, Turkey is prepared to pledge herself never to undertake anything against German interests, or to enter into
conflict with Germany. In reference to the contradiction with the obligations under the Anglo-Turkish treaty, he said: "Where there is the will, a formulation can be found." Talks with Foreign Minister Saracoglu are to begin at once.

Through transport of war material to Iraq may accordingly be regarded as assured.

Papen

No. 2

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Fuschl, May 16, 1941, 18 h. 40 m.
Received: May 16, 1941, 19 h. 00 m.
Via Foreign Office, Berlin
Ankara
No. 388

For the Ambassador personally

Before we carry out the idea of a treaty with Turkey which would unloose the country from its present tie with Britain and more or less lead it into our camp, the question must be examined whether we would not thereby be running the risk of an internal political putsch in Turkey, similar to the one we recently witnessed in Yugoslavia when that country joined the Tripartite Pact. Are we not opening ourselves to sudden surprises, such as the removal of the President and the leading Ministers by a coup d'état, or the like? I request you to give your opinion at length on this subject telegraphically, stating your views on the general internal political situation in Turkey and the stability of the present state leadership, also in case of the foreign policy reorientation we are striving for.

Ribbentrop

Transmitted to Ankara,
May 16, 20 h. 10 m., No. 471
No. 3

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret

Fuschi, May 17, 1941, 1 h. 55 m.
Received: May 17, 1941, 2 h. 50 m.
No. 393

Very urgent

Ankara

For the Ambassador personally

In your reports of May 13 and 14 on the situation which you found there on your return, I find confirmation of the fact that the moment has now come to reach an understanding with Turkey. And I believe that we should utilize the situation described in your communication and endeavour to go even somewhat farther with Turkey than we hitherto contemplated. I therefore request you, in supplement of the instructions already given you orally here, to conduct your preparatory talks that we may achieve the following objectives:

Simultaneously with the official treaty with Turkey, a secret treaty shall be concluded which would permit us unrestricted transit of arms and war material through Turkey. It shall therein be laid down in suitable form that Turkey shall raise no objection if the war material during transit is accompanied by the necessary escort personnel. Practically, this would amount to sanctioning the transit of a certain number of troops in disguised form. If we find that Turkey is prepared to consent to transit of material and arms accompanied by escort, she may be promised in return a correction of the frontier near Adrianople, to an extent still to be determined, and eventually one or other island in the Aegean. It is understood that it is not small consignments of material which are in question, such as those which follow from our commitments to deliver arms to Iran, etc., but substantial consignments the volume of which must be left to our discretion. There must be no unclarity on this point. It should also be remarked that according to the customary practice of international law transit solely of material is quite compatible with the neutrality of a state, so that the stipulation of this point in a treaty should present no difficulty.

As to the stipulation regarding escort personnel, it should be easy to find a formulation for such a stipulation, provided the Turks are prepared to agree to an understanding to this effect and to carry out this understanding in a manner conformable with our wishes.

Such a line of procedure would also enable the Turks to preserve face vis-à-vis England. Should there be any scruples, they may be removed by the following argument:

The treaty was concluded by Turkey with England and France, and rested on the mutual obligation to assist one another in the event of a threat. France is beaten, and England is generally no longer in a position to support Turkey in any way. Moreover, one of the partners to the treaty, France, is already swinging over to our side. Thereby the former Turko-Anglo-French treaty, both legally and practically, has lost all foundation. I request you to make this clear to the Turks in your talks.
That the Turks want to preserve face is understandable. We may therefore without more ado lend the official treaty a corresponding form. On the other hand, the world will understand that today, when England is not in a condition to render her any support, Turkey, from motives of self-preservation, is compelled to guarantee herself against an alleged German and actual Russian threat. Turkey may secure this guarantee against Russia by a friendly arrangement with us. If the sole price for this friendly arrangement is the sanctioning of transit of war material accompanied by escort for the support of Arab peoples, e.g., Iraq, against British attack or breach of contract, Turkey will have weighty arguments with which to counter anyone who asserts that she has lost face.

I request you, in accordance with the instructions given you here orally, and taking the aforementioned directives as a basis, to enter at once into negotiations with the Turkish Government for the conclusion of a treaty. You are requested to conduct these negotiations for the present only orally, and to refrain for the time being from submitting a draft treaty or any other written formulation. I shall give you further instruction on this point when I receive your report on the results of your oral negotiations.

We are interested in having the matter arranged as speedily as possible. I therefore request you to begin negotiations at once and to report. I will then if necessary immediately send you drafts for the treaty.

Ribbentrop

Transmitted to Ankara,
May 17, 4 h. 35 m., No. 476

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No. 4

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM
Secret

Fuschi, May 19, 1941
Received: May 19, 1941, 2 h. 30 m.
No. 495

Very urgent

Transmitted to Ankara,
May 19, 1941, No. 485

For the Ambassador personally
Re: telegram No. 569 of 17th

In view of the considerations you mention, I agree to your refraining from the attempt to reach agreement with Turkey on the lines indicated in my telegram No. 476 of May 17. If, as I gather from your telegram, the situation there does not permit the attainment of the desired objective just now, we must seek to achieve it in several phases, the first of which should be an arrangement on the lines discussed with you here orally. I request you to start negotiations with the Turkish Government in this direction without delay, observing however the following points:

1. It is important that the treaty we are seeking shall now be concluded as speedily as possible. As soon as your report on the results of the preliminary negotiations is received, a draft of the treaty will be sent you from here
for submission to the Turkish Government. Please wire your suggestions on the subject.

2. The decisive thing in the contemplated pact is to secure the possibility of transporting war material through Turkey, which is to be stipulated in a supplementary secret agreement. If we are to help Iraq we must do so quickly. Material is already being assembled at Constantza. Only in this point are the Turks not the takers but the givers, and herein lies the compensation Turkey makes in return for our far-reaching promises and guarantee of her security and her interests in the Straits. It is therefore essential that there should be complete clarity between the partners regarding this compensation.

It will not satisfy us if it is only agreed that Turkey will permit the transit of war material addressed to a neutral state, and then believe that she is only obligated to forward a few cars now and then to Iran or Afghanistan. It may rather be, depending on further developments in the Near East, that we may find it desirable to direct big consignments of war material to Syria or Iraq through Turkey. Such a possibility must be provided for in the agreement in any event.

3. Should it be necessary in discussing this question to promise to address the consignments to neutral states, I request you to bear in mind that this will be done only for purposes of camouflage. It must be understood that no further significance is to be attached to this.

4. As tangible compensation, you may promise Turkey a stretch of territory near Adrianople. We have in mind, as you know, not all the territory near Adrianople that Turkey ceded in 1915 to Bulgaria, which King Boris would not want to surrender entirely, but chiefly the eastern half, and Turkey would in any case get the railway line from Python to Adrianople.

5. As to the offer of one or other island in the Aegean, I would leave it for you to decide whether it is necessary to raise this question during the discussion of the treaty. If it is, please wire us before giving any promise.

I request you to keep me informed of the progress of your negotiations as promptly as possible by telegraph.

Ribbentrop
No. 5

PAPEN TO RIBBENTROP

TELEGRAM

Secret

Ankara, May 20, 1941
Received: May 20, 1941, 20 h. 55 m.*
No. 582
Transmitted to Fuschl,
May 20, 20 h. 15 m.,* No. 1593

Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs
Re: telegram No. 485 of 19th

On receipt of your new instructions I requested Saracoglu to begin our talks forthwith. He told me that only on Saturday had he had the opportunity to orientate the British Ambassador as to the intentions of the Turkish Government in accordance with my telegram of May 16, No. 563. I would have to be patient for two or three days until this matter was settled. For the rest, I am preparing everything so that the matter may be concluded speedily, and after my next talk with Saracoglu will submit you my suggestions for the draft treaty.

* So in the original.
No. 6

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Fuschi, May 26, 1941, 1 h. 41 m.
Received: May 26, 1941, 2 h. 45 m.
Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs 213/R 41
Fuschi, May 25, 1941
Transmitted to Ankara, May 26, No. 527

For the Ambassador personally
Re: telegram of May 23, 1941, No. 598

I perused with interest your report of the first conversation with Saracoglu regarding the contemplated treaty.

With reference to point 2 of your telegram, I would observe that the promise to “satisfy Turkey’s wishes (Interessenwahrung türkischer Wünsche) in southern and eastern neighbouring zones” requires very cautious handling. I request you to confine yourself in this point to expressions that are not very concrete. What was said in this respect in the rough draft of the treaty prepared here, with which you are familiar, was: “Germany will politically and diplomatically support the aspirations of Turkey to guarantee her possessions and to secure a revision of the Treaty of Lausanne conformable to her vital needs.” We must
avoid any specific geographical definition of the direction such aspirations of Turkey may take; in particular, our present relations with France and our collaboration with that country in Syria do not permit us to encourage Turkey in any aspirations in this direction. Also in respect to holding out the prospect of one or other island in the Aegean, as well as in respect to the status of the Straits, extreme caution in the selection of the formulations is recommended pending further concretization of the draft treaty.

I await an early further report on the progress of the negotiations.

Ribbentrop
No. 7

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Fuschl, June 9, 1941, 15 h. 30 m.
Received: June 9, 1941, 16 h. 13 m.
No. 526

Transmitted to Ankara,
June 9, 1941, No. 631

Very urgent

Secret

For the Ambassador personally
Re: telegrams No. 679 of June 6 and No. 686 of
June 7, 1941

I. Herr Numan has advanced the objection to our formulation of the treaty that, according to it, Germany might regard a request from Turkey to England for help in the event of attack by a third party, or any other tie between Turkey and England, as an action indirectly aimed at Germany, and that the Turkish Government wants to preclude the possibility of such an interpretation of the Turko-German treaty. He therein gave expression to the underlying Turkish standpoint in the negotiations with us. Turkey would indeed like to conclude a treaty with Germany in order to guarantee herself against German attack, but would
at the same time like to remain allied to England and apparently to preserve the possibility of co-operating with her politically and militarily in case of necessity, at least indirectly. The Turkish Government must clearly understand that if Turkey co-operates even indirectly with England, with which Germany is waging a life and death struggle, she will automatically place herself in opposition to Germany. She would thereby again abandon the neutrality, the re-establishment of which is to be the minimum consequence of the treaty with Germany. We of course understand that Turkey desires to formulate the treaty with Germany in a way that would not imply an open breach of her treaty with England, and we have formulated our proposals accordingly. But if Turkey demands our direct recognition of her treaty with England, and if she wants explicitly to reserve for herself the possibility of co-operating with England, that we naturally cannot accept.

II. The possibility to which Herr Numan refers of an attack on Turkey by a third power is purely theoretical. In general, only Russia and Italy can be in question here. But, as things are, especially in view of the German attitude toward Turkey, the fear of an attack on Turkey by either of these powers has no political reality.

III. It is therefore to be presumed that in objecting to our treaty draft, Herr Numan had in mind possible actions against Syria. It is probable that precisely in view of such an eventualty did he consider our proposed explicit reference to indirect actions inconvenient. However, the reply of the Turkish Foreign Minister to the inquiry you made in accordance with my telegram No. 625 of June 8 sounds satisfactory, so that we may proceed from the assumption that the Turkish Government will continue to be very reserved on the Syrian question. In this connection, I would also observe in reference to the concluding paragraph of your telegram No. 686 of June 7 that consideration for France makes it simply impossible to give Turkey any written or even verbal promises with regard to Syria.

IV. I request you to give due consideration to the above and to adopt the following position relative to the formulation of the details of the treaty:

1) Preamble. The present formulation of the preamble proposed by the Turks does not seem happy to us. The expression “peace-loving character” is even stylistically (sprachlich) impossible and should be replaced by the expression “friendly character.” The words “in the spirit of their exchange of letters” were indeed contained also in the text we had proposed, but later gave rise to doubt, inasmuch as the exchange of letters between the two heads of State is not complete, since, as we know, the Turkish President has not yet replied to the Führer’s last letter. Moreover, it is hardly feasible expressly to refer in a treaty which is to be made public to an exchange of letters which is not made public simultaneously. Their publication has so far not been contemplated, and furthermore does not seem to us to be opportune. Lastly, the concluding part of the formulation of the preamble proposed by the Turks, which speaks of the present commitments of the two countries, must also be omitted, because it would signify an explicit recognition of the Anglo-Turkish treaty. I must also observe for your personal information that, by accepting such a passage in the preamble, we should be blocking the way to the further development of Turko-German relations. Turkey would always be able to counter any subsequent wishes of Germany with the convenient excuse that we had in the preamble to the treaty expressly renounced the presentation of such wishes.
Under the circumstances, it seems to us best to formulate the preamble very briefly as follows:

The German Reichskanzler and the President of the Turkish Republic, animated by the desire to create a firm foundation for the friendly development of their mutual relations, have agreed to conclude a treaty and have, etc...

2) In article 1 we must, just because of the arguments adduced by Herr Numan, insist on the retention of the words “direct or indirect.” Our arguments for this follow from point 1 above, and it is particularly necessary to point out that Turkish neutrality, which will have just been re-established by the treaty, would be prejudiced by any cooperation with England indirectly aimed against us.

3) The addition which the Turkish side desires to make to article 2 would weaken the significance of this article extremely, and would again restrict it, as was originally proposed by the Turks, to questions of interpretation of the treaty. This wish seems to us all the less understandable as the text of article 2 proposed by us mentions only the minimum of what is usually included as something self-understood in similar agreements between two countries. If the Turks want to omit this, or weaken it in the aforesaid manner, they are certainly very far indeed from the concept which guides us in the conclusion of this treaty.

V. If Turkey should still not agree to the formulation of the treaty we propose, or should again make proposals which weaken it, we would have to consider whether such a treaty would meet the desired ends at all. The position expressed in the Turkish attitude is so reserved that the treaty as formulated by the Turks, when commented on in the Turkish press, may in the end be reduced to something quite meaningless. Yet, in view of the actual political situation, Turkey has a far greater political interest than we in the conclusion of the treaty. The Turkish Government would therefore do well to make up its mind as soon as possible whether it wants to accept our offer of a treaty or not.

I request a prompt telegraphic report on the progress of your negotiations with the Turkish Government.

Ribbentrop
No. 8

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret

Fuschl, June 13, 1941, 14 h. 20 m.
Received: June 13, 1941, 14 h. 30 m.
No. 548
Transmitted to Ankara,
June 13, 1941, No. 650

Re: telegram 715 of June 12

You inform us in your telegram that our desire to have no reference made in the treaty to Turkey’s former commitments has created the impression there that we want by this treaty directly to force Turkey out of the British camp into the German. This impression is false. As you have already been informed, we intend nothing else than to bring Turkey back to neutrality, which the Turkish Government itself at the beginning of the negotiations wanted expressly to proclaim of its own accord, but has since desisted from doing. Before we can in general consider the new situation which has arisen from the present Turkish attitude, I should be interested to know whether perhaps another formula could be found for the reservation regarding Turkey’s present commitments. One might, for instance, consider the following formulation: “Animated by the desire to place the relations between the two countries on a foundation of mutual confidence and sincere friendship, the two countries, with reservation respecting their present commitments, have agreed to conclude a treaty...” Such a formula would essentially imply the same as the Turkish formula. It would not however smack of the unpleasant suggestion that Turkey must guard herself against Germany’s making demands upon her which are not compatible with existing Turkish treaty obligations.

I request you to ask the Turkish Foreign Minister about this, and at the same time to tell him that you have not yet received from us any reaction to your report on your last talk with Saracoglu except this brief inquiry. You have, in other words, no intimation yet from Berlin whether, in view of the present attitude of Turkey, which is so different from her attitude at the beginning of the negotiations, the conclusion of a treaty is possible at all. Since I am leaving tomorrow for Italy and will only return next week, I request you to send me the Turkish Government’s reply to this question today, because I should like to settle the matter finally before my departure.

Ribbentrop
No. 9

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Ankara, June 17, 1941
Received: June 17, 1941, 13 h. 22 m.
No. 741

Very urgent

Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs
Re: No. 671 of June 16

In accordance with your instructions, I have just together with Saracoglu compared the treaty texts and found that they fully conform. Only in article 3 should the following sentence be added:

“The present treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Berlin as early as possible.”

2. Complete agreement as to an exchange of notes regarding economic relations.

3. In the statement to the press your wish will be taken into account. The text therefore conforms with your telegram.

4. Saracoglu is prepared to sign on the evening of Wednesday, June 18. He will let me know the exact hour tomorrow morning after reporting to the President. The publication will, in accordance with your wish, be made in the morning press on June 19. Hence the German and Turkish radios will report nothing in the night broadcasts of June 18/19, so that the news will first appear in the press of both countries on June 19. Saracoglu will of course take care that the Turkish press and radio also greet the treaty of friendship with proper warmth.

5. For my authorization a telegram to me will be enough.

6. Please send authority to sign the railway agreement if possible simultaneously.

Papen
No. 10

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

German Embassy
No. A 3018/41

Foreign Office,
Berlin

Secret

Therapia, August 5, 1941

Re: The Pan-Turan Movement

A well-informed confidential agent communicates the following:

In view of the German successes in Russia, Turkish government circles are giving increasing consideration to the fate of their co-racialis on the other side of the Turkish-Russian border, especially the Azerbaijan Turks.

There seems to be a disposition in these circles to revert back to the events of 1918 and to want to annex this area, especially the valuable Baku oil region. To this end, something in the nature of a committee of experts has been formed, composed partly of persons who rendered similar services at the time of Abdul Hamid, the duty of which is to collect all relevant material and to win adherence.

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*A summer resort near Istanbul where the German Embassy had a villa.

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* Army of Islam—a Pan-Turkic organization in Turkey.
Azerbaijan—in other words, the Volga Turks, the Tatars, the Turkomans, etc.—is to weld them together into their own, outwardly independent, East Turkish state, in which, however, the Western Turks would play a dominant political and cultural role as “advisers.”

But these plans by no means conform to the wishes of the Eastern Turks themselves. In their opinion, the Turks inhabiting Turkey have been definitely lost to the true Turkic folk, and moreover, not from any recent date, but since many years. They are regarded in Baku as nothing but Turkish-speaking Levantines, with whom it is desired to have as little to do as possible. This development dates back many hundreds of years. For the past few centuries of Osman history, the higher officials of the court and the Empire consisted only to a very small extent of Turks. They were consecutively of Hungarian origin, Albanians, and, lastly, under Abdul Hamid, Circassians and Arabs, but never Turks. (This historical concept and political attitude was often expressed in political conversations with interested circles in Tabriz. There, particularly, these views are now on the order of the day, since the inhabitants of Tabriz are likewise Azerbaijan Turks, and consider themselves to be blood relations of those in Baku. It is particularly noteworthy that one of the leading figures of this movement in Tabriz is the Iranian Governor-General himself.)

The leader of this movement is considered, as heretofore, to be Mehmet Emin Rasul-Zade (founder of the Mussavat, or Equality, Party). He joined the Polish Prometheus movement, which was nothing more than a sub-department of the Polish General Staff. R. lived on the General Staff funds transferred to Switzerland (the so-called Pilsudski Fund) even after the fall of Poland in 1939, visited Sikorski in London on a political mission in 1940, and then lived with other Polish refugees in Bucharest. He is a politician of parts, if one ignores the financial side. (Since other Turkish members of the Prometheus organization have recently expressed themselves in Turkey in an unfriendly spirit toward Germany, an attitude of reserve toward R., too, is recommended.)

R. is represented in Turkey by his adjutant, Mursa Bala (who has now been called up by the Turks to the army and is serving as a private soldier in the vicinity of Istanbul. Nothing more is to be said of him except that he is a faithful disciple of his greater teacher).

It is worth working with both these people, in the opinion of the confidential agent. (In the opinion of another East-Turkic confidential agent, it would be better to have nothing to do with this whole old guard, who because of their past and their financial connections cannot be trusted to play any reliable role in a new Azerbaijan state.)

This new Azerbaijan state does not want to be burdened with the other Eastern Turks and is rather of the opinion that they, the Volga Turks, the Tatars, the Turkomans, etc., because of the way they are distributed—that is, in no way forming a compact community—and above all because of their economic backwardness, can have no claim yet to state independence, but must still go through a long period of evolution. The Azerbaijan revolutionary movement does not regard it as its duty to train them for statehood. Nevertheless, the confidential agent recommends that this task should not be left to the Russians, but to see to it that German organization and experience be the decisive factor in their further development.

Germany should attach great importance to the formation of as strong a state as possible in the southeast, in order by this roundabout way to be in a position to keep the Russians constantly in check. The Ukraine is not quite
adequate to this task. The Ukrainians are Slavs and, like the Bulgarians and Serbs, might at any moment recall their common past with Russia. In the case of the Turks this is entirely precluded!

When I mentioned that the Iran Government was also extremely interested in the Azerbaijan Turks, my confidential agent replied this was quite understandable. There were as many Turks living in Iran today as Persians. The Shah himself came from a Turkish family. He could therefore easily, by a mere stroke of the pen, build up his Iran-Arab state into a state of mixed nationalities, if the advantage of such a transformation were made clear to him and he saw that he could in this way maintain his political independence. This also explained the role which the Governor-General of Tabriz is playing in the movement.

Papen

P. S. Addition to p. 1:
One of the Government’s agents on the East-Turkish question in Ankara is General Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilat, who is of Tatar origin.

No. 11
WEIZSÄCKER TO RIBBENTROP

Secret

Berlin, August 5, 1941
No. 494
Copy

The Turkish Ambassador today presented his new Embassy Counsellor to me. He soon directed the conversation to the border peoples of Turkish blood in Soviet Russia. He drew attention to the possibility of conducting anti-Soviet propaganda through these Turkish tribes. He then said quite bluntly that the Caucasian peoples could later be united into a buffer state, and hinted that an independent Turan state might also be formed east of the Caspian.

Gerede mentioned this in conversational tone. His remarks were however by no means casual, as they completely coincide with what Ali Fuad had said to Herr von Papen (see Ankara report of the 14th ult., No. 2335). Gerede laid his finger on the crux of the matter when he remarked that Baku was a completely Turkish-speaking city.

For the attention of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs.

Weizsäcker

Copy by courier to the German Embassy in Therapia
The General seemed to be particularly grateful for the instructive talks given him at the unit headquarters he visited by officers of the General Staff on the big operations in the Battle of Kiev, the forcing of the Dnieper, etc. He added the wish to receive, if possible, a map of these operations, indicating the Russian dislocation (without, of course, detailed data as to the German forces), so that he might use these exemplary historical operations for instructional purposes in the Turkish Military Academy.

The German commanders made a splendid impression on him. He had words of the highest praise for the training of the General Staff, even of its junior members. The unparalleled successes of the German armies against almost invariable superiority of numbers and matériel could have been achieved only thanks to the excellent training of this corps of commanders. He was inspired with particular admiration by the functioning of the rear services.

It was naturally a great experience for the gentlemen to be personally received by the Führer and to have from him a detailed account of the operational position. General Ali Fuad concluded from what the Führer had said that he intended to reach the Caspian and the Caucasus as speedily as possible. He inferred this particularly from the fact that the First Army was being used, with heavy forces and in spite of not inconsiderable losses, to conduct the extremely difficult operation against the Crimea, in order to push on from there to the North Caucasus. For otherwise, he believed, it would probably have been easier simply to cut off the Crimea, and to continue with the First Army the advance on Rostov.

Not without interest were his observations on his visit to a Russian war prisoners’ camp, where many Turk-Russian prisoners appealed to him to use his influence
to secure for them better treatment and rations than the Russians.

I would like in this connection to revert once more to my proposal that when the Crimean operation is concluded an administration should be established there in which the Turkic-Crimean Tatars would have a considerable share. This would make a very strong political impression in Turkey.

The day after his return, General Ali Fuad made a report to the President, at which the Foreign Minister and Marshal Cakmak were present. The talk lasted six hours, and this should show how great was the political importance of the visit.

Ali Fuad’s general conclusions fully coincide with the opinion expressed to him by the Führer, namely, that, with the exception of the three points of resistance, the Russian campaign may essentially be regarded as over, and that the reduction of these points only depended on the weather. He believes, however, that we shall have to leave considerable forces in Russia. As regards the occupation of European Russia and its reverberation on the British blockade, he is of the opinion that the blockade has been rendered ineffective thereby.

The General requested me to convey his heartfelt thanks to the Führer, the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, as well as to Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch and Keitel.

Papen

No. 13
HENTIG TO ERKILET

Minister von Hentig

Berlin, November 17, 1941

Dear and Highly Esteemed General,

I thank you for your lines of November 10, which reached me safely. As for me, the matter which we had jointly worked on was, even before the arrival of your letter, urgently dealt with in the spirit suggested by me and in which you concur. I am myself awaiting information as to the last detailed decisions.

I was strongly dissuaded by various parties, including semi-official Turkish, from going to Turkey just now to resume or continue the talks we had arranged. I myself am not altogether in a position to form a judgment, since, in the full knowledge and conviction that my intentions would exclusively promote the cause of Turk-German cooperation, I would have gone without the slightest hesitation. But if this might give even the slightest cause for unbiased parties to reckon me among the “fifth column,” I would naturally prefer to refrain. Meanwhile, the gentlemen you mentioned have long ago received entry visas into Germany. However, from the date of the exchange of telegrams, which on account of my long illness were only
laid before me today, I gather that they were too late to achieve their purpose, namely, of meeting you here.

I have followed the friendly interviews you have given with the greatest interest. We are now awaiting the press, which always arrives rather late, in order to read the articles promised to us and the world.

With best greetings to you and also to His Excellency Ali Fuad Pasha,

I am,
Always yours faithfully,

von Hentig

His Excellency, General Hüsnü Emir Erkiler,
Istanbul

No. 14

HENTIG TO ERDMANNSDORFF AND WOERMANN*

Pol. Dept. VII 7234 secr.

I was visited by Dr. Harun who is well known in Berlin, having been for seventeen years lecturer at the Technical College here, and who is now again living in Istanbul. Evidently commissioned by the Embassy here and by other leading Turkish circles, he came in order to learn our attitude toward Turanism. Dr. Harun conveyed to me messages from Ambassador Gerecz and the Turkish Chief of Staff, Fevzi Cakmak. Both declare that they are greatly interested in this question, without being able to act officially in its behalf. The Chief of Staff is reported to have said that the Turanian question might be a basis on which to build relations between Turkey and Germany. He furthermore gave the assurance that Turkey would never take the field against Germany. Only in case of invasion would she have to defend

* The document bears Woermann's initial.
herself. He was also following our treatment of the Turkic peoples with the greatest sympathy. He was ready to place people at our disposal to propaganda the war prisoners.

For the attention, through Legation Counsellor Melechers, of Minister von Ermmannsdoaff and Under Secretary of State Woermann.

Hentig

Berlin, November 24, 1941

No. 15
ERKILET TO HENTIG *

General H. E. Erkilet

Istanbul, November 27, 1941

Dear and Highly Esteemed Minister,

I thank you very much for your friendly lines of November 17 sent me through Herr Veli Menger, and for your highly valued efforts in behalf of our common cause.

I am very sorry to hear that your visit to Istanbul, which we so much desire, has been postponed. But the reasons given in your letter are to me neither clear nor well-founded. You are no fifth column to us, but only a friend, and what is more, a highly valued friend. Moreover, I cannot understand who these semi-official Turkish parties may be who strongly dissuaded you from coming to Turkey just now. I am convinced they are wrong and are wrongly dissuading you. I am also convinced that the only proper person to give correct advice on this matter is His Excellency Ambassador von Papen. I informed him, through General Rohde, of your intended visit to Turkey. He is in Ankara and will not be in Istanbul before December 5. When he comes I shall naturally speak with him and write you again.

* The letter is written in German in Erkilet's hand.

47
I was sorry to hear you were ill. I hope you are now quite well again.

Two of the gentlemen who recently received visas, Müstecib Fagil and Edige Kemal,* will come to see you. They have been commissioned to help the Germans in the Crimea and at the same time to be helpful to the Crimea Turks. I have written to Prof. Idris about it and requested him to translate to you everything I have written him. Müstecib is a lawyer and writer and was lately public prosecutor. Edige is also a well-educated young man. They are both from the Crimea and are very reliable. I request that the two of them be sent to the Crimea and be used there in behalf of common Turko-German interests. They don’t know German but they speak Russian and will soon learn German.

With best greetings,

I am always,

Yours faithfully,

H. E. Erkilet

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* The first page of the document bears the stamp, “Submitted to the Führer,” and the letter “F” in green pencil, evidently in Hitler’s hand. The original is initialled by Weizsäcker and Woermann.

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No. 16

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

German Embassy
No. A 6/42 secr.

SECRET

Ankara, January 5, 1942

Foreign Office,
Berlin

POLITICAL REPORT!

Re: Turkey’s Attitude at the Beginning of the New Year

Three copies

The extension of the war theatre owing to the outbreak of the American-Japanese conflict and the declaration of war on the United States by the Axis Powers at first caused a deep feeling of disappointment here.

As I have repeatedly reported, the Turkish Government cherished the hope of a compromise between the British Empire and the Axis Powers, which it thought could be found so long as America did not definitely join the other side. It is now thought that all doors to this have been closed.
The immediate consequence of this development was renewed emphasis on Turkey’s unalterable will to keep out of the war and not to be enlisted by any side for interests which do not affect Turkey.

That is the formal position today. However, on closer examination of the potentialities which lay their imprint on the world conflict, the Turkish attitude begins to reveal nuances.

It is clear that—as far as Turkey’s foreign interests are concerned—the entente between the Anglo-American bloc and Soviet Russia determines the contours of Turkish foreign political thought.

Turkey knows too well from her long history that her national existence is intimately linked with the outcome of the German-Russian war. The fact that Britain has apparently decided to reorder Europe with the help of Bolshevik Russia was a severe shock. It positively cannot be imagined that a civilized power like the British Empire, which should more than any continental power be concerned to maintain principles of thousands of years’ standing, can mean this seriously. The declaration is regarded as a propagandist measure, in order to support Soviet Russia’s fight with every means.

In the Turkish opinion, of the partners of the Anglo-American bloc, America is invincible. Consequently, the Axis Powers could secure a decision in their favour only by smashing the British world empire. That the total smashing of the Empire is not in the interest of Turkey, I have often pointed out. For Turkish interests require a balance of power in the Mediterranean, and not unlimited Italian domination, which might be the consequence of a total victory for the Axis.

The other eventuality is a total victory for the Anglo-American bloc with the help of Soviet Russia. This, in the Turkish opinion, would mean the complete dissolution of Europe, since neither Britain nor the U.S.A. would be in a position to check the Russians territorially, or to prevent the bolshevization of a starving, war-exhausted and impoverished Europe.

Consequently, Turkish foreign policy is still concerned to find the possibility of a compromise, in the event of which she would undoubtedly be prepared at the proper moment to throw her military weight into the scales

Such being the case, it would be interesting to examine the Turkish view on the world situation and its development more closely.

The talks in Washington and Moscow have made it fairly clear that the Anglo-American bloc will seek to decide the world conflict not in the Pacific but in Europe. It is even believed here that the U.S.A. and Britain have already to a large extent written off their positions in the Pacific—the British Empire, it goes without saying, on the assumption that in the event of the loss of the Pacific positions India could be retained in any case, and that the Empire would find rich compensation in Africa for its position in the Far East. As to the U.S.A., it is known that it has always regarded its far-advanced positions as difficultly defensible in case of a conflict. If it were possible at the end of the conflict to secure profitable economic agreements with Japan and China, then it would be sufficient for America’s security needs to retain her position in Hawaii, at the same time, however, taking over the legacy of the British Empire in all the West Indian bases and establishing out-and-out imperialism in Central and South America.

If, therefore, the Anglo-American bloc seeks the decision in Europe, it can only find it on the Russian battlefields. Therein, however, lies a direct threat to the future of Turkey, and, therefore, developments in this theatre
of operations will necessarily determine Turkey's future line of foreign policy.

Two eventualities may induce Turkish policy to renounce the principle of neutrality with regard to one side or the other:

1. If the Axis Powers should succeed in securing a decision in Russia in the spring, and, in particular, penetrate into the Caucasus and thence threaten the British oil supply in the Persian Gulf, then, in the opinion of Turkish statesmen, it would be clear that the Anglo-American bloc cannot win the war in Europe. This prospect would then perhaps create the possibility of a compromise, which Turkey would be prepared to support with her military weight.

2. Any attempt to induce Turkey prematurely to take up an active position, whether by demanding her participation in the war or demanding the right of transit for troops through her territory, would inevitably push Turkey over to the other side.

The longer the decision of this war is delayed, the stronger is Turkey's wish to keep aloof from the conflict, so as under no circumstances to find herself on the losing side.

This feeling also strongly dominates Turkish public opinion; the Government could therefore justify entry into the war only on the ground of a violation of its sovereign rights.

In the highly revealing talk I had the other day with the President, the assurance was repeatedly intimated that Turkey was strongly interested in the destruction of the Russian colossus, and that no propaganda or pressure from the Anglo-American side could induce Turkey to do the slightest thing against our interests. On the contrary, said the President, Turkey's neutral position was already today much more advantageous to the Axis than to Brit-
ain. If Turkey had been actively on the side of the British ally, the British navy would today be in the Black Sea supporting the Russian southern flank and a convenient way for the defence of the Caucasus would have been found.

When I said to the President that in the gigantic fight for the protection of Europe from Bolshevism no European state could stand aloof, and that he ought to consider to what extent Turkish policy permitted the rendering of more active help, he replied that these questions were being examined with the greatest earnestness. I pointed out that if we began the offensive against the Caucasus in the spring, a strong concentration of Turkish forces on the Russian frontier would be of great value to us.

From a conversation which Minister Ali Fuad had lately with Minister Jenke, it is to be inferred that the Turkish General Staff has examined this question and decided in the coming spring to handle it in the way we desire. The arctic winter in the Turkish eastern provinces, and the almost complete lack of means of communication and possibility of maintaining supply render any alteration of dislocation quite impossible until the snow has melted.

When, at the end of the conversation, the President averred that he had, in stating his views, far overstepped the bounds demanded by impartial neutrality, he was obviously expressing the wish that such indirect support of the Axis by Turkey should under no circumstances become known to the enemy prematurely.

My recent conversations with Messrs. Saracoglu and Numun again made it clear that they expect anything from Russia. Even if the Turkish Government were to receive no official confirmation of the territorial demands discussed between Eden and Stalin, they will still assume that such demands conform with the Bolsheviks' actual intentions. It would be highly desirable if in this sphere we shared
all information confidentially with the Turkish Government. The trust of the Turkish Government in our assurances not to do anything which might put Turkey into a morally embarrassing position vis-à-vis her British ally must remain unshaken. The march of events must leave the Turks free to choose for themselves the moment at which they become convinced that the maintenance of their alliance with Britain is incompatible with the safeguarding of their national future.

It is the opinion here that there is now little scope for propaganda treatment of the world conflict, since all peoples and nations have taken up their stand. On the other hand, great emphasis is here laid on the idea that the Axis Powers must proceed to give practical shape to the European new order which has hitherto been proclaimed only by propaganda. In all circles one hears the hope expressed that it will be possible now already to give shape to the new Europe, which, on the one hand, would strengthen the material military weight of the Axis Powers, and, on the other, would enable the strong internal opposition in the United States effectively to combat Roosevelt and his aims. The Foreign Minister said to me only yesterday: “Churchill has now in the Washington declaration guaranteed full sovereignty to the European states (with the probable exception of the Baltic countries). The Axis Powers have proclaimed the same aim. The Führer should now proceed to create a fait accompli. This would be of particular importance in the French question, since Africa will be a battlefield which will decisively influence the entire European situation.”

In this conversation, the Foreign Minister also touched on Roosevelt’s message to Congress, in which the fable was again dished up that the Führer wants to extend his plans for world supremacy to South America. M. Saracoglu be-

Allerdings kam es im Verhandlungsbereich der Außenminister auf die Besprechung der Auslandspolitik, und zwar auf der westlichen Seite, daß der Führer lieber eine weitere Verhandlung in der DDR forderte, weil er nicht mehr nur den westlichen Staat anerkenne, sondern auch die DDR. Daher forderte er, in den derzeitigen Umständen geändert werden sollte, um in einem Frieden von Intensität durch die Entwicklung politisch Informationspresse in Europa zu schaffen.

Zusammenfassend kann man sagen: Das Verständnis der politischen Entwicklung in den Ländern der DDR ist erstaunend klar. Der Führer forderte, daß man den Kriegswelt zivil werden sollte, der Führer forderte, in den derzeitigen Umständen geändert werden sollte, um in einem Frieden von Intensität durch die Entwicklung politisch Informationspresse in Europa zu schaffen.

Unter diesen Umständen bleibt die Entscheidung über die politische Auswirkung der Kriegsverhältnisse.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WARLIMONT
WITH COVERING LETTER BY WOERMANN*

Secret
Berlin, January 23, 1942

The enclosed memorandum, in my opinion, on the whole gives a quite correct picture of the Turkish attitude. It is, in particular, true that Turkey cannot remain indifferent to anything we do in the Arab and Turan questions. It has therefore been provided that Turkey shall be informed, for instance, before we make any statement on the subject of Free Arabia. And later, too, in the constitution of the Arab Raum, it will be absolutely essential to cooperate with Turkey.

Nevertheless, for various reasons, the present moment is not deemed opportune for negotiations or transactions with Turkey on this question.

1. For the attention of the Secretary of State.
2. For Pol. Dept. VII, through Chief of Pol. Dept., with request to draft an instruction to Ankara roughly in the above spirit, to be sent with a copy of the enclosure.

Woermann

* The document bears Weizsäcker’s initial.
December 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM
FOR GENERAL WARLIMONT

1. The Turkish Government wants to keep the country out of the war, but, on the other hand, is increasingly unable to resist the temptation to derive advantages for Turkey from the new ordering of things. The propaganda developed, with its toleration, by General Erkiyet to awaken interest in the peoples of Turkic race indicates where it is being driven, or allowing itself to be driven.

Turkey has interpreted her treaty obligations toward Britain very elastically, but will scarcely venture to go so far as a rupture of the treaty. The offer of peace mediation hinted in a speech of the President is obviously designed either to secure advantages as a reward for the peace efforts, or to facilitate a swing over to the Axis Powers which would bring advantages in return for minimal participation in battle operations.

2. Britain has nothing to offer territorially or in any other respect. Syria has been included in the category of liberated democratic states, and promises have likewise been made to the other Arab states. The policy which crops up every now and again in favour of an independent Caucasus is not taken seriously, since it would represent a manifest breach vis-à-vis the Russian ally. The propaganda in behalf of an independent Kurd state hits Turkey on a very sensitive spot and gives rise to grave misgivings.

3. Germany has her grip on the Greek islands, which control the Dardanelles and are important to Turkey as a Mediterranean power. Turkey believes Germany will conquer the Caucasus and determine the fate of the Caucasian peoples, who are mostly Mohammedan and partly Turkic. This has its reverberations also on the Turkic peoples east of the Caspian, in whose fate Turkey is interested. Furthermore, Germany is pursuing a policy in the Arab area toward which Turkey cannot remain indifferent.

4. Turkish policy vis-à-vis Germany has grown increasingly friendlier in the course of the Russian campaign. Events such as the Libyan campaign and the difficulties encountered by the offensive on the Russian Southern Front are temporarily strengthening the inclination to preserve neutrality, although to all appearances this does not imply that Turkey will cease to swing toward Germany, or will slide back into the British sphere of influence, since the British army in the North African and Arab-Iranian areas will in any event be seriously exhausted by the Libyan campaign. Reinforcements from Australia or New Zealand are not to be expected. Whether replenishments can be brought from the British metropolis cannot be judged from Turkey. Turkey therefore considers that the danger of a British attack which cropped up from time to time in the past months is apparently out of the question in the next few months. One thing which worries Turkey is the position of Italy, which is regarded as internally weak.

5. Turkey has not yet succeeded in getting into contact with anti-British groups in the Arab countries. She will learn with great interest, and not without nervousness, of the negotiations on the Arab question which are to be held shortly in Berlin. As a neighbouring Great Power, she believes herself entitled to be at least informed of such negotiations, even if she cannot justify a claim to participate in them. This offers an opportunity to discuss with her the future shaping of things, and this should be done before the beginning of the phase of the Russian campaign which affects the Caucasus. The idea of sharing in the war against Russia by maintaining a benevolent attitude and granting certain advantages would be popular in the army.
and among many sections of the population, and this question could be discussed unreservedly after Turkey has been informed of the Arab negotiations.

6. The Turkey of Ataturk was built on the purely national principle, and Mohammedan or Turkic interests outside Turkey proper, which had been discussed at the time of the Young Turks, have ceased to evoke interest. That Turkey expects territorial increment has so far not been intimated. There are certain signs which seem to indicate that a revolutionary movement among the Azerbaijanians in North Iran might be utilized as a basis for territorial claims, or at least for the creation of a sphere of influence. However, the idea advocated is the formation of independent, or at least outwardly independent, Turkic state entities in the Crimea, the North Caucasus and Russian Azerbaijan—the two latter as part of a Caucasian State—and similar entities east of the Caspian.

7. The above-mentioned points provide a basis for negotiations with Turkey. The Turkish Government certainly does not expect to receive any advantages without making considerable compensation in return. It is very questionable whether, bearing in mind the price involved, Turkey's participation in the war is desirable at all. The object of the negotiations should be to ascertain how far Turkey is prepared to stretch the concept benevolent neutrality and thereby make it easier for the Germans to carry the war into the Arab area and the Suez Canal.

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No. 18

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

Secret Copy

German Embassy
No. 71/42 secr.
Foreign Office,
Berlin

Ankara, February 16, 1942

POLITICAL REPORT!

Re: A Turkish Proposal

I have already attempted in my report G. Rs. No. 47/42 and in my telegram No. 206 of February 10 to indicate the underlying factors which determine present Turkish policy. The central consideration is the desire to keep out of the war, in order not to weaken Turkey's growing military potential by a new loss of blood and to be armed and prepared for any possible issue of the war. Whereas until last summer the possibility of a total victory for the Axis and the domination of the Eastern Mediterranean by Italy was the chief preoccupation, against which Turkey hoped

* The document is initialed by Woermann and bears the following note in his hand: "I have transmitted (next word indecipherable) to Ministerial Director Wiehl."

5—1303
to find a counterbalance on the British side, the war with the Soviet Union has completely changed the picture.

As I have already reported, the present situation is dominated by the anxiety that a Soviet Russia reawakened to life with the help of the Anglo-American forces will in the event of an unfavourable issue of the war, in accordance with Cripps’ prediction, lay down the law for the new order in Europe. Acting on these considerations, Numan proposed to his Minister and the Premier that he be empowered to discuss with me how Turko-German relations might be developed and strengthened on a basis of confidence, without at the present moment complicating Turkey’s relations with the Soviet Union or prejudicing her relations with the Allies.

The talks suggested to me have now taken place. Numan described Turkey’s attitude, in the way I have briefly sketched in the foregoing lines. He added that it would be of advantage to the Axis to have Turkey as strong as possible militarily, so that she might be able in any circumstances to resist possible Anglo-American pressure. It was true that Turkey had been promised substantial deliveries under the lend-lease law. How far they could be realized depended on the transport situation, which, as we knew, was extremely bad. Furthermore, even more important for Turkey were supplies of grain and food, which Turkey could under no circumstances renounce. But it accorded with Turkish policy to lean toward Germany and thus create a counterbalance to the Anglo-American influence which was being broadened in this way.

His proposal was that the credit agreement concluded with Minister Funk—which was not ratified and accordingly was shelved—be revived and the sums provided in it used to supply Turkey with war material. This measure should not be viewed from the angle of propaganda, but rather as an expression of Turkey’s real political considerations.

During the discussion of this proposal, Numan particularly stressed that it was a matter of confidence in Turkish policy, since at the present moment Turkey was not in a position to offer any concrete compensation, such as I had proposed. Consideration of the military situation should suffice to make clear to the Axis the value of a militarily strong Turkey, which wanted to be prepared at any moment to successfully resist Anglo-American pressure. It might be argued on the German side that it was not necessary for this purpose to supply Turkey with war material, because if Germany were in occupation of the Caucasus in the summer of 1942, the German armies would constitute a sufficient guarantee and, as allies of Turkey, could at any moment go into action against the Anglo-American forces. However, even in the event of Russia’s utter defeat and Germany’s victorious advance in the Caucasus, it would, in his opinion, be of great advantage to German policy to know that the then very sensitive German flank would not be exposed to any surprise attack from Turkish soil.

I naturally explained to Herr Numan that the large-scale delivery of German war material to Turkey which he expected must have some political equivalent. It went without saying that we should first have to examine the technical feasibility of such a plan. If it should appear to be practicable, my Government would undoubtedly insist on certain compensation, which, without anticipating the decisions of my Minister, I believed should essentially consist in a concretization of the Turkish attitude toward the “Europe and Soviet Russia” problem.

Numan replied that both M. Saracoglu and he had not left the slightest doubt in the minds of their British friends regarding Turkey’s wish to see the Soviets beaten. Never
under any circumstances could Turkey desire to see a victorious Soviet Russia exercising a decisive influence on the new arrangement of Europe. Nevertheless, concretization of this Turkish view would constitute a political act which Turkey for the moment could not afford. As to the dislocation of military forces, I might rest assured that Turkey would fully take the new situation into account. This, too, would be tantamount to supporting us in the Caucasian campaign.

In the course of the discussion we finally agreed that I should report the proposal to the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs, with the reservation that a common basis is found. He, Numan, cherished no illusions but that the publication of such a project would deal a sad blow to Anglo-Turkish relations, but he was prepared to say to the British: "We have made this agreement with Germany because we want to be militarily armed for any eventuality—even for the event of an Anglo-American attack."

Reporting Numan's proposal, I should like to recommend that the technical possibility of supplying the material be first examined. In spite of the obvious difficulty of securing an equivalent political return at the present moment, I regard the proposal as a good opportunity to achieve more intimate relations with the Turks, and especially the Turkish General Staff.

I should be grateful for a lead as to the opinion at your end.

Papen

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No. 19

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret

Ankara, March 7, 1942
Received: March 7, 1942, 13 h. 50 m.
No. 358

In supplement to telegram No. 351 of the 6th
1. A Russian was arrested yesterday in Kayseri.
2. The time limit for the voluntary surrender of Pavlov by the Consulate-General has been extended till tomorrow morning, after which forcible arrest will be effected.
3. Last night the Chief of the Press Department telephoned for details of the police measures against the Russian. Please inform the appropriate departments that such inquiries are purposeless, since, in order not to prejudice thorough elucidation, the Embassy can give no information by telephone.

Papen

69
No. 20

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret

Ankara, March 9, 1942
Received: March 9, 1942, 11 h. 35 m.
No. 363
Pol. Dept. VII 308 secr.

In supplement to telegram No. 355 of the 6th

Numan told me that the Russian had been voluntarily surrendered after the Consulate-Generals had been surround-
ed by a battalion of infantry and no other alternative re-
mained. He of course denies everything, but he is just now being put to the third degree. Journalistic reports notwithstanding, the Russian Ambassador has not left for Moscow.

Papen

No. 21

WIEHL TO RIBBENTROP

Chief of
Commercial Policy
Department
62 secr.

Secret

Berlin, March 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM

On Delivery of 20 Krupp 7.5 cm. Field Anti-Aircraft Guns and 100,000 Rounds of Ammunition

Field-Marshall Keitel has informed Ambassador Ritter that the Fuhrer would like to discuss with the Reichsmin-
ister of Foreign Affairs whether the 20 field anti-aircraft guns should be delivered to Turkey as an advance against eventual deliveries of chromium. The substance of the matter is as follows:

A pre-war contract with the firm of Krupp provided for the delivery of 108 pieces of 7.5 cm. field anti-aircraft guns and 6,400 rounds of ammunition, of which 20 pieces were still undelivered on the outbreak of the war and were detained. The finished guns have since been lying at the Krupp works. Their utilization in the Wehrmacht would

* The document bears Woermann’s initial.
be difficult, because they do not correspond with German patterns. The delivery of these 20 pieces was again promised in the Clodius agreement with Turkey of October 9, 1941, together with 100,000 rounds of ammunition, which would have to be manufactured. The firm of Krupp have to conclude a new contract for the delivery. The government agreement does not couple the delivery of these German weapons with any Turkish counter-deliveries of chromium or any other material. At first the High Command of the Wehrmacht expressed the desire that the private negotiations of the Krupp firm be so steered as to fix the date for the delivery of the guns and the ammunition still to be manufactured for after January 15, 1943, since, according to the government agreement, after this date we could receive chromium ore by way of counter-delivery. The Ankara Embassy, however, recommended that the guns be delivered earlier, because we are obligated to do so by the agreement and, since the guns are ready, no excuse can be offered for delaying their delivery. When the Foreign Office asked the High Command whether the guns might be delivered earlier, Field-Marshall Keitel reported the matter to the Führer, because meanwhile—a fact with which the Foreign Office was not acquainted—the delivery of the guns had been interdicted by order of the Führer. When Field-Marshall Keitel made his report, the Führer said that he had indeed contemplated another use for the guns, but he did not object to again giving consideration to the question of their delivery, perhaps in the form of a certain advance against subsequent Turkish deliveries of chromium. The 20 guns are valued at about Rm. 2,000,000, the 100,000 rounds of ammunition at Rm. 12,000,000. If the contract is signed in April, the delivery of the ammunition still to be manufactured could begin in December 1942. Speedy conclusion of the contract, followed by delivery of the guns, would have the advantage that we would receive a 30 per cent advance payment, roughly Rm. 4,000,000, on the signing of the contract for the ammunition, and the value of the guns, roughly Rm. 2,000,000, on their delivery, or Rm. 6,000,000 in all. For this sum we could forthwith buy in Turkey urgently needed strategical raw materials, such as copper and cotton. With the further payments of about Rm. 8,000,000, which would fall due on the delivery of the ammunition starting with the beginning of next year, we could, besides the aforesaid strategical raw materials, buy chromium on account of the contingent of 45,000 tons provided for the period of January 15 to March 31, 1943.

Economically, in view of the important counter-deliveries, such a contract would be very advantageous, all the more that the guns are ready for delivery and can hardly be used by us. Early conclusion of the contract is also desirable from the political standpoint, since delay might raise doubts in the Turks' minds as to our willingness to carry out the agreement of October 9, 1941.

The War Economy and Armaments Office of the High Command, in a memorandum to Field-Marshall Keitel, has also recommended the delivery of the guns. Field-Marshall Keitel has requested, after the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs has reported to the Führer, to be informed of the decision.

I recommend that the firm of Krupp be allowed to conclude a contract with the Turks on the above lines.

For the attention, through Ambassador Ritter and the Secretary of State, of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs

Wiehl
No. 22

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

German Embassy
No. A 2632/42

Copy

Foreign Office,
Berlin

Ankara, May 13, 1942

Re: Turkish Interest in the Caucasus

I was today visited by General Mursel Baku Pasha, who told me that he had had a long talk with Marshal Cakmak. The latter had assured him that the civilian persons in whom we were interested in connection with this matter would receive travel permits for Germany without delay. As to the officers, he would have for the time being to refrain. The Turkish army had a large number of former Caucasian, especially Azerbaijan, officers who were intimately acquainted with the country. If the operations make further progress, he would, at our wish, grant them furlough.

He also told me that he had learned in the General Staff that the Russians had built new aircraft plants, namely, a group in Chita, a group near Tomsk and Omsk, and a third group near Tashkent. The oil wells at Ufa had been completed, and it was hoped that their output would exceed that of Baku.

The Pasha then handed me a memorandum from Kerim Oder, who is Rasul-Zade Emin’s deputy and a leader of the Azerbaijan National Party. A translation of the memorandum is appended.

Papen

*This memorandum has not been found among the German Foreign Office archives in the possession of the Soviet Government.
MINUTE

Notified by one of the members of the Indian Committee whom I met by chance, Dr. Harun visited me today and confidentially informed me of his latest observations in Turkey. Dr. Harun claims to be a confidential agent of Marshal Cakmak. He had not less than five times discussed with him the question of Turkey's entering the war. Cakmak holds that Turkey's entry is hardly avoidable. It may happen at any moment, and will as soon as the Turkish army possesses sufficient arms. The Turkish advance would be in the direction of Baku, through the Iranian uplands. There could be no question of an attack on the Caucasian positions proper. They do not reckon on encountering any substantial opposition from the British in Iran, but do from the Russians... *

With reference to the "Turan" question, he assured me that he knew from his own experience and from what he had learned in Turkish parliamentary circles, and also from the Marshal, that, contrary to official declarations and probably also to the reports of our Ambassador in Ankara, a Greater Turkey movement not only existed, but was steadily gaining in strength and importance. The true state of affairs was revealed, among other things, by the fact that the President had ordered the deletion of all foreign words from the Constitution, and had done so with an eye not only to Turkey, but also most definitely to the other Turkic peoples. Asked how he conceived future developments, Dr. Harun told me that what was envisaged was not the conquest of these lands by Turkey, but rather the creation of a federal state, similar to the Bismarck Reich. It was to include, besides Anatolia, the Caucasus and the Turkic peoples east of the Volga.

But the ideal of the Turkish statesmen was and is, precisely because of their recognition of the yellow peril, to play the role of mediator between Germany and Britain. "Germany and Turkey," he said, "should build a wall against the yellow flood."—"And England too," I added, to which he readily assented. In reply to my remark that the Turks had once already, under Bayezid, faced the Mongolians, he said that that was quite a different matter. This denotes a complete alteration of Turkey's position from an Asiatic to a European Power.

Hentig

Berlin, June 1, 1943

* Part of the minute, concerning the situation on the Soviet-German Front, is omitted.
No. 24

PAPEN TO MENEMENCIOLU

Confidential
Ankara, June 13, 1942

Ambassador Numan Menemencioglu,
General Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Office,
Ankara

Mr. Ambassador,

I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency the following list of war material specified in Article 4, Price Group VIII, of the supplementary agreement signed today:

20 Krupp field anti-aircraft guns
40 Bochumer Verein gun barrels
64 Skoda mountain guns.

Accept, etc.

Franz von Papen

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No. 25

DITTMANN TO TIPPELSKRICH

Committee on Russia
Legation Counsellor Dittmann

In reference to the questions raised in the report of Ambassador von Papen of July 24—A 3835/42—I should like to express the following opinion.

1) From numerous talks in the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas I have got the impression that Reichsminister Rosenberg does not favour the plan for the creation of independent Caucasian states under German protection. True, recognition is gaining ground even in the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas that conditions in the Caucasus differ essentially from those in the other already conquered regions of the Soviet Union, and that therefore an at least outwardly different form of administration must be chosen in the Caucasus from that, say, in the Ukraine. But I have been informed in strict confidence that these past days Reichsminister Rosenberg has personally drafted for submission to the Führer a comprehensive memorandum regarding the future political structure of the Caucasian region, the details of which are still unknown even to the competent officials in the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas, but which adheres to the principle that a German civil administration should be set up in the Caucasus. How-
ever, the supreme representative of the German civilian authority in the Caucasus as a whole is not to bear, as hitherto contemplated, the title of "Reichskommissar," but of "Statthalter," and its representatives in the individual regions (Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, North Caucasus) are to be called "General-bevollmächtigte."

2) As to the Crimean Tatars, as far as I am aware it has already been decided not to grant them self-government. Until about three weeks ago it was even contemplated removing the Crimean Tatars from the Crimea and making the latter a purely German region. This plan has now been dropped, chiefly because of the technical difficulties involved in its execution. The Crimea, with the addition of certain Ukrainian areas north of Perekop, is to be administered by a Commissariat-General, under the direction of Gauleiter Frauenfeld.

3) The dissatisfaction of the leading representatives of the Caucasian émigrés in Berlin, to which Ambassador von Papen refers in his report, has considerably increased these past days. Their uneasiness is to be attributed to the fact that the request submitted to Gauleiter Meyer by Ambassador Count von Schuleenburg that the Caucasian émigrés enlisted by the Foreign Office be engaged in a manner befitting their position was rejected by Reichsminister Rosenberg. Against the advice of his officials, Reichsminister Rosenberg decided only that a few of the émigrés be taken on by the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas to fill advisory posts, which already exist in the Ministry. The émigrés rejected this proposal, because they do not want to be employees of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas, which acceptance of the offer would practically result in. In several talks with the representatives, particularly of the Azerbaijan émigrés, I was able to observe that they are deeply depressed, and it was only with great difficulty that they could be dissuaded from the conviction that their mission in Germany must already be regarded as having completely failed. Only with great effort were they dissuaded from their intention to return to Turkey immediately because there was no longer a suitable field of activity for them in Germany. It is unquestionable that the return of the émigrés at this juncture would have the effect of increasing the uneasiness in Turkish circles.

In my opinion, the report of Ambassador von Papen should be made the occasion for a communication from the Foreign Office to the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas (perhaps in the form of a letter from the Secretary of State to Gauleiter Meyer), which, referring to the conversation between Ambassador Count von Schuleenburg and Gauleiter Meyer, should once more intimate that a satisfactory solution of the émigré problem is urgently necessary in the interest of Turko-German relations. I would remark confidentially that two days ago Professor von Mende, the Caucasian expert in the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas, explicitly requested me that such a communication be sent by the Foreign Office, since he hopes with its help still to be able to get Reichsminister Rosenberg to alter his view.

Dittmann

For the attention of Herr Minister von Tippelskirch, with reference to the oral conversation.

Berlin, August 5, 1942
No. 26

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret

Ankara, August 26, 1942
Received: August 27, 1942, 3 h. 07 m.
No. 74, August 26

Today I had my first official talk with Numan after his assumption of office.*

Numan thanked me for the cordial reception given to Arikian by the Führer and the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs. Of his conversation with the Reichsminister he remarked that he had taken note of the fact that the Reichsminister had for the second time conveyed to him that even after the defeat of Russia there could be no question of a separate peace with Britain. In reference to the remark of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs that Turkey still seemed to be uncertain as to who would win this war, he, Numan, would like to explain to me the view of the Turkish General Staff, which was also, of course, his own view.

The Turkish General Staff believed that the capture of Stalingrad would be the coping stone of this year's operations. The solution of the Russian problem, in his estimation, was to push forward northward from Stalingrad in order to cut the railway line between Kuibyshev and Moscow. The central and the northern Russian army groups would then have only one railway at their disposal, which was bound to lead to the collapse of these forces. That the Russians were for three weeks throwing their strategical reserves into a hopeless diversive action against the German forces in the central and northern sectors was a capital strategical error.

In comparison with the complete liquidation of the Russian forces in the central and northern sectors by an operation against Kuibyshev, the operation in the Caucasus was only of secondary importance. In view of this situation, the General Staff was convinced that by the end of this year Germany will have so weakened the Russians that they will no longer count as a decisive factor in this war.

To this must be added the blocking of Anglo-American supplies from the South.

From this Numan drew the conclusion that the above-mentioned question of the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs was unjustified. In view of this general situation, and because Turkey was as interested as ever in seeing Bolshevik Russia defeated as thoroughly as possible, Turkey had never had any negotiations with the Russian Government, with the exception of the declaration which, owing to British pressure, she had made to the Russians that the earlier treaty of friendship remained in force. He wanted most categorically to tell me that his new ambassador in Moscow had received instructions not to enter into any negotiations. He must most categorically repudiate the suspicion expressed by the Germans that the Russians had withdrawn several divisions from the Turkish border as the result of assurances given by Turkey.

* Memmencioğlu had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.
I thanked Numan for his statements, but did not conceal from him that we had latterly had the feeling that Turkey was lending an all too willing ear to the British and American insinuations that Russia was already so weakened that she could never again represent a danger to Turkey, whereas Germany, on the other hand, if she were to gain possession of the Black Sea, would constitute a future threat to Turkish interests which was not to be underestimated.

Numan denied this very vehemently. The Allies may have suggested this to him, but he had always rejoined that the huge Slav empire would never cease to be a menace to Turkey, and that, on the other hand, she could not perceive any menace in having Germany as a neighbour. For, he added, he could positively not imagine that the Führer would seek a final and lasting solution of the Russian problem in the erection of a frontier wall which would always have to be defended and of a number of states under the police direction of Germany. Germany’s task of settling the Russian problem was immensely difficult. Turkey had every interest in ... [garbled] and she was therefore ready to assist the Reich within the bounds of possibility. Since his country was not pursuing imperialist aims, its only interest was in having the cultural existence of its political minorities guaranteed. Furthermore, they were convinced that the Russian problem could be solved only if these various peoples, with their specific cultural characteristics, were placed on their own feet under German guidance. Only thus could their active co-operation be enlisted against the danger of Pan-Slavism.

In reply to my question as to what form Turkey’s co-operation could take, Numan said that certain bounds were placed to such co-operation by the necessity of maintaining neutrality, but that it would be forthcoming wherever his country had legitimate cultural interests to represent. He requested me to apply to him on all questions in which we desired Turkey’s advice on matters of administration or personnel.

In a written report to be sent with the courier of August 29, I shall revert to detailed aspects of this question in connection with the visit of the representatives of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas.

On the question of the navy, he declared ... [garbled] that there was only one irrevocable decision: complete internment, and in a place that corresponded with Turkey’s interests (in any case, no Mediterranean ports). There could be no negotiations. No changes would be tolerated.

Asked about the results of the Moscow conference, he said that all that one heard from Kuibyshev diplomatic circles was idle chatter. But he was expecting a comprehensive report from his London Ambassador in the next few days and would let me know. It appeared that a decision to open a second front in the Caucasus had been taken. Until now the Russians had categorically rejected the employment of foreign troops on their territory. Even in these past few days further Polish divisions had been shipped off to Iran. Even two British airmen, intended as symbolical of co-operation, had been sent back. It now seemed, however, that Russia was willing to depart from this principle as far as the Southern Caucasus was concerned. The appointment of Voroshilov and Wilson indicated this. Two American divisions are said to be arriving at Basra.

Numan added in connection with this information that any demand on the part of the Allies to involve Turkey in any way in such a second front would inevitably mean war. This attitude accorded primarily with Turkey’s interests, but he believed that it would also be useful to Germany.
Willkie’s visit to Turkey, and its announcement in the press without Turkey having been asked, was a usual piece of American insolence.

In conclusion, the Minister handed me a memorandum regarding the state of the Turko-German negotiations on the armament credit. He complained that in the hands of the experts the negotiations now bid fair to be endlessly protracted. He had believed, and the cordial reception given to the delegation had stressed this, that it was to be an agreement dictated by political usefulness. He regretted that, evidently as a result of false conceptions in Berlin regarding Turkey’s attitude, the negotiations seemed to be deadlocked.

I replied that I was not informed of the progress of the negotiations. A telegram on this subject follows.

Papen

No. 27

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

German Embassy
No. A 524/42 secr.

Foreign Office,
Berlin

S e c r e t

Ankara, August 27, 1942

POLITICAL REPORT!

Re: The New Turkish Premier on the Turkish Minorities and the Future of Russia

Today I paid my first visit to the newly appointed Prime Minister, M. Saracoğlu.

In the course of the conversation, which touched upon the general situation in Turkey, I requested him, as I had requested Numan yesterday, to let me have his views on the Russian problem.

The Prime Minister said that he would like to reply both as a Turk and as Prime Minister.

As a Turk, he yearned for the destruction of Russia, which would be an epoch-making deed on the part of the Führer, and which had been the dream of the Turkish people for centuries. No Turk, even Yağlı in who wrote for the British, could think differently from him on this

* The document bears Woermann’s initial.
point. In his recent avowal of fidelity to the Turkish racial cause he had made an indirect reference to this.

Germany could solve the Russian problem only if she slaughtered off at least one-half of all living Russians, and if she rescued the Russified national minority regions from Russian influence once and for all, set them on their own feet, and educated them to be willing collaborators of the Axis and foes of Slavdom. In exterminating a substantial part of the Russian population potential, the allies were taking the best course. He did not know what the Führer had decided regarding the future constitution of the minority regions. The overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of these regions belonged to the Turkish race, and Turkey therefore had a legitimate interest in the settlement of this question. He recalled that he had at one time declared to the President on the instructions of the Führer that in the new Europe Turkey was to constitute a strong buttress in the Southeast, and consequently the Turkish racial elements in the present Russified lands must also be taken into consideration. True, the intellectuals there—so far as they existed at all—had either surrendered to Bolshevism or had been massacred by it. Consequently, a section of the younger generation of these countries should be sent to German universities and a section to Turkish universities, then this new generation would in the future be a guarantee of effective co-operation between the two factors.

Germany had invited to the Reich a number of émigrés from these countries in order to hear their opinion or to make use of their services. Some of them had come back with the conviction that it was not intended to grant the countries with Turkic minorities independent existence, but to turn them into states under German administrative and police direction. He could not believe that this was the Führer’s view. If the Russians were soon completely
beaten, we would find that the lands in question, with their non-Russian minorities, expected from us freedom and reconstruction. We must not disappoint this hope. Nor would the minorities disappoint us.

So far he had spoken as a Turk.

As Prime Minister, it was his business to see that at the present moment not the least thing occurred which might furnish the Russians with an excuse to slaughter the Turkish minorities. The Russians’ fear of other races was well known. It was for this reason that they would not allow either Poles, or Britons, or Americans to fight on their territory. Only recently, Azerbaijan Turks in Iran who had expressed their sympathy with Turkey were completely exterminated, together with their villages. Hence the necessity for a strictly neutral attitude. As Prime Minister, he considered it necessary not to compromise Turkey’s position also because, in his opinion, the approaching collapse of Russia would certainly prompt a desire for peace on the part of the British. This opportunity to restore peace to Europe must not be missed.

I thanked the Prime Minister for his statements and asked him in what practical way we could make sure of Turkish co-operation or take account of Turkey’s interests in the administration and development of the conquered regions. Saracoglu told me, as Numan had told me yesterday, that he would be very willing, in case of necessity, to discuss practical questions with me confidentially, or to indicate a third person for the discussion of such matters.

The Prime Minister is setting out today for a tour of inspection of the Russian frontier, because, as he told

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8 This assertion of Saracoglu is false from beginning to end. Nothing of the kind happened in Azerbaijan. Regarding the “sympathy” of the Azerbaijan Turks for Turkey, see Document No. 10, pp. 34-38.
me, he was not familiar with these regions and wanted to form a personal impression. He will return to Ankara via Samsun.

I got the impression from this conversation that the Prime Minister is following developments in Russia, especially the Caucasus, with the liveliest interest, and that he would like to maintain close contact with me on this matter.

The above-mentioned questions were also discussed with Professor von Mende, the representative of the Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas. SS Brigade-Führer Zimmermann, who has established contact with another émigré circle, was present. From our talks, I might draw the following conclusions regarding the practical handling of the matter:

The Turks are of the opinion—and I fully share it—that a lasting solution of the Russian problem will only be possible if we enlist the active co-operation of the minorities in the various parts of the country, and if they are educated in a feeling of independence, naturally within the framework of German spiritual, economic and military leadership. Following good examples (e.g., Japan in Burma), we should endeavour to find in each of the Caucasian and Transcaucasian countries a suitable person who could outwardly appear as the native representative head of the administration. Side by side with this head, there must be a responsible German director—outwardly, in the background, as an adviser; actually, as the leading, deciding and responsible person. Under this head there should be the necessary number of administrative authorities, in which the native element had a big share. The already existing legions composed of minority nationals constitute a splendid nucleus around which to build up the armed forces in the various districts. Outwardly, the organizations of the armed forces and the police should wherever possible likewise be represented by a native person.

In the matter of selecting the leading native person for each district, I could, as I reported after my conversations with Numan and Saracoglu, always ask the opinion of influential Turkish circles, and in this way create a common interest in the new political entities.

This proposal, of course, completely differs from the purely German government and administration set up in the Ukraine and the other occupied regions of Russia. But I would urge in support of my proposal relative to the Transcaucasian and Transcaucasian lands that a question of foreign policy of first-rate importance is here involved. Without Turkey’s participation, and without the co-operation of the factors involved in the common Mohammedan religion, we could occupy and administer these lands only on a purely German police basis. Turkey would then necessarily remain outside this new European combination. The consequences of so defective a construction would soon make themselves felt.

Since, with the descent from the Caucasus of the victorious German troops, the first elements of a new administration in these lands will have to be inaugurated, it would seem very urgent that the Führer decide this question along the lines of the grand general political conception he at one time prescribed.

Papen
No. 28

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Therapia, August 28, 1942
Received: August 28, 1942, 14 h. 37 m.
No. 1305

Secret

I am sending a detailed report of the lengthy conversation I had yesterday with the Prime Minister. Briefly, I may state that he too is led to believe by the Moscow talks that the Allies will greatly activate the prosecution of the war in the Orient, with the result that Turkey will again find herself in the centre of events. In order, while fully maintaining her neutral position, to make possible a quite confidential exchange of opinions on questions of mutual interest relative to the neighbouring regions, should this be agreeable to us, he offered to name a third person with whom such conversations could be conducted. I also received the promise that Turkey would close her eyes to the passage of certain persons through her territory.

In my estimation, Saracoglu’s proposal signifies a gratifying advance, and a trump card in the fight for Turkey’s allegiance which is again developing. (He is setting out, accompanied by military men, for a tour of inspection of the eastern frontier.)

Papen

No. 29

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE*

Intelligence Department
Foreign Intelligence
No. 1372/42 secr.
Gmd. VIIa U/M

Secret

September 10, 1942

Re: Conversation Between the Swiss Minister and the Turkish Foreign Minister

On August 25, 1942, the Swiss Legation in Ankara sent the enclosed report (translated from the French) to the Federal Political Department in Berne.

It is particularly requested that if it is intended to make use of this report its source should not be indicated or be apparent.

By order,

(Signature indecipherable)

I Encl. (5 pages)

* The document bears the initials of Weizäcker and Woermann.
ENCLOSURE

On my return from Switzerland, and after a two-days’ stay in Istanbul, where I met the German and Italian Ambassadors, but could not be received by the American Ambassador who was sick in hospital, I paid the customary visit to M. Numan Menemenciglu, who after his appointment as Deputy was called to the post of Foreign Minister.

M. Menemenciglu was of course very pleased by the message I conveyed to him from you, and requested me to assure you of his friendship. He assured me at once that the Saracoğlu Ministry would follow the same foreign policy as the Refik Seydam Cabinet; his appointment to the Foreign Office was a corroboration of this, as was also the ministerial declaration of M. Saracoğlu, in which he deliberately repeated the formula: British alliance and German friendship. This, he added in reply to a question from me, was the way Turkey’s so-called “active” neutrality, in distinction to our integral neutrality, was to be understood. This casual and practical neutrality did not prevent Turkey from pursuing a policy of alliances, which included constant “negotiations” with the governments, whether allied or friendly.

As regards the general situation, Menemenciglu, when I asked his opinion of the state of things in Russia, said that, according to reports received, the harvest in the Ukraine was over 60 per cent of normal, which, in his opinion, was “enormous,” and all the more important that the “scorched earth” policy had compelled a large part of the population, which would otherwise had to be fed, to evacuate. On the other hand, the fact that many of the transports recently sunk north of Murmansk were carrying food indicated that the Russian army was threatened with a food crisis; it was quite obvious that infinitely precious tonnage would not have been employed for the transport of food unless it had been imperatively necessary. Menemenciglu attaches greater significance at the moment to the loss of the producing regions of the Ukraine and the Donets Basin than to the severing of communication with Iran, which has not yet occurred; actually, he holds, the American food supply via Basra is only of symbolic importance. Under these circumstances, the Minister continued, there is every reason to assume that in the coming winter the German army will not be confronted with an opponent equivalent to the one of last winter, even taking into account Russia’s possession of important reserves of munitions and oil, as well as the exploitation of new mines. This does not necessarily mean that the Russian army will be put out of the running in the coming autumn. It is still too early to assert anything, as the issue of the summer campaign remains uncertain; nevertheless, the season is well advanced and the September rains are already hampering operations; on the other hand, the fact must not be lost sight of that the “three hundred” divisions of the Russians’ main army have still taken no part in the operations in the Caucasus, where at present only fourteen Russian divisions are engaged. Under these conditions, the Turkish General Staff is inclined to the view that the German High Command, if it does not want to postpone its decisive blow until next spring, or even summer, will be compelled to attack the Russians’ main forces. For this purpose, an offensive northward from the Stalingrad-Volga area may be expected. If the German army should succeed by this offensive in driving a wedge between Moscow and Kuibyshev, the Soviet army would be in a “bad way.” As to the current operations in the South,
one of their principal purposes, namely, to drive the Russians away from the Black Sea coast," is on the point of accomplishment, in spite of the necessity of capturing Novorossisk and Tuapse through mountain passes negotiable only by infantry. But nearer to the east the approaches will become harder and harder to master, so that the capture of Baku will be a problem.

The prospect for the future, as Menemencioglu sees it, is a much easier winter campaign in Russia, on the one hand, and possible operations against Egypt, on the other. He assured me of his conviction that Rommel would at the end of autumn resume the offensive, in conjunction with a new "pincer movement" through Cyprus and Syria.

The picture so sketched has the advantage, so important for a Turkish Minister, that Turkey would remain outside the fighting zone. Turkish diplomacy has apparently every interest that the strategical objectives of the Axis should develop in the direction of Moscow, rather than of Iran and Iraq; it has likewise every reason to wish that a coming attack on Syria from Cyprus may leave Anatolia outside the strategical pinners, whose jaws this winter will converge on the Suez. It is in the light of these factors that the Minister's predictions must presumably be taken.

At this first conversation, which lasted forty minutes, I did not have time to raise the question of the "second front." I know, however, that M. Menemencioglu, in a recent conversation with the Bulgarian Minister, character-

ized such an undertaking as a "plaisanterie macabre." On the other hand, Menemencioglu spoke with greater emphasis to the Belgian Minister than he did to me of the still unbroken strength of the Russian army and only touched lightly on the harvest in the Ukraine. This apparently can only be interpreted as different shades of polite circumspection.

The Greek Minister, whom I visited, laid great weight on the three hundred intact Russian divisions. In his opinion, the lost oil regions accounted for not more than 25 per cent of production, while the exploitation of the oil fields in the Urals is already yielding "unexpected results." The Minister contested the opinion that the German army could reach Baku this autumn, and pointed out that the oil from Baku could be shipped across the Caspian to the railway station at Krasnovodsk, on a branch line of the trans-Siberian Railway.

My talk with Herr von Papen, with whom I lunched at Therapia, and the Italian Ambassador was dominated by the Italo-German naval victory in the Mediterranean, and I found them optimistically impressed by this news. The Italian Ambassador gave repeated expression to his conviction that next year would see victory. In face of the inflexible attitude of the Anglo-Saxons, the word apparently now is to adopt a similar tone and to repudiate the very idea of a compromise. Chancellor Hitler recently spoke to the new Turkish Ambassador in the same spirit. Nevertheless, M. Menemencioglu accepts such assurances, from whatever quarter they may come, with reserve; in a conversation he had lately with the Dutch Minister he expressed the conviction that a compromise which would include the complete independence of Belgium, Holland and Norway was possible. The Belgian and Dutch Ministers, who are getting more and more worried about the situation of their
countries, continue to show interest in this question, although orders have come from London not to mention it any more and to react negatively if it is raised. The British Ambassador, with whom I lunched on Wednesday, questioned me at length on the situation in Switzerland and also, naturally, about my journey. This gave me the opportunity, after I had spoken of the good order prevailing in our country and had praised the splendid behaviour of our people, to refer to the concern which the navicerts were causing the Federal Council. I was able to observe, in contradistinction to earlier conversations, an absence of the customary insinuations regarding the impending collapse of German resistance. On the contrary, the Ambassador told me he was inclined to believe the reports of the Turks that the Axis was in a position to continue the fight for “one or even two years.”

My return journey through Italy, Belgrade and Sofia were without incident and gave me no reason to anticipate the attack which was made on our courier on the same stretch. In the Italian region of former Yugoslavia (Postumia-Ljubljana), the line was heavily guarded, with a post in trenches at about every 200 metres; along the whole stretch semi-permanent fortresses protected artificial structures (bridges, tunnels, etc.). The walls of these blockhouses were built of a double row of logs filled in with stone, and were furnished with firing slits; many of these works were still in construction. The approaches were protected by barbed-wire fences, which barred access to the artificial structures themselves and to other probably threatened zones. On both sides of the stretch the forest, which is dense in these parts, had been cleared, or was in process of being cleared, to a width of about 100 metres. At one part of the journey a detachment of troops occupied the train, chiefly my car. These precautionary measures apparently ceased in the German-occupied region (Ljubljana-Zagreb), as well as on the Croatian stretch (Zagreb-Belgrade), at least in the western area, which one travels through by day; they began again in Serbia, beyond Belgrade, where fortifications again appeared, this time older and very solid structures (of brick and stone, with searchlights). They are manned chiefly by Bulgarian troops, but the sentry posts are more rare. In Serbia and Bulgaria my train (with the exception of the sleeping cars) was so overcrowded that free movement through the corridors was impossible; it is wiser not to leave one’s compartment at all. As to the stations, the one at Milan, where seething crowds keep surging forward, or spend the whole night in complete darkness waiting for the rare trains, makes an unpleasant impression on the uninitiated. Elsewhere, however, and especially in the Balkans, where military police duty is performed by German and other posses, such overcrowding was not to be observed. Everything seemed to be proceeding without friction. Not far from Sofia we passed a train going in the other direction which seemed to me to be carrying a German motor transport column (cars, trucks, motorcycles); the matériel looked badly mauled and was covered with dust and had evidently been through a severe ordeal. The soldiers, young and spirited Germans, had well-kept but very threadbare uniforms. Major Frick, who has just arrived and who travelled the same route, will give fuller details of his observations on the journey in a technical report.
RIBBENTROP TO HEWEL-WEHRWOLF*

TELEGRAM

Fuschl, September 12, 1942, 16 h. 30 m.  
Received: September 12, 1942, 17 h. 35 m.  
No. 1104

Transmitted to  
Minister Hewel-Wehrwolf,  
September 12, 1942, No. 179

For Minister Hewel-Wehrwolf

Note for the Führer

The reports of Ambassador von Papen from Ankara respecting his talks with the Turkish Prime Minister and Turkish Foreign Minister concerning the Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union have prompted me to draft the enclosed telegraphic instruction to Ambassador von Papen, in which he is ordered to exercise absolute reserve in this matter. Minister Hewel informs me that the reports have suggested to the Führer the idea of calling Ambassador von Papen to Germany in order that he might be told by word of mouth

* The document bears Woermann's initial.
to exercise the utmost reserve in these matters and not to be led into any inopportune conversations. I believe that the attached telegraphic instruction, which has not yet been sent, would create the necessary guarantee that Herr von Papen will not pursue this subject any farther in Ankara. If I were to have Ambassador von Papen come here at this juncture, it may be presumed that in view of the undesirable publicity which his trips usually get in the international press, the perverted impression might easily be created abroad that we are on the point of entering into closer contact with the Turkish Government, and, in view of the war situation, it would be generally conjectured that this must be connected with our operations in the Caucasus and the future fate of these regions.

If the Führer therefore agrees, I would suggest that we confine ourselves for the present to sending the enclosed instruction to Herr von Papen. Should however, the Führer desire that I have Herr von Papen come here nonetheless, in order to discuss this and perhaps other questions with him, I should be grateful for an intimation to this effect.

Fuschl, September, 12, 1942

End of note for Führer
Draft telegram follows
German Embassy,
Ankara

Secret

For the Ambassador personally

As is evident from your telegrams of August 26 and 28, and from your written report of August 27, in your latest conversation with Turkish statesmen the subject of Turkish interest in the Turkic peoples in the Caucasus and other former Soviet-Russian regions was repeatedly raised, and the question was also discussed how Turkey could cooperate in the solution of the problems involved. Both Herr Numan and Herr Saracoglu took advantage of this opportunity to stress Turkey’s interest in this matter and, by means of vague offers to advise us on these questions, confidentially or through a third person, to present Turkey’s wishes and demands, at the same time emphatically reiterating Turkey’s known neutral position.

We have no interest just now in entering into any conversations with the Turkish Government concerning these questions and thus prejudicing their development. Nor is there anything to induce us to give the Turks any assurances or to present them with the opportunity to convey to us their wishes and demands relative to these questions, for obviously Turkish interest in these matters does not yet go so far as to prompt Turkey to change her general political attitude toward the belligerent Powers in our favour.

I therefore request you not to enter into any further conversations on these questions and, should the Turks again bring up the problem of the Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union, to exercise the utmost reserve.

End of draft

Ribbentrop

Sonnleithner

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No. 31

KROLL TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Telegram

Therapia, September 21, 1942
Received: September 21, 1942, 19 h. 20 m.
No. 1334
Pol VII 1242 sec.

In reply to telegram No. 1334 of September 16.

The report of the Greek Ambassador, of whom it is generally known that he is not very scrupulous with the truth, regarding the impression Willkie’s tables of figures supposedly made on Numan is certainly incorrect. On the Ambassador’s instructions, I was myself personally in Ankara during Willkie’s visit, and from my talks with Numan, with politically influential Foreign Office officials, with the Director-General of the Press, and with members of parliament, I got the uniform impression that Willkie’s primitive, stereotyped and extremely superficial arguments were assessed as pure propaganda. The Turks agreed with me that the American production figures could give a useful picture only if they were compared with the production figures of the Axis, which could not be done because of their secrecy. I of course had no difficulty in scoffing at Willkie’s prediction that next year the German U-boats will sink only 350,000 tons per month. His assertion that Rommel’s
offensive power was smashed and that the Egyptian front was definitely secured, did, it is true, give food for reflection here, but, in view of the many surprises that have already been experienced in this field, it was not altogether convincing. The Turks even considered the manner in which a civilian like Willkie spoke of so tried and tested a military leader as Rommel extremely tactless.

Naturally, after having seriously erred regarding the Soviet Union, Italy, France, etc., the Turkish Government is interested to have as reliable a picture as possible of the present and future military strength of the United States. It is known that the former Turkish Minister in Cairo has been sent to Washington to devote himself specially to this subject. Willkie’s visit was also certainly utilized to obtain from him confidential explanations on certain matters. That he was in a position to do so, seems to me doubtful. As already reported in previous telegrams (see No. 1276 of September 10 and No. 1285 of September 11), the Turks took advantage of the visit in order in the first place to press for the speediest and largest possible deliveries of war material and grain. The rumours spread by the Rumanians and Italians that Willkie offered a loan of one billion dollars and delivery of 5,000 aircraft are still unconfirmed. They were probably launched by the Americans and British themselves in order to cover up Willkie’s failure.

Kroll

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No. 32

KILLINGER TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

TELEGRAM

Secret

Bucharest, October 25, 1942, 11 h. 00 m.
Received: October 25, 1942, 11 h. 15 m.
No. 5307, October 25

The Vice-Premier told me that he had had a talk with Turkish Ambassador Tanrıöver, who has returned after a longish stay in Turkey. Tanrıöver declared that Russia was still Enemy No. 1 for Turkey, and that the latter would continue to observe strict neutrality.

Killinger

* The document bears the notation in black pencil: “Copy to Ankara by courier.”
No. 33

PAPEN TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE*

German Embassy
No. 717/42 secr.

Foreign Office,
Berlin

Secret
Ankara December 2, 1942

Re: Conversation Between the Military Attaché and the Turkish Deputy Chief of Staff

Yesterday, Major-General Rohde had a lengthy conversation with the Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Asim Gündüz. I should like to draw particular attention to his report, which will arrive with this same courier.

The Colonel-General seriously criticized the operational measures of the German General Staff, and was amazed that the communications he had made to the Military Attaché regarding the impending threat to North Africa had remained unheeded by the German side and no counter-measures had been taken. The Military Attaché got the impression that the very frank, if critical, remarks of the Colonel-General were prompted by deep concern that we

* The first page of the document bears Weissäcker's initial and the stamp: "Submitted to the Reichsminister of Foreign Affairs."
might not succeed in bringing the operations on the Eastern Front to a conclusion which would guarantee the security of Europe.

The German General Staff had acted contrary to the cardinal rules of classical strategy by neglecting to build up the necessary concentrations of strength in the vital sectors of the war theatre. In the opinion of the Turkish General Staff, Stalingrad, which had obviously riveted far too many German forces for far too long a time, was not a strategical objective. Owing to the heavy expenditure of available reserves at this focal point, the Caucasian Front was left without adequate concentrations of strength and the offensive there consequently petered out.

Position "Egypt," which was so decisive for the future of the Axis, had not been captured and had succumbed to British attack, because air support on the Eastern Front had also obviously absorbed forces which should have been used for success here.

The Colonel-General believed that it might definitely be taken that the Eastern Front in its entirety could be held. The question, however, was whether the German General Staff would be able to concentrate a sufficient number of divisions on this front in order either to undertake a new offensive in the spring with adequate shock strength, or to hold what in his opinion is the most threatened sector of the Axis, Italy. The chances of retaining North Africa are apparently estimated very low here. The Turkish General Staff believes that in Tunis only about three divisions are available in all, against six British and American divisions and the total fighting potential of the French armed forces in North Africa.

Particularly worthy of attention seems the Colonel-General's intimation that the British will attempt a landing in the spring in the North of Norway, in order to lend a
hand to the Russians on the Finnish front. The aim apparently is, by an attack at the extreme ends of the front, to cause the greatest possible strain on Germany’s transport facilities and a scattering of reserves.

Interesting in this connection is a conversation I had today with the very well-informed Minister of a neutral country. In a recent report I have already quoted this same source as saying that the enemy is showing extremely great interest in the Axis’ fuel supply. Today he told me that it is the intention of the enemy Powers to take advantage of the present unsatisfactory fuel situation of the Axis to compel us to expend the maximum possible quantity of fuel precisely this winter. If we should succeed by economies this winter in building up a new “stock” which would permit operations on a big scale in the spring, then the enemy would have missed a very great chance. For our fuel situation next year, thanks to the Maikop yield, would probably be much better.

Papen
No. 34

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Special train, December 5, 1942, 2 h. 30 m.
Received: December 5, 1942, 3 h. 30 m.
No. 1526
German Embassy,
Ankara

For the Ambassador personally

In response to your communication of November 20—
A 6154—I have given instructions to remit to you immediately
five million Reichsmarks in gold, so that you may be in
a position to help out our friends in Turkey in their strait-
ened circumstances. I request you to use this money most
generously and to report.

Ribbentrop

Transmitted to the German Embassy, Ankara, No. 1700
Berlin, December 5, 1942.
No. 35

SEILER TO GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Istanbul, December 9, 1942

Turkey, which would be very unwilling to see the British driven out of the Mediterranean (Suez Canal), on the other hand, wishes us success in our campaign against Russia and is sincerely worried that our strength may not suffice to put the Russians out of the running, at least for some time to come. She is today less inclined than ever to contribute to this, since, as the Turks see it, the final issue still seems very much in doubt. The Turks, it is true, clearly realize that a British victory would mean a Russian victory, and hence an end to Turkey's domination of the Straits. This realization is, however, compensated by the increasing pressure which is being exerted, notably by the Americans, in order to take advantage of the difficult food situation Turkey is in as a result of three bad harvests in succession. The object of the Americans is undoubtedly to use Turkey as an air base for raids on the Rumanian oil fields. This is the purpose of the airfields being built by the British. Further, roads are being built in South Anatolia which can have meaning only if they are intended for the transit of troops in the direction of Izmir-Salonika. Whether the Americans intend to carry out this plan independently of, parallel with, or after the failure of an undertaking in French North Africa, we, of course, are not in a position to judge.

Foreign Minister Numan, in the name of and on the orders of the Cabinet, has informed the Ambassador that, even if the Axis were on the eve of collapse, Turkey does not intend to renounce her neutrality, but, on the contrary, will defend it under all circumstances. I am inclined to believe that this declaration corresponds with the view of the General Staff, as well as with Turkey's real interest, which certainly cannot lie in a collapse of Germany. I am therefore inclined to believe that Numan's declaration also reflects the sincere opinion of the Foreign Office, at least at the present juncture. However, there are some, notably among the military attachés and journalists, who question whether Turkey would still defend her neutrality if the Americans should be in a position to build up a big army in the Near East, and if Germany, whose position in respect to transport (Black Sea) is very unfavourable, should have nothing to counter it with. Further, they regard the close collaboration between British and Turkish military men as very suspicious. I would not go so far as they and believe that Turkey is already playing a pernicious game with us and leading us by the nose, but am rather inclined to think that Turkey is at present non-committally making eyes to our enemies in order to obtain as much war material as possible. In any case, caution is indicated.

Seiler
No. 36

MANNSTEIN TO DIRKSEN

May 9, 1943

Highly Esteemed Herr von Dirksen,

Many thanks for your detailed and interesting letter. I should first of all like to express my regret that your wife does not feel so well and to convey my best wishes to her.

Your impressions of your visit to Niedermeyer interest me very much. If only these auxiliary peoples might really develop into useful soldiers for us! So far they have mostly run away when the Russians seriously attacked. It would naturally be a great relief if Russians and alien peoples could be put into action on a big scale against the Bolsheviks. But the difficult thing will always be what object to offer them, since their interests are antithetical, and in the long run diverge from ours. It is certainly true that the attempt to bring about a split should have been made earlier, and above all should have been prepared by suitable behaviour in the occupied areas.

I am now sitting again at my headquarters in the summer heat and waiting for things to happen. So far it is still quiet. The developments in Tunis are very regrettable. Above all, it will again have a depressing effect in Germany, and it will scarcely prompt the Italians to new enthusiasm for the war.

Unfortunately, I must now close, because my mail has accumulated.

With cordial wishes for your wife, and best greetings,

Yours very truly,

Mannstein
NAME INDEX

ABDUL-HAMID II: Sultan of Turkey; born 1842; succeeded to the throne in 1876, and deposed in 1909; died 1918.—34, 36

ALI FUAD: Cf. Erden Ali Fuad

ARIKAN, SAFFET: Turkish Minister of Defence, 1940-41; Ambassador to Berlin, July 1942 to August 1944.—82

ATATURK, GHAZI MUSTAFA KEMAL: Leader of the Turkish national liberation movement; President of Turkish Republic; born 1881; died 1938.—35, 64

BAKU MURSEL PASHA: Brigadier-General; in World War I commanded the Turkish army in the Caucasus which occupied Baku in 1918; in 1937, inspector of cavalry; from March 1943, member of the Committee of National Defence, and Deputy from Kocaeli to 7 dönüm of Mejlis.—74

BALA MIRSA: Member of Pan-Turkic movement and collaborator of Rasul-Zade.—37

BAYEZID: The reference is presumably to Sultan Bayezid I; born 1347; succeeded to the throne, 1389; died 1403.—77

BORIS III: Tsar; born 1894; succeeded to the throne October 1918; died August 28, 1943.—74

BRUCHITSCH, WALThER von: Nazi Field-Marshal; Commander-in-Chief of the Hitler German Army, 1939-41.—42

CAKMAK, FEVZI: Marshal; Turkish Chief-of-Staff; retired January 12, 1944.—42, 45, 74, 76

CAFER AHMED (SAIT CAIER; CAFEROGLLU): White émigré, member of the Pan-Turkic movement in Turkey.—35

CHURCHILL, WINSTON SPENCER:—56

CLODIUS: German diplomatist; headed the delegation to negotiate a commercial agreement with Turkey in 1941.—72

CRIPPS, SIR STAFFORD: M. P.; Member British Labour Party; Ambassador to U.S.S.R., 1940-42; member of Churchill's Coalition Cabinet.—66

DIRKSEN, HERBERT von: German diplomatist; Ambassador to London 1938-39; from October 1939 in Foreign Office reserve.—5, 120

DITTMANN, H.: Legation Counsellor and official at the German Foreign Office; in 1940, Counsellor to the German Legation in Teheran.—4, 79, 81

EDIGE KEMAL: Lawyer; member of the Pan-Turkic movement; was sent from Turkey to the Crimea to assist the Germans in establishing ties with the Crimean Tatars.—48

EDEN, ROBERT ANTHONY: British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Churchill's Cabinet, 1940-45.—55

ENVER PASHA: Leader of the Young Turks; Turkish War Minister in World War I; Pan-Turk; one of the organizers of the Basmach movement in Central Asia, where he was killed in 1922.—35

ERDEN ALI FUAD: In 1937, director of the Turkish Military Academy; Mejlis Deputy; later until February 1944, commanded 3rd Army Corps, then President of the Supreme Military Court of Cassation.—39, 42, 44, 55

ERDMANNSDORFF, OTTO von: German diplomatist; Minister to Budapest, 1937-41; from 1942, official in the Foreign Office.—45, 46

ERKILET HÜSEYN HÜSNÜ EMIR: Retired Turkish general; one of the leaders of the Pan-Turkic movement.—4, 38, 43, 44, 47, 48, 62

FAGIL MÜŞTECIB: Lawyer; Member of the Pan-Turkic movement; sent from Turkey to the Crimea to assist the Germans in establishing ties with the Crimean Tatars.—48

FRAUENFELD: Austrian Nazi; served with the Nazi administration of the Crimea, 1942-43.—80

FROMM: Colonel-General in Hitler's army.—40

FUNK, WALTHER: Major German war criminal; Secretary of State in Reich Ministry of National Economy; Head of the Reichsbank as successor to Dr. Schacht since 1939; sentenced by the International Military Tribunal to lifelong imprisonment in 1945.—66

GERBDE, HÜSEYN: Turkish diplomatist; Ambassador to Germany 1930-42.—3, 39, 45

GÜNDÜZ ASIM: Colonel-General; Deputy Chief-of-Staff of Turkish Army.—110
HAMDULLAH SUPHI TANRIÖVER: Turkish Minister to Bucharest.—109
HARUN: Lecturer at technical college in Berlin.—4, 45, 76, 77
HENTIG: German diplomatist with rank of Minister, official at the Foreign Office.—43, 47, 76, 77
HEWEL-WEHRWOLF: German diplomatist; Chief of the “personal staff” of Ribbentrop, German Foreign Minister.—5, 102
HITLER, ADOLF:—7, 27, 40-42, 49, 56, 71-73, 79, 82, 87, 88, 93, 99, 102, 105
IDRIS: Professor; member of the Pan-Turkic movement.—48
JENKE, A.: Commercial Counsellor to the German Embassy in Ankara, 1940-42.—55
KEITEL, WILHELM: General; Major German war criminal; official in the War Ministry, 1935-38; from 1938 till the defeat of Hitler Germany, Chief of Staff of the Oberkommando of the Wehrmacht. Field-Marshal from 1941; executed in 1946 by sentence of the International Military Tribunal.—42, 71, 72, 73
KILLINGER, MANFRED Baron von: German diplomatist; Minister to Bucharest.—5, 109
KROLL, H. A.: Counsellor to German Embassy in Ankara, 1940-41.—5, 107, 109
MANNSTEIN: Field-Marshal; commanded the German southern army group on the Soviet front.—5, 120, 122
MELECHERS: Official in the Political Department of the German Foreign Office.—46
MENDE: Professor; official of the Nazi Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas.—81, 92
MENEMENCIOGLU NUMAN: From 1937, General Secretary of the Turkish Foreign Office; from mid-1942 to 1944, Foreign Minister.—4, 5, 25, 26, 28, 55, 66, 67, 68, 70, 78, 82, 84, 85, 87, 91, 93, 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 107, 119
MEYER: Official of the Nazi Ministry for the Eastern Occupied Areas.—80, 81
NEIN: German captain.—7
NIEDERMeyer: German general.—109
NUMAN MENEMENCIOGLU: Cf. Menemencioglu Numan
NURI PASHA: Brother of Enver Pasha; member of the Pan-Turkic movement.—43
ODER KERIM: A leader of the Mussavatists, a White émigré organization of Azerbaijan nationalists.—75
PAPEN, FRANZ von: Major German war criminal; Reich Chancellor, May 30, 1932—January 30, 1933; Nazi Special Ambassador to Austria, 1934-38; Ambassador to Turkey, 1939-44.—3-5, 7-10, 13, 16-18, 25, 50, 32-24, 38, 40, 42, 47, 49, 57, 65, 68, 69, 70, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 82, 86, 87, 93, 94, 99, 103, 105, 110, 114, 117
PAVLOV: Official of the Soviet Consulate-General in Istanbul.—69
PILSUDSKI, JOSEPH: Polish statesman; in 1918 proclaimed himself Chief of State; in 1926 he temporarily retired from power, but in 1926 he organized a coup d’état and established a military dictatorship.—36
RASUL-ZADE MEHMET EMIN: Leader of the Mussavatists, a White émigré organization of Azerbaijan nationalists; member of the Pan-Turkic movement.—36, 37, 75
RIBBENTROP, JOACHIM von: Major German war criminal; Ambassador to Great Britain, 1936-38; Reichsm Minister of Foreign Affairs from February 1938 to downfall of Hitler Germany; executed by sentence of the International Military Tribunal in 1946.—3, 5, 7, 9-10, 12, 13, 15-26, 18, 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 39, 71, 103, 105, 117
RITTER, KARL: German diplomatist; as head of the Economic Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1920-35, he took part in political and economic negotiations with Belgium, Poland, Finland and France; Ambassador to Brazil in 1937-38, after which worked in Foreign Office.—71, 73
ROHDE, H.: Major-General; German military attaché in Turkey.—47, 110
ROMMEL, ERWIN: Field-Marshal commanding the German forces in North Africa, 1941-43, then in Italy.—98, 107, 108
ROOSEVELT, FRANKLIN DELANO:—56
ROSENBERG, ALFRED: Major German war criminal; Director of the Foreign Office of Nazi Party; Editor-in-Chief of the Volksischer Beobachter, 1919-38; Minister for Eastern Occupied Areas, 1941-44; executed by sentence of the International Military Tribunal in 1946.—79, 81
SARAÇOGLU SHUKRU: Turkish Foreign Minister from 1938 to August 1942, then Prime Minister.—8, 16, 18, 31-33, 55, 56, 67, 87, 91, 93, 94, 96, 105
SCHULENBURG, FRIEDRICH WERNER von: German diplomatist; Ambassador to Moscow from 1938 until Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R.; later official in Foreign Office.—80, 81
SEFKET MEMDUH (ESENDAL): Turkish Ambassador to Kabul.—25
SEILER, F.: German Consul-General in Istanbul, 1940-43.—5, 118, 119
SEYDAM REFIK: Turkish Prime Minister, 1936-42; died July 7, 1942.—96
SHUKRU, YENI: Cf. Yeni Shukru bağı
SIKORSKI W.: General; Prime Minister and War Minister of the exile Polish government in London, 1939-43.—35, 36
SONNLEITNER: Member of Ribbentrop's personal staff.—105
STALIN, J.V.: —55
TANRİÖVER, HAMDULLAH SUPHI: Cf. Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver
TIPPELSKIRCH: German diplomatist; official at the Foreign Office.—4, 79, 81
VELI, MËNGER: Confidential agent of Erkilet for contacts with Germans.—47
VELIDI ZEKHI (TOGAN): Member of the counter-revolutionary movement in Bashkoria, then White émigré; received title of professor in Turkey; a leader of the Pan-Turkic organization.—35
VOROŠILOV, KLIMENT EFREMOWICH: Marshal of the Soviet Union; Vice-Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, 1940-46; Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers, since 1946; during the Great Patriotic War, member of the State Committee for Defence.—85
WARLIMONT: Lieutenant-General; chief of operations and planning sections of the Operational Department of the German High Command.—4, 61, 62
WEIZSÄCKER, ERNST, Baron von: German diplomatist; Director of Political Department of Foreign Office, 1936-38; Secretary of State at Foreign Office, 1938-43.—3, 39, 46, 49, 61, 95, 110
WIEHL, EMIL: Commissioner for Commercial Treaties at the German Foreign Office.—4, 65, 71, 73

WILLKIE, WENDELL: Republican candidate for presidency of the United States in 1940; died 1944.—86, 107, 108
WILSON, HENRY MÀITLAND: Field-Marshal; British officer, born 1881; served in 1914-18 war; in 1941, Military Gov. and Gen. officer commanding Cyrenaica, Greece, Palestine and Transjordan; appointed commander 9th Army in Middle East, 1941; Gen. officer commanding Iraq, and Persia, 1942-43; British Commander-in-Chief Middle East, 1943-44; Supreme Allied Commander in Mediterranean Theatre 1944.—85
WOERMANN, ERNST: German diplomatist; Director of Political Department and Under Secretary of State at Foreign Office, 1938-43.—4, 45, 46, 49, 61, 65, 71, 87, 95, 102
YALÇIN, HÜSEYN CAHIT: Turkish journalist, editor of Tanın; Mejlis Deputy.—87
YENI SHUKRU bağı: Mejlis Deputy from Istanbul; member of the Pan-Turkic movement.—55
ZIMMERMANN: SS Brigade-Führer.—92