English

 

 

STALIN

1944

 

War Telegrams



 

 

No. 1

January 2, 1944

Personal Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill

 

I shall send you the music of the new Soviet Anthem by the next post. V. M. Molotov has asked me to thank you on his behalf for your greetings and to transmit his best wishes. I fully agree with you about frequent meetings.

January 2, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 2

January 4, 1944

Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt

 

I am glad to learn from the press that your health is improving. I send you best regards and, more important, wish you speedy and complete recovery.

January 4, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 3

January 7, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill

 

Your message of January 5 received. I am glad to learn from you that the preparations for “Overlord” are in full swing and that you will take other measures before the month is out.

 

2. I must say, since you have brought up the matter, that if we are to judge by the latest declaration of the Polish émigré Government and other statements by Polish leaders, we will see that there are no grounds for thinking that these circles can be made to see reason. They are incorrigible.

 

3. Please convey my thanks and good wishes to Lord Beaverbrook.

 

4. Our offensive is still making headway, particularly in the South, although the Germans are resisting desperately wherever they can.

January 7, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 4

January 14, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of January 12 received. Our armies have indeed achieved success of late, but we are still a long way from Berlin. What is more, the Germans are now launching rather serious counter-attacks, particularly east of Vinnitsa. There is no danger in that, of course, but they have succeeded in pushing back our advanced units there and in temporarily checking our progress. Hence you should not slacken, but intensify the bombing of Berlin as much as possible. By the time we all arrive in Berlin the Germans will have had a chance to rebuild certain premises that you and we here shall need.

Your message to Tito, whom you are encouraging so much with your support, will be of great importance.

I hope your preparations jointly with the Americans for “Overlord” are making good progress.

January 14, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 5

January 20, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Prime Minister W. Churchill

 

Thank you for informing me of your decision to send an additional convoy of 20 ships to the Soviet Union in mid-March over and above those provided for earlier. They will be of great value to our front.

January 20, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 6

January 29, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill, and the President, Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt

 

The joint messages signed by you, Mr Prime Minister, and you, Mr President, concerning the transfer of Italian vessels to the Soviet Union, arrived on January 23.

I must say that after getting your joint favourable reply to my question in Tehran about transferring Italian ships to the Soviet Union before the end of January 1944 I had considered the matter settled; it never occurred to me that that decision reached and agreed to by the three of us could be revised in any way. All the more so because we agreed at the time that the matter would be fully settled with the Italians during December and January. Now I see that this is not the case and that nothing has been said to the Italians on this score.

However, in order not to delay settlement of this matter, which is so vitally important to our common fight against Germany, the Soviet Union is willing to accept your proposal for the battleship Royal Sovereign and one cruiser being transferred from British ports to the U.S.S.R. and for the Soviet Naval Command using the two ships temporarily, until corresponding Italian ships can be made available to the Soviet Union. In the same way we are ready to accept from the U.S.A. and Britain 20,000 tons of merchant shipping apiece, which we shall likewise use until we are provided with the same amount of Italian shipping. The important thing is that there should no longer be any delay in the matter and that the ships mentioned above be handed over to us before the end of February.

However, there is no mention in your reply of the transfer to the Soviet Union at the end of January of the eight Italian destroyers and four submarines to which you, Mr Prime Minister, and you, Mr President, consented in Tehran. Yet this question of destroyers and submarines is of paramount importance to the Soviet Union, for without them the transfer of one battleship and one cruiser would be pointless. You will agree that cruisers and battleships are powerless unless accompanied by destroyers. As the whole of the Italian Navy is at your disposal, it should not be difficult for you to carry out the Tehran decision for the transfer of eight destroyers and four submarines from the Navy to the Soviet Union. I also agree to accept, instead of Italian destroyers and submarines, as many U.S. or British destroyers and submarines for the Soviet Union. The transfer of the destroyers and submarines should not be delayed, it should be effected simultaneously with the transfer of the battleship and cruiser, as the three of us agreed in Tehran.

January 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 7

January 29, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill

 

I have received your message of January 24.

I am a little late with this reply due to the pressure of front affairs.

As regards the Pravda report, its significance should not be overrated, nor is there any reason to question the right of a newspaper to carry reports or rumours received from tried and tested correspondents. In any case we Russians have never laid claim to that kind of interference in the affairs of the British press, even though we have had, and still have, far more reasons for doing so. Our TASS denies only a very small part of the reports printed in British newspapers and deserving to be denied.

To come to the gist of the matter, I cannot agree with you that Britain could easily have made a separate peace with Germany, largely at the expense of the U.S.S.R. and without serious loss to the British Empire. I think that that was said rashly, for I recall statements of a different nature made by you. I recall, for example, that when Britain was in difficulties, before the Soviet Union became involved in the war against Germany, you believed that the British Government might have to move to Canada and fight Germany across the ocean. On the other hand, you admitted that it was the Soviet Union which, by engaging Hitler, eliminated the danger which undoubtedly threatened Great Britain on the part of Germany. But if, nevertheless, we grant that Britain could have managed without the U.S.S.R., exactly the same could be said about the Soviet Union. I should have preferred not to bring this up, but I had to do so to remind you of the facts.

Concerning War and the Working Class all I can say is that it is a trade-union magazine for whose articles the Government cannot be held responsible. However, this magazine, like our other magazines, is loyal to the fundamental principle – closer friendship with the Allies – which does not preclude but presupposes friendly criticism as well.

Like you I was favourably impressed by our meetings in Tehran and our joint work.

I will certainly see Mr Kerr when he arrives.

January 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 8

February 4, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Winston Churchill

 

Your message on the Polish question has reached me through Mr Kerr who arrived in Moscow a few days ago and with whom I had a useful talk.

I see you are giving a good deal of attention to the problem of Soviet-Polish relations. All of us greatly appreciate your efforts.

I have the feeling that the very first question which must be completely cleared up even now is that of the Soviet-Polish frontier. You are right, of course, in noting that on this point Poland should be guided by the Allies. As for the Soviet Government, it has already stated, openly and clearly, its views on the frontier question. We have stated that we do not consider the 1939 boundary final, and have agreed to the Curzon Line, thereby making very important concessions to the Poles. Yet the Polish Government has evaded our proposal for the Curzon Line and in its official statements continues to maintain that the frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty is final. I infer from your letter that the Polish Government is prepared to recognise the Curzon Line, but, as is known, the Poles have not made such a statement anywhere.

I think the Polish Government should officially state in a declaration that the boundary line established by the Riga Treaty shall be revised and that the Curzon Line is the new boundary line between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. It should state that as officially as the Soviet Government has done by declaring that the 1939 boundary line shall be revised and that the Soviet-Polish frontier should follow the Curzon Line.

As regards your statement to the Poles that Poland could considerably extend her frontiers in the West and North, we are in agreement with that with, as you are aware, one amendment. I mentioned the amendment to you and the President in Tehran. We claim the transfer of the north-eastern part of East Prussia, including the port of Königsberg as an ice-free one, to the Soviet Union. It is the only German territory claimed by us. Unless this minimum claim of the Soviet Union is met, the Soviet Union’s concession in recognising the Curzon Line becomes entirely pointless, as I told you in Tehran.

Lastly, about the composition of the Polish Government. I think you realise that we cannot re-establish relations with the present Polish Government. Indeed, what would be the use of re-establishing relations with it when we are not at all certain that tomorrow we shall not be compelled to sever those relations again on account of another fascist provocation on its part, such as the “Katyn affair”? Throughout the recent period the Polish Government, in which the tone is set by Sosnkowski, has not desisted from statements hostile to the Soviet Union. The extremely anti-Soviet statements of the Polish Ambassadors in Mexico and Canada and of Gen. Anders in the Middle East, the hostility displayed towards the Soviet Union by Polish underground publications in German-occupied territory, a hostility which transcends all bounds, the annihilation, on directions from the Polish Government, of Polish guerrillas fighting the Hitler invaders, these and many other pro-fascist actions of the Polish Government are known. That being so, no good can be expected unless the composition of the Polish Government is thoroughly improved. On the other hand, the removal from it of pro-fascist imperialist elements and the inclusion of democratic-minded people would, one is entitled to hope, create the proper conditions for normal Soviet- Polish relations, for solving the problem of the Soviet-Polish frontier and, in general, for the rebirth of Poland as a strong, free and independent state. Those interested in improving the composition of the Polish Government along these lines are primarily the Poles themselves, the broad sections of the Polish people. By the way, last May you wrote to me saying that the composition of the Polish Government could be improved and that you would work towards that end. You did not at that time think that this would be interference in Poland’s internal sovereignty.

With reference to the questions posed by the Polish Ministers and mentioned in paragraph 4 of your letter I think there will be no difficulty in reaching agreement on them.

February 4, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 9

February 11, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I received your message on February 9.

Thank you for your congratulations. Our troops are still pushing on in some sectors, but the Germans are doggedly counter-attacking.

I have read your communication on Italy. I hope for an improvement in the Allies’ position in the near future. The Soviet Government is grateful to you for the information on the despatch of another additional convoy to the U.S.S.R. in March.

Please accept my best wishes.

February 11, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 10

February 16, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt

 

Your message on the Polish question to hand. It goes without saying that a correct solution of this problem is of great importance both to the U.S.S.R. and to our common cause.

There are two major points to be considered: first, the Soviet- Polish frontier and, second, the composition of the Polish Government. The Soviet Government’s point of view is familiar to you from its recently published statements and from V. M. Molotov’s letter in reply to Mr Hull’s Note, received in Moscow through the Soviet Ambassador, Gromyko, on January 22.

First of all, about the Soviet-Polish frontier. As you know, the Soviet Government has officially declared that it does not consider the 1939 boundary final, and has agreed to the Curzon Line. In stating this we have made quite important concessions to the Poles on the frontier question. We had grounds for anticipating an appropriate declaration on the part of the Polish Government. It should have officially declared that the frontier established by the Riga Treaty would be revised and that it accepts the Curzon Line as the new frontier line between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. It should have made an official declaration on recognition of the Curzon Line just as the Soviet Government has done. But the Polish Government in London refused to budge, and continued to insist in official statements that the frontier imposed upon us under the Riga Treaty at a difficult moment should be left unchanged. Hence, there is no basis for agreement, for the standpoint of the present Polish Government, as we see, precludes agreement.

In view of this circumstance the question of the composition of the Polish Government has likewise become more acute. It is clear that the Polish Government, in which the main role is played by pro-fascist, imperialist elements hostile to the Soviet Union, such as Sosnkowski, and in which there are hardly any democratic elements, can have no basis in Poland, nor, as experience has shown, can it establish friendly relations with democratic neighbouring countries. Clearly, such a Polish Government is incapable of establishing friendly relations with the Soviet Union and it cannot be anticipated that it will not sow discord among the democratic countries which, on the contrary, would like to strengthen their unity. It follows that a radical improvement in the composition of the Polish Government is an urgent matter.

I had to delay reply, being busy at the front.

February 16, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 11

February 21, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to Prime Minister W. Churchill

 

Your message of February 19 received. Thank you for the communications.

I must at the same time point out that so far I have had no reply on the eight British and U.S. destroyers and other ships, which were to be put at Soviet disposal temporarily in exchange for Italian warships and merchant vessels, as agreed in Tehran by you, the President and myself. I cannot understand the long delay.

I await a reply to my message of January 29.

February 21, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 12

February 21, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. D. Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your message of February 18. Thank you for the news.

It does not, however, exhaust the matter as it says nothing about Anglo-American destroyers and submarines in lieu of the Italian ones – eight destroyers and four submarines – as decided at Tehran. I look forward to an early reply on these points mentioned in my message of January 29.

February 21, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 13

February 23, 1944

Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President Roosevelt

 

I have received your message with congratulations on the latest successes of the Soviet forces. Please accept my thanks for your friendly wishes.

February 23, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 14

February 26, 1944

Secret and Personal

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, and the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I received on February 24 your two messages, including the one of February 7 concerning the Italian ships. I have also read Mr Kerr’s letter on the matter, addressed to V. M. Molotov.

My thanks to you and the President for the news about the temporary transfer to the Soviet Union of eight destroyers and four submarines, as well as a battleship and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by Great Britain and a cruiser and 20,000 tons of merchant shipping by the United States. Mr Kerr has expressly warned us that all the destroyers are old ones so that I have misgivings about their combat qualities. It seems to me that the British and U.S. Navies should find no difficulty in assigning, out of the eight destroyers, at least four modern, not old, ones. I still hope that you and the President will find it possible to transfer at least four modern destroyers. As a result of military operations by Germany and Italy we have lost a substantial part of our destroyers. It is, therefore, very important for us to have that loss repaired at least in part.

February 26, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 15

Sent on February 28, 1944

To Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America

The White House, Washington

 

Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your friendly congratulations on the 26th anniversary of the Red Army and the successes achieved by the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the struggle against the Hitler invaders.

I am firmly convinced that the day is not far off when the successful struggle of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union jointly with the Armies of the United States and Great Britain will, on the basis of the agreements reached at Moscow and Tehran, result in the final defeat of our common foe, Hitler Germany.

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 16

Sent on February 29, 1944

Message from Marshal J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Please accept my thanks and the thanks of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union for your congratulations on the 26th anniversary of the Red Army and for your high praise of its achievements in the struggle against our common foe, Hitler Germany.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 17

March 3, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Much as I should like to react favourably to Mr Churchill’s message about the Poles – a message you are familiar with – I feel obliged to say that the Polish émigré Government does not want normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to say that the Polish émigrés in London not only reject the Curzon Line, they also claim Lvov, and Vilna, the Lithuanian capital.

All I can say is that the time is not yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Polish-Soviet relations. For your information I enclose my reply to Mr Churchill on this matter.

March 3, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 18

March 3, 1944

Secret and Personal

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Both messages of February 20 on the Polish question reached me through Mr Kerr on February 27.

Now that I have read the detailed record of your conversations with the leaders of the Polish émigré Government, I am more convinced than ever that men of their type are incapable of establishing normal relations with the U.S.S.R. Suffice it to point out that they, far from being ready to recognise the Curzon Line, claim both Lvov and Vilna. As regards the desire to place certain Soviet territories under foreign control, we cannot agree to discuss such encroachments, for, as we see it, the mere posing of the question is an affront to the Soviet Union.

I have already written to the President that the time is not yet ripe for a solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations. I am compelled to reaffirm the soundness of this conclusion. March 3, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 19

March 6, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. D. Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your communication on the statement made at the press conference in Washington concerning the transfer of a number of Italian vessels or their equivalent of U.S. and British shipping to the Soviet Union. Thank you.

March 6, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 20

March 10, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr Roosevelt

 

Your message on post-war economic cooperation to hand. The problems of international economic cooperation, raised in Mr Hull’s Memorandum, are undoubtedly of great importance and merit attention. I think it quite timely to set up a United Nations staff to study them and to specify ways and means of examining the various aspects of international economic cooperation in keeping with the decisions of the Moscow and Tehran conferences.

March 10, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 21

March 13, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for your information about the latest convoy, which has delivered badly-needed cargoes to the Soviet Union. I was deeply satisfied to learn from your telegram that the convoy sunk four enemy U-boats en route.

March 13, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 22

March 16, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on the Polish question, dated March 7, reached me through Mr Kerr on March 12.

Thank you for the elucidations you offer in the message.

Although our correspondence is considered secret and personal, for some time past the contents of my messages to you have been getting into the British press and with serious distortions at that, distortions which I am not in a position to rebut. That, as I see it, is a violation of secrecy. This circumstance makes it difficult for me to speak my mind freely. You will, I hope, appreciate the point.

March 16, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 23

March 17, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill and the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message concerning the transfer of eight destroyers to the Soviet Union by the British Government. I am ready to agree that the said destroyers are quite fit for escort service, but surely you realise that the Soviet Union also needs destroyers fit for other combat operations. The Allies’ right to dispose of the Italian Navy is absolutely beyond question, of course, and this should be made clear to the Italian Government, especially as regards the Italian ships which are to be transferred to the Soviet Union.

March 17, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 24

March 20, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message setting forth the draft of your letter to the President of Turkey about Turkish deliveries of chrome to Germany.

The representation you suggest making to the Turks is, I think, most timely, although I must say that I have little hope of positive results.

March 20, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No.25

March 23, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Since Mr Churchill has sent you, as he tells me, a copy of his March 21 message to me on the Polish question, I think it proper to send, for your information, a copy of my reply to his message.

Copy enclosed.

March 23, 1944

 

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have lately received two messages from you on the Polish question and have read the statement made by Mr Kerr on the question to V. M. Molotov on instructions from you. I have not been able to reply earlier as front affairs often keep me away from non-military matters.

I shall now answer point by point.

I was struck by the fact that both your message and particularly Kerr’s statement bristle with threats against the Soviet Union. I should like to call your attention to this circumstance because threats as a method are not only out of place in relations between Allies, but also harmful, for they may lead to opposite results.

The Soviet Union’s efforts to uphold and implement the Curzon Line are referred to in one of your messages as a policy of force. This implies that you are now trying to describe the Curzon Line as unlawful and the struggle for it as unjust. I totally disagree with you. I must point out that at Tehran you the President and myself were agreed that the Curzon Line was lawful.

At that time you considered the Soviet Government’s stand on the issue quite correct, and said it would be crazy for representatives of the Polish émigré Government to reject the Curzon Line. But now you maintain something to the contrary.

Does this mean that you no longer recognise what we agreed on in Tehran and are ready to violate the Tehran agreement? I have no doubt that had you persevered in your Tehran stand the conflict with the Polish émigré Government could have been settled. As for me and the Soviet Government, we still adhere to the Tehran standpoint, and we have no intention of going back on it, for we believe implementation of the Curzon Line to be evidence, not of a policy of force, but of a policy of re-establishing the Soviet Union’s legitimate right to those territories, which even Curzon and the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers recognised as non-Polish in 1919.

You say in your message of March 7 that the problem of the Soviet-Polish frontier will have to be put off till the armistice conference is convened. I think there is a misunderstanding here. The Soviet Union is not waging nor does it intend to wage war against Poland. It has no conflict with the Polish people and considers itself an ally of Poland and the Polish people. That is why it is shedding its blood to free Poland from German oppression. It would be strange, therefore, to speak of an armistice between the U.S.S.R. and Poland. But the Soviet Union is in conflict with the Polish émigré Government, which does not represent the interests of the Polish people or express their aspirations. It would be stranger still to identify Poland with the Polish émigré Government in London, a government isolated from Poland. I even find it hard to tell the difference between Poland’s émigré Government and the Yugoslav émigré Government, which is akin to it, or between certain generals of the Polish émigré Government and the Serb General Mihajlović.

In your message of March 21 you tell me of your intention to make a statement in the House of Commons to the effect that all territorial questions must await the armistice or peace conferences of the victorious Powers and that in the meantime you cannot recognise any forcible transferences of territory. As I see it you make the Soviet Union appear as being hostile to Poland, and virtually deny the liberation nature of the war waged by the Soviet Union against German aggression. That is tantamount to attributing to the Soviet Union something which is non-existent, and, thereby, discrediting it. I have no doubt that the peoples of the Soviet Union and world public opinion will evaluate your statement as a gratuitous insult to the Soviet Union.

To be sure you are free to make any statement you like in the House of Commons – that is your business. But should you make a statement of this nature I shall consider that you have committed an unjust and unfriendly act in relation to the Soviet Union.

In your message you express the hope that the break-down over the Polish question will not affect our cooperation in other spheres. As far as I am concerned, I have been, and still am, for cooperation. But I fear that the method of intimidation and defamation, if continued, will not benefit our cooperation.

March 23, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 26

March 25, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I share your desire for cooperation between our two Governments in studying economic and social problems linked with improving the welfare of labour on an international scale. The Soviet Union cannot, however, send representatives to the International Labour Organisation conference in Philadelphia for the reasons set forth in the letter to Mr Harriman, because the Soviet trade unions are opposed to participation in it, and the Soviet Government cannot but take account of the opinion of the trade unions.

It goes without saying that if the International Labour Organisation were to become an agency of the United Nations, not of the League of Nations with which the Soviet Union cannot associate itself, Soviet participation would be possible. I hope that this will become feasible and the appropriate steps taken in the near future.

March 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 27

March 25, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have had a rigorous check made on your communication that correspondence between you and me had been divulged, through the fault of the Soviet Embassy in London, in particular Ambassador F. T. Gusev. The verification showed that neither the Embassy as such nor F. T. Gusev personally is to, blame in the least and, in fact, does not even have some of the documents the contents of which were divulged by British newspapers. In other words, the leak came from the British, not the Soviet side. Gusev is willing for any investigation to prove that neither he nor any member of his staff has had anything to do with divulging the contents of our correspondence. It appears that you have been misled as to Gusev and the Soviet Embassy.

March 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 28

March 28, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your message advising me that passports have been issued to Dr. Lange and Father Orlemański. Although Soviet transport facilities are greatly overtaxed, we shall make transport available for Lange and Orlemański. The Soviet Government regards the Lange and Orlemański visit to the Soviet Union as a visit by two private persons.

March 28, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 29

April 6, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message about the International Labour Organisation reached me on April 4. Thank you for reply. I believe that implementation of measures for reconstructing the International Labour Organisation will pave the way for future Soviet participation in its work.

April 6, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 30

April 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill and the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message of April 18 received.

The Soviet Government is satisfied to learn that in accordance with the Tehran agreement the sea crossing will take place at the appointed time, which Generals Deane and Burrows have already imparted to our General Staff, and that you will be acting at full strength. I am confident that the planned operation will be a success.

I hope that the operations you are undertaking in Italy will likewise be successful.

As agreed in Tehran, the Red Army will launch a new offensive at the same time so as to give maximum support to the Anglo-American operations.

Please accept my thanks for the good wishes you have expressed on the occasion of the Red Army’s success. I subscribe to your statement that your armies and our own, supporting each other, will defeat the Hitlerites and thus fulfil their historic mission.

April 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 31

April 29, 1944

To Mr Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America

The White House, Washington

 

Please accept the sincere condolences of the Soviet Government on the occasion of the grievous loss suffered by the United States through the death of Franklin Knox, U.S. Secretary of the Navy.

J. Stalin

April 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 32

Sent on May 6, 1944

To Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the United States of America

 

Dear friend,

Thank you very much for helping Father Stanislaw Orlemański to obtain permission to come to Moscow.

I wish you good health and success.

Sincerely yours,

Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 33

May 8, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of May 3 received.

The organisation of the convoys which delivered their cargoes to Soviet northern ports is indeed worthy of recognition and approval. I thank you for the exceptional attention you have devoted to this matter. Would you mind if the Soviet Government were to confer an Order on Mr Lyttelton for his great services? We would gladly award decorations to others as well, who have distinguished themselves in organising and sailing convoys.

I am pleased to learn from your communication that you have issued instructions to study the question of sending the further convoys of which we are still badly in need.

I realise how much your attention is now riveted to “Overlord,” which is bound to call for tremendous exertion, but which also holds out the promise of tremendous gains for the entire course of the war.

Best wishes.

May 8, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 34

May 15, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill and the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your Joint message received. You can best decide how and in what way to allocate your forces. The important thing, of course, is to ensure complete success for “Overlord.” I express confidence also in the success of the offensive launched in Italy.

May 15, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 35

May 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of May 19 has reached me.

As you say, I shall await your final communication with regard to Mr Lyttelton and the other persons eligible for decoration.

Congratulations on the successful Allied offensive in Italy, under Gen. Alexander. The important thing now is to ensure that the Allied operations against the German forces in Italy should indeed keep considerable German forces away from “Overlord.”

I have read your telegram to Marshal Tito. I, too, welcome the good relations between our Missions in Yugoslavia, and I hope they will continue so.

May 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 36

May 26, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your communication on a statement to the people of Germany has reached me.

In view of the experience of the war against the Germans and the German character I do not think that your suggested statement would have a positive effect, seeing that it is to be synchronised with the beginning of the landing and not with the moment when the Anglo-American landing and the forthcoming offensive of the Soviet armies will have registered notable success.

As to the nature of the statement, we can return to this when circumstances favour publication.

May 26, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 37

May 26, 1944

Personal and Secret

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I am obliged to you for the information on the battle in Italy, contained in your latest message. We are watching your successes with admiration.

We are greatly encouraged by your news on the “Overlord” preparations now in full swing. What is most important is that the British and U.S. troops are so full of resolve.

I welcome your readiness to resume later the programme for Arctic convoys.

Thank you for your congratulations. We are preparing might and main for new major operations.

May 26, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 38

May 30, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for your latest message on the battle in Italy. We, too, hope for its successful conclusion, which is bound to facilitate the efforts involved in “Overlord.” We wish you further success.

May 30, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 39

May 30, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message informing me that you have decided not to do anything in the way of a statement to the German people at the present time has reached me.

Thank you for the communication.

May 30, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 40

June 5, 1944

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I congratulate you on the taking of Rome – a grand victory for the Allied Anglo-American troops. The news has caused deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

June 5, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 41

June 5, 1944

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the President of the U.S.A., Mr Roosevelt

 

I congratulate you on the taking of Rome – a grand victory for the Allied Anglo-American troops.

The news has caused deep satisfaction in the Soviet Union.

June 5, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 42

Sent on June 7, 1944

Secret and Personal to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

I feel it necessary to let you know that on June 6, in reply to a message from Mr Churchill I sent the following personal message about the plan for a Soviet summer offensive.

“Your communication on the successful launching of ‘Overlord’ has reached me. It is a source of joy to us all and of hope for further successes.

“The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, to be launched in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran Conference, will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the front. The general offensive will develop by stages, through consecutive engagement of the armies in offensive operations. Between late June and the end of July operations will turn into a general offensive of the Soviet troops.

“I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the operations.

“June 6, 1944.”

 

 

* * *

 

No. 43

June 6, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your communication on the successful launching of “Overlord” has reached me. It is a source of joy to us all and of hope for further successes.

The summer offensive of the Soviet troops, to be launched in keeping with the agreement reached at the Tehran Conference, will begin in mid-June in one of the vital sectors of the front. The general offensive will develop by stages, through consecutive engagement of the armies in offensive operations. Between late June and the end of July the operations will turn into a general offensive of the Soviet troops.

I shall not fail to keep you posted about the course of the operations.

June 6, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 44

June 9, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of June 7 informing me of the successful development of “Overlord.” We all salute you and the gallant British and U.S. troops and sincerely wish you further success.

Preparations for the summer offensive of the Soviet troops are nearing completion. Tomorrow, June 10, we begin the first round on the Leningrad front.

June 9, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 45

June 11, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message on the resignation of Badoglio. To me, too, his resignation came as a surprise. I thought that without the consent of the Allies – the British and Americans – Badoglio could not be removed and replaced by Bonomi. However, it appears from your message that this has happened against the will of the Allies. It is to be expected that certain Italian circles will try to change the armistice terms in their favour. Be that as it may, if circumstances suggest to you and the Americans that Italy should have a Government different from that of Bonomi, you may rest assured that the Soviet side will raise no obstacles.

 

2. I have also received your message of June 10. Thank you for the information. It appears that the landing, planned on a tremendous scale, has been crowned with success. I and my colleagues cannot but recognise that this is an enterprise unprecedented in military history as to scale, breadth of conception and masterly execution. As is known, Napoleon’s plan for crossing the Channel failed disgracefully. Hitler the hysteric, who for two years had boasted that he would cross the Channel, did not venture even to make an attempt to carry out his threat. None but our Allies have been able to fulfil with flying colours the grand plan for crossing the Channel. History will record this as a feat of the highest order.

June 11, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 46

June 15, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on June 14 received.

I think you are right in proposing that the question of a new Italian Cabinet be examined preliminarily by the Advisory Council for Italy so that our three Governments can arrive at a common view on the matter.

I have read with great interest your news about the military operations in Northern France. All success to the planned encirclement of Caen and to the further development of the operations in Normandy.

Thank you for your good wishes for the success of our offensive. Our operations are developing according to plan and will be of vital importance to the whole of our common Allied front.

June 15, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 47

June 21, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for the news that you and the President plan to resume northern convoys to the Soviet Union about August 10. This will help us considerably.

As regards Italian affairs, I presume that you are already familiar with the Advisory Council resolution on the new Italian Government. The Soviet Government has no objection to the resolution.

We are all happy about the progress of the operations by the British and U.S. troops in Normandy, which have already assumed such a vast scale. With all my heart I wish your troops further success.

 

2. The second round of the summer offensive of the Soviet forces will begin within a week. The offensive will involve 130 divisions, including armoured ones. I and my colleagues expect important success from it and I hope it will be a substantial help to the Allied operations in France and in Italy.

June 21, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 48

June 21, 1944

Secret and Personal to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

I am in a position to inform you that not later than a week from now the Soviet armies will start the second round of their offensive. It will involve 130 divisions, including armoured ones. I and my colleagues anticipate important success. I hope that it will be a substantial help to the Allied operations in France and Italy.

June 21, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 49

Moscow, June 24, 1944

Secret and Personal to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

Thank you for informing me of your meeting with Mr Mikolajczyk.

If we have in view military cooperation between the Red Army and the Polish underground forces fighting the Hitler invaders, that, undoubtedly, is vital to the final defeat of our common enemy. Certainly, the proper solution of the problem of Soviet-Polish relations is of great importance in this respect. You are aware of the Soviet Government’s point of view and of its desire to see Poland strong, independent and democratic, and Soviet-Polish relations good-neighbourly and based on lasting friendship. A vital condition for this, in the view of the Soviet Government, is a reconstruction of the Polish émigré Government that would ensure participation of Polish leaders in Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., and more particularly of Polish democratic leaders inside Poland, plus recognition by the Polish Government of the Curzon Line as the new frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Poland.

I must say, however, that Mr Mikolajczyk’s Washington statement makes it appear that he has not made a step forward on this point. Hence at the moment I find it hard to express an opinion about a visit to Moscow by Mr Mikolajczyk.

We all greatly appreciate your attention to Soviet-Polish relations and your efforts in this field.

Moscow, June 24, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 50

June 27, 1944

Personal for the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Please accept my warmest congratulations on the liberation of Cherbourg from the German invaders. I salute the valiant British and U.S. troops on the occasion of their brilliant success.

J. Stalin

June 27, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 51

June 27, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of June 25 received.

Meanwhile the Allied troops have liberated Cherbourg, thus crowning their efforts in Normandy with another major victory. I welcome the continuing success of the gallant British and U.S. troops who are developing their operations both in Northern France and in Italy.

While the scale of the operations in Northern France is becoming more and more powerful and menacing for Hitler, the successful development of the Allied offensive in Italy, too, is worthy of the greatest attention and praise. We wish you further success.

With regard to our offensive I may say that we shall give the Germans no respite, but shall go on extending the front of our offensive operations, increasing the force of our drive against the German armies. You will agree, I suppose, that this is essential for our common cause.

As to Hitler’s flying bomb, this weapon, as we see, cannot seriously affect either the operations in Normandy or the population of London whose courage is a matter of record.

June 27, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 52

June 27, 1944

Secret and Personal to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

Your message about the two scrolls for Stalingrad and Leningrad has reached me. They were handed to me by Ambassador Harriman and will be forwarded to their destinations.

Upon receiving the scrolls I made the following statement:

“I accept President Roosevelt’s scrolls as a symbol of the fruitful cooperation between our two countries in the name of the freedom of our nations and of human progress.

“The scrolls will be handed to the representatives of Leningrad and Stalingrad.”

 

2. Please accept my heartfelt gratitude for your high commendation of the efforts exerted by Stalingrad and Leningrad in the struggle against the German invaders.

June 27, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 53

June 27, 1944

Personal for the President, Mr F. D. Roosevelt

 

Please accept my warm congratulations on the liberation of Cherbourg from the German invaders. I salute the valiant U.S. and British troops on the occasion of their splendid success.

J. Stalin

June 27, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 54

June 30, 1944

Secret and Personal to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

I thank you on my own behalf and on behalf of the Red Army for your congratulations on the liberation of Vitebsk by Soviet troops.

June 30, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 55

July 4, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of July 1 received.

I am grateful for your high praise of the successes of the Red Army, which is now fighting the second round of its summer offensive.

We are all confident that the temporary difficulties in Normandy of which you write will not prevent the British and U.S. forces from making good use of their superiority over the enemy in aircraft and armour, from further exploiting the success of their offensive operations.

Regards and best wishes from us all.

July 4, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 56

July 7, 1944

Personal for the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

Thank you for your warm greetings on the occasion of the capture of Minsk by the Soviet troops.

July 7, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 57

July 11, 1944

Personal for the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill, from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

I congratulate you on the glorious victory of the British troops who have liberated Caen.

July 11, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 58

July 15, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of July 12 received.

With regard to the question of Roumania and Greece there is no need to repeat what you already know from correspondence between our Ambassador in London and Mr Eden. One thing is clear to me, that the U.S. Government has certain doubts about this matter, and we shall do well to return to the matter when we get the U.S. reply. I shall write to you on the subject again the moment we get the U.S. Government’s comments.

 

2. The question of Turkey should be examined in the light of the facts with which the Governments of Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. have been familiar since the negotiations with the Turkish Government at the end of last year. You will no doubt recall how insistently the Governments of our three countries proposed that Turkey should enter the war against Hitler Germany on the side of the Allies as early as November and December 1943. But nothing came of this. As you know, on the initiative of the Turkish Government we resumed negotiations with it last May and June, and twice made the same proposal that the three Allied Governments made at the end of last year. Nothing came of that, either. As regards any half-hearted step by Turkey I do not at the moment see how it can benefit the Allies. In view of the evasive and vague attitude which the Turkish Government has assumed in relation to Germany it is better to leave Turkey to herself and to refrain from any further pressure on her. This implies, of course, that the claims of Turkey, who has evaded fighting Germany, to special rights in post-war affairs will be disregarded.

 

3. We should like to comply with your request, stated in your message of July 13, concerning the experimental station at Debice in the event of it falling into our hands. Please specify which Debice you mean, for I understand there are several places with that name in Poland.

 

4. Thank you for the information on the situation in Normandy and Italy and for the congratulations on our advance in the Vilna area.

July 15, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 59

July 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I share your opinion about the desirability of a meeting between you, Mr Churchill and myself.

I must say, however, that now, with the Soviet armies deeply involved in fighting along so vast a front, it is impossible for me to leave the country and withdraw myself for any length of time from direction of front affairs. My colleagues consider it absolutely impossible.

July 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 60

July 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

In connection with your latest message I have given proper instructions on the experimental station in Debice. General Slavin, a General Staff representative, will establish the necessary contact on this matter with Generals Burrows and Deane. I appreciate the British Government’s great interest in this matter. I promise, therefore, to take personal care of the matter so as to do all that can be done according to your wishes.

I was deeply satisfied to learn from you that your troops in Normandy have broken into the German rear. I wish you further success.

July 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 61

July 23, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I am sending you for your information the text of my message to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, on the Polish question.

July 23, 1944

 

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of July 20 received. I am now writing to you on the Polish question only.

Events on our front are going forward at a very rapid pace. Lublin, one of Poland’s major towns, was taken today by our troops, who continue their advance.

In this situation we find ourselves confronted with the practical problem of administration on Polish territory. We do not want to, nor shall we, set up our own administration on Polish soil, for we do not wish to interfere in Poland’s internal affairs. That is for the Poles themselves to do. We have, therefore, seen fit to get in touch with the Polish Committee of National Liberation, recently set up by the National Council of Poland, which was formed in Warsaw at the end of last year, and consisting of representatives of democratic parties and groups, as you must have been informed by your Ambassador in Moscow. The Polish Committee of National Liberation intends to set up an administration on Polish territory, and I hope this will be done. We have not found in Poland other forces capable of establishing a Polish administration. The so-called underground organisations, led by the Polish Government in London, have turned out to be ephemeral and lacking influence. As to the Polish Committee, I cannot consider it a Polish Government, but it may be that later on it will constitute the core of a Provisional Polish Government made up of democratic forces.

As for Mikolajczyk, I shall certainly not refuse to see him. It would be better, however, if he were to approach the Polish National Committee, who are favourably disposed towards him.

July 23, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 62

July 26, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I fully agree with you about decorating, besides Mr Lyttelton, Lord Beaverbrook who has contributed so much to the successful running of the convoys and indeed deserves a high reward. The Soviet Government will propose to the Supreme Soviet that Lord Beaverbrook and Mr Lyttelton be decorated with the Order of Suvorov First Class. The Soviet Government shares your idea of decorating men of lower rank, who have distinguished themselves in organising and sailing the convoys, and has assigned for the purpose a hundred and twenty Orders and fifty medals. A specific communication on the matter will be sent through diplomatic channels.

 

2. I was pleased to learn from your message about the August convoy, to be followed, as you write, by a new cycle of convoys, which we need badly.

 

3. As regards a meeting between you, Mr Roosevelt and myself, also mentioned in your message of July 24, I rather think that a meeting is desirable. But now that the Soviet armies are fighting along so extended a front and expanding their offensive, I am unable to leave the Soviet Union, to relinquish the leadership of the armies, even for a short time. My colleagues think this absolutely impossible.

 

4. You tell me about the planned new offensive in Normandy. If launched it will be of tremendous importance in the situation in which Germany finds herself and will make Hitler’s plight pretty sore indeed.

 

5. The success of “Anvil” will hasten the defeat of Hitler or at least involve him in insurmountable difficulties. I hope you will cope with that task as successfully as you did with the invasion of Normandy.

Thank you for your friendly congratulations on the success of the Soviet armies.

July 26, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 63

July 28, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your messages of July 25 and 27 concerning the departure of Mikolajczyk have reached me. Mr Mikolajczyk and his companions will be given every help in Moscow.

You know our point of view on Poland, which is a neighbour of ours and relations with which are of special importance to the Soviet Union. We welcome the National Committee of the democratic forces on Polish soil, and I think the formation of this Committee signifies a good beginning for the unification of those Poles who are friendly towards Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and the United States, and for overcoming the resistance of those Polish elements who are incapable of uniting with the democratic forces.

I realise the importance of the Polish question to the common cause of the Allies, and that is why I am willing to help all Poles and to mediate in achieving understanding among them. The Soviet troops have done and are continuing to do all in their power to accelerate the liberation of Poland from the German invaders and to help the Polish people regain freedom and achieve prosperity for their country.

July 28, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 64

August 1, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

It goes without saying that with regard to decorating those who have distinguished themselves in organising and manning the convoys, we have not forgotten the Americans. Thank you for your friendly advice.

Concerning the impracticability of a meeting between you, the President and myself at the moment, I notified the President at the same time as I did you, giving him the reasons.

Please accept my thanks for your good wishes.

August 1, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 65

August 2, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your messages of July 28.

I share your opinion concerning the importance of a meeting, but circumstances connected with the operations on our front, of which I apprised you last time, prevent me, unfortunately, from reckoning on the possibility of a meeting in the immediate future.

As regards the Polish question, the matter hinges primarily on the Poles themselves and on the ability of members of the Polish émigré Government to cooperate with the Committee of National Liberation which is already functioning in Poland and to which the democratic forces of Poland are rallying more and more. For my part I am ready to render all Poles whatever assistance I can.

August 2, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 66

August 4, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of August 3 about the experimental station received. The Soviet Ambassador in Tehran has been instructed to issue entry visas right away to the British experts.

August 4, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 67

August 5, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I am in receipt of your message about Warsaw.

I think that the information given to you by the Poles is greatly exaggerated and unreliable. I am impelled to this conclusion by the mere fact that the Polish émigrés claim that they have all but captured Vilna with Home Army units, and have even announced this on the radio. But, of course, that has nothing at all to do with the facts. The Home Army consists of a few detachments misnamed divisions. They have neither guns, aircraft nor tanks. I cannot imagine detachments like those taking Warsaw, which the Germans are defending with four armoured divisions, including the Hermann Goering Division.

August 5, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 68

August 5, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

With regard to sending six British submarines into the Baltic I must say this.

The White Sea-Baltic Canal has been heavily damaged by the Germans and cannot be used this year. But if the British submarines could make their way into the Baltic through the Skagerrak and Kattegat, as they did during the last world war, that would be a magnificent exploit and would be a fresh blow to the Germans.

August 5, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 69

August 8, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I should like to inform you of my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has inadequate information about the situation in Poland. At the same time I had the impression that Mikolajczyk is not against ways being found to unite the Poles.

As I do not think it proper to impose any decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and his colleagues should meet and discuss their problems with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, first and foremost the matter of early unification of all democratic forces on liberated Polish soil. Meetings have already taken place. I have been informed of them by both parties. The National Committee delegation suggested the 1921 Constitution as a basis for the Polish Government and expressed readiness if the Mikolajczyk group acceded to the proposal, to give it four portfolios, including that of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, however, could not see his way to accept. I regret to say the meetings have not yet yielded the desired results. Still, they were useful because they provided Mikolajczyk and Morawski, as well as Bierut who had just arrived from Warsaw, with the opportunity for an exchange of views and particularly for informing each other that both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk are anxious to co-operate and to seek practical opportunities in that direction. That can be considered as the first stage in the relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. Let us hope that things will improve.

August 8, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 70

August 9, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I should like to inform you of my meeting with Mikolajczyk, Grabski and Romer. My talk with Mikolajczyk convinced me that he has inadequate information about the situation in Poland. At the same time I had the impression that Mikolajczyk is not against ways being found to unite the Poles.

As I do not think it proper to impose any decision on the Poles, I suggested to Mikolajczyk that he and his colleagues should meet and discuss their problems with representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, first and foremost the matter of early unification of all democratic forces on liberated Polish soil. Meetings have already taken place. I have been informed of them by both parties. The National Committee delegation suggested the 1921 Constitution as a basis for the Polish Government and expressed readiness if the Mikolajczyk group acceded to the proposal, to give it four portfolios, including that of Prime Minister for Mikolajczyk. Mikolajczyk, however, could not see his way to accept. I regret to say the meetings have not yet yielded the desired results. Still, they were useful because they provided Mikolajczyk and Morawski as well as Bierut, who had just arrived from Warsaw, with the opportunity for an exchange of views and particularly for informing each other that both the Polish National Committee and Mikolajczyk are anxious to cooperate and to seek practical opportunities in that direction. That can be considered as the first stage in the relations between the Polish Committee and Mikolajczyk and his colleagues. Let us hope that things will improve.

I understand the Polish Committee of National Liberation in Lublin has decided to invite Professor Lange to join it and take charge of foreign affairs. If Lange, a well-known Polish democratic leader, were enabled to go to Poland in order to assume that office it would undoubtedly promote Polish unity and the struggle against our common enemy. I hope you share this view and will for your part not withhold your support in this matter, which is so very important to the Allied cause.

August 9, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 71

August 14, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Mister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I read with the greatest interest your communication on the front situation in Northern France and acquainted myself with your plan for encircling and destroying the main German forces. I wish you all success in carrying out the plan.

Thank you for the good wishes and for the news about your forthcoming meeting with Marshal Tito.

August 14, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 72

August 16, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

After a talk with Mr Mikolajczyk I instructed the Red Army Command to drop munitions intensively into the Warsaw area. A liaison officer was parachuted, but headquarters report that he did not reach his objective, being killed by the Germans.

Now, after probing more deeply into the Warsaw affair, I have come to the conclusion that the Warsaw action is a reckless and fearful gamble, taking a heavy toll of the population. This would not have been the case had Soviet headquarters been informed beforehand about the Warsaw action and had the Poles maintained contact with them.

Things being what they are, Soviet headquarters have decided that they must dissociate themselves from the Warsaw adventure since they cannot assume either direct or indirect responsibility for it.

 

2. I have received your communication about the meeting with Marshal Tito and Prime Minister Šubašić. Thank you for the information.

 

3. The successful Allied landing in Southern France is very heartening. I wish them every success.

August 16, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 73

August 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message on Pacific affairs and I appreciate the importance you attach to them. We, too, attach considerable importance to your success there. At the same time I feel sure that you are well aware of the effort exerted by our forces in order to ensure success of the struggle that has now been joined in Europe. This gives us reason to hope that the day is not far off when we shall succeed in fulfilling our urgent task and be able to turn to other matters. It is my wish that General Deane will even now cooperate fruitfully with our Staff.

August 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 74

August 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt, And the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

The message from you and Mr Churchill about Warsaw has reached me. I should like to state my views.

Sooner or later the truth about the handful of power-seeking criminals who launched the Warsaw adventure will out. Those elements, playing on the credulity of the inhabitants of Warsaw, exposed practically unarmed people to German guns, armour and aircraft. The result is a situation in which every day is used, not by the Poles for freeing Warsaw, but by the Hitlerites, who are cruelly exterminating the civilian population.

From the military point of view the situation, which keeps German attention riveted to Warsaw, is highly unfavourable both to the Red Army and to the Poles. Nevertheless, the Soviet troops, who of late have had to face renewed German counterattacks, are doing all they can to repulse the Hitlerite sallies and go over to a new large-scale offensive near Warsaw. I can assure you that the Red Army will stint no effort to crush the Germans at Warsaw and liberate it for the Poles. That will be the best, really effective, help to the anti-Nazi Poles.

August 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 75

August 24, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

This morning, August 24, the squadron of one battleship and eight destroyers, transferred to the Soviet Union by Great Britain, arrived safely at the Soviet port of which you are aware.

I wish to convey to you and to the Government of Great Britain heartfelt thanks on my own behalf and on behalf of the Soviet Government for this vital aid to the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union.

August 24, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 76

September 7, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message about participation of the Soviet Union Republics in the International Security Organisation.

I attach the utmost importance to the statement made by the Soviet Delegation on the subject. Since the constitutional changes in our country early this year the Governments of the Union Republics have been taking very careful note of the friendly countries’ reaction to the extension of their rights in international relations, set down in the Soviet Constitution. You know, of course, that the Ukraine and Byelorussia, for instance, which are members of the Soviet Union, surpass some countries in population and political importance, countries which we all agree should be among the founders of the International Organisation. I hope, therefore, to have an opportunity of explaining to you the political importance of the question raised by the Soviet Delegation at Dumbarton Oaks.

September 7, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 77

September 14, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I am in receipt of your message on the Dumbarton Oaks discussions.

It is my wish, too, that those important discussions be brought to a successful close. This may play a prominent part in furthering cooperation between our countries and promoting future peace and security as a whole.

The voting procedure in the Council will, I feel, be of appreciable importance to the success of the International Security Organisation because it is essential that the Council should base its work on the principle of agreement and unanimity between the four leading Powers on all matters, including those that directly concern one of these Powers. The original American proposal for establishing a special voting procedure in the event of a dispute directly involving one or several members of the Council who have the status of permanent members is, I think, sound. Otherwise the agreement we reached at the Tehran Conference, where we were guided by the desire to ensure above all the four-Power unity of action so vital to preventing future aggression, will be reduced to nought.

This unity implies, naturally, that there must be no suspicions among the Powers. As to the Soviet Union, it cannot very well ignore the existence of certain absurd prejudices which often hamper a genuinely objective attitude to the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, other countries should likewise weigh the likely consequences of lack of unity among the leading Powers.

I hope you will appreciate the importance of these considerations and that we shall arrive at an agreed decision on this matter.

September 14, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 78

September 29, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received the message from you and Mr Churchill about the Quebec Conference, informing me of your future military plans. Your communication shows the important tasks ahead of the U.S. and British armed forces. Allow me to wish you and your armies every success.

At present Soviet troops are mopping up the Baltic group of German forces which threatens our right flank. Without wiping out this group we shall not be able to thrust deep into Eastern Germany. Besides, our forces have two immediate aims – to knock Hungary out of the war and to probe the German defences on the Eastern Front and, if the situation proves favourable, pierce them.

September 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 79

September 29, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received the message from you and Mr Roosevelt about the Quebec Conference, informing me of your future military plans. Your communication shows the important tasks ahead of the U.S. and British armed forces.

Allow me to wish you and your armies every success.

At present Soviet troops are mopping up the Baltic group of German forces, which threatens our right flank. Without wiping out this group we shall not be able to thrust deep into Eastern Germany. Besides, our forces have two immediate aims – to knock Hungary out of the war and to probe the German defences on the Eastern Front and, if the situation proves favourable, pierce them.

September 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 80

September 30, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of September 27 received.

I share your conviction that stable harmony between the three leading Powers is an earnest of future peace and is in tune with the hopes cherished by all peace-loving nations. The consistency of our Governments in this policy in the post-war; period, like that achieved during this great war, will, I believe, be the decisive thing.

Certainly I should like very much to meet you and the President. I think it very important to our common cause. I must, however, make a reservation as far as I am concerned: my doctors advise against undertaking long journeys. I shall have to bow to this for some time to come.

I wholeheartedly welcome your desire to come to Moscow in October. Military and other problems of great importance need to be discussed. Should anything keep you from coming, we should, naturally, be glad to see Mr Eden.

Your communication on the plans for the President’s visit to Europe is very interesting. I, too, feel sure that he will win the election.

As regards Japan, our attitude remains the same as it was in Tehran.

I and Molotov send you our best wishes.

September 30, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 81

October 5, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of October 4 received.

Landing arranged at the Sarabuz air field near Simferopol. Direct your signal aircraft thither.

October 5, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 82

October 8, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I was somewhat puzzled by your message of October 5. I had imagined that Mr Churchill was coming to Moscow in keeping with an agreement reached with you at Quebec. It appears, however, that my supposition is at variance with reality.

I do not know what points Mr Churchill and Mr Eden want to discuss in Moscow. Neither of them has said anything to me so far. In a message, Mr Churchill expressed the wish to come to Moscow if it was all right with me. I agreed, of course. That is how matters stand with the Churchill visit to Moscow.

I shall keep you informed, according as I clear up things with Mr Churchill.

October 8, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 83

October 10, 1944

Message to President Roosevelt from Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill

 

In an informal discussion we have taken a preliminary view of the situation as it affects us and have planned out the course of our meetings, social and others. We have invited Messrs Mikolajczyk, Romer and Grabski to come at once for further conversations with us and with the Polish National Committee. We have agreed not to refer in our discussions to the Dumbarton Oaks issues, and that these shall be taken up when we three can meet together. We have to consider the best way of reaching an agreed policy about the Balkan countries, including Hungary and Turkey. We have arranged for Mr Harriman to sit in as an observer at all the meetings, where business of importance is to be transacted, and for General Deane to be present whenever military topics are raised. We have arranged for technical contacts between our high officers and General Deane on military aspects, and for any meetings which may be necessary later in our presence and that of the two Foreign Secretaries together with Mr Harriman. We shall keep you fully informed ourselves about the progress we make.

2. We take this occasion to send you our heartiest good wishes and to offer our congratulations on the prowess of the United States forces and upon the conduct of the war in the West by General Eisenhower.

Churchill
Stalin

October 10, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 84

October 12, 1944

To the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill

 

Dear Mr Churchill,

I am in receipt of your letter of October 12, in which you suggest holding the military talks on the 14th, at 10 p.m. I agree with the proposal and with your plan for the conference. I suggest that we hold the discussions in Molotov’s office in the Kremlin.

Sincerely yours,

J. Stalin

 

 

* * *

 

No. 85

October 19, 1944

To Mr Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain

Moscow

 

Dear Mr Churchill,

On the occasion of your departure from Moscow please accept from me two modest gifts as souvenirs of your sojourn in the Soviet capital: the vase “Man in a Boat” is for Mrs Churchill and the vase “With Bow Against Bear” for yourself.

Once again I wish you good health and good cheer.

J. Stalin

October 19, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 86

October 19, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

During the stay of Mr Churchill and Mr Eden in Moscow we exchanged views on a number of issues of common interest. Ambassador Harriman will assuredly have informed you of all the important talks. I also know that the Prime Minister intended sending you his appraisal of the talks. For my part I can say that they were very useful in acquainting us with each other’s views on such matters as the future of Germany, the Polish question, policy on the Balkans and major problems of future military policies. The talks made it plain that we can without undue difficulty coordinate our policies on all important issues and that even if we cannot ensure immediate solution of this or that problem, such as the Polish question, we have, nevertheless, more favourable prospects in this respect as well. I hope that the Moscow talks will be useful also in other respects, that when we three meet we shall be able to take specific decisions on all the pressing matters of common interest to us.

 

2. Ambassador Gromyko has informed me of his recent talk with Mr Hopkins, who told him that you could arrive at the Black Sea late in November and meet with me on the Soviet Black Sea coast. I should very much welcome your doing so. My talk with the Prime Minister convinced me that he shares the idea. In other words, the three of us could meet late in November to examine the questions that have piled up since Tehran. I shall be glad to hear from you about this.

October 19, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 87

October 22, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message of October 21 concerning your intention to recognise the existing French authorities as the Provisional Government of France and to establish a zone of the interior under French administration. The British Government, too, has notified the Soviet Government of its desire to recognise the Provisional Government of France. As regards the Soviet Union, it welcomes the decision to recognise the French Provisional Government and has already given proper instructions to its representative in Paris.

October 22, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No 88

October 24, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of October 24 informing me of the Norwegians’ intention to send a token force of two hundred to Northern Norway. I must say that in a talk with Molotov the Norwegian Ambassador spoke of more substantial measures against the Germans on the part of the Norwegians.

If you could launch naval operations of some kind against the Germans in Norway they would be helpful.

Congratulations on your safe return to London and my best wishes.

October 24, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 89

October 29, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message of October 25 to hand.

If a meeting on the Soviet Black Sea coast, as suggested by you earlier, is all right with you, I should think it highly desirable to carry out that plan. Conditions are quite favourable for a meeting there. I hope the safe entry of your ship into the Black Sea will also be possible by that time. My doctors advise for the time being against long journeys so I must take their view into account.

I shall be glad to see you if you find it possible to make the voyage.

October 29, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 90

November 7, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message of October 31 is to hand.

At the request of the Norwegian Government and in keeping with your previous message, I have instructed the Soviet military authorities to receive the Norwegian unit arriving at Murmansk from Britain and to send it to the liberated Norwegian territory, where it will be under the general guidance of the Soviet Command.

As for other Norwegian military groups, that, I think, is a matter for the Norwegian Government to decide.

I have no specific proposals for British naval forces taking part in liberating Norway. Any step you might take towards that end would be welcomed.

November 7, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 91

November 9, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for your message of November 5.

I was glad to learn that you now have effective control of the approaches to so important a port as Antwerp. I hope your preparations for a new offensive are making good progress and that soon the Germans will again experience the force of powerful Anglo-American blows.

With regard to Yugoslavia, I have been advised that the trend is favourable to the Allies. Dr. Šubašić plans to come to Moscow to tell us about his latest meetings with Marshal Tito. It appears that we can count on the formation of a United Yugoslav Government before long.

As to Polish affairs, it must be admitted that Mr Mikolajczyk, to the detriment of his own chances, is wasting much valuable time.

Thank you for your congratulations on the Soviet forces’ advance to Budapest. Our troops are pushing on in Hungary, though they are having to overcome numerous difficulties on the way. With regard to the 32 German divisions left in Latvia we are taking the necessary steps to accelerate their destruction. Rain and fog have greatly handicapped our operations in that area in the past few days. The delay, however, has enabled us to step up preparations for forthcoming decisive operations.

It is now safe to say that the President has won the election, and with a big majority. In the Soviet Union the news will be hailed as another victory for all of us. November 9, 1944

 

For President Roosevelt

Sent on November 9, 1944
Washington

 

I congratulate you on your re-election. I am confident that under your tried and tested leadership the American people will, jointly with the peoples of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the other democratic countries, round off the struggle against the common foe and ensure victory in the name of liberating mankind from Nazi tyranny.

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 92

November 13, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

The news of the sinking of the Tirpitz by British aircraft has greatly rejoiced us. The pilots have every reason to be proud of their feat.

Here’s wishing you success in the large-scale operations of which you have apprised me.

Best wishes.

November 13, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 93

Sent on November 16, 1944

To the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr Churchill

 

Thank you for your congratulations and good wishes for the anniversary of the Soviet State. I am confident that the growing alliance of our two countries will promote victory over our common foe and serve lasting peace throughout the world.

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 94

November 20, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for keeping me posted about your talks with de Gaulle. I read your communications with interest. I have nothing against the proposal for an eventual meeting between the three of us and the French if the President is willing, but we must first reach final agreement on the time and place of the meeting of us three.

Recently General de Gaulle expressed the wish to come to Moscow to contact Soviet Government leaders. We told him we were willing, and we expect the French to reach Moscow by the end of the month. They have not yet specified the points they would like to discuss. Anyway, I shall inform you of them after the talks with de Gaulle.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 95

November 23, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. Roosevelt

It is too bad that your naval authorities question the advisability of your original idea that the three of us should meet on the Soviet Black Sea coast. There is no objection, as far as I am concerned, to the time of meeting suggested by you – late January or early February; I expect, however, that we shall be able to select one of the Soviet sea ports. I still have to pay heed to my doctors’ warning of the risk involved in long journeys.

Even so I hope that we shall be able to reach final agreement – a little later if not now – on a place acceptable to all of us.

Best wishes.

November 23, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 96

November 24, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Dr. Šubašić is leaving Moscow today after a brief visit. I had a talk with him, as well as with Kardelj, Vice-Chairman of the National Committee, and Simić, the Yugoslav Ambassador. The talk showed that the agreement reached by Marshal Tito and Šubašić about a United Yugoslav Government is likely to benefit Yugoslavia and that its implementation should not be delayed. You are probably aware of the agreement, and I hope, will have no objection, especially after you talk with Šubašić who is now on his way to London. Now that Belgrade has been liberated and that the Yugoslavs – Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and others – are ready to unite and work together, support by our Governments for the joint efforts of the peoples of Yugoslavia will be another blow to the Hitlerites and will considerably further the common Allied cause.

November 24, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 97

Sent on November 29, 1944

From Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Heartfelt congratulations on your birthday. I send you my friendly wishes for long years of good health and good cheer for the benefit of our common cause.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 98

December 1, 1944

Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

As regards the Western bloc, so far I have little information about it, and the newspaper reports are contradictory. I am grateful to you for the promise to keep me informed about developments, and I myself am ready to reciprocate.

I read with interest your message on military operations in the West. True, weather is now a serious obstacle.

I shall not fail to profit by your kind advice and shall inform you of anything worthy of special attention.

December 1, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 99

December 2, 1944

Most Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

The indications are that de Gaulle and his friends, who have arrived in the Soviet Union, will raise two questions.

 

1. Concluding a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual aid similar to the Anglo-Soviet pact.

We shall find it hard to object. But I should like to know what you think. What do you advise?

 

2. De Gaulle will probably suggest revising the eastern frontier of France and shifting it to the left bank of the Rhine. There is talk, too, about a plan for forming a Rhine-Westphalian region under international control. Possibly French participation in the control is likewise envisaged. In other words, the French proposal for shifting the frontier line to the Rhine will compete with the plan for a Rhineland region under international control.

I would like your advice on this matter as well.

I have sent a similar message to the President.

December 2, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 100

December 2, 1944

Most Secret and Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to President F. Roosevelt

 

The indications are that de Gaulle and his friends, who have arrived in the Soviet Union, will raise two questions.

 

1. Concluding a Franco-Soviet pact of mutual aid similar to the Anglo-Soviet pact.

We shall find it hard to object. But I should like to know what you think. What do you advise.

 

2. De Gaulle will probably suggest revising the eastern frontier of France and shifting it to the left bank of the Rhine. There is talk, too, about a plan for forming a Rhine-Westphalian region under international control. Possibly French participation in the control is likewise envisaged. In other words, the French proposal for shifting the frontier line to the Rhine will compete with the plan for a Rhineland region under international control.

I would like your advice on this matter as well.

I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill.

December 2, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 101

December 3, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

The meeting with General de Gaulle provided the opportunity for a friendly exchange of views on Franco-Soviet relations. In the course of the talks General de Gaulle, as I had anticipated, brought up two major issues – the French frontier on the Rhine and a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact patterned on the Anglo-Soviet Treaty.

As to the French frontier on the Rhine, I said, in effect, that the matter could not be settled without the knowledge and consent of our chief Allies, whose forces are waging a liberation struggle against the Germans on French soil. I stressed the difficulty of the problem.

Concerning the proposal for a Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact I pointed to the need for a thorough study of the matter and for clearing up the legal aspects, in particular the question of who in France in the present circumstances is to ratify such a pact. This means the French will have to offer a number of elucidations, which I have yet to receive from them.

I shall be obliged for a reply to this message and for your comments on these points.

I have sent a similar message to Mr Churchill.

Best wishes.

December 3, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 102

December 7, 1944

Personal and Secret to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill from Premier J. V. Stalin

 

I have received your reply to my message about the Franco- Soviet pact and the French frontier on the Rhine. Thank you for your advice.

By the time your reply came we had begun talks on the pact with the French. I and my colleagues approve of your suggestion that a tripartite Anglo-Franco-Soviet pact, improved in comparison with the Anglo-Soviet one, would be preferable. We have suggested a tripartite pact to de Gaulle, but have had no reply so far.

I am behind in replying to the other messages I have had from you. I hope to be able to answer them soon.

December 7, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 103

December 8, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Your message on Mikolajczyk received.

It has become obvious since my last meeting with Mr Mikolajczyk in Moscow that he is incapable of helping a Polish settlement. Indeed, his negative role has been revealed. It is now evident that his negotiations with the Polish National Committee are designed to cover up those who, behind his back, engaged in criminal terror acts against Soviet officers and Soviet people generally on Polish territory. We cannot tolerate this state of affairs. We cannot tolerate terrorists, instigated by the Polish émigrés, assassinating our people in Poland and waging a criminal struggle against the Soviet forces liberating Poland. We look on these people as allies of our common enemy, and as to their radio correspondence with Mr Mikolajczyk, which we found on émigré agents arrested on Polish territory, it not only exposes their treacherous designs, it also casts a shadow on Mr Mikolajczyk and his men.

Ministerial changes in the émigré Government no longer deserve serious attention. For these elements, who have lost touch with the national soil and have no contact with their people, are merely marking time. Meanwhile the Polish Committee of National Liberation has made substantial progress in consolidating its national, democratic organisations on Polish soil, in implementing a land reform in favour of the peasants and in expanding its armed forces, and enjoys great prestige among the population.

I think that our task now is to support the National Committee in Lublin and all who want to cooperate and are capable of cooperating with it. This is particularly important to the Allies in view of the need for accelerating the defeat of the Germans.

December 8, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 104

December 8, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Both your messages of December 2 received. Of course, we must ensure complete coordination and effectiveness of our operations against the Germans in Yugoslavia. A report has been submitted to me concerning the proposal, received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff on November 29, for establishing a new boundary line for the operations of the Soviet and Allied air forces in Yugoslavia. You are probably aware that as early as December 3 our General Staff agreed that the boundary should be established along the line Sarajevo-Mokro-Sokolac- Babrun-Uvac-Prijepolje-Sjenica-Peć through Prilep to the southern frontier of Yugoslavia, it being understood that Peć and Prilep would remain in the sphere of operations of the Soviet air forces, and along the southern frontier of Bulgaria. I presume that that line meets your wishes.

As to the other questions, I hope our military representatives will be able to settle them.

December 8, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 105

December 10, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I informed General de Gaulle of your opinion that an Anglo- Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact was preferable and declared for your proposal. General de Gaulle, however, insisted on a Franco- Soviet pact, suggesting that a tripartite pact be the next stage, because the matter required preparation. Meanwhile we received a message from the President, saying that he had no objection to a Franco-Soviet pact. As a result we agreed on a pact which was signed today. The text will be published when General de Gaulle reaches Paris.

I think de Gaulle’s visit has yielded positive results; not only will it help strengthen Franco-Soviet relations, it will be a contribution to the common cause of the Allies.

December 10, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 106

December 10, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Thank you for your communication on the subject of France. General de Gaulle and I have arrived at the conclusion that the Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact will benefit both Franco-Soviet relations and European security in general. The pact was signed today.

As to the post-war frontier of France, examination of this question has, as I informed you, been deferred.

December 10, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 107

December 14, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message and the copy of your letter to Marshal Tito.

Before expressing an opinion on the issues raised in your message to Marshal Tito I should like to have Marshal’s views on these matters. I bear out your statement that the Soviet and British Governments agreed in Moscow on pursuing, as far as feasible, a joint policy on Yugoslavia. I hope you will be able to come to terms with Marshal Tito and give your backing to the agreement reached between him and Mr Šubašić.

 

2. I have received your message concerning the German T5 torpedo. Soviet seamen have actually captured two German acoustic torpedoes, which our experts are now examining. Unfortunately we cannot at the moment send one of them to Britain because both have been damaged by explosion, so that in order to examine and test the torpedo, the damaged parts of one torpedo will have to be replaced by those of the other, otherwise it will be impossible to examine and test it. Hence the alternative: either the drawings and descriptions of the torpedo can be turned over to the British Military Mission at once, as the torpedo is examined, and after examination and tests are finished the torpedo itself can be handed over to the British Admiralty; or British experts could leave for the Soviet Union at once to examine the torpedo in detail on the spot and make the required drawings. We are ready to provide you with either opportunity.

December 14, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 108

December 25, 1944

Personal Message from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

Thank you for your congratulations and good wishes for my birthday. I have always greatly appreciated your friendly sentiments.

December 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 109

December 25, 1944

Personal from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

It goes without saying that I shall welcome the conclusion of an Anglo-French treaty.

I greatly appreciate your praise for the Kutuzov film and shall not fail to convey your comment to those who made it.

Best wishes.

December 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 110

December 25, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message about a competent officer coming to Moscow from Gen. Eisenhower.

I have already advised the President of my concurrence and readiness to exchange information with the said officer.

December 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 111

December 25, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

I have received your message about the sending of a competent officer from Gen. Eisenhower’s staff to Moscow.

It goes without saying that I agree to your proposal, and, by the same token, I am ready to meet the officer from Gen. Eisenhower’s staff and to exchange information with him.

December 25, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 112

Sent on December 26, 1944

To Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America

The White House, Washington

Please accept my thanks for your congratulations and good wishes on the occasion of my birthday.

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 113

December 26, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message reached me through Mr Harriman on December 14.

I fully share your opinion that before the general conference of the United Nations meets to discuss the founding of an International Organisation it would be advisable for us to reach agreement on the more important problems that found no solution at Dumbarton Oaks, primarily on the voting procedure in the Security Council. I feel it necessary to recall that the original American draft stressed the necessity of drawing up special rules with regard to voting procedure in the event of a dispute directly affecting one of several permanent members of the Council. The British draft, too, pointed out that the general procedure of settling disputes between the Great Powers, should disputes arise, might prove unworkable.

In this connection paragraphs 1 and 2 of your proposal do not give rise to any objections and can be accepted, it being understood that paragraph 2 is concerned with questions of procedure mentioned in Chapter VI, Section D.

As to paragraph 3 of your proposal, I regret to say that I cannot accept it as worded by you. As acknowledged by you, the principle of unanimity of the permanent members is indispensable in all Council decisions determining a threat to peace, as well as in those calling for action to remove the threat or to crush aggression or other breaches of peace. In adopting decisions on these questions there should without doubt be complete agreement among the Powers who are permanent members of the Council and who bear the chief responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. It goes without saying that any attempt to bar at any stage one or several permanent members of the Council from voting on the questions mentioned above, and this, theoretically speaking, is possible, and it may even be that the majority of the permanent members find themselves excluded from participation in settling an issue – could have dire consequences for the preservation of international security. This runs counter to the principle of agreement and unanimity in the decisions of the four leading Powers and may result in some of the Great Powers being played against others – a development which would be likely to undermine universal security. The small countries are interested in preventing that just as much as the Great Powers, for a split among the Great Powers who have united to safeguard peace and the security of all freedom-loving nations is fraught with the most dangerous consequences to all those states.

That is why I must insist on our former stand as to the voting in the Security Council. As I see it this attitude will ensure four-Power unity for the new International Organisation and help to prevent attempts at playing some of the Great Powers against others, which is vital to their joint struggle against future aggression. Such a situation would, naturally, safeguard the interests of the small nations in maintaining their security and would be in keeping with the interests of universal peace.

I hope that you will fully appreciate the importance of the considerations set forth above in support of the principle of unanimity of the four leading Powers and that we shall arrive at agreed decisions on this point, as well as on certain other points still outstanding. On the basis of an agreed decision our representatives could work out a final draft and discuss the measures necessary for the early convening of a general United Nations conference.

December 26, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 114

December 27, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the President, Mr F. Roosevelt

 

Your message on Polish affairs reached me on December 20.

As to Mr Stettinius’ statement of December 18, I should prefer to comment on it when we meet. At any rate events in Poland have already gone far beyond that which is reflected in the said statement.

A number of things that have taken place since Mr Mikolajczyk’s last visit to Moscow, in particular the wireless correspondence with the Mikolajczyk Government, which we found on terrorists arrested in Poland – underground agents of the émigré Government – demonstrate beyond all doubt that Mr Mikolajczyk’s talks with the Polish National Committee served to cover up those elements who, behind Mr Mikolajczyk’s back, had been engaged in terror against Soviet officers and soldiers in Poland. We cannot tolerate a situation in which terrorists, instigated by Polish émigrés, assassinate Red Army soldiers and officers in Poland, wage a criminal struggle against the Soviet forces engaged in liberating Poland and directly aid our enemies, with whom they are virtually in league. The substitution of Arciszewski for Mikolajczyk and the ministerial changes in the émigré Government in general have aggravated the situation and have resulted in a deep rift between Poland and the émigré Government.

Meanwhile the National Committee has made notable progress in consolidating the Polish state and the machinery of state power on Polish soil, in expanding and strengthening the Polish Army, in implementing a number of important government measures, primarily the land reform in favour of the peasants. These developments have resulted in the consolidation of the democratic forces in Poland and in an appreciable increase in the prestige of the National Committee among the Polish people and large sections of the Poles abroad.

As I see it, we must now be interested in supporting the National Committee and all who are willing to cooperate and who are capable of cooperating with it, which is of special moment for the Allies and for fulfilment of our common task – accelerating the defeat of Hitler Germany. For the Soviet Union, which is bearing the whole burden of the struggle for freeing Poland from the German invaders, the problem of relations with Poland is, in present circumstances, a matter of everyday, close and friendly relations with an authority brought into being by the Polish people on their own soil, an authority which has already grown strong and has armed forces of its own, which, together with the Red Army, are fighting the Germans.

I must say frankly that in the event of the Polish Committee of National Liberation becoming a Provisional Polish Government, the Soviet Government will, in view of the- foregoing, have no serious reasons for postponing its recognition. It should be borne in mind that the Soviet Union, more than any other Power, has a stake in strengthening a pro-Ally and democratic Poland, not only because it is bearing the brunt of the struggle for Poland’s liberation, but also because Poland borders on the Soviet Union and because the Polish problem is inseparable from that of the security of the Soviet Union. To this I should add that the Red Army’s success in fighting the Germans in Poland largely depends on a tranquil and reliable rear in Poland, and the Polish National Committee is fully cognizant of this circumstance, whereas the émigré Government and its underground agents by their acts of terror threaten civil war in the rear of the Red Army and counter its successes.

On the other hand, in the conditions now prevailing in Poland there are no grounds for continuing to support the émigré Government, which has completely forfeited the trust of the population inside the country and which, moreover, threatens civil war in the rear of the Red Army, thereby injuring our common interest in the success of the struggle we are waging against the Germans. I think it would be only natural, fair and beneficial to our common cause if the Governments of the Allied Powers agreed as a first step to exchange representatives at this juncture with the National Committee with a view to its later recognition as the lawful government of Poland, after it has proclaimed itself the Provisional Government of Poland. Unless this is done I fear that the Polish people’s trust in the Allied Power may diminish. I think we should not countenance a situation in which Poles can say that we are sacrificing the interests of Poland to those of a handful of émigrés in London.

December 27, 1944

 

 

* * *

 

No. 115

December 27, 1944

Personal and Secret from Premier J. V. Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr W. Churchill

 

I have received your message informing me that you prefer to send British experts to the Soviet Union to examine the German torpedo on the spot. Appropriate instructions have, therefore, been given to the relevant Soviet military authorities.

December 27, 1944

 

* * *

 

 

Stalin