English

 

 

STALIN

1945

 

War Telegrams


No. 1

January 1, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message of December 31 received.

I am very sorry that I have not succeeded in convincing you of the correctness of the Soviet Government’s stand on the Polish question. Nevertheless, I hope events will convince you that the National Committee has always given important help to the Allies, and continues to do so, particularly to the Red Army, in the struggle against Hitler Germany, while the émigré Government in London is disorganising that struggle, thereby helping the Germans.

Of course I quite understand your proposal for postponing recognition of the Provisional Government of Poland by the Soviet Union for a month. But one circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish. The point is that on December 27 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., replying to a corresponding question by the Poles, declared that it would recognise the Provisional Government of Poland the moment it was set up. This circumstance makes me powerless to comply with your wish.

Allow me to congratulate you on the New Year and to wish you good health and success.

January 1, 1945

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No. 2

January 3, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

You, no doubt, know already that the Polish National Council in Lublin has announced its decision to transform the National Committee into a Provisional National Government of the Polish Republic. You are well aware of our attitude to the National Committee, which, in our view, has already won great prestige in Poland and is the lawful exponent of the will of the Polish people. The decision to make it the Provisional Government seems to us quite timely, especially now that Mikolajczyk has withdrawn from the émigré Government and that the latter has thereby lost all semblance of a government. I think that Poland cannot be left without a government. Accordingly, the Soviet Government has agreed to recognise the Provisional Polish Government.

I greatly regret that I have not succeeded in fully convincing you of the correctness of the Soviet Government’s stand on the Polish question. Still, I hope the events will show that our recognition of the Polish Government in Lublin is in keeping with the interests of the common cause of the Allies and that it will help accelerate the defeat of Germany.

I enclose for your information the two messages I sent to the President on the Polish question.

 

2. I know that the President has your consent to a meeting of the three of us at the end of the month or early in February. I shall be glad to see you both on our soil and hope that our joint work will be a success.

I take this opportunity to send you New Year greetings and to wish you the best of health and success.

January 3, 1945

 

 

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No. 3

January 7, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of January 6 reached me in the evening of January 7.

I am sorry to say that Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived in Moscow.

It is extremely important to take advantage of our superiority over the Germans in guns and aircraft. What we need for the purpose is clear flying weather and the absence of low mists that prevent aimed artillery fire. We are mounting an offensive, but at the moment the weather is unfavourable. Still, in view of our Allies’ position on the Western Front, GHQ of the Supreme Command have decided to complete preparations at a rapid rate and, regardless of weather, to launch large-scale offensive operations along the entire Central Front not later than the second half of January. Rest assured we shall do all in our power to support the valiant forces of our Allies.

January 7, 1945

 

 

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No. 4

January 10, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I agree to the use of “Argonaut” as a code name for all messages on the meeting, as suggested in your message of January 5.

In accordance with the proposal sent by the President, I want your agreement to Yalta as the place and February 2 as the date for the meeting.

January 10, 1945

 

 

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No. 5

January 13, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on the Yugoslav question received. Thank you for the information.

I accept your proposal for putting the Tito-Šubašić agreement into effect. By doing so we shall stave off eventual complications. I hope you have already informed the President.

January 13, 1945

 

 

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No. 6

January 15, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Today, January 15, I had a talk with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. In my view the information we exchanged was complete enough. Both parties gave exhaustive answers to the questions. I must say that I was most impressed by Marshal Tedder.

After four days of offensive operations on the Soviet-German front I am now in a position to inform you that our offensive is making satisfactory progress despite unfavourable weather. The entire Central Front – from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea – is moving westwards. The Germans, though resisting desperately, are retreating. I feel sure that they will have to disperse their reserves between the two fronts and, as a result, relinquish the offensive on the Western Front. I am glad that this circumstance will ease the position of the Allied troops in the West and expedite preparations for the offensive planned by General Eisenhower.

As regards the Soviet troops, you may rest assured that, despite the difficulties, they will do all in their power to make the blow as effective as possible.

January 15, 1945

 

 

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No. 7

January 15, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Today I had a talk with Marshal Tedder and the generals accompanying him. I think that the information exchanged was complete enough, as Marshal Tedder will probably report to you. Let me add that Marshal Tedder made a very good impression on me.

Despite unfavourable weather the Soviet offensive is developing according to plan. The troops are in action all along the Central Front, from the Carpathians to the Baltic Sea. Although offering desperate resistance, the Germans have been forced to retreat. I hope this circumstance will facilitate and expedite General Eisenhower’s planned offensive on the Western Front.

January 15, 1945

 

 

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No. 8

January 16, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of January 14 on the Yugoslav question has reached me.

As far as I am concerned I see no grounds for putting off execution of our decision, which I communicated to you last time. In my view we should not waste time and thus expose the whole thing to the trials caused by delay.

January 16, 1945

 

 

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No. 9

January 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your telegram of January 21 to hand.

I agree to your suggestion that the Press be excluded from “Argonaut.” I have no objection to each party admitting a number of photographers.

I have replied in similar strain to the President’s query.

January 23, 1945

 

 

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No. 10

January 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt

 

I have received your cable about the attendance of press representatives and photographers at “Argonaut.” I have nothing against your suggestions.

I have sent a similar reply to the Prime Minister’s query.

January 23, 1945

 

 

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No. 11

January 25, 1945

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of January 23 on the Yugoslav question.

I agree that the Tito-Šubašić agreement as agreed between them, should be put into effect without further delay and that the three Great Powers should recognise the United Government. I think we should not make any reservations whatever in carrying out this plan.

January 25, 1945

 

 

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No. 12

January 29, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Thank you for the condolences on the occasion of the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, whose work was highly valued by the Soviet Government.

January 29, 1945

 

 

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No. 13

Sent on January 30, 1945

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Please accept, Mr President, my heartfelt congratulations and best wishes on the occasion of your birthday.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 14

February 1, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message received.

I and my colleagues have arrived at the meeting place.

February 1, 1945

 

 

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No. 15

Koreiz, February 9, 1945

To President Franklin D. Roosevelt

“Livadia,” the Crimea

 

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Please accept my thanks for the sentiments expressed on behalf of the American people and the U.S. Government on the occasion of the tragic death of the Soviet Ambassador in Mexico, K. A. Oumansky, his wife and the three members of the Embassy staff.

The Soviet Government gratefully accepts your offer to have their remains sent to Moscow by a U.S. Army plane.

Yours very sincerely,

J. Stalin

Koreiz, February 9, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 16

Koreiz, February 11, 1945

To President Franklin D. Roosevelt

“Livadia,” the Crimea

 

My dear Mr Roosevelt,

Your letter of February 10 received. I fully agree with you that because the Soviet Union’s votes will increase to three owing to the admission of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Byelorussia to Assembly membership, the number of U.S. votes should likewise be increased.

I think that the U.S. votes should be raised to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two main Republics. If necessary, I am prepared to give official endorsement to this proposal.

Most sincerely yours,

J. Stalin

Koreiz, February 11, 1945

 

 

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No. 17

February 20, 1945

Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of February 18. I am very glad that you were satisfied with the facilities provided in the Crimea.

February 20, 1945

 

 

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No. 18

February 21, 1945

Personal Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Please accept my gratitude for the condolences on the death of General I. D. Chernyakhovsky, one of the finest Red Army soldiers.

February 21, 1945

 

 

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No. 19

Sent on February 27, 1945

Personal Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Please accept my thanks for your high praise of the Red Army’s contribution to the cause of defeating the German armed forces.

I will gladly convey your greetings to the Red Army on its twenty-seventh anniversary.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 20

Sent on February 27, 1945

To Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America

The White House, Washington

 

Please accept, Mr President, my gratitude for your friendly greetings on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the Red Army.

I am confident that the further strengthening of cooperation between our two countries, which found expression in the decisions of the Crimea Conference, will shortly lead to the complete defeat of our common enemy and to a lasting peace based on the principle of cooperation among all freedom-loving nations.

J. Stalin

 

 

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No. 21

March 5, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message of March 4 about prisoners of war received. I have again conferred with our local representatives in charge of this matter and can tell you the following:

The difficulties which arose during the early stages of the speedy evacuation of American prisoners of war from the zones of direct military operations have decreased substantially. At present the special agency set up by the Soviet Government to take care of foreign prisoners of war has adequate personnel, transport facilities and food supplies, and whenever new groups of American prisoners of war are discovered steps are taken at once to help them and to evacuate them to assembly points for subsequent repatriation. According to the information available to the Soviet Government, there is now no accumulation of U.S. prisoners of war on Polish territory or in other areas liberated by the Red Army, because all of them, with the exception of individual sick men who are in hospital, have been sent to the assembly point in Odessa, where 1,200 U.S. prisoners of war have arrived so far and the arrival of the remainder is expected shortly. Hence there is no need at the moment for U.S. planes to fly from Poltava to Polish territory in connection with U.S. prisoners of war. You may rest assured that appropriate measures will immediately be taken also with regard to American aircraft crews making a forced landing. This, however, does not rule out cases in which the help of U.S. aircraft may be required. In this event the Soviet military authorities will request the U.S. military representatives in Moscow to send U.S. aircraft from Poltava.

As at the moment I have no proposals to make concerning the status of the Allied prisoners of war in German hands, I should like to assure you that we shall do all we can to provide them with facilities as soon as they find themselves on territory captured by Soviet troops.

March 5, 1945

 

 

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No. 22

March 22, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your message about the evacuation of former U.S. prisoners of war from Poland.

With regard to your information about allegedly large numbers of sick and injured Americans in Poland or awaiting evacuation to Odessa, or who have not contacted the Soviet authorities, I must say that the information is inaccurate. Actually, apart from a certain number who are on their way to Odessa, there were only 17 sick U.S. servicemen on Polish soil as of March 16. I have today received a report which says that the 17 men will be flown to Odessa in a few days.

With reference to the request contained in your message I must say that if it concerned me personally I would be ready to give way even to the detriment of my own interests. But in the given instance the matter concerns the interests of Soviet armies at the front and of Soviet commanders who do not want to have around odd officers who, while having no relation to the military operations, need looking after, want all kinds of meetings and contacts, protection against possible acts of sabotage by German agents not yet ferreted out, and other things that divert the attention of the commanders and their subordinates from their direct duties. Our commanders bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at the front and in the immediate rear, and I do not see how I can restrict their rights to any extent.

I must also say that U.S. ex-prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army have been treated to good conditions in Soviet camps – better conditions than those afforded Soviet ex-prisoners of war in U.S. camps, where some of them were lodged with German war prisoners and were subjected to unfair treatment and unlawful persecutions, including beating, as has been communicated to the U.S. Government on more than one occasion.

March 22, 1945

 

 

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No. 23

March 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your messages.

As regards British prisoners of war, your fears for their welfare are groundless. They have better conditions than the Soviet prisoners of war in British camps where in a number of cases they were ill-treated and even beaten. Moreover, they are no longer in our camps, being on their way to Odessa, whence they will leave for home.

Thank you for the information on the position on the Western Front. I have faith in the strategic talent of Field Marshal Montgomery.

March 23, 1945

 

 

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No. 24

March 27, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

We highly value and attach great importance to the San Francisco Conference to lay the foundations of an international organisation for peace and security of the nations, but present circumstances preclude V. M. Molotov’s attendance.

I and Molotov are very sorry about this, but the convening, at the instance of Deputies to the Supreme Soviet, of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in April, at which Molotov’s attendance is imperative, makes it impossible for him to attend even the opening session of the Conference.

You are aware that Ambassador Gromyko successfully coped with his task at Dumbarton Oaks, and we are certain that he will ably head the Soviet Delegation at San Francisco.

As to the different interpretations, you will appreciate that they cannot determine the decisions to be taken.

March 27, 1945

 

 

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No. 25

March 29, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have analysed the matter raised in your letter of March 25, and find that the Soviet Government could not have given any other reply after its representatives were barred from the Berne negotiations with the Germans for a German surrender and opening the front to the Anglo-American troops in Northern Italy.

Far from being against, I am all for profiting from cases of disintegration in the German armies to hasten their surrender on one or another sector and encourage them to open the front to Allied forces.

But I agree to such talks with the enemy only in cases where they do not lead to an easing of the enemy’s position, if the opportunity for the Germans to manoeuvre and to use the talks for switching troops to other sectors, above all to the Soviet front, is precluded.

And it was solely with an eye to providing this guarantee that the Soviet Government found it necessary to have representatives of its Military Command take part in such negotiations with the enemy wherever they might take place – whether in Berne or in Caserta. I cannot understand why the representatives of the Soviet Command have been excluded from the talks and in what way they could have handicapped the representatives of the Allied Command.

I must tell you for your information that the Germans have already taken advantage of the talks with the Allied Command to move three divisions from Northern Italy to the Soviet front.

The task of coordinated operations involving a blow at the Germans from the West, South and East, proclaimed at the Crimea Conference, is to hold the enemy on the spot and prevent him from manoeuvring, from moving his forces to the points where he needs them most. The Soviet Command is doing this. But Field Marshal Alexander is not. This circumstance irritates the Soviet Command and engenders distrust.

“As a military man,” you write to me, “you will understand the necessity for prompt action to avoid losing an opportunity. The sending of a flag of truce to your General at Königsberg or Danzig would be in the same category.” I am afraid the analogy does not fit the case. The German troops at Danzig and at Königsberg are encircled. If they surrender they will do so to escape extermination, but they cannot open the front to Soviet troops because the front has shifted as far west as the Oder. The German troops in Northern Italy are in an entirely different position. They are not encircled and are not faced with extermination. If, nevertheless, the Germans in Northern Italy seek negotiations in order to surrender and to open the front to the Allied troops, then they must have some other, more far-reaching aims affecting the destiny of Germany.

I must tell you that if a similar situation had obtained on the Eastern Front, somewhere on the Oder, providing an opportunity for a German surrender and for the opening of the front to the Soviet troops, I should have immediately notified the Anglo-American Military Command and asked it to send its representatives to take part in the talks, for in a situation of this kind Allies should have nothing to conceal from each other.

March 29, 1945

 

 

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No. 26

April 3, 1945

Personal, Most Secret

From Marshal J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your message on the Berne talks.

You are quite right in saying, with reference to the talks between the Anglo-American and German Commands in Berne or elsewhere, that “the matter now stands in an atmosphere of regrettable apprehension and mistrust.”

You affirm that so far no negotiations have been entered into. Apparently you are not fully informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on the basis of information in their possession, are sure that negotiations did take place and that they ended in an agreement with the Germans, whereby the German Commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, is to open the front to the Anglo-American troops and let them move east, while the British and Americans have promised, in exchange, to ease the armistice terms for the Germans.

I think that my colleagues are not very far from the truth. If the contrary were the case the exclusion of representatives of the Soviet Command from the Berne talks would be inexplicable.

Nor can I account for the reticence of the British, who have left it to you to carry on a correspondence with me on this unpleasant matter, while they themselves maintain silence, although it is known that the initiative in the matter of the Berne negotiations belongs to the British.

I realise that there are certain advantages resulting to the Anglo-American troops from these separate negotiations in Berne or in some other place, seeing that the Anglo-American troops are enabled to advance into the heart of Germany almost without resistance; but why conceal this from the Russians, and why were the Russians, their Allies, not forewarned?

And so what we have at the moment is that the Germans on the Western Front have in fact ceased the war against Britain and America. At the same time they continue the war against Russia, the Ally of Britain and the U.S.A.

Clearly this situation cannot help preserve and promote trust between our countries.

I have already written in a previous message, and I think I must repeat, that I and my colleagues would never in any circumstances have taken such a hazardous step, for we realise that a momentary advantage, no matter how great, is overshadowed by the fundamental advantage of preserving and promoting trust between Allies.

April 3, 1945

 

 

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No. 27

April 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of April 1 on the Polish problem. In a relevant message to the President, a copy of which I am also sending to you, I have replied to the salient points about the work of the Moscow Commission on Poland. Concerning the other points in your message, I must say this:

The British and U.S. Ambassadors – members of the Moscow Commission – refuse to consider the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government and insist on inviting Polish leaders for consultation regardless of their attitude to the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland or to the Soviet Union. They insist, for example, on Mikolajczyk being invited to Moscow for consultation, and they do so in the form of an ultimatum, ignoring the fact that Mikolajczyk has openly attacked the Crimea Conference decisions on Poland. However, if you deem it necessary, I shall try to induce the Provisional Polish Government to withdraw its objections to inviting Mikolajczyk provided he publicly endorses the decisions of the Crimea Conference on the Polish question and declares in favour of establishing friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

2. You wonder why the Polish military theatre should be veiled in secrecy. Actually there is no secrecy at all. You forget the circumstance that the Poles regard the despatch of British or other foreign observers to Poland as an affront to their national dignity, especially when it is borne in mind that the Polish Provisional Government feels the British Government has adopted an unfriendly attitude towards it. As to the Soviet Government, it has to take note of the Polish Provisional Government’s negative view on sending foreign observers to Poland. Furthermore, you know that, given a different attitude towards it, the Polish Provisional Government would not object to representatives of other countries entering Poland and, as was the case, for example, with representatives of the Czechoslovak Government, the Yugoslav Government and others, would not put any difficulties in their way.

3. I had a pleasant talk with Mrs Churchill who made a deep impression upon me. She gave me a present from you. Please accept my heartfelt thanks for it.

April 7, 1945

 

 

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No. 28

April 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

With reference to your message of April 1st I think I must make the following comments on the Polish question.

The Polish question has indeed reached an impasse. What is the reason?

The reason is that the U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow – members of the Moscow Commission – have departed from the instructions of the Crimea Conference, introducing new elements not provided for by the Crimea Conference. Namely:

 

(a) At the Crimea Conference the three of us regarded the Polish Provisional Government as the government now functioning in Poland and subject to reconstruction, as the government that should be the core of a new Government of National Unity. The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, have departed from that thesis; they ignore the Polish Provisional Government, pay no heed to it and at best place individuals in Poland and London on a par with the Provisional Government. Furthermore, they hold that reconstruction of the Provisional Government should be understood in terms of its abolition and the establishment of an entirely new government. Things have gone so far that Mr Harriman declared in the Moscow Commission that it might be that not a single member of the Provisional Government would be included in the Polish Government of National Unity.

Obviously this thesis of the U.S. and British Ambassadors cannot but be strongly resented by the Polish Provisional Government. As regards the Soviet Union, it certainly cannot accept a thesis that is tantamount to direct violation of the Crimea Conference decisions.

 

(b) At the Crimea Conference the three of us held that five people should be invited for consultation from Poland and three from London, not more. But the U.S. and British Ambassadors have abandoned that position and insist that each member of the Moscow Commission be entitled to invite an unlimited number from Poland and from London.

Clearly the Soviet Government could not agree to that, because, according to the Crimea decision, invitations should be sent not by individual members of the Commission, but by the Commission as a whole, as a body. The demand for no limit to the number invited for consultation runs counter to what was envisaged at the Crimea Conference.

 

(c) The Soviet Government proceeds from the assumption that by virtue of the Crimea decisions, those invited for consultation should be in the first instance Polish leaders who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference, including the one on the Curzon Line, and, secondly, who actually want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government insists on this because the blood of Soviet soldiers, so freely shed in liberating Poland, and the fact that in the past 30 years the territory of Poland has twice been used by an enemy for invading Russia, oblige the Soviet Government to ensure friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The U.S. and British Ambassadors in Moscow, however, ignore this and want to invite Polish leaders for consultation regardless of their attitude to the Crimea decisions and to the Soviet Union.

Such, to my mind, are the factors hindering a settlement of the Polish problem through mutual agreement. In order to break the deadlock and reach an agreed decision, the following steps should, I think, be taken:

 

(1) Affirm that reconstruction of the Polish Provisional Government implies, not its abolition, but its reconstruction by enlarging it, it being understood that the Provisional Government shall form the core of the future Polish Government of National Unity.

 

(2) Return to the provisions of the Crimea Conference and restrict the number of Polish leaders to be invited to eight persons, of whom five should be from Poland and three from London.

 

(3) Affirm that the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government shall be consulted in all circumstances, that they be consulted in the first place, since the Provisional Government is much stronger in Poland compared with the individuals to be invited from London and Poland whose influence among the population in no way compares with the tremendous prestige of the Provisional Government.

I draw your attention to this because, to my mind, any other decision on the point might be regarded in Poland as an affront to the people and as an attempt to impose a government without regard to Polish public opinion.

 

(4) Only those leaders should be summoned for consultation from Poland and from London who recognise the decisions of the Crimea Conference on Poland and who in practice want friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union.

 

(5) Reconstruction of the Provisional Government to be effected by replacing a number of Ministers of the Provisional Government by nominees among the Polish leaders who are not members of the Provisional Government.

As to the ratio of old and new Ministers in the Government of National Unity, it might be established more or less on the same lines as was done in the case of the Yugoslav Government.

I think if these comments are taken into consideration the Polish question can be settled in a short time.

April 7, 1945

 

 

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No. 29

April 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of April 5.

I have already answered, in my message of April 7 to the President, which I am also sending to you, all the main points raised in your message in relation to the negotiations in Switzerland. As regards other points in your message, I think it necessary to say this.

Neither I nor Molotov had any intention of “aspersing” anyone. It is not a question of our wanting to “asperse” anyone but of the fact that differences have arisen between us as to the duties and the rights of an Ally. You will see from my message to the President that the Russian view of the matter is correct, for it guarantees the rights of any Ally and deprives the enemy of any opportunity to sow distrust between us.

 

2. My messages are personal and most secret. This enables me to speak my mind frankly and clearly. That is an advantage of secret correspondence. But if you take every frank statement of mine as an affront, then the correspondence will be greatly handicapped. I can assure you that I have never had, nor have I now, any intention of affronting anyone.

April 7, 1945

 

 

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No. 30

April 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message of April 5.

In my message of April 3 the point was not about integrity or trustworthiness. I have never doubted your integrity or trustworthiness, just as I have never questioned the integrity or trustworthiness of Mr Churchill. My point is that in the course of our correspondence a difference of views has arisen over what an Ally may permit himself with regard to another and what he may not. We Russians believe that, in view of the present situation on the fronts, a situation in which the enemy is faced with inevitable surrender, whenever the representatives of one of the Allies meet the Germans to discuss surrender terms, the representatives of the other Ally should be enabled to take part in the meeting. That is absolutely necessary, at least when the other Ally seeks participation in the meeting. The Americans and British, however, have a different opinion – they hold that the Russian point of view is wrong. For that reason they have denied the Russians the right to be present at the meeting with the Germans in Switzerland. I have already written to you, and I see no harm in repeating that, given a similar situation, the Russians would never have denied the Americans and British the right to attend such a meeting. I still consider the Russian point of view to be the only correct one, because it precludes mutual suspicions and gives the enemy no chance to sow distrust between us.

 

2. It is hard to agree that the absence of German resistance on the Western Front is due solely to the fact that they have been beaten. The Germans have 147 divisions on the Eastern Front. They could safely withdraw from 15 to 20 divisions from the Eastern Front to aid their forces on the Western Front. Yet they have not done so, nor are they doing so. They are fighting desperately against the Russians for Zemlenice, an obscure station in Czechoslovakia, which they need just as much as a dead man needs a poultice, but they surrender without any resistance such important towns in the heart of Germany as Osnabrück, Mannheim and Kassel. You will admit that this behaviour on the part of the Germans is more than strange and unaccountable.

 

3. As regards those who supply my information, I can assure you that they are honest and unassuming people who carry out their duties conscientiously and who have no intention of affronting anybody. They have been tested in action on numerous occasions. Judge for yourself. In February General Marshall made available to the General Staff of the Soviet troops a number of important reports in which he, citing data in his possession, warned the Russians that in March the Germans were planning two serious counter-blows on the Eastern Front, one from Pomerania towards Thorn, the other from the Moravskâ Ostrava area towards Lódź. It turned out, however, that the main German blow had been prepared, and delivered, not in the areas mentioned above, but in an entirely different area, namely, in the Lake Balaton area, south-west of Budapest. The Germans, as we now know, had concentrated 35 divisions in the area, 11 of them armoured. This, with its great concentration of armour, was one of the heaviest blows of the war. Marshal Tolbukhin succeeded first in warding off disaster and then in smashing the Germans, and was able to do so also because my informants had disclosed – true with some delay – the plan for the main German blow and immediately apprised Marshal Tolbukhin. Thus I had yet another opportunity to satisfy myself as to the reliability and soundness of my sources of information.

 

 

For your guidance in this matter I enclose a letter sent by Army General Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army, to Major-General Deane.

 

April 7, 1945

Copy. Secret

To Major-General John R. Deane, Head Of the Military Mission Of the U.S.A. In the U.S.S.R.

 

Dear General Deane,

Please convey to General Marshall the following:

On February 20 I received a message from General Marshall through General Deane, saying that the Germans were forming two groups for a counter-offensive on the Eastern Front: one in Pomerania to strike in the direction of Thorn and the other in the Vienna-Moravskâ Ostrava area to advance in the direction of Lódź. The southern group was to include the 6th S.S. Panzer Army. On February 12 I received similar information from Colonel Brinkman, head of the Army Section of the British Military Mission.

I am very much obliged and grateful to General Marshall for the information, designed to further our common aims, which he so kindly made available to us.

At the same time it is my duty to inform General Marshall that the military operations on the Eastern Front in March did not bear out the information furnished by him. For the battles showed that the main group of German troops, which included the 6th S.S. Panzer Army, had been concentrated, not in Pomerania or in the Moravskâ Ostrava area, but in the Lake Balaton area, whence the Germans launched their offensive in an attempt to break through to the Danube and force it south of Budapest.

Thus, the information supplied by General Marshall was at variance with the actual course of events on the Eastern Front in March.

It may well be that certain sources of this information wanted to bluff both Anglo-American and Soviet Headquarters and divert the attention of the Soviet High Command from the area where the Germans were mounting their main offensive operation on the Eastern Front.

Despite the foregoing, I would ask General Marshall, if possible, to keep me posted with information about the enemy. I consider it my duty to convey this information to General Marshall solely for the purpose of enabling him to draw the proper conclusions in relation to the source of the information. Please convey to General Marshall my respect and gratitude.

Truly yours,

Army General Antonov
Chief of Staff of the Red Army

March 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 31

Sent on April 13, 1945

For President Truman

Washington

 

On behalf of the Soviet Government and on my own behalf I express to the Government of the United States of America deep regret at the untimely death of President Roosevelt. The American people and the United Nations have lost in the person of Franklin Roosevelt a great statesman of world stature and champion of post-war peace and security.

The Government of the Soviet Union expresses its heartfelt sympathy with the American people in their grievous loss and its confidence that the policy of cooperation between the Great Powers who have borne the brunt of the war against the common foe will be promoted in the future as well.

J. Stalin

 

 

* * *

 

No. 32

April 14, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your messages of April 14.

I agree that it would be advisable to broadcast brief messages to the troops by you, the President and myself in connection with the anticipated link-up of our troops – that is, of course, if President Truman does not object. We should agree, however, on the date for these broadcasts.

 

2. I also agree that we should issue a joint warning on behalf of the three Governments about the safety of the prisoners of war in the hands of the Hitler Government. I have no objection to the text of the warning sent by you. Kindly advise me whether the warning has to be signed or not. And let me know date and time of publication.

April 14, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 33

April 15, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on the occasion of the death of President F. Roosevelt has reached me.

In President Franklin Roosevelt the Soviet people recognised an outstanding political leader and unswerving champion of close cooperation between our three countries.

Our people will always value highly and remember President F. Roosevelt’s friendly attitude to the Soviet Union.

As for myself, I am deeply afflicted by the loss of this great man, our common friend.

April 15, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 34

Sent on April 18, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I am in receipt of your message of April 16 concerning the texts of the broadcasts to the troops and the joint warning.

I have no objection to the succession in which you propose releasing the messages. As to warning the Germans about the safety of prisoners of war, we can, no doubt, direct V. M. Molotov, Mr Eden and Mr Stettinius to reach agreement in Washington.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 35

Sent on April 18, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message setting out Mikolajczyk’s declaration reached me on April 16. Thank you for the information.

Mikolajczyk’s declaration is undoubtedly a big step forward, but it is not clear whether he accepts that part of the Crimea Conference decisions which bears on Poland’s eastern frontier. It wouldn’t be bad first, to have the full text of Mikolajczyk’s declaration and, second, to have an elucidation from him as to whether he also accepts that part of the Crimea decisions which relates to Poland’s eastern frontier.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 36

April 20, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill

 

I have received yours of April 19 concerning the messages to the troops. I am in agreement with the procedure set out by you.

My message will run as follows:

“The victorious armies of the Allied Powers, waging a war of liberation in Europe, have defeated the German forces and linked up on German soil.

“It is our task and our duty to finish off the enemy, to force him to lay down his arms and surrender unconditionally. This task and this duty to our people and to all the freedom-loving peoples will be fully carried out as far as the Red Army is concerned.

“We salute the valiant troops of our Allies, who now stand on German soil shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet troops, fully resolved to carry out their duty to the end.”

The message will be recorded and sent to you immediately.

I have no objection to leaving it to the broadcasting authorities in each country to fix the exact time when our messages will be broadcast the moment the link-up of Soviet and Anglo- American troops is officially announced. Nor have I any objection to coordinating our link-up statements with a similar statement by General Eisenhower.

Your suggestion that our messages be broadcast first in the respective countries over their own network is likewise acceptable.

April 20, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 37

April 23, 1945

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

Your message on the procedure of releasing President Truman’s statement reached me on April 21. Thank you for the information. As agreed, the sound record of my message is being flown to you by the returning Mosquito.

April 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 38

April 23, 1945

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

Your message concerning the time of announcing the link-up of our armies in Germany reached me on April 22.

I have no objection to President Truman’s proposal that the link-up of our armies be announced simultaneously in the three capitals at 12.00 hours Washington Time.

I am sending a similar message to Mr Truman.

April 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 39

April 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Truman

 

Your message about announcing the link-up of our armies in Germany reached me on April 21.

I have nothing against your proposal for accepting the hour for the announcement suggested by Gen. Eisenhower, that is, twelve o’clock noon Washington Time.

I am sending a similar message to Mr Churchill.

April 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 40

April 24, 1945

J. V. Stalin to H. Truman

 

I have received from you and Prime Minister Churchill the joint message of April 18 and the message transmitted to me through V. M. Molotov on April 24.

The messages indicate that you still regard the Polish Provisional Government, not as the core of a future Polish Government of National Unity, but merely as a group on a par with any other group of Poles. It would be hard to reconcile this concept of the position of the Provisional Government and this attitude towards it with the Crimea decision on Poland. At the Crimea Conference the three of us, including President Roosevelt, based ourselves on the assumption that the Polish Provisional Government, as the Government now functioning in Poland and enjoying the trust and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the core, that is, the main part of a new, reconstructed Polish Government of National Unity.

You apparently disagree with this understanding of the issue. By turning down the Yugoslav example as a model for Poland, you confirm that the Polish Provisional Government cannot be regarded as a basis for, and the core of, a future Government of National Unity.

 

2. Another circumstance that should be borne in mind is that Poland borders on the Soviet Union, which cannot be said about Great Britain or the U.S.A.

Poland is to the security of the Soviet Union what Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

You evidently do not agree that the Soviet Union is entitled to seek in Poland a Government that would be friendly to it, that the Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a Government hostile to it. This is rendered imperative, among other things, by the Soviet people’s blood freely shed on the fields of Poland for the liberation of that country. I do not know whether a genuinely representative Government has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian Government is a genuinely democratic one. The Soviet Union was not consulted when those Governments were being formed, nor did it claim the right to interfere in those matters, because it realises how important Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

I cannot understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union in terms of security as well.

 

3. One cannot but recognise as unusual a situation in which two Governments – those of the United States and Great Britain – reach agreement beforehand on Poland, a country in which the U.S.S.R. is interested first of all and most of all, and place its representatives in an intolerable position, trying to dictate to it.

I say that this situation cannot contribute to agreed settlement of the Polish problem.

 

4. I am ready to accede to your request and to do all in my power to reach an agreed settlement. But you are asking too much. To put it plainly, you want me to renounce the interests of the security of the Soviet Union; but I cannot proceed against the interests of my country.

I think there is only one way out of the present situation and that is to accept the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland. That, I believe, might enable us to arrive at agreed settlement.

April 24, 1945

* * *

 

No. 41

April 24, 1945

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

I received the joint message from you and President Truman of April 18.

It would appear that you still regard the Polish Provisional Government, not as the core of a future Polish Government of National Unity, but merely as a group on a par with any other group of Poles. It would be hard to reconcile this concept of the position of the Provisional Government and this attitude towards it with the Crimea decision on Poland. At the Crimea Conference the three of us, including President Roosevelt, based ourselves on the assumption that the Polish Provisional Government, as the Government now fuctioning in Poland and enjoying the trust and support of the majority of the Polish people, should be the core, that is, the main part of a new, reconstructed Polish Government of National Unity.

You apparently disagree with this understanding of the issue. By turning down the Yugoslav example as a model for Poland, you confirm that the Polish Provisional Government cannot be regarded as a basis for, and the core of, a future Government of National Unity.

 

2. Another circumstance that should be borne in mind is that Poland borders on the Soviet Union, which cannot be said about Great Britain or the U.S.A.

Poland is to the security of the Soviet Union what Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

You evidently do not agree that the Soviet Union is entitled to seek in Poland a Government that would be friendly to it, that the Soviet Government cannot agree to the existence in Poland of a Government hostile to it. This is rendered imperative, among other things, by the Soviet people’s blood freely shed on the fields of Poland for the liberation of that country. I do not know whether a genuinely representative Government has been established in Greece, or whether the Belgian Government is a genuinely democratic one. The Soviet Union was not consulted when those Governments were being formed, nor did it claim the right to interfere in those matters, because it realises how important Belgium and Greece are to the security of Great Britain.

I cannot understand why in discussing Poland no attempt is made to consider the interests of the Soviet Union in terms of security as well.

 

3. One cannot but recognise as unusual a situation in which two Governments – those of the United States and Great Britain – reach agreement beforehand on Poland, a country in which the U.S.S.R. is interested first of all and most of all, and, placing its representatives in an intolerable position, try to dictate to it.

I say that this situation cannot contribute to agreed settlement of the Polish problem.

 

4. I am most grateful to you for kindly communicating the text of Mikolajczyk’s declaration concerning Poland’s eastern frontier. I am prepared to recommend to the Polish Provisional Government that they take note of this declaration and withdraw their objection to inviting Mikolajczyk for consultation on a Polish Government.

The important thing now is to accept the Yugoslav precedent as a model for Poland. I think that if this is done we shall be able to make progress on the Polish question.

April 24, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 42

April 24th, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Marshal Stalin from the Prime Minister

 

I have seen the message about Poland which the President handed to M. Molotov for transmission to you, and I have consulted the War Cabinet on account of its special importance. It is my duty now to inform you that we fully support the President in the aforesaid message. I earnestly hope that means will be found to compose the serious difficulties which, if they continue, will darken the hour of victory.

April 24th, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 43

April 25, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for the message of April 25 about Himmler’s intention to surrender on the Western Front.

I regard your suggestion for confronting Himmler with a demand for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, as the only correct one. Knowing you as I do, I never doubted that you would act in exactly this manner. Please act in the spirit of your suggestion, and as for the Red Army, it will press on to Berlin in the interest of our common cause.

For your information I have sent a similar reply to President Truman who addressed me with the same query.

April 25, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 44

April 26, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on “Crossword” reached me on April 26. Thank you for the information.

For my part I want to tell you that the Soviet Military Command has appointed Major-General Kislenko, at present the Soviet Government’s delegate on the Advisory Council for Italy, to take part in the negotiations at Field Marshal Alexander’s headquarters for the surrender of the German forces in Northern Italy.

April 26, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 45

April 26, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of April 26 received. Thank you for informing me of Himmler’s intention to surrender on the Western Front.

I think that your contemplated reply to Himmler, which calls for unconditional surrender on all fronts, including the Soviet front, is absolutely sound. Please act in the spirit of your proposal, and as for us Russians, we undertake to continue our attacks upon the Germans.

For your information I have sent a similar reply to Prime Minister Churchill who had made the same inquiry.

April 26, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 46

April 28, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Truman

 

Your message concerning the instructions you have given to Mr Johnson reached me on April 27. Thank you for the news.

The decision to seek unconditional surrender of the German armed forces, adopted by you and Mr Churchill, is to my mind the right reply to the German proposals.

April 28, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 47

April 30, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Marshal Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of April 28 received.

I have nothing against your proposal for publishing, on behalf of the Four Powers, a declaration establishing the defeat and unconditional surrender of Germany, in the event of Germany being left without a normally functioning centralised authority.

The Soviet representative on the European Advisory Commission has been instructed to insert in the preamble to the declaration, the draft of which has been submitted by the British delegation, an amendment laying down the principle of unconditional surrender for the armed forces of Germany.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 48

May 2, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of April 27 concerning the order of the occupation of Germany and Austria by the Red Army and the Anglo-American armed forces.

For my part I want to tell you that the Soviet Supreme Command has given instructions that whenever Soviet troops contact Allied troops the Soviet Command is immediately to get in touch with the Command of the U.S. or British troops, so that they, by agreement between themselves, (1) establish a temporary tactical demarcation line and (2) take steps to crush within the bounds of their temporary demarcation line all resistance by German troops.

May 2, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 49

May 2, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your messages of April 29 and 30 concerning the unconditional surrender by the Germans in Italy have reached me.

Thanks for the information. I have no objection to the announcement of the German surrender in Italy being made first by Field Marshal Alexander.

May 2, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 50

May 2, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

I received on April 28 your message expressing agreement with the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the procedure of the occupation of Germany and Austria.

The Soviet Supreme Command has given instructions that whenever Soviet troops contact Allied troops the Soviet Command is immediately to get in touch with the Command of the U.S. or British troops, so that they, by agreement between themselves, (1) establish a temporary tactical demarcation line and (2) take steps to crush within the bounds of their temporary demarcation line all resistance by German troops.

May 2, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 51

May 2, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Thank you for communicating to me the text of your message to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, concerning the German surrender in Italy. I have nothing against Field Marshal Alexander publishing the announcement of the surrender as proposed by you.

May 2, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 52

Sent on May 4, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

In view of your interest in the Polish question and because you are bound to be familiar with Mr Churchill’s message to me on the subject, dated April 28, I think it proper to send you the full text of my reply to Mr Churchill, despatched on May 4.

 

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to Prime Minister W. Churchill

 

I am in receipt of your message of April 28 on the Polish question.

I must say that I cannot accept the arguments put forward in support of your stand.

You are inclined to regard the proposal that the Yugoslav precedent be accepted as a model for Poland as renunciation of the procedure agreed between us for setting up a Polish Government of National Unity. I cannot agree with you. I think that the Yugoslav precedent is important first of all because it points the way to the most suitable and practical solution of the problem of forming a new United Government based on the governmental agency at present exercising state power in the country.

It is quite obvious that, unless the Provisional Government now functioning in Poland and enjoying the support and trust of a majority of the Polish people is taken as a basis for a future Government of National Unity, it will be impossible to count on successful fulfilment of the task set us by the Crimea Conference.

 

2. I cannot subscribe to that part of your considerations on Greece where you suggest three-Power control over the elections. Such control over the people of an allied country would of necessity be assessed as an affront and gross interference in their internal affairs. Such control is out of place in relation to former satellite countries which subsequently declared war on Germany and ranged themselves with the Allies, as demonstrated by electoral experience, for example, in Finland, where the election was held without outside interference and yielded positive results.

Your comments on Belgium and Poland as war theatres and communication corridors are perfectly justified. As regards Poland, it is her being a neighbour of the Soviet Union that makes it essential for a future Polish Government to seek in practice friendly relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R., which is also in the interests of the other freedom-loving nations. This circumstance, too, speaks for the Yugoslav precedent. The United Nations are interested in constant and durable friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Hence we cannot acquiesce in the attempts that are being made to involve in the forming of a future Polish Government people who, to quote you, “are not fundamentally anti-Russian,” or to bar from participation only those who, in your view, are “extreme people unfriendly to Russia.” Neither one nor the other can satisfy us. We insist, and shall continue to insist, that only people who have demonstrated by deeds their friendly attitude to the Soviet Union, who are willing honestly and sincerely to cooperate with the Soviet state, should be consulted on the formation of a future Polish Government.

 

3. I must deal specially with paragraph 11 of your message concerning the difficulties arising from rumours about the arrest of 15 Poles, about deportations, etc.

I am able to inform you that the group of Poles mentioned by you comprises 16, not 15, persons. The group is headed by the well-known General Okulicki. The British information services maintain a deliberate silence, in view of his particular odiousness, about this Polish General, who, along with the 15 other Poles, has “disappeared.” But we have no intention of being silent about the matter. This group of 16, led by General Okulicki, has been arrested by the military authorities of the Soviet front and is undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki’s group, in the first place General Okulicki himself, is charged with preparing and carrying out subversive activities behind the lines of the Red Army, subversion which has taken a toll of over a hundred Red Army soldiers and officers; the group is also charged with keeping illegal radio-transmitters in the rear of our troops, which is prohibited by law. All, or part of them – depending on the outcome of the investigation – will be tried. That is how the Red Army is forced to protect its units and its rear lines against saboteurs and those who create disorder.

The British information services are spreading rumours about the murder or shooting of Poles in Siedlce. The report is a fabrication from beginning to end and has, apparently, been concocted by Arciszewski’s agents.

 

4. It appears from your message that you are unwilling to consider the Polish Provisional Government as a basis for a future Government of National Unity, or to accord it the place in that Government to which it is entitled. I must say frankly that this attitude precludes the possibility of an agreed decision on the Polish question.

May 4, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 53

May 6, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr H. Truman

 

Your message about announcing V.-E. Day reached me on May 5.

I agree with your proposal for the three of us – you, Mr Churchill and myself – simultaneously making an appropriate statement. Mr. Churchill suggests 3 p.m. British Double Summer Time, which corresponds to 4 p.m. Moscow Time and 9 a.m. Washington Time. I have notified Mr Churchill that this hour suits the U.S.S.R.

May 6, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 54

May 6, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of May 5 about the time of announcing V.-E. Day reached me on May 6.

I agree to your proposal for 3 p.m. British Double Summer Time, which corresponds to 4 p.m. Moscow Time. I have also notified Mr Truman about this.

May 6, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 55

May 7, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Marshal J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your messages of May 7 regarding the announcement of Germany’s surrender.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army is not sure that the order of the German High Command on unconditional surrender will be executed by the German armies on the Eastern Front. We fear, therefore, that if the Government of the U.S.S.R. announces today the surrender of Germany we may find ourselves in an awkward position and mislead the Soviet public. It should be borne in mind that the German resistance on the Eastern Front is not slackening but, judging by intercepted radio messages, a considerable grouping of German troops have explicitly declared their intention to continue the resistance and to disobey Dönitz’s surrender order.

For this reason the Command of the Soviet troops would like to wait until the German surrender takes effect and to postpone the Government’s announcement of the surrender till May 9, 7 p.m. Moscow Time.

May 7, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 56

May 7, 1945

Secret and Personal Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Truman

 

I am in receipt of your message of May 7 about announcing Germany’s surrender.

The Supreme Command of the Red Army is not sure that the order of the German High Command on unconditional surrender will be executed by the German armies on the Eastern Front. We fear, therefore, that if the Government of the U.S.S.R. announces today the surrender of Germany we may find ourselves in an awkward position and mislead the Soviet public. It should be borne in mind that the German resistance on the Eastern Front is not slackening but, judging by intercepted radio messages, a considerable grouping of German troops have explicitly declared their intention to continue the resistance and to disobey Dönitz’s surrender order.

For this reason the Command of the Soviet troops would like to wait until the German surrender takes effect and to postpone the Government’s announcement of the surrender till May 9, 7 p.m. Moscow Time.

May 7, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 57

May 9, 1945

Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Truman

 

I thank you with all my heart for your friendly congratulations on the unconditional surrender of Hitler Germany. The peoples of the Soviet Union greatly appreciate the part played by the friendly American people in this liberation war. The joint effort of the Soviet, U.S. and British Armed Forces against the German invaders, which has culminated in the latter’s complete rout and defeat, will go down in history as a model military alliance between our peoples.

On behalf of the Soviet people and Government I beg you to convey my warmest greetings and congratulations on the occasion of this great victory to the American people and the gallant U.S. Armed Forces.

J. Stalin

May 9, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 58

May 10, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of May 5 on the subject of Poland received.

On the previous day I sent you the text of my reply to Mr Churchill’s message of April 28 on the same subject. I hope you have received that text.

I think, therefore, that I need not return to the matter. I should merely like to add this:

I have a feeling that you are unwilling to consider the Polish Provisional Government as a basis for the future Government of National Unity and object to the Polish Provisional Government occupying in that Government the place to which it is; entitled. I am obliged to say that this attitude rules out an agreed decision on the Polish question.

May 10, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 59

May 10, 1945

From J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

Message to the Armed Forces and People of Great Britain from the Peoples of the Soviet Union

 

I salute you, the gallant British Armed Forces and people of Britain, and cordially congratulate you on the great victory over our common enemy, German imperialism. This historic victory has crowned the joint struggle waged by the Soviet, British and United States armies for the liberation of Europe.

I express confidence in continued successful and happy development in the post-war period of the friendly relations that have taken shape between our countries during the war.

I have instructed our Ambassador in London to convey to all of you my congratulations on the victory and my best wishes.

May 10, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 60

May 18, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of May 17 about the visit of U.S. and Allied military representatives to Vienna received. Actually I had agreed in principle to their coming but, of course, I had done so on the understanding that by the time they arrived proper agreement would have been reached as to the occupation zones of Austria and the zones themselves determined by the European Advisory Commission. As agreed between Mr Churchill, President Roosevelt and myself, these matters are wholly under the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission.

That is still my point of view. Hence we could not agree to the point about the occupation zones and other points concerning Austria being referred to Vienna for consideration.

I have no objection, however, to U.S. and Allied representatives going to Vienna to see for themselves the condition of the city and to draft proposals for its occupation zones. Marshal Tolbukhin will be instructed accordingly. The understanding is that the U.S. military representatives should come to Vienna at the end of May or the beginning of June, when Marshal Tolbukhin, now en route to Moscow, returns.

May 18, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 61

May 18, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I am in receipt of your message of May 17 concerning the arrival of British representatives in Vienna in connection with establishing the occupation zones there.

The Soviet Government considers that the establishment of occupation zones in Vienna, as well as the examination of other matters relating to the situation in Austria, are wholly under the jurisdiction of the European Advisory Commission, as agreed between you, President Roosevelt and myself. Hence the Soviet Government could not agree to Allied military representatives coming to Vienna to establish occupation zones and settle other issues bearing on the situation in Austria. That is still our point of view. Judging from your message of May 17, you, too, do not find it possible to transfer settlement of the zone issue to Vienna. And since our views on the matter are identical, it can be anticipated that the issue of occupation zones in Austria and in Vienna will be settled by the European Advisory Commission in the near future.

As regards the visit of British representatives to Vienna to acquaint themselves with the condition of the city on the spot and to draft proposals for the occupation zones in Vienna, the Soviet Government has no objection to the visit. Accordingly, we are giving appropriate directions to Marshal Tolbukhin simultaneously with this. The British military representatives could arrive in Vienna towards the end of May or early June, when Marshal Tolbukhin, now on his way to Moscow, returns to Vienna.

May 18, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 62

May 20, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

I have received your message about the arrival of Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman in Moscow by May 26. I readily agree to your suggestion for a meeting with Mr Hopkins and Ambassador Harriman. May 26 suits me perfectly.

May 20, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 63

May 22, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Although your information message of May 15 did not call for reply, I think it proper to send you the text of the message I sent to President Truman in reply to his on the Yugoslav question.

May 22, 1945

 

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message on the Istria-Trieste area reached me on May 21. A little earlier I received from you, through Mr Kennan, the text of a message on the same subject, transmitted by the U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade to the Yugoslav Government. Thank you for the information.

My views on the substance of the matter are as follows.

I think you are quite correct in saying that the matter is one of principle and that in relation to the Istria-Trieste territory no action should be permitted that does not take full account of Yugoslavia’s rightful claims and of the contribution made by the Yugoslav armed forces to the common Allied cause in fighting against Hitler Germany. It goes without saying that the future of that territory, the population of which is mostly Yugoslav, will have to be determined at the peace settlement. However, the point at issue at the moment is its temporary military occupation. In this respect account should be taken, I believe, of the fact that it was the allied Yugoslav troops who drove the German invaders out of the Istria-Trieste territory, thereby rendering an important service to the common Allied cause. By virtue of this circumstance alone, it would be unfair and would be a gratuitous insult to the Yugoslav Army and people to deny Yugoslavia the right to occupy a territory won from the enemy, after their great sacrifice in the struggle for the national rights of Yugoslavia and for the common cause of the United Nations.

The right solution of this problem, in my view, would be for the Yugoslav troops and administration now functioning in the Istria-Trieste area to stay there. At the same time the area should be placed under the control of the Allied Supreme Commander and a demarcation line established by mutual agreement between Field Marshal Alexander and Marshal Tito. If these proposals were accepted the problem of administration in the Istria-Trieste area would likewise find the right solution.

And since Yugoslavs are a majority in the territory and even during the German occupation a local Yugoslav administration, now enjoying the trust of the local population, began to function there, these things should be taken into account. The problem of administrative government of the territory could be properly solved by subordinating the existing Yugoslav civil administration to the Yugoslav Military Command.

I do hope that the misunderstandings over the status of the Istria-Trieste region, which have arisen between the U.S. and British Governments, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, on the other, will be removed and a happy solution found.

May 22, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 64

May 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Military and Naval Commands, Germany, in keeping with the instrument of surrender, has delivered her navy and merchant marine to the British and Americans. I must inform you that the Germans have refused to surrender a single warship or merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces, and have sent the whole of their navy and merchant marine to be handed over to the Anglo-American armed forces.

In these circumstances the question naturally arises of assigning the Soviet Union its share of German warships and merchant vessels, as was done with regard to Italy. The Soviet Government holds that it can with good reason and in all fairness count on a minimum of one-third of Germany’s navy and merchant marine. In addition I think it necessary for the naval representatives of the U.S.S.R. to be enabled to acquaint themselves with all the materials pertaining to the surrender of Germany’s navy and merchant marine, and with their actual condition.

The Soviet Naval Command has appointed Admiral Levchenko and a group of assistants to take care of the matter.

I am sending a similar message to President Truman.

May 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 65

May 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Military and Naval Commands, Germany, in keeping with the instrument of surrender, has delivered her navy and merchant marine to the British and Americans. I must inform you that the Germans have refused to surrender a single warship or merchant vessel to the Soviet armed forces, and have sent the whole of their navy and merchant marine to be handed over to the Anglo-American armed forces.

In these circumstances the question naturally arises of assigning the Soviet Union its share of German warships and merchant vessels, as was done with regard to Italy. The Soviet Government holds that it can with good reason and in all fairness count on a minimum of one-third of Germany’s navy and merchant marine. In addition I think it necessary for the naval representatives of the U.S.S.R. to be enabled to acquaint themselves with all the materials pertaining to the surrender of Germany’s navy and merchant marine, and with their actual condition.

The Soviet Naval Command has appointed Admiral Levchenko and a group of assistants to take care of the matter.

I am sending a similar message to Prime Minister Churchill.

May 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 66

May 27, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Mr Hopkins, who has arrived in Moscow, on behalf of the President has suggested a meeting between the three of us in the immediate future. I think that a meeting is called for and that the most convenient place would be the vicinity of Berlin. That would probably be right politically as well.

Have you any objections?

May 27, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 67

May 27, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

More than eight months have passed since Roumania and Bulgaria broke off relations with Hitler Germany, signed an armistice with the Allied countries and entered the war on the Allied side, against Germany, assigning their armed forces for the purpose. They thereby contributed to the defeat of Hitlerism and to the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe. The Governments of Bulgaria and Roumania have during this time demonstrated by deeds their readiness to cooperate with the United Nations. Consequently the Soviet Government deems it proper and timely right away to resume diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria and exchange envoys with them.

The Soviet Government also considers it advisable to resume diplomatic relations with Finland, which, fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement, is now taking the democratic way. I think it will be possible a little later to adopt a similar decision with regard to Hungary.

I am simultaneously sending a similar message to Mr W. Churchill.

May 27, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 68

May 27, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

More than eight months ago Roumania and Bulgaria broke with Hitler Germany, signed an armistice with the Allied countries and entered the war on the side of the Allies against Germany, assigning their armed forces. They thereby contributed to the defeat of Hitlerism and facilitated the victorious conclusion of the war in Europe. In view of this the Soviet Government deems it timely to resume diplomatic relations right now and exchange Ministers with the Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments.

The Soviet Government also considers it advisable to resume diplomatic relations with Finland, which, fulfilling the terms of the armistice agreement, is now taking the democratic way. I think that it will be possible a little later to adopt a similar decision with regard to Hungary.

I am sending a similar message to the President.

May 27, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 69

May 30, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Mr Hopkins conveyed to me today your proposal for a tripartite meeting. I have no objection to the date – July 15 – suggested by you.

May 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 70

May 30, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of May 29 to hand.

A few hours after it arrived Mr Hopkins called and informed me that President Truman thought July 15 would be the most convenient date for the meeting of the three of us. If it suits you I have no objections.

Best wishes.

May 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 71

June 3, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of June 2 received.

I have already written to you that I agree to July 15 as a perfectly suitable date for the tripartite meeting.

June 3, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 72

June 5, 1945

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

With reference to your message on the desirability of fixing the meeting of the three of us for an earlier date than July 15 I should like to tell you again that July 15 was suggested by President Truman and that I have agreed. In view of the correspondence now being exchanged between you and the President on the matter, I refrain from suggesting a new date for our meeting.

June 5, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 73

June 8, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Thank you for your second message about the Istria-Trieste area. I have also read Mr Harriman’s Note setting forth the proposals of the U.S. and British Governments to the Government of Yugoslavia for a settlement.

I gather from your communication that agreement has been reached in principle between the U.S. and British Governments, on the one hand, and the Yugoslav Government, on the other, concerning the establishment in the Trieste-Istria territory of an Allied Military Administration under the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean. I think, however, that a complete settlement of the situation in Trieste-Istria necessitates agreement with the Yugoslav Government also on the concrete proposals made by the U.S. and British Governments.

Now that the Yugoslav Government has consented to the establishment of an Allied Military Administration in the Trieste-Istria territory it is my hope that nothing will be put in the way of Yugoslav interests being fully met and that a happy solution will be found to the entire problem of the present strained situation in the Trieste-Istria area.

June 8, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 74

June 9, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

I have received your message in reply to my suggestions for resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland and Hungary.

It appears from your message that you, too, consider it desirable to establish normal diplomatic relations with these countries at the earliest possible date. However, I see no reason to show any preference in the matter to Finland which, unlike Roumania or Bulgaria, did not participate on the Allied side in the war against Hitler Germany. Public opinion in the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet command would find it hard to understand if Roumania and Bulgaria, the armed forces of which have played an active part in the defeat of Hitler Germany, were to be placed in a less favourable position compared with Finland.

As regards political regimes, the opportunities for the democratic elements in Roumania and Bulgaria are not less than, say, in Italy, with which the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union have already resumed diplomatic relations. On the other hand, one cannot but notice that in recent times political development in Roumania and Bulgaria has pursued a tranquil course, and I see no signs that could give grounds for disquiet over the future development of democratic principles in these countries. And so, as I see it, there is no need for special Allied measures as far as these countries are concerned.

Hence the Soviet Government holds that resumption of diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland should not be delayed any longer and that the question of Hungary might be considered somewhat later.

June 9, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 75

Sent on June 11, 1945

To the President, Mr H. Truman

The White House, Washington

 

On the third anniversary of the Soviet-American Agreement on the Principles Applying to Mutual Aid in the Prosecution of the War against Aggression, I beg you and the Government of the United States of America to accept this expression of gratitude on behalf of the Soviet Government and myself.

The Agreement, under which the United States of America throughout the war in Europe supplied the Soviet Union, by way of lend-lease, with munitions, strategic materials and food, played an important role and to a considerable degree contributed to the successful conclusion of the war against the common foe – Hitler Germany.

I feel entirely confident that the friendly links between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, strengthened in the course of their joint effort, will continue to develop for the benefit of our peoples and in the interests of durable cooperation between all freedom-loving nations.

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 76

June 14, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for yours of June 10 about resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria and Finland, as well as Hungary. I note that you will shortly let me have your proposals on the point. I still think that resumption of diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria, who together with Soviet troops helped defeat Hitler Germany, should not be delayed any longer. Nor is there any reason to defer resumption of diplomatic relations with Finland, which is fulfilling the armistice terms. As to Hungary, this can be done somewhat later.

June 14, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 77

June 15, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Yours of June 15 to hand. Agree with “Terminal.”

June 15, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 78

June 15, 1945

Personal and Most Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

I am in receipt of your message about preparations for a Soviet-Chinese agreement and your instructions to Mr Hurley. Thank you for the steps you have taken.

June 15, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 79

June 16, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message about the withdrawal of Allied troops in Germany and Austria into their respective zones received.

Regretfully I must tell you that your proposal for beginning the withdrawal of U.S. troops into their zone and moving U.S. troops into Berlin on June 21 is meeting with difficulties, for Marshal Zhukov and other military commanders have been summoned to the Supreme Soviet session which opens in Moscow on June 19, and also to arrange and take part in a parade on June 24. Moreover, some of the districts of Berlin have not yet been cleared of mines, nor can the mine-clearing operations be finished until late June. Since Marshal Zhukov and the other Soviet military commanders will not be able to return to Germany before June 28-30, I should like the beginning of the withdrawal to be put off till July 1, when the commanders will be back at their posts and the mine-clearing finished.

As regards Austria, what I have said about summoning the Soviet commanders to Moscow and the time of their return to their posts applies to that country as well. It is essential, furthermore, that in the next few days the European Advisory Commission should complete its work on establishing the occupation zones in Austria and in Vienna. In view of the foregoing the stationing of the respective forces in the zones assigned to them in Austria should likewise be postponed till July 1.

Besides, in respect of both Germany and Austria we must establish occupation zones right away for the French troops.

We for our part shall take proper steps in Germany and Austria according to the plan set out above.

June 16, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 80

June 17, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message about the withdrawal of Allied forces into their respective zones in Germany and Austria.

I must say regretfully that difficulties have arisen in the matter of beginning the withdrawal of British and U.S. troops into their zones and the moving of British and U.S. troops into Berlin on June 21, as Marshal Zhukov and other military commanders have been summoned to the Supreme Soviet session which opens in Moscow on June 19, and to arrange a parade and take part in it on June 24. They will not be able to return to Berlin until June 28-30. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that mine-clearing operations in Berlin are not yet complete and are not likely to be so before the end of the month.

With regard to Austria I must repeat what I have said about calling the Soviet commanders to Moscow and about the time of their return. It is necessary, furthermore, that in the next few days the European Advisory Commission should complete its work on establishing the occupation zones in Austria and in Vienna, which has yet to be done.

In view of the foregoing I suggest that we put off the beginning of the withdrawal of the respective troops and the placing of them in their zones both in Germany and in Austria till July 1.

Besides, in respect of both Germany and Austria we should even now establish occupation zones for the French troops.

We shall take proper steps in Germany and Austria in keeping with the plan set out above.

I have written about this to President Truman as well.

June 17, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 81

June 18, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Yours of June 14 to hand.

I fully appreciate the motives which make you think it necessary to include Mr Attlee in the British delegation.

June 18, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 82

June 18, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I am in receipt of your message of June 17.

The delegations will be accommodated as anticipated in your message and as was done in the Crimea. Each delegation will have its own enclave with regulations in accordance with the wishes of the head of the delegation. All three delegations will be accommodated in the Babelsberg district, south-east of Potsdam. The Crown Prince’s palace in Potsdam, a fourth building, will be used for joint meetings.

2. Marshal Zhukov will arrive in Berlin on June 28. By that date the advance groups of Montgomery and Eisenhower should be on the spot to inspect and take over the Babelsberg premises. The Montgomery and Eisenhower groups will get all the information and explanations they need concerning the premises from General Kruglov, whom your people know from Yalta.

3. There is a good air field in Kladow, not far from where the delegations will stay, and landings can be made there.

June 18, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 83

June 21, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Although the Yugoslav Government has accepted the U.S. and British Governments’ proposal concerning the Istria-Trieste area, the Trieste negotiations seem to be deadlocked. The main reason is that the representatives of the Allied Command in the Mediterranean refuse to entertain even the minimum wishes of the Yugoslavs, to whom credit is due for liberating the area from the German invaders, an area, moreover, where the Yugoslav population predominates. This situation cannot be considered satisfactory from the Allied point of view.

Being loath to aggravate relations, I have so far in my correspondence refrained from mentioning the conduct of Field Marshal Alexander, but now I must stress that in the course of the negotiations the haughty tone to which Field Marshal Alexander sometimes resorts in relation to the Yugoslavs is inadmissible. It is simply intolerable that Field Marshal Alexander has, in an official public address, permitted himself to compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini. That is unfair and insulting to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Government was also surprised by the peremptory tone of the statement which the Anglo-American representatives made to the Yugoslav Government on June 2. How can one expect to get lasting and positive results by using such methods?

The foregoing compels me to draw your attention to the situation. I still hope that as far as Trieste-Istria is concerned, the Yugoslavs’ rightful interests will be respected, particularly in view of the fact that on the main point the Yugoslavs have met the Allies half-way.

June 21, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 84

June 21, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Although the Yugoslav Government has accepted the U.S. and British Governments’ proposal concerning the Istria-Trieste area, the Trieste negotiations seem to be deadlocked. The main reason is that the representatives of the Allied Command in the Mediterranean refuse to entertain even the minimum wishes of the Yugoslavs, to whom credit is due for liberating the area from the German invaders, an area, moreover, where the Yugoslav population predominates. This situation cannot be considered satisfactory from the Allied point of view.

Being loath to aggravate relations, I have so far in my correspondence refrained from mentioning the conduct of Field Marshal Alexander, but now I must stress that in the course of the negotiations the haughty tone to which Field Marshal Alexander sometimes resorts in relation to the Yugoslavs is inadmissible. It is simply intolerable that Field Marshal Alexander has, in an official public address, permitted himself to compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and Mussolini. That is unfair and insulting to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Government was also surprised by the peremptory tone of the statement which the Anglo-American representatives made to the Yugoslav Government on June 2. How can one expect to get lasting and positive results by using such methods?

The foregoing compels me to draw your attention to the situation. I still hope that as far as Trieste-Istria is concerned, the Yugoslavs’ rightful interests will be respected, particularly in view of the fact that on the main point the Yugoslavs have met the Allies half-way.

June 21, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 85

June 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

I am in receipt of your message of June 19 about resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

I see that you are still studying the matter. As for me I maintain as heretofore that there is no justification for further delay in resuming diplomatic relations with Roumania and Bulgaria.

June 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 86

June 23, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of June 22 about the King visiting Berlin, and your previous message on the same subject, have reached me.

My plan did not envisage a meeting with the King, it had in view the conference of the three of us, on which you, the President and myself had exchanged messages earlier. However, if you think it necessary that I should meet the King, I have no objection to your plan.

June 23, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 87

June 27, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I accept the proposal contained in your message of June 23.

June 27, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 88

July 6, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of June 26 concerning Trieste-Istria and Yugoslavia to hand.

In this matter there are of course points that warrant joint discussion by us. I am prepared to discuss them when we meet in Germany.

July 6, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 89

July 6, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on Trieste-Istria and Yugoslavia received.

I have nothing against discussing this matter at the forthcoming meeting in Germany.

July 6, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 90

July 6, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of July 4 received.

I agree with you about warning the press that its representatives will not be admitted to “Terminal”.

July 6, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 91

July 27, 1945

Personal and Secret

From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to Mr C. Attlee

 

I received your message on July 27. I have no objection to your proposal for holding our conference on Saturday, July 28, at any hour you like.

July 27, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 92

Berlin, July 29, 1945

To Mr Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America

Berlin

 

My dear Mr President,

Your Memorandum of July 27 about German coal, and the copy of your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, have reached me.

The important matter of using German coal to meet European requirements, raised in your Memorandum, will be duly studied. The Government of the United States of America will be informed of the Soviet Government’s view on the subject.

I must say, however, that care should be taken to ensure that the measures for exporting the coal do not give rise to disturbances of any kind in Germany, to which you draw attention in your instructions to Gen. Eisenhower, and I think this is quite feasible and essential from the standpoint of the interests of the Allied countries.

J. Stalin

Berlin, July 29, 1945

 

* * *

 

No. 93

Berlin, July 29, 1945

To Mr Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America

Berlin

 

My dear Mr President,

I have received your message of July 20 about diverting the route of U.S. and Soviet traffic from Tehran to Berlin.

The Soviet Government takes a favourable view of your proposal. The appropriate Soviet authorities have been instructed to discuss with U.S. representatives the technical problems arising out of the proposal.

J. Stalin

Berlin, July 29, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 94

Berlin, July 30, 1945

To Mr Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America

Berlin

 

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of July 30. I feel better today, and expect to be able to attend the Conference tomorrow, July 31.

Very sincerely yours,

J. Stalin

Berlin, July 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 95

Berlin, July 30, 1945

To Mr Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America

Berlin

 

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for sending me your portrait. I shall not fail to send you mine the moment I return to Moscow.

Sincerely yours,

J. Stalin

Berlin, July 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 96

August 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr C. Attlee

 

Your letter of August 1 received. I have nothing against the British Ambassador in Moscow discussing with V. M. Molotov the question of the Soviet citizens who married British subjects during the war leaving for Great Britain.

August 7, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 97

August 12, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the United States, Mr H. Truman

 

I have received your message of August 12 about designating General of the Army Douglas MacArthur Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to accept, coordinate and carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces.

The Soviet Government accepts your proposal and is in agreement with the procedure suggested by you which provides that General MacArthur shall issue to the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters instructions concerning unconditional surrender of the Japanese troops to the Soviet High Commander in the Far East as well. Lieutenant-General Derevyanko has been appointed the representative of the Soviet Military High Command, and has received appropriate directions.

August 12, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 98

August 16, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, H. Truman

 

Your message enclosing General Order Number 1 received. I have nothing against the substance of the order. It is understood that the Liaotung Peninsula is an integral part of Manchuria. However, I suggest amending General Order Number 1 as follows: 1. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to the Soviet troops all the Kurile Islands which according to the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union.

 

2. To include in the area to be surrendered by the Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops the northern half of the Island of Hokkaido adjoining in the north La Perouse Strait, which lies between Karafuto and Hokkaido. To draw the demarcation line between the northern and southern halves of Hokkaido along a line running from the town of Kushiro on the east coast of the island to the town of Rumoe on the west coast of the island, including the said towns in the northern half of the island.

This last point is of special importance to Russian public opinion. As is known, in 1919-21 the Japanese occupied the whole of the Soviet Far East. Russian public opinion would be gravely offended if the Russian troops had no occupation area in any part of the territory of Japan proper.

I am most anxious that the modest suggestions set forth above should not meet with any objections.

August 16, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 99

August 20, 1945

From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Attlee

 

I thank you for your friendly greetings and congratulations on the victory over Japan and in turn congratulate you on the victory. The war against Germany and Japan and our common aims in the struggle against the aggressors have brought the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom closer and have promoted our cooperation, which for many years to come will be based on the treaty of alliance between us.

I am confident that this cooperation, tried in war and in the perils of war, will develop and grow stronger for the benefit of our peoples in the post-war as well.

August 20, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 100

August 22, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your message of August 18 to hand.

I understand your message to imply refusal to accede to the Soviet Union’s request that the northern half of Hokkaido be included in the area of surrender of Japanese armed forces to Soviet troops. I must say that I and my colleagues had not anticipated that such would be your reply.

2. As regards your demand for a permanent air base on one of the Kurile Islands, which, in keeping with the three-Power decision taken in the Crimea, are to pass into the possession of the Soviet Union, I consider it my duty to say the following. First, I must point out that no such measure was envisaged by the tripartite decision either in the Crimea or at Berlin, nor does it in any way follow from the decisions adopted there. Second, demands of this kind are usually laid either before a vanquished country or before an allied country that is unable to defend a particular part of its territory and expresses, therefore, readiness to grant its ally an appropriate base. I do not think the Soviet Union can be classed in either category. Third, since your message furnishes no reasons for the demand that a permanent base be granted, I must tell you in all frankness that neither I nor my colleagues understand the circumstances in which this claim on the Soviet Union could have been conceived.

August 22, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 101

Sent on September 24, 1945

Personal and Secret Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Attlee

 

Your message on the differences over the Council of Ministers has reached me.

V. M. Molotov’s stand on this issue derives from the necessity of faithfully carrying out the Berlin Conference decision, clearly formulated in paragraph 3 (b) of the decision on the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers decision of September 11 runs counter to the Berlin Conference decision mentioned above and is, therefore, inacceptable.

The point, then, is not Council of Ministers procedure, but whether the Council of Foreign Ministers has the right to revoke this or that provision of the Berlin Conference decisions. I think we shall depreciate the Berlin Conference decisions if we for a single moment grant the Council of Foreign Ministers the right to revoke them.

I do not think that rectification of the error committed – a rectification designed to reaffirm the decisions of the Berlin Conference, on which V. M. Molotov insists – can give rise to a negative attitude to the Conference or to the Council of Ministers, or offend anyone.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 102

August 30, 1945

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Truman

 

I am in receipt of your message of August 27. I am glad that the misunderstandings that had crept into our correspondence have been dispelled. While not in the least offended by your proposal, I was taken aback by it, for, as is now plain, I had misunderstood you.

Of course, I agree to your suggestion for granting the United States the right to land on our air fields on one of the Kuriles in emergency cases during the period of occupation of Japan.

I am also in agreement with commercial aircraft being granted landing facilities on a Soviet air field on one of the Kuriles. In this matter the Soviet Government counts on U.S. reciprocity with regard to the right of Soviet commercial planes to land on a U.S. air field on one of the Aleutians. The fact is that the present air route from Siberia to the United States via Canada is not satisfactory on account of its great length. We prefer to have a shorter route between the Kuriles and Seattle by way of the Aleutians as an intermediate point.

August 30, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 103

September 2, 1945

To the President of the United States of America, Mr Truman

 

On the day of the signing of the instrument of surrender by Japan allow me to congratulate you, the Government of the United States of America and the American people on the great victory over Japan.

I salute the Armed Forces of the United States of America on the occasion of their brilliant victory.

J. Stalin

September 2, 1945

 

 

* * *

 

No. 104

Sent on September 23, 1945

From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr Truman

 

Your message received.

I have made inquiries of Molotov but so far have not received a reply. After studying the matter I have arrived at the conclusion that if it is a question of France and China taking part in a Balkans settlement, then, in conformity with the exact meaning of the Berlin Conference decision, the two countries should not be invited to attend.

 

 

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No. 105

Sent on September 23, 1945

From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Your second message about the Council of Ministers has reached me.

Today I have received V. M. Molotov’s reply, which says that he adheres to the Berlin Conference resolution and considers that that resolution should not be violated. For my part I must stress that at the Berlin Conference we neither resolved nor agreed that members of the Council who had not signed the surrender terms could participate in discussions but not vote.

I think that Molotov’s stand in the sense of strict adherence to the Berlin Conference decision cannot make a bad impression or offend anyone.

 

 

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No. 106

October 26, 1945

Personal and Secret from Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr Truman

 

On October 24 Mr Harriman handed me your message. I had two talks with him on matters discussed at the Foreign Ministers’ conference in London. In the course of the talks I replied to all the questions which he, on your directions, raised with me.

October 26, 1945

 

 

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No. 107

November 7, 1945

Personal and Secret from Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr H. Truman

 

I have received your message concerning the withdrawal of U.S. and Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia. I am sorry to say delivery was delayed because of the irregular functioning of the airline between Moscow and Sochi due to weather conditions.

I welcome your proposal for withdrawing the troops in November, all the more as it is in full accord with the Soviet plan for demobilisation and withdrawal of troops. Consequently we may consider that the withdrawal of Soviet and U.S. troops from Czechoslovakia will be completed by December 1.

November 7, 1945

 

 

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No. 108

November 8, 1945

Personal and Secret from Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr C. Attlee

 

I am in receipt of your message about the meeting with President Truman. Thank you for the communication.

November 8, 1945

 

 

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No. 109

Sent on November 15, 1945

From Generalissimo J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr C. Attlee

 

Thank you for your congratulations on the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Soviet State.

 

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No. 110

December 9, 1945

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr H. Truman

 

Thank you for your message of December 8, 1945.

You may rest assured that I, too, should like to cooperate with you so that the forthcoming conference of the three Ministers in Moscow will yield the results desired for the benefit of our common cause.

I shall shortly be in Moscow and am willing to talk with Mr Byrnes in all candour.

December 9, 1945

 

 

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No. 111

December 23, 1945

J. V. Stalin to H. Truman

Most Secret

 

My dear Mr President,

I was glad to receive your message, transmitted to me by Mr Byrnes, in which you dwell on the highly important subjects that we are now discussing. I agree with you that the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States should strive to work together in restoring and maintaining peace, and that we should proceed from the fact that the common interests of our two countries far outweigh certain differences between us.

The conference of the Ministers now in session in Moscow has already yielded good results. The steps taken by you and Mr Byrnes with regard to both Japan and the peace treaties have helped in a big way. We may take it that agreement on these important points has been reached and that the conference has done work that will play a prominent part in establishing proper mutual understanding between our countries in this period of transition from war to peace.

The subject of atomic energy is still under discussion. I hope that on this matter, too, we shall establish unity of views and that by joint effort a decision will be reached that will be satisfactory to both countries and to the other nations.

I take it that you have been informed of my first talk with Mr Byrnes. We shall meet for further talks. But even now I feel I can say that on the whole I am optimistic as to the results of the exchange of views now taking place between us on urgent international problems, and this, I hope, will provide further opportunities for coordinating the policies of our countries on other issues.

I take this opportunity to answer the letter which I recently received from you concerning the arrival of the artist Chandor in Moscow. I have been away from Moscow for a long time and regret to say that in the immediate future I should find it hard, in view of my numerous duties, to give any time to Mr Chandor.

I am, of course, ready to send him my portrait if you think that would be suitable in this instance.

J. Stalin

December 23, 1945

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Stalin