English

 

 

STALIN

1942

 

War Telegrams



No. 1

Sent on January 8, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

Thank you for the message and your solicitude for the progress of Soviet-American relations. The Pravda article to which you refer is not at all official and certainly has no other aims in view but the interests of the fight against aggression, which are common to our countries. For its part the Soviet Government is doing, and will certainly continue to do its utmost to strengthen Soviet-American relations.

 

* * *

No. 2

Sent on January 16, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

I have received your message of January 15.

I sincerely thank you for your good wishes for the New Year and the successes of the Red Army. I greet you and the British Army on the occasion of your major successes in North Africa.

 

* * *

No. 3

Sent on February 14, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

Thank you for your congratulations on the successes of the Red Army. Despite the difficulties experienced on the Soviet- German front and on the other fronts, I do not doubt for a moment that the mighty alliance of the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the U.S.A. will crush the enemy and achieve complete victory.

 

 

* * *

No. 4

Sent on February 18, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

I have received your message about U.S. arms deliveries in January and February. I stress that it is now, when the peoples of the Soviet Union and their Army are bending their energies to throw the Hitler troops back by a tenacious offensive, that U.S. deliveries, including tanks and aircraft, are essential for our common cause and our further success.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 5

Sent on February 18, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

This is to acknowledge receipt of yours of February 13. I should like first of all to point out that I share your conviction that the efforts of the new U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, Admiral Standley, whom you hold in such high esteem, to bring our two countries still closer together, will be crowned with success.

Your decision, Mr President, to grant the Government of the U.S.S.R. another $1,000,000,000 under the Lend-Lease Act5 on the same terms as the first $1,000,000,000, is accepted by the Soviet Government with sincere gratitude. With reference to the matter raised by you I would like to say that, in order not to delay decision, the Soviet Government will not at the moment raise the matter of revising the terms for the second $1,000,000,000 to be granted to the Soviet Union nor call for taking due account of the extreme strain placed on the U.S.S.R. by the war against our common foe. At the same time I fully agree with you and hope that later we shall jointly fix the moment when it will be mutually desirable to revise the financial agreements now being concluded, in order to take special account of the circumstances pointed out above.

I take this opportunity to draw your attention to the fact that in using the loan extended to the U.S.S.R. the appropriate Soviet agencies are encountering great difficulties as far as shipping the munitions and materials purchased in the U.S.A. is concerned. In these circumstances we think that the most useful system is the one effectively used in shipping munitions from Britain to Archangel, a system not introduced so far with regard to supplies from the U.S.A. In keeping with this system the British military authorities supplying the munitions and materials select the ships, supervise their loading in harbour and convoying to the ports of destination. The Soviet Government would be most grateful if the same system of delivering munitions and convoying the ships to Soviet harbours were adopted by the U.S. Government.

Yours very sincerely,

J. Stalin

 

* * *

 

No. 6

Sent on March 14, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

Thank you very much for your message, transmitted in Kuibyshev on March 12.

Please accept the Soviet Government’s gratitude for the information on the steps you have taken to ensure deliveries to the U.S.S.R. and to intensify the air offensive against Germany.

I feel entirely confident that the combined efforts of our troops occasional setbacks notwithstanding, will culminate in crushing the common enemy and that the year 1942 will see a decisive turn on the anti-Hitler front.

As to paragraph one of your message – concerning the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. – I think we still shall have to exchange views on the text of an appropriate treaty, if it is approved for signing by both parties.

 

 

* * *

No. 7

March 29, 1942

Personal and Secret

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

Thank you for the message which reached me through Mr Kerr a few days ago. I have had a talk with Mr Kerr, and my impression is that our joint work will proceed in an atmosphere of complete mutual trust.

I convey to you the Soviet Government’s gratitude for the assurance that the British Government will treat any use of poison gas upon the U.S.S.R. by the Germans as if that weapon were directed against Great Britain and that the British Air Force will not hesitate to use the large store of gas bombs available in Britain for dropping on suitable targets in Germany.

According to our information poison gas may be launched against the U.S.S.R. not only by the Germans, but also by the Finns. I should like what you say in your message about retaliation with gas attack upon Germany to be extended to Finland in the event of the latter assaulting the U.S.S.R. with poison gas.

I think it highly advisable for the British Government to give in the near future a public warning that Britain would treat the use of poison gas against the U.S.S.R. by Germany or Finland as an attack on Britain herself and that she would retaliate by using gas against Germany.

It goes without saying that, if the British Government so desires, the U.S.S.R. is prepared in its turn to issue a similar warning to Germany against a German gas attack upon Britain.

The Soviet Government holds that a British Government warning to Germany on the above lines should come not later than the end of April or early May.

The Soviet Government would be most grateful if the British Government could help the U.S.S.R. to obtain certain chemical means of defence it lacks, as well as means of chemical retaliation against eventual chemical attack upon the U.S.S.R. by Germany. If you have no objection I could send an authorised person to Britain shortly to take care of the matter.

 

 

* * *

No. 8

Sent on April 20, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Thank you for the message which I received in Moscow a few days ago.

The Soviet Government agrees that it is essential to arrange a meeting between V. M. Molotov and you for an exchange of views on the organisation of a second front in Europe in the near future. Molotov can arrive in Washington not later than May 10-15, accompanied by an appropriate military representative.

It goes without saying that Molotov will also go to London to exchange views with the British Government.

I have no doubt that I shall be able to have a personal meeting with you, to which I attach great importance, especially in view of the big problems of organising the defeat of Hitlerism that confront our two countries.

Please accept my sincere regards and wishes for success in the struggle against the enemies of the United States of America.

 

J. Stalin

 

* * *

No. 9

April 22, 1942

Personal and Secret

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

Thank you for the readiness you have expressed to give a warning to Germany and Finland early in May concerning the use of poison gas by Britain in the event of Germany and Finland resorting to that weapon in the war against the U.S.S.R.

I express to you my gratitude for the readiness to supply 1,000 tons of Mustard and 1,000 tons of Bleaching. Since, however, the U.S.S.R. has a more pressing need for other chemicals, the Soviet Government would like to receive, instead of the products mentioned above, 1,000 tons of calcium hypochloride and 1,000 tons of chloramine or, if these products cannot be supplied, 2,000 tons of liquid Bleaching in holders. The Soviet Government intends to send Andrei Georgiyevich Kasatkin, Deputy People’s Commissar of the Chemical Industry, to London as its expert in chemical defence and counterattack.

2. A few days ago the Soviet Government received from Mr Eden the drafts of two treaties between the U.S.S.R. and Britain, which substantially depart on certain points from the texts of the treaties discussed during Mr Eden’s stay in Moscow. As this circumstance involves fresh differences which it is hard to iron out by correspondence, the Soviet Government has resolved, despite the difficulties, to send V. M. Molotov to London for personal talks with a view to settling the issues holding up the signing of the treaties. This is all the more essential as the question of a second front in Europe raised by Mr Roosevelt the U.S. President, in his latest message to me, inviting- V. M. Molotov to Washington to discuss the matter, calls for a preliminary exchange of views between representatives of our two Governments.

Please accept my regards and wishes for success in the fight against the enemies of Great Britain.

 

J. Stalin

 

 

* * *

No. 10

May 6, 1942

Secret

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

I have a request to you. Up to 90 shiploads of essential war supplies for the U.S.S.R. have accumulated at present in Iceland and on the approaches to Iceland from America. I understand that the ships have been delayed for a long time owing to the difficulty British naval forces have in running a convoy.

I am conscious of the real difficulty involved and I know about the sacrifices which Britain has made in this matter. Nevertheless, I consider it possible to request you to do your utmost to ensure delivery of those cargoes to the U.S.S.R. during May, when we shall need them badly for the front.

Please accept my best regards and good wishes.

 

J. Stalin

 

* * *

No. 11

Sent on May 12, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

I have received your message of May 11 and thank you for the promise to take measures to deliver the maximum war materials to the U.S.S.R. We fully realise the serious difficulties which Great Britain has to overcome and the heavy naval casualties involved in carrying out that major task.

As to your proposal for increased assistance by the Soviet air and naval forces in covering the supply ships in the area mentioned by you, rest assured that we shall immediately do all we can. It should be borne in mind, however, that, as you know, our naval forces are very limited and by far most of our air forces are engaged in action at the front.

Please accept my best regards.

J. Stalin

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 12

Sent on May 15, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Thank you for the message delivered by M. M. Litvinov. In connection with the present difficulties in sailing and escorting ships to the U.S.S.R. I have already approached Prime Minister Churchill for his help in overcoming them as quickly as possible. As the delivery of cargoes from the U.S.A. and Britain in May is a pressing matter, I address the same request to you, Mr President.

V. M. Molotov will leave for the U.S.A. and Britain a few days later than planned – on account of weather vagaries. It appears that he can fly in a Soviet aircraft – both to Britain and the U.S.A. I should add that the Soviet Government thinks it necessary for Molotov to travel without any press publicity until he returns to Moscow, as was done in the case of Mr Eden’s visit to Moscow last December.

As to Molotov’s place of residence in Washington, both he and I thank you for your offer.

J. Stalin

 

 

* * *

 

No. 13

Sent on May 24, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

I have received the message, transmitted in Kuibyshev on May 20, in which you say that thirty-five ships with supplies for the U.S.S.R. are en route to Soviet ports. Thank you for the message and the steps taken by you in sending the ships. Our air and naval forces will, on their part, do all they can to cover the supply ships in the sector of which you informed me in your message of May 9.

 

 

 

 

No. 14

Sent on May 24, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

Your latest message reached me on May 24. Both Vyacheslav Molotov and myself think it advisable for him to stop in London on his way back from the U.S.A. to complete the discussions with British Government representatives on matters of interest to our two countries.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 15

Sent on May 28, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

I am very grateful to you for the friendly sentiments and good wishes expressed on the occasion of our signing the new treaty.

I am certain that this treaty will be of great importance in promoting friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, as well as between our two countries and the United States, and that it will ensure close cooperation by our three countries after victory.

I also hope that your meeting with Molotov on his way back from the United States will make it possible to complete the work left unfinished.

As to measures for covering the convoy, you may rest assured that we are doing and will continue to do our utmost in this respect.

Please accept my sincere good wishes and the expression of firm confidence in our common complete victory.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 16

Sent on June 12, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

The Soviet Government considers as you do, Mr President, that the results of V. M. Molotov’s visit to the U.S.A. were quite satisfactory.

I take the occasion to express to you, Mr President, the Soviet Government’s sincere gratitude for the cordial welcome given to Molotov and his colleagues during their stay in the U.S.A.

He returned safely to Moscow today.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 17

Sent on June 20, 1942

Message for the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill, from J. V. Stalin

 

 

I have received your message warning me of the Germans’ intention to launch an invasion from Northern Norway and Finland.

I fully share your view of the desirability of joint operations in those two areas, but I should like to know whether British naval and land forces are planned to take part in the operations and, if so, on what scale.

Thank you very much for the promise to send six squadrons to the Murmansk area. Will you let me know when they are due to arrive?

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 18

Sent on July 1, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

With reference to your latest messages I should like to tell you that I fully concur with you as to the advisability of using the Alaska-Siberia route for U.S. aircraft deliveries to the Western Front. The Soviet Government has, therefore, issued instructions for completing at the earliest possible date the preparations now under way in Siberia to receive aircraft, that is, for adapting the existing air fields and providing them with additional facilities. As to whose pilots should fly the aircraft from Alaska, I think the task can be entrusted, as the State Department once suggested, to Soviet pilots who could travel to Nome or some other suitable place at the appointed time. An appropriate group of those pilots could be instructed to carry out the survey flight proposed by you. To fully ensure reception of the aircraft we should like to know the number of planes which the U.S.A. is allocating for despatch to the Western Front by that route.

As to your proposal for a meeting between U.S. and Soviet Army and Navy representatives to exchange information if necessary, the Soviet Government is in agreement and would prefer to have the meeting in Moscow.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 19

Sent on July 7, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

In view of the situation in which the Allied forces find themselves in Egypt I have no objection to forty of the A-20 bombers now in Iraq en route to the U.S.S.R. being transferred to the Egyptian front.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 20

Sent on July 18, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Your message on the designation of Major-General F. Bradley, Captain Duncan and Colonel Michela as the U.S. representatives at the Moscow conference has reached me. The U.S. delegates will be given every assistance in carrying out their assignment.

On the Soviet side the conference will be attended by Major- General Sterligov, Colonel Kabanov and Colonel Levandovich.

As regards the survey flight, we could in the next few days send a plane from Krasnoyarsk to Nome – I mean an American twin-engine aircraft – which could take on the U.S. officers on its way back from Nome.

I take this opportunity to thank you for the news about the despatch of an additional hundred and fifteen tanks to the U.S.S.R.

I consider it my duty to warn you that, according to our experts at the front, U.S. tanks catch fire very easily when hit from behind or from the side by anti-tank rifle bullets. The reason is that the high-grade gasoline used forms inside the tank a thick layer of highly inflammable fumes. German tanks also use gasoline, but of low grade which yields smaller quantities of fumes, hence, they are more fireproof. Our experts think that the diesel makes the best tank motor.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 21

Sent on July 23, 1942

Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

I have received your message of July 18.

I gather from the message, first, that the British Government refuses to go on supplying the Soviet Union with war materials by the northern route and, secondly, that despite the agreed Anglo-Soviet Communiqué28 on the adoption of urgent measures to open a second front in 1942, the British Government is putting off the operation till 1943.

According to our naval experts, the arguments of British naval experts on the necessity of stopping delivery of war supplies to the northern harbours of the U.S.S.R. are untenable. They are convinced that, given goodwill and readiness to honour obligations, steady deliveries could be effected, with heavy loss to the Germans. The British Admiralty’s order to the P.Q. 17 convoy to abandon the supply ships and return to Britain, and to the supply ships to disperse and make for Soviet harbours singly, without escort, is, in the view of our experts, puzzling and inexplicable. Of course, I do not think steady deliveries to northern Soviet ports are possible without risk or loss. But then no major task can be carried out in wartime without risk or losses. You know, of course, that the Soviet Union is suffering far greater losses. Be that as it may, I never imagined that the British Government would deny us delivery of war materials precisely now, when the Soviet Union is badly in need of them in view of the grave situation on the Soviet-German front. It should be obvious that deliveries via Persian ports can in no way make up for the loss in the event of deliveries via the northern route being discontinued.

As to the second point, namely, that of opening a second front in Europe, I fear the matter is taking an improper turn. In view of the situation on the Soviet-German front, I state most emphatically that the Soviet Government cannot tolerate the second front in Europe being postponed till 1943.

I hope you will not take it amiss that I have seen fit to give you my frank and honest opinion and that of my colleagues on the points raised in your message.

J. Stalin

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 22

July 31, 1942

Most Secret

For Prime Minister Churchill from Premier Stalin

 

 

I have received both your messages of July 31.

I hereby invite you on behalf of the Soviet Government to the U.S.S.R. for a meeting with members of the Government.

I should be much obliged if you could travel to the U.S.S.R. for joint consideration of urgent matters relating to the war against Hitler, who is now threatening Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. more than ever.

I think that Moscow would be the most suitable place for our meeting, since the members of the Government, the General Staff and myself cannot be away at this moment of bitter fighting against the Germans.

The presence of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff would be most desirable.

I would request you to fix the date for the meeting at your convenience, depending on how you finish your business in Cairo and with the knowledge that there will be no objection on my part as to the date.

I am grateful to you for agreeing to sail the next convoy with war materials to the U.S.S.R. early in September. Although it will be very difficult for us to withdraw aircraft from the front, we shall take all possible steps to increase air cover for supply ships and convoy.

 

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 23

Sent on August 2, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

I have received your latest message about the survey flight from Alaska. Our B-25 aircraft will arrive at Nome probably between August 8 and 10 and before taking off for the planned survey flight will pick up the three American members of the flight.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 24

Sent on August 6, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

 

Your message of August 5 received.

The representatives of the Soviet Air Force in Tehran have been given the necessary instructions in compliance with your wishes.

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 25

Sent on August 7, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

I have received your messages dated August 5. Thank you for advising me of Mr Harriman’s forthcoming arrival in Moscow. I read with interest your information on Japan, and shall not fail to pass it on to my visitor.

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 26

Sent on August 12, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Your message of August 9 to hand. The Soviet Government takes a favourable view of Mr Wendell Willkie’s visit to the U.S.S.R. and I can assure you that he will be most cordially entertained.

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 27

August 13, 1942

J. V. Stalin to W. Churchill

 

Memorandum

 

 

As a result of the exchange of views in Moscow on August 12 I have established that Mr Churchill, the British Prime Minister, considers it impossible to open a second front in Europe in 1942.

It will be recalled that the decision to open a second front in Europe in 1942 was reached at the time of Molotov’s visit to London, and found expression in the agreed Anglo-Soviet Communiqué released on June 12 last.

It will be recalled further that the opening of a second front in Europe was designed to divert German forces from the Eastern Front to the West, to set up in the West a major centre of resistance to the German fascist forces and thereby ease the position of the Soviet troops on the Soviet-German front in 1942.

Needless to say, the Soviet High Command, in planning its summer and autumn operations, counted on a second front being opened in Europe in 1942.

It will be readily understood that the British Government’s refusal to open a second front in Europe in 1942 delivers a moral blow to Soviet public opinion, which had hoped that the second front would be opened, complicates the position of the Red Army at the front and injures the plans of the Soviet High Command.

I say nothing of the fact that the difficulties in which the Red Army is involved- through the refusal to open a second front in 1942 are bound to impair the military position of Britain and the other Allies.

I and my colleagues believe that the year 1942 offers the most favourable conditions for a second front in Europe, seeing that nearly all the German forces – and their crack troops, too – are tied down on the Eastern Front, while only negligible forces, and the poorest, too, are left in Europe. It is hard to say whether 1943 will offer as favourable conditions for opening a second front as 1942. For this reason we think that it is possible and necessary to open a second front in Europe in 1942. Unfortunately I did not succeed in convincing the British Prime Minister of this, while Mr Harriman, the U.S. President’s representative at the Moscow talks, fully supported the Prime Minister.

J. Stalin

 

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 28

Sent on August 22, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Your message of August 19 received. I, too, regret that you were unable to take part in the talks which Mr Churchill and I recently had.

With reference to what you say about the despatch of tanks and other strategic materials from the United States in August I should like to emphasise our special interest in receiving U.S. aircraft and other weapons, as well as trucks in the greatest numbers possible. It is my hope that every step will be taken to ensure early delivery of the cargoes to the Soviet Union, particularly over the northern sea route.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 29

Sent on September 8, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

I received your message on September 7. I realise the importance of the safe arrival in the Soviet Union of P.Q. 18 convoy and the need for measures to protect it. Difficult though we find it at present to assign extra long-range bombers for the purpose, we have decided to do so. Orders have been given today to assign an additional force of long-range bombers for the purpose mentioned by you.

I wish you success in the operation against Rommel in Egypt and all success in “Torch.”

 

 

* * *

No. 30

October 3, 1942

Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

I must inform you that our position in the Stalingrad area has changed for the worse since the early days of September. It appears that the Germans have large reserves of aircraft which they concentrated in the Stalingrad area, achieving a two-fold air superiority. We were short of fighters with which to cover our ground forces. Even the bravest troops are helpless without air cover. What we need particularly is Spitfires and Aircobras. I have given Mr Willkie detailed information on these points.

2. Supply ships with munitions have reached Archangel and are being unloaded. This is a great help. However, in view of the shortage of tonnage we could forgo for a while certain kinds of aid and thereby reduce the demand for shipping, provided the aid in the shape of fighter aircraft is increased. We could forgo for a while our request for tanks and guns, if Britain and the U.S.A. together could supply us with 800 fighters a month – Britain giving roughly 300 and the U.S.A. 500. This aid would be more effective and would improve the situation at the front.

3. Your intelligence to the effect that Germany’s monthly output of operational aircraft does not exceed 1,300 does not tally with our information. According to our data, the German aircraft industry, including plants in the occupied countries making aeroplane parts, turns out some 2,500 operational aircraft a month.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 31

October 7, 1942

From Premier Stalin to the President, Mr Roosevelt

 

 

In taking this opportunity to send you a personal message through the courtesy of Mr Standley, who is leaving for Washington, I should like to say a few words about U.S. military deliveries to the U.S.S.R.

The difficulties of delivery are reported to be due primarily to shortage of shipping. To remedy the shipping situation the Soviet Government would be prepared to agree to a certain curtailment of U.S. arms deliveries to the Soviet Union. We should be prepared temporarily fully to renounce deliveries of tanks, guns, ammunition, pistols, etc. At the same time, however, we are badly in need of increased deliveries of modern fighter aircraft – such as Aircobras – and certain other supplies. It should be borne in mind that the Kittyhawk is no match for the modern German fighter.

It would be very good if the U.S.A. could ensure the monthly delivery of at least the following items: 500 fighters, 8,000 to 10,000 trucks, 5,000 tons of aluminium, and 4,000 to 5,000 tons of explosives. Besides, we need, within 12 months, two million tons of grain (wheat) and as much as we can have of fats, concentrated foods and canned meat. We could bring in a considerable part of the food supplies in Soviet ships via Vladivostok if the U.S.A. consented to turn over to the U.S.S.R. 20 to 30 ships at the least to replenish our fleet. I have talked this over with Mr Willkie, feeling certain that he will convey it to you.

As regards the situation at the front, you are undoubtedly aware that in recent months our position in the South, particularly in the Stalingrad area, has deteriorated due to shortage of aircraft, mostly fighters. The Germans have bigger stocks of aircraft than we anticipated. In the South they have at least a twofold superiority in the air, which makes it impossible for us to protect our troops. War experience has shown that the bravest troops are helpless unless protected against air attack.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 32

Sent on October 13, 1942

Reply of Premier Stalin to Message from Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

Your message of October 9 received. Thank you.

J. Stalin

 

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 33

Sent on October 15, 1942

Reply from Premier Stalin to Message from President Roosevelt

 

 

Your message of October 12 to hand. I am grateful for the information.

J. Stalin

 

 

 

* * *

No. 34

October 19, 1942

From Premier Stalin to U.S. President Roosevelt

 

 

I have received your message of October 16. I am behind in answering because front affairs held my attention. The thing now is to have the promised cargoes delivered to the U.S.S.R. as scheduled by you.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 35

Sent on October 28, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

Your message of October 24 received. Thank you for the information.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 36

Sent on November 8, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

Your message reached me on November 5.

I congratulate you on the progress of the operation in Egypt and feel confident that now it will be possible to finish off the bands of Rommel and his Italian allies.

All of us here hope that “Torch” will be successful.

I am grateful to you for informing me that you and President Roosevelt have decided to send 20 British and American Squadrons to the Southern Front in the near future. Speedy despatch of the 20 Squadrons will be a very valuable help. As to the conferences required in this connection and to the working out of specific measures by representatives of the British, American and our own Air Forces, it would be best to hold the appropriate meetings first in Moscow and then, if necessary, directly in the Caucasus. I have already been informed that the U.S. side is sending General Elmer E. Adler for the purpose. I shall expect to hear from you the name of the British appointee.

The situation on our Caucasian front has deteriorated somewhat compared with October. The Germans have succeeded in capturing Nalchik and are closing in on Vladikavkaz, where heavy fighting is now in progress. Our weak point there is shortage of fighter aircraft.

Thank you for your good wishes for the anniversary of the U.S.S.R.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 37

November 9, 1942

Personal Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

We are highly pleased with your success in Libya and the successful launching of “Torch.” I wish you all success.

Thanks for the warning about Baku. We are taking counter measures.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 38

November 14, 1942

To President Roosevelt from Premier Stalin

 

 

My dear Mr President,

Thank you very much for your letter, which reached me through General Hurley today. I have had a long talk with him on strategic matters. I think that he understood me and is now convinced of the soundness of the Allies’ present strategy. He asked for an opportunity to visit one of our fronts, in particular the Caucasus. This opportunity will be provided.

No serious changes have occurred on the Soviet-German front in the past week. We plan to launch our winter campaign in the near future and are preparing for it. I shall keep you informed about it.

All of us here rejoice at the brilliant success of U.S. and British arms in North Africa. Congratulations on the victory. With all my heart I wish you further success.

Yours very sincerely,

Stalin

 

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 39

November 14, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill

 

 

Thank you for the message of November 13. All of us here are delighted with your success in Libya and the Anglo-American success in French Africa. I congratulate you with all my heart on the victory, and wish you further success.

In the past few days we have succeeded in halting the German advance on Vladikavkaz and stabilising the situation. Vladikavkaz is, and I think will remain, in our hands. We are taking all possible steps to retain our positions in the North Caucasus.

We are planning to start a winter campaign in the near future. Just when, depends on the weather, which is beyond our control. I shall keep you posted.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 40

Sent on November 20, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill

 

 

We have begun the offensive operations in the Stalingrad area – in its southern and north-western sectors. The objective of the first stage is to seize the Stalingrad-Likhaya railway and disrupt the communications of the Stalingrad group of the German troops. In the north-western sector the German front has been pierced along a 22-kilometre line and along a 12-kilometre line in the southern sector. The operation is proceeding satisfactorily.

 

 

 

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No. 41

Sent on November 27, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to the Prime Minister, Mr Churchill

 

 

Thank you for your message, which I received on November 25. I fully share your view that it is highly important to promote our personal relations.

I express gratitude for the steps you are taking to send another large convoy to Archangel. I realise that at the moment this is particularly difficult for you, especially in view of the considerable operations by the British fleet in the Mediterranean.

I agree with you and President Roosevelt concerning the desirability of doing everything to bring Turkey into the war on our side in the spring. That, without a doubt, would mean a great deal for the speedy defeat of Hitler and his accomplices. As for Darlan, I think the Americans have made skilful use of him to facilitate the occupation of North and West Africa. Military diplomacy should know how to use for the war aims not only the Darlans, but even the devil and his grandmother.

I have carefully read your communication saying that you and the Americans are continuing the preparations along your south-eastern and southern coasts in order to keep the Germans pinned in the Pas de Calais, etc., and that you are ready to take advantage of any favourable opportunity. That, I hope, does not imply renunciation of your Moscow promise to open a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.

I accept President Roosevelt’s and your suggestion that we call a conference of representatives of our three Staffs in Moscow to make appropriate war plans for 1943. We are prepared to meet your representatives, and the Americans, whenever you like.

So far the Stalingrad operation is proceeding successfully, helped among other things by snowfall and fog which prevent full-scale action by German aircraft.

We are planning active operations on the Central Front one of these days in order to tie up the enemy and prevent him from moving forces south.

 

 

 

* * *

 

 

No. 42

Sent on November 27, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt

 

 

Thank you for your message, received on November 21. I fully appreciate your desire to explain the military set-up to people in Australia and New Zealand, and your preoccupation with operations in the South-west Pacific. As to the Mediterranean operations, which are making such favourable progress and are important in terms of changing the whole military situation in Europe, I share your view that the time is ripe for appropriate consultations between the General Staffs of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.

Heartfelt regards and best wishes for further success in your offensive.

 

* * *

 

 

No. 43

November 28, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt

 

 

Thank you for your message which reached me on November 27. I am glad to hear of your successes in the Solomons area and of the strong build-up of your forces in the Southwest Pacific.

Feeling certain of the speedy expulsion of Germans from North Africa, I trust that this will help in launching Allied offensive operations in Europe. The intensive air raids planned for Italy will no doubt be very- useful.

We have achieved some success in the Stalingrad operation, largely facilitated by snowfall and fog which prevented the Germans from making full use of their aircraft.

We have decided to launch operations on the Central Front, too, to keep the enemy from moving his forces south.

I send you warm regards and best wishes to the U.S. Armed Forces.

 

 

 

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No. 44

Sent on November 29, 1942

To Mr Winston Churchill

 

 

On the occasion of your birthday I send you best wishes for good health and success in your war effort for the triumph of our common cause.

J. Stalin

 

 

* * *

 

No. 45

Sent on December 6, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to President Roosevelt

 

 

Your message reached me on December 5.

I welcome the idea of a meeting between the three heads of the Governments to establish a common strategy. To my great regret, however, I shall be unable to leave the Soviet Union. This is so crucial a moment that I cannot absent myself even for a single day. Just now major military operations – part of our winter campaign – are under way, nor will they be relaxed in January. It is more than likely that it will be the other way round.

Fighting is developing both at Stalingrad and on the Central Front. At Stalingrad we have encircled a large group of German troops and hope to complete their destruction.

 

 

* * *

 

No. 46

Sent on December 6, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

Your message of December 4 received. I welcome the idea of a meeting of the three heads of the Governments to establish a common strategic line. To my great regret, however, I shall be unable to leave the Soviet Union. I must tell you that this is such a crucial moment that I cannot be away even for a single day. Just now the major operations of our winter campaign are getting under way, nor will they be relaxed in January. More than likely it will be the other way round.

I await your reply to that part of my previous message concerning the opening of a second front in Western Europe in the spring of 1943.

Fighting is developing both at Stalingrad and on the Central Front. At Stalingrad we have encircled a large group of German troops and hope to complete their destruction.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 47

Sent on December 14, 1942

J. V. Stalin to F. Roosevelt

 

 

I, too, express deep regret at not being able to leave the Soviet Union in the immediate future, or even in early March. Front affairs simply will not let me do so. Indeed, they necessitate my continuous presence.

I do not know as yet what were the specific matters that you, Mr President, and Mr Churchill wanted discussed at our joint conference. Could we not discuss them by correspondence until we have an opportunity to meet? I think we shall not differ.

I feel confident that no time is being wasted, that the promise to open a second front in Europe, which you, Mr President, and Mr Churchill gave for 1942 or the spring of 1943 at the latest, will be kept and that a second front in Europe will really be opened jointly by Great Britain and the U.S.A. next spring.

With reference to the rumours about the Soviet attitude to the use of Darlan and people like him, I should like to tell you that as I and my colleagues see it, Eisenhower’s policy towards Darlan, Boisson, Giraud and the others is absolutely sound. I consider it an important achievement that you have succeeded in winning Darlan and others to the Allied side against Hitler. Earlier I wrote the same to Mr Churchill.

 

 

 

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No. 48

Sent on December 18, 1942

Personal and Secret Message from Premier Stalin to the U.S. President, Mr Roosevelt

 

 

Thank you very much for the willingness to help us. The Anglo-American squadrons with crews are no longer needed in Transcaucasia. The main battles are being fought, and will be fought, on the Central Front and in the Voronezh area. I should be most grateful if you would expedite the despatch of aircraft, especially fighters, but without crews, whom you now need badly for use in the areas mentioned.

A feature of the Soviet Air Force is that we have more than enough pilots but suffer from a shortage of machines.

 

 

 

* * *

 

No. 49

Sent on December 21, 1942

Personal Message from Premier Stalin to Prime Minister Churchill

 

 

Please accept my heartfelt thanks for your congratulations and good wishes.

 

 

* * *

 

 

Stalin