WORKERS OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!
PREFACE

The Original Russian edition of J. Stalin's works as published by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) contains thirteen volumes and covers the period from 1901 up to January 1934 and has been published in English by the Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow.

After this time, writings of J. Stalin in the English language could so far only be found in numerous pamphlets, Congress reports, newspaper articles e.t.c.

After reprinting the 13 Volume Moscow edition, we now present five further volumes of works of J. Stalin. Three volumes: (14 -16) contain a collection of writings, speeches, messages, orders and reports. One volume (17) contains war telegrams and messages as sent by Stalin to Churchill and Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman: And volume 18 will be a reprint of the History of the C.P.S.U. (B), short course, which has been written under the close supervision of J. Stalin. The collection of writings in the volumes 14 -16 should give a close insight into Stalin's politics and activities in the period up to his death in 1953, but by no means can we claim that this collection could be complete. At times where no material seemed to be available, we have included material that reflects Stalin's activity; as for instance in volume 14 there are some reports from Kolkhozine leaders to Stalin to show the range of problems Soviet leadership had
to handle and solve. As well in volume 14 after Stalin's explanatory speech on the Draft Constitution, we have included the full text of the Constitution as finally adopted by the Supreme Soviet.

Not included in volume 14 though, is Stalin's article Dialectical and Historical Materialism as it is to be found in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B), short course, (volume 18) where it was originally published.

In assembling the material for volume 14, we have avoided splitting it into different parts and appendices, so the partially indirect material is to be found under its appropriate date. In researching the material we have made use of the 17 volume German edition of Stalin's works as published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany (Marxist - Leninist), and also of the recent French edition of Stalin's works as published by "Nouveau Bureau d' Edition", Paris.

THE EDITORS
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ON AN ARTICLE BY ENGELS

19 July 1934

Comrade Adoratsky proposes to print in the next number of "Bolshevik", devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the imperialist world war, the article by Engels, entitled "The Foreign Policy of Russian Tsardom", which was first published abroad, in 1890. I should consider it a completely ordinary matter if it were proposed to print this article in a collection of Engels' works, or in one of the historical journals; but the proposal is made to print it in our fighting journal "Bolshevik", in the number devoted to the twentieth anniversary of the imperialist world war. This means that those who make this proposal, consider that the article in question can be regarded as an article which gives guidance, or which at least, is profoundly instructive for our Party workers, in the matter of the clarification of the problems of imperialism and of imperialist wars. But Engels' article, as is evident from its contents, is unfortunately lacking in these qualities, in spite of its merits. Moreover, it has a number of weaknesses of such a character that, if it were to be published without critical notes, it could mislead the reader. Therefore I consider it inexpedient to publish Engels' article in the next number of "Bolshevik".

What are the weaknesses to which I have referred?

1. Characterising the predatory policy of Russian
Tsarism and correctly showing the abominable nature of this policy, Engels explained it not so much by the "need" of the military-feudal-mercantile upper circles of Russia for outlets to the sea, sea-ports, for extending foreign trade and dominating strategic points, as by the circumstance that there stood at the head of Russia's foreign policy, an all-powerful and very talented band of foreign adventurers, who succeeded everywhere and in everything, who, in wonderful fashion managed to overcome each and every obstacle in the way of their adventurist purpose, who deceived with astonishing cleverness, all the Governments of Europe, and finally brought it about that Russia became a most powerful state, from the point of military strength. Such a treatment of the question by Engels may seem highly improbable, but it is, unfortunately, a fact. Here are the relevant passages from Engels' article:

"Foreign policy is unquestionably the side on which Tsardom is strong - very strong. Russian diplomacy forms, to a certain extent, a modern Order of Jesuits, powerful enough, if need be, to overcome even the whims of a Tsar, and to crush corruption within its own body, only to spread it the more plenteously abroad; an Order of Jesuits originally, and by preference, recruited from foreigners, Corsicans like Pozzo di Borgo, Germans like Nesselrode, Russo-Germans like Lieven, just as its founder, Catherine the Second, was a foreigner.

Up to the present time, only one thoroughbred Russian, Gortchakov, has filled the highest post in this order, and his successor, Von Giers, again bears
a foreign name.

It is this secret order, originally recruited from foreign adventurers, which has raised the Russian Empire to its present power. With iron perseverance, gaze fixed resolutely on the goal, shrinking from no breach of faith, no treachery, no assassinations, no servility, lavishing bribes in all directions, made arrogant by no victory, discouraged by no defeat, stepping over the corpses of millions of soldiers and of, at least, one Tsar, this band, unscrupulous as talented, has done more than all the Russian armies to extend the frontiers of Russia from the Dnieper and Dvina, to beyond the Vistula, to the Pruth, the Danube and the Black Sea; from the Don and Volga beyond the Caucasus, and to the sources of the Oxus and Jaxartes; to make Russia great, powerful and dreaded, and to open for her, the road to the sovereignty of the world."

One might suppose that in Russia's external history, it was diplomacy that achieved everything, while Tsars, feudalists, merchants, and other social groups did nothing, or almost nothing.

One might suppose that, if at the head of Russia's foreign policy, there had stood, not foreign adventurers like Nesselrode or Von Giers, but Russian adventurers like Gortchakov and others, the foreign policy of Russia would have taken a different direction.

It is hardly necessary to mention that the policy of conquest, abominable and filthy as it was, was by no means a monopoly of the Russian Tsars. Everyone knows that a policy of conquest was then the policy, to no less a degree, if not to a greater, of
all the rulers and diplomats of Europe, including such an Emperor of bourgeois background as Napoleon, who notwithstanding his non-Tsarist origin, practised in his foreign policy, also, intrigue and deceit, perfidy and flattery, brutality and bribery, murder and incendiaryism. Clearly, matters could not be otherwise.

It is evident that in writing his pamphlet against Russian Tsardom, (Engels' article is a good fighting pamphlet), Engels was a little carried away, and, being carried away, forgot for a short time, certain elementary things which were well known to him.

2. Characterising the situation in Europe, and expounding the causes and prospects of the approaching world war, Engels writes:

"The European situation today is governed by three facts:

(1). The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. (2). The impending advance of Russian Tsardom upon Constantinople. (3). The struggle in all countries, ever growing fiercer, between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the working-class and the middle-class, a struggle whose thermometer is the everywhere advancing socialist movement.

The first two facts necessitate the grouping of Europe today, into two large camps. The German annexation makes France the ally of Russia against Germany; the threatening of Constantinople by Tsardom, makes Austria and even Italy, the allies of Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive battle, for a war such as the world has not yet seen, in which ten to fifteen million armed combatants will stand face to face. Only two circum-
stances have thus far prevented the outbreak of this fearful war: first, the incredibly rapid improvements in firearms, in consequence of which, every newly invented weapon is already superseded by a new invention, before it can be introduced into even one army; and, secondly, the absolute impossibility of calculating the chances, the complete uncertainty as to who will finally come out victor from this gigantic struggle.

All this danger of a general war will disappear on the day when a change of things in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the traditional policy of conquest of its Tsars; and to turn its attention to its own internal vital interests, now seriously menaced, instead of dreaming about universal supremacy.

...a Russian National Assembly, in order to settle only the most pressing internal difficulties, would at once have to put a decided stop to all hankering after new conquests.

Europe is gliding down an inclined plane with increasing swiftness towards the abyss of a general war, a war of hitherto unheard-of extent and ferocity. Only one thing can stop it - a change of system in Russia. That this must come about in a few years there can be no doubt.

On that day, when Tsardom falls, - this last stronghold of the whole European reaction - on that day, a quite different wind will blow across Europe."

It is impossible not to observe that in this characterisation of the situation in Europe, and summary of the causes leading towards world war,
Engels omits one important factor, which later on played the most decisive part, namely, the factor of imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, for sources of raw materials. This had very serious importance already at that time. He omits the role of Great Britain as a factor in the coming world war, the factor of the contradictions between Germany and Great Britain, contradictions which were already of serious importance and which later on played almost the determining part in the beginning and development of the world war.

I think that this omission constitutes the principal weakness in Engels' article. From this weakness there ensue the remaining weaknesses of the article, of which the following are noteworthy:

(a). Overestimation of the role of Tsarist Russia's striving towards Constantinople in connection with the maturing of the world war. True, Engels mentions first as a war factor, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but thereafter, he removes this factor into the background and brings to the forefront the predatory strivings of Russian Tsardom, asserting that "all the danger of general war will disappear on the day when a change of things in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the traditional policy of conquest of its Tsars."

This is certainly an exaggeration.

(b). Overestimation of the role of the bourgeois revolution in Russia, the role of the "Russian National Assembly" (bourgeois Parliament), in relation to averting the approaching world war. Engels asserts
that the downfall of Russian Tsarism is the only means of averting world war. This is plain exaggeration. A new bourgeois order in Russia, with its "national assembly", could not avert war, if only because the principal sources of war lay in the increasing intensity of imperialist struggle between the main imperialist powers. The fact is, that from the time of Russia's defeat in the Crimea in the 'fifties of the last century, the independent role of Tsarism in the sphere of European foreign policy, began to wane to a significant extent, and that, as a factor in the imperialist world conflict, Tsarist Russia served essentially as an auxiliary reserve for the principal powers of Europe.

(c). Overestimation of the role of the Tsarist power as the "last stronghold of the whole European reaction." That the Tsarist power in Russia, was a mighty stronghold of all European (and also Asiatic) reaction, there can be no doubt. But that it was the last stronghold of this reaction, one can legitimately doubt.

It is necessary to note that these weaknesses of Engels' article are not only of "historical value." They have, or can have, a most serious practical importance. Truly, if imperialist struggle for colonies and spheres of influence is lost sight of, as a factor in the approaching world war; if the imperialist contradictions between England and Germany are forgotten; if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany is withdrawn from the foreground as a war factor in favour of Russian Tsardom's striving towards Constantinople, considered as the more se-
rious and determining factor; if, finally, Russian Tsardom represents the last rampart of all European reaction, - then, is it not clear that a war, let us say, of bourgeois Germany against Tsarist Russia is not an imperialist war, not a robber war, not an anti-popular war, but a war of liberation, or almost of liberation?

One can hardly doubt that this way of thinking facilitated the sin of the German Social-Democrats on August 4th, 1914, when they decided to vote for war credits, and proclaimed the slogan of defence of the bourgeois Fatherland against Tsarist Russia and against "Russian barbarism" and so on.

It is characteristic that, in his letters to Bebel written in 1891, a year after the publication of this article, when he deals with the prospects of the coming war, Engels says directly that "the victory of Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", and that "if Russia starts a war, then - forward against the Russians and their allies, whoever they may be!"

It is obvious that such a way of thinking allows no place for revolutionary war into civil war.

That is how matters stand as regards the weaknesses in Engels' article.

Evidently Engels, alarmed by the Franco-Russian alliance which was then (1801-91) being formed, with its edge directed against the Austro-German coalition set himself the task of attacking Russia's foreign policy in this article, so as to deprive it of all credit in the eyes of European public opinion, and especially British public opinion; but in carrying out
this task, he lost sight of a number of other very important and even determining factors, with the result that he fell into the one-sidedness which we have revealed.

After all this, is it appropriate to print Engels' article in our fighting organ, "Bolshevik", as an article which provides guidance, or which, in any case, is profoundly instructive - because it is clear that to print it in "Bolshevik", would mean to give it, tacitly, such a recommendation?

I think it is not appropriate.

J. V. Stalin.

(Written as a letter to members of the political bureau of the C.P.S.U. on July 19, 1934).
Wells: I am very much obliged to you, Mr. Stalin, for agreeing to see me. I was in the United States recently. I had a long conversation with President Roosevelt and tried to ascertain what his leading ideas were. Now I have come to ask you what you are doing to change the world... 

Stalin: Not so very much... 

Wells: I wander around the world as a common man and, as a common man, observe what is going on around me. 

Stalin: Important public men like yourself are not "common men". Of course, history alone can show how important this or that public man has been; at all events, you do not look at the world as a "common man."

Wells: I am not pretending humility. What I mean is that I try to see the world through the eyes of the common man, and not as a party politician or a responsible administrator. My visit to the United States excited my mind. The old financial world is collapsing; the economic life of the country is being reorganized on new lines. Lenin said: "We must learn to do business, learn this from the capitalists." Today the capitalists have to learn from you, to grasp the spirit of socialism. It seems to me that
what is taking place in the United States is a profound reorganisation, the creation of planned, that is, socialist, economy. You and Roosevelt begin from two different starting points. But is there not a relation in ideas, a kinship of ideas, between Moscow and Washington? In Washington I was struck by the same thing I see going on here; they are building offices, they are creating a number of state regulation bodies, they are organising a long-needed Civil Service. Their need, like yours, is directive ability.

Stalin: The United States is pursuing a different aim from that which we are pursuing in the U.S.S.R. The aim which the Americans are pursuing, arose out of the economic troubles, out of the economic crisis. The Americans want to rid themselves of the crisis on the basis of private capitalist activity, without changing the economic basis. They are trying to reduce to a minimum the ruin, the losses caused by the existing economic system. Here, however, as you know, in place of the old, destroyed economic basis, an entirely different, a new economic basis has been created. Even if the Americans you mention partly achieve their aim, i.e., reduce these losses to a minimum, they will not destroy the roots of the anarchy which is inherent in the existing capitalist system. They are preserving the economic system which must inevitably lead, and cannot but lead, to anarchy in production. Thus, at best, it will be a matter, not of the reorganisation of society, not of abolishing the old social system which gives rise to anarchy and crises, but of restricting certain of
its excesses. Subjectively, perhaps, these Americans think they are reorganising society; objectively, however, they are preserving the present basis of society. That is why, objectively, there will be no reorganisation of society.

Nor will there be planned economy. What is planned economy? What are some of its attributes? Planned economy tries to abolish unemployment. Let us suppose it is possible, while preserving the capitalist system, to reduce unemployment to a certain minimum. But surely, no capitalist would ever agree to the complete abolition of unemployment, to the abolition of the reserve army of unemployed, the purpose of which is to bring pressure on the labour market, to ensure a supply of cheap labour. Here you have one of the rents in the "planned economy" of bourgeois society. Furthermore, planned economy presupposes increased output in those branches of industry which produce goods that the masses of the people need particularly. But you know that the expansion of production under capitalism takes place for entirely different motives, that capital flows into those branches of economy in which the rate of profit is highest. You will never compel a capitalist to incur loss to himself and agree to a lower rate of profit for the sake of satisfying the needs of the people. Without getting rid of the capitalists, without abolishing the principle of private property in the means of production, it is impossible to create planned economy.

Wells: I agree with much of what you have said. But I would like to stress the point that if a country
as a whole adopts the principle of planned economy, if the government, gradually, step by step, begins consistently to apply this principle, the financial oligarchy will at last be abolished and socialism, in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, will be brought about. The effect of the ideas of Roosevelt's "New Deal" is most powerful, and in my opinion they are socialist ideas. It seems to me that instead of stressing the antagonism between the two worlds, we should, in the present circumstances, strive to establish a common tongue for all the constructive forces.

Stalin: In speaking of the impossibility of realising the principles of planned economy while preserving the economic basis of capitalism, I do not in the least desire to belittle the outstanding personal qualities of Roosevelt, his initiative, courage and determination. Undoubtedly, Roosevelt stands out as one of the strongest figures among all the captains of the contemporary capitalist world. That is why I would like, once again, to emphasize the point that my conviction that planned economy is impossible under the conditions of capitalism, does not mean that I have any doubts about the personal abilities, talent and courage of President Roosevelt. But if the circumstances are unfavourable, the most talented captain cannot reach the goal you refer to. Theoretically, of course, the possibility of marching gradually, step by step, under the conditions of capitalism, towards the goal which you call socialism in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, is not precluded. But what will this "socialism" be? At best,
bridling to some extent, the most unbridled of indi-
vidual representatives of capitalist profit, some
increase in the application of the principle of regu-
lation in national economy. That is all very well. But
as soon as Roosevelt, or any other captain in the
contemporary bourgeois world, proceeds to undertake
something serious against the foundation of capital-
ism, he will inevitably suffer utter defeat. The banks,
the industries, the large enterprises, the large farms
are not in Roosevelt's hands. All these are private
property. The railroads, the mercantile fleet, all
these belong to private owners. And, finally, the
army of skilled workers, the engineers, the tech-
nicians, these too are not at Roosevelt's command,
they are at the command of the private owners; they
all work for the private owners. We must not for-
get the functions of the State in the bourgeois world.
The State is an institution that organises the defence
of the country, organises the maintenance of "order";
it is an apparatus for collecting taxes. The capitalist
State does not deal much with economy in the strict
sense of the word; the latter is not in the hands of
the State. On the contrary, the State is in the hands
of capitalist economy. That is why I fear that in
spite of all his energies and abilities, Roosevelt will
not achieve the goal you mention, if indeed that is
his goal. Perhaps, in the course of several generations
it will be possible to approach this goal somewhat;
but I personally think that even this is not very
probable.

Wells: Perhaps, I believe more strongly in the
economic interpretation of politics than you do. Huge
forces driving towards better organisation, for the better functioning of the community, that is, for socialism, have been brought into action by invention and modern science. Organisation, and the regulation of individual action, have become mechanical necessities, irrespective of social theories. If we begin with the State control of the banks and then follow with the control of transport, of the heavy industries of industry in general, of commerce, etc., such an all-embracing control will be equivalent to the State ownership of all branches of national economy. This will be the process of socialisation. Socialism and individualism are not opposites like black and white. There are many intermediate stages between them. There is individualism that borders on brigandage, and there is discipline and organisation that are the equivalent of socialism. The introduction of planned economy depends, to a large degree, upon the organisers of economy, upon the skilled technical intelligentsia, who, step by step, can be converted to the socialist principles of organisation. And this is the most important thing. Because organisation comes before socialism. It is the more important fact. Without organisation the socialist idea is a mere idea.

Stalin: There is no, nor should there be, irreconcilable contrast between the individual and the collective, between the interests of the individual person and the interests of the collective. There should be no such contrast, because collectivism, socialism, does not deny, but combines individual interests with the interests of the collective.
Socialism cannot abstract itself from individual interests. Socialist society alone can most fully satisfy these personal interests. More than that; socialist society alone can firmly safeguard the interests of the individual. In this sense there is no irreconcilable contrast between "individualism" and socialism. But can we deny the contrast between classes, between the propertied class, the capitalist class, and the toiling class, the proletarian class? On the one hand we have the propertied class which owns the banks, the factories, the mines, transport, the plantations in colonies. These people see nothing but their own interests, their striving after profits. They do not submit to the will of the collective; they strive to subordinate every collective to their will. On the other hand we have the class of the poor, the exploited class, which owns neither factories nor works, nor banks, which is compelled to live by selling its labour power to the capitalists which lacks the opportunity to satisfy its most elementary requirements. How can such opposite interests and strivings be reconciled? As far as I know, Roosevelt has not succeeded in finding the path of conciliation between these interests. And it is impossible, as experience has shown. Incidentally, you know the situation in the United States better than I do as I have never been there and I watch American affairs mainly from literature. But I have some experience in fighting for socialism, and this experience tells me that if Roosevelt makes a real attempt to satisfy the interests of the proletarian class at the expense of the capitalist class, the latter will put
another president in his place. The capitalists will say: Presidents come and presidents go, but we go on forever; if this or that president does not protect our interests, we shall find another. What can the president oppose to the will of the capitalist class?

Wells: I object to this simplified classification of mankind into poor and rich. Of course there is a category of people which strive only for profit. But are not these people regarded as nuisances in the West just as much as here? Are there not plenty of people in the West for whom profit is not an end, who own a certain amount of wealth, who want to invest and obtain a profit from this investment, but who do not regard this as the main object? They regard investment as an inconvenient necessity. Are there not plenty of capable and devoted engineers, organisers of economy, whose activities are stimulated by something other than profit? In my opinion there is a numerous class of capable people who admit that the present system is unsatisfactory and who are destined to play a great role in future socialist society. During the past few years I have been much engaged in and have thought of the need for conducting propaganda in favour of socialism and cosmopolitanism among wide circles of engineers, airmen, military-technical people, etc. It is useless to approach these circles with two-track class war propaganda. These people understand the condition of the world. They understand that it is a bloody muddle, but they regard your simple class-war antagonism as nonsense.

Stalin: You object to the simplified classification of mankind into rich and poor. Of course there is a
middle stratum, there is the technical intelligentsia that you have mentioned and among which there are very good and very honest people. Among them there are also dishonest and wicked people, there are all sorts of people among them. But first of all mankind is divided into rich and poor, into property owners and exploited; and to abstract oneself from this fundamental division and from the antagonism between poor and rich means abstracting oneself from the fundamental fact. I do not deny the existence of intermediate middle strata, which either take the side of one or the other of these two conflicting classes, or else take up a neutral or semi-neutral position in this struggle. But, I repeat, to abstract oneself from this fundamental division in society and from the fundamental struggle between the two main classes means ignoring facts. The struggle is going on and will continue. The outcome will be determined by the proletarian class, the working class,

Wells: But are there not many people who are not poor, but who work and work productively?
Stalin: Of course, there are small landowners, artisans, small traders, but it is not these people who decide the fate of a country, but the toiling masses, who produce all the things society requires.

Wells: But there are very different kinds of capitalists. There are capitalists who only think about profit, about getting rich; but there are also those who are prepared to make sacrifices. Take old Morgan for example. He only thought about profit; he was a parasite on society, simply, he merely accumulated wealth. But take Rockefeller. He is a brilliant or-
ganiser; he has set an example of how to organise the delivery of oil that is worthy of emulation. Or take Ford. Of course Ford is selfish. But is he not a passionate organiser of rationalised production from whom you take lessons? I would like to emphasise the fact that recently an important change in opinion towards the U.S.S.R. has taken place in English speaking countries. The reason for this, first of all, is the position of Japan and the events in Germany. But there are other reasons besides those arising from international politics. There is a more profound reason namely, the recognition by many people of the fact that the system based on private profit is breaking down. Under these circumstances, it seems to me, we must not bring to the forefront the antagonism between the two worlds, but should strive to combine all the constructive movements, all the constructive forces in one line as much as possible. It seems to me that I am more to the Left than you, Mr. Stalin; I think the old system is nearer to its end than you think.

Stalin: In speaking of the capitalists who strive only for profit, only to get rich, I do not want to say that these are the most worthless people, capable of nothing else. Many of them undoubtedly possess great organising talent, which I do not dream of denying. We Soviet people learn a great deal from the capitalists. And Morgan, whom you characterise so unfavourably, was undoubtedly a good, capable organiser. But if you mean people who are prepared to reconstruct the world, of course, you will not be able to find them in the ranks of those who
faithfully serve the cause of profit. We and they
stand at opposite poles. You mentioned Ford. Of
course, he is a capable organiser of production. But
don't you know his attitude to the working class?
Don't you know how many workers he throws on the
street? The capitalist is riveted to profit; and no
power on earth can tear him away from it. Capitalism
will be abolished, not by "organisers" of production
not by the technical intelligentsia, but by the working
class, because the aforementioned strata do not play
an independent role. The engineer, the organiser of
production does not work as he would like to, but
as he is ordered, in such a way as to serve the in-
terests of his employers. There are exceptions of
course; there are people in this stratum who have
awakened from the intoxication of capitalism. The
technical intelligentsia can, under certain conditions,
perform miracles and greatly benefit mankind. But
it can also cause great harm. We Soviet people have
not a little experience of the technical intelligentsia.
After the October Revolution, a certain section of
the technical intelligentsia refused to take part in
the work of constructing the new society; they op-
posed this work of construction and sabotaged it.
We did all we possibly could to bring the technical
intelligentsia into this work of construction; we tried
this way and that. Not a little time passed before
our technical intelligentsia agreed actively to assist
the new system. Today the best section of this tech-
nical intelligentsia are in the front rank of the
builders of socialist society. Having this experience
we are far from underestimating the good and the
bad sides of the technical intelligentsia and we know that on the one hand it can do harm, and on the other hand, it can perform "miracles." Of course, things would be different if it were possible, at one stroke, spiritually to tear the technical intelligentsia away from the capitalist world. But that is utopia. Are there many of the technical intelligentsia who would dare break away from the bourgeois world and set to work reconstructing society? Do you think there are many people of this kind, say, in England or in France? No, there are few who would be willing to break away from their employers and begin reconstructing the world.

Besides, can we lose sight of the fact that in order to transform the world it is necessary to have political power? It seems to me, Mr. Wells, that you greatly underestimate the question of political power, that it entirely drops out of your conception. What can those, even with the best intentions in the world, do if they are unable to raise the question of seizing power, and do not possess power? At best they can help the class which takes power, but they cannot change the world themselves. This can only be done by a great class which will take the place of the capitalist class and become the sovereign master as the latter was before. This class is the working class. Of course, the assistance of the technical intelligentsia must be accepted; and the latter in turn, must be assisted. But it must not be thought that the technical intelligentsia can play an independent historical role. The transformation of the world is a great, complicated and painful process.
For this task a great class is required. Big ships go on long voyages.

Wells: Yes, but for long voyages a captain and navigator are required.

Stalin: That is true; but what is first required for a long voyage is a big ship. What is a navigator without a ship? An idle man,

Wells: The big ship is humanity, not a class.

Stalin: You, Mr. Wells, evidently start out with the assumption that all men are good. I, however, do not forget that there are many wicked men. I do not believe in the goodness of the bourgeoisie.

Wells: I remember the situation with regard to the technical intelligentsia several decades ago. At that time the technical intelligentsia was numerically small, but there was much to do and every engineer, technician and intellectual found his opportunity. That is why the technical intelligentsia was the least revolutionary class. Now, however, there is a superabundance of technical intellectuals, and their mentality has changed very sharply. The skilled man, who would formerly never listen to revolutionary talk, is now greatly interested in it. Recently I was dining with the Royal Society, our great English scientific society. The President's speech was a speech for social planning and scientific control. Thirty years ago, they would not have listened to what I say to them now. Today, the man at the head of the Royal Society holds revolutionary views and insists on the scientific reorganisation of human society. Mentality changes. Your class-war propaganda has not kept pace with these facts.
Stalin: Yes, I know this, and this is to be explained by the fact that capitalist society is now in a cul-de-sac. The capitalists are seeking, but cannot find a way out of this cul-de-sac that would be compatible with the dignity of this class, compatible with the interests of this class. They could, to some extent, crawl out of the crisis on their hands and knees, but they cannot find an exit that would enable them to walk out of it with head raised high, a way out that would not fundamentally disturb the interests of capitalism. This, of course, is realised by wide circles of the technical intelligentsia. A large section of it is beginning to realise the community of its interests with those of the class which is capable of pointing the way out of the cul-de-sac.

Wells: You of all people know something about revolutions, Mr. Stalin, from the practical side. Do the masses ever rise? Is it not an established truth that all revolutions are made by a minority?

Stalin: To bring about a revolution a leading revolutionary minority is required; but the most talented, devoted and energetic minority would be helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive support of millions.

Wells: At least passive? Perhaps sub-conscious?

Stalin: Partly also the semi-instinctive and semi-conscious, but without the support of millions, the best minority is impotent.

Wells: I watch communist propaganda in the West and it seems to me that in modern conditions this propaganda sounds very old-fashioned, because it is insurrectionary propaganda. Propaganda in favour of
the violent overthrow of the social system was all very well when it was directed against tyranny. But under modern conditions, when the system is collapsing anyhow, stress should be laid on efficiency, on competence, on productiveness, and not on insurrection. It seems to me that the insurrectionary note is obsolete. The communist propaganda in the West is a nuisance to constructive-minded people.

Stalin: Of course the old system is breaking down and decaying. That is true. But it is also true that new efforts are being made by other methods, by every means, to protect, to save this dying system. You draw a wrong conclusion from a correct postulate. You rightly state that the old world is breaking down. But you are wrong in thinking that it is breaking down of its own accord. No, the substitution of one social system for another is a complicated and long revolutionary process. It is not simply a spontaneous process, but a struggle, it is a process connected with the clash of classes. Capitalism is decaying, but it must not be compared simply with a tree which has decayed to such an extent that it must fall to the ground of its own accord. No, revolution, the substitution of one social system for another, has always been a struggle, a painful and a cruel struggle, a life and death struggle. And every time the people of the new world came into power they had to defend themselves against the attempts of the old world to restore the old power by force; these people of the new world always had to be on the alert, always had to be ready to repel the attacks of the old world upon the new system.
Yes, you are right when you say that the old social system is breaking down; but it is not breaking down of its own accord. Take Fascism for example. Fascism is a reactionary force which is trying to preserve the old system by means of violence. What will you do with the fascists? Argue with them? Try to convince them? But this will have no effect upon them at all. Communists do not in the least idealise the methods of violence. But they, the Communists, do not want to be taken by surprise, they cannot count on the old world voluntarily departing from the stage, they see that the old system is violently defending itself, and that is why the Communists say to the working class: Answer violence with violence; do all you can to prevent the old dying order from crushing you, do not permit it to put manacles on your hands, on the hands with which you will overthrow the old system. As you see, the Communists regard the substitution of one social system for another, not simply as a spontaneous and peaceful process, but as a complicated, long and violent process. Communists cannot ignore facts.

Wells: But look at what is now going on in the capitalist world. The collapse is not a simple one; it is the outbreak of reactionary violence which is degenerating to gangsterism. And it seems to me that when it comes to a conflict with reactionary and unintelligent violence, socialists can appeal to the law, and instead of regarding the police as the enemy they should support them in the fight against the reactionaries. I think that it is useless operating with the methods of the old insurrectionary socialism.
Stalin: The Communists base themselves on rich historical experience which teaches that obsolete classes do not voluntarily abandon the stage of history. Recall the history of England in the seventeenth century. Did not many say that the old social system had decayed? But did it not, nevertheless, require a Cromwell to crush it by force?

Wells: Cromwell acted on the basis of the constitution and in the name of constitutional order.

Stalin: In the name of the constitution he resorted to violence, beheaded the king, dispersed Parliament, arrested some and beheaded others!

Or take an example from our history. Was it not clear for a long time that the tsarist system was decaying, was breaking down? But how much blood had to be shed in order to overthrow it?

And what about the October Revolution? Were there not plenty of people who knew that we alone, the Bolsheviks, were indicating the only correct way out? Was it not clear that Russian capitalism had decayed? But you know how great was the resistance, how much blood had to be shed in order to defend the October Revolution from all its enemies, internal and external.

Or take France at the end of the eighteenth century. Long before 1789 it was clear to many how rotten the royal power, the feudal system was. But a popular insurrection, a clash of classes was not, could not be avoided. Why? Because the classes which must abandon the stage of history are the last to become convinced that their role is ended. It is impossible to convince them of this. They think that the fissures in the decaying edifice of the old order
can be repaired and saved. That is why dying classes take to arms and resort to every means to save their existence as a ruling class.

Wells: But there were not a few lawyers at the head of the Great French Revolution.

Stalin: Do you deny the role of the intelligentsia in revolutionary movements? Was the Great French Revolution a lawyers' revolution and not a popular revolution, which achieved victory by rousing vast masses of the people against feudalism and championed the interests of the Third Estate? And did the lawyers among the leaders of the Great French Revolution act in accordance with the laws of the old order? Did they not introduce new, bourgeois-revolutionary laws?

The rich experience of history teaches that up to now not a single class has voluntarily made way for another class. There is no such precedent in world history. The Communists have learned this lesson of history. Communists would welcome the voluntary departure of the bourgeoisie. But such a turn of affairs is improbable; that is what experience teaches. That is why the Communists want to be prepared for the worst and call upon the working class to be vigilant, to be prepared for battle. Who wants a captain who lulls the vigilance of his army, a captain who does not understand that the enemy will not surrender, that he must be crushed? To be such a captain means deceiving, betraying the working class. That is why I think that what seems to you to be old-fashioned is in fact a measure of revolutionary expediency for the working class.
Wells: I do not deny that force has to be used, but I think the forms of the struggle should fit as closely as possible to the opportunities presented by the existing laws, which must be defended against reactionary attacks. There is no need to disorganise the old system because it is disorganising itself enough as it is. That is why it seems to me insurrection against the old order, against the law, is obsolete; old-fashioned. Incidentally, I deliberately exaggerate in order to bring the truth out more clearly. I can formulate my point of view in the following way: first, I am for order; second, I attack the present system in so far as it cannot assure order; third, I think that class war propaganda may detach from socialism just those educated people whom socialism needs.

Stalin: In order to achieve a great object, an important social object, there must be a main force, a bulwark, a revolutionary class. Next it is necessary to organise the assistance of an auxiliary force for this main force; in this case this auxiliary force is the Party, to which the best forces of the intelligentsia belong. Just now you spoke about "educated people." But what educated people did you have in mind? Were there not plenty of educated people on the side of the old order in England in the seventeenth century, in France at the end of the eighteenth century, and in Russia in the epoch of the October Revolution? The old order had in its service many highly educated people who defended the old order, who opposed the new order. Education is a weapon the effect of which is determined by the
hands which wield it, by who is to be struck down. Of course, the proletariat, socialism, needs highly educated people. Clearly, simpletons cannot help the proletariat to fight for socialism, to build a new society. I do not underestimate the role of the intelligentsia; on the contrary, I emphasize it. The question is, however, which intelligentsia are we discussing? Because there are different kinds of intelligentsia.

Wells: There can be no revolution without a radical change in the educational system. It is sufficient to quote two examples: The example of the German Republic, which did not touch the old educational system, and therefore never became a republic; and the example of the British Labour Party, which lacks the determination to insist on a radical change in the educational system.

Stalin: That is a correct observation.

Permit me now to reply to your three points.

First, the main thing for the revolution is the existence of a social bulwark. This bulwark of the revolution is the working class.

Second, an auxiliary force is required, that which the Communists call a Party. To the Party belong the intelligent workers and those elements of the technical intelligentsia which are closely connected with the working class. The intelligentsia can be strong only if it combines with the working class. If it opposes the working class it becomes a cipher.

Third, political power is required as a lever for change. The new political power creates the new laws, the new order, which is revolutionary order.

I do not stand for any kind of order. I stand for
order that corresponds to the interests of the working class. If, however, any of the laws of the old order can be utilised in the interests of the struggle for the new order, the old laws should be utilised. I cannot object to your postulate that the present system should be attacked in so far as it does not ensure the necessary order for the people.

And, finally, you are wrong if you think that the Communists are enamoured of violence. They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class. But the experience of history speaks against such an assumption.

Wells: There was a case in the history of England, however, of a class voluntarily handing over power to another class. In the period between 1830 and 1870, the aristocracy, whose influence was still very considerable at the end of the eighteenth century, voluntarily, without a severe struggle, surrendered power to the bourgeoisie, which serves as a sentimental support of the monarchy. Subsequently, this transference of power led to the establishment of the rule of the financial oligarchy.

Stalin: But you have imperceptibly passed from questions of revolution to questions of reform. This is not the same thing. Don't you think that the Chartist movement played a great role in the Reforms in England in the nineteenth century?

Wells: The Chartists did little and disappeared without leaving a trace.

Stalin: I do not agree with you. The Chartists, and the strike movement which they organised, played
a great role; they compelled the ruling class to make a number of concessions in regard to the franchise, in regard to abolishing the so-called "rotten boroughs," and in regard to some of the points of the "Charter." Chartism played a not unimportant historical role and compelled a section of the ruling classes to make certain concessions, reforms, in order to avert great shocks. Generally speaking, it must be said that of all the ruling classes, the ruling classes of England, both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, proved to be the cleverest, most flexible from the point of view of their class interests, from the point of view of maintaining their power. Take as an example, say, from modern history, the general strike in England in 1926. The first thing any other bourgeoisie would have done in the face of such an event, when the General Council of Trade Unions called for a strike, would have been to arrest the trade union leaders. The British bourgeoisie did not do that, and it acted cleverly from the point of view of its own interests. I cannot conceive of such a flexible strategy being employed by the bourgeoisie in the United States, Germany or France. In order to maintain their rule, the ruling classes of Great Britain have never foresworn small concessions, reforms. But it would be a mistake to think that these reforms were revolutionary.

Wells: You have a higher opinion of the ruling classes of my country than I have. But is there a great difference between a small revolution and a great reform? Is not a reform a small revolution?

Stalin: Owing to pressure from below, the pres-
sure of the masses, the bourgeoisie may sometimes concede certain partial reforms while remaining on the basis of the existing social-economic system. Acting in this way, it calculates that these concessions are necessary in order to preserve its class rule. This is the essence of reform. Revolution, however, means the transference of power from one class to another. That is why it is impossible to describe any reform as revolution. That is why we cannot count on the change of social systems taking place as an imperceptible transition from one system to another by means of reforms, by the ruling class making concessions.

Wells: I am very grateful to you for this talk which has meant a great deal to me. In explaining things to me you probably called to mind how you had to explain the fundamentals of socialism in the illegal circles before the revolution. At the present time there are only two persons to whose opinion, to whose every word, millions are listening: you, and Roosevelt. Others may preach as much as they like; what they say will never be printed or heeded. I cannot yet appreciate what has been done in your country; I only arrived yesterday. But I have already seen the happy faces of healthy men and women and I know that something very considerable is being done here. The contrast with 1920 is astounding.

Stalin: Much more could have been done had we Bolsheviks been cleverer.

Wells: No, if human beings were cleverer. It would be a good thing to invent a five-year plan for the reconstruction of the human brain which obviously
lacks many things needed for a perfect social order. (Laughter.)

Stalin: Don't you intend to stay for the Congress of the Soviet Writers' Union?

Wells: Unfortunately, I have various engagements to fulfil and I can stay in the USSR only for a week. I came to see you and I am very satisfied by our talk. But I intend to discuss with such Soviet writers as I can meet the possibility of their affiliating to the PEN club. This is an international organisation of writers founded by Galsworthy; after his death I became president. The organisation is still weak, but it has branches in many countries, and what is more important, the speeches of the members are widely reported in the press. It insists upon this free expression of opinion - even of opposition opinion. I hope to discuss this point with Gorky. I do not know if you are prepared yet for that much freedom here.

Stalin: We Bolsheviks call it "self-criticism." It is widely used in the USSR. If there is anything I can do to help you I shall be glad to do so.

Wells: (Expresses thanks.)

Stalin: (Expresses thanks for the visit.)
(In connection with the successful fulfilment by the iron and steel industry of the plan of production for 1934, a delegation of directors, engineers and workers of metallurgical plants was received on December 26, 1934, by Comrades Stalin, Molotov and Orjonikidze.

In the course of the interview Stalin spoke of the tasks facing the iron and steel industry and of certain important problems of socialist development. Stalin said :-)

...We had all too few technically trained people. We were faced with a dilemma: either to begin with giving people technical training in schools and to postpone the production and mass operation of machines for ten years until such time as our schools trained technically educated cadres; or to proceed immediately to create machines and to develop their mass operation in the national economy in order to train people in technical knowledge and to create cadres during the very process of production and operation of machines. We chose the second course. We frankly and deliberately consented to incur what in this case would be inevitable charges and over-expenditures owing to the inadequate number of technically trained people capable of handling machines. True, not a few of our machines were damaged during this period. But, on
the other hand, we gained what was most precious-time, and created what is most valuable in production-cadres. In a period of three or four years we created cadres of people technically educated both in the sphere of production of machines of all kinds (tractors, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, etc.) and in the sphere of their mass operation. What it took decades to perform in Europe, we were able in the rough and in the main to perform in a period of three to four years. The charges and over-expenditures, the damage to machines and the other losses have been repaid and more than repaid. That is the basis of the rapid industrialisation of our country. But we should not have had these successes if our iron and steel industry had not been developing, had not been thriving.

We have every right to speak of the great successes of the iron and steel industry, which is the chief force in the national economy. We have succeeded it is true. But we must not grow conceited over these successes. The most dangerous thing is when people are complacently satisfied with their successes and forget the shortcomings, forget that further tasks face them...

(Stalin enumerated certain of the shortcomings in the iron and steel industry, indicating how they should be removed.)

In all developed countries, the production of steel exceeds the production of pig iron. There are countries where the production of steel exceeds the production of pig iron by 25 or 30 per cent. With us it is just the opposite - the production of steel lags behind the
production of pig iron. How long will this continue? Why, it cannot now be said that we are a "wood" country, that there is no scrap iron in the country, and so on. We are now a metal country. Is it not time to put an end to this disproportion between pig iron and steel?

(The next problem to which Stalin drew the attention of the metal producers was that the open hearth departments and the rolled steel departments of the iron and steel mills were lagging in the matter of mastering the technique of these processes. Stalin said :-)

...Many have wrongly understood the slogan of the Party: "In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything." Many have understood this slogan mechanically, that is to say, they have understood it in the sense that if we pile up as many machines as possible, everything that this slogan requires will have been done. That is not true. Technique cannot be separated from the people who set the technique going. Without people, technique is dead. The slogan "In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything," refers not to naked technique but to technique in the charge of people who have mastered the technique. That is the only correct understanding of this slogan. And since we have already learnt to value technique, it is time to declare plainly that the chief thing now is the people who have mastered technique. But it follows from this that while formerly the emphasis was one-sidedly laid on technique, machinery, now the emphasis must be laid on the people who have mastered technique. This is what

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our slogan on technique demands. We must cherish every capable and intelligent worker, we must cherish and cultivate him. People must be cultivated as tenderly and carefully as a gardener cultivates a favourite fruit tree. We must train, help to grow, offer prospects, promote at the proper time, transfer to other work at the proper time when a man is not equal to his job, and not wait until he has finally come to grief. What we need in order to create a numerous army of production and technical cadres is to carefully cultivate and train people, to place them and organize them properly in production, to organize wages in such a way as to strengthen the decisive links in production and to induce people to improve their vocational skill...

Not everything with you is as it should be. At the blast furnaces you have been more or less able to cultivate and organize technically experienced people, but in other branches of metallurgy you have not yet been able to do so. And that is why steel and rolled steel are lagging behind pig iron. The task is to put an end to this discrepancy at last. Bear in mind that in addition to pig iron we need more steel and rolled steel...

(Stalin's speech was followed by a lively exchange of views which lasted uninterruptedly for about seven hours. Responsible workers in the iron and steel industries, mill directors, technical directors, department foremen, Party workers and shock workers took part in the conversation and dwelt in detail on the prospects confronting the iron and steel industry in 1935, the methods by which the problems referred
to by Stalin could be solved, and the spirit of creative enthusiasm which reigned in the mills.)

Izvestiya
29 December 1934
According a greater significance to the institution of the teaching of civil history in the schools of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and Central Committee of the Communist Party, from the 16th May, 1934, made and published the following resolution - "On the teaching of civil history in the schools of the U.S.S.R." In this decision the Council of People's Commissars and the Party Central Committee stated that the teaching of history in the schools of the U.S.S.R. was not satisfactory. The Council of People's Commissars and the Party Central Committee established that the principal fault of the Manuals of History and of the teaching of history was their abstract schematic characteristic: "Instead of teaching history in a living and vital form with an expose of principal events, of achievements in chronological order and with the defining of the role of the leaders, we present to the pupils some abstract definitions of social or economic systems, thus replacing the vitality of civil history with abstract sociological schema". (Extract from the decision of the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the 16th May, 1934).

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central
Committee indicated that "the pupils cannot profit from history lessons which do not observe the chronological order of historical events, leading figures and important dates. Only a course of history of this type can render accessible, intelligible and concrete the historical material which is indispensible for an analysis and a synthesis of historical events and capable of guiding the pupil towards a Marxist understanding of history".

Consequently, it was decided to prepare for June 1935, the following manuals of history:

a) The history of ancient times.
b) The history of the Middle Ages.
c) Modern history.
d) History of the U.S.S.R.
e) History of modern dependent and colonial countries.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided to organize five groups charged with the responsibility of compiling the new manuals, and they confirmed the composition of these groups.

On the 9th June, 1934, the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars resolved to introduce into primary schools, and into the 1st grade of the Secondary schools an elementary course of the history of the U.S.S.R., and they organized some groups charged with the composition of these elementary manuals of the history of the U.S.S.R.

On the 14th August, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of People's Commissars approved the remarks made by Comrades
Stalin, Kirov and Idanov, with respect to the summaries of the new manuals of "History of the U.S.S.R." and of "Modern History."

In these remarks, all the summaries were submitted to a detailed examination and to a severe criticism. And it was established that the one which left the most to be desired was the summary of the manual of the "History of the U.S.S.R.", which abounded in anti-scientific and crude conceptions from the Marxist point of view and manifested an extreme negligence particularly inadmissible for the constitution of a manual where "each word, each conception, must be weighted." Although fewer, the faults of the summary of the manual of "Modern History" were equally important.

The remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and Idanov indicated exhaustively in which ways it would be necessary to transform these summaries and the complete manuals. However the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the Communist Party are obliged to establish that the manuals of history that have just been presented to them, leave on the whole, a lot to be desired, and that they continue to show the same faults that have been indicated above. The books which leave the most to be desired are the manual of the "History of the U.S.S.R." presented by Professor Vanag's group as well as the manuals of the elementary course of the "History of the U.S.S.R." for use in primary schools, presented by the groups of Mintz and of Lozinsky. The fact that the authors of these manuals continue to defend the conceptions and historical principles
already denounced more than once by the Party, and of which, the deficiency is clear, conceptions and principles which are based on errors well-known by Pokrovsky, cannot be interpreted by the Council of People's Commissars as anything other than testimony to the fact that one sector of our historians, especially the historians of the U.S.S.R., persist in conceptions from anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist historical science, which are fundamentally anti-scientific, and even the negation of history. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party emphasize that these harmful tendencies and these endeavours to liquidate history as a science expounded by the chief ring leader, are bound up with the presence amongst certain of our historians erroneous historical conceptions, appropriately called "the historical school of Pokrovsky." The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party prescribe that the triumph over these harmful theories constitutes the indispensible necessity as much for the composition of historical manuals as for the development of Marxist-Leninist historical science, and for the historical instruction in the U.S.S.R. which is of capital importance for the cause of our State, for our Party, for the instruction of the young generations.

Consequently, the Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party have decided to create, in order to examine and to radically improve and, in the case of necessity, to alter and correct the historical manuals already written, a commission from the Council of People's
Commissars and the Central Committee of the Communist Party composed of Comrades Idanov (President), Radek, Svadindze, Gorin, Lukin, Jakoblev, Bystrjansky, Zatonsky, Faizulla, Khodjav, Bauman, Budnov, Bucharin. This commission has the right to organize groups for the examination of each manual and to open a concourse for the composition of the manuals which the Commission will decide need to be re-written.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee decide unanimously to publish in the press the remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and Idanov as well as other documents concerning this question.

President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.
V. M. MOLOTOV

The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.
J. STALIN

Pravda
27 January 1936

8 August 1934

The group presided over by Vanag has not accomplished its task and has not even understood it. It has made a summary of "Russian History" and not of the history of the U.S.S.R., that is to say, a history of Russia, but without a history of the peoples who came into the bosom of the U.S.S.R. (Nothing is given on the history of the Ukraine, of Byelorussia, of Finland and of other Baltic countries, of people of North Caucasus and Transcaucasia, of people from Central Asia and the Far East, of people from the Volga and people from the North: Tartars, Bakhirs, Mordvines, Tchovaks, etc).

In the summary, the role of the colonizer for Russian Tsarism and its supporters, the Russian bourgeoisie and the landowners is not emphasized. (Tsarism, imprisonment of the people).

In the summary the counter-revolutionary role of Russian Tsarism in foreign politics since Catherine II up until about 1850 and onwards is not emphasized. (Tsarism as international police).

In the summary, the concepts of reaction and of counter-revolution, of bourgeois revolution, of bourgeois democratic revolution, and of revolution in general, are confused.

In the summary the foundation and the origins
of the national liberation movement of the peoples of Russia, downtrodden by Tsarism, does not figure and thus, the October Revolution, in as much as it was the revolution which liberated these people from the national yoke is not dealt with anymore than is the formation of the U.S.S.R.

The summary abounds in banalities and cliches such as "the police terrorism of Nicholas I", "the insurrection of Razine", "the insurrection of Pugatchev", "the offensive of the counter-revolution of landowners in the 1870s", "the first steps of Tsarism and of the bourgeoisie in the fight against the revolution of 1905 - 1907", etc. The authors of the summary copy blindly the banalities and unscientific definitions of bourgeois historians, forgetting that they have to teach our youth the scientifically founded Marxist conceptions.

The summary does not reflect the influence of the bourgeoisie and the Social-Revolutionaries from Eastern Europe on the formation of the bourgeois revolutionary movement and the proletarian socialist movement in Russia. The authors of the summary appear to have forgotten that the Russian revolutionaries are recognized to be the continuators and pupils of Marxist thought.

In the summary, the ravages of the first imperialist war and the role of Tsarism in this war are not shown up, in as much as the dependence of Russian Tsarism on Russian capitalism and the dependence of Russian capitalism on Western Europe, is not brought out. Also the importance of the October Revolution which liberated Russia from her semi-colonial situation
remains undefined.
The summary does not acknowledge the existence of a European political crisis on the brink of a world war, which will be brought about by the decadence of bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism. Also the importance of the Soviets from the viewpoint of universal history, as the representatives of the proletarian democracy, organs of the liberation of workers and peasants from capitalism remains undefined.
The summary does not acknowledge the inner party struggle of the Communist Party of Russia, nor the struggle against Trotskyism and petty-bourgeois counter-revolution.
And thus to continue. We judge a radical revision of this summary to be indispensible in the light of the propositions stated above, and it is necessary also to realise that this necessitates a manual where each word and each concept must be weighed and not just an unclear review which substantiates not more than idle and irresponsible chatter.
We must have a manual of the history of the U.S.S.R. where primarily the history of our great Russia will not be detached from the other peoples of the U.S.S.R. and where secondly, the history of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not be detached from European history and world history in general.

STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV

Bolshevik No. 3
1936
REMARKS ON THE SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL OF MODERN HISTORY

9 August 1934

As modern history is the most rich in achievements and as it is this which is the most important thing in the modern history of bourgeois countries, if one considers the period preceding the October Revolution in Russia, it is the victory of the French Revolution and the affirmation of capitalism in Europe and America which should be emphasized and so we believe that it would be more valuable to have a manual of modern history beginning with a chapter on the French Revolution.

The biggest failure of the summary seems to be that it does not emphasize clearly enough the great difference between the French Revolution (bourgeois revolution) and the October Revolution in Russia (socialist revolution). The central theme of a manual of modern history must be precisely the theme of the opposition between the bourgeois revolution and the socialist revolution. To show that the bourgeois revolution in France (as in all other countries) in liberating the people from the chains of feudalism and absolutism, imposes on them instead, the chains of capitalism and bourgeois democracy, whilst socialist revolution in Russia broke all chains and liberated the people from all forms of exploitation and that is what must be the thread running through a manual of modern history.
One cannot claim that the French Revolution was complete. It is still necessary to recognize it as a bourgeois revolution and treat it as such.

In the same way, one cannot give to our socialist revolution in Russia, only the name October Revolution. It is necessary to qualify it with the term socialist revolution, and to treat it as such.

STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV

Bolshevik No. 3
1936
THE DEATH OF KIROV

1 December 1934

A great sorrow has befallen our Party. On December 1st, Comrade Kirov fell victim to the hand of an assassin, a scallawag sent by the class enemies.

The death of Kirov is an irreparable loss, not only for us, his close friends and comrades, but also for all those who have known him in his revolutionary work, and have known him as a fighter, comrade and friend. A man who has given all his brilliant life to the cause of the working class, to the cause of Communism, to the cause of the liberation of humanity, is dead, victim of the enemy.

Comrade Kirov was an example of Bolshevism, recognizing neither fear nor difficulties in the realizing of the great aim, fixed by the Party. His integrity, his will of iron, his astonishing qualities as an orator, inspired by the Revolution, were combined in him with such cordiality and such tenderness in his relations with his comrades and personal friends, with such warmth and modesty, all of which are traits of the true Leninist.

Comrade Kirov has worked in different parts of the U.S.S.R. in the period of illegality and after the October Revolution - at Tomsk and Astrakhan, at Vladicaucase and Baku - and everywhere he upheld the high standard of the Party; he has won for the Party
millions of workers, due to his revolutionary work, indefatigable, energetic and fruitful.

During the last nine years, Comrade Kirov directed the organization of our Party in Lenin's town, and the region of Leningrad. There is no possibility, by means of a short and sad letter, to give an appreciation of his activities among the workers of Leningrad. It would have been difficult to find in our Party, a director who could be more successfully in harmony with the working class of Leningrad, who could so ably unite all the members of the Party and all the working class around the Party. He has created in the whole organization of Leningrad, this same atmosphere of organization, of discipline, of love and of Bolshevik devotion to the Revolution, which characterised Comrade Kirov himself.

You were near us all Comrade Kirov, as a trusted friend, as a loved comrade, as a faithful companion in arms. We will remember you, dear friend, till the end of our life and of our struggle and we feel bitterness at our loss. You were always with us in the difficult years of the struggle for the victory of Socialism in our country, you were always with us in the years of uncertainty and internal difficulties in our Party, you have lived with us all the difficulties of these last years, and we have lost you at the moment when our country has achieved great victories. In all these struggles, in all our achievements, there is very much evidence of you, of your energy, your strength and your ardent love for the Communist cause.

Farewell, Sergei, our dear friend and comrade.

Pravda
2 December 1934
LETTER TO COMRADE CHOUMIATSKY

Greetings and best wishes to the workers of the Soviet cinema on its glorious fifteenth anniversary.

The cinema, in the hands of Soviet power constitutes an inestimable force.

Possessing exceptional possibilities of cultural influence on the masses, the cinema helps the working class and its party to educate the workers in the spirit of socialism, to organize the masses in the struggle for socialism, to heighten their sense of culture and political awareness.

The Soviet power awaits more successes from you; new films glorifying, as did Tchapvaiev, the grandeur of historical achievements in the struggle of the workers and peasants for power in the Soviet Union, mobilizing them in order to accomplish new tasks and reviewing not only the successes but also pointing out the difficulties in socialist construction.

The Soviet power awaits from you a courageous investigation by your teachers in the new fields of art, into this most important sphere of art (Lenin) which above all reflects the character of the masses.

J. STALIN

Pravda
11 January 1935
ADDRESS GIVEN AT THE RECEIPTION OF THE
1st MAY PARADE

1 May 1935

At the end of the reception, addressing the assembly, Comrade Stalin saluted the entire gathering of fighters and commanders of all the Red Army of workers and peasants. He speaks of them as being "Bolsheviks of the Party, and non-Party Bolsheviks" because one can be a Bolshevik without being a member of the Party. Millions and millions of non-Party members, strong, capable and talented, serve the working class with faith and truth. Many amongst them have not joined the Party because they are too young; others because they do not yet feel ready, because they have such a high estimation of the name "Party Member."

Comrade Stalin toasts the health of the fearless submarine men, of the competent artillery men, of the strong tank drivers, the valiant pilots and bombardiers, of modest and hardy cavaliers, of the courageous infantrymen, consolidating the victory which serves the cause of the working people.

"Our government and Party", said Stalin, "have no other interests, no other worries than those of the people."

"To the health of the strong, capable, talented and courageous Bolsheviks, Party and non-Party," proclaimed Comrade Stalin, and his words were taken
up by an endless ovation from the soldiers and commanders of the Red Army and participants in the 1st of May parade.

Pravda
4 May 1935
ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATES FROM
THE RED ARMY ACADEMIES
(Delivered in the Kremlin, May 4, 1935)

Comrades, it cannot be denied that in the last few years we have achieved great successes both in the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration. In this connection there is too much talk about the services rendered by chiefs, by leaders. They are credited with all, or nearly all, of our achievements. That, of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. It is not merely a matter of leaders. But it is not of this I wanted to speak today. I should like to say a few words about cadres, about our cadres in general and about the cadres of our Red Army in particular.

You know that we inherited from the past a technically backward, impoverished and ruined country. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined again by three years of civil war, a country with a semi-literate population, with a low technical level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf peasant farms - such was the country we inherited from the past. The task was to transfer this country from mediaeval darkness to modern industry and mechanized agriculture. A serious and difficult task, as you see. The question that confronted us was: Either we solve this problem in the shortest possible time and consolidate Socialism in our country, or we do not solve it, in which case our country - weak
technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense - will lose its independence and become a stake in the game of the imperialist powers.

At that time our country was passing through a period of an appalling dearth of technique. There were not enough machines for industry. There were no machines for agriculture. There were no machines for transport. There was not that elementary technical base without which the reorganization of a country on industrial lines is inconceivable. There were only isolated prerequisites for the creation of such a base. A first-class industry had to be built up. This industry had to be so directed as to be capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, but also agriculture and our railway transport. And to achieve this it was necessary to make sacrifices and to exercise the most rigorous economy in everything; it was necessary to economize on food, on schools, on textiles, in order to accumulate the funds required for building industry. There was no other way of overcoming the dearth of technique. That is what Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed in the footsteps of Lenin.

Naturally, uniform and rapid success could not be expected in so great and difficult a task. In a task like this, successes only become apparent after several years. We therefore had to arm ourselves with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit, and stubborn patience to overcome our first failures and to march unswervingly towards the great goal, permitting no wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.

You know that that is precisely how we set about
this task. But not all our comrades had the necessary spirit, patience and grit. There turned out to be people among our comrades who at the first difficulties began to call for a retreat. "Let bygones be bygones," it is said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed with memory, and in summing up the results of our work, one involuntarily recalls the past. (Animation.) Well, then, there were comrades among us who were frightened by the difficulties and began to call on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the good of your industrialisation and collectivisation, your machines, your iron and steel industry, tractors, harvester combines, automobiles? You should rather have given us more textiles, bought more raw materials for the production of consumers' goods, and given the population more of the small things that make life pleasant. The creation of an industry, and a first-class industry at that, when we are so backward, is a dangerous dream."

Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 rubles in foreign currency obtained as a result of a most rigorous economy, and spent on building up our industry, for importing raw materials, and for increasing the output of articles of general consumption. That is also a "plan," in a way. But with such a "plan" we would not now have a metallurgical industry, or a machine-building industry, or tractors and automobiles, or aeroplanes and tanks. We would have found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign foes. We would have undermined the foundations of Socialism in our country. We would have fallen captive to the bourgeoisie, home and foreign.
It is obvious that a choice had to be made between two plans: between the plan of retreat, which would have led, and was bound to lead, to the defeat of Socialism, and the plan of advance, which led, as you know, and has already brought us to the victory of Socialism in our country.

We chose the plan of advance, and moved forward along the Leninist road, brushing aside those comrades as people who could see more or less what was under their noses, but who closed their eyes to the immediate future of our country, to the future of Socialism in our country.

But these comrades did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist road. These people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are people of a special cut. They forgot that neither difficulties nor threats can frighten Bolsheviks. They forgot that we had been trained and steeled by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our father, who knew and recognised no fear in the fight. They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the more hysterical the foes within the Party become, the more ardent the Bolsheviks become for fresh struggles and the more vigorously they push forward.

Of course, it never even occurred to us to turn from the Leninist road. Moreover, once we stood firmly on this road, we pushed forward still more vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path.
True, in pursuing this course we were obliged to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a hand in this. (Loud cheers and applause.)

Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigorously along the road of industrialising and collectivising our country. And now we may consider that the road has been traversed.

Everybody now admits that we have achieved tremendous successes along this road. Everybody now admits that we already have a powerful, first-class industry, a powerful mechanised agriculture, a growing and improving transport system, an organised and excellently equipped Red Army.

This means that we have in the main emerged from the period of dearth in technique.

But, having emerged from the period of dearth of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing it. The point is that we have factories, mills, collective farms, state farms, a transport system, an army; we have technique for all this; but we lack people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of this technique all that can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say that "technique decides everything." This slogan helped us to put an end to the dearth of technique and to create a vast technical base in every branch of activity, for the equipment of our people with first-class technique. That is very good. But it is not enough by far. In order to set technique going and to utilise it to the full,
we need people who have mastered technique, we need cadres capable of mastering and utilising this technique according to all the rules of the art. Without people who have mastered technique, technique is dead. In the charge of people who have mastered technique, technique can and should perform miracles. If in our first-class mills and factories, in our state farms and collective farms, in our transport system and in our Red Army we had sufficient cadres capable of harnessing this technique, our country would secure results three times and four times as great as at present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique decides everything," which is a reflection of a period already passed, a period in which we suffered from a dearth of technique, must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything." That is the main thing now.

Can it be said that our people have fully grasped and realised the great significance of this new slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there would not have been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards cadres, towards workers, which we not infrequently observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" demands that our leaders should display the most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they show their first successes, promoting them, and so forth. Yet we meet in practice in a number of cases
with a soulless, bureaucratic, and positively outrageous attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being studied, and placed at their posts only after being studied, people are frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned to value machinery and to make reports on how many machines we have in our mills and factories. But I do not know of a single instance when a report was made with equal zest on the number of people we trained in a given period, on how we have assisted people to grow and become tempered in their work. How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, to value workers, to value cadres.

I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the spring floods. About thirty men went to the river to pull out timber which had been carried away by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned to the village, but with one comrade missing. When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained there." To my question, "How do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, "Why ask - drowned, of course." And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've got to go and water the mare." When I reproached them with having more concern for animals than for men, one of them said, amid the general approval of the rest: "Why should we be concerned about men? We can always make men. But a mare...just try and make a mare." (Animation.) Here you have
a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. It seems to me that the indifference of certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their inability to value people, is a survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far off Siberia that I have just related.

And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get over the dearth of people and to provide our country with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique and setting it going, we must first of all, learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every worker capable of benefitting our common cause. It is time to realise that of all the valuable capital the world possesses, the most valuable and most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realised that under our present conditions "cadres decide everything." If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, agriculture, transport, and the army - our country will be invincible. If we do not have such cadres - we shall be lame on both legs.

In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a toast to the health and success of our graduates from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success in the work of organising and directing the defence of our country.

Comrades, you have graduated from institutions of higher learning, in which you received your first tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive their real tempering in practical work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that only those cadres are any good who do not fear dif-
ficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only in the fight against difficulties that real cadres are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible.

Your health, comrades! (Stormy applause. All rise. Loud cheers for Comrade Stalin.)

Pravda
6 May 1935
Comrades, wait! Do not applaud in advance, said Stalin jokingly, - you do not yet know what I am going to say to you. (Laughter and applause).

I have two corrections dictated by the comrades sitting right here. (Comrade Stalin made a large sweep of the hall with his hand). The matter can be presented as follows.

The Party and the State have given decorations for the success of the construction of the Moscow Metro, the first with the Order of Lenin, the second with the Order of the Red Star, the third with the Order of the Red Flag of Labour, the fourth with the Charter of the Central Committee of Soviets.

But here is the question. What to do with the others, what to do with the comrades who worked just as hard as those who have been decorated, who have put as much into their work with their ability and strength? Some among you seem to be happy and others are perplexed. What should we do? That is the question.

Therefore, we want to repair this mistake of the Party and of the State in the face of all honest people. (Laughter and lively applause). I am not an amateur in making long speeches, therefore allow me to expound on the corrections.

First correction : for the successful work of the
Metro construction, congratulations on behalf of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., to the shock workers, the whole collective of mechanics, technicians, working men and women of the Metro construction. (The hall greets the propositions of Comrade Stalin with cheers and a loud ovation - all rise).

Even today, it is necessary to correct our mistake by congratulating the workers of the construction of the Metro (applause). Do not applaud me: it is the decision of all the comrades.

And the second correction, I tell you it directly. For the particular merits in the cause of mobilization, deserved by the Komsomols in the successful construction of the Moscow Metro, I decorate with the Order of Lenin, the organization of Komsomols of Moscow. (More applause and ovations. Smiling, Comrade Stalin applauds with all the people assembled in the Hall of Collonades). It is also necessary to correct this mistake today and publish it tomorrow. (Holding up the paper of corrections, Comrade Stalin addressed the audience simply and warmly). Perhaps, Comrades, it is a small thing, but we have not been able to invent anything better.

If we could do something else, go ahead, tell us!

Saluting the workers and builders of the Metro, the director leaves the tribune. The operators of the concrete mixers, the shaft sinkers from the mines, the welders, the engineers, the foremen, the professors, the working men and women, happy people, leave the hall filled with joy, applauding and shouting "Hurrah for beloved Stalin!"
In the sixth row, a young girl in a pink sweater stood up on a chair and addressing herself to the presidents, shouted with emotion, "A Komsomol Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!"

The ovation continued for several minutes, and when finally the cheering stopped, Comrade Stalin asked the assembly once again "What do you think? Are these enough corrections?"

And again the hall responded with a lively ovation.

Pravda
15 May 1935
Comrades, what we have seen here today is a slice of the new life we call the collective life, the socialist life. We have heard the simple accounts of simple toiling people, how they strove and overcame difficulties in order to achieve success in socialist competition. We have heard the speeches not of ordinary women, but, I would say, of women who are heroines of labour, because only heroines of labour could have achieved the successes they have achieved. We had no such women before. Here am I, already 56 years of age, I have seen many things in my time, I have seen many labouring men and women. But never have I met such women. They are an absolutely new type of people. Only free labour, only collective farm labour could have given rise to such heroines of labour in the countryside.

There were no such women, there could not have been such women in the old days.

And, indeed, just think what women were before, in the old days. As long as a woman was unmarried she was regarded as the lowest of toilers. She worked for her father, she worked ceaselessly, and her father would nevertheless keep reproaching her: "I feed you." When she married, she would work for her husband, she would work just as much as her
husband would compel her to work, and her husband too would keep reproaching her: "I feed you." Woman in the countryside was the lowest of toilers. Naturally, no heroines of labour could arise among the peasant women under such conditions. Labour in those days was a curse to a woman, and she would avoid it as much as she could.

Only the collective farm life could have made labour a thing of honour, it alone could have bred genuine heroines in the countryside. Only the collective farm life could have destroyed inequality and put woman on her feet. That you know very well, yourselves. The collective farm introduced the work-day. And what is the work-day? Before the work-day all are equal - men and women. He who has most work-days to his credit earns most. Here, neither father nor husband can reproach a woman with the fact that he is feeding her. Now, if a woman works and has work-days to her credit, she is her own master. I remember conversing with several women comrades at the Second Collective Farm Congress. One of them, from the Northern Territory, said:

"Two years ago no suitor would even have set his foot in our house. I had no dowry! Now I have five hundred work-days to my credit. And what do you think? Suitors give me no peace; they want to marry, they say. But I will take my time; I will pick out my own young man."

The collective farm has liberated women, and made her independent by means of the work-days. She no longer works for her father when she is unmarried, but works primarily for herself. And that
is just what is meant by the emancipation of peasant women; that is just what is meant by the collective farm system which makes the working woman the equal of every working man. Only on these grounds, only under these conditions could such splendid women arise. That is why I regard today's meeting not as just an ordinary meeting of prominent people with members of the government, but as a solemn day, on which the achievements and capabilities of the emancipated labour of women are being demonstrated. I think the government ought to confer distinctions on the heroines of labour who have come here to report their achievements to the government.

How should this day be marked? We here, Comrades Voroshilov, Chernov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Orjonikidze, Kalinin, Mikoyan and myself have conferred together and have arrived at the idea of requesting the government to award our heroines of labour with the Order of Lenin, - the team leaders with the Order of Lenin, and the rank-and-file shock workers with the Order of the Banner of Labour. Comrade Maria Demchenko, of course, will have to be singled out specially.

Voroshilov: Good girl!
Molotov: The chief culprit!
Stalin: I think that Maria Demchenko, as the pioneer in this matter, in addition to being awarded the Order of Lenin, should receive the thanks of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and the women collective farmers in her team should be awarded the Order of the Banner of Labour.

A voice: They are all present, except one. She
is sick.

Stalin: The sick one must also be awarded. That is how we think of marking this day.

(Loud and prolonged applause. All rise.)

Pravda
11 November 1935
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT.

Comrades, so much has been said at this conference about the Stakhanovites, and it has been said so well, that there is really very little left for me to say. But since I have been called on to speak, I will have to say a few words.

The Stakhanov movement cannot be regarded as an ordinary movement of working men and women. The Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which will go down in the history of our Socialist construction as one of its most glorious pages.

Wherein lies the significance of the Stakhanov movement?

Primarily, in the fact that it is the expression of a new wave of Socialist emulation, a new and higher stage of Socialist emulation. Why new, and why higher? Because the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of Socialist emulation, contrasts favourably with the old stage of Socialist emulation. In the past, some three years ago, in the period of the first stage of Socialist emulation, Socialist emulation was not necessarily associated with modern technique.
At that time, in fact, we had hardly any modern technique. The present stage of Socialist emulation, the Stakhanov movement, on the other hand, is necessarily associated with modern technique. The Stakhanov movement would be inconceivable without a new and higher technique. We have before us people like Comrades Stakhanov, Busygin, Smetanin, Krivonoss, Pronin, the Vinogradovas, and many others, new people, working men and women, who have completely mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed it and driven ahead. There were no such people, or hardly any such people, some three years ago. These are new people, people of a special type.

Further, the Stakhanov movement is a movement of working men and women which sets itself the aim of surpassing the present technical standards, surpassing the existing designed capacities, surpassing the existing production plans and estimates. Surpassing them - because these standards have already become antiquated for our day, for our new people. This movement is breaking down the old views on technique, it is shattering the old technical standards, the old designed capacities, and the old production plans, and demands the creation of new and higher technical standards, designed capacities, and production plans. It is destined to produce a revolution in our industry. That is why the Stakhanov movement is at bottom a profoundly revolutionary movement.

It has already been said here that the Stakhanov movement, as an expression of new and higher technical standards, is a model of that high productivity
of labour which only Socialism can give, and which capitalism cannot give. That is absolutely true. Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of productivity of labour, it enabled society to procure an incomparably greater quantity of products than could be procured under the feudal system; because it made society richer. Why is it that Socialism can, should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of economy? Because it can furnish higher models of labour, a higher productivity of labour, than the capitalist system of economy; because it can provide society with more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy.

Some people think that Socialism can be consolidated by a certain equalisation of people's material conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living. That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception of Socialism. In point of fact, Socialism can succeed only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. But if Socialism is to achieve this aim and make our Soviet society the most prosperous of all societies, our country, must have a productivity of labour which surpasses that of the foremost capitalist countries. Without this we cannot even think of securing an abundance of products and of articles of consumption of all kinds. The significance of the Stakhanov movement lies in the fact that it is a movement which is smash-
ing the old technical standards, because they are inadequate, which in a number of cases is surpassing the productivity of labour of the foremost capitalist countries, and is thus creating the practical possibility of further consolidating Socialism in our country, the possibility of converting our country into the most prosperous of all countries.

But the significance of the Stakhanov movement does not end there. Its significance lies also in the fact that it is preparing the conditions for the transition from Socialism to Communism.

The principle of Socialism is that in a Socialist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to his needs, but according to the work he performs for society. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class is as yet not a high one, that the distinction between mental and manual labour still exists, that the productivity of labour is still not high enough to ensure an abundance of articles of consumption, and, as a result, society is obliged to distribute articles of consumption not in accordance with the needs of its members, but in accordance with the work they perform for society.

Communism represents a higher stage of development. The principle of Communism, is that in a Communist society each works according to his abilities and receives articles of consumption, not according to the work he performs, but according to his needs as a culturally developed individual. This means that the cultural and technical level of the working class has become high enough to undermine
the basis of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour, that the distinction between mental labour and manual labour has already disappeared, and that productivity of labour has reached such a high level that it can provide an absolute abundance of articles of consumption, and as a result society is able to distribute these articles in accordance with the needs of its members.

Some people think that the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and technical equalisation of mental and manual workers by lowering the cultural and technical level of engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive Communism in this way. In reality the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour can be brought about only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technical workers. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive forces of the country have been freed from the fetters of capitalism, where labour has been freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working class is in power, and where the younger generation of the working class has every opportunity of obtaining an adequate technical education. There is no reason to doubt that only such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class can undermine the basis of the distinction between men-

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tal labour and manual labour, that only this can ensure the high level of productivity of labour and the abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary in order to begin the transition from Socialism to Communism.

In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is significant for the fact that it contains the first beginnings - still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless the beginnings - of precisely such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class of our country.

And, indeed, look at our comrades, the Stakhanovites, more closely. What type of people are they? They are mostly young or middle-aged working men and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, who show examples of precision and accuracy in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor in work, and who have learned to count not only the minutes, but also the seconds. The majority of them have taken the technical minimum courses and are continuing their technical education. They are free of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, technicians and business executives; they are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated technical standards and creating new and higher standards; they are introducing amendments into the designed capacities and economic plans drawn up by the leaders of our industry; they often supplement and correct what the engineers and technicians have to say, they often teach them and impel them forward, for they are people who have completely mastered the technique of their job, and who are able to squeeze
out of technique the maximum that can be squeezed out of it. Today the Stakhanovites are still few in number, but who can doubt that tomorrow there will be ten times more of them? Is it not clear that the Stakhanovites are innovators in our industry, that the Stakhanov movement represents the future of our industry, that it contains the seed of the future rise in the culture and technical level of the working class, that it opens to us the path by which alone can be achieved those high indices of productivity of labour which are essential for the transition from Socialism to Communism and for the elimination of the distinction between mental labour and manual labour.

Such, comrades, is the significance of the Stakhanov movement for our Socialist construction.

Did Stakhanov and Busygin think of this great significance of the Stakhanov movement when they began to smash the old technical standards? Of course not. They had their own worries - they were trying to get their enterprise out of difficulties and to over-fulfil the economic plan. But in seeking to achieve this aim they had to smash the old technical standards and to develop a high productivity of labour, surpassing that of the foremost capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous, however, to think that this circumstance can in any way detract from the great historical significance of the movement of the Stakhanovites.

The same may be said of those workers who first organised the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in our country in 1905. They never thought, of course, that
the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would become the foundation of the Socialist system. They were only defending themselves against tsarism, against the bourgeoisie, when they created the Soviets of Workers' Deputies. But this circumstance in no way contradicts the unquestionable fact that the movement for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies begun in 1905 by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow, led in the end, to the rout of capitalism and the victory of Socialism on one-sixth of the globe.

2. THE ROOTS OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT.

We now stand at the cradle of the Stakhanov movement, at its source.

Certain characteristic features of the Stakhanov movement should be noted.

What first of all strikes the eye is the fact that this movement began somehow, of itself, almost spontaneously, from below, without any pressure whatsoever from the administrators of our enterprises. More than that - this movement in a way, arose and began to develop in spite of the administrators of our enterprises, even in opposition to them. Comrade Molotov has already told you what troubles Comrade Mussinsky, the Archangelsk saw-mill worker, had to go through when he worked out new and higher technical standards, in secret from the administration, in secret from the inspectors. The lot of Stakhanov himself was no better, for in his progress he had to defend himself not only against certain officials of the administration, but also against certain workers who hounded him because of
his "new-fangled ideas." As to Busygin, we know that he almost paid for his "new-fangled ideas" by losing his job at the factory, and it was only the intervention of the shop superintendent, Comrade Sokolinsky, that helped him to remain at the factory.

So you see, if there was any kind of action at all on the part of the administrators of our enterprises, it was not to help the Stakhanov movement, but to hinder it. Consequently, the Stakhanov movement arose and developed as a movement coming from below. And just because it arose of itself, just because it comes from below, it is the most vital and irresistible movement of the present day.

Mention should further be made of another characteristic feature of the Stakhanov movement. This characteristic feature is that the Stakhanov movement spread over the whole of our Soviet Union not gradually, but at an unparalleled speed, like a hurricane. How did it begin? Stakhanov raised the technical standard of output of coal five or six times, if not more. Busygin and Smetanin did the same - one in the sphere of machine-building and the other in the shoe industry. The newspapers reported these facts. And suddenly, the flames of the Stakhanov movement enveloped the whole country. What was the reason? How is it that the Stakhanov movement has spread so rapidly? Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin are great organisers, with wide contacts in the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R., and they organised this movement themselves? No, of course not! Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin have ambitions of becoming great figures in our country,
and they themselves carried the sparks of the Stakhanov movement all over the country? That is also not true. You have seen Stakhanov and Busygin here. They spoke at this conference. They are simple, modest people, without the slightest ambition to acquire the laurels of national figures. It even seems to me that they are somewhat embarrassed by the scope the movement has acquired, beyond all their expectations. And if, in spite of this, the match thrown by Stakhanov and Busygin was sufficient to start a conflagration, that means that the Stakhanov movement is absolutely ripe. Only a movement that is absolutely ripe, and is awaiting just a jolt in order to burst free - only such a movement can spread with such rapidity and grow like a rolling snow-ball.

How is it to be explained that the Stakhanov movement proved to be absolutely ripe? What are the causes for its rapid spread? What are the roots of the Stakhanov movement?

There are at least four such causes.

1. The basis for the Stakhanov movement was first and foremost the radical improvement in the material welfare of the workers. Life has improved, comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when life is joyous, work goes well. Hence the high rates of output. Hence the heroes and heroines of labour. That, primarily, is the root of the Stakhanov movement. If there had been a crisis in our country, if there had been unemployment - that scourge of the working class - if people in our country lived badly, drably, joylessly, we should have had nothing like the Stakhanov movement. (Applause.) Our proletarian rev-
olution is the only revolution in the world which had the opportunity of showing the people not only political results but also material results. Of all workers' revolutions, we know only one which managed to achieve power. That was the Paris Commune. But it did not last long. True, it endeavoured to smash the fetters of capitalism; but it did not have time enough to smash them, and still less to show the people the beneficial material results of revolution. Our revolution is the only one which not only smashed the the fetters of capitalism and brought the people freedom, but also succeeded in creating the material conditions of a prosperous life for the people. Therein lies the strength and invincibility of our revolution. It is a good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, to drive out the landlords, to drive out the tsarist henchmen, to seize power and achieve freedom. That is very good. But, unfortunately, freedom alone is not enough, by far. If there is a shortage of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom will not carry you very far. It is very difficult, comrades, to live on freedom alone. (Shouts of approval. Applause.) In order to live well and joyously, the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented by material benefits. It is a distinctive feature of our revolution that it brought the people not only freedom, but also material benefits and the possibility of a prosperous and cultured life. That is why life has become joyous in our country, and that is the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang.

2. The second source of the Stakhanov movement
is the fact that there is no exploitation in our country. People in our country do not work for exploiters, for the enrichment of parasites, but for themselves, for their own class, for their own Soviet society, where power is wielded by the best members of the working class. That is why labour in our country has social significance, and is a matter of honour and glory. Under capitalism, labour bears a private and personal character. You have produced more - well, then, receive more, and live as best you can. Nobody knows you or wants to know you. You work for the capitalists, you enrich them? Well, what do you expect? That is why they hired you, so that you should enrich the exploiters. If you do not agree with that, join the ranks of the unemployed, and get along as best you can - "we shall find others who are more tractable." That is why people's labour is not valued very highly under capitalism. Under such conditions, of course, there can be no room for a Stakhanov movement. But things are different under the Soviet system. Here, the working man is held in esteem. Here, he works, not for the exploiters, but for himself, for his class, for society. Here, the working man cannot feel neglected and alone. On the contrary, the man who works, feels himself a free citizen of his country, a public figure in a way. And if he works well and gives society his best - he is a hero of labour, and is covered with glory. Obviously, the Stakhanov movement could have arisen only under such conditions.

3. We must regard, as the third source of the Stakhanov movement, the fact that we have a mod-
ern technique. The Stakhanov movement is organically bound up with the modern technique. Without the modern technique, without the modern mills, and factories, without the modern machinery, the Stakhanov movement could not have arisen. Without modern technique, technical standards might have been doubled or trebled, but not more. And if the Stakhanovites have raised technical standards five and six times, that means that they rely entirely, on the modern technique. It thus follows, that the industrialisation of our country, the reconstruction of our mills and factories, the introduction of modern technique and modern machinery, was one of the causes that gave rise to the Stakhanov movement.

4. But modern technique alone will not carry you very far. You may have first-class technique, first-class mills and factories, but if you have not the people capable of harnessing that technique, you will find that your technique is just bare technique. For modern technique to produce results, people are required, cadres of working men and women, capable of taking charge of the technique and advancing it. The birth and growth of the Stakhanov movement means that such cadres have already appeared among the working men and women of our country. Some two years ago, the Party declared that in building new mills and factories, and supplying our enterprises with modern machinery, we had performed only half of the job. The Party then declared that enthusiasm for the construction of new factories must be supplemented by enthusiasm for mastering these new factories, that only in this way could the job be
completed. It is obvious that the mastering of this new technique and the growth of new cadres have been proceeding during these two years. It is now clear that we already have such cadres. It is obvious that without such cadres, without these new people, we would never have had a Stakhanov movement. Hence the new people, working men and women, who have mastered the new technique, constitute the force that has shaped and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

Such are the conditions that gave rise to, and advanced the Stakhanov movement.

3. NEW PEOPLE - NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS.

I have said that the Stakhanov movement developed not gradually, but like an explosion, as if it had broken through some sort of dam. It is obvious that it had to overcome certain barriers. Somebody was hindering it, somebody was holding it back; and then, having gathered strength, the Stakhanov movement broke through these barriers and swept over the country.

What was wrong? Who exactly was hindering it?

It was the old technical standards, and the people behind these standards, that were hindering it. Several years ago, our engineers, technical workers, and business managers drew up certain technical standards, adapted to the technical backwardness of our working men and women. Several years have elapsed since then. During this period, people have grown, and acquired technical knowledge. But the technical standards have remained unchanged. Of course, these standards have now proved out of date for our new
people. Everybody now abuses the existing technical standards. But, after all, they did not fall from the skies. And the point is not that these technical standards were set too low at the time when they were drawn up. The point is, primarily, that now, when these standards have already become antiquated, attempts are made to defend them as modern standards. People cling to the technical backwardness of our working men and women, guiding themselves by this backwardness, basing themselves on this backwardness, and matters finally reach a pitch, when people begin to pretend backwardness. But what is to be done if this backwardness is becoming a thing of the past? Are we really going to worship our backwardness and turn it into an icon, a fetish? What is to be done if the working men and women have already managed to grow and to gain technical knowledge? What is to be done if the old technical standards no longer correspond to reality, and our working men and women have already managed in practice to exceed them five or tenfold? Have we ever taken an oath of loyalty to our backwardness? It seems to me we have not, have we, comrades? (General laughter.) Did we ever assume that our working men and women would remain backward forever? We never did, did we? (General laughter.) Then what is the trouble? Will we really lack the courage to smash the conservatism of certain of our engineers and technicians, to smash the old traditions and standards and allow free scope to the new forces of the working class?

People talk about science. They say that the data of science, the data contained in technical handbooks
and instructions, contradict the demands of the Stakh-
anovites for new and higher technical standards. But
what kind of science are they talking about? The data
of science have always been tested by practice, by
experience. Science which has severed contact with
practice, with experience - what sort of science is
that? If science were the thing it is represented to
be by certain of our conservative comrades, it would
have perished for humanity long ago. Science is cal-
led science just because it does not recognise fet-
ishes, just because it does not fear to raise its hand
against the obsolete and antiquated, and because it
lends an attentive ear to the voice of experience, of
practice. If it were otherwise, we would have no
science at all; we would have no astronomy, say, and
would still have to get along with the outworn system
of Ptolemy; we would have no biology, and would still
be comforting ourselves with the legend of the
creation of man; we would have no chemistry, and
would still have to get along with the auguries of
the alchemists.

That is why I think that our engineers, technical
workers, and business managers, who have already
managed to fall a fairly long distance behind the
Stakhanov movement, would do well if they ceased
to cling to the old technical standards and readjusted
their work in a real scientific manner to the new
way, the Stakhanov way.

Very well, we shall be told, but what about tech-
nical standards in general? Does industry need them,
or can we get along without any standards at all?

Some say that we no longer need any technical
standards. That is not true, comrades. More, it is stupid. Without technical standards, planned economy is impossible. Technical standards are, moreover, necessary in order to help the masses who have fallen behind to catch up with the more advanced. Technical standards are a great regulating force which organises the masses of the workers in the factories around the advanced elements of the working class. We therefore need technical standards; not those, however, that now exist, but higher ones.

Others say that we need technical standards, but that they must immediately be raised to the level of the achievements of people like Stakhanov, Busygin, the Vinogradovas, and the others. That is also not true. Such standards would be unreal at the present time, since working men and women with less technical knowledge than Stakhanov and Busygin could not fulfil these standards. We need technical standards somewhere between the present technical standards and those achieved by people like Stakhanov and Busygin. Take, for example, Maria Demchenko, the well-known "five-hundreder" in sugar beet. She achieved a harvest of over 500 centners of sugar beet per hectare. Can this achievement be made the standard yield for the whole of sugar beet production, say, in the Ukraine? No, it cannot. It is too early to speak of that. Maria Demchenko secured over 500 centners from one hectare, whereas the average sugar beet harvest this year in the Ukraine, for instance, is 130 or 132 centners per hectare. The difference, as you see, is not a small one. Can we set the standard of sugar beet yield at 400 or 300
Every expert in this field says that this cannot be done yet. Evidently, the standard yield per hectare for the Ukraine in 1936 must be set at 200 or 250 centners. And this is not a low standard, for if it were fulfilled it might give us twice as much sugar as we got in 1935. The same must be said of industry. Stakhanov exceeded the existing standard of output ten times, or even more, I believe. To declare this achievement the new technical standard for all pneumatic drill operators would be unwise. Obviously, a standard must be set somewhere between the existing technical standard and that achieved by Comrade Stakhanov.

One thing, at any rate, is clear: the present technical standards no longer correspond to reality; they have fallen behind and become a brake on our industry; and in order that there shall be no brake on our industry, they must be replaced by new, higher technical standards. New people, new times - new technical standards.

4. IMMEDIATE TASKS.

What are our immediate tasks from the standpoint of the interests of the Stakhanov movement?

In order not to be diffuse, let us reduce the matter to two immediate tasks.

First. The task is to help the Stakhanovites to further develop the Stakhanov movement, and to spread it in all directions, throughout all the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R. That, on the one hand. And on the other hand, the task is to curb all those elements among the business managers, engineers,
and technical workers who obstinately cling to the old, do not want to advance, and systematically hinder the development of the Stakhanov movement. The Stakhanovites alone, of course, cannot spread the Stakhanov movement in its full scope over the whole face of our country. Our Party organisations must take a hand in this matter, and help the Stakhanovites to consummate the movement. In this respect, the Donetz regional organisation has undoubtedly displayed great initiative. Good work is being done in this direction by the Moscow and Leningrad regional organisations. But what about the other regions? They, apparently, are still "getting started." For instance, we somehow hear nothing, or very little from the Urals, although, as you know, the Urals is a vast industrial centre. The same must be said of Western Siberia and the Kuzbas, where, to all appearances, they have not yet managed to "get started." However, we need have no doubt that our Party organisations will take a hand in this matter and help the Stakhanovites to overcome their difficulties. As to the other aspect of the matter - the curbing of the obstinate conservatives among the business managers, engineers and technical workers - things will be a little more complicated. We shall have in the first place, to persuade these conservative elements in industry, persuade them in a patient and comradely manner, of the progressive nature of the Stakhanov movement, and of the necessity of readjusting themselves to the Stakhanov way. And if persuasion does not help, more vigorous measures will have to be adopted. Take, for instance,
the People's Commissariat of Railways. In the central apparatus of that Commissariat, there was, until recently, a group of professors, engineers, and other experts - among them Communists - who assured everybody that a commercial speed of 13 or 14 kilometres per hour was a limit that could not be exceeded without contradicting "the science of railway operation." This was a fairly authoritative group, who preached their views in verbal and printed form, issued instructions to the various departments of the People's Commissariat of Railways, and, in general, were the "dictators of opinion" in the traffic departments. We, who are not experts in this sphere, basing ourselves on the suggestions of a number of practical workers on the railway, on our part assured these authoritative professors that 13 or 14 kilometres could not be the limit, and that if matters were organised in a certain way, this limit could be extended. In reply, this group, instead of heeding the voice of experience and practice, and revising their attitude to the matter, launched into a fight against the progressive elements on the railways and still further intensified the propaganda of their conservative views. Of course, we had to give these esteemed individuals a light tap on the jaw and very politely remove them from the central apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Railways. (Applause.) And what is the result? We now have a commercial speed of 18 and 19 kilometres per hour. (Applause.) It seems to me, comrades, that at the worst, we shall have to resort to this method in other branches of our national economy as well - that is, of course,
if the stubborn conservatives do not cease interfering and putting spokes in the wheels of the Stakhanov movement.

Second. In the case of those business executives, engineers and technicians who do not want to hinder the Stakhanov movement, who sympathise with this movement, but have not yet been able to readjust themselves and assume the lead of the Stakhanov movement, the task is to help them readjust themselves and take the lead of the Stakhanov movement. I must say, comrades, that we have quite a few such business executives, engineers and technicians. And if we help these comrades, there will undoubtedly be still more of them.

I think that if we fulfil these tasks, the Stakhanov movement will develop to its full scope, will embrace every region and district of our country, and will show us miracles of new achievements.

5. A FEW MORE WORDS.

A few words regarding the present conference, regarding its significance. Lenin taught us that only such leaders can be real Bolshevik leaders, as know not only how to teach the workers and peasants, but also how to learn from them. Certain Bolsheviks were not pleased with these words of Lenin's. But history has shown that Lenin was one hundred per cent right in this field also. And, indeed, millions of working people, workers and peasants, labour, live and struggle. Who can doubt that these people do not live in vain, that, living and struggling, these people accumulate vast practical experience? Can it be doubted
that leaders who scorn this experience cannot be regarded as real leaders? Hence, we leaders of the Party and the government must not only teach the workers, but also learn from them. I shall not undertake to deny that you, the members of the present conference, have learned something here at this conference from the leaders of our government. But neither can it be denied that we, the leaders of the government, have learned a great deal from you, the Stakhanovites, the members of this conference. Well, comrades, thanks for the lesson, many thanks! (Loud applause.)

Finally, two words about how it would be fitting to mark this conference. We here in the presidium have conferred and have decided that this conference between the leaders of the government and the leaders of the Stakhanov movement must be marked in some way. Well, we have come to the decision that a hundred or a hundred and twenty of you will have to be recommended for the highest distinction.

Voices: Quite right. (Loud applause.)

Stalin: If you approve, comrades, that is what we shall do.

(The conference accords a stormy ovation to Comrade Stalin. Thunderous cheers and applause. Greetings are shouted to Comrade Stalin, the leader of the Party, from all parts of the hall. The three thousand members of the conference join in singing the proletarian hymn, the "Internationale.")

Pravda
22 November 1935
Comrades, allow me first to congratulate you on the successes you have achieved on the harvest front. These successes are no mean ones. The fact that, on an average for the whole of the U.S.S.R., the performance per harvester combine has doubled in one year, is no mean achievement. This achievement is particularly important in the conditions prevailing in our country, where our number of technically trained people is still small. Our country was always distinguished by a lack of technically trained cadres, especially in the sphere of agriculture. The technical training of cadres on a country-wide scale is a very big job. It requires decades. And the fact that in a comparatively short space of time, we have managed to convert the peasant sons and daughters of yesterday into excellent harvester-combine operators, who are surpassing the standards of capitalist countries, means that the training of technical cadres in our country is proceeding at seven-league strides. Yes, comrades, your successes are great and important ones, and you fully deserve to be congratulated by the leaders of the Party and the government.

And now let me pass to the essence of the matter. It is frequently said that we have already solved the grain problem. That, of course, is true if we are
referring to the period we are now passing through. This year we shall gather in more than five and a half billion poods of grain. This is quite sufficient to feed the population to satiety and to lay aside adequate reserves for any unforeseen contingency. That, of course, is not bad for the present day. But we cannot confine ourselves to the present day. We must think of the morrow, of the immediate future. And if we regard the matter from the point of view of the morrow, the results achieved cannot satisfy us. How much grain shall we require in the immediate future, three or four years hence, let us say? We shall require not less than seven or eight billion poods of grain. That is how matters stand, comrades. This means that we must take measures at once, so that the production of grain in our country shall increase from year to year, and that by that time we shall prove fully prepared for the accomplishment of this most important task. In the old days, before the revolution, about four or five billion poods of grain were produced in our country annually. Whether this quantity of grain was sufficient or not is another question. At any rate, they all thought it sufficient, since 400 or 500 million poods of grain were exported annually. That is how matters stood in the past. But it is different now, under our Soviet conditions. I have already said that we must at once prepare ourselves to increase the annual production of grain to seven or eight billion poods in the immediate future, in about three or four years. As you see, the difference is not a small one. Four or five billion poods are one thing, seven
or eight billion poods are another.

Whence this difference? How are we to explain this colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country?

It is to be explained by the fact that our country is now not what it was in the old, pre-revolutionary days.

To begin, for example, with the fact that during the past few years, industry and towns have grown at least double as compared with the old days. We now have at least twice as many cities and city dwellers, industries and workers engaged in industry, as in the old days. What does this mean? It means that we have taken several million toilers from the countryside and transferred them to the cities, that we have made them workers and employees, and that they are now, together with the rest of the workers, advancing our industry. This means that whereas several million toilers, formerly connected with the countryside, used to produce grain, today they not only do not produce grain, but themselves require that grain should be brought to them from the countryside. And our cities will grow and the demand for grain will increase.

That is the first reason for the increase in the demand for grain.

Further, in the old days we had less industrial crops than now. We are now producing twice as much cotton as in the old days. As to flax, sugar beet, and other industrial crops, we are producing incomparably more than in the old days. What follows from this? It follows from this that the people who
are engaged in the production of industrial crops, cannot adequately engage in grain growing. And therefore we must have large stocks of grain for the people who are producing industrial crops, so that it may be possible steadily to increase the production of industrial crops, the cultivation of cotton, flax, sugar beet, sunflower seed, and so forth. And we must steadily increase the production of industrial crops if we want to advance our light industries and our food industries.

There you have the second reason for the increase in the demand for grain.

Further, I have already said that in the old days our country used to produce four or five billion poods of grain annually. The tsarist ministers at that time used to say: "We will go short ourselves, but we will export grain." Who were the people who went short? Not the tsarist ministers, of course. The people who went short were the twenty or thirty million poor peasants, who did indeed go short, and lived a life of semi-starvation in order that the tsarist ministers might send grain abroad. Such was the state of affairs in the old days. But times with us have entirely changed. The Soviet government cannot permit the population to go short. For two or three years now we no longer have any poor, unemployment has ceased, undernourishment has disappeared, and we have firmly entered on the path of prosperity. You will ask, what has become of the twenty or thirty million hungry poor peasants? They have joined the collective farms, have established themselves there, and are successfully building a life
of prosperity for themselves. And what does this mean? It means that we now need far more grain to feed our toiling peasants than in the old days; because the poor peasants of yesterday, who are the collective farmers of today, having established themselves in the collective farms, must have enough grain with which to build a prosperous life. You know they have it, and will have still more.

That is the third reason for the colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country.

Further, everybody is now saying that the material conditions of the toilers in our country have considerably improved, that life has become better, happier. That, of course, is true. But the result is that the population has begun to multiply far more rapidly than in the old days. Mortality has declined, births are increasing, and the net growth of population is incomparably greater. That, of course, is good, and we welcome it. (Amusement.) We now have an annual increase of population of about three million. That means that every year, there is an increase equal to one whole Finland. (Laughter.) Well, the result is that we have to feed more and more people.

There you have another reason for the increase in the demand for bread.

Finally, one more reason. I have spoken of people and their increased demand for bread. But man's food does not consist of bread alone. He also needs meats, fats. The growth of the cities, the increase in industrial crops, the general growth of the population, a prosperous life - all this results in an increase in the demand for meat and fats. It is therefore neces-
sary to have a well-ordered animal husbandry, with a great quantity of livestock, large and small, in order to be able to satisfy the growing demand of the population for meat products. All this is clear. But a growth of animal husbandry is inconceivable without large stores of grain for the livestock. Only a growing and expanding grain production can create the conditions for the growth of animal husbandry. There you have one more reason for the colossal increase in the demand for grain in our country.

Such, comrades, are the causes which have radically changed the face of our country and which have confronted us with the urgent task of increasing the annual production of grain in the near future to seven or eight billion poods.

Can we accomplish this task?
Yes, we can. There can be no doubt of it.
What is required to accomplish this task?
It requires, firstly, that the prevailing form of enterprise in agriculture should be not the small farm, but the large farm. Why the large farm? Because only the large farm can master modern technique, only the large farm can utilize modern agronomical knowledge to a sufficient extent, only the large farm can make proper use of fertilizers. In capitalist countries, where the prevailing form of agriculture is the individual small farm, large farms are created by the enrichment of a small group of landowners and the ruin of the majority of the peasants. There, usually, the land of the ruined peasants passes into the hands of the rich landowners, while the peasants themselves, in order not to die of hunger, go to
work as hands for the landowners. We consider this a wrong way and a ruinous way. It does not suit us. We have therefore adopted another way of forming large agricultural enterprises. The way we have adopted is to unite the small peasant farms into large collective farms, cultivating the land by collective labour, and taking advantage of all the benefits and opportunities offered by large-scale farming. That is the way of the collective farms. Is the collective form of large-scale farming the prevailing form of agriculture in our country? Yes, it is. About 90 per cent of our peasants are now in the collective farms. And so we already have large-scale enterprise in agriculture, collective farming, as the prevailing form.

It requires, secondly, that our collective farms, our large farms should have enough suitable land. Have our collective farms enough suitable land? Yes, they have. You know that all the imperial, landlord and kulak lands have been handed over to the collective farms. You know that these lands have already been assigned to the collective farms in perpetuity. The collective farms therefore have enough suitable land to develop the production of grain to the utmost.

It requires, thirdly, that the collective farms should have enough machinery, tractors, agricultural machines and harvester combines. I need not tell you that hand labour alone will not carry us very far. A rich technique is therefore required in order that the collective farms may be able to develop the production of grain. Have the collective farms this technique? Yes, they have. And this technique will
increase as time goes on.

It requires, finally, that the collective farms should have people, cadres capable of handling technique, who have mastered this technique and have learnt to harness it. Have the collective farms such people, such cadres? Yes, they have. Still not many, it is true, but they have them. This conference, which is attended by the finest harvester-combine operators, men and women, and which represents only a small part of the army of harvester-combine operators in the collective farms, is a proof that such cadres have already grown up in the collective farms. True, such cadres are still few, and that, comrades, is our chief difficulty. But there are no grounds for doubting that the number of such cadres will increase, not yearly and monthly, but daily and hourly.

It follows, therefore, that we have all the conditions necessary for achieving an annual production of seven or eight billion poods of grain in the near future.

That is why I think that the urgent task of which I have spoken can unquestionably be fulfilled.

The main thing now is to devote ourselves to cadres, to train cadres, to help the backward to master technique, to develop, day in and day out, people capable of mastering technique and driving it forward. That is now the main thing, comrades.

Particular attention must be devoted to harvester combines and the harvester-combine operators. You know that the most responsible job in grain farming is harvesting. Harvesting is a seasonal job - and it
does not like to wait. If you have harvested in time - you have won, if you have delayed harvesting - you have lost. The importance of the harvester combine is that it helps to gather in the harvest in time. This is a very great and important job, comrades.

But the importance of the harvester combine does not end here. Its importance also lies in the fact that it saves us from tremendous loss. You know yourselves that harvesting by means of reaping machines involves a tremendous loss of grain. You first have to reap the grain, then to gather it into sheaves, then to gather it into stacks, and then to carry the harvest to the threshing machines - and all this means loss after loss. Everybody admits that by this system of harvesting we lose about 20 or 25 per cent of the harvest. The great importance of the harvester combine is that it reduces loss to an insignificant minimum. The experts tell us that, other conditions being equal, harvesting by means of reaping machines gives a harvest yield of ten poods less per hectare than does harvesting by means of harvester combines. If you take an area of one hundred million hectares of grain crops, and we have a far larger area, as you know, the loss as a result of harvesting by reaping machines would amount to one billion poods of grain. Now try to organise the harvesting of these hundred million hectares with the help of harvester combines, assuming that the combines do not work badly, and you will have a saving of a whole billion poods of grain. Not a small figure, you see.

So you see how great is the importance of har-
vester combines and the people operating the harvester combines.

That is why I think that the introduction of the harvester combine in agriculture, and the training of numerous cadres of harvester-combine operators, men and women, is a task of prime importance.

That is why, in conclusion, I should like to express the wish that the number of harvester-combine operators, men and women, should increase, not daily, but hourly, that, by learning the technique of the harvester combine and teaching it to their comrades, they in the long run should become real victors in agriculture in our country. (Loud and prolonged cheers and applause. Cries of "Long live our beloved Stalin!")

Two more words, comrades. We here in the presidium have been quietly conferring and have decided that it would be fitting to recommend the participants of this conference for the highest award, for an order of distinction - because of their good work. We think, comrades, that we shall put this matter through in the next few days. (Loud and prolonged applause. Cries of "Thanks, Comrade Stalin.")

Pravda
4 December 1935
ADDRESS TO THE COMMISSION OF THE SECOND ALL UNION CONGRESS OF KOLKHOZINES

15 February 1935

If you want to consolidate the artel, if you want to have a mass kolkhozine movement, which will embrace millions of households and not just odd units and groups, if you want to achieve this objective, you are compelled to take into consideration in the actual conditions, not only the communal interests of the Kolkhозine people, but also their private interests.

You do not at all take into consideration the private interests of the Kolkhозine people when you say that it is not necessary to give the Kolkhозине more than one-tenth of a hectare as his individual portion of land. Some people think it is not necessary for the Kolkhозине to have a cow, others think it not necessary to have a sow which is capable of breeding. And in general you want to stifle the Kolkhозине. This state of affairs cannot go on. It is incorrect. You are advanced people. I understand that you are very preoccupied with the Kolkhозине system and with the Kolkhозине economy. But are all the Kolkhозине like you? You are therefore a minority in the Kolkhоз. The majority think rather differently. Is it necessary to take this into account or not? I think it is necessary to take this into account.

If in your artel, your products are not yet in
abundance and you cannot give to the isolated Kolkhozine family all that it needs, then the Kolkhoz cannot claim to satisfy the social and private needs of the people. It would be better to admit frankly that one aspect of your work is social and the other is private. It would be better to admit squarely, openly and frankly that in the Kolkhozine household, there is inevitably minor but very definite exploitation of the individual. It is not enough to concern yourselves only with the large scale exploitation which is admittedly great, decisive and important and the handling of it is indispensible if the social needs of the people are to be satisfied, but of equal importance with this, if the private needs of the people are to be satisfied, is the handling of the small individual exploitation. If one has a family, children, individual needs and tastes, - with your method these things are not taken into consideration. And you have no right not to take into consideration these current interests of the Kolkhozines. Without this, the consolidation of the Kolkhoz is not possible.

It is the combination of the private interests of the Kolkhozines with their social interests which will lead to consolidation. Here lies the key!

Pravda
13 March 1935
Comrades, the presidium of this conference has instructed me to make two announcements:

Firstly, that the presidium intends to recommend for highest award, for an order of distinction, all those present at this conference, men and women, for their excellent work. (Loud and prolonged applause and cheers. Cries of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" Shouts of greeting to the leaders of the Party and government.)

Secondly, that the government has decided to make a gift of an automobile truck to every collective farm represented here and to present every participant at this conference with a gramophone and records (applause) and watches - pocket watches for the men and wrist watches for the women. (Prolonged applause.)

I am being told on all hands that I must say something.

Voices: Quite right. (Applause.)

What is there to say? Everything has been said.

Evidently, you are going to make a success of cotton. That is apparent from everything that is going on here. Your collective farms are growing, you have the desire to work, we shall give you machines, fertilizers you will receive, every kind
of assistance you may possibly need - Comrade Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, has already told you that - will be given. Consequently, you will make a success of cotton and a prosperous life is opening up.

But, comrades, there is one thing more precious than cotton - it is the friendship between the peoples of our country. The present conference, your speeches, your actions, go to show that the friendship between the peoples of our great country is growing stronger. That is a very important and noteworthy fact, comrades. In the old days, when the tsar, the capitalists, and the landlords were in power in our country, it was the policy of the government to make one people - the Russian people - the dominant people, and all the other peoples subjugated and oppressed peoples. That was a bestial, a wolfish policy. In October 1917, when the great proletarian revolution began in our country, when we overthrew the tsar, the landlords and capitalists, the great Lenin, our teacher, our father and tutor, said that henceforth there must be neither dominant nor subjugated peoples, that the people must be equal and free. In this way he buried the old tsarist, bourgeois policy and proclaimed a new policy, a Bolshevik policy - a policy of friendship, a policy of brotherhood between the peoples of our country.

Since then eighteen years have elapsed. And now we already see the beneficial results of this policy. The present conference is a vivid proof of the fact that the former-mistrust between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. has long ago been laid to rest, that mistrust
has been replaced by complete and mutual trust, that the friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is growing and gaining in strength. That, comrades, is the most precious thing that the Bolshevik national policy has given us.

And friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is a great and important achievement. For as long as this friendship exists, the peoples of our country will be free and invincible. Nothing can daunt us, neither enemies at home nor enemies abroad, as long as this friendship lives and flourishes. You need have no doubt of that, comrades.

(Tumultuous applause. All rise and greet Comrade Stalin.)

Pravda
6 December 1935
CONFERNECE OF THE AVANT-GARDIST KOLKHOZINE
MEN AND WOMEN OF TAJIKSTAN AND OF
TURKMENISTAN
WITH THE DIRECTORS OF THE PARTY AND THE
STATE

4 December 1935

Intervention of Comrade Gueldyev Ene, Kolkhozine
president of the Executive Committee of the Farab
district (Turkmenistan).

On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women, Kom-
somols and pioneers in the Farab district, I address
an ardent, fraternal and friendly greeting to the
Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin (applause).

On this solemn and joyful day, I cannot help but
speak of the past of the Turkmenian women. Pre-
viously Turkmenian men took 5 or 6 women at the
same time. They sold small girls of 8 - 10 years old.
They considered a woman's place to be only in the
house, a slave to the domestic household. Now the
situation is very different. Comrades Lenin and Stalin
suggested that it is indispensible to attract the
Turkmenian women into all spheres of construction,
to draw them into the Kolkhozes, into factories,
into the management of Soviet work. We put these
suggestions into practice.

I want to tell you what happened in the district
of Farab, to give an example of the ways in which
suggestions made by Comrades Lenin and Stalin, re-
garding women, have been realized in practice. The
district of Farab is very backward. In reading the
discourse of Comrade Stalin, we have worked un-
ceasingly in order to transform the district of Farab into an avant-garde district, and we have succeeded.

Our women do not only work in cotton, they also work in other branches of the economy. The women especially work in the carpet industry. Our carpet workers have become masters of their art. Moreover, the women of the Farab district now work in the silk industry. This year we have surpassed the plan concerning the production of silk.

Comrade Stalin said to the 1st Congress of the Kolkhozine Oudarniks that woman is a great strength in the Kolkhoz, One cannot improve on this illustration as an example of our Farab district. The majority of men in the district work in navigation and Sovkhozes, Three - quarters of all work in the district is undertaken by women. And these women in the current year have brought the Farab district to the avant garde level.

This year we have encountered great difficulties on two questions. The first, the hand mills. The women have wasted an enormous amount of time grinding cereal in the hand mills. I propose that help be given to the women in the Farab district and throughout Turkestan in order that they do not waste time working in the hand mills.

Stalin : There are no power mills over there.

Gueldyev Ene : Very few, hardly any. Our second difficulty is the khochany work. We have few male workers in our district.

Stalin : What is khochany work?

Gueldyev Ene : It is the cleaning up of the canals. All the time, in winter as well, we have to work in
the water, up to our knees. I ask that help be given to the Farab district by supplying it with excavators and other machines in order to transfer the weight of the work onto the machinery.

We are backward in things concerning our level of culture. We actually live in old kibitikas (old covered carts) in these rough little tents. We have no wood for building and it is for that reason that I am asking you now to give us help with some building materials and cement so that we can build and organize in an exemplary fashion, the Kolkhozine villages.

Molotov: They must have help.

Gueldyev Ene: Our great Party has led us along a great and joyous road, has given us a joyful life. Once we heard these suggestions from our leaders, we forced ourselves to work even harder to make better harvests, and to try to reach a higher standard of living.

Kolkhozine men and women, Komsomols and pioneers of our district address a fraternal and friendly greeting to the Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin. (Lengthy applause - all rise - shouts of "Hurrah!")

I extend greetings to Comrade Stalin on behalf of the carpet workers of the Turkmenian Republic, an ardent salute and a portrait of V. I. Lenin (applause, shouts of "Hurrah", ovations to the addresses of Comrades Stalin and Molotov).

Long live Stalin, well-beloved leader, friend and teacher of the people! (The cheers grow into an ovation - shouts of "Hurrah!")

The Kolkhozine women have asked me to personally present this portrait of Comrade Lenin to our well-
beloved leader and to embrace him on behalf of all of us. (She embraces Comrade Stalin amidst lengthy applause and shouts of "Hurrah!")

Stalin: (looking at the portrait of Lenin) - What an impressive work. (Lengthy ovations to Stalin).

Address from Comrade Aga Iousoup Ali, President of the Bolshevik Kolkhoz of the Turkmenian district of Bairam-Altusk (in Turkmen).

On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women of Turkmenistan, I address a warm greeting to Comrade Stalin and the Politburo. (Applause).

I have been delegated to the 2nd Congress of the Kolkhozine Oudarniks of the U.S.S.R. Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, we have elaborated on the statutes of the agricultural artel. As a delegate, I have taken the spirit of the Congress to heart. So my contribution was 3,250 Kgs. of cotton per hectare. I promised Comrade Stalin that this year I would bring my quota to 4,000 Kgs. per hectare. I say to him now, the promise has been fulfilled. (Applause).

Returning from the Congress together with all the Kolkhозines of our "Bolshevik" Kolkhoz, we studied in depth and detail, the statutes of the agricultural artel. The Kolkhозines have equally considered my promise to Comrade Stalin at the Congress. They have unanimously accepted it, and have decided to take to heart the word of their own president. When I spoke of the Stalinist statutes of the agricultural artel, I mentioned a couple of points about the number of cattle each Kolkhозine could own. "It is as if Comrade Stalin is present among us and knows the need of each individual Kolkhoz member." This is the extent
of the influence on people of the statutes. We have promised to fulfil our obligations to our leader and we have kept this promise which we gave at the 2nd Congress of the Kolkhozines.

As a result of this, we have brought in nearly one million roubles in revenue from cotton. Therefore we have exceeded our aim by 200,000 roubles, according to the fixed price of cotton.

Stalin asks if this is what only one Kolkhoz has brought in.

Aga Iousoup Ali: Yes, just one Kolkhoz.

Stalin: How many groups?

Aga Iousoup Ali: Forty seven.

We now have electric lighting and radio. We have schools, we have money, but, Comrade Stalin, we are still living in these little tents as before.

Stalin: You need wood for building.


Molotov: That’s fair.

Aga Iousoup Ali: We have money, we have everything, but in Turkmenistan there is no wood for building. I ask for immediate help in this matter.

What people could come here before to a Congress? Previously only the Tsarist generals, the governors, the high fonctioneers could be here. Today, we are all present here at this Congress together with Comrade Stalin. This was never possible under the old regime. I live in the district of Bairam-Altusk. In this district there is an old property of Tsar Nicholas II. Iousoup Kahn, Voli-Kahn, used to live there.

We used to work for them and we never knew how
much we earned. He ruined us continuously.

Now the Party has opened up for us a bright and joyful life. We owe this to the leadership of Comrade Stalin, to the leadership of our great Party. Long live Comrade Stalin, great leader and beloved by the people! Long live the members of the Politburo! (Prolonged applause).

Pravda
5 December 1935
INTERVIEW BETWEEN J. STALIN AND ROY HOWARD

(On March 1, 1936, Comrade Stalin granted an interview to Roy Howard, President of Scripps-Howard Newspapers.)

Howard: What, in your opinion, would be the consequences of the recent events in Japan for the situation in the Far East?

Stalin: So far it is difficult to say. Too little material is available to do so. The picture is not sufficiently clear.

Howard: What will be the Soviet attitude should Japan launch the long predicted military drive against Outer Mongolia?

Stalin: If Japan should venture to attack the Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its independence, we will have to help the Mongolian People's Republic. Stomonyakov, Litvinov's assistant, recently informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow of this, and pointed to the immutable friendly relations which the U.S.S.R. has been maintaining with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped it in 1921.

Howard: Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulan-Bator make positive action by the U.S.S.R. a necessity?

Stalin: Yes.

Howard: Have recent events developed any new
Japanese activities in this region which are construed by the Soviets as of an aggressive nature?

Stalin: The Japanese, I think, are continuing to concentrate troops on the frontiers of the Mongolian People's Republic, but no new attempts at frontier conflicts are so far observed.

Howard: The Soviet Union appears to believe that Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union, and are planning military cooperation. Poland, however, protested her unwillingness to permit any foreign troops using her territory as a basis for operations against a third nation. How does the Soviet Union envisage such aggression by Germany? From what position, in what direction would the German forces operate?

Stalin: History shows that when any state intends to make war against another state, even not adjacent, it begins to seek for frontiers across which it can reach the frontiers of the state it wants to attack. Usually, the aggressive state finds such frontiers. It either finds them with the aid of force, as was the case in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium in order to strike at France, or it "borrows" such a frontier, as Germany, for example, did from Latvia in 1918, in her drive to Leningrad. I do not know precisely what frontiers Germany may adapt to her aims, but I think she will find people willing to "lend" her a frontier.

Howard: Seemingly, the entire world today is predicting another great war. If war proves inevitable, when, Mr. Stalin, do you think it will come?

Stalin: It is impossible to predict that. War may
break out unexpectedly. Wars are not declared, nowadays. They simply start. On the other hand, however, I think the positions of the friends of peace are becoming stronger. The friends of peace can work openly. They rely on the power of public opinion. They have at their command instruments like the League of Nations, for example. This is where the friends of peace have the advantage. Their strength lies in the fact that their activities against war are backed by the will of the broad masses of the people. There is not a people in the world that wants war. As for the enemies of peace, they are compelled to work secretly. That is where the enemies of peace are at a disadvantage. Incidentally, it is not precluded that precisely because of this they may decide upon a military adventure as an act of desperation.

One of the latest successes the friends of peace have achieved is the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance by the French Chamber of Deputies. To a certain extent, this pact is an obstacle to the enemies of peace.

Howard: Should war come, Mr. Stalin, where is it most likely to break out? Where are the war clouds the most menacing, in the East or in the West?

Stalin: In my opinion there are two seats of war danger. The first is in the Far East, in the zone of Japan. I have in mind the numerous statements made by Japanese military men containing threats against other powers. The second seat is in the zone of Germany. It is hard to say which is the most menacing, but both exist and are active. Compared
with these two principal seats of war danger, the Italian-Abyssinian war is an episode. At present, the Far Eastern seat of danger reveals the greatest activity. However, the centre of this danger may shift to Europe. This is indicated, for example, by the interview which Herr Hitler recently gave to a French newspaper. In this interview Hitler seems to have tried to say peaceful things, but he sprinkled his "peacefulness" so plentifully with threats against both France and the Soviet Union that nothing remained of his "peacefulness." You see, even when Herr Hitler wants to speak of peace he cannot avoid uttering threats. This is symptomatic.

Howard: What situation or condition, in your opinion, furnishes the chief war menace today?

Stalin: Capitalism.

Howard: In which specific manifestation of capitalism?

Stalin: Its imperialist, usurpatory manifestation.

You remember how the first World War arose. It arose out of the desire to re-divide the world. Today we have the same background. There are capitalist states which consider that they were cheated in the previous redistribution of spheres of influence, territories, sources of raw materials, markets, etc., and which would want another redivision that would be in their favour. Capitalism, in its imperialist phase, is a system which considers war to be a legitimate instrument for settling international disputes, a legal method in fact, if not in law.

Howard: May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear existent in what you term cap-
italistic countries of an intent on the part of the Soviet Union to force its political theories on other nations?

Stalin: There is no justification whatever for such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to change the face of surrounding states, and by forcible means at that, you are entirely mistaken. Of course, Soviet people would like to see the face of surrounding states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding states. I fail to see what danger the surrounding states can perceive in the ideas of the Soviet people if these states are really sitting firmly in the saddle.

Howard: Does this, your statement, mean that the Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans and intentions for bringing about world revolution?

Stalin: We never had such plans and intentions.

Howard: You appreciate, no doubt, Mr. Stalin, that much of the world has long entertained a different impression.

Stalin: This is the product of a misunderstanding.

Howard: A tragic misunderstanding?

Stalin: No, a comical one. Or, perhaps, tragi-comic.

You see, we Marxists believe that a revolution will also take place in other countries. But it will take place only when the revolutionaries in those countries think it possible, or necessary. The export of revolution is nonsense. Every country will make its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not want to, there will be no revolution. For example, our country wanted to make a revolution and made
it, and now we are building a new, classless society. But to assert that we want to make a revolution in other countries, to interfere in their lives, means saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated.

Howard: At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., President Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged identical notes concerning the question of propaganda. Paragraph four of Litvinov's letter to President Roosevelt said that the Soviet government undertakes "not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organisation or group - and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organisation or group, or of representatives or officials of any organisation or group - which has as its aim, the overthrow, or preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of its territories or possessions." Why, Mr. Stalin, did Litvinov sign this letter if compliance with the terms of paragraph four is incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union or beyond its control?

Stalin: The fulfilment of the obligations contained in the paragraph you have quoted is within our control; we have fulfilled, and will continue to fulfil, these obligations.

According to our constitution, political emigrants have the right to reside on our territory. We provide them with the right of asylum just as the United States gives right of asylum to political emigrants. It is quite obvious that when Litvinov signed that
letter he assumed that the obligations contained in it were mutual. Do you think, Mr. Howard, that the fact that there are on the territory of the U.S.A., Russian whiteguard emigrants who are carrying on propaganda against the Soviets, and in favour of capitalism, who enjoy the material support of American citizens, and who, in some cases, represent groups of terrorists, is contrary to the terms of the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement? Evidently these emigrants enjoy the right of asylum, which also exists in the United States. As far as we are concerned, we would never tolerate on our territory a single terrorist, no matter against whom his criminal designs were directed. Evidently the right of asylum is given a wider interpretation in the U.S.A. than in our country. But we are not complaining.

Perhaps you will say that we sympathize with the political emigrants who come on to our territory. But are there no American citizens who sympathize with the whiteguard emigrants who carry on propaganda in favour of capitalism and against the Soviets? So what is the point? The point is not to assist these people, not to finance their activities. The point is that official persons in either country must refrain from interfering in the internal life of the other country. Our officials are honestly fulfilling this obligation. If any of them has failed in his duty, let us be informed about it.

If we were to go too far and to demand that all the white guard emigrants be deported from the United States, that would be encroaching on the right of asylum proclaimed both in the U.S.A. and in the
U.S.S.R. A reasonable limit to claims and counter-claims must be recognised. Litvinov signed his letter to President Roosevelt, not in a private capacity, but in the capacity of representative of a state, just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement is an agreement between two states. In signing that agreement both Litvinov and President Roosevelt, as representatives of two states, had in mind the activities of the agents of their states who must not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of the other side. The right of asylum proclaimed in both countries could not be affected by this agreement. The Roosevelt - Litvinov agreement, as an agreement between the representatives of two states, should be interpreted within these limits.

Howard: Did not Browder and Darcy, the American Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress of the Communist International last summer, appeal for the overthrow by force of the American government?

Stalin: I confess I do not remember the speeches of Comrades Browder and Darcy; I do not even remember what they spoke about. Perhaps they did say something of the kind. But it was not Soviet people who formed the American Communist Party. It was formed by Americans. It exists in the U.S.A. legally. It puts up its candidates at elections, including presidential elections. If Comrades Browder and Darcy made speeches in Moscow once, they made hundreds of similar, and certainly stronger speeches at home, in the U.S.A. The American Communists are permitted to advocate their ideas freely, are
they not? It would be quite wrong to hold the Soviet government responsible for the activities of American Communists.

Howard: But in this instance, is it not a fact that their activities took place on Soviet soil, contrary to the terms of paragraph four of the agreement between Roosevelt and Litvinov?

Stalin: What are the activities of the Communist Party; in what way can they manifest themselves? Usually their activities consist in organising the masses of the workers, in organising meetings, demonstrations, strikes, etc. It goes without saying that the American Communists cannot do all this on Soviet territory. We have no American workers in the U.S.S.R.

Howard: I take it that the gist of your thought then is that an interpretation can be made which will safeguard and continue good relations between our countries?

Stalin: Yes, absolutely.

Howard: Admittedly communism has not been achieved in Russia. State socialism has been built. Have not fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in Germany claimed that they have attained similar results? Have not both been achieved at the price of privation and personal liberty, sacrificed for the good of the state?

Stalin: The term "state socialism" is inexact. Many people take this term to mean the system under which a certain part of wealth, sometimes a fairly considerable part, passes into the hands of the state, or under its control, while in the overwhelming
majority of cases the works, factories and the land remain the property of private persons. This is what many people take "state socialism" to mean. Sometimes this term covers a system under which the capitalist state, in order to prepare for, or wage war, runs a certain number of private enterprises at its own expense. The society which we have built cannot possibly be called "state socialism." Our Soviet society is socialist society, because the private ownership of the factories, works, the land, the banks and the transport system has been abolished and public ownership put in its place. The social organisation which we have created may be called a Soviet socialist organisation, not entirely completed, but fundamentally, a socialist organisation of society. The foundation of this society is public property: state, i.e., national, and also co-operative, collective farm property. Neither Italian fascism nor German National-"Socialism" has anything in common with such a society. Primarily, this is because the private ownership of the factories and works, of the land, the banks, transport, etc., has remained intact, and, therefore, capitalism remains in full force in Germany and in Italy.

Yes, you are right, we have not yet built communist society. It is not so easy to build such a society. You are probably aware of the difference between socialist society and communist society. In socialist society certain inequalities in property still exist. But in socialist society there is no longer unemployment, no exploitation, no oppression of
nationalities. In socialist society everyone is obliged to work, although he does not, in return for his labour receive according to his requirements, but according to the quantity and quality of the work he has performed. That is why wages, and, moreover, unequal, differentiated wages, still exist. Only when we have succeeded in creating a system under which, in return for their labour, people will receive from society, not according to the quantity and quality of the labour they perform, but according to their requirements, will it be possible to say that we have built communist society.

You say that in order to build our socialist society we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privation. Your question suggests that socialist society denies personal liberty. That is not true. Of course, in order to build something new one must economize, accumulate resources, reduce one's consumption for a time and borrow from others. If one wants to build a house one saves up money, cuts down consumption for a time, otherwise the house would never be built. How much more true is this when it is a matter of building a new human society? We had to cut down consumption somewhat for a time, collect the necessary resources and exert great effort. This is exactly what we did and we built a socialist society.

But we did not build this society in order to restrict personal liberty but in order that the human individual may feel really free. We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks. It is difficult for me to imagine what "personal liberty" is enjoyed by an unemployed person,
who goes about hungry, and cannot find employment. Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of being tomorrow deprived of work, of home and of bread. Only in such a society is real, and not paper, personal and every other liberty possible.

Howard: Do you view as compatible the coincidental development of American democracy and the Soviet system?

Stalin: American democracy and the Soviet system may peacefully exist side by side and compete with each other. But one cannot evolve into the other. The Soviet system will not evolve into American democracy, or vice versa. We can peacefully exist side by side if we do not find fault with each other over every trifling matter.

Howard: A new constitution is being elaborated in the U.S.S.R. providing for a new system of elections. To what degree can this new system alter the situation in the U.S.S.R. since, as formerly, only one party will come forward at elections?

Stalin: We shall probably adopt our new constitution at the end of this year. The commission appointed to draw up the constitution is working and should finish its labours soon. As has been announced already, according to the new constitution, the suffrage will be universal, equal, direct and secret. You are puzzled by the fact that only one party will come forward at elections. You cannot see how election contests can take place under these con-
ditions. Evidently candidates will be put forward not only by the Communist Party, but by all sorts of public, non-Party organisations. And we have hundreds of these. We have no contending parties any more than we have a capitalist class contending against a working class which is exploited by the capitalists. Our society consists exclusively of free toilers of town and country - workers, peasants, intellectuals. Each of these strata may have its special interests and express them by means of the numerous public organisations that exist. But since there are no classes, since the dividing lines between classes have been obliterated, since only a slight, but not a fundamental, difference between various strata in socialist society has remained, there can be no soil for the creation of contending parties. Where there are not several classes there cannot be several parties, for a party is part of a class.

Under National-"Socialism" there is also only one party. But nothing will come of this fascist one-party system. The point is that in Germany, capitalism and classes have remained, the class struggle has remained and will force itself to the surface in spite of everything, even in the struggle between parties which represent antagonistic classes, just as it did in Spain, for example. In Italy there is also only one party, the Fascist Party. But nothing will come of it there for the same reasons.

Why will our suffrage be universal? Because all citizens, except those deprived of the franchise by the courts, will have the right to elect and be elected.

Why will our suffrage be equal? Because neither
differences in property (which still exist to some extent) nor racial or national affiliation will entail either privilege or disability. Women will enjoy the same rights to elect and be elected as men. Our suffrage will be really equal.

Why secret? Because we want to give Soviet people complete freedom to vote for those they want to elect, for those whom they trust to safeguard their interests.

Why direct? Because direct elections to all representative institutions, right up to the supreme bodies, will best of all safeguard the interests of the toilers of our boundless country.

You think that there will be no election contests. But there will be, and I foresee very lively election campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our country which work badly. Cases occur when this or that local government body fails to satisfy certain of the multifarious and growing requirements of the toilers of town and country. Have you built a good school or not? Have you improved housing conditions? Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our labour more effective and our lives more cultured? Such will be the criteria with which millions of electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' lists, and promote and nominate the best. Yes, election campaigns will be very lively, they will be conducted around numerous, very acute problems, principally of a practical nature, of first class importance for the people. Our new electoral system will tighten up all institutions and organisations and
compel them to improve their work. Universal, direct and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip in the hands of the population against the organs of government which work badly. In my opinion our new Soviet constitution will be the most democratic constitution in the world.

Pravda
5 March 1936
To Comrade Jose Diaz.

The workers of the Soviet Union are merely carrying out their duty in giving help within their power to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They are aware that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist reactionaries is not a private affair of the Spanish people but the common cause of the whole of advanced and progressive mankind.

Fraternal greetings,
J. Stalin.

Pravda
16 October 1936
ON THE
DRAFT CONSTITUTION
OF THE U.S.S.R.

REPORT DELIVERED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY
EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE U.S.S.R.

25 November 1936

(Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is
greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers.
All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Hurrah
for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!"
"Long live the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great
genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Hurrah
for Comrade Stalin!")

1. FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION
AND ITS TASKS.

Comrades, the Constitution Commission, whose
draft has been submitted for consideration to the
present Congress, was formed, as you know, by
special decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets
of the U.S.S.R. This decision was adopted on February
6, 1935. It reads:

"1. To amend the Constitution of the Union
Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction of:

"a) further democratizing the electoral
system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage
by equal suffrage, indirect elections, by direct
elections and the open ballot by the secret
ballot;

"b) giving more precise definition to the social and economic basis of the Constitution by bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present relation of class forces in the U.S.S.R. (the creation of a new, Socialist industry, the demolition of the kulak class, the victory of the collective farm system, the consolidation of Socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, and so on).

"2. To enjoin the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to elect a Constitution Commission which shall be instructed to draw up an amended text of the Constitution in accordance with the principles indicated in Clause 1, and to submit it for approval to a Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"3. To conduct the next ordinary elections of the organs of Soviet government in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis of the new electoral system."

This was on February 6, 1935. The day after this decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the First Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. met, and in pursuance of the decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission to prepare a draft of an amended Constitution of the U.S.S.R.
Such were the formal grounds and instructions of the supreme body of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of which the work of the Constitution Commission was to proceed.

Thus, the Constitution Commission was to introduce changes in the Constitution now in force, which was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes in the direction of Socialism which have been brought about in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to the present day.


What are the changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. that have been brought about in the period from 1924 to 1936 and which the Constitution Commission was to reflect in its Draft Constitution?

What is the essence of these changes?

What was the situation in 1924?

That was the first period of the New Economic Policy, when the Soviet government permitted a certain revival of capitalism while taking all measures to develop Socialism; when it calculated on securing, in the course of competition between the two systems of economy - the capitalist system and the Socialist system - the preponderance of the Socialist system over the capitalist system. The task was to consolidate the position of Socialism in the course of this competition, to achieve the elimination of the capitalist elements, and to consummate the victory of the Socialist system as the fundamental system of the national economy.
Our industry, particularly heavy industry, presented an unenviable picture at that time. True, it was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised its output to anywhere near the pre-war level. It was based on the old, backward, and insufficient technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction of Socialism. The Socialist sector of our industry at that time accounted for about 80 per cent of the whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no less than 20 per cent of industry.

Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly picture. True, the landlord class had already been eliminated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small individual peasant farms with backward, mediaeval technical equipment. In this ocean there existed, in the form of isolated small dots and islets, collective farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were not yet of any considerable significance in our national economy. The collective farms and state farms were weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time we spoke not of eliminating the kulaks, but of restricting them.

The same must be said about our country's trade. The Socialist sector in trade represented some 50 or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the field was occupied by merchants, profiteers, and other private traders.
Such was the picture of economic life in our country in 1924.

What is the situation now, in 1936?

At that time we were in the first period of the New Economic Policy, the beginning of NEP, the period of a certain revival of capitalism; now, however, we are in the last period of NEP, the end of NEP, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism in all spheres of the national economy.

Take the fact, to begin with, that during this period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on new, rich, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully developed heavy industry, and an even more developed machine-building industry. But the most important thing is that capitalism has been banished entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the Socialist form of production now holds undivided sway in the sphere of our industry. The fact that in volume of output our present Socialist industry exceeds pre-war industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded as a minor detail.

In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean of small individual peasant farms, with their poor technical equipment, and a strong kulak influence, we now have mechanized production, conducted on a scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an all-embracing system of collective farms and state farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class in agriculture has been eliminated, while the sector of
small individual peasant farms, with its backward, mediaeval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant place; its share in agriculture as regards crop area does not amount to more than two or three per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horse power, and, together with the state farms, over 400,000 tractors, with a total of 7,580,000 horse power.

As for the country's trade, the merchants and profiteers have been banished entirely from this sphere. All trade is now in the hands of the state, the cooperative societies, and the collective farms. A new, Soviet trade - trade without profiteers, trade without capitalists - has arisen and developed.

Thus the complete victory of the Socialist system in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact.

And what does this mean?

It means that the exploitation of man by man has been abolished, eliminated, while the Socialist ownership of the implements and means of production has been established as the unshakable foundation of our Soviet society. (Prolonged applause.)

As a result of all these changes in the sphere of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we now have a new, Socialist economy, which knows neither crises nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor ruin, and which provides our citizens with every opportunity to lead a prosperous and cultured life.

Such, in the main, are the changes which have taken place in the sphere of our economy during the period from 1924 to 1936.
In conformity with these changes in the economic life of the U.S.S.R., the class structure of our society has also changed.

The landlord class, as you know, had already been eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus all the exploiting classes have been eliminated.

There remains the working class.

There remains the peasant class.

There remains the intelligentsia.

But it would be a mistake to think that these social groups have undergone no change during this period, that they have remained the same as they were, say, in the period of capitalism.

Take, for example, the working class of the U.S.S.R. By force of habit, it is often called the proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat is a class bereft of the instruments and means of production, under an economic system in which the means and instruments of production belong to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as you know, the capitalist class has already been eliminated, and the instruments and means of production have been taken from the capitalists and transferred to the state, of which the leading force
is the working class. Consequently, our working class, far from being bereft of the instruments and means of production, on the contrary, possess them jointly with the whole people. And since it possesses them, and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all possibility of the working class being exploited is precluded. This being the case, can our working class be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments and means of production from the capitalists, and abolish those conditions of production which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already brought about these conditions for its emancipation? Unquestionably, this can and must be said. And what does this mean? This means that the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R., which has abolished the capitalist economic system, which has established the Socialist ownership of the instruments and means of production and is directing Soviet society along the road to Communism.

As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is an entirely new working class, a working class emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class of small producers, with its members atomized, scattered over the face of the land, delving away in isolation on their small farms with their backward
technical equipment; that they are slaves to private property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated from exploitation. Further Our Soviet peasantry, its overwhelming majority, is a collective farm peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on individual labour and on backward technical equipment, but on collective labour and up-to-date technical equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasants is based, not on private property, but on collective property, which has grown up on the basis of collective labour.

As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind has never known before.

Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, of workers on the cultural front, of employees in general, and so on. The intelligentsia too, has undergone great changes during this period. It is no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried to place itself above classes, but which actually,
for the most part, served the landlords and the capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with the working class and the peasantry. In the first place, the composition of the intelligentsia has changed. People who come from the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie constitute but a small percentage of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from the peasantry, or from some other strata of the working population. Finally, the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting classes. And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together with them, it is engaged in building the new, classless, Socialist society.

As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, the like of which you will not find in any other country on earth.

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period as regards the class structure of Soviet society.

What do these changes signify?

Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines between the working class and the peasantry, and between these classes and the intelligentsia, are being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness is disappearing. This means that the distance between
these social groups is steadily diminishing.

Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions between these social groups are declining and becoming obliterated.

And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions between them are also declining and becoming obliterated.

Such is the position in regard to the changes in the class structure of the U.S.S.R.

The picture of the changes in the social life of the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete if a few words were not said about the changes in yet another sphere. I have in mind the sphere of national relationships in the U.S.S.R. As you know, within the Soviet Union there are about sixty nations, national groups and nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national state. Clearly, the question of the relations among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be one of prime importance for us.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you know, was formed in 1922, at the First Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles of equality and the voluntary affiliation of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in force, adopted in 1924, was the first Constitution of the U.S.S.R. That was the period when relations among the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when survivals of distrust towards the Great-Russians had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces still continued to operate. Under those conditions it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation among the peoples on the basis of economic, political,
and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single federated, multi-national state. The Soviet government could not but see the difficulties of this task. It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had before it the experiment of old Austria-Hungary, which ended in failure. Nevertheless, it resolved to make the experiment of creating a multi-national state, for it knew that a multi-national state which has arisen on the basis of Socialism is bound to stand every and any test.

Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period long enough to test the experiment. And what do we find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the experiment of forming a multi-national state based on Socialism has been completely successful. This is the undoubted victory of the Leninist national policy. (Prolonged applause.)

How is this victory to be explained?

The absence of exploiting classes, which are the principal organizers of strife between nations; the absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that power is in the hands of the working class, which is the foe of all enslavement and the true vehicle of the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture which is national in form and Socialist in content - all these and similar factors have brought about a radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the
U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, a feeling of mutual friendship has developed among them, and thus real fraternal cooperation among the peoples has been established within the system of a single federated state.

As a result, we now have a fully formed multinational Socialist state, which has stood all tests, and whose stability might well be envied by any national state in any part of the world. (Loud applause.)

Such are the changes which have taken place during this period in the sphere of national relations in the U.S.S.R.

Such is the sum total of changes which have taken place in the sphere of the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

III. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

How are all these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. reflected in the draft of the new Constitution?

In other words: What are the principal specific features of the Draft Constitution submitted for consideration to the present Congress?

The Constitution Commission was instructed to amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The work of the Constitution Commission has resulted in a new text of the Constitution, a draft of a new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In drafting the new Constitution, the Constitution Commission proceeded from the proposition that a constitution must not
be confused with a program. This means that there is an essential difference between a program and a constitution. Whereas a program speaks of that which does not yet exist, of that which has yet to be achieved and won in the future, a constitution, on the contrary, must speak of that which already exists, of that which has already been achieved and won now, at the present time. A program deals mainly with the future, a constitution with the present.

Two examples by way of illustration.

Our Soviet society has already, in the main, succeeded in achieving Socialism; it has created a Socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, phase of Communism. Hence, in the main, we have already achieved the first phase of Communism. Socialism. (Prolonged applause.) The fundamental principle of this phase of Communism is, as you know, the formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work." Should our Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that Socialism has been achieved? Should it be based on this achievement? Unquestionably, it should. It should, because for the U.S.S.R. Socialism is something already achieved and won.

But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher phase of Communism, in which the ruling principle will be the formula: "From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs," although it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase of Communism in the future. Can our Constitution-
be based on the higher phase of Communism, which does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? No, it cannot, because for the U.S.S.R. the higher phase of Communism is something that has not yet been realized, and which has to be realized in the future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into a program or a declaration of future achievements. Such are the limits of our Constitution at the present historical moment.

Thus, the draft of the new Constitution is a summary of the path that has been traversed, a summary of the gains already achieved. In other words, it is the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won in actual fact. (Loud applause.)

That is the first specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist system is immutable. The main foundation of these constitutions consists of the principles of capitalism, of its main pillars: the private ownership of the land, forests, factories, works, and other implements and means of production; the exploitation of man by man and the existence of exploiters and exploited; insecurity for the toiling majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the non-toiling but secure minority at the other pole, etc., etc. They rest on these, and similar pillars of capitalism. They reflect them, they embody them in law.

Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution
of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that the capitalist system has been liquidated, and that the Socialist system has triumphed in the U.S.S.R. The main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the principles of Socialism, whose main pillars are things that have already been achieved and realized: the Socialist ownership of the land, forests, factories, works and other instruments and means of production; the abolition of exploitation and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and an honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in accordance with the formula: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat"; the right to work, i.e., the right of every citizen to receive guaranteed employment; the right to rest and leisure; the right to education, etc., etc. The draft of the new Constitution rests on these, and similar pillars of Socialism. It reflects them, it enbodies them in law.

Such is the second specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that society consists of antagonistic classes, of classes which own wealth and classes which do not own wealth; that no matter what party comes into power, the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the bourgeoisie; that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the propertied classes.

Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the
new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the labouring classes, that are in power; that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) is in the hands of the working class, the most advanced class in society, that a constitution is needed for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, and beneficial to, the working people.

Such is the third specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed from the premise that nations and races cannot have equal rights, that there are nations with full rights and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, there is a third category of nations or races, for example the colonies, which have even fewer rights than the nations without full rights. This means that, at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, i.e., constitutions of ruling nations.

Unlike these constitutions, the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races have equal rights. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference in colour or language, cultural level, or level of political development, nor any other difference between nations and races, can serve as grounds for justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds from the proposition that all nations and races, irrespective of their past and present position, ir-
respective of their strength or weakness, should enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, social, political and cultural life of society.

Such is the fourth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution.

The fifth specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing democratism. From the standpoint of democratism, bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two groups: One group of constitutions openly denies, or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions readily accepts, and even advertises democratic principles, but at the same time it makes reservations and provides for restrictions which utterly mutilate these democratic rights and liberties. They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, but at the same time limit it by residential, educational, and even property qualifications. They speak of equal rights for citizens, but at the same time they make the reservation that this does not apply to women, or applies to them only in part. And so on and so forth.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the fact that it is free from such reservations and restrictions. For it, there exists no division of citizens into active and passive ones; for it, all citizens are active. It does not recognize any difference in rights as between men and women, "residents" and "non-residents," propertied and propertyless, educated and uneducated. For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not
property status, not national origin, not sex, nor office, but personal ability and personal labour, that determines the position of every citizen in society.

Lastly, there is still one more specific feature of the draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois constitutions usually confine themselves to stating the formal rights of citizens, without bothering about the conditions for the exercise of these rights, about the opportunity of exercising them, about the means by which they can be exercised. They speak of the equality of citizens, but forget that there cannot be real equality between employer and workman, between landlord and peasant, if the former possess wealth and political weight in society while the latter are deprived of both - if the former are exploiters while the latter are exploited. Or again: they speak of freedom of speech, assembly, and the press, but forget that all these liberties may be merely a hollow sound for the working class, if the latter cannot have access to suitable premises for meetings, good printing shops, a sufficient quantity of printing paper, etc.

What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution is the fact that it does not confine itself to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses the guarantee of these rights, the means by which these rights can be exercised. It does not merely proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the fact that the citizens have been emancipated from all exploitation. It does not merely proclaim the
right to work, but ensures it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that there are no crises in Soviet society, and that unemployment has been abolished. It does not merely proclaim democratic liberties, but legislatively ensures them by providing definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, that the democratism of the draft of the new Constitution is not the "ordinary" and "universally recognized" democratism in the abstract, but Socialist democratism.

These are the principle specific features of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

This is the way the draft of the new Constitution reflects the progress and changes that have been brought about in the economic and social-political life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936.

IV. BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

A few words about bourgeois criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The question of the attitude of the foreign bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is undoubtedly of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign press reflects the public opinion of the various sections of the population of bourgeois countries, we cannot ignore its criticism of the Draft Constitution.

The first reaction of the foreign press to the Draft Constitution was expressed in a definite tendency - to hush up the Draft Constitution, I am referring here to the most reactionary press, the
fascist press. This group of critics thought it best to simply hush up the Draft Constitution and to pretend that there is no such Draft, and never has been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. But that is not true. The method of keeping silence, as a special method of ignoring things, is also a form of criticism - a stupid and ridiculous form, it is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. (Laughter and applause.) But their silence was of no avail. In the end they were obliged to open the valve and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, a Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. does exist, and not only does it exist but it is beginning to exercise a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could it be otherwise; for, after all, there is such a thing as public opinion in the world, there is the reading public, living people, who want to know the facts, and to hold them in the vise of deception for long is quite impossible. Deception does not carry one far...

The second group of critics admits that there really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution, but considers that the draft is not of much interest, because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a scrap of paper, an empty promise, with the idea of performing a certain manoeuvre to deceive people. And they add that the U.S.S.R. could not produce a better draft, because the U.S.S.R. itself is not a state, but only a geographical concept (general laughter), and since it is not a state, its Constitution cannot be a real constitution. A typical representative of this group of critics is, strange as it may appear,
the German semi-official organ, "Deutsche Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz." This journal bluntly declares that the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin village." It unhesitantly declares that the U.S.S.R. is not a state, that the U.S.S.R. "is nothing more nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" (general laughter), and that in view of this, the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. cannot be regarded as a real constitution.

What can one say about such critics, so-called?

In one of his tales the great Russian writer Shchedrin portrays a pig-headed official, very narrow-minded and obtuse, but self-confident and zealous to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established "order and tranquillity" in the region "under his charge," having exterminated thousands of its inhabitants and burned down scores of towns in the process, he looked around him, and on the horizon espied America - a country little known, of course, where, it appears, there are liberties of some sort or other which serve to agitate the people, and where the state is administered in a different way. The bureaucrat espied America and became indignant: What country is that, how did it get there, by what right does it exist? (Laughter and applause.) Of course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? (General laughter.) Thereupon he wrote an order: "Shut America up again!" (General laughter.)

It seems to me that the gentlemen of the
"Deutsche Diplomatisch - Politische Korrespondenz" and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. (Laughter and applause.) The U.S.S.R. has long been an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years the U.S.S.R. has stood like a beacon, spreading the the spirit of emancipation among the working class all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies of the working class. And it turns out that this U.S.S.R. not only exists, but is even growing; is not only growing, but is even flourishing; and is not only flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds and inspiring the oppressed classes with new hope. (Applause.) How can the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ be anything but indignant after this? What sort of country is this? - they howl; by what right does it exist? (General laughter.) And if it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? Thereupon they resolved: Shut the U.S.S.R. up again; proclaim publicly that the U.S.S.R., as a state, does not exist, that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but a mere geographical concept. (General laughter.)

In writing his order to shut America up again, Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, evinced some reality by adding to himself: "However, it seems that same is not within my power." (Roars of laughter and applause.) I do not know whether the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ are endowed with sufficient intelligence to suspect that - while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that country on paper - speaking seriously, however, "same
is not within their power..." (Roars of laughter and applause.)

As for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. being an empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would like to refer to a number of established facts which speak for themselves.

In 1917 the peoples of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the proletariat, established a Soviet government. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government eliminated the landlord class and transferred to the peasants over 150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government, and monasterial lands, over and above the lands which were already in the possession of the peasants. This is a fact, not a promise.

Further, the Soviet government expropriated the capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, railways, and other implements and means of production, declared these to be Socialist property, and placed at the head of these enterprises the best members of the working class. This is a fact, not a promise. (Prolonged applause.)

Further, having organized industry and agriculture on new, Socialist lines, with a new technical base, the Soviet government has today attained a position where agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is producing one and a half times as much as was produced in pre-war times, where industry is producing seven times more than was produced in pre-war times, and where the national income has increased fourfold compared with pre-war times. All these are facts, not pro-
Further, the Soviet government has abolished unemployment, has introduced the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to education, has provided better material and cultural conditions for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and has ensured the introduction of universal, direct and equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. All these are facts, not promises. (prolonged applause.)

Finally, the U.S.S.R. has produced the draft of a new Constitution which is not a promise but the registration and legislative embodiment of these generally known facts, the registration and legislative embodiment of what has already been achieved and won.

One may ask: In view of all this, what can all the talk of the gentlemen of the German semi-official organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to but an attempt on their part to conceal from the people the truth about the U.S.S.R., to mislead the people, to deceive them.

Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semi-official organ may say: So much the worse for the facts. (Laughter.) But then, we can answer them in the words of the well-known Russian proverb: "Laws are not made for fools." (Laughter and prolonged applause.)

The third group of critics are not averse to recognizing certain merits in the Draft Constitution; they regard it as a good thing; but, you see, they
doubt very much whether a number of its principles can be applied in practice, because they are convinced that these principles are generally impracticable and must remain a dead letter. These, to put it mildly, are sceptics. These sceptics are to be found in all countries.

It must be said that this is not the first time we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power in 1917 the sceptics said: The Bolsheviks are not bad fellows, perhaps, but nothing will come of their government; they will fail. Actually it turned out, however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, but the sceptics.

During the civil war and foreign intervention this group of sceptics said: The Soviet government is not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that the sceptics were wrong again in their calculations.

When the Soviet government published the First Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the scene saying: The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, of course, but it is hardly feasible; the Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts proved, however, that once again the sceptics had bad luck: the Five-Year Plan was carried out in four years.

The same must be said about the draft of the new Constitution and the criticism levelled against it by the sceptics. No sooner was the Draft published than this group of critics again appeared on the scene with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts as to
the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. There is not the slightest ground for doubt that in this case, too, the sceptics will fail, that they will fail today as they have failed more than once in the past.

The fourth group of critics, in attacking the draft of the new Constitution, characterize it as a "swing to the Right," as the "abandonment of the dictatorship of the proletariat," as the "liquidation of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung to the Right, that is a fact," they declare in a chorus of different voices. Particularly zealous in this respect are certain Polish newspapers, and also some American newspapers.

What can one say about these critics, so-called?

If the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship of the working class and the transformation of the dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, a more powerful system of guidance of society by the state is interpreted by them not as strengthening the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know what the dictatorship of the working class means.

If the legislative embodiment given to the victories of Socialism, the legislative embodiment given to the successes of industrialization, collectivization, and democratization is represented by them as a "swing to the Right," then it is legitimate to ask: Do these gentlemen really know the difference between left and right? (General laughter and applause.)

There can be no doubt that these gentlemen have
entirely lost their way in their criticism of the Draft Constitution, and, having lost their way, they confuse right with left.

One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the "wench" Pelageya in Gogol's "Dead Souls." Gogol relates that Pelageya offered to act as guide to Chichikov's coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the right side of the road from the left, she lost her way and got into an embarrassing situation. It must be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, the intelligence of our critics on the Polish newspapers is not much above that of the "wench" Pelageya in "Dead Souls." (Applause.) If you remember, the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to her: "Oh, you dirty-legs...you don't know which is right and which is left." It seems to me that our luckless critics should be chided in the same way: "Oh, you sorry critics...you don't know which is right and which is left." (Prolonged applause.)

Finally, there is yet another group of critics. While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses it of not changing anything in the existing position in the U.S.S.R., of leaving the dictatorship of the working class intact, of not granting freedom to political parties, and of preserving the present leading position of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. And this group of critics maintains that the absence of freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is a symptom of the violation of the principles of democratism.
I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.) If the esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. (Loud applause.)

As to freedom for various political parties, we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable - in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests - far from being mutually hostile - are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end. And that it defends the interests of these classes not at all badly, of that there can hardly be any doubt. (Loud applause.)
They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all. But from this it follows that the principles of democratism are violated, not by the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., but by the bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world.

Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

V. AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION.

Let us pass on to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during the nation-wide discussion of the draft.

The nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution, as you know, produced a fairly large number of amendments and addenda. These have all been published in the Soviet press. In view of the great variety of amendments and the fact that they are not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, be divided into three categories.

The distinguishing feature of the amendments in the first category is that they deal not with constitutional questions but with questions which come
within the scope of the current legislative work of the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning insurance, some questions concerning collective farm development, some questions concerning industrial development, financial questions - such are the subjects with which these amendments deal. Evidently the authors of these amendments were not clear as to the difference between constitutional questions and questions of current legislation. That is why they strive to squeeze as many laws as possible into the Constitution, thus tending to convert the Constitution into something in the nature of a code of laws. But a constitution is not a code of laws. A constitution is the fundamental law, and only the fundamental law. A constitution does not preclude but presupposes current legislative work on the part of the future legislative bodies. A constitution provides the juridical basis for the future legislative activities of these bodies. Therefore, amendments and addenda of this kind, which have no direct bearing on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be referred to the future legislative bodies of the country.

To the second category should be assigned those amendments and addenda which strive to introduce into the Constitution elements of historical references, or elements of declarations concerning what the Soviet government has not yet achieved and what it should achieve in the future. To describe in the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working class, and all the working people have overcome during the long years of struggle for the victory of Socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate
goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of a complete Communist society - such are the subjects with which these amendments deal, in different variations. I think that such amendments and addenda should also be set aside as having no direct bearing on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration and legislative embodiment of the gains that have already been achieved and secured. Unless we want to distort this fundamental character of the Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with historical references to the past, or with declarations concerning the future achievements of the working people of the U.S.S.R. For this we have other means and other documents.

Finally, to the third category should be assigned amendments and addenda which have a direct bearing on the Draft Constitution.

A large number of amendments in this category are simply a matter of wording. They could therefore be referred to the Drafting Commission of the present Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with instructions to decide on the final text of the new Constitution.

As for the rest of the amendments in the third category, they are of greater material significance, and in my opinion a few words should be said about them.

1. First of all about the amendments to Article 1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. Some propose that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of working people." Others propose that we add the
words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state of workers and peasants." A third group proposes that we substitute for the words "state of workers and peasants" the words "state of all the races and nationalities inhabiting the territory of the U.S.S.R." A fourth group proposes that we substitute for the word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or "toilers of Socialist agriculture."

Should these amendments be adopted? I think they should not.

What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speak of? It speaks of the class composition of Soviet society. Can we Marxists ignore the question of the class composition of our society in the Constitution? No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution properly reflects the class composition of our society. It may be asked: What about the working intelligentsia? The intelligentsia has never been a class, and can never be a class - it was and remains a stratum, which recruits its members from all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia recruited its members from the ranks of the nobility, of the bourgeoisie, partly from the ranks of the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable extent from the ranks of the workers. In our day, under the Soviets, the intelligentsia recruits its members mainly from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But no matter where it may recruit its members, and what character it may bear, the intel-
ligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class.

Does this circumstance infringe upon the rights of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 1 of the Draft Constitution deals not with the rights of the various strata of Soviet society, but with the class composition of that society. The rights of the various strata of Soviet society, including the rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft Constitution. It is evident from these chapters that the workers, the peasants, and the working intelligentsia enjoy entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social, and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon the rights of the working intelligentsia.

The same must be said of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R. In Chapter II of the Draft Constitution it is stated that the U.S.S.R. is a free union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worthwhile repeating this formula in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution, which deals not with the national composition of Soviet society, but with its class composition? Clearly, it is not worthwhile. As to the rights of the nations and races comprising the U.S.S.R., these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters it is evident that the nations and races of the U.S.S.R. enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, political, social and cultural life of the country. Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement upon national rights.
It would also be wrong to substitute for the word "peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler of Socialist agriculture." In the first place, besides the collective farmers, there are still over a million households of non-collective farmers among the peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the authors of this amendment propose to strike them off the books? That would be unwise. Secondly, the fact that the majority of the peasants have started collective farming does not mean that they have already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer have their personal economy, their own households, etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then have to substitute the words "toiler of Socialist industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment for some reason or other do not propose. Finally, have the working class and the peasant class already disappeared in our country? And if they have not disappeared, is it worth while deleting from our vocabulary the established names for them? Evidently, what the authors of the amendment have in mind is not present society, but future society, when classes will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants will have been transformed into toilers of a homogeneous Communist society. Consequently, they are obviously running ahead. But in drawing up a constitution one must not proceed from the future, but from the present, from what already exists. A constitution should not and must not run ahead.

2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of the Draft Constitution. The amendment proposes that we completely delete from the Constitution
Article 17, which reserves to the Union Republics the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. I think that this proposal is a wrong one and therefore should not be adopted by the Congress. The U.S.S.R. is a voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. To delete from the Constitution the article providing for the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. would be to violate the voluntary character of this union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we cannot and should not agree to it. It is said that there is not a single republic in the U.S.S.R. that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R., and that therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. It is, of course, true that there is not a single republic that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R. But this does not in the least mean that we should not fix in the Constitution the right of Union Republics freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. In the U.S.S.R. there is not a single Union Republic that would want to subjugate another Union Republic. But this does not in the least mean that we ought to delete from the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the article dealing with the equality of rights of the Union Republics.

3. Then there is a proposal that we add a new article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution, to the following effect: that on reaching the proper level of economic and cultural development Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics may be raised to the status of Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not be adopted. It is a wrong proposal, not only because
of its content, but also because of the condition it lays down, Economic and cultural maturity can no more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged as grounds for leaving any particular republic in the list of Autonomous Republics. This would not be a Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; but this does not mean that from the standpoint of cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former is on a higher cultural and economic level than the latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic.

What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous Republics to the category of Union Republics?

There are three such grounds.

First, the republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic, on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the U.S.S.R. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding
from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it must be so arranged that this right does not become a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred to the category of Union Republics. Could they logically and actually raise the question of seceding from the U.S.S.R.? No, they could not. Why? Because they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet republics and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere to go if they secede from the U.S.S.R. (Laughter and applause.) Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer such republics to the category of Union Republics.

Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or less compact majority within that republic. Take the Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute the majority in that republic; on the contrary, they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category of Union Republics.

Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a population; it should have a population of, say, not less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet republic with a very small population and a small army could hope to maintain its existence as an independent state. There can hardly be any doubt that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay hands on it.
I think that unless these three objective grounds exist, it would be wrong at the present historical moment to raise the question of transferring any particular Autonomous Republic to the category of Union Republics.

4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the detailed enumeration of the administrative territorial division of the Union Republics into territories and regions. I think that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are people in the U.S.S.R. who are always ready and eager to go on tirelessly recarving the territories and regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in our work. The Draft Constitution puts a check on these people. And that is very good, because here, as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of certainty, we need stability and clarity.

5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The creation of two chambers is regarded as inexpedient, and it is proposed that the Soviet of Nationalities be abolished. I think that this amendment is also wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than a dual-chamber system if the U.S.S.R. were a single-nation state. But the U.S.S.R. is not a single-nation state. The U.S.S.R., as we know, is a multi-national state. We have a supreme body in which are represented the common interests of all the working people of the U.S.S.R. irrespective of nationality. This is the Soviet of the Union. But in addition to common interests, the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have their particular, specific interests, connected with their specific national characteristics. Can these specific
interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need a special supreme body to reflect precisely these specific interests? Unquestionably, we do. There can be no doubt that without such a body it would be impossible to administer a multi-national state like the U.S.S.R. Such a body is the second chamber, the Soviet of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R.

Reference is made to the parliamentary history of European and American states; it is pointed out that the dual-chamber system in these countries has produced only negative results - that the second chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction and a brake on progress. All that is true. But this is due to the fact that in those countries there is no equality between the two chambers. As we know, the second chamber is not infrequently granted more rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a rule the second chamber is constituted undemocratically, its members not infrequently being appointed from above. Undoubtedly, these defects will be obviated if equality is established between the chambers and if the second chamber is constituted as democratically as the first.

6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution is proposed calling for an equal number of members in both chambers. I think that this proposal might be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the chambers.

7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution which proposes that the members of the Soviet of Nationalities be elected by direct vote, as
in the case of the members of the Soviet of the Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. True, it may create certain technical inconveniences during elections; but, on the other hand, it would be of great political advantage, for it would enhance the prestige of the Soviet of Nationalities.

8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40, proposing that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. I think that this addendum is wrong and should not be adopted by the Congress. It is time we put an end to a situation in which not one but a number of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the principle that laws should be stable. And we need stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative power in the U.S.S.R. must be exercised only by one body, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the President of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be elected not by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. but by the whole population of the country. I think this addendum is wrong, because it runs counter to the spirit of our Constitution. According to the system of our Constitution there must not be an individual president in the U.S.S.R., elected by the whole population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme Soviet. The president in the U.S.S.R. is a collegium, it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, elected, not by the whole population, but by
the Supreme Soviet, and accountable to the Supreme Soviet. Historical experience shows that such a structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic, and safeguards the country against undesirable contingencies.

10. Then follows another amendment to Article 48. It reads as follows: that the number of Vice-Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be increased to eleven, one from each Union Republic. I think that this amendment might be adopted, for it would be an improvement and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's Commissariat - the People's Commissariat of the Defence Industry. I think that this amendment should likewise be accepted (applause), for the time has arrived to separate our defence industry and have a People's Commissariat for it. It seems to me that this would only improve the defence of our country.

12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the article be changed to provide for the prohibition of religious rites. I think that this amendment should be rejected as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution.

13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a more or less material character. I am referring to an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. It proposes that ministers of religion, former Whiteguards, all the former rich, and persons not engaged in socially useful occupations be dis-
franchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of people in this category be restricted to the right to elect, but not to be elected. I think that this amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet government disfranchised the non-working and exploiting elements not for all time, but temporarily, up to a certain period. There was a time when these elements waged open war against the people and actively resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet government's reply to this resistance. Quite some time has elapsed since then. During this period we have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, and the Soviet government has become an invincible force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise this law? I think the time has arrived. It is said that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the Soviet government, some of the former Whiteguards, kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the supreme governing bodies of the country. But what is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves, keep out of the woods. (Laughter and loud applause.) In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards and priests are hostile to the Soviet government. Secondly, if the people in some place or other do elect hostile persons, that will show that our propaganda work was very badly organized, and we shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way, the people will not let hostile persons slip into the supreme governing bodies. This means that we must work and not whine (loud applause), we must work and not wait
to have everything put before us ready-made by official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that the time was not far distant when the Soviet government would deem it expedient to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions. Please note: without any restrictions. He said this at a time when foreign military intervention had not yet been overcome, and when our industry and agriculture were in a desperate condition. Since then, seventeen years have elapsed. Comrades, is it not time we carried out Lenin's behest? I think it is.

Here is what Lenin said in 1919 in his "Draft Program of the Communist Party of Russia." Permit me to read it.

"The Russian Communist Party must explain to the masses of the working people, in order to avoid a wrong generalization of transient historical needs, that the disfranchizement of a section of citizens does not in the Soviet Republic affect, as has been the case in the majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a definite category of citizens disfranchised for life, but applies only to the exploiters, only to those who in violation of the fundamental laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist in defending their position as exploiters, in preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, every day of added strength for Socialism and diminution in the number of those who have objective possibilities of remaining exploiters or of preserving capitalist relationships, auto-
matically reduces the percentage of disfranchised persons. In Russia at the present time this percentage is hardly more than two or three per cent. On the other hand in the not distant future the cessation of foreign invasion and the completion of the expropriation of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, create a situation in which the proletarian state power will choose other methods of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters and will introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions." (Lenin: Collected Works, Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 94.)

That is clear, I think.

Such is the position with regard to the amendments and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R.

Judging by the results of the nation-wide discussion, which lasted nearly five months, it may be presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved by the present Congress. (Loud applause and cheers. All rise.)

In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a new, Socialist Constitution, built on the principles of fully developed Socialist democratism.

It will be an historical document dealing in simple and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, with the facts of the victory of Socialism in the
U.S.S.R., with the facts of the emancipation of the working people of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, with the facts of the victory in the U.S.S.R. of full and thoroughly consistent democracy.

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what millions of honest people in capitalist countries have dreamed of and still dream of has already been realized in the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.)

It will be a document testifying to the fact that what has been realized in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible of realization in other countries also. (Loud applause.)

But from this it follows that the international significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the Socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that Socialism and democracy are invincible. (Applause.) The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. (Loud applause.)

Still greater is the significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. While for the peoples of capitalist countries the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will have the significance of a program of action, it is significant for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. as the summary of their struggles, a summary of their victories in the
struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution, which treats of the fruits of our victories. It is pleasant and joyful to know what our people fought for and how they achieved this victory of worldwide historical importance. It is pleasant and joyful to know that the blood our people shed so plentifully was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. (Prolonged applause.) This arms our working class, our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate pride. It increases confidence in our strength and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement of new victories of Communism. (Thunderous ovation. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall: "Long live Comrade Stalin." All stand and sing the "Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. Shouts of "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin, hurrah.")

Pravda
26 November 1936
CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.


CHAPTER I
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

ARTICLE 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

ARTICLE 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies, which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, constitute the political foundation of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 3. In the U.S.S.R. all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 4. The socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production, firmly established as a result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the abolition of the
exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic foundation of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 5. Socialist property in the U.S.S.R. exists either in the form of state property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of cooperative and collective-farm property (property of a collective farm or property of a cooperative association).

ARTICLE 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, post, telegraph, and telephones, large state organized agricultural enterprises (state farms, machine and tractor stations and the like) as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial localities, are state property, that is, belong to the whole people.

ARTICLE 7. Public enterprises in collective farms and cooperative organizations, with their livestock and implements, the products of the collective farms and cooperative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of the collective farms and cooperative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the public, collective-farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor
agricultural implements - in accordance with the statutes of the agricultural artele.

ARTICLE 8. The land occupied by collective farms is secured to them for their use free of charge and for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity.

ARTICLE 9. Alongside the socialist system of economy, which is the predominant form of economy in the U.S.S.R., the law permits the small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen based on their personal labour and precluding the exploitation of the labour of others.

ARTICLE 10. The right of citizens to personal ownership of their incomes from work and of their savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household economy, their household furniture and utensils and articles of personal use and convenience, as well as the right of inheritance of personal property of citizens, is protected by law.

ARTICLE 11. The economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and directed by the state national economic plan with the aim of increasing the public wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions of the working people and raising their cultural level, of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and strengthening its defensive capacity.

ARTICLE 12. In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in
accordance with the principle: "He who does not work, neither shall he eat."

The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of socialism: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his work."

CHAPTER II
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE.

ARTICLE 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a federal state, formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights, namely:
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic
The Esthonian Soviet Socialist Republic

ARTICLE 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its
highest organs of state authority and organs of government, covers:

a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states;

b) Questions of war and peace;

c) Admission of new republics into the U.S.S.R.;

d) Control over the observance of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions of the Union Republics with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.;

e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between Union Republics;

f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories and Regions and also of new Autonomous Republics within Union Republics;

g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. and direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.;

h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly;

i) Safeguarding the security of the state;

j) Establishment of the national economic plans of the U.S.S.R.;

k) Approval of the single state budget of the U.S.S.R. as well as of the taxes and revenues which go to the all-Union, Republican and local budgets;

l) Administration of the banks, industrial and agricultural establishments and enterprises and trading enterprises of all-Union importance;

m) Administration of transport and communications;

n) Direction of the monetary and credit system;

o) Organization of state insurance;
p) Raising and granting of loans;
q) Establishment of the basic principles for the use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, forests and waters;
r) Establishment of the basic principles in the spheres of education and public health;
s) Organization of a uniform system of national economic statistics;
t) Establishment of the principles of labour legislation;
u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial procedure; criminal and civil codes;
v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the rights of foreigners;
w) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty.

ARTICLE 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics is limited only within the provisions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. Outside of these provisions, each Union Republic exercises state authority independently. The U.S.S.R. protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 16. Each Union Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 17. To every Union Republic is reserved the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 18. The territory of a Union Republic may not be altered without its consent.
ARTICLE 19. The laws of the U.S.S.R. have the same force within the territory of every Union Republic.

ARTICLE 20. In the event of a discrepancy between a law of a Union Republic and an all-Union law, the all-Union law prevails.

ARTICLE 21. A single Union citizenship is established for all citizens of the U.S.S.R.
Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the U.S.S.R.


ARTICLE 23. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye,
Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltova, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, Sumi, Tarnopol; Kharkov, Chernigov and Chernovitsi Regions.


ARTICLE 27. The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Garm, Kulyab, Leninabad and Stalinabad Regions, and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

ARTICLE 29. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Baranovichi, Byelostok, Brest, Vileyka, Vitebsk, Gomel, Minsk, Moghilev, Pinsk and Polessye Regions.

ARTICLE 29-a. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic consists of the Ashkhabad, Krasnovodsk, Mari, Tashauz and Charjow Regions.


CHAPTER III
THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 30. The highest organ of state authority of the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 31. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. exercises all rights vested in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of the Constitution, in so far as they do not, by virtue of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction of organs of the U.S.S.R. that are accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., that is, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 32. The legislative power of the U.S.S.R.
is exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.


ARTICLE 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to electoral areas on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 of the population.

ARTICLE 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to Union and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and national areas on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous Region and one deputy from each national area.

ARTICLE 36. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is elected for a term of four years.

ARTICLE 37. Both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, have equal rights.

ARTICLE 38. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities have an equal right to initiate legislation.

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ARTICLE 39. A law is considered adopted if passed by both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by a simple majority vote in each.

ARTICLE 40. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are published in the languages of the Union Republics over the signatures of the President and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 41. Sessions of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities begin and terminate simultaneously.

ARTICLE 42. The Soviet of the Union elects a Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 43. The Soviet of Nationalities elects a Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and two Vice-Chairmen.

ARTICLE 44. The Chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities preside over the sittings of the respective Chambers and direct the procedure of these bodies.

ARTICLE 45. Joint sittings of both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are presided over alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.
ARTICLE 46. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. twice a year.

Special sessions are convened by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at its discretion or on the demand of one of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 47. In the event of a disagreement between the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement to a conciliation commission formed on a parity basis. If the conciliation commission fails to arrive at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy one of the Chambers, the question is considered for a second time by the Chambers. Failing agreement between the two Chambers, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections.

ARTICLE 48. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at a joint sitting of both Chambers elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., consisting of a President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., sixteen Vice-Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and twenty-four members of the Presidium.

The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for all its activities.

ARTICLE 49. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.:
a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

b) Interprets laws of the U.S.S.R. in operation, issues decrees;


d) Conducts referendums on its own initiative or on the demand of one of the Union Republics;

e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics in case they do not conform to law;

f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., relieves of their posts and appoints People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on the recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.;

g) Awards with decorations and confers titles of honour of the U.S.S.R.;

h) Exercises the right of pardon;

i) Appoints and removes the higher commands of the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.;

j) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., proclaims a state of war in the event of armed attack on the U.S.S.R., or whenever necessary to fulfil international treaty obligations concerning mutual defence against aggression;

k) Orders general or partial mobilization;

l) Ratifies international treaties;
m) Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives of the U.S.S.R. to foreign states;

n) Receives the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by foreign states;

o) Proclaims martial law in separate localities or throughout the U.S.S.R. in the interests of the defence of the U.S.S.R. or for the purpose of ensuring public order and state security.

ARTICLE 50. The Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities elect Credentials Commissions which verify the credentials of the members of the respective Chambers.
On there commendation of the Credentials Commissions, the Chambers decide either to endorse the the credentials or to annul the election of the deputies concerned.

ARTICLE 51. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of enquiry and investigation on any matter.
It is the duty of all institutions and public servants to comply with the demands of these commissions and to submit to them the necessary materials and documents.

ARTICLE 52. A member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. may not be prosecuted or arrested without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and during the period when the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is not in session, without the

ARTICLE 54. On the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or in the event of its dissolution prior to the expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. orders new elections to be held within a period not exceeding two months from the date of expiration of the term of office or dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 55. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is convened by the outgoing Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. not later than one month after the elections.

ARTICLE 56. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at a joint sitting of both Chambers, appoints the Government of the U.S.S.R., namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.
CHAPTER IV

THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY
OF THE UNION REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 57. The highest organ of state authority
of a Union Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the
Union Republic.

ARTICLE 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union
Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic
for a term of four years.

The basis of representation is established by the
Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union
Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Republic.

ARTICLE 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union
Republic:

a) Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and
amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the
Constitution of the U.S.S.R.;

b) Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous
Republics forming part of it and defines the bound-
aries of their territories;

c) Approves the national economic plan and also
the budget of the Republic;

d) Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of
citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the Union
Republic.
ARTICLE 61. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, consisting of a Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic.

The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic are defined by the Constitution of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 62. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic elects a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman to conduct its sittings.

ARTICLE 63. The Supreme Soviet of a Union Republic appoints the Government of the Union Republic, namely, the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER V

THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS.

ARTICLE 64. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 65. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is responsible to the Supreme Soviet
of the U.S.S.R. and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 66. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 67. Decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. are binding throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 68. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.:
   a) Coordinates and directs the work of the All-Union and Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. and of other institutions, economic and cultural, under its administration;
   b) Adopts measures to carry out the national economic plan and the state budget, and to strengthen the credit and monetary system;
   c) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public order, for the protection of the interests of the state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of citizens;
   d) Exercises general guidance in respect of relations with foreign states;
   e) Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be called up for military service and directs the general organization and development of the armed forces
of the country;
f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees and Central Administrations under the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. for matters concerning economic, cultural and defence organization and development.

ARTICLE 69. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. has the right, in respect of those branches of administration and economy which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R., to suspend decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics and to annul orders and instructions of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 70. The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and consists of:
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R.;
The Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission;
The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.;
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts;
The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education;
The Chairman of the Board of the State Bank.
ARTICLE 71. The Government of the U.S.S.R. or a People's Commissar of the U.S.S.R. to whom a question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is addressed must give a verbal or written reply in the respective Chamber within a period not exceeding three days.

ARTICLE 72. The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 73. The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of the respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and also of decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and supervise their execution.

ARTICLE 74. The People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. are either All-Union or Union-Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 75. The All-Union People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. either directly or through bodies appointed by them.

ARTICLE 76. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats, as a rule, direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them through the cor-
responding People's Commissariats of the Union Republics; they administer directly only a definite and limited number of enterprises according to a list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 77. The following People's Commissariats are All-Union People's Commissariats:
- Defence
- Foreign Affairs
- Foreign Trade
- Railways
- Post, Telegraph and Telephones
- Maritime Fleet
- River Fleet
- Coal-Mining Industry
- Oil Industry
- Electric Power Stations
- Electrical Engineering Industry
- Iron and Steel Industry
- Non-Ferrous Metals Industry
- Chemical Industry
- Aircraft Industry
- Shipbuilding Industry
- Munitions Industry
- Armaments Industry
- Heavy Machine-Building Industry
- Medium Machine-Building Industry
- General Machine-Building Industry
- Navy
- Agricultural Stocks
- Civil Engineering Industry
Cellulose and Paper Industry.

ARTICLE 78. The following People's Commissariats are Union-Republican People's Commissariats:
- Food Industry
- Fishing Industry
- Meat and Dairy Produce Industry
- Light Industry
- Textile Industry
- Timber Industry
- Agriculture
- State Grain and Livestock Farms
- Finance
- Trade
- Internal Affairs
- State Security
- Justice
- Public Health
- Building Materials Industry
- State Control.

CHAPTER VI
THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 79. The highest executive and administrative organ of state authority of a Union Republic is the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 80. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is responsible to the Supreme
Soviet of the Union Republic and accountable to it; and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic it is responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the respective Union Republic.

ARTICLE 81. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic issues decisions and orders on the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, and of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and supervises their execution.

ARTICLE 82. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic has the right to suspend decisions and orders of Councils of People's Commissars of Autonomous Republics, and to annul decisions and orders of Executive Committees of Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Territories, Regions and Autonomous Regions.

ARTICLE 83. The Council of People's Commissars of a Union Republic is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the Union Republic and consists of:
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic;
The Vice-Chairmen;
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission;
The People's Commissars of:
Food Industry
Fishing Industry
Meat and Dairy Produce Industry
Light Industry
Textile Industry
Timber Industry
Building Materials Industry
Agriculture
State Grain and Livestock Farms
Finance
Trade
Internal Affairs
State Security
Justice
Public Health
State Control
Education
Local Industry
Municipal Economy
Social Maintenance
Motor Transport
The Chief of the Arts Administration;
The Representatives of the All-Union People's Commissariats.

ARTICLE 84. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic direct the branches of state administration which come within the jurisdiction of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 85. The People's Commissars of a Union Republic issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction of their respective People's Commissariats, orders and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of
the laws of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and that of the Union Republic, and of the orders and instructions of the Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 86. The People's Commissariats of a Union Republic are either Union-Republican or Republican Commissariats.

ARTICLE 87. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them, and are subordinate both to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic and to the corresponding Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 88. The Republican People's Commissariats direct the branches of state administration entrusted to them and are directly subordinate to the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic.

CHAPTER VII
THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF THE AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ARTICLE 89. The highest organ of state authority of an Autonomous Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.
ARTICLE 90. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic for a term of four years on the basis of representation established by the Constitution of the Autonomous Republic.

ARTICLE 91. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

ARTICLE 92. Each Autonomous Republic has its own Constitution, which takes account of the specific features of the Autonomous Republic and is drawn up in full conformity with the Constitution of the Union Republic.


CHAPTER VIII
THE LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY

ARTICLE 94. The organs of state authority in territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

ARTICLE 95. The Soviets of Working People's
Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are elected by the working people of the respective territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities or rural localities for a term of two years.

ARTICLE 96. The basis of representation for Soviets of Working People's Deputies is defined by the Constitutions of the Union Republics.

ARTICLE 97. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies direct the work of the organs of administration subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance of public order, the observance of the laws and the protection of the rights of citizens, direct local economic and cultural organization and development and draw up the local budgets.

ARTICLE 98. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic.

ARTICLE 99. The executive and administrative organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities and rural localities are the Executive Committees elected by them, consisting of a Chairman, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary and members.

ARTICLE 100. The executive and administrative
organ of rural Soviets of Working People's Deputies in small localities, in accordance with the Constitutions of the Union Republics, is the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by them.

ARTICLE 101. The executive organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies which elected them and to the executive organ of the superior Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

CHAPTER IX
THE COURTS AND THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE

ARTICLE 102. In the U.S.S.R. justice is administered by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Republics and the Autonomous Regions, the Area courts, the special courts of the U.S.S.R. established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., and the People's Courts.

ARTICLE 103. In all courts cases are tried with the participation of people's assessors, except in cases specially provided for by law.

ARTICLE 104. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. is charged with the supervision of the judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republics.
ARTICLE 105. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. and the special courts of the U.S.S.R. are elected by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 106. The Supreme Courts of the Union Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 107. The Supreme Courts of the Autonomous Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 108. The Territorial and the Regional courts, the courts of the Autonomous Regions and the Area courts are elected by the Territorial, Regional or Area Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Autonomous Regions for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 109. People's Courts are elected by the citizens of the district on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term of three years.

ARTICLE 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing this language being guaranteed every opportunity of fully acquainting themselves with the material of the case through an interpreter and likewise the right to use their own language in court.
ARTICLE 111. In all courts of the U.S.S.R. cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by Counsel.

ARTICLE 112. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

ARTICLE 113. Supreme supervisory power over the strict execution of the laws by all People's Commissariats and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by public servants and citizens of the U.S.S.R. is vested in the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 114. The Procurator of the U.S.S.R. is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a term of seven years.

ARTICLE 115. Procurators of Republics, Territories and Regions, as well as Procurators of Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions are appointed by the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. for a term of five years.

ARTICLE 116. Area, district and city procurators are appointed for a term of five years by the Procurators of the Union Republics, subject to the approval of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 117. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.
CHAPTER X
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS

ARTICLE 118. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises, and the abolition of unemployment.

ARTICLE 119. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the reduction of the working day to seven hours for the overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution of annual vacations with full pay for workers and employees and the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

ARTICLE 120. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to maintenance in old age and also in the case of sickness or loss of capacity to work. This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of workers and employees at state expense, free medical service for the working people and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.
ARTICLE 121. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education.

This right is ensured by universal, compulsory elementary education; by education, including higher education, being free of charge; by the system of state stipends for the overwhelming majority of students in the universities and colleges; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language, and by the organization in the factories, state farms, machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.

ARTICLE 122. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life.

The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to women by granting them an equal right with men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance and education, and by state protection of the interests of mother and child, pre-maternity and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries and kindergartens.

ARTICLE 123. Equality of rights of citizens of the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.

Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their
race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, is punishable by law.

ARTICLE 124. In order to ensure to citizens freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens.

ARTICLE 125. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to strengthen the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed by law:

a) freedom of speech;
b) freedom of the press;
c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of mass meetings;
d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations;

These civil rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working people and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites for the exercise of these rights.

ARTICLE 126. In conformity with the interests of the working people, and in order to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the masses of the people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. are ensured the right to unite in public organizations -
trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, sport and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies; and the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state.

ARTICLE 127. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed inviolability of the person. No person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator.

ARTICLE 128. The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.

ARTICLE 129. The U.S.S.R. affords the right of asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, or for their scientific activities, or for their struggle for national liberation.

ARTICLE 130. It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to abide by the Constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse.
ARTICLE 131. It is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to safeguard and strengthen public, socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation of the Soviet system, as the source of the wealth and might of the country, as the source of the prosperous and cultured life of all the working people.

Persons committing offences against public, socialist property are enemies of the people.

ARTICLE 132. Universal military service is law. Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is an honourable duty of the citizens of the U.S.S.R.

ARTICLE 133. To defend the fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. Treason to the country - violation of the oath of allegiance, desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power of the state, espionage - is punishable with all the severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes.

CHAPTER XI
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

ARTICLE 134. Members of all Soviets of Working People's Deputies - of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the Territories and Regions, the Supreme Soviets of the Autonomous Republics, the Soviets of Working People’s Deputies of Autonomous Regions, area,
district, city and rural (stanitsa, village, hamlet, kishlak, aul) Soviets of Working People's Deputies - are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot.

ARTICLE 135. Elections of deputies are universal: all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, religion, educational and residential qualifications, social origin, property status or past activities, have the right to vote in the election of deputies and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights.

ARTICLE 136. Elections of deputies are equal: each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate in elections on an equal footing.

ARTICLE 137. Women have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with men.

ARTICLE 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms with all other citizens.

ARTICLE 139. Elections of deputies are direct: all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from rural and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., inclusive, are elected by the citizens by direct vote.
ARTICLE 140. Voting at elections of deputies is secret.

ARTICLE 141. Candidates for election are nominated according to electoral areas.
The right to nominate candidates is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies.

ARTICLE 142. It is the duty of every deputy to report to his electors on his work and on the work of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner established by law upon decision of a majority of the electors.

CHAPTER XII
ARMS, FLAG, CAPITAL

ARTICLE 143. The arms of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consists of a sickle and hammer against a globe depicted in the rays of the sun and surrounded by ears of grain with the inscription "Workers of All Countries, Unite!" in the languages of the Union Republics. At the top of the arms is a five-pointed star.

ARTICLE 144. The state flag of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is of red cloth with the sickle and hammer depicted in gold in the upper cor-
ner near the staff and above them a five-pointed star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the length is 1:2.

ARTICLE 145. The capital of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is the City of Moscow.

CHAPTER XIII
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION

ARTICLE 146. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. may be amended only by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the votes cast in each of its Chambers.


APPENDIX I

LAW
ON CREATING TROOP FORMATIONS OF THE UNION REPUBLICS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A UNION REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

With the object of strengthening the defence capacity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:
1. To establish that the Union Republics shall organize troop formations of their respective Republics.

2. To introduce into the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the following amendments:
   a) to insert in ARTICLE 14g of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. after the words "Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. and direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.," the words - "establishment of the guiding principles of organization of the troop formations of the Union Republics," thus formulating this point as follows:

   "g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R., direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., establishment of the guiding principles of organization of the troop formations of the Union Republics."

   b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ARTICLE 18-b, as follows:

   "ARTICLE 18-b

   Each Union Republic has its own Republican troop formations."

   c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. sec. f, as follows:

   "f) Establishes the system of organization of the Republican troop formations."

3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of Defence from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat.

M. KALININ.
President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
APPENDIX II

LAW
ON GRANTING THE UNION REPUBLICS PLENIPO-TENTIARY POWERS IN THE SPHERE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A UNION-REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT

With the object of extending international connections and strengthening the collaboration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with other states and taking into consideration the growing requirements of the Union Republics in the matter of establishing direct relations with foreign states, the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics decrees:

1. To establish that the Union Republics may enter into direct relations with foreign states and conclude agreements with them.

2. To introduce into the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the following amendments:
   a) To insert in ARTICLE 14a of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., after the words "Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states," the words - "establishment of a uniform system in the
relations between the Union Republics and foreign states," thus formulating this point as follows:

"a) Representation of the Union in international relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties with other states, establishment of a uniform system in the relations between the Union Republics and foreign states."

b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ARTICLE 18-a, as follows:

"ARTICLE 18-a

"Each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states, conclude agreements with them and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives."

c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. sec. e, as follows:

"e) Establishes representation of the Union Republic in international relations."

3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs from an All-Union into a Union-Republican People's Commissariat.

M. KALININ
President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

A. GORKIN
Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow, The Kremlin
February 1, 1944.
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DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER DOUBLE-DEALERS

Comrades, from the reports and the debates on these reports heard at this Plenum it is evident that we are dealing with the following three main facts.

First, the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom a rather active role was played by the Trotskyites, affected more or less all, or nearly all, our organisations - economic, administrative and Party.

Second, the agents of foreign countries, among them the Trotskyites, not only penetrated into our lower organisations, but also into a number of responsible positions.

Third, some of our leading comrades, at the centre and in the districts, not only failed to discern the real face of these wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, but proved to be so careless, complacent and naive that not infrequently they themselves helped to promote agents of foreign powers to responsible positions.

Such are the three incontrovertible facts which naturally emerge from the reports and the debates on these reports.
1. POLITICAL CARELESSNESS

How are we to explain the fact that our leading comrades, who have rich experience in the fight against all sorts of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, proved in this case to be so naive and blind that they were unable to see the real face of the enemies of the people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's clothing, unable to tear off their masks?

Can it be said that the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the agents of foreign powers operating in the territory of the U.S.S.R. can be anything unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, that cannot be said. This is shown by the wrecking activities in various branches of national economy during the past ten years, beginning with the Shakhti period, activities which are registered in official documents.

Can it be said that in this past period there were no warning signals and warning signs about the wrecking, espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, that cannot be said. We had such signals, and Bolsheviks have no right to forget about them.

The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first serious warning which showed that the enemies of the people would resort to duplicity, and resorting to duplicity would disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, in order to worm their way into our confidence and gain access to our organizations.

The trial of the "Leningrad Centre" as well as the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial gave fresh grounds for
the lessons which followed from the foul murder of Comrade Kirov.

The trial of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" broadened the lessons of the preceding trials and strikingly demonstrated that the Zinovievites and Trotskyites had united around themselves all the hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become transformed into an espionage, diversionist and terrorist agency of the German secret police, that duplicity and camouflage are the only means by which the Zinovievites and Trotskyites can penetrate into our organizations, that vigilance and political insight are the surest means of preventing such penetration, of liquidating the Zinovievite-Trotskyite gang.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in its confidential letter of January 18, 1935, on the foul murder of Comrade Kirov emphatically warned the Party organizations against political complacency and philistine heedlessness. In the confidential letter it was stated:

"We must put a stop to opportunist complacency which comes from the mistaken assumption that as we grow in strength our enemies become tamer and more innocuous. Such an assumption is radically wrong. It is an echo of the Right deviation which assured all and sundry that the enemy would quietly creep into socialism, that in the end they would become real socialists. Bolsheviks cannot rest on their laurels and become heedless. We do not want complacency, but vigilance, real Bol-

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shevik, revolutionary vigilance. We must remember that the more hopeless the position of the enemies becomes the more eagerly will they clutch at extreme methods as the only methods of the doomed in their struggle against the Soviet power. We must remember this and be vigilant."

In its confidential letter of July 29, 1936, on the espionage - terrorist activities of the Trotskyite - Zinovievite bloc the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. once again called upon the Party organizations to display the utmost vigilance, to acquire the ability to discern the enemies of the people no matter how well disguised they may be. In that confidential letter it was stated:

"Now that it has been proved that the Trotskyite - Zinovievite monsters are uniting in their struggle against the Soviet power all the most enraged and sworn enemies of the toilers of our country - spies, provocateurs, diversionists, whiteguards, kulaks, etc. - when between these elements and the Trotskyites and Zinovievites all lines of demarcation have been obliterated, all our Party organizations, all members of the Party, must understand that the vigilance of Communists is needed on every sector and under all circumstances. An inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under present conditions must be the ability to discern the enemy of the Party no matter how
And so there were signals and warnings. What did these signals and warnings call for? They called for the elimination of the weakness of Party organizational work and for the transformation of the Party into an impregnable fortress into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate. They called upon us to put a stop to the underestimation of Party political work and to make an emphatic turn in the direction of intensifying this work to the utmost, of intensifying political vigilance.

But what happened? The facts show that our comrades reacted to these signals and warnings very slowly. This is eloquently shown by all the known facts that have emerged from the campaign of verifying and exchanging Party documents.

How are we to explain the fact that these warnings and signals did not have the required effect? How are we to explain the fact that our Party comrades, notwithstanding their experience in the struggle against anti-Soviet elements, notwithstanding the numerous warning signals and warning signs, proved to be politically short-sighted in face of the wrecking, espionage and diversionist work of the enemies of the people?

Perhaps our Party comrades have deteriorated, have become less class-conscious and less disciplined? No, of course not!

Perhaps they have begun to degenerate? Again, of course not! There are no grounds whatever for
such an assumption.

What is the matter then? Whence this heedlessness, carelessness, complacency, blindness?

The matter is that our comrades, carried away by economic campaigns and by colossal successes on the front of economic construction, simply forgot about certain very important facts which Bolsheviks have no right to forget. They forgot about the main fact in the international position of the U.S.S.R. and failed to notice two very important facts which have direct relation to the present-day wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins who are concealing themselves behind Party membership cards and disguising themselves as Bolsheviks.

II. THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT

What are the facts which our Party comrades forgot about, or simply failed to notice?

They forgot that the Soviet power is victorious only on one-sixth of the globe, that five-sixths of the globe are in the possession of capitalist states. They forgot that the Soviet Union is encircled by capitalist states. It is an accepted thing among us to chatter about capitalist encirclement, but people refuse to ponder over what sort of thing this capitalist encirclement is. Capitalist encirclement is not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant thing. Capitalist encirclement means that there is a country, the Soviet Union, which has established the socialist system, and that there are, besides, many other countries, bourgeois countries, which
continue to lead the capitalist mode of life and which surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity to attack her, to crush her, or, at all events, to undermine her might and weaken her.

It is this main fact that our comrades forgot. But it is precisely this fact that determines the basis of the relations between the capitalist encirclement and the Soviet Union.

Take the bourgeois states, for example. Naive people might think that exceptionally good relations exist between them, as between states of the same type. But only naive people can think like that. As a matter of fact relations far from neighbourly exist between them. It has been proved as definitely as twice two are four that the bourgeois states send to each other spies, wreckers, diversionists, and sometimes also assassins, instruct them to penetrate into the institutions and enterprises of these states, set up their agencies and "in case of necessity" disrupt their rear, in order to weaken them and to undermine their strength. Such is the case at the present time. Such, also, was the case in the past. For example, take the states in Europe at the time of Napoleon the First. At that time France was swarming with spies and diversionists from the side of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. On the other hand, England, the German states, Austria and Russia, had in their rear a no smaller number of spies and diversionists from the French side. English agents twice made an attempt on the life of Napoleon, and several times they roused the peasants of the Vendee in France against the Napoleon
government. And what was this Napoleon government? A bourgeois government, which strangled the French Revolution and preserved only those results of the revolution which were of advantage to the big bourgeoisie. Needless to say the Napoleon government did not remain in debt to its neighbours and also undertook diversionist measures. Such was the case in the past, 130 years ago. That is the case now, 130 years after Napoleon the First. Today France and England are swarming with German spies and diversionists, and, on the other hand, Anglo-French spies and diversionists are busy in Germany; America is swarming with Japanese spies and diversionists, and Japan is swarming with American spies and diversionists.

Such is the law of the relations between bourgeois states.

The question arises, why should the bourgeois states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently and in a more neighbourly manner than they treat bourgeois states of their own type? Why should they send to the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, diversionists and assassins than they send to their kindred bourgeois states? Why should you think so? Would it not be more correct from the point of view of Marxism to assume that the bourgeois states would send twice and three times as many wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins to the Soviet Union as they send to any bourgeois state?

Is it not clear that as long as capitalist encirclement exists we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists and assassins sent to us by agents of foreign states?
Our Party comrades forgot about all this, and having forgotten about it, they were caught unawares. That is why the espionage and diversionist work of the Trotskyite agents of the Japano-German secret police proved to be quite unexpected for some of our comrades.

III. PRESENT DAY TROTSKYISM

Further, while fighting the Trotskyite agents, our Party comrades failed to notice, overlooked the fact that present-day Trotskyism is not what it was, say, seven or eight years ago, that during this period Trotskyism and the Trotskyites had undergone an important evolution which radically changed the face of Trotskyism, that in view of this, the struggle against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it, have to be radically changed. Our Party comrades failed to notice that Trotskyism had ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that from the political trend in the working class that it was seven or eight years ago Trotskyism had become transformed into a wild and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins acting on the instructions of the intelligence services of foreign states.

What is a political trend in the working class? A political trend in the working class is a group, or party, which has a definite political face, a platform, a program, which does not and cannot hide its views from the working class, but on the contrary, advocates its views openly and honestly before the working class, which is not afraid of showing its political face to
the working class, which is not afraid of demonstrating its real aims and objects to the working class, but on the contrary, goes to the working class with open visor in order to convince it of the correctness of its views. In the past, seven or eight years ago, Trotskyism was such a political trend in the working class, an anti-Leninist and, therefore, a profoundly mistaken trend, it is true, but a political trend, nevertheless.

Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, Trotskyism, say, of 1936, is a political trend in the working class? No, this cannot be said, Why? Because the present-day Trotskyites are afraid to show their real face to the working class, are afraid to reveal to it their real aims and objects, carefully hide their political face from the working class, fearing that if the working class learns about their real intentions it will curse them as people alien to it and drive them away. This, in fact, explains why the principal methods of Trotskyite work are now not the open and honest advocacy of its views in the working class, but the disguising of its views, the obsequious, fawning eulogy of the views of its opponents, the pharisaical and hypocritical trampling of its own views in the mud.

At the trial in 1936, if you remember, Kamenev and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any political platform. They had every opportunity of unfolding their political platform at the trial. But they did not do this, declaring that they had no political platform. There can be no doubt that both of them were lying when they denied that they had
a political platform. Now even the blind can see that they had a political platform. But why did they deny that they had a political platform? Because they were afraid to reveal their real political face, they were afraid to demonstrate their real platform of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R., they were afraid because such a platform would cause revulsion in the ranks of the working class.

At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov took a different line. They did not deny that the Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. They admitted that they had a definite political platform, admitted it and unfolded it in their evidence. But they unfolded it not in order to call upon the working class, to call upon the people, to support the Trotskyite platform, but in order to curse and brand it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation of the collective farms and state farms, the restoration of the system of exploitation, alliance with the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring nearer war against the Soviet Union, the fight for war and against the policy of peace, the territorial dismemberment of the Soviet Union in which the Ukraine was to be surrendered to the Germans and the Maritime Region to the Japanese, preparation for the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on her by hostile states and, as a means of achieving these aims, wrecking, diversion, individual acts of terrorism against the leaders of the Soviet government, espionage on behalf of the Japano-German fascist forces - such was the political
platform of present-day Trotskyism unfolded by
Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. Naturally the Trotsky-
ites could not but hide such a platform from the
people, from the working class. And they hid it not
only from the working class, but also from the rank-
and-file Trotskyites, and not only from the rank-
and-file Trotskyites, but even from the leading
Trotskyite group consisting of a small clique of
thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov
demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a
small conference of thirty or forty Trotskyites for
the purpose of informing them about the character
of this platform, Trotsky forbade them on the ground
that it was inexpedient to tell even a small clique
of Trotskyites about the real character of this plat-
form, for such an "operation" might cause a split.

"Political figures," hiding their views and their
platform not only from the working class, but also
from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, and not only from
the Trotskyite rank-and-file, but from the leading
group of the Trotskyites - such is the face of present-
day Trotskyism.

But it follows from this that present-day Trotsky-
ism can no longer be called a political trend in the
working class.

Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend
in the working class, but a gang without principles
and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversion-
ists, intelligence service agents, spies, assassins,
a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, work-
ing in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign
states.
Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years. Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time.

The mistake our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice this profound difference between Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, to the point of espionage and the downright betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, more determinedly.

That is why the abominable work of the Trotskyites during the last few years was quite unexpected for some of our Party comrades.

To proceed. Finally, our Party comrades failed to notice that there is an important difference between the present-day wreckers and diversionists, among whom the Trotskyite agents of fascism play rather an active part, and the wreckers and diversionists of the time of the Shakhti case.

Firstly, the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers were people openly alien to us. They were for the most part former factory owners, former managers for the old employers, former share-holders in joint stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our
people had any doubt about the real political face of these gentlemen. And the Shakhti wreckers themselves did not conceal their dislike for the Soviet system. The same cannot be said about the present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are for the most part Party people with a Party card in their pocket, consequently, people who, formally, are not alien to us. The old wreckers opposed our people, but the new wreckers fawn upon our people, praise them, toady to them in order to worm their way into their confidence. As you see, the difference is an important one,

Secondly, the strength of the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers was that they, more or less, possessed the necessary technical knowledge, whereas our people, not possessing such knowledge, were compelled to learn from them. This circumstance put the wreckers of the Shakhti period in an advantageous position, it enabled them to carry on their wrecking work freely and unhindered, enabled them to deceive our people technically. This is not the case with the present-day wreckers, with the Trotskyites. The present-day wreckers are not superior to our people in technical knowledge. On the contrary, our people are technically better trained than the present-day wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the period from the Shakhti case to the present day tens of thousands of genuine, technically well-equipped Bolshevik cadres have grown up among us. One could mention thousands and tens of thousands of technically educated Bolshevik leaders, compared with whom people
like Pyatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, Muralov and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere tyros from the standpoint of technical training. That being the case, wherein lies the strength of the present-day wreckers, the Trotskyites? Their strength lies in the Party card, in the possession of a Party card. Their strength lies in the fact that the Party card enables them to be politically trusted and gives them access to all our institutions and organizations. Their advantage lies in that, holding a Party card and pretending to be friends of the Soviet power, they deceived our people politically, abused their confidence, did their wrecking work furtively and disclosed our state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. The political and moral value of this "advantage" is a doubtful one, but still, it is an "advantage." This "advantage" explains why the Trotskyite wreckers, having a Party card, having access to all places in our institutions and organizations, were a real windfall for the intelligence services of foreign states.

The mistake some of our Party comrades made is that they failed to notice, did not understand this difference between the old and the new wreckers, between the Shakhty wreckers and the Trotskyites, and, not noticing this, they were unable to adapt themselves in time to fight the new wreckers in a new way.

IV. THE BAD SIDE OF ECONOMIC SUCCESSES

Such are the main facts of our international and internal situation which many of our Party comrades
forgot, or which they failed to notice.

That is why our people were taken unawares by the events of the last few years as regards wrecking and diversion.

It may be asked: But why did our people fail to notice all this, why did they forget about all this? Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, complacency, come from?

Is it an organic defect in the work of our people?

No, it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary phenomenon which can be rapidly removed if our people make some effort.

What is the matter then?

The matter is that during the last few years our Party comrades have been totally absorbed in economic work, have been carried away to the extreme by economic successes, and being absorbed by all this, they forgot about everything else, neglected everything else.

The matter is that, being carried away by economic successes, they began to regard this as the beginning and end of all things, and simply ceased to pay attention to such things as the international position of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, increasing the political work of the Party, the struggle against wrecking, etc., assuming that all these were second-rate or even third-rate matters.

Successes and achievements are a great thing, of course. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction are truly enormous. But successes, like everything else in the world, have their bad side. Among people who are not very skilled in politics,
big successes and big achievements not infrequently give rise to carelessness, complacency, self satisfaction, excessive self-confidence, swelled-headedness and boastfulness. You cannot deny that lately brag-garts have multiplied among us enormously. It is not surprising that in this atmosphere of great and important successes in the sphere of socialist construction boastfulness should arise, that showy demonstrations of our successes, underestimation of the strength of our enemies, overestimation of our own strength, and, as a result of all this, political blindness, should arise.

Here I must say a few words about the dangers connected with successes, about the dangers connected with achievements.

We know by experience about the dangers connected with difficulties. We have been fighting against such dangers for a number of years and, I may say, not without success. Among people who are not staunch, dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently give rise to despondency, lack of confidence in their own strength, feelings of pessimism. When, however, it is a matter of combating dangers which arise from difficulties, people are hardened in this struggle and emerge from the struggle really granite Bolsheviks. Such is the nature of the dangers connected with difficulties. Such are the results of overcoming difficulties.

But there is another kind of danger, the danger connected with successes, the danger connected with achievements. Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected with successes, with achievements. These dangers are
that among people not very skilled in politics and not having seen much, the atmosphere of successes - success after success, achievement after achievement, overfulfilment of plans after overfulfilment of plans - gives rise to carelessness and self-satisfaction, creates an atmosphere of showy triumphs and mutual congratulations, which kills the sense of proportion and dulls political intuition, takes the spring out of people and causes them to rest on their laurels.

It is not surprising that in this intoxicating atmosphere of swelled-headedness and self-satisfaction in this atmosphere of showy demonstrations and loud self-praise, people forget certain essential facts of first-rate importance for the fate of our country; people begin not to notice such unpleasant facts as the capitalist encirclement, the new forms of wrecking, the dangers connected with our successes, and so forth. Capitalist encirclement? Oh, that's nothing! What does capitalist encirclement matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The new forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? Mere trifles! What do these trifles matter if we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The Party rules, electing Party bodies, Party leaders reporting to the Party members? Is there really any need for all this? Is it worth while bothering about all these trifles if our economy is growing and the material conditions of the workers and peasants are becoming better and better? Mere trifles! The plans are being overfulfilled, our Party is not a bad one, the Central Committee of our Party is also not a bad one - what else do we need? They are some funny
people sitting there in Moscow, in the Central Committee of the Party, inventing all sorts of problems, talk about wrecking, don't sleep themselves and don't let other people sleep . . .

This is a striking example of how easily and "simply" some of our inexperienced comrades are infected with political blindness as a result of dizzying rapture over economic successes.

Such are the dangers connected with successes, with achievements.

Such are the reasons why our Party comrades, having been carried away by economic successes, forgot about facts of an international and internal character which are of vital importance for the Soviet Union, and failed to notice a number of dangers surrounding our country.

Such are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, complacency, political blindness.

Such are the roots of the defects in our economic and Party work.

V. OUR TASKS

How can these defects in our work be removed? What must be done to achieve this?

The following measures must be carried out:

1) First of all the attention of our Party comrades who have become submerged in "current questions" in some department or other must be turned towards the big political international and internal problems.

2) The political work of our Party must be raised to the proper level, making the cornerstone the task
of politically educating and giving Bolshevik hardness to the Party, Soviet and economic cadres.

3) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the economic successes, the significance of which is undoubtedly very great and which we shall go on striving to achieve, day after day, year after year, are nevertheless not the whole of our work of socialist construction.

It must be explained that the bad sides connected with economic successes which are expressed in self-satisfaction, carelessness, the dulling of political intuition, can be removed only if economic successes are combined with successes in Party construction and extensive political work of our Party.

It must be explained that economic successes, their stability and duration wholly and entirely depend on the successes of Party organizational and Party political work, that without this, economic successes may prove to have been built on sand.

4) We must remember and never forget that the capitalist encirclement is the main fact which determines the international position of the Soviet Union.

We must remember and never forget that as long as the capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent to the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states; this must be borne in mind and a struggle must be waged against those comrades who underestimate the significance of the capitalist encirclement, who underestimate the strength and significance of wrecking.

It must be explained to our Party comrades that
no economic successes, no matter how great, can annul the capitalist encirclement and the consequences arising from it.

The necessary measures must be taken to enable our comrades, both Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, to become familiar with the aims and objects, with the practice and technique of the wrecking, diversionist and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services.

5) It must be explained to our Party comrades that the Trotskyites, who are the active elements in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services, have long ceased to be a political trend in the working class, that they have long ceased to serve any ideal compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have become a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without principles and ideals, working in the pay of foreign intelligence services.

It must be explained that in the struggle against present-day Trotskyism, not the old methods, the methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, uprooting and smashing methods.

6) We must explain to our Party comrades the difference between the present-day wreckers and the wreckers of the Shakhti period; we must explain that whereas the wreckers of the Shakhti period deceived our people in the sphere of technique, taking advantage of their technical backwardness, the present-day wreckers, with Party cards in their possession, deceive our people by taking advantage of the political confidence shown towards them as Party members, by
taking advantage of the political carelessness of our people.

The old slogan of the mastery of technique which corresponded to the Shakhti period must be supplemented by the new slogan of political training of cadres, the mastery of Bolshevism and abandonment of our political trustfulness, a slogan which fully corresponds to the period we are now passing through.

It may be asked: Was it not possible ten years ago, during the Shakhti period, to advance both slogans simultaneously, the first slogan on the mastery of technique, and the second slogan on the political training of cadres? No, it was not possible. Things are not done that way in the Bolshevik Party. At the turning points of the revolutionary movement some basic slogan is always advanced as the key slogan which we grasp in order to pull the whole chain. That is what Lenin taught us: find the main link in the chain of our work, grasp it, pull it and thus pull the whole chain forward. The history of the revolutionary movement shows that this is the only correct tactic. In the Shakhti period the weakness of our people lay in their technical backwardness. Technical questions and not political ones were our weak spot at that time. Our political attitude towards the wreckers of that time was perfectly clear, it was the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien people. We eliminated our technical weakness by advancing the slogan on the mastery of technique and by educating during this period tens and hundreds of technically equipped Bolshevik cadres. It is a different matter now when we have technically equipped Bol-
shevik cadres and when the part of wreckers is being played by people who are not openly alien to us and moreover are not technically superior to us, but who possess Party cards and enjoy all the rights of Party members. The weakness from which our people suffer now is not technical backwardness but political carelessness, blind faith in people who have accidentally obtained Party cards, the failure to judge people not by their political declarations, but by the results of their work. The key question now facing us is not the elimination of the technical backwardness of our cadres for, in the main, this has already been done, but the elimination of the political carelessness and political trustfulness in wreckers who have accidentally obtained Party cards.

Such is the radical difference between the key question in the struggle for cadres in the Shakhti period and the key question at the present time.

That is why we could and should not have issued both slogans ten years ago: the one on the mastery of technique and the one on the political training of cadres.

That is why the old slogan on the mastery of technique must now be supplemented by the new slogan on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training of cadres and the abandonment of our political carelessness.

7) We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory that with every advance we make the class struggle here must subside, the more successes we achieve the tamer will the class enemy become.

This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous
one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the struggle against the Soviet government.

On the contrary, the further forward we advance, the greater the successes we achieve, the greater will be the fury of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes, the more ready will they be to resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will they seek to harm the Soviet state, and the more will they clutch at the most desperate means of struggle as the last resort of the doomed.

It must be borne in mind that the remnants of the defeated classes in the U.S.S.R. do not stand alone. They have the direct support of our enemies beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. It would be a mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle is limited to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. One end of the class struggle operates within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., but its other end stretches across the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot but be aware of this. And precisely because they are aware of it, they will continue their desperate sorties.

This is what history teaches us. This is what Leninism teaches us.

We must remember all this and be on the alert.

8) We must smash and cast aside another rotten theory to the effect that a person who is not always engaged in wrecking and who even occasionally shows successes in his work cannot be a wrecker.

This strange theory exposes the naivete of its authors. No wrecker will engage in wrecking all the
time if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest possible time. On the contrary, the real wrecker must from time to time show successes in his work, for this is his only means of preservation as a wrecker, of winning the confidence of people and of continuing his wrecking work.

I think that this question is clear and requires no further explanation.

9) We must smash and cast aside the third rotten theory to the effect that the systematic fulfilment of the economic plans nullifies wrecking and its consequences.

Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely to tickle the self-esteem of our department officials, to lull them and to weaken their struggle against wrecking.

What does "the systematic fulfilment of our economic plans" mean?

Firstly, it has been proved that all our economic plans are too low, for they do not take into account the enormous reserves and possibilities lying hidden in our national economy.

Secondly, the total fulfilment of economic plans by the respective People's Commissariats does not mean that there are not some very important branches which fail to fulfil their plans. On the contrary, the facts go to show that quite a number of People's Commissariats which have fulfilled or even more than fulfilled the annual economic plans, systematically fail to fulfil the plans in several very important branches of national economy.

Thirdly, there can be no doubt that had the wreck-
ers not been exposed and ejected, the position in respect to the fulfilment of economic plans would have been far worse. This is something which the short-sighted authors of the theory under review ought to remember.

Fourthly, the wreckers usually time the main part of their wrecking work not for peace time, but for the eve of war, or for war itself. Suppose we lulled ourselves with this rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory and did not touch the wreckers. Do the authors of this rotten theory appreciate what an enormous amount of harm the wreckers would do to our country in case of war if we allowed them to remain within the body of our national economy, sheltered by the rotten "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory?

Is it not clear that this "systematic fulfilment of economic plans" theory is a theory which is advantageous to the wreckers?

10) We must smash and cast aside the fourth rotten theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement is the principal means for the liquidation of wrecking.

This theory has been invented in order, amidst the noisy chatter about the Stakhanovites and the Stakhanov movement, to parry the blow against the wreckers.

In his report Comrade Molotov quoted a number of facts which show how the Trotskyite and non-Trotskyite wreckers of the Kuznetsk and Donetz Basins abused the confidence of our politically careless comrades, systematically led the Stakhanovites by the
nose, put spokes in their wheel, so to speak, deliberately created numerous obstacles to prevent them from working successfully and finally succeeded in disorganizing their work. What can the Stakhanovites do alone if capital construction as carried on by the wreckers, let us say, in the Donetz Basin, caused the preparatory work of coal mining to lag behind all other branches of the work?

Is it not clear that the Stakhanov movement itself is in need of our real assistance against the various machinations of the wreckers so as to advance the movement and enable it to fulfil its great mission? Is it not clear that the struggle against wrecking, the fight to liquidate it, to curb this wrecking is a necessary condition to enable the Stakhanov movement to expand to the full?

I think that this question is also clear and needs no further comment.

11) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten theory to the effect that the Trotskyite wreckers have no more reserves, that they are mustering their last cadres.

This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have their reserves. These consist first of all of the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the U.S.S.R. They consist of a whole number of groups and organizations beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. which are hostile to the Soviet Union.

Take, for example, the Trotskyite counter-revolutionary Fourth International, two-thirds of which is made up of spies and diversionist agents. Is
not this a reserve? Is it not clear that this international of spies will provide forces for the spying and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the group of that rascal, Scheflo, in Norway who provided a haven for the arch-spy Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. Is not this group a reserve? Who can deny that this counter-revolutionary group will continue to render services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers?

Or take, for example, the group of another rascal like Scheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Is not this a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of rascals will also help the Trotskyites in their espionage and wrecking work against the Soviet Union?

Those ladies and gentlemen from Germany, the Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, and Urbahns who have sold themselves body and soul to the fascists - are they not reserves for the espionage and wrecking work of the Trotskyites?

Or take, for example, the well-known gang of writers in America headed by the well-known crook Eastman, all these pen pirates who live by slandering the working class of the Soviet Union - are they not reserves for Trotskyism?

No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are mustering their last forces must be cast aside.

12) Finally we must smash and cast aside still another rotten theory to the effect that since we Bolsheviks are many, while the wreckers are few, since we Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people, while the Trotskyite wreckers can be numbered in tens and units, then we Bolsheviks
can afford to ignore this handful of wreckers.

This is wrong, comrades. This more than strange theory has been invented for the consolation of certain of our leading comrades who have failed in their work because of their inability to combat wrecking. It has been invented to lull their vigilance, to enable them to sleep peacefully.

Of course it is true that the Trotskyite wreckers have the support of individuals, while the Bolsheviks have the support of tens of millions of people. But it by no means follows from this that the wreckers are not able to inflict very serious damage on us. It does not need a large number of people to do harm and to cause damage. To build a Dnieper Dam tens of thousands of workers have to be set to work. But to blow it up, only a score or so would be required. To win a battle in a war several Red Army corps may be required. But to nullify this gain at the front only a few spies are needed at Army Headquarters, or even at Divisional Headquarters, to steal the plan of operations and pass it on to the enemy. To build a big railway bridge thousands of people are required. But to blow it up a few are sufficient. Scores and hundreds of similar examples could be quoted.

Consequently, we must not comfort ourselves with the fact that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite wreckers, are few.

We must see to it that not a single Trotskyite wrecker is left in our ranks.

This is how the matter stands with the question of how to remove the defects in our work, which are common to all our organizations - economic,
Soviet, administrative and Party.

Such are the measures that are necessary to remove these defects.

As regards the Party organizations in particular, and the defects in their work, the measures necessary to remove these defects are indicated in sufficient detail in the Draft Resolution submitted for your consideration. I think, therefore, that there is no need to enlarge on this aspect of the question here.

I would like to say just a few words on the question of political training and of improving our Party cadres.

I think that if we were able, if we succeeded in giving our Party cadres, from top to bottom, ideological training and in hardening them politically so that they could easily find their bearings in the internal and international situation, if we succeeded in making them fully mature Leninists, Marxists, capable of solving the problems of leading the country without serious error, we would thereby solve nine-tenths of our problems.

What is the situation with regard to the leading forces of our Party?

In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, there are 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders. These are what I would call the generals of our Party.

Then there are 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders, who are our Party's commissioned officers.

Then there are about 100,000 to 150,000 lower Party leaders who are, so to speak, our Party's non-commissioned officers.

The task is to raise the ideological level of these commanding cadres, to harden them politically, to
infuse them with new forces which are awaiting promotion, and thus enlarge the ranks of these leading cadres.

What is needed for this?

First of all we must instruct each of our Party leaders, from secretaries of Party cells to secretaries of Regional and - Republic Party organizations, to select within a certain time two persons, two Party workers, who are capable of acting as his effective deputies. It might be asked: where are we to get these two deputies for each secretary, we have no such people, no workers who answer these requirements. This is wrong, comrades. We have tens of thousands of capable and talented people. All we have to do is get to know them and promote them in time so as not to keep them in one place too long, until they begin to rot. Seek and ye shall find.

Further. For the Party instruction and re-training of secretaries of Party cells, four months' "Party courses" should be established in every Regional centre. The secretaries of all primary Party organizations (cells) should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and the most capable members of the primary Party organizations should be sent to these courses.

Further. For the political re-training of first secretaries of District organizations, eight months' "Lenin courses" should be established in, say, ten of the most important centres in the U.S.S.R. The first secretaries of District and Regional Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, their deputies and
the most capable members of the District and Regional organizations should be sent.

Further, For the ideological re-training and political improvement of secretaries of city organizations, six months' "Courses for the study of Party history and policy" under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should be established. The first or second secretaries of city Party organizations should be sent to these courses, and when they finish and return home, the most capable members of the city Party organizations should be sent.

Finally, a six months' "Conference on questions of internal and international policy" under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should be established. The first secretaries of Regional and Territorial organizations and of Central Committees of national Communist Parties should be sent here. These comrades should provide not one but several relays, capable of replacing the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. This should and must be done.

I now conclude, comrades.

We have thus indicated the main defects in our work, those which are common to all our organizations - economic, administrative and Party, and also those which are peculiar only to the Party organizations, defects which the enemies of the working class have taken advantage of in their diversionist and wrecking, espionage and terrorist work.

We have also indicated the principal measures that have to be adopted to remove these defects and to render harmless the diversionist, wrecking, espionage and terrorist sorties of the Trotskyite-fascist agents
of the foreign intelligence services.

The question arises: can we carry out all these measures, have we all the necessary means for this?

Undoubtedly we can. We can because we have all the means necessary to carry out these measures.

What do we lack?

We lack only one thing, the readiness to rid ourselves of our carelessness, our complacency, our political short-sightedness.

There's the rub.

Cannot we, who have overthrown capitalism, who, in the main, have built Socialism and have raised aloft the great banner of world Communism, get rid of this ridiculous and idiotic disease?

We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly get rid of it, if, of course, we want to do so. We will not just get rid of it, but get rid of it in the Bolshevik way, in real earnest.

And when we get rid of this idiotic disease we shall be able to say with complete confidence that we fear no enemies from within or without, we do not fear their sorties, for we shall smash them in the future as we are smashing them now and as we have smashed them in the past. (Applause.)

Pravda
29 March 1937
Comrades, in my report I dealt with the main problems of the subject we are discussing. The debate has shown that there is now complete clarity among us, that we understand the tasks and that we are ready to remove the defects in our work. But the debate has also shown that there are several definite questions of our organizational and political practice on which there is not yet complete and clear understanding. I have counted seven such questions.

Permit me to say a few words about these questions.

1) We must assume that everybody now understands and realises that excessive absorption in economic campaigns and allowing ourselves to be carried away by economic successes while Party political problems are underestimated and forgotten, lead into a cul-de-sac. Consequently, the attention of Party workers must be turned in the direction of Party political problems so that economic successes may be combined and march side by side with successes in Party political work.

How, practically, can the task of reinforcing Party political work, the task of freeing Party organizations from minor economic details, be carried out? As is evident from the debate, some comrades are inclined to draw from this the wrong conclusion
that economic work must now be abandoned entirely, At all events, there were voices which said in effect: Well, now, thank god, we shall be free from economic affairs, now we shall be able to devote our attention to Party political work. Is this conclusion correct? No, it is not correct. When our Party comrades who were carried away by economic successes abandoned politics, it meant going to the extreme, for which we had to pay dearly. If, now, some comrades, in setting to work to reinforce Party political work, think of abandoning economic work, this will be going to the other extreme, for which we shall pay no less dearly. You must not rush from one extreme to the other. Politics cannot be separated from economics. We can no more abandon economics than we can abandon politics. For convenience of study people usually, methodologically separate problems of economy from problems of politics. But this is only done methodologically, artificially, only for convenience of study. In real life, however, in practice, politics are inseparable from economics. They exist together and operate together. And whoever thinks of separating economics from politics in our practical work, of reinforcing economic work at the expense of political work, or, on the contrary, of reinforcing political work at the expense of economic work, will inevitably find himself in a cul-de-sac.

The meaning of the point in the draft resolution on freeing Party organizations from minor economic details and increasing Party political work is not that we must abandon economic work and economic leadership, but merely that we must no longer permit our
Party organizations to supersede the business organizations, particularly the land departments, and deprive them of personal responsibility. Consequently, we must learn the Bolshevik method of leading business organizations, which is, systematically to help these organizations, systematically to strengthen them and to guide economy, not over the heads of these organizations, but through the medium of them. We must give the business organizations, and primarily the land departments, the best people, we must fill the staffs of these organizations with fresh workers of the best type who are capable of carrying out the duties entrusted to them. Only after this has been done can we count on the Party organizations being quite free from minor economic details. Of course, this is a serious matter and requires a certain amount of time. But until it is done the Party organizations will have to continue for a short period to deal very closely with agricultural affairs, with all the details of ploughing, sowing, harvesting, etc.

2) Two words about wreckers, diversionists, spies, etc. I think it is clear to everybody now that the present-day wreckers and diversionists, no matter what disguise they may adopt, either Trotskyite or Bukharinite, have long ceased to be a political trend in the labour movement, that they have become transformed into a gang of professional wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins, without principles and without ideals. Of course, these gentlemen must be ruthlessly smashed and uprooted as the enemies of the working class, as betrayers of our country. This is clear and requires no further explanation.
But the question arises: how is this task of smashing and uprooting the Japano-German Trotskyite agents to be carried out in practice? Does that mean that we must strike at and uproot, not only real Trotskyites, but also those who at some time or other wavered in the direction of Trotskyism and then, long ago, abandoned Trotskyism; not only those who are really Trotskyite wrecking agents, but also those who, at some time or other, had occasion to walk down a street through which some Trotskyite had passed? At all events, such voices were heard at this Plenum. Can such an interpretation of the resolution be regarded as correct? No, it cannot be regarded as correct. In this matter, as in all others, an individual, discriminate approach is required. You cannot measure everybody with the same yardstick. Such a wholesale approach can only hinder the fight against the real Trotskyite wreckers and spies.

Among our responsible comrades there are a number of former Trotskyites who abandoned Trotskyism long ago and are fighting Trotskyism not less and perhaps more effectively than some of our respected comrades who have never wavered in the direction of Trotskyism. It would be foolish to cast a slur upon such comrades now.

Among our comrades there are some who ideologically were always opposed to Trotskyism, but who, notwithstanding this, maintained personal connections with individual Trotskyites which they did not hesitate to dissolve as soon as the practical features of Trotskyism became clear to them. Of course, it would have been better had they broken
off their personal friendly connections with individual Trotskyites at once, and not only after some delay. But it would be foolish to lump such comrades with the Trotskyites.

3) What does choosing the right people and putting them in the right place mean?

It means, firstly, choosing workers according to political principle, i.e., whether they are worthy of political confidence, and secondly, according to business principle, i.e., whether they are fit for such and such a definite job.

This means that the business approach must not be transformed into a narrow business approach, when people interest themselves in the business qualifications of a worker but do not interest themselves in his political face.

It means that the political approach must not be transformed into the sole and exclusive approach, when people interest themselves in the political face of the worker but do not interest themselves in his business qualifications.

Can it be said that this Bolshevik rule is adhered to by our Party comrades? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. Reference was made to this at this Plenum. But not everything was said about it. The point is that this tried and tested rule is frequently violated in our practical work, and violated in the most flagrant manner. Most often, workers are not chosen for objective reasons, but for casual, subjective, philistine, petty-bourgeois reasons. Most often, so-called acquaintances, friends, fellow-townsmen, personally devoted people, masters in the art of praising their
chiefs are chosen without regard for their political and business fitness.

Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible workers we get a little family of intimate people, an artel, the members of which try to live in peace, try not to offend each other, not to wash dirty linen in public, to praise each other, and from time to time send vapid and sickening reports to the centre about successes.

It is not difficult to understand that in such a family atmosphere there can be no place for criticism of defects in the work, or for self-criticism by leaders of the work.

Of course, such a family atmosphere creates a favourable medium for the cultivation of toadies, of people who lack a sense of self-respect, and therefore, have nothing in common with Bolshevism.

Take for example Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov. The first is the secretary of the Kazakhstan Territorial Party Organization, and the second is the secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Party Organization. These people are not the worst in our midst. But how do they choose workers? The first dragged with him to Kazakhstan from Azerbaidjan and the Urals, where he had worked formerly, thirty to forty of his "own" people and placed them in responsible positions in Kazakhstan. The second dragged with him to Yaroslavl from the Donetz Basin, where he had worked formerly, over a dozen of his "own" people and also placed them in responsible positions. And so Comrade Mirzoyan has his own artel. And Comrade Vainov also has his own artel. Guided by the Bolshevik
method of choosing and placing people, could they not choose workers from among the local people? Of course they could. Why, then, did they not do so? Because the Bolshevik method of choosing workers precludes the possibility of a philistine petty-bourgeois approach, precludes the possibility of choosing workers on the family and artel principle. Moreover, in choosing as workers people who were personally devoted to them these comrades evidently wanted to make themselves, to some extent, independent of the local people and independent of the Central Committee of the Party. Let us assume that Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov, owing to some circumstance or other, are transferred from their present place of work to some other place. What, in such a case, will they do with their "tails"? Will they drag them again to the new places where they are going to work?

This is the absurd position to which the violation of the Bolshevik rule of properly choosing and placing people leads.

4) What does testing workers, verifying the fulfilment of tasks mean?

Testing workers means testing them, not by their promises and declarations, but by the results of their work,

Verifying the fulfilment of tasks means verifying and testing, not only in offices and only by means of formal reports, but primarily at the place of work, according to actual results.

Is such testing and verification required at all? Undoubtedly it is required. It is required, firstly,
because only such testing and verification enables us to get to know the worker, to determine his real qualifications. It is required, secondly, because only such testing and verification enables us to determine the virtues and defects of the executive apparatus. It is required, thirdly, because only such testing and verification enables us to determine the virtues and defects of the tasks that are set.

Some comrades think that people can be tested only from above, when leaders test those who are led by the results of their work. That is not true. Of course, testing from above is needed as one of the effective measures for testing people and verifying the fulfilment of tasks. But testing from above far from exhausts the whole business of testing. There is another kind of test, the test from below, when the masses, when those who are led, test the leaders, draw attention to their mistakes and indicate the way in which these mistakes may be rectified. This sort of testing is one of the most effective methods of testing people.

The Party membership tests its leaders at meetings of Party actives, at conferences and at congresses by hearing their reports, by criticising defects and, finally, by electing or not electing this or that leading comrade to leading bodies. The strict adherence to democratic centralism in the Party, as the rules of our Party demand, the obligatory election of Party bodies, the right to nominate and to object to candidates, secret ballot, freedom of criticism and self-criticism - all these and similar measures must be carried out in order, among other things, to facilitate
the testing and control of Party leaders by the Party membership.

The non-Party masses test their business, trade union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party actives, at mass conferences of all kinds, at which they hear the reports of their leaders, criticise defects and indicate the way in which these defects may be removed.

Finally, the people test the leaders of the country during elections of the government bodies of the Soviet Union by means of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

The task is to combine testing from above with testing from below.

5) What does educating cadres on their own mistakes mean?

Lenin taught that conscientiously exposing the mistakes of the Party, studying the causes which gave rise to these mistakes and indicating the way in which these mistakes may be rectified are one of the surest means of properly training and educating Party cadres, of properly training and educating the working class and the toiling masses. Lenin says:

"The attitude of a political party toward its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest criteria of the seriousness of the party and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations toward its class and toward the toiling masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose its reasons, to analyse the conditions which gave rise to it, to study attentively the means of correcting it - these are the signs of a
serious party; this means the performance of its duties, this means educating and training the class, and then the masses."

This means that it is the duty of Bolsheviks, not to gloss over their mistakes, not to wriggle out of admitting their mistakes, as often happens among us, but honestly and openly to admit their mistakes, honestly and openly to indicate the way in which these mistakes may be rectified, honestly and openly to rectify their mistakes.

I would not say that many of our comrades would cheerfully agree to do this. But Bolsheviks, if they really want to be Bolsheviks, must have the courage openly to admit their mistakes, to reveal their causes, indicate the way in which they may be rectified, and in that way help the Party to give the cadres a proper training and proper political education. For only in this way, only in an atmosphere of open and honest self-criticism, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik cadres, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik leaders.

Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of Lenin's thesis.

Take, for example, our mistakes in collective farm construction. You, no doubt, remember 1930, when our Party comrades thought they could solve the very complicated problem of transferring the peasantry to collective farm construction in a matter of three or four months, and when the Central Committee of the Party found itself obliged to curb these over-zealous comrades. This was one of the most dangerous periods in the life of our Party. The mis-
take was that our Party comrades forgot about the voluntary nature of collective farm construction, forgot that the peasants could not be transferred to the collective farm path by administrative pressure, they forgot that collective farm construction required, not several months, but several years of careful and thoughtful work. They forgot about this and did not want to admit their mistakes. You, no doubt, remember that the Central Committee's reference to comrades being dizzy with success and its warning to our comrades in the districts not to run too far ahead and ignore the real situation were met with hostility. But this did not restrain the Central Committee from going against the stream and turning our Party comrades to the right path. Well? It is now clear to everybody that the Party achieved its aim by turning our Party comrades to the right path. Now we have tens of thousands of excellent peasant cadres for collective farm construction and for collective farm leadership. These cadres were educated and trained on the mistakes of 1930. But we would not have had these cadres today had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time.

The other example is taken from the sphere of industrial construction. I have in mind our mistakes in the period of the Shakhti wrecking. Our mistakes were that we did not fully appreciate the danger of the technical backwardness of our cadres in industry, we were reconciled to this backwardness and thought that we could develop extensive socialist industrial construction with the aid of specialists who were
hostile to us, dooming our own business cadres to the role of bad commissars attached to bourgeois specialists. You, no doubt, remember how unwillingly our business cadres admitted their mistakes at that time, how unwillingly they admitted their technical backwardness, and how slowly they assimilated the slogan "master technique." Well? The facts show that the slogan "master technique" had good effects and produced good results. Now we have tens and hundreds of thousands of excellent Bolshevik business cadres who have already mastered technique and are advancing our industry. But we would not have had these cadres now had the Party yielded to the stubbornness of the business leaders who would not admit their technical backwardness, had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time.

Some comrades say that it is inexpedient to talk openly about our mistakes, as the open admission of our mistakes may be construed by our enemies as our weakness and may be utilised by them. That is nonsense, comrades, sheer nonsense. On the contrary, the open admission of our mistakes and their honest rectification can only strengthen our Party, raise the prestige of our Party in the eyes of the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia, increase the strength and might of our state. And that is the main thing. If only the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia are with us, all the rest will come.

Other comrades say that the open admission of our mistakes may lead, not to the training and strengthening of our cadres, but to their becoming weaker and disturbed, that we must spare and take care of
our cadres, that we must spare their self-esteem and peace of mind. And so they propose that we gloss over the mistakes of our comrades, relax criticism, and still better, ignore these mistakes. Such a line is not only radically wrong but extremely dangerous, dangerous first of all for the cadres whom they want to "spare" and "take care of." To spare and take care of cadres by glossing over their mistakes means killing these very cadres for certain. We would certainly have killed our collective farm Bolshevik cadres had we not exposed the mistakes of 1930, and had we not educated them on these mistakes. We would certainly have killed our industrial Bolshevik cadres had we not exposed the mistakes of our comrades in the period of the Shakhti wrecking, and had we not educated our industrial cadres on these mistakes. Whoever thinks of sparing the self-esteem of our cadres by glossing over their mistakes is killing the cadres and the self-esteem of cadres, for by glossing over their mistakes he helps them to make fresh and perhaps even more serious mistakes, which, we may assume, will lead to the complete breakdown of the cadres, to the detriment of their "self-esteem" and "peace of mind."

6) Lenin taught us not only to teach the masses, but also to learn from the masses.

What does that mean?

It means that we, the leaders, must not get swelled heads, must not think that because we are members of the Central Committee, or People's Commissars, we possess all the knowledge necessary to lead properly. Rank alone does not give knowledge and experience. Still less does title.
It means that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is not sufficient to enable us to lead properly, that, consequently, we must supplement our experience, the experience of the leaders, with the experience of the masses, the experience of the Party membership, the experience of the working class, the experience of the people.

It means that we must not for a moment relax, let alone sever our ties with the masses.

And finally, it means that we must listen attentively to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rank-and-file members of the Party, to the voice of the so-called "little people," to the voice of the people.

What does leading properly mean?

It does not in the least mean sitting in offices and writing instructions.

Leading properly means:

Firstly, finding the proper solution to a problem; but it is impossible to find the proper solution to a problem without taking into account the experience of the masses who feel the results of our leadership on their own backs;

Secondly, organizing the application of the correct solution, which, however, cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses;

Thirdly, organizing the verification of the fulfilment of this solution, which again cannot be done without the direct assistance of the masses.

We, the leaders, see things, events and people only from one side, I would say, from above; consequently, our field of vision is more or less limited. The masses, on the other hand, see things, events
and people from the other side, I would say, from below; consequently, their field of vision is also to some extent limited. In order to find the proper solution to a problem these two experiences must be combined. Only then will the leadership be correct.

This is what not only teaching the masses but also learning from the masses means.

Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of Lenin's thesis.

This happened several years ago. We, the members of the Central Committee, were discussing the question of improving the situation in the Donetz Basin. The measures proposed by the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry were obviously unsatisfactory. Three times we sent the proposals back to the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. And three times we got different proposals from the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. But even then we could not regard them as satisfactory. Finally, we decided to call several workers and lower business and trade union officials from the Donetz Basin. For three days we discussed matters with these comrades. And all of us members of the Central Committee had to admit that only these ordinary workers, these "little people," were able to suggest the proper solution to us. You no doubt remember the decision of the Central Committee and of the Council of People's Commissars on measures for increasing coal output in the Donetz Basin. Well, this decision of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, which all our comrades admitted was a correct and even a remarkable one, was suggested to us by simple people from the ranks.
The other example. I have in mind the case of Comrade Nikolayenko. Who is Nikolayenko? Nikolayenko is a rank-and-file member of the Party. She is an ordinary "little person." For a whole year she had been giving signals that all was not well in the Party organization in Kiev; she exposed the family spirit, the philistine petty-bourgeois approach to workers, the suppression of self-criticism, the prevalence of Trotskyite wreckers. But she was constantly brushed aside as if she were a pestiferous fly. Finally, in order to get rid of her they expelled her from the Party. Neither the Kiev organization nor the Central Committee of the C.P. of the Ukraine helped her to bring the truth to light. The intervention of the Central Committee of the Party alone helped to unravel the knot. And what transpired after the case was investigated? It transpired that Nikolayenko was right and the Kiev organization was wrong. Neither more nor less. And yet, who is Nikolayenko? Of course, she is not a member of the Central Committee, she is not a People's Commissar, she is not the secretary of the Kiev Regional Organization, she is not even the secretary of a Party cell, she is only a simple rank-and-file member of the Party.

As you see, simple people sometimes prove to be much nearer to the truth than some high institutions.

I could quote scores and hundreds of similar examples. Thus you see that our experience alone, the experience of the leaders, is far from enough for the leadership of our cause. In order to lead properly the experience of the leaders must be supplemented by the experience of the Party membership, the experience
of the working class, the experience of the toilers, the experience of the so-called "little people."

But when is it possible to do that?

It is possible to do that only when the leaders are most closely connected with the masses, when they are connected with the Party membership, with the working class, with the peasantry, with the working intelligentsia.

Connection with the masses, strengthening this connection, readiness to heed the voice of the masses - herein lies the strength and invincibility of Bolshevik leadership.

We may take it as the rule that as long as the Bolsheviks maintain connection with the broad masses of the people they will be invincible. And, on the contrary, as soon as the Bolsheviks become severed from the masses and lose their connection with them, as soon as they become covered with bureaucratic rust, they will lose all their strength and become a mere squib.

In the mythology of the ancient Greeks there is the celebrated hero Antaeus who, so the legend goes, was the son of Poseidon, god of the seas, and Gaea, goddess of the earth. Antaeus was particularly attached to his mother who gave birth to him, suckled him and reared him. There was not a hero whom this Antaeus did not vanquish. He was regarded as an invincible hero, Wherein lay his strength? It lay in the fact that every time he was hard pressed in the fight against his adversary he touched the earth, his mother, who gave birth to him and suckled him, and that gave him new strength.
But he had a vulnerable spot - the danger of being detached from the earth in some way or other. His enemies took this into account and watched for it. One day an enemy appeared who took advantage of this vulnerable spot and vanquished Antaeus. This was Hercules. How did Hercules vanquish Antaeus? He lifted him off the ground, kept him suspended, prevented him from touching the ground and throttled him.

I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero of Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, like Antaeus, are strong because they maintain connection with their mother, the masses who gave birth to them, suckled them and reared them. And as long as they maintain connection with their mother, with the people, they have every chance of remaining invincible.

This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik leadership.

7) Lastly, one more question. I have in mind the question of the formal and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude of some of our Party comrades towards the fate of individual members of the Party, to the question of expelling members from the Party, or the question of reinstating expelled members of the Party. The point is that some of our Party leaders suffer from a lack of concern for people, for members of the Party, for workers. More than that, they do not study members of the Party, do not know what interests they have, how they are developing; generally, they do not know the workers. That is why they have no individual approach to Party members and Party workers. And because they have no individual approach in appraising Party members and Party workers they
usually act in a haphazard way: either they praise them wholesale, without measure, or roundly abuse them, also wholesale and without measure, and expel thousands and tens of thousands of members from the Party. Such leaders generally try to think in tens of thousands, not caring about "units," about individual members of the Party, about their fate. They regard the expulsion of thousands and tens of thousands of people from the Party as a mere trifle and console themselves with the thought that our Party has two million members and that the expulsion of tens of thousands cannot in any way affect the Party's position. But only those who are in fact profoundly anti-Party can have such an approach to members of the Party.

As a result of this heartless attitude towards people, towards members of the Party and Party workers, discontent and bitterness is artificially created among a section of the Party, and the Trotskyite double-dealers cunningly hook on to such embittered comrades and skilfully drag them into the bog of Trotskyite wrecking.

Taken by themselves, the Trotskyites never represented a big force in our Party. Recall the last discussion in our Party in 1927. That was a real Party referendum. Of a total of 854,000 members of the Party, 730,000 took part in the voting. Of these, 724,000 members of the Party voted for the Bolsheviks, for the Central Committee of the Party and against the Trotskyites, while 4,000 members of the Party, i.e., about one-half per cent, voted for the Trotskyites, and 2,600 members of the Party
abstained from voting. One hundred and twenty-three thousand members of the Party did not take part in the voting. They did not take part in the voting either because they were away, or because they were working on night shift. If to the 4,000 who voted for the Trotskyites we add all those who abstained from voting on the assumption that they, too, sympathised with the Trotskyites, and if to this number we add, not half per cent of those who did not take part in the voting, as we should do by right, but five per cent, i.e., about 6,000 Party members, we will get about 12,000 Party members who, in one way or another, sympathised with Trotskyism. This is the whole strength of Messieurs the Trotskyites. Add to this the fact that many of them became disillusioned with Trotskyism and left it, and you will get an idea of the insignificance of the Trotskyite forces. And if in spite of this the Trotskyite wreckers have some reserves around our Party it is because the wrong policy of some of our comrades on the question of expelling and reinstating members of the Party, the heartless attitude of some of our comrades towards the fate of individual members of the Party and individual workers, artificially creates a number of discontented and embittered people, and thus creates these reserves for the Trotskyites.

For the most part people are expelled for so-called passivity. What is passivity? It transpires that if a member of the Party has not thoroughly mastered the Party program he is regarded as passive and subject to expulsion. But that is wrong, comrades. You cannot interpret the rules of our Party in such a
pedantic fashion. In order to thoroughly master the Party program one must be a real Marxist, a tried and theoretically trained Marxist. I do not know whether we have many members of our Party who have thoroughly mastered our program, who have become real Marxists, theoretically trained and tried. If we continued further along this path we would have to leave only intellectuals and learned people generally in our Party. Who wants such a Party? We have Lenin's thoroughly tried and tested formula defining a member of the Party. According to this formula a member of the Party is one who accepts the program of the Party, pays membership dues and works in one of its organizations. Please note: Lenin's formula does not speak about thoroughly mastering the program, but about accepting the program. These are two very different things. It is not necessary to prove that Lenin is right here and not our Party comrades who chatter idly about thoroughly mastering the program. That should be clear. If the Party had proceeded from the assumption that only those comrades who have thoroughly mastered the program and have become theoretically trained Marxists could be members of the Party it would not have created thousands of Party circles, hundreds of Party schools where the members of the Party are taught Marxism, and where they are assisted to master our program. It is quite clear that if our Party organizes such schools and circles for the members of the Party it is because it knows that the members of the Party have not yet thoroughly mastered the Party program, have not yet become theoretically
trained Marxists.

Consequently, in order to rectify our policy on the question of Party membership and on expulsion from the Party we must put a stop to the present blockhead interpretation of the question of passivity.

But there is another error in this sphere. It is that our comrades recognise no mean between two extremes. It is enough for a worker, a member of the Party, to commit a slight offence, to come late to a Party meeting once or twice, or to fail to pay membership dues for some reason or other, to be kicked out of the Party in a trice. No interest is taken in the degree to which he is to blame, the reason why he failed to attend a meeting, the reason why he did not pay membership dues. The bureaucratic approach displayed on these questions is positively unprecedented. It is not difficult to understand that it is precisely the result of this heartless policy that excellent, skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites, found themselves expelled from the Party. Was it not possible to caution them before expelling them from the Party, or if that had no effect, to reprove or reprimand them, and if that had no effect, to put them on probation for a certain period, or, as an extreme measure, to reduce them to the position of candidates, but not expel them from the Party at one stroke? Of course it was. But this calls for concern for people, for the members of the Party, for the fate of members of the Party. And this is what some of our comrades lack.

It is time, comrades, high time, to put a stop to this disgraceful state of affairs. (Applause.)

Pravda
1 April 1937
LETTER TO THE AUTHORS OF THE MANUAL OF THE "HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY"

I think that our manuals of the "History of the Communist Party" are far from satisfactory, for three main reasons. They are not satisfactory because either they present the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. without linking it with the history of the country, or because they limit themselves within the narration, to a simple description of events and achievements of the current struggle without giving the necessary Marxist explanation, or else because they are mistaken in their plan and mistaken in their grouping of events in given periods of time.

In order to avoid these faults, the authors must be aware of the following considerations: firstly, it is necessary to precede each chapter (or part) of the manual with a brief historical introduction on the economic and political situation of the country. Otherwise the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. will have the aspect not of a history, but of a superficial recital of incomprehensible things of the past.

Secondly, it is necessary not only to present the facts which show the abundance of contradictions within the Party and in the working class in the period of capitalism in the U.S.S.R., but also to give the Marxist explanations of these facts indicating:
a) the presence in Russia before the Revolution of the new classes which were modern from the capitalist viewpoint, equally with the presence of the old pre-capitalist classes; b) the petty-bourgeois characteristics of the country, the heterogenous composition of the working class. It is necessary to indicate these things in so far as they constituted the conditions which favoured the existence of a multitude of contradictions within the Party and within the working class. Otherwise the abundance of these contradictions will remain incomprehensible.

Thirdly it is necessary not only to present a narrative of these facts of this desperate struggle to solve contradictions but also to give the Marxist explanation of these features, indicating that the struggle of the Bolsheviks against these anti-Bolshevik factions and contradictions was chiefly a struggle for the principles of Leninism; that in these capitalist conditions and from a general standpoint, the existence of antagonistic classes, the contradictions and divergencies within the Party are inevitable; that we can only develop and consolidate the proletarian parties, under the conditions indicated by overcoming these contradictions; that without the principle fight against the anti-Leninist groups, without vanquishing them our Party will inevitably degenerate, as have degenerated the Social-Democratic Parties of the Second International which did not accept this struggle. One could use this occasion to mention a well-known letter from Engels to Bernstein (1882), that I cited in the first chapter of my report to the Seventh Plenary Session, enlarging upon "the Social-Democratic
deviation in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." and added my comments to his subject. Without these explanations the struggle between factions and contradictions in the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., would appear to be merely the facts of an incomprehensible dispute and the Bolsheviks to be incorrigible and tireless quibblers and scrappers.

It is necessary finally to put some order into the grouping by clarifying periods of events in the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.

I think that the following schema or analogy could serve as a good basis.

SCHEMA:

1. The struggle for the building of a Social-Democratic Party in Russia. (From the formation of the "Liberation of Labour" group of Plekhanov, in 1883, to the appearance of the first numbers of ISKRA, 1900 - 1901).

2. The formation of the first Social-Democratic Workers Party of Russia, and the appearance within the Party of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. (1901 - 1904).


4. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the period of the reaction of Stolypin. The constitution of the Bolsheviks into an independent Social-Democratic Workers Party (1908 - 1912).

5. The Bolshevik Party in the years of the progress of the Workers movement on the eve of the first imperialist war (1912 - 1914).


8. The Bolshevik Party in the period of the Civil War (1918 - 1920).

9. The Bolshevik Party in the period of transition to the peaceful work of building up the National Economy (1921 - 1925).


12. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the achievement of the construction of Socialist society. Also the application of the New Constitution (1935 - 1937).

J. STALIN

Pravda
6 May 1937
Comrades,

My toast will be a little singular and unusual. It is the custom with us to toast the health of the directors, heads, leaders and Commissars of the People. This is naturally not a bad thing, but outside of the superior leaders are the middle and lower leaders, and of these middle and lower leaders we have dozens. These are modest people, they do not push themselves forward, one hardly notices them. But it would be blindness not to notice them. Because on these people depends the output of production in all our National Economy. That is to say that on them depends also the destiny of our economic conditions.

To the health of our middle and lower economic leaders. (Ovations and cheers).

In general it must be said of these leaders that unfortunately they are not always aware of the heights to which history has raised them under the conditions of the Soviet regime. They do not always understand that to be a leader in the economy, under the conditions of our country, signifies that they must prove themselves worthy of this great honour, of this great consideration, and prove themselves worthy of the great confidence shown in them by the working
class, by the people. In the old days, in the time of capitalism, the leaders of the economy, the diverse directors, administrators, heads, foremen and supervisors were considered guard dogs of the owners and capitalists. The people detested them and saw them as enemies, knowing that they directed the economy according to the interests of the owners, and to the profit of the capitalists. Conversely, in our Soviet regime, the directors of the economy have every reason to rejoice in the confidence and love of the people, because they direct the economy not for the profit of a handful of capitalists, but in the interests of the whole people. That is the reason why the title "leader of the economy" in the conditions of our country is an honoured title and why each head in the Soviet regime must prove himself worthy of this great honour, this great confidence, in the eyes of the people. The confidence of the people in the worker-directors of the economy is a great thing, Comrades. The leaders come and go, but the people remain. Only the people are immortal, everything else is ephemeral. That is why it is necessary to appreciate the full value of the confidence of the people.

To the health of our worker-directors of the economy who have understood the greatness of their task and are conscious of it, and who will not allow anyone to dishonour and disgrace this great title of director of the Soviet economy. (Ovations and cheers).

Comrades, we have amongst us the pioneers of the new cause in the sphere of the national economy, the fighters of the Stakhanovite movement.
To the health of the pioneers and fighters for the new cause. To the health of Comrades Stakhanov, Droukanov, Isotov, Riobachapka, and others. (Cheers),

And finally, to the health of the young and the old pioneers of the blast furnaces, of the metal industry, and above all to the health of the workers of the blast furnaces, Comrade Korolov, of his father, and his son, and of the whole Korolov family, workers of the blast furnaces, so that the Korolov family do not remain behind the new methods of work. (Tempestuous applause).

Korolov, the father said, leaning towards Stalin: "Comrade Stalin, I am already an old man, but I will work with all my strength in order to accomplish your desire, and to march at the head of other workers in the mines."

Pravda
31 October 1937
Chairman : Comrade Stalin, our candidate, has the floor.

(Comrade Stalin's appearance in the rostrum is greeted by a stormy ovation lasting several minutes. The whole audience rises to greet Comrade Stalin. Constant cries from the audience : "Hurrah for the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the author of the Soviet Constitution, the most democratic in the world!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the leader of the oppressed all over the world!"

Stalin : Comrades, to tell you the truth, I had no intention of making a speech. But our respected Nikita Sergeyevich (Kruschov) dragged me, so to speak, to this meeting. "Make a good speech," he said. What shall I talk about, exactly what sort of speech? Everything that had to be said before the elections has already been said and said again in the speeches of our leading comrades, Kalinin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Yezhov and many other responsible comrades. What can be added to these speeches?

What is needed, they say, are explanations of certain questions connected with the election campaign. What explanations, on what questions? Everything that had to be explained has been explained and
explained again in the well-known appeals of the Bolshevik Party, the Young Communist League, the All-Union Central Trade Union Council, the Osoaviakhim and the Committee of Physical Culture. What can be added to these explanations?

Of course, one could make a light sort of speech about everything and nothing. (Amusement.) Perhaps such a speech would amuse the audience. They say that there are some great hands at such speeches not only over there, in the capitalist countries, but here too, in the Soviet country. (Laughter and applause.) But, firstly, I am no great hand at such speeches. Secondly, is it worth while indulging in amusing things just now when all of us Bolsheviks are, as they say, "up to our necks" in work? I think not.

Clearly, you cannot make a good speech under such circumstances.

However, since I have taken the floor, I will have, of course, to say at least something one way or another. (Loud applause.)

First of all, I would like to express my thanks (applause) to the electors for the confidence they have shown in me. (Applause.)

I have been nominated as candidate, and the Election Commission of the Stalin Area of the Soviet capital has registered my candidature. This, comrades, is an expression of great confidence. Permit me to convey my profound Bolshevik gratitude for this confidence that you have shown in the Bolshevik Party of which I am a member, and in me personally as a representative of that Party. (Loud applause.)

I know what confidence means. It naturally lays
upon me new and additional duties and, consequently, new and additional responsibilities. Well, it is not customary among us Bolsheviks to refuse responsibilities. I accept them willingly. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

For my part, I would like to assure you, comrades, that you may safely rely on Comrade Stalin. (Loud and sustained cheers. A voice: "And we all stand for Comrade Stalin!") You may take it for granted that Comrade Stalin will be able to discharge his duty to the people (applause), to the working class (applause), to the peasantry (applause) and to the intelligentsia. (Applause.)

Further, comrades, I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of the forthcoming national holiday, the day of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. (Loud applause.) The forthcoming elections are not merely elections, comrades, they are really a national holiday of our workers, our peasants and our intelligentsia. (Loud applause.) Never in the history of the world have there been such really free and really democratic elections - never! History knows no other example like it. (Applause.) The point is not that our elections will be universal, equal, secret and direct, although that fact in itself is of great importance. The point is that our universal elections will be carried out as the freest elections and the most democratic of any country in the world.

Universal elections exist and are held in some capitalist countries, too, so-called democratic countries. But in what atmosphere are elections held there? In an atmosphere of class conflicts, in an
atmosphere of class enmity, in an atmosphere of pressure brought to bear on the electors by the capitalists, landlords, bankers and other capitalist sharks. Such elections, even if they are universal, equal, secret and direct, cannot be called altogether free and altogether democratic elections.

Here, in our country, on the contrary, elections are held in an entirely different atmosphere. Here there are no capitalists and no landlords and, consequently, no pressure is exerted by propertied classes on non-propertied classes. Here elections are held in an atmosphere of collaboration between the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia, in an atmosphere of mutual confidence between them, in an atmosphere, I would say, of mutual friendship; because there are no capitalists in our country, no landlords, no exploitation and nobody, in fact, to bring pressure to bear on people in order to distort their will.

That is why our elections are the only really free and really democratic elections in the whole world. (Loud applause.)

Such free and really democratic elections could arise only on the basis of the triumph of the socialist system, only on the basis of the fact that in our country socialism is not merely being built, but has already become part of life, of the daily life of the people. Some ten years ago the question might still be debated whether socialism could be built in our country or not. Today this is no longer a debatable question. Today it is a matter of facts, a matter of real life, a matter of habits that permeate the whole life of the people. Our mills and factories are
being run without capitalists. The work is directed by men and women of the people. That is what we call socialism in practice. In our fields the tillers of the land work without landlords and without kulaks. The work is directed by men and women of the people. That is what we call socialism in daily life, that is what we call a free, socialist life.

It is on this basis that our new, really free and really democratic elections have arisen, elections which have no precedent in the history of mankind.

How then, after this, can one refrain from congratulating you on the occasion of the day of national celebration, the day of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union! (Loud, general cheers.)

Further, comrades, I would like to give you some advice, the advice of a candidate to his electors. If you take capitalist countries, you will find that peculiar, I would say, rather strange relations exist there between deputies and voters. As long as the elections are in progress, the deputies flirt with the electors, fawn on them, swear fidelity and make heaps of promises of every kind. It would appear that the deputies are completely dependent on the electors. As soon as the elections are over, and the candidates have become deputies, relations undergo a radical change. Instead of the deputies being dependent on the electors, they become entirely independent. For four or five years, that is, until the next elections, the deputy feels quite free, independent of the people, of his electors. He may pass from one camp to another, he may turn from the right road to the wrong road, he may even become entangled in machin-
ations of a not altogether desirable character, he may turn as many somersaults as he likes - he is independent.

Can such relations be regarded as normal? By no means, comrades. This circumstance was taken into consideration by our Constitution and it made it a law that electors have the right to recall their deputies before the expiration of their term of office if they begin to play monkey tricks, if they turn off the road, or if they forget that they are dependent on the people, on the electors.

This is a wonderful law, comrades. A deputy should know that he is the servant of the people, their emissary in the Supreme Soviet, and he must follow the line laid down in the mandate given him by the people. If he turns off the road, the electors are entitled to demand new elections, and as to the deputy who turned off the road, they have the right to blackball him. (Laughter and applause.) This is a wonderful law. My advice, the advice of a candidate to his electors, is that they remember this electors' right, the right to recall deputies before the expiration of their term of office, that they keep an eye on their deputies, control them and, if they should take it into their heads to turn off the right road, get rid of them and demand new elections. The government is obliged to appoint new elections. My advice is to remember this law and to take advantage of it should need arise.

And, lastly, one more piece of advice from a candidate to his electors. What in general must one demand of one's deputies, selecting from all possible
demands the most elementary?

The electors, the people, must demand that their deputies should remain equal to their tasks, that in their work they should not sink to the level of political philistines, that in their posts they should remain political figures of the Lenin type, that as public figures they should be as clear and definite as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as fearless in battle and as merciless towards the enemies of the people as Lenin was (applause), that they should be free from all panic, from any semblance of panic, when things begin to get complicated and some danger or other looms on the horizon, that they should be as free from all semblance of panic as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as wise and deliberate in deciding complex problems requiring a comprehensive orientation and a comprehensive weighing of all pros and cons as Lenin was (applause), that they should be as upright and honest as Lenin was (applause), that they should love their people as Lenin did. (Applause.)

Can we say that all the candidates are public figures precisely of this kind? I would not say so. There are all sorts of people in the world, there are all sorts of public figures in the world. There are people of whom you cannot say what they are, whether they are good or bad, courageous or timid, for the people heart and soul or for the enemies of the people. There are such people and there are such public figures. They are also to be found among us, the Bolsheviks. You know yourselves, comrades - there are black sheep in every family. (Laughter and applause.)
Of people of this indefinite type, people who resemble political philistines rather than political figures, people of this vague, amorphous type, the great Russian writer, Gogol, rather aptly said: "Vague sort of people, says he, neither one thing nor the other, you can't make head or tail of them, they are neither Bogdan in town nor Seliphan in the country." (Laughter and applause.) There are also some rather apt popular sayings about such indefinite people and public figures: "A middling sort of man - neither fish nor flesh" (general laughter and applause), neither a candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (General laughter and applause.)

I cannot say with absolute certainty that among the candidates (I beg their pardon, of course) and among our public figures there are not people who more than anything resemble political philistines, who in character and make-up resemble people of the type referred to in the popular saying: "Neither a candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (Laughter and applause.)

I would like you, comrades, to exercise systematic influence on your deputies, to impress upon them that they must constantly keep before them the great image of the great Lenin and imitate Lenin in all things. (Applause.)

The functions of the electors do not end with the elections. They continue during the whole term of the given Supreme Soviet. I have already mentioned the law which empowers the electors to recall their deputies before the expiration of their term of office if they should turn off the right road. Hence it is
the duty and right of the electors to keep their deputies constantly under their control and to impress upon them that they must under no circumstances sink to the level of political philistines, impress upon their deputies that they must be like the great Lenin. (Applause.)

Such, comrades, is my second piece of advice to you, the advice of a candidate to his electors, (Loud and sustained applause and cheers. All rise and turn towards the government box, to which Comrade Stalin proceeds from the platform. Voices : "Hurrah for the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the first of the Leninists, candidate for the Soviet of the Union, Comrade Stalin!")

Pravda
12 Decembre 1937
ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE U.S.S.R.

18 January 1938 - 12 February 1938

Ivan Philipovich Ivanov, staff propagandist of the Manturovsk District of the Young Communist League in the Kursk Region of the U.S.S.R., addressed a letter to Comrade Stalin requesting his opinion on the question of the final victory of Socialism in the Soviet Union.

IVANOV TO STALIN

Dear Comrade Stalin,

I earnestly request you to explain the following question: In the local districts here and even in the Regional Committee of the Young Communist League, a two-fold conception prevails about the final victory of socialism in our country, i.e., the first group of contradictions is confused with the second.

In your works on the destiny of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. you speak of two groups of contradictions - internal and external.

As for the first group of contradictions, we have, of course, solved them - within the country Socialism is victorious.

I would like to have your answer about the second group of contradictions, i.e., those between the land of Socialism and capitalism.

You point out that the final victory of Socialism implies the solution of the external contradictions, that we must be fully guaranteed against intervention.
and, consequently, against the restoration of capitalism.

But this group of contradictions can only be solved by the efforts of the workers of all countries.

Besides, Comrade Lenin taught us that "we can achieve final victory only on a world scale, only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries."

While attending the class for staff propagandists at the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L., I, basing myself on your works, said that the final victory of Socialism is possible only on a world scale. But the leading regional committee workers - Urozhenko, First Secretary of the Regional Committee, and Kazelkov, propaganda instructor - described my statement as a Trotskyist sortie.

I began to read to them passages from your works on this question, but Urozhenko ordered me to close the book and said: "Comrade Stalin said this in 1926, but we are now in 1938. At that time we did not have the final victory, but now we have it and there is no need for us at all to worry about intervention and restoration."

Then he went on to say: "We have now the final victory of Socialism and a full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

And so I was counted as an abettor of Trotskyism and removed from propaganda work and the question was raised as to whether I was fit to remain in the Y.C.L.

Please, Comrade Stalin, will you explain whether we have the final victory of Socialism yet or not, Perhaps there is additional contemporary material
on this question connected with recent changes that I have not come across yet. Also I think that Urozhenko's statement that Comrade Stalin's works on this question are somewhat out of date is an anti-Bolshevik one. Are the leading workers of the Regional Committee right in counting me as a Trotskyist? I feel very much hurt and offended over this.

I hope, Comrade Stalin, that you will grant my request and reply to the Manturovsk District, Kursk Region, First Zasemsky Village Soviet, Ivan Philipovich Ivanov.


STALIN TO IVANOV

Of course you are right, Comrade Ivanov, and your ideological opponents, i.e., Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov, are wrong. And for the following reasons:

Undoubtedly the question of the victory of Socialism in one country, in this case our country, has two different sides.

The first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between classes in our country. This concerns the sphere of internal relations.

Can the working class of our country overcome the contradictions with our peasantry and establish an alliance, collaboration with them?

Can the working class of our country, in alliance - with our peasantry, smash the bourgeoisie of our country, deprive it of the land, factories, mines, etc., and by its own efforts build a new, classless
society, complete Socialist society?

Such are the problems that are connected with the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the affirmative. Lenin teaches us that "we have all that is necessary for the building of a complete Socialist society."

Hence we can and must, by our own efforts, overcome our bourgeoisie and build Socialist society.

Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and those other gentlemen who later became spies and agents of fascism, denied that it was possible to build Socialism in our country unless the victory of the Socialist revolution was first achieved in other countries, in capitalist countries. As a matter of fact, these gentlemen wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois development and they concealed their apostasy by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the revolution" in other countries.

This was precisely the point of controversy between our Party and these gentlemen.

Our country's subsequent course of development proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky and company were wrong.

For, during this period, we succeeded in liquidating our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration with our peasantry and in building, in the main, Socialist society, notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist revolution has not yet been victorious in other countries.

This is the position in regard to the first side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our
country.

I think, Comrade Ivanov, that this is not the side of the question that is the point of controversy between you and Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov.

The second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the mutual relations between our country and other countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the mutual relations between the working class of our country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This concerns the sphere of external, international relations. Can the victorious Socialism of one country, which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts to restore capitalism in our country?

Can our working class and our peasantry, by their own efforts, without the serious assistance of the working class in capitalist countries, overcome the bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words: Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, assuming that Socialism is victorious only in one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues to exist?

Such are the problems that are connected with the second side of the question of the victory of Socialism in our country.

Leninism answers these problems in the negative. Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Social-
ism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration of bourgeois relations, is possible only on an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union).

This means that the serious assistance of the international proletariat is a force without which the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one country cannot be solved.

This, of course, does not mean that we must sit with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside. On the contrary, this assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.

This is what Lenin says on this score:

"We are living not merely in a State but in a system of States, and it is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to co-exist for a long period side by side with imperialist States. Ultimately one or other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois States is inevitable. This means that if the proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and will rule, it must prove this also by military organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.)

And further:

"We are surrounded by people, classes and governments which openly express their hatred
for us. We must remember that we are at all
times but a hair's breadth from invasion."  
(Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.)

This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and
truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able
to speak.

On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in
"Problems of Leninism" that:

"The final victory of Socialism is the full
guarantee against attempts at intervention,
and that means against restoration, for any
serious attempt at restoration can take place
only with serious support from outside, only
with the support of international capital.

"Hence the support of our revolution by the
workers of all countries, and still more, the
victory of the workers in at least several
countries, is a necessary condition for fully
guaranteeing the first victorious country against
attempts at intervention and restoration, a
necessary condition for the final victory of
Socialism," (Problems of Leninism, 1937. P. 134.)

Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close
our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think
that our external enemies, the fascists, for example,
will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt
at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind
braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the
vigilance of our people can think like that.
No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the event of the slightest success of military intervention, the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet system in the districts they occupied and restore the bourgeois system.

Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists any better than Denikin or Kolchak?

Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger of military intervention and attempts at restoration as long as the capitalist encirclement exists.

Can the victory of Socialism in one country be regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, and if it is not fully guaranteed against the danger of intervention and restoration?

Clearly, it cannot,

This is the position in regard to the question of the victory of Socialism in one country.

It follows that this question contains two different problems:

1. The problem of the internal relations in our country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and
2. The problem of the external relations of our country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our country against the dangers of military intervention and restoration.

We have already solved the first problem, for our bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism has already been built in the main. This is what we
call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, the victory of Socialist Construction in one country.

We could say that this victory is final if our country were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded by numerous capitalist countries.

But as we are not living on an island but "in a system of States," a considerable number of which are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our country is not yet final.

But from this it follows that the second problem is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved. More than that: the second problem cannot be solved in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., solely by the efforts of our country.

The second problem can be solved only by combining the serious efforts of the international proletariat with the still more serious efforts of the whole of our Soviet people.

The international proletarian ties between the working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; the political assistance of the working class in the bourgeois countries for the working class of our country must be organized in the event of a military attack on our country; and also every assistance of the working class of our country for the working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased and strengthened to the utmost.
The whole of our people must be kept in a state of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" and no tricks on the part of our external enemies may take us by surprise . . .

From your letter it is evident that Comrade Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee against intervention and the restoration of capitalism."

There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong.

Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained only by his failure to understand the surrounding reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited young bureaucrat.

If it is true that "we have full guarantee against intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, more and stronger ties with the international proletariat?

Would it not be better to spend the milliards that now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether?

People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous to it because by their boastfulness they - willingly or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) - lull the vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and
peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise in the event of international complications.

As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work and the question has been raised of your fitness to remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear.

If the people in the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will lose on this game.

Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country.

Now you can judge whether the passage from the book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism in one country is out of date or not.

I myself would very much like it to be out of date. I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, the danger of military attack, the danger of the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant things still exist.

(Signed) J. Stalin. February 12, 1938.

Pravda
14 February 1938
LETTER ON PUBLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN DIRECTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL UNION COMMUNIST YOUTH

16 February 1938

I am absolutely against the publication of "Stories of the childhood of Stalin."

The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of unmerited praise. Some amateur writers, scribblers, (perhaps honest scribblers) and some adulators have led the author astray. It is a shame for the author, but a fact remains a fact.

But this is not the important thing. The important thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental. The theory of "heroes" and the "crowd" is not a Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. The heroes make the people, transform them from a crowd into people, thus say the Social-Revolutionaries. The people make the heroes, thus reply the Bolsheviks to the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. No matter which book it is that brings the water to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries, this book is going to drown in our common, Bolshevik cause.

I suggest we burn this book.

Voprosy Istorii No. 11, 1953
(Questions of History)

J. STALIN
Comrades, permit me to propose a toast to science and its progress, and to the health of the men of science.

To the progress of science, of that science which will not permit its old and recognized leaders smugly to invest themselves in the robe of high priests and monopolists of science; which understands the meaning, significance and omnipotence of an alliance between the old scientists and the young scientists; which voluntarily and willingly throws open every door of science to the young forces of our country, and affords them the opportunity of scaling the peaks of science, and which recognizes that the future belongs to the young scientists. (Applause.)

To the progress of science, of that science whose devotees, while understanding the power and significance of the established scientific traditions and ably utilising them in the interests of science, are nevertheless not willing to be slaves of these traditions; the science which has the courage and determination to smash the old traditions, standards and views when they become antiquated and begin to act as a fetter on progress, and which is able to create new traditions, new standards and new views. (Applause.)

In the course of its development science has known not a few courageous men who were able to break
down the old and create the new, despite all obstacles, despite everything. Such scientists as Galileo, Darwin - and many others - are widely known. I should like to dwell on one of these eminent men of science, one who at the same time was the greatest man of modern times. I am referring to Lenin, our teacher, our tutor. (Applause.) Remember 1917. A scientific analysis of the social development of Russia and of the international situation brought Lenin to the conclusion that the only way out of the situation lay in the victory of Socialism in Russia. This conclusion came as a complete surprise to many men of science of the day. Plekhanov, an outstanding man of science, spoke of Lenin with contempt, and declared that he was "raving." Other men of science, no less well-known, declared that "Lenin had gone mad," and that he ought to be put away in a safe place. Scientists of all kinds set up a howl that Lenin was destroying science. But Lenin was not afraid to go against the current, against the force of routine. And Lenin won, (Applause.)

Here you have an example of a man of science who boldly fought an antiquated science and laid the road for a new science.

But sometimes it is not well-known men of science who lay the new roads for science and technology, but men entirely unknown in the scientific world, plain, practical men, innovators in their field. Here, sitting at this table, are Comrades Stakhanov and Papanin. They are unknown in the scientific world, they have no scientific degrees, but are just practical men in their field. But who does not know that in their prac-
tical work in industry Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites have upset the existing standards, which were established by well-known scientists and technologists, have shown that they were antiquated, and have introduced new standards which conform to the requirements of real science and technology? Who does not know that in their practical work on the drifting ice-floe Papanin and the Papaninites upset the old conception of the Arctic, in passing, as it were, without any special effort, showed that it was antiquated, and established a new conception which conforms to the demands of real science? Who can deny that Stakhanov and Papanin are innovators in science, men of our advanced science.

There you see what "miracles" are still performed in science.

I have been speaking of science. But there are all kinds of science.

The science of which I have been speaking is advanced science.

To the progress of our advanced science!
To the men of advanced science!
To Lenin and Leninism!
To Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites!
To Papanin and the Papaninites! (Applause.)

Pravda
19 May 1938
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EXCLUSION OF KOLKHOZINES FROM THE KOLKHOZES
(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) )

19 April 1938

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have warned on several occasions, local Party organizations and Soviets about the prejudice which excludes Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes, without any foundations. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have shown more than once that such a practice is anti-Party and anti-Governmental. However, in many regions and many Republics, this unfounded exclusion of Kolkhozines has taken place. The exaggerations and the distortions, then, of the exclusion of Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes have reached ridiculous proportions in the administrative regions of Sverdlovsk, Novossibirsk, Smolensk, Kalinine, Kam-enetz, Podolsk and Jitomir, and in the regions of Altai, of Krasnoda, of Ordjonikidze and in the S.S.R. of Kazakhstan. The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) emphasize that the harmful practice of excluding Kolkhozines exists equally in other regions.

The practice shows that the directors and presidents of the Kolkhozes, instead of respecting the statutes of the agricultural artel and not tolerating arbitration against Kolkhozines, are themselves committing illegal actions. The authority has established that exclusions
of Kolkhozines have no foundation whatsoever, operate with absolutely no legitimate pretext and only from the most insignificant of motives. The most widespread form of illegal exclusions of Kolkhozines is the exclusion of members of families, of which the fathers are taking a temporary or a permanent part in working for firms or enterprises of the State. This form of exclusion based on parental ties, fundamentally contradicts the statutes of the agricultural artel.

Before the permitting of the exclusion of Kolkhozines, the statutes of the agricultural artel state a series of intermediate measures of a preventive and educative nature for each Kolkhozine who violates the internal laws of the Kolkhoz, as for example: he is made to re-do work of a bad quality within his normal working hours without warning, without blame being put on the commune in general, without inscription on the black-list, without interfering with the five day week and without suspension. But the lines the Kolkhozes are taking, for some unknown reason, have not adhered to these measures and very often exclude Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes for a simple violation of internal rules.

If, according to the statutes of the agricultural artel, exclusion from the artel can only be effected by a decision of a general assembly of members of the artel and moreover with the participation of not less than two thirds of all the members, in effect this statutory law is very often violated. The cases are not rare where the exclusion of Kolkhozines are pronounced by the authorities of the Kolkhoz and even by its own president.
Instead of repressing and correcting this harmful practice of exclusion of Kolkhozines, the worker-directors of the Party and of the district Soviets do not take decisive measures for the repression of the arbitration against Kolkhozines; they have an insensitive and bureaucratic attitude of the type which is so harmful to Kolkhozines, the type of attitude which makes no use of the provisions made against the illegal exclusions within the Kolkhozes and leaves unpunished the people who persist in arbitration against Kolkhozines. The attitude of these people in fact reduces their own role to that of simply registering the cases of exclusion and drawing up statistical reports for the leading Soviet organs. Worse, the workers themselves often push the presidents and managements of the Kolkhozes on to the road of illegal exclusions of Kolkhozines under the pretext of purging the Kolkhozes of foreign and hostile social elements, from the class point of view.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) estimate that at the basis of such a practice is found a formal attitude, bureaucratic and insensitive on the part of a great number of worker-directors of the Kolkhozes as regards the destiny of living people, the people of the Kolkhoz. These directors do not understand that to exclude a Kolkhozine from a Kolkhoz signifies depriving him of his means of livelihood and that signifies not only dishonouring him in the face of public opinion, but also condemning him to starvation. They do not understand that exclusion from the Kolkhoze artificially creates a dissatisfaction, an unrest among the
excluded Kolkhozines, brought about in a great many cases by their insecurity and uncertainty regarding their standing in the Kolkhoz. That is what makes this affair the enemy of the people.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree:

1. To forbid the purging of the Kolkhozes under any pretext whatsoever.
2. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhozes of members of the families of Kolkhozines under the pretext that a member of that family is going to work temporarily or permanently for the State.
3. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhoz for the violation of internal rules and rulings.
4. To establish for the future that exclusion of Kolkhozines from Kolkhozes can only be applied as an extreme measure against members of the Kolkhoz who are declared to be incorrigible and who disrupt or disorganize the Kolkhoz, only after the preventive and educative measures have been exhausted, and only in strict accordance with the type of exclusion defined by the statutes of the agricultural artel, that is to say, conforming with the decisions of the general assembly of members of the artel of which not less than two thirds must be present.

Equally, in each case the appeals made by those excluded from the Kolkhoz must be examined with the greatest attention.

5. To warn the directors and the management of the Kolkhozes as well as the workers of the Party and district Soviets, that those guilty of the violation of the present decree will be handed over to legal
jurisdiction as would any common criminal.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938
ON THE INCORRECT DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES IN THE KOLKHOZES

(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)).
19 April 1938

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) notice that from the fact of the complete victory of the Kolkhozine order and the growth of the output from the Kolkhozine fields, the communal revenues of the Kolkhozes together with the revenues from the daily work of the Kolkhozines, have augmented considerably.

At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) state on the basis of innumerable facts that in the Kolkhozes from a series of regions and Republics and from administrative regions, the monetary revenues are incorrectly distributed in total contradiction with the interests of the Kolkhozines. The management of the Kolkhozes with the direct agreement of the Party organizations, and of the district Soviets, administrative regions, regions and Republics, spend a substantial portion of the revenues on Socialist construction in the Kolkhozes, production and administrative expenses after which the portion of revenues distributed among the Kolkhozines for their daily work, has reduced considerably. This often forces the Kolkhozines to look for work outside the Kolkhozes, and the Kolkhozes themselves often suffer
from an insufficient work force.

In the S.S.R. of Tatarie for example, on 172 Kol-
khozes, on average, only 28 per cent of the revenue
is distributed among the workers; in the administrative
region of Gorki, on 1,279 Kolkhozes only 33 per cent
of the monetary revenue is distributed among the
workers. In certain administrative regions and Re-
publics (administrative regions of the Rostov, Vor-
onieze and of Riazan, the S.S.R. of Kazakhstan and
others) there are some Kolkhozes in which the monetary
revenues have absolutely not been distributed among
the workers for their daily labour during the year
1937.

The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.
and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have
at their disposal analogues of facts in appreciable
numbers and which concern a great number of other
administrative regions, regions and Republics.

Instead of constantly caring for the augmentation
of monetary revenue for the daily work of the Kol-
khozines and of the correct combination of the in-
dividual interests of the Kolkhozines with the social
interests of the Kolkhozes, the management of the
Kolkhozes are infatuated with large scale work, with
excessive production expenses and with the expenses
of the economic and administrative management of
the Kolkhozes. From the amount appropriated to the
joint funds, the expenditure on economic, administrative
and cultural needs, has not only not lowered but on
the contrary, has largely exceeded the standards set
by statutes of the agricultural artels.

The statutes of the agricultural artels demand
that the management of the Kolkhozes spend, only in that measure and only on those articles stipulated by the budget which was fixed at the conclusion of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. In practice, however, several managements of Kolkhozes, firstly, themselves establish the budget with additional expenses, taking no notice of the budget already established and without asking for a general assembly of Kolkhozines, transferring arbitrarily, the expenditure from one article to another, without taking into consideration the realization of the plan for the revenues. These presidents and managements of the Kolkhozes do not have the right to change the fixed budget in an independent fashion, without the agreement of the Kolkhozines, to do this or that with the expenses; they forget that they are totally accountable to the general assembly of the Kolkhoz. The control commissions, as a general rule, do nothing which would transform the auxiliary apparatus of the management for the elaboration of a formal conclusion in the account of activities to be given at the end of the year.

The statutes of the agricultural artel demand that all work of the Kolkhozes should be done by the members of the Kolkhozes and only in exceptional cases is the provisional enlisting of another worker tolerated. However, the facts show that there are quite a few cases where, owing to the poor organization of work, the management of Kolkhozes spend considerable sums of money in order to enlist an outside worker, and this contributes to the undermining of the resources of the Kolkhozes and to
the lowering of their revenues.

Instead of concentrating on the true task, the drawbacks and the realization of the Kolkhozine production, with the intention of increasing its monetary revenue, it is not unusual that the management of certain Kolkhozes, throughout the year conduct a practice condemned by the Party and the State, which consists of wasting Kolkhozine production by making distributions at the lowest prices both inside and outside the Kolkhozes. They are negligent in the delivery of goods, which leads finally to a decline in the price paid for the daily work of the Kolkhozines.

The directors of the Party organizations and district Soviets, of administrative regions, of regions and Republics, do not themselves understand and do not explain to the Kolkhozines, that by the sensible augmentation of the revenues in the Kolkhozes and the reinforcement of their social funds in the form of buildings, cattle and machinery (the use of the machinery of the Kolkhoz), they have there the possibility of reducing the appropriation of the revenues of the Kolkhozes to their social funds, and the large expenses, and the expenses of production and to distribute a large portion of the monetary revenues of the Kolkhozes in payment for the work of the Kolkhozines.

The directors of the Party and of the district Soviets, administrative regions, regions and Republics, forget that such a careless practice in the face of increasing wages paid for daily work, the wastage and depreciation of the resources of the Kolkhozes,
are objectively acts of sabotage and anti-Kolkhozine.

Our directors of the Party and of Soviets must remember that in a series of places, on the basis of artificial inflation, the expenses of production, large expenditure in the Kolkhozes and the reduction in the amount of monetary revenue distributed in payment for daily work, the enemies of the people, lying in wait in their agrarian organs and other places, have consciously incited provocation in order to sabotage the Kolkhozes.

The Council of People's Commissars and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree:

1. To condemn as anti-Kolkhozine, the practice of having a negligent attitude towards the daily work of the Kolkhozines and also the wastage of Kolkhozine revenues on unnecessary excessive expenditure on large scale work, on production, and on administrative and economic needs. The district committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) are ordered to put an end to these practices.

2. To abolish the existing usage outlined by the statutes of the artel, concerning the distribution of the monetary revenues of the artel, and to establish that in the future the artel will redistribute among the Kolkhozines not less than 60 - 70 per cent of all the monetary revenues of the artel for their work.

3. To establish that appropriation of funds to large scale work will not exceed 10 per cent of the monetary revenues, moreover that the amount to be spent on large scale work in the current year must be based
on the revenue of the previous year.

4. To establish that in the annual budget approved by the general assembly of Kolkhozines, for the needs of production, the management must not spend more than the 70 per cent outlined by the budget, before the final evaluation of the harvest. The remaining 30 per cent must be kept in reserve and spent only after the final evaluation of the harvest and after the discussion of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines.

In relation to this, Article 12 changes the statutes of the agricultural artel and re-directs them as follows:

THE MONETARY REVENUES OF THE ARTEL

a) Pays to the State the taxes fixed by law, and pays the insurance quotas.

b) Distributes not less than 60 - 70 per cent of the monetary revenues among the members of the artel according to their daily work.

c) Pays out the expenses which are necessary for the current needs of production and of current distributions of agricultural machinery, medical treatment for cattle, the struggle against saboteurs, etc.

d) Covers the administrative and economic expenses of the artel without exceeding 2 per cent of the monetary revenue.

e) Pays out the expenditure on cultural needs, e.g. training of brigadiers and other cadres, organization of nurseries, assembling radios.

f) Completes the joint funds for the appropriation
of the expenses of the following year in view of the purchase of cattle and agricultural material, of the regulation of building materials, of payment to workers recruited from outside for construction, of regular taxes to the agricultural bank according to the long term credits; moreover, the appropriation, in order to complete the joint funds must be carried out according to a figure which does not exceed 10 per cent of all the monetary revenue of the artel.

All the remunerations must be recorded on a receipt of the artel, not later than the day of their payment.

An annual budget is made by the artel as much for the remuneration as for the outlays, and which will not come into force until after the ratification of the general assembly of the members of the artel.

The management can only effect these expenses on the articles outlined by the budget. The arbitrary transfer of resources from one article to another is forbidden. If a manager wants to do this, he must first confer with the general assembly.

The annual budget for the needs of production of the Kolkhozes is fixed by the general assembly of Kolkhozines. The management cannot spend more than 70 per cent of the allowance outlined by the budget before the evaluation of the harvest. The other 30 per cent must be kept in reserve and only spent after the final evaluation of the harvest, and after the decision of the general assembly of Kolkhozines.

The artel keeps its monetary resources available in its current bank account or at the Savings Bank. The curtailment of the current account can only be
effected by the order of the management of the artel, which is made valid by the signature of the President and accountable to the artel.

5. To establish the usage, according to which the budget of each Kolkhoz is put, it is, after its ratification by the general assembly, submitted to an examination by a presidium of the executive committee of the district, which examines the budget submitted to the president of the management and to the President of the Commission of Registration of the Kolkhoz.

6. To establish that the engaging of paid workers in the Kolkhoz can only be effected with the agreement of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. To oblige the secretaries of the districts of the C.P.S.U.(B), and the president of the district executive committees not to tolerate the abuse and the violation of point 13 of the statutes of the agricultural artel, which forbids the paid employment of non-Kolkhozines, except in cases outlined by the artel.

7. To oblige the committees of the administrative regions, the regions and the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties to re-establish the work of the Commission of Registration in all Kolkhozes in such a way that they can do their work of registration throughout the whole year, as demanded by the statutes, and not to merely limit themselves to giving a formal conclusion in the accounting of the work of the management at the end of the year.

8. To establish that the branches of the State Banks and the agricultural banks only give credit to Kolkhozines in the case where it has been decided by
the general assembly of Kolkhozines.

9. To oblige the committees of the administrative regions, of regions, the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties, the executive committees of the administrative regions, and of regions, and the Council of People's Commissars, and the Republics, to make sure that their procurators bring to justice those responsible for illegal expenditure from the resources of the Kolkhozes, and those who violate the statutes of the agricultural artel and the interests of the Kolkhozine people, since these activities are considered to be a betrayal of the Kolkhozine cause, and a help to the enemies of the people.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Communist Party of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938
ON THE TAXES AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING INDEPENDENT OPERATORS

Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

19 April 1938

On the basis of numerous facts, the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have established that the policy and decrees of the State and of the Party concerning independent operators or free-lance workers, are violated by the organs of the Party and of Soviets in the Republics, the regions and the administrative regions. The obligations to the State are established by Soviet laws for the individual in the sphere of taxes, the delivery of grain, and meat. However, instead of guaranteeing the execution of these obligations, the local Party and district organs tolerate a situation in which the free-lance worker fails to fulfil his obligations to the State. In a series of administrative regions and regions, the free-lance workers are absolutely not called upon to deliver meat, and the execution of the tasks outlined in the district plan concerning the delivery of meat, falls back on the Kolkhozes.

In this way, the Party and Soviet organizations put these free-lance workers in a privileged position in comparison with the Kolkhozes, which is a fundamental contradiction of existing laws.

The horses, not taxable to the free-lance workers
are, as a general rule, used by them, not in their agricultural efforts, but as a means of speculation and gain.

In the face of the tolerance of the Party and Soviet organs in the districts, the managements of the Kolkhozes, violating the statutes of the agricultural artel come very often to the practice of engaging free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes, and pay them more than the Kolkhozines for the days work, a fact which can only undermine discipline in the Kolkhozes.

This incorrect attitude to independent operations brings as a result direct prejudice owing to the ultimate engagement of free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes.

All this bears witness to the presence of grave mistakes on the part of the organs of the Soviets, and of the Parties of the Republics, of the regions and the administrative regions concerning the free-lance worker.

The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree:

1. To oblige the Central Committees of the national Communist Parties, the executive committees of regions and administrative regions, the Council of the People's Commissars of the Republics, the executive committees of the Soviets of regions and of administrative regions, to bring to an end this anti-State and anti-Party practice of complacency concerning the free-lance workers and to severely watch out that these individuals do carry out exactly all their obligations to the State, concerning taxes and delivery of grain and meat, etc.

2. To re-establish, from August 25th, 1938, a
state tax on the horses of free-lance workers.

3. To oblige the Party and Soviet organizations of the Republics, regions and administrative regions not to tolerate in the future that the free-lance workers manage to avoid their responsibilities (work on the roads, working in the forests, education service, hospital service, etc.) and in the same way not to tolerate the holding of any privileges at the expense of the Kolkhozines.

V. M. MOLOTOV
President of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

J. STALIN
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B)

Pravda
20 April 1938
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

23 February 1939

I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, joining the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, do hereby take the oath of allegiance and do solemnly vow to be an honest, brave, disciplined and vigilant fighter, to guard strictly all military and State secrets, to obey implicitly all Army regulations and orders of my commanders, commissars and superiors.

I vow to study the duties of a soldier conscientiously, to safeguard Army and National property in every way possible and to be true to my People, my Soviet Motherland, and the Workers' and Peasants' Government to my last breath.

I am always prepared at the order of the Workers' and Peasants' Government to come to the defence of my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - and, as a fighter of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, I vow to defend her courageously, skilfully, creditably and honourably, without sparing my blood and my very life to achieve complete victory over the enemy.

And if through evil intent I break this solemn oath, then let the stern punishment of the Soviet law, and the universal hatred and contempt of the working people, fall upon me.

Pravda
25 February 1939

J. STALIN
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

(Delivered March 10, 1939.)

I

THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Comrades, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth Party Congress. No small period, as you see. During this period the world has undergone considerable changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, are now in many respects totally altered.

What changes exactly have taken place in the international situation in this period? In what way exactly have the foreign and internal affairs of our country changed?

For the capitalist countries this period was one of very profound perturbations in both the economic and political spheres. In the economic sphere these were years of depression, followed, from the beginning of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the United States, Great Britain and France; consequently, these were years of new economic complications. In the political sphere they were years of serious political conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar and involving over five hundred million people. The
map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly re-drawn. The entire post-war system, the so-called regime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further development of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

Such is the general picture.

Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating the changes in the international situation.

1. New Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries, Intensification of the Struggle for Markets and Sources of Raw Material, and for a New Redivision of the World.

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began which seized the United States first of all and then England, France and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the recent one.

This circumstance naturally led to an increase of
unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from thirty million in 1933 to fourteen million in 1937, has now again risen to eighteen million as a result of the new economic crisis.

A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it differs in many respects from the preceding one, and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival, which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Further, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; at a time when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economy on a war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal way out of the present crisis than during the preceding crisis.

Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present crisis is not a general one, but as yet
involves chiefly the economically powerful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war economy basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, who have already reorganized their economy on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful, non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries.

VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES (In millions of former gold dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>End of 1936</th>
<th>Sept 1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,980</td>
<td>14,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>6,649</td>
<td>8,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>2,396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,769</td>
<td>1,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows that the combined gold reserves of Germany, Italy and Japan amount to less than the reserves of Switzerland alone.

Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the trend of industrial progress in the U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 1929 (1929 = 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is continuously on the upgrade.

This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has already begun and is developing in the United States, Great Britain and France.

Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, who placed their national economy on a war footing earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry already began in 1938.

Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, who reorganized her economy on a war footing later than
Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend - although a small one, it is true - corresponding to that which took place in Japan and Italy until recently.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must enter the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a one-sided war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption - and, consequently, reducing consumption by the population and confronting the country with an economic crisis.

Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations among the powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia by Italy - all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis must lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial war, of dumping. These methods of struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres
of influence and colonies, by military action.

Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by the argument that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess vast colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, who had suffered severely as a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first imperialist war had deprived her.

Thus the bloc of three aggressive states came to be formed.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.


Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of
Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.

Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn over five hundred million people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar.

After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, had set up a new regime in the relations between countries, the post-war regime of peace. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defence of the security of states. However, three aggressive states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, have upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime. Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations.

The new imperialist war became a fact.
It is not so easy in our day to suddenly break loose and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead it, to deceive it.

A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (Laughter.)

A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind. "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. (General laughter.)

A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.

That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (Laughter.)

But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any
guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain - and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, who in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter.

Incredible, but true.

To what are we to attribute this one-sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their positions and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? Of course not. Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably
stronger than the fascist states, both economically and in the military sense.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors? It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality."

Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet
Union: to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hongkong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying: "Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings,
and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of over thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country. (Thunderous applause.) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish to seriously talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine: The gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you . . . Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way
to live? ... As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me ... (General laughter.) Well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories ..." (General laughter and applause.)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and pressmen, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east, against the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the west and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non-intervention.

Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.
3. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist Countries.

The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the post-war peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including primarily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, who are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.

Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peacable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.

At the same time, in order to strengthen its
international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic.

It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit.

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our
position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon:

1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might;

2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;

3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our country;

4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;

5. Its policy of peace;

6. The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;

7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

* * *
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;

2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;

3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;

4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.

II

INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION

Let us now pass to the internal affairs of our country.

From the standpoint of its internal situation, the Soviet Union, during the period under review, presented a picture of further progress of its entire economic life, a rise in culture, and the strengthening of the political might of the country.

In the sphere of economic development, we must regard the most important result during the period under review to be the fact that the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new, modern technique has been completed. There are no more or hardly any more old plants in our country, with their old technique, and hardly any old peasant
farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry and agriculture are now based on new, up-to-date technique. It may be said without exaggeration that from the standpoint of the technique of production, from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry and agriculture with new machinery, our country is more advanced than any other country, where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production and hampers the introduction of modern technique.

In the sphere of the social and political development of the country, we must regard the most important achievement of the period under review to be the fact that the remnants of the exploiting classes have been completely eliminated, that the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been welded into one common front of the working people, that the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been strengthened, that the friendship among the nations of our country has become closer, and, as a result, that the political life of our country has been completely democratized and a new Constitution created. No one will dare deny that our Constitution is the most democratic in the world, and that the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., as well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, have been the most exemplary.

The result of all this is a completely stable internal situation and a stability of government which any other government in the world might envy.

Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the economic and political situation of our country.

1. Further Progress of Industry and Agriculture.
a) Industry: During the period under review our industry presented a picture of uninterrupted progress. This progress was reflected not only in an increase of output generally, but, and primarily, in the flourishing state of Socialist industry on the one hand, and the doom of private industry on the other. Here is a table which illustrates this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total output</td>
<td>42,030</td>
<td>50,477</td>
<td>62,137</td>
<td>80,929</td>
<td>90,166</td>
<td>100,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Socialist industry</td>
<td>42,002</td>
<td>50,443</td>
<td>62,114</td>
<td>80,898</td>
<td>90,138</td>
<td>100,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Private industry</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per cent</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Private industry</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)
This table shows that during the period under review the output of our industry more than doubled, and that, moreover, the whole increase in output was accounted for by Socialist industry.

Further, this table shows that the only system of industry in the U.S.S.R. is the Socialist system.

Lastly, this table shows that the complete ruin of private industry is a fact which even a blind man cannot now deny.

The ruin of private industry must not be regarded as a thing of chance. Private industry perished, firstly, because the Socialist economic system is superior to the capitalist system; and, secondly, because the Socialist economic system made it possible for us to re-equip in a few years the whole of our Socialist industry on new and up-to-date lines. This is a possibility which the capitalist economic system does not and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from the standpoint of the technique of production and from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry with modern machinery, our industry holds first place in the world.

If we take the rate of growth of our industry, expressed in percentages of the pre-war level, and compare it with the rate of growth of the industry of the principal capitalist countries, we get the following picture:
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1913 - 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.S.R.</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>G.B.</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>380.5</td>
<td>108.7</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>107.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>457.0</td>
<td>112.9</td>
<td>97.1</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>99.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>562.6</td>
<td>128.6</td>
<td>104.0</td>
<td>105.9</td>
<td>94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>732.7</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>114.2</td>
<td>118.1</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>816.4</td>
<td>156.9</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>129.3</td>
<td>101.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>908.8</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>113.3</td>
<td>131.6</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table shows that our industry has grown more than nine-fold as compared with pre-war, whereas the industry of the principal capitalist countries continues to mark time round about the pre-war level, exceeding the latter by only 20 or 30 per cent.

This means that as regards rate of growth our Socialist industry holds first place in the world.

Thus we find that as regards technique of production and rate of growth of our industry, we have already overtaken and outstripped the principal capitalist countries.

In what respect are we lagging? We are still lagging economically, that is, as regards the volume of our industrial output per head of population. In 1938 we produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Great Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide
this number of tons by the number of population we shall find that the output of pig iron per head of population in 1938 was 145 kilograms in Great Britain, and only 87 kilograms in the U.S.S.R. Or, further: in 1938 Great Britain produced 10,800,000 tons of steel and about 29,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity, whereas the U.S.S.R. produced 18,000,000 tons of steel and over 39,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of tons and kilowatt-hours by the number of population we shall find that in 1938 in Great Britain the output of steel per head of the population was 226 kilograms and of electricity 620 kilowatt-hours, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the output of steel per head of population was only 107 kilograms, and of electricity only 233 kilowatt-hours.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that our population is several times larger than that of Great Britain, and hence our requirements are greater: the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000, whereas Great Britain has a population of not more than 46,000,000. The economic power of a country's industry is not expressed by the volume of industrial output in general, irrespective of the size of population, but by the volume of industrial output taken in direct reference to the amount consumed per head of population. The larger a country's industrial output per head of population, the greater is its economic power; and, conversely, the smaller the output per head of population, the less is the economic power of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the
larger a country's population, the greater is the need for articles of consumption, and hence the larger should be the industrial output of the country.

Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order to outstrip Great Britain economically in respect to the production of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted in that country to 7,000,000 tons, we must increase our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons. In order economically to outstrip Germany, which in 1938 produced 18,000,000 tons of pig iron in all, we must raise our annual output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,000 tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically - not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year of crisis, and in which the U.S.A. produced only 18,800,000 tons of pig iron, but as regards the level of 1929, when the U.S.A. was experiencing an industrial boom and when it produced about 43,000,000 tons of pig iron - we must raise our annual output of pig iron to 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 tons.

The same must be said of the production of steel and rolled steel, of the machine-building industry, and so on, inasmuch as all these branches of industry, like the other branches, depend in the long run on the production of pig iron.

We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. That is very good, but it is not enough. We must outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated with consumers' goods, on having an abundance of
products, and on being able to make the transition from the first phase of Communism to its second phase.

What do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically? First of all, we require the earnest and indomitable desire to move ahead and the readiness to make sacrifices and invest very considerable amounts of capital for the utmost expansion of our Socialist industry. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Further, we require a high technique of production and a high rate of industrial development. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Lastly, we require time. Yes, comrades, time. We must build new factories. We must train new cadres for industry. But this requires time, and no little time at that. We cannot outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in two or three years. It will require rather more than that. Take, for example, pig iron and its production. How much time do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in regard to the production of pig iron? When the Second Five-Year Plan was being drawn up, certain members of the old personnel of the State Planning Commission proposed that the annual output of pig iron towards the end of the Second Five-Year Plan should be fixed in the amount of sixty million tons. That means that they assumed the possibility of an average annual increase in pig iron production of ten million tons. This, of course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Incidentally, it was not only in regard to the production of pig iron that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They
considered, for example, that during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the annual increase of population in the U.S.S.R. should amount to three or four million persons, or even more. This was also fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic dreamers and come down to reality, we may consider quite feasible an average annual increase in the output of pig iron of two or two and a half million tons, bearing in mind the present state of the technique of iron smelting. The industrial history of the principal capitalist countries, as well as of our country, shows that such an annual rate of increase involves a great strain, but is quite feasible.

Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, in order to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically. And the higher our productivity of labour becomes, and the more our technique of production is perfected, the more rapidly can we accomplish this cardinal economic task, and the more can we reduce the period of its accomplishment.

b) Agriculture. Like the development of industry, the development of agriculture during the period under review has followed an upward trend. This upward trend is expressed not only in an increase of agricultural output, but, and primarily, in the growth and consolidation of Socialist agriculture on the one hand, and the utter decline of individual peasant farming on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective farms increased from 75,000,000 hectares in 1933 to 92,000,000 in 1938, the grain area of the individual peasant farmers dropped in this period from 15,700,000 hectares to 600,000 hectares, or to 0.6 per cent of
the total grain area. I will not mention the area under industrial crops, a branch where individual peasant farming has been reduced to zero. Furthermore, it is well known that the collective farms now unite 18,800,000 peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of all the peasant households, aside from the collective fisheries and collective trapping and handicraft industries.

This means that the collective farms have been firmly established and consolidated, and that the Socialist system of farming is now our only form of agriculture.

If we compare the areas under all crops during the period under review with the crop areas in the pre-revolutionary period, we observe the following picture of growth:

AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1913</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total crop area</td>
<td>105.0</td>
<td>131.5</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>133.8</td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>136.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Grain</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>103.4</td>
<td>102.4</td>
<td>104.4</td>
<td>102.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Industrial</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Vegetable</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Fodder</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows that we have an increase in area for all cultures, and above all for fodder, industrial crops and vegetables.

This means that our agriculture is becoming more high-grade and productive, and that a solid foundation is being provided for the increasing application of proper crop rotation.

The way our collective farms and state farms have been increasingly supplied with tractors, harvester-combines and other machines during the period under review is shown by the following tables.

If in addition to these figures, we bear in mind that in the period under review the number of machine and tractor stations increased from 2,900 in 1934 to 6,350 in 1938, it may be safely said that the reconstruction of our agriculture on the basis of a new and up-to-date machine technique has in the main already been completed.

Our agriculture, consequently, is not only run on the largest scale, and is the most mechanized in the world, and therefore produces the largest surplus for the market, but is also more fully equipped with modern machinery than the agriculture of any other country.

(See tables next page)
1) TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1938 comp. with 1933 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. Number of tractors (thousands)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>210.9</td>
<td>276.4</td>
<td>360.3</td>
<td>422.7</td>
<td>454.5</td>
<td>483.5</td>
<td>229.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) In machine and tractor stations</td>
<td>123.2</td>
<td>177.3</td>
<td>254.7</td>
<td>328.5</td>
<td>365.8</td>
<td>394.0</td>
<td>319.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>88.5</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>102.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. Capacity (thous. h.p.)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All tractors</td>
<td>3,209.2</td>
<td>4,462.8</td>
<td>6,184.0</td>
<td>7,672.4</td>
<td>8,385.0</td>
<td>9,256.2</td>
<td>288.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) In machine and tractor stations</td>
<td>1,758.1</td>
<td>2,753.9</td>
<td>4,281.6</td>
<td>5,856.0</td>
<td>6,679.2</td>
<td>7,437.0</td>
<td>423.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings</td>
<td>1,401.7</td>
<td>1,669.5</td>
<td>1,861.4</td>
<td>1,730.7</td>
<td>1,647.5</td>
<td>1,751.8</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) TOTAL HARVESTER COMBINES AND OTHER MACHINES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

(In thousands; at end of year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1938 comp. with 1933 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harvester combines</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>128.8</td>
<td>153.5</td>
<td>604.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal combustion and steam engines</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>174.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex and semi-complex grain trashers</td>
<td>120.3</td>
<td>121.9</td>
<td>120.1</td>
<td>123.7</td>
<td>126.1</td>
<td>130.8</td>
<td>108.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor trucks</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>144.5</td>
<td>195.8</td>
<td>736.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automobiles (units)</td>
<td>3,991</td>
<td>5,533</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>7,630</td>
<td>8,156</td>
<td>9,594</td>
<td>240.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial crops during the period under review with the pre-revolutionary period, we get the following picture of growth:

GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In millions of centners</th>
<th>1938 compared with 1933 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grain</td>
<td>801.0</td>
<td>894.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raw cotton</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax fibre</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar beet</td>
<td>109.0</td>
<td>113.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil seed</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table it can be seen that despite the drought in the eastern and southeastern districts in 1936 and 1938, and despite the unprecedentedly large harvest in 1913, the gross production of grain and industrial crops during the period under review steadily increased as compared with 1913.

Of particular interest is the question of the amount of grain marketed by the collective farms and state farms as compared with their gross harvests. Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, has calculated that of a gross grain harvest of 5,000,000,000 poods in pre-war times, only about 1,300,000,000 poods were marketed. Thus the proportion of marketed produce of grain farming at that time was 26 per cent. Comrade Nemchinov computes that the proportion of marketed produce to gross harvest in the years
1926-27, for example, was about 47 per cent in the case of collective and state farming, which is large-scale farming, and about 12 per cent in the case of individual peasant farming. If we approach the matter more cautiously and assume the amount of marketed produce in the case of collective and state farming in 1938 to be 40 per cent of the gross harvest, we find that in the year our Socialist grain farming was able to release, and actually did release, about 2,300,000,000 poods of grain for the market, or 1,000,000,000 poods more than was marketed in pre-war times.

Consequently, the high proportion of produce marketed constitutes an important feature of state and collective farming, and is of cardinal importance for the food supply of our country.

It is this feature of the collective farms and state farms that explains the secret why our country has succeeded so easily and rapidly in solving the grain problem, the problem of producing an adequate supply of market grain for this vast country.

It should be noted that during the last three years annual grain deliveries to the state have not dropped below 1,600,000,000 poods, while sometimes, as for example in 1937, they have reached 1,800,000,000 poods. If we add to this about 200,000,000 poods or so of grain purchased annually by the state, as well as several hundred million poods sold by collective farms and farmers directly in the market, we get in all the total of grain marketed by the collective farms and state farms already mentioned.

Further, it is interesting to note that during the
last three years the base of market grain has shifted from the Ukraine, which was formerly considered the granary of our country, to the north and the east, that is, to the R.S.F.S.R. We know that during the last two or three years grain deliveries in the Ukraine have amounted in all to about 400,000,000 poods annually, whereas in the R.S.F.S.R. the grain deliveries during these years have amounted to 1,100,000,000 or 1,200,000,000 poods annually.

That is how things stand with regard to grain farming.

As regards livestock farming, considerable progress has been made during the past few years in this, the most backward branch of agriculture, as well. True, in the number of horses and in sheep breeding we are still below the pre-revolutionary level; but as regards cattle and hog breeding we have already passed the pre-revolutionary level.

Here are the figures:

**TOTAL HEAD OF LIVESTOCK IN THE U.S.S.R.**

(In millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>July 1916 according to census</th>
<th>July 1933</th>
<th>July 1934</th>
<th>July 1935</th>
<th>July 1936</th>
<th>July 1937</th>
<th>July 1938</th>
<th>1938 compared with 1916 according to census (per cent)</th>
<th>1933 (per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>105.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>57.0</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>104.3</td>
<td>164.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep and goats</td>
<td>121.2</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>102.5</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>204.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hogs</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>146.4</td>
<td>252.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There can be no doubt that the lag in horse breeding and sheep breeding will be remedied in a very short period.

c) Trade and transport. The progress in industry and agriculture was accompanied by an increase in the trade of the country. During the period under review the number of state and cooperative retail stores increased by 25 per cent. State and cooperative retail trade increased by 178 per cent. Trade in the collective farm markets increased by 112 per cent. Here is the corresponding table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRADE</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. State and cooperative retail stores</td>
<td>285,355</td>
<td>286,236</td>
<td>268,713</td>
<td>298,473</td>
<td>327,361</td>
<td>356,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and booths— at end of year .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. State and cooperative retail trade</td>
<td>49,789.2</td>
<td>61,814.7</td>
<td>81,712.1</td>
<td>106,760.9</td>
<td>125,943.2</td>
<td>138,574.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>including public catering</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in millions of rubles) . . . . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trade in collective farm markets</td>
<td>11,500.0</td>
<td>14,000.0</td>
<td>14,500.0</td>
<td>15,607.2</td>
<td>17,799.7</td>
<td>24,399.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in millions of rubles) . . . . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Regional wholesale departments of the</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>1,141</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>1,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Commissariats of the Food Industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Industry, Heavy Industry, Timber</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, and Local Industry of the Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republics—at end year . . . . . .</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is obvious that trade in the country could not have developed in this way without a certain increase in freight traffic. And indeed during the period under review freight traffic increased in all branches of transport, especially rail and air. There was an increase in water-borne freight, too, but with considerable fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, there was even a drop in water-borne freight as compared with the previous year.

Here is the corresponding table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FREIGHT TRAFFIC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways (in millions of ton-kilometres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River and marine transport (in millions of ton-kilometres)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil air fleet (in thousands of ton-kilometres)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There can be no doubt that the lag in water transport will be remedied in 1939.

2. Further Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard of the People.

The steady progress of industry and agriculture could not but lead, and has actually led, to a new rise in the material and cultural standard of the people.
The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the Socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with its attendant poverty, in town and country, the enormous expansion of industry and the steady growth in the number of workers, the increase in the productivity of labour of the workers and collective farmers, the securement of the land to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast number of first-class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the collective farms - all this has created effective conditions for a further rise in the standard of living of the workers and peasants. In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants has naturally led to an improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia, who represent a considerable force in our country and serve the interests of the workers and the peasants.

Now it is no longer a question of finding room in industry for unemployed and homeless peasants who have been set adrift from their villages and live in fear of starvation - of giving them jobs out of charity. The time has long gone by when there were such peasants in our country. And this is a good thing, of course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our countryside. If anything, it is now a question of asking the collective farms to comply with our request and to release, say, one and a half million young collective farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry. The collective farms, which have already become prosperous, should bear in mind that if we do not get this assistance from them it will be very
difficult to continue the expansion of our industry, and that if we do not expand our industry we will not be able to satisfy the peasants' growing demand for consumers' goods. The collective farms are quite able to meet this request of ours, since the abundance of machinery in the collective farms releases a portion of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry, could be of immense service to our whole national economy.

As a result, we have the following indications of the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants during the period under review:

1. The national income rose from 48,500,000,000 rubles in 1933 to 105,000,000,000 rubles in 1938;
2. The number of workers and other employees rose from a little over 22,000,000 in 1933 to 28,000,000 in 1938;
3. The total annual payroll of workers and other employees rose from 34,953,000,000 rubles to 96,425,000,000 rubles;
4. The average annual wages of industrial workers, which amounted to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 3,447 rubles in 1938;
5. The total monetary incomes of the collective farms rose from 5,661,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 14,180,100,000 rubles in 1937;
6. The average amount of grain received per collective-farm household in the grain growing regions rose from 61 poods in 1933 to 144 poods in 1937, exclusive of seed, emergency seed stocks, fodder for the collectively-owned cattle, grain deliveries, and payments in kind for work performed by the
machine and tractor stations;

7. State budget appropriations for social and cultural services rose from 5,839,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 35,202,500,000 rubles in 1938.

As regards the cultural standard of the people, the period under review has been marked by a veritable cultural revolution. The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education in the languages of the various nations of the U.S.S.R., an increasing number of schools and scholars of all grades, an increasing number of college-trained experts, and the creation and growth of a new intelligentsia, a Soviet intelligentsia - such is the general picture of the cultural advancement of our people.

Here are the figures:

(See next page)

As a result of this immense cultural work a numerous new, Soviet intelligentsia has arisen in our country, an intelligentsia which has emerged from the ranks of the working class, peasantry and Soviet employees, which is of the flesh and blood of our people, which has never known the yoke of exploitation, which hates exploiters, and which is ready to serve the peoples of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly.

I think that the rise of this new, Socialist intelligentsia of the people is one of the most important results of the cultural revolution in our country.
1) RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unit of measurement</th>
<th>1933-34</th>
<th>1938-39</th>
<th>1933-39 compared with 1933-34</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of pupils and students of all grades</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>23,814</td>
<td>33,965.4</td>
<td>142.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In elementary schools</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>17,873.3</td>
<td>21,288.4</td>
<td>119.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In intermediate schools (general and special)</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>5,482.2</td>
<td>12,076.0</td>
<td>220.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In higher educational institutions</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>458.3</td>
<td>601.0</td>
<td>131.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of persons engaged in all forms of study in the U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>47,442.1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of public libraries</td>
<td></td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>173.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of books in public libraries</td>
<td>millions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of clubs</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>156.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of theatres</td>
<td>units</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>134.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film)</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>27,467</td>
<td>30,461</td>
<td>110.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With sound equipment</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>15,202</td>
<td>31 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film) in rural districts</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>17,470</td>
<td>18,991</td>
<td>108.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of which:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With sound equipment</td>
<td>”</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td>278 times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual newspaper circulation</td>
<td>millions</td>
<td>4,984.6</td>
<td>7,092.4</td>
<td>142.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2) NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1933-38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In towns and hamlets</th>
<th>In rural localities</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>3,261</td>
<td>3,587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>3,488</td>
<td>4,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>2,829</td>
<td>3,362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>4,206</td>
<td>5,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>2,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>1,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (1933-38)</td>
<td>4,254</td>
<td>16,353</td>
<td>20,607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2) YOUNG SPECIALISTS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1933-38

(In thousands)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total for U.S.S.R. (exclusive of military specialists)</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>106.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Engineers for industry and building</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Engineers for transport and communications</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agricultural engineers, agronomists, veterinarians and zoo-technicians</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Economists and jurists</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Teachers of intermediate schools, workers’ facilities, technical schools, and other educational workers, including art workers</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Physicians, pharmacists, and physical culture instructors</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other specialists</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Further Consolidation of the Soviet System.

One of the most important results of the period under review is that it has led to the further internal consolidation of the country, to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment of the Socialist system in all branches of national economy, the progress of industry and agriculture, the rising material standard of the people, the rising cultural standard of the people and their increasing political activity - all this, accomplished under the guidance of the Soviet power, could not but lead to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.
The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants and intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. While capitalist society is torn by irreconcilable contradictions between workers and capitalists and between peasants and landlords - resulting in its internal instability - Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such contradictions, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is this community of interest which has formed the basis for the development of such motive forces as the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet patriotism. It has also been the basis for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in November 1936, and for the complete democratization of the elections to the supreme organs of the country.

As to the elections themselves, they were a magnificent demonstration of that unity of Soviet society and of that amity among the nations of the U.S.S.R. which constitute the characteristic feature of the internal situation of our country. As we know, in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in December 1937, nearly ninety million votes, or 98.6 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc, while in the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in June 1938, ninety-two million votes, or 99.4 per cent
of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc.

There you have the basis of the stability of the Soviet system and the source of the inexhaustible strength of the Soviet power.

This means, incidentally, that in the case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which people beyond our borders who are fond of military conflicts would do well to remember.

Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of Soviet organizations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoralization." One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralize the Soviet system? This Trotsky-Bukharin bunch of spies, assassins and wreckers, who kow-towed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig, and, who were ready to enter his employ as a spy - this handful of people who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery - who needs this miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the people, and whom can they "demoralize"? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were
sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Rosen-goltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of "demoralization," we would like to know, and why was this "demoralization" not reflected in the results of the elections?

To listen to these foreign drivellers, one would think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. (Laughter.) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins and wreckers?

Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet organizations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organizations?

What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations.

* * *

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of industrial policy are:

1. To increase the progress of our industry, the
rise of productivity of labour, and the perfection of the technique of production, in order, having already outstripped the principal capitalist countries in technique of production and rate of industrial development, to outstrip them economically as well in the next ten or fifteen years.

2. To increase the progress of our agriculture and stock breeding so as to achieve in the next three or four years an annual grain harvest of 8,000,000,000 poods, with an average yield of 12-13 centners per hectare; an average increase in the harvest of industrial crops of 30-35 per cent; and an increase in the number of sheep and hogs by 100 per cent, of cattle by about 40 per cent, and of horses by about 35 per cent.

3. To continue to improve the material and cultural standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.

4. Steadfastly to carry into effect our Socialist Constitution; to complete the democratization of the political life of the country; to strengthen the moral and political unity of Soviet society and fraternal collaboration among our workers, peasants and intellectuals; to promote the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, and to develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism.

5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our Socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.
From the standpoint of the political line and day-to-day practical work, the period under review was one of complete victory for the general line of our Party. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness of the policy of our Party and the correctness of its leadership are the firm establishment of the Socialist system in the entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new technique, the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest to a level of 7,000,000,000 poods, the abolition of poverty and unemployment and the raising of the material and cultural standard of the people.

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed "platforms," and to go into hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.
Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people.

When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the Party became still more united in its political and organizational work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Committee (Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Central Committee of our Party!")

Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating the development of the internal life of the Party and its organizational and propaganda work during the period under review.

1. Measures to Improve the Composition of the Party
   Division of Organizations Closer Contact Between the Leading Party Bodies and the Work of the Lower Bodies.

The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two lines: along the line of regulating the composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best elements, and along the line of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies.

There were 1,874,488 Party members represented at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this
figure with the number of Party members represented at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in the interval between these two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. The Party could not but feel that in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal ends. The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and the admission of new members actually was suspended until September 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed. As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out
chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal people. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

As regards the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size, People's Commissariats as well as the administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were divided up. The result of the measures adopted is that instead of 7 Union Republics, we now have 11; instead of 14 People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.
we now have 34; instead of 70 territories and regions we now have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural districts we now have 3,815. Correspondingly, within the system of leading Party bodies, we now have 11 central committees, headed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 6 territorial committees, 104 regional committees, 30 area committees, 212 city committees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 rural district committees, and 113,060 primary Party organizations.

It cannot be said that the division of organizations is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, it is already yielding good results both in the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. I need not mention that the division of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts.

That, too, is a big achievement.

2. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres.

The regulation of the composition of the Party and the bringing of the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies was not, and could not be, the only means of further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in the period under review was a radical improvement in the training of cadres, an improvement in the work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of testing them in the process of work.
The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

What is meant by the correct selection of cadres?

The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order. (Laughter.) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (Laughter.)

The proper selection of cadres means:
Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

Secondly, knowing cadres carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must rely chiefly on the young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken. The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to the Party and the state. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience
in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But, firstly, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming. As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, firstly, the young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become worthy of replacing them. Consequently, the thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state, (Prolonged applause.)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party
during the period under review in the matter of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party, show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state and Party posts over five hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, over twenty per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body.

This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, territorial and regional Party organizations.


There is still another sphere of Party work, a very important and very responsible sphere, in which the work of strengthening the Party and its leading
bodies has been carried on during the period under review. I am referring to Party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the Party members and the Party cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and theoretical level of the Party and its workers.

There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our people. I am referring not only to Party functionaries. I am also referring to the workers in the Young Communist League, trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, military and other organizations. The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above - then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state Party work the better and more fruitful will be the
work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether. It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and moulding of our young cadres usually proceeds in some particular branch of science or technology, along the line of specialization. This is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a man who specializes in medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa. But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of Socialist construction, and of the victory of Communism. For a man who calls himself
a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his speciality, in mathematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing beyond that speciality. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his favourite science; he must also be a political and social worker, keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws of social development, capable of applying these laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political guidance of the country. This, of course, will be an additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks, but it will be a burden more than compensated for by its results.

The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development.

Measures for improving the work of propaganda and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed many times by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) jointly with propagandists from various regional Party organizations. The publication, in September 1938, of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) - Short Course" was taken into account in this connection. It was ascertained that the publication of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" had given a new impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country. The results of the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) have been published in its decision, "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Con-
nection with the Publication of the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) - Short Course."

On the basis of this decision and with due reference to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Com-
mittee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of March 1937, "On De-
fects in Party Work," the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has outlined the following major measures for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and improving the work of the Marxist-Leninist training of Party members and Party cadres:

1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments and the press departments into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation departments in each republican, territorial and regional Party organization;

2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for the system of propaganda through study circles, and considering the method of individual study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members to be more expedient, to centre the attention of the Party on propaganda through the press and on the organization of a system of propaganda by lectures;

3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for our lower cadres in each regional centre;

4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle cadres in various centres of the country;

5. To organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism under the auspices of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) with a three-year course for the training
of highly qualified Party theoreticians;
6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for propagandists and journalists in various centres of the country;
7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction for teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational establishments.

There can be no doubt that the realization of these measures, which are already being carried out, although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results.

4. Some Questions of Theory.

Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological work is the absence of full clarity among our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our Socialist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet intelligentsia.

It is sometimes asked "We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away. - Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish of a state?"

Or further : "The exploiting classes have already
been abolished in our country; Socialism has been built in the main; we are advancing towards Communism. Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under Communism. - Why then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorized certain propositions contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades have failed to understand the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realise in what historical conditions the various propositions of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the Socialist country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our Socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defence of the Socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect.
Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification: for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our Socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

What could have given rise to this underestimation? It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general propositions in the Marxist doctrine of the
state were incompletely worked out and inadequate. It received currency owing to our unpardonably heedless attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty years of practical experience in state affairs which provides rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important injunction about the theoretical duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further develop the Marxist theory. Here is what Lenin said in this connection:

"We do not regard Marxist theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the corner-stone of the science which Socialists must further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an independent elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian Socialists, for this theory provides only general guiding principles, which, in particular, are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia." (Lenin, Collected Works, Russian Edition, Vol. II, p. 492.)

Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the theory of the development of the Socialist state given by Engels:

"As soon as there is no longer any class of
society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole - the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society - is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not 'abolished,' it withers away." (Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution in Science (Anti-Duhring), pp. 308-09.)

Is this proposition of Engels' correct?
Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: (1) if we study the Socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or (2) if we assume that Socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists in-
instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

Well, but what if Socialism has been victorious only in one country, taken singly, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions - what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that Socialism has already been victorious in all countries, or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific Socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the Socialist state in general, on the assumption that Socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries - according to the formula: "Assuming that Socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletarian, Socialist state undergo?" Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the Socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the Socialist state in general cannot be extended to the partial and specific case of the victory of Socialism in one country only, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack,
cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of Socialism from foreign attack.

We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. (General laughter.) But we can and should expect of the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the twenty years of existence of the Socialist state in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them. Lenin wrote his famous book, "The State and Revolution," in August 1917, that is, a few months before the October Revolution and the establishment
of the Soviet state Lenin considered it the main
task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' doctrine
of the state from the distortions and vulgarizations
of the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a
second volume of "The State and Revolution," in which
he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the
experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and
1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in
the second volume of his book to elaborate and de-
velop the theory of the state on the basis of the
experience gained during the existence of Soviet power
in our country. Death, however, prevented him from
carrying this task into execution. But what Lenin
did not manage to do should be done by his disciples.
(Loud applause.)

The state arose because society split up into
antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in
restraint the exploited majority in the interests of
the exploiting minority. The instruments of state
authority have been mainly concentrated in the army,
the punitive organs, the espionage service, the prisons.
Two basic functions characterize the activity of the
state: at home (the main function), to keep in re-
straint the exploited majority; abroad (not the main
function), to extend the territory of its class, the
ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other
states, or to defend the territory of its own state
from attack by other states. Such was the case in
slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case
under capitalism.

In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only
necessary to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it
was not only necessary to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state machine and its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, proletarian form of state, a new, Socialist state. And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not follow that the new proletarian state may not preserve certain functions of the old state, changed to suit the requirements of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms of our Socialist state must remain unchanged, that all the original functions of our state must be fully preserved in future. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing and will continue to change in line with the development of our country and with the changes in the international situation.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said:

"The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same: in one way or another, in the final analysis, all these states are inevitably the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to Communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but their essence will inevitably be the same: the dictatorship of the proletariat."

(Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 34.)

Since the October Revolution, our Socialist state has passed through two main phases in its development.

The first phase was the period from the October revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes.
The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize the defence of the country against the attacks of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the labouring majority, while previous states had suppressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defended from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function: this was the work of economic organization and cultural education performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the new, Socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of Socialism. But this new function did not attain to any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elim-
ination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the Socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to establish the Socialist economic system all over the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thoroughly modern army for the defence of the country. And the functions of our Socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting Socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. The function of defending the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic organization and cultural education by the state organs also remained, and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country is the work of peaceful economic organization and cultural education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country, but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, Socialist
state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the Socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards Communism. Will our state remain in the period of Communism also?

Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist encirclement takes its place.

That is how the question stands with regard to the Socialist state.

The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia.

On this question, too, as on the question of the state, there is a certain unclearness and confusion among Party members.

In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly clear, there are still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the Party position. As you know, those who hold these views practise a disdainful and contemptuous attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and regard it as an alien force, even as a force hostile to the working class and the peasantry. True, during the period of Soviet development the intelligentsia has undergone a radical change both in its composition
and status. It has come closer to the people and is honestly collaborating with the people, in which respect it differs fundamentally from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia. But this apparently means nothing to these comrades. They go on harping on the old tunes and wrongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views and attitudes which were justified in the old days when the intelligentsia was in the service of the landlords and capitalists.

In the old days, under capitalism, before the revolution, the intelligentsia consisted primarily of members of the propertied classes - noblemen, manufacturers, merchants, kulaks and so on. Some members of the intelligentsia were sons of small tradesmen, petty officials, and even of peasants and workingmen, but they did not and could not play a decisive part. The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelihood on the propertied classes and ministered to the propertied classes. Hence it is easy to understand the mistrust, often bordering on hatred, with which the revolutionary elements of our country and above all the workers regarded the intellectuals. True, the old intelligentsia produced some courageous individuals, handfuls of revolutionary people who adopted the standpoint of the working class and completely threw in their lot with the working class. But such people were all too few among the intelligentsia, and they could not change the complexion of the intelligentsia as a whole.

Matters with regard to the intelligentsia have undergone a fundamental change, however, since the October Revolution, since the defeat of the foreign
armed intervention, and especially since the victory of industrialization and collectivization, when the abolition of exploitation and the firm establishment of the Socialist economic system made it really possible to give the country a new constitution and to put it into effect. The most influential and qualified section of the old intelligentsia broke away from the main body in the very first days of the October Revolution, proclaimed war on the Soviet government, and joined the ranks of the saboteurs. They met with well-deserved punishment for this; they were smashed and dispersed by the organs of Soviet power. Subsequently the majority of those that survived were recruited by the enemies of our country as wreckers and spies, and thus were expunged by their own deeds from the ranks of the intellectuals. Another section of the old intelligentsia, less qualified but more numerous, long continued to mark time, waiting for "better days"; but then, apparently giving up hope, decided to go and serve and to live in harmony with the Soviet government. The greater part of this group of the old intelligentsia are well on in years and are beginning to go out of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, mainly comprising its rank-and-file, and still less qualified than the section just mentioned, joined forces with the people and supported the Soviet government. It needed to perfect its education, and it set about doing so in our universities. But parallel with this painful process of differentiation and break-up of the old intelligentsia there went on a rapid process of formation, mobilization and mustering of forces of a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands
of young people coming from the ranks of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia entered the universities and technical colleges, from which they emerged to reinforce the attenuated ranks of the intelligentsia. They infused fresh blood into it and reanimated it in a new, Soviet spirit. They radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, moulding it in their own form and image. The remnants of the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, Soviet intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the people. There thus arose a new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately bound up with the people and, for the most part, ready to serve them faithfully and loyally.

As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, Socialist intelligentsia, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia both in composition and in social and political character.

The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that it should be treated with distrust and combated, fully applied to the old, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, which served the landlords and capitalists. This theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class and the peasantry.

That is clear, I should think.

It is therefore all the more astonishing and strange that after all these fundamental changes in the status of the intelligentsia people should be found within our Party who attempt to apply the old theory, which
was directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia, to our new, Soviet intelligentsia, which is basically a Socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, assert that workers and peasants who until recently were working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and collective farms and who were then sent to the universities to be educated, thereby ceased to be real people and became second-rate people. So we are to conclude that education is a pernicious and dangerous thing. (Laughter.) We want all our workers and peasants to be cultured and educated, and we shall achieve this in time. But in the opinion of these queer comrades, this purpose harbours a grave danger; for after the workers and peasants become cultured and educated they may face the danger of being classified as second-rate people. (Loud laughter.) The possibility is not precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink to the position of extolling backwardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism. It would be quite in the nature of things. Theoretical vagaries have never led, and never can lead, to any good.

Such is the position with regard to our new, Socialist intelligentsia.

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Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening of the Party are:

1. To systematically improve the composition of the Party, raising the level of knowledge of its membership, and admitting into its ranks, by a process of individual selection, only tried and tested comrades who are loyal to the cause of Communism.
2. To establish closer contact between the leading bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to make their work of leadership more practical and specific and less confined to meetings and offices.

3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to train them carefully and foster them, to study the merits and demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote young workers boldly and adapt the selection of cadres to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, to extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and to raise the theoretical level and improve the political schooling of our cadres.

*   *   *

Comrades, I am now about to conclude my report. I have sketched in broad outline the path traversed by our Party during the period under review. The results of the work of the Party and of its Central Committee during this period are well known. There have been mistakes and shortcomings in our work. The Party and the Central Committee did not conceal them and strove to correct them. There have also been important successes and big achievements, which must not be allowed to turn our heads.

The chief conclusion to be drawn is that the working class of our country, having abolished the exploitation of man by man and firmly established the Socialist system, has proved to the world the truth of its cause. That is the chief conclusion, for it strengthens our faith in the power of the working class and in the inevitability of its ultimate victory.
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the people cannot get along without capitalists and landlords, without merchants and kulaks. The working class of our country has proved in practice that the people can get along without exploiters perfectly well.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that, having destroyed the old bourgeois system, the working class is incapable of building anything new to replace the old. The working class of our country has proved in practice that it is quite capable not only of destroying the old system but of building anew and better system, a Socialist system, a system, moreover, to which crises and unemployment are unknown.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the peasantry is incapable of taking the path of Socialism. The collective farm peasants of our country have proved in practice that they can do so quite successfully.

The chief endeavour of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of its reformist hangers-on is to kill in the working class faith in its own strength, faith in the possibility and inevitability of its victory, and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For the bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been overthrown and still continues to exist, it owes it not to its own merits, but to the fact that the proletariat has still not enough faith in the possibility of its victory. It cannot be said that the efforts of the bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether unsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie and its agents among the working class have to some extent succeeded in poisoning the minds of
the working class with the venom of doubt and scepticism. If the successes of the working class of our country, if its fight and victory serve to rouse the spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, then our Party may say that its work has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that this will be the case. (Loud and prolonged applause.) Long live our victorious working class! (Applause.)

Long live our victorious collective-farm peasantry! (Applause.)

Long live our Socialist intelligentsia! (Applause.)

Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! (Applause.)

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! (Applause.)

(The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and stormy cheers. Cries of: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!")
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

1935

January 15 - 23
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 16th Congress of Russian Soviets. The Congress elects J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee of Soviets of Russia.

January 28 - February 6
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 7th Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The Congress elects J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

February 7
At the first session of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin is elected to the Presidium of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., and President of the Commission charged with the effecting of the alterations in the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

February 11 - 17
J. V. Stalin attends the meeting of the 2nd Congress of avant-garde Kolkhozines of the U.S.S.R. He directs the work of the Commission charged with the examining of the draft of the Statute of the agricultural artel.
May 4
J. V. Stalin delivers an address from the Kremlin to the graduates of the Red Army Academy.

July 25 - August 20
J. V. Stalin participates in the 7th Congress of the Communist International. He is elected member of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

November 14 - 17
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the general Conference of Stakhanovites of Industry and Transport of the U.S.S.R.

November 17
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of the Stakhanovites of Russia.

December 1
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Operators of Combines of the U.S.S.R., a conference which was held with the participation of the members of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and members of the government.

December 4
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of Kolkhozines of Tajikstan and Turkmenistan, which was held with the participation of the directors of the Party and the government.
February 13 - 16
J. V. Stalin takes part with the other directors of the Party and the government at the Conference of advanced workers in cattle raising.

April 11 - 21
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 10th Congress of Komsomols.

June 1 - 4
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and delivers a report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

June 11
At the reunion of the Presidium of the Central Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin presents a report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

June 20
J. V. Stalin attends the burial of Gorky in Red Square.

November 25 - December 5
December 5

J. V. Stalin presents to the Eighth Congress (Extraordinary) of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. a report on the work of the Commission in drawing up the Draft Constitution.

1937

January 15 - 21

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Extraordinary Thirteenth Congress of Soviets of S.S.R. The Congress elected J. V. Stalin to the Commission for the drawing up of the final text of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R.

February 25 - March 5

J. V. Stalin presides over the meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and presents there a report "Defects in Party Work and Measures for Liquidating Trotskyites and other Double - dealers".

October 29

Speech by J. V. Stalin at a reception given in the Kremlin in honour of the directors and Stakhanovites of the metallurgy and coal mining industry.

December 11

J. V. Stalin's Electoral Speech at the Bolshoi Theatre to a meeting of voters of the Stalin Electoral Area, Moscow.
December 12
J. V. Stalin is elected deputy of the Stalin Electoral Zone, Moscow, to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

1938

January 12 - 19
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 1st Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. He is elected member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

May 17
Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at the reception organized at the Kremlin in honour of the participants in the 1st Conference of Higher Educational Workers.

September 9 - 19
J. V. Stalin's book, "History of the C.P.S.U.(B) - Short Course" is published in Pravda.

September 27 - 29
J. V. Stalin presides over the Conference of propagandists relating to the publication of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B) - Short Course."

1939

March 10 - 21
J. V. Stalin presides over the work of the 18th Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B), presents a report on the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). He is elected by the Congress as a member of the
Commission charged with the examination of the proposed corrections and additions to the speech submitted by V. M. Molotov on the 3rd Five Year Plan, and on the report of Idanov on the alterations of the statutes of the C.P.S.U.(B).

March 22
At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B), J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Politburo, the organizational bureau, the secretariat of the Central Committee and is confirmed in his position as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

December 20
On the occasion of his 60th anniversary, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the title "Hero of Socialist Work" is bestowed upon J. V. Stalin for his extraordinary merits in the organization of the Bolshevik Party, in the foundation of the Soviet State, in the construction of Socialist society in the U.S.S.R. and in the consolidation of the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union.

December 21
J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the "V. I. Lenin" Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

December 22
J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.
March 26 - 28

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

March 29 - April 4

J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 6th Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

May 28 - June 2

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 3rd Session of the Supreme Soviet.

July 29 - 31

J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B).

August 1 - 7

J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 7th Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.