i.e., nothing. This much easier problem, i.e., to turn something into nothing, once again poses the whole story of the youth, who "has yet to seek the perfect spirit"; and one needs merely to repeat the old phrases from pages 17-18 to be extricated from all difficulties. Particularly, when one has such an obedient and gullible servant as Szeliga, on whom "Stirner" can impose the idea that just as "in the enthusiasm of thinking it may easily" (!) "happen that sight and hearing fail" him "Stirner". So he, Szeliga, has also been "seized with the enthusiasm of the spirit" and he, Szeliga, is now aspiring with all his might to become spirit", instead of acquiring spirit, that is to say, he now has to play the role of the youth as presented on page 18. Szeliga believes it and in fear and trembling he obeys: he obeys when Saint Max thunders at him: The spirit is your ideal—your God. You do this for me, you do that for me. Now you inveigh", now you say", now you can envisage", etc. When "Stirner" imposes on him the idea that "the pure spirit is an other, for he" (Szeliga) "is not it", then in truth, it is only Szeliga who is capable of believing him and who gabbles the entire nonsense after him, word for word. Incidentally, the method by which Jacques le bonhomme makes up this nonsense was already exhaustively analysed when dealing with the youth. Since you are well aware that you are something else as well as a mathematician, you aspire to become wholly a mathematician, to become merged in mathematics, the mathematician is your ideal. Mathematician means you—God. You say contritely: I am less than a mathematician and I can only envisage the mathematician, and since I am not him, then he is an other: he exists as an other, whom I call "God". Someone else in Szeliga’s place would say—Arago.

"Now, at last, after we have proved Stirner’s thesis to be a repetition of the "youth", one can state" that he “in truth originally set himself no other task” than to identify the spirit of Christian asceticism with spirit in general, and to identify the frivolous esprit for example, of the eighteenth century with Christian spiritlessness.

It follows, therefore, that the necessity of spirit dwelling in the beyond, i.e., being God, is not to be explained, as Stirner asserts, "because ego and spirit are different names for different things, because ego is not spirit and spirit is not ego" (p. 42). The explanation lies in the "enthusiasm of the spirit" which is ascribed without any grounds to Szeliga and which makes him an ascetic, i.e., a man who wishes to become God (pure spirit), and because he is not able to do this posits God outside himself. But it was a matter of the spirit having first to create itself out of nothing and then having to create spirits out of itself. Instead of this, Szeliga now produces God (the unique spirit that makes its appearance here) not because he,
Szeliga, is the spirit, but because he is Szeliga, i.e., imperfect spirit, unspiritual spirit, and therefore at the same time non-spirit. But Saint Max does not say a word about how the Christian conception of spirit as God arises, although this is now no longer such a clever feat; he assumes the existence of this conception in order to explain it.

The history of the creation of the spirit “has in truth originally set itself no other task” than to put Stirner’s stomach among the stars.

“Precisely because we are not the spirit which dwells within us, for that very reason we had to put it outside of ourselves; it was not us, and therefore we could not conceive it as existing except outside of ourselves, beyond us, in the beyond” (p. 43).

It was a matter of the spirit having first to create itself and then having to create something other than itself out of itself; the question was: What is this something else? No answer is given to this question, but after the above-mentioned “various transformations” and twists, it becomes distorted into the following new question:

“The spirit is something other than the ego. But what is this something other?” (p. 45).

Now, therefore, the question arises: What is the spirit other than the ego? whereas the original question was: What is the spirit, owing to its creation out of nothing, other than itself? With this Saint Max jumps to the next “transformation”.

**B. The Possessed (Impure History of Spirits)**

Without realising it, Saint Max has so far done no more than give instruction in the art of spirit-seeing, by regarding the ancient and modern world only as the “pseudo-body of a spirit”, as a spectral phenomenon, and seeing in it only struggles of spirits. Now, however, he consciously and *ex professo* gives instruction in the art of ghost-seeing.

*Instructions in the art of seeing spirits.* First of all one must become transformed into a complete fool, i.e., imagine oneself to be Szeliga, and then say to oneself, as Saint Max does to this Szeliga: “Look around you in the world and say for yourself whether a spirit is not looking at you from everywhere!” If one can bring oneself to imagine this, then the spirits will come “easily”, of themselves; in a “flower” one sees only the “creator”, in the mountains—a “spirit of loftiness”, in water—a “spirit of longing” or the longing of the spirit, and one hears “millions of spirits speak through the mouths of
people”. If one has achieved this level, if one can exclaim with Stirner: “Yes, ghosts are teeming in the whole world,” then “it is not difficult to advance to the point” (p. 93) where one makes the further exclamation: “Only in it? No, the world itself is an apparition” (let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil, a logical transition), “it is the wandering pseudo-body of a spirit, it is an apparition.” Then cheerfully “look near at hand or into the distance, you are surrounded by a ghostly world.... You see spirits”. If you are an ordinary person you can be satisfied with that, but if you are thinking of ranking yourself with Szeliga, then you can also look into yourself and then “you should not be surprised” if, in these circumstances and from the heights of Szeligality, you discover also that “your spirit is a ghost haunting your body”, that you yourself are a ghost which “awaits salvation, that is, a spirit”. Thereby you will have arrived at the point where you are capable of seeing “spirits” and “ghosts” in “all” people, and therewith spirit-seeing “reaches its final goal” (pp. 46, 47).

The basis of this instruction, only much more correctly expressed, is to be found in Hegel, inter alia, in the Geschichte der Philosophie, III, pp. 124, 125.

Saint Max has such faith in his own instruction that as a result he himself becomes Szeliga and asserts that

“ever since the word was made flesh, the world is spiritualised, bewitched, a ghost” (p. 47).

“Stirner” “sees spirits”.

Saint Max intends to give us a phenomenology of the Christian spirit and in his usual way seizes on only one aspect. For the Christian the world was not only spiritualised but equally despiritualised as, for example, Hegel quite correctly admits in the passage mentioned, where he brings the two aspects into relation with each other, which Saint Max should also have done if he wanted to proceed historically. As against the world’s despiritualisation in the Christian consciousness, the ancients, “who saw gods everywhere”, can with equal justification be regarded as the spiritualisers of the world—a conception which our saintly dialectician rejects with the well-meaning warning: “Gods, my dear modern man, are not spirits” (p. 47). Pious Max recognises only the holy spirit as spirit.

But even if he had given us this phenomenology (which after Hegel is moreover superfluous), he would all the same have given us

—Matthew 5:37.—Ed.
—John 1:14.—Ed.
nothing. The standpoint at which people are content with such tales about spirits is itself a religious one, because for people who adopt it religion is a satisfactory answer, they regard religion as *causa sui* (for both “self-consciousness” and “man” are still religious) instead of explaining it from the empirical conditions and showing how definite relations of industry and intercourse are necessarily connected with a definite form of society, hence, with a definite form of state and hence with a definite form of religious consciousness. If Stirner had looked at the real history of the Middle Ages, he could have found why the Christian’s notion of the world took precisely this form in the Middle Ages, and how it happened that it subsequently passed into a different one; he could have found that “Christianity” has no history whatever and that all the different forms in which it was visualised at various times were not “self-determinations” and “further developments” “of the religious spirit”, but were brought about by wholly empirical causes in no way dependent on any influence of the religious spirit.

Since Stirner “does not stick to the rules” (p. 45), it is possible, before dealing in more detail with spirit-seeing, to say here and now that the various “transformations” of Stirner’s people and their world consist merely in the transformation of the entire history of the world into the body of Hegel’s philosophy; into ghosts, which only apparently are an “other being” of the thoughts of the Berlin professor. In the *Phänomenologie*, the Hegelian bible, “the book”, individuals are first of all transformed into “consciousness” [and the] world into “object”, whereby the manifold variety of forms of life and history is reduced to a different attitude of “consciousness” to the “object”. This different attitude is reduced, in turn, to three cardinal relations: 1) the relation of consciousness to the object as to truth, or to truth as mere object (for example, sensual consciousness, natural religion, Ionian philosophy, Catholicism, the authoritarian state, etc.); 2) the relation of consciousness as the true to the object (reason, spiritual religion, Socrates, Protestantism, the French Revolution); 3) the true relation of consciousness to truth as object, or to the object as truth (logical thinking, speculative philosophy, the spirit as existing for the spirit). In Hegel, too, the first relation is defined as God the Father, the second as Christ, the third as the Holy Spirit, etc. Stirner already used these transformations when speaking of child and youth, of ancient and modern, and he repeats them later in regard to Catholicism and Protestantism, the Negro and the Mongol, etc., and then accepts this series of camouflages of a thought.

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a Its own cause.—Ed.
in all good faith as the world against which he has to assert and maintain himself as a "corporeal individual".

Second set of instructions in spirit-looking. How to transform the world into the spectre of truth, and oneself into something made holy or spectral. A conversation between Saint Max and his servant Szeliga (pp. 47, 48).

_Saint Max:_ "You have spirit, for you have thoughts. What are your thoughts?"

_Szeliga:_ "Spiritual entities."

_Saint Max:_ "Hence they are not things?"

_Szeliga:_ "No, but they are the spirit of things, the important element in all things, their innermost essence, their idea."

_Saint Max:_ "What you think is, therefore, not merely your thought?"

_Szeliga:_ "On the contrary, it is the most real, genuinely true thing in the world: it is truth itself: when I truly think, I think the truth. I can admittedly be mistaken about the truth and fail to perceive it, but when I truly perceive, then the object of my perception is the truth."

_Saint Max:_ "Thus, you endeavour all the time to perceive the truth?"

_Szeliga:_ "For me the truth is sacred.... The truth I cannot abolish; in the truth I believe, and therefore I investigate into its nature: there is nothing higher than it; it is eternal. The truth is sacred, eternal, it is the holy, the eternal."

_Saint Max_ (indignantly): "But you, by allowing yourself to become filled with this holiness, become yourself holy."

Thus, when Szeliga truly perceives some object, the object ceases to be an object and becomes "the truth". This is the first manufacture of spectres on a large scale.—It is now no longer a matter of perceiving objects, but of perceiving the truth: first he perceives objects truly, which he defines as the truth of perception, and he transforms this into perception of the truth. But after Szeliga has thus allowed truth as a spectre to be imposed on him by the threatening saint, his stern master strikes home with a question of conscience, whether he is filled "all the time" with longing for the truth, whereupon the thoroughly confused Szeliga blurts out somewhat prematurely: "For me the truth is sacred." But he immediately notices his error and tries to correct it, by shamefacedly transforming objects no longer into the truth, but into a number of truths, and abstracting "the truth" as the truth of these truths, "the truth" which he can now no longer abolish after he has distinguished it from truths which are capable of being abolished. Thereby it becomes "eternal". But not satisfied with giving it predicates such as "sacred, eternal", he transforms it into the holy, the eternal, as subject. After this, of course, Saint Max can explain to him that.

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*Here and in the following passages the German word _heilig_ and its derivatives are used, which can mean: holy, pious, sacred, sacredness, saintly, saint, to consecrate, etc.—_Ed._
having become "filled" with this holiness, he "himself becomes holy" and "should not be surprised" if he now "finds nothing but a spectre" in himself. Then our saint begins a sermon:

"The holy, moreover, is not for your senses" and quite consistently appends by means of the conjunction "and": "never will you, as a sensual being, discover its traces"; that is to say, after sensual objects are "all gone" and "the truth", "the sacred truth", "the holy" has taken their place. "But"—obviously!—"for your faith or more exactly for your spirit" (for your lack of spirit), "for it is itself something spiritual" (per appositionem), "a spirit" (again per appos.), "is spirit for the spirit".

Such is the art of transforming the ordinary world, "objects", by means of an arithmetical series of appositions, into "spirit for the spirit". Here we can only admire this dialectical method of appositions—later we shall have occasion to explore it and present it in all its classical beauty.\(^b\)

The method of appositions can also be reversed—for example here, after we have once produced "the holy", it does not receive further appositions, but is made the apposition of a new definition; this is combining progression with equation. Thus, as a result of some dialectical process "there remains the idea of another entity" which "I should serve more than myself" (per appos.), "which for me should be more important than everything else" (per appos.), "in short—a something in which I should seek my true salvation" (and finally per appos. the return to the first series), and which becomes "something 'holy'" (p. 48). We have here two progressions which are equated to each other and can thus provide the opportunity for a great variety of equations. We shall deal with this later. By this method too, "the sacred", which hitherto we have been acquainted with only as a purely theoretical designation of purely theoretical relations, has acquired a new practical meaning as "something in which I should seek my true salvation", which makes it possible to make the holy the opposite of the egoist. Incidentally we need hardly mention that this entire dialogue with the sermon that follows is nothing but another repetition of the story of the youth already met with three or four times before.

Here, having arrived at the "egoist", we need not stick to Stirner's "rules" either, because, firstly, we have to present his argument in all its purity, free from any intervening intermezzos, and, secondly, because in any case these intermezzos (on the analogy of "a Lazzarone"—Wigand, p. 159, the word should be Lazzarone—Sancho would say intermezzi's) will occur again in other parts of the book.

\(^a\) By means of an apposition.—Ed.

\(^b\) See this volume, p. 274 et seq.—Ed.
for Stirner, far from obeying his own requirement “always to draw back into himself”, on the contrary expresses himself again and again. We shall only just mention that the question raised on page 45: What is this something distinct from the “ego” that is the spirit? is now answered to the effect that it is the holy, i.e., that which is foreign to the “ego”, and that everything that is foreign to the “ego” is—thanks to some unstated appositions, appositions “in themselves”—accordingly without more ado regarded as spirit. Spirit, the holy, the foreign are identical ideas, on which he declares war, in the same way almost word for word as he did at the very outset in regard to the youth and the man. We have, therefore, still not advanced a step further than we had on page 20.

a) The Apparition

Saint Max now begins to deal seriously with the “spirits” that are “offspring of the spirit” (p. 39), with the ghostliness of everything (p. 47). At any rate, he imagines so. Actually, however, he only substitutes a new name for his former conception of history according to which people were from the outset the representatives of general concepts. These general concepts appear here first of all in the Negroid form as objective spirits having for people the character of objects, and at this level are called spectres or—apparitions. The chief spectre is, of course, “man” himself, because, according to what has been previously said, people only exist for one another as representatives of a universal—essence, concept, the holy, the foreign, the spirit—i.e., only as spectral persons, spectres, and because, according to Hegel’s Phänomenologie, page 255 and elsewhere, the spirit, insofar as for man it has the “form of thinghood”, is another man (see below about “the man”).

Thus, we see here the skies opening and the various kinds of spectres passing before us one after the other. Jacques le bonhomme forgets only that he has already caused ancient and modern times to parade before us like gigantic spectres, compared with which all the harmless fancies about God, etc., are sheer trifles.

Spectre No. 1: the supreme being, God (p. 53). As was to be expected from what has preceded, Jacques le bonhomme, whose faith moves all the mountains of world history, believes that “for thousands of years people have set themselves the task”, “have tired themselves out struggling with the awful impossibility, the endless Danaidean labour”—“to prove the existence of God”. We need not waste any more words on this incredible belief.

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a Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:2.—Ed.
Spectre No. 2: essence. What our good man says about essence is limited—apart from what has been copied out of Hegel—to “pompous words and miserable thoughts” (p. 53). “The advance from” essence “to” world essence “is not difficult”, and this world essence is, of course,

Spectre No. 3: the vanity of the world. There is nothing to say about this except that from it “easily” arises

Spectre No. 4: good and evil beings. Something, indeed, could be said about this but is not said—and one passes at once to the next:

Spectre No. 5: the essence and its realm. We should not be at all surprised that we find here essence for the second time in our honest author, for he is fully aware of his “clumsiness” (Wigand, p. 166), and therefore repeats everything several times in order not to be misunderstood. Essence is here in the first place defined as the proprietor of a “realm” and then it is said of it that it is “essence” (p. 54), after which it is swiftly transformed into

Spectre No. 6: “essences”. To perceive and to recognise them, and them alone, is religion. “Their realm” (of essences) “is—a realm of essences” (p. 54). Here there suddenly appears for no apparent reason

Spectre No. 7: the God-Man, Christ. Of him Stirner is able to say that he was “corpulent”. If Saint Max does not believe in Christ, he at least believes in his “actual corpus”. According to Stirner, Christ introduced great distress into history, and our sentimental saint relates with tears in his eyes “how the strongest Christians have racked their brains in order to comprehend him”—indeed,

“there has never been a spectre that caused such mental anguish, and no shaman, spurring himself into wild frenzy and nerve-racking convulsions, can have suffered such agony as Christians have suffered on account of this most incomprehensible spectre”.

Saint Max sheds a sympathetic tear at the grave of the victims of Christ and then passes on to the “horrible being”,

Spectre No. 8, man. Here our bold writer is seized with immediate “horror”—“he is terrified of himself”, he sees in every man a “frightful spectre”, a “sinister spectre” in which something “stalks” (pp. 55, 56). He feels highly uncomfortable. The split between phenomenon and essence gives him no peace. He is like Nabai, Abigail’s husband, of whom it is written that his essence too was separated from his phenomenal appearance: “And there was a man in Maon, whose possessions were in Carmel”. (1 Samuel 25:2.) But

\[^a\] In German a pun on the word Wesen (essence)—in Luther’s Bible translation Wesen is used in its old meaning: “possession”.—Ed.
in the nick of time, before the "mental anguish" causes Saint Max in desperation to put a bullet through his head, he suddenly remembers the ancients who "took no notice of anything of the kind in their slaves". This leads him to

Spectre No. 9, the national spirit (p. 56), about which too Saint Max, who can no longer be restrained, indulges in "frightful" fantasies, in order to transform

Spectre No. 10, "everything", into an apparition and, finally, where all enumeration ends, to hurl together in the class of spectres the "holy spirit", truth, justice, law, the good cause (which he still cannot forget) and half a dozen other things completely foreign to one another.

Apart from this there is nothing remarkable in the whole chapter except that Saint Max's faith moves an historical mountain. That is to say, he utters the opinion (p. 56):

"Only for the sake of a supreme being has anyone ever been worshipped, only as a spectre has he been regarded as a sanctified, i.e." (that is!) "protected and recognised person."

If we shift this mountain, moved by faith alone, back into its proper place, then "it will read": Only for the sake of persons who are protected, i.e., who protect themselves, and who are privileged, i.e., who seize privileges for themselves, have supreme beings been worshipped and spectres sanctified. Saint Max imagines, for example, that in antiquity, when each people was held together by material relations and interests, e.g., by the hostility of the various tribes, etc., when owing to a shortage of productive forces each had either to be a slave or to possess slaves, etc., etc., when, therefore, belonging to a particular people was a matter of "the most natural interest" (Wigand, p. [162])—that then it was only the concept people, or "nationality" that gave birth to these interests from itself; he imagines also that in modern times, when free competition and world trade gave birth to hypocritical, bourgeois cosmopolitanism and the notion of man—that here, on the contrary, the later philosophical construction of man brought about those relations as its "revelations" (p. 51). It is the same with religion, with the realm of essences, which he considers the unique realm, but concerning the essence of which he knows nothing, for otherwise he must have known that religion as such has neither essence, nor realm. In religion people make their empirical world into an entity that is only conceived, imagined, that confronts them as something foreign. This again is by no means to be explained from other concepts, from "self-consciousness" and similar nonsense, but from the entire hitherto existing mode of production and intercourse, which is just
as independent of the pure concept as the invention of the self-acting mule\textsuperscript{a} and the use of railways are independent of Hegelian philosophy. If he wants to speak of an “essence” of religion, i.e., of a material basis of this inessentiality,\textsuperscript{b} then he should look for it neither in the “essence of man”, nor in the predicates of God, but in the material world which each stage of religious development finds in existence (cf. above Feuerbach).\textsuperscript{c}

All the “spectres” which have filed before us were concepts. These concepts—leaving aside their real basis (which Stirner in any case leaves aside)—understood as concepts inside consciousness, as thoughts in people’s heads, transferred from their objectivity back into the subject, elevated from substance into self-consciousness, are—whimsies or fixed ideas.

Concerning the origin of Saint Max’s history of ghosts, see Feuerbach in Anekdoten II, p. 66,\textsuperscript{d} where it is stated:

“Theology is belief in ghosts. Ordinary theology, however, has its ghosts in the sensuous imagination, speculative theology has them in non-sensuous abstraction.”

And since Saint Max shares the belief of all critical speculative philosophers of modern times that thoughts, which have become independent, objectified thoughts—ghosts—have ruled the world and continue to rule it, and that all history up to now was the history of theology, nothing could be easier for him than to transform history into a history of ghosts. Sancho’s history of ghosts, therefore, rests on the traditional belief in ghosts of the speculative philosophers.

b) Whimsy

“Man, there are spectres in your head!... You have a fixed idea!” thunders Saint Max at his slave Szeliga. “Don’t think I am joking,” he threatens him. Don’t dare to think that the solemn “Max Stirner” is capable of joking.

The man of God is again in need of his faithful Szeliga in order to pass from the object to the subject, from the apparition to the whimsy.

Whimsy is the hierarchy in the single individual, the domination

\textsuperscript{a} The English term is used in the manuscript.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} In German a pun on the words \textit{Wesen}—essence, substance, being—and \textit{Unwesen}—literally inessence. \textit{Unwesen} can be rendered in English as disorder, nuisance, confusion or, in a different context, monster.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{c} See this volume, pp. 53-54.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{d} Ludwig Feuerbach, “Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie”.—\textit{Ed.}
of thought “in him over him”. After the world has confronted the fantasy-making youth (of page 20) as a world of his “feverish fantasies”, as a world of ghosts, “the offsprings of his own head” inside his head begin to dominate him. The world of his feverish fantasies—this is the step forward he has made—now exists as the world of his deranged mind. Saint Max—the man who is confronted by “the world of the moderns” in the form of the fantasy-making youth—has necessarily to declare that “almost the whole of mankind consists of veritable fools, inmates of a mad-house” (p. 57).

The whimsy which Saint Max discovers in the heads of people is nothing but his own whimsy—the whimsy of the “saint” who views the world sub specie aeterni and who takes both the hypocritical phrases of people and their illusions for the true motives of their actions; that is why our naive, pious man confidently pronounces the great proposition: “Almost all mankind clings to something higher” (p. 57).

“Whimsy” is “a fixed idea”, i.e., “an idea which has subordinated man to itself” or—as is said later in more popular form—all kinds of absurdities which people “have stuffed into their heads”. With the utmost ease, Saint Max arrives at the conclusion that everything that has subordinated people to itself—for example, the need to produce in order to live, and the relations dependent on this—for the child’s world is the only “world of things”, as we learned in the myth of “a man’s life”, everything that does not exist “for the child” (at times also for the animal) is in any case an “idea” and “easily also” a “fixed idea”. We are still a long way from getting rid of the youth and the child.

The chapter on whimsy aims merely at establishing the existence of the category of whimsy in the history of “man”. The actual struggle against whimsy is waged throughout the entire “book” and particularly in the second part. Hence a few examples of whimsy can suffice us here.

On page 59, Jacques le bonhomme believes that

“our newspapers are full of politics, because they are in the grip of the delusion that man was created in order to become a zoön politikon”.

Hence, according to Jacques le bonhomme, people engage in politics because our newspapers are full of them! If a church father were to glance at the stock exchange reports of our newspapers, he could not judge differently from Saint Max and would have to say: these newspapers are full of stock exchange reports because they are

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a Under the aspect of eternity (see Benedictus Spinoza, Ethica, Pars quinta).—Ed.

b Political animal—thus Aristotle defines man at the beginning of De republica, Book I.—Ed.
in the grip of the delusion that man was created in order to engage in financial speculation. Thus, it is not the newspapers that possess whimsies, but whimsies that possess "Stirner".

Stirner explains the condemnation of incest and the institutions of monogamy from "the holy", "they are the holy". If among the Persians incest is not condemned, and if the institution of polygamy occurs among the Turks, then in those places incest and polygamy are "the holy". It is not possible to see any difference between these two "holies" other than that the nonsense with which the Persians and Turks have "stuffed their heads" is different from that with which the Christian Germanic peoples have stuffed their heads.—Such is the church father's manner of "detaching himself" from history "in good time".—Jacques le bonhomme has so little inkling of the real, materialist causes for the condemnation of polygamy and incest in certain social conditions that he considers this condemnation to be merely the dogma of a creed and in common with every philistine imagines that when a man is imprisoned for a crime of this kind, it means that "moral purity" is confining him in a "house of moral correction" (p. 60)—just as jails in general seem to him to be houses for moral correction—in this respect he is at a lower level than the educated bourgeois, who has a better understanding of the matter—cf. the literature on prisons. "Stirner's" "jails" are the most trite illusions of the Berlin burgher which for him, however, hardly deserve to be called a "house of moral correction".

After Stirner, with the help of an "episodically included" "historical reflection", has discovered that "it had to come to pass that the whole man with all his abilities would prove to be religious" (p. 64) "so, too, in point of fact" "it is not surprising"—"for we are now so thoroughly religious"—"that" the oath "of the members of the jury condemns us to death and that by means of the 'official oath' the police constable, as a good Christian, has us put in the clink".

When a gendarme stops him for smoking in the Tiergarten, the cigar is knocked out of his mouth not by the royal Prussian gendarme who is paid to do so and shares in the money from fines, but by the "official oath". In precisely the same way the power of the bourgeois in the jury court becomes transformed for Stirner—owing to the pseudo-holy appearance which the amis du commerce assume here—into the power of making a vow, the power of the oath, into the "holy". "Verily, I say unto you: I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel." (Matthew 8:10.)

"For some persons a thought becomes a maxim, so that it is not the person who possesses the maxim, but rather the latter that possesses him, and with the maxim he again acquires a firm standpoint." But "it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy" (Romans 9:16).
Therefore Saint Max has on the same page to receive several thorns in the flesh and must give us a number of maxims: firstly, the maxim [to recognise] no maxims, with which goes, secondly, the maxim not to have any firm standpoint; thirdly, the maxim "although we should possess spirit, spirit should not possess us"; and fourthly, the maxim that one should also be aware of one's flesh, "for only by being aware of his flesh is man fully aware of himself, and only by being fully aware of himself, is he aware or rational".

C. The Impurely Impure History of Spirits

a) Negroes and Mongols

We now go back to the beginning of the "unique" historical scheme and nomenclature. The child becomes the Negro, the youth—the Mongol. See "The Economy of the Old Testament".

"The historical reflection on our Mongolhood, which I shall include episodically at this point, I present without any claim to thoroughness or even to authenticity, but solely because it seems to me that it can contribute to clarifying the rest" (p. 87).

Saint Max tries to "clarify" for himself his phrases about the child and the youth by giving them world-embracing names, and he tries to "clarify" these world-embracing names by replacing them with his phrases about the child and the youth. "The Negroid character represents antiquity, dependence on things" (child); "the Mongoloid character—the period of dependence on thoughts, the Christian epoch" (the youth). (Cf. "The Economy of the Old Testament".) The following words are reserved for the future: I am owner of the world of things, and I am owner of the world of thoughts" (pp. 87, 88). This "future" has already happened once, on page 20, in connection with the man, and it will occur again later, beginning with page 226.

First "historical reflection without claim to thoroughness or even to authenticity": Since Egypt is part of Africa where Negroes live, it follows that "included" "in the Negro era" (p. 88) are the "campaigns of Sesostris", which never took place, and the "significance of Egypt" (the significance it had also at the time of the Ptolemies, Napoleon's expedition to Egypt, Mohammed Ali, the Eastern question, the pamphlets of Duvergier de Haurannes, etc.), "and of North Africa in general" (and therefore of Carthage, Hannibal's campaign against Rome, and "easily also", the significance of Syracuse and Spain, the Vandals, Tertullian, the Moors, Al Hussein Abu Ali Ben Abdallah Ibn Sina, piratical states, the French

\[2\text{ Corinthians 12:7.—Ed.}\]
in Algeria, Abd-el-Kader, Père Enfantin and the four new toads of the Charivari) (p. 88). Consequently, Stirner clarifies the campaigns of Sesostris, etc., by transferring them to the Negro era, and he clarifies the Negro era by "episodically including" it as a historical illustration of his unique thoughts "about our childhood years".

**Second "historical reflection":** "To the Mongoloid era belong the campaigns of the Huns and Mongols up to the Russians" (and Wasserpolackeren): thus here again the campaigns of the Huns and Mongols, together with the Russians, are "clarified" by their inclusion in the "Mongoloid era", and the "Mongoloid era"—by pointing out that it is the era of the phrase "dependence on thoughts", which we have already encountered in connection with the youth.

**Third "historical reflection":**

In the Mongoloid era the "value of my ego cannot possibly be put at a high level because the hard diamond of the non-ego is too high in price, because it is still too gritty and impregnable for it to be absorbed and consumed by my ego. On the contrary, people are simply exceptionally busy crawling about on this static world, this substance, like parasitic animalcules on a body from whose juices they extract nourishment, but nevertheless do not devour the body. It is the bustling activity of noxious insects, the industriousness of Mongols. Among the Chinese indeed everything remains as of old, etc.... *Therefore* (because among the Chinese everything remains as of old) "in our Mongol era every change has only been reformatory and corrective, and not destructive, devouring or annihilating. The substance, the object remains. All our industriousness is only the activity of ants and the jumping of fleas ... juggling on the tightrope of the objective", etc. (p. 88. Cf. Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, pp. 113, 118, 119 (unsoftened substance), p. 140, etc., where China is understood as "substantiality").

We learn here, therefore, that in the true Caucasian era people will be guided by the maxim that the earth, "substance", the "object", the "static" has to be devoured, "consumed", "annihilated", "absorbed", "destroyed", and along with the earth the solar system that is inseparable from it. World-devouring "Stirner" has already introduced us to the "reformatory or corrective activity" of the Mongols as the youth's and Christian's "plans for the salvation and correction of the world" on page 36. Thus we have still not advanced a step. It is characteristic of the entire "unique" conception of history that the highest stage of this Mongol activity earns the title of "scientific"—from which already now the conclusion can be drawn, which Saint Max later tells us, that the culmination of the Mongolian heaven is the Hegelian kingdom of spirits.

**Fourth "historical reflection":** The world on which the Mongols crawl about is now transformed by means of a "flea jump" into the "positive", this into the "precept", and, with the help of a paragraph on page 89, the precept becomes "morality". "Morality appears in its
first form as custom”—hence it comes forward as a person, but in a trice it becomes transformed into a sphere:

“To act in accordance with the morals and customs of one’s country means here” (i.e., in the sphere of morality) “to be moral”. “Therefore” (because this occurs in the sphere of morality as a custom) “pure, moral behaviour in the most straightforward form is practised in ... China!”

Saint Max is unfortunate in his examples. On page 116 in just the same way he attributes to the North Americans the “religion of honesty”. He regards the two most rascally nations on earth, the patriarchal swindlers—the Chinese, and the civilised swindlers—the Yankees, as “straightforward”, “moral” and “honest”. If he had looked up his crib he could have found the North Americans classed as swindlers on page 81 of the *Philosophie der Geschichte* and the Chinese ditto on page 130.

“One”—that friend of the saintly worthy man—now helps him to arrive at innovation, and from this an “and” brings him back to custom, and thus the material is prepared for achieving a master stroke in the

Fifth historical reflection: “There is in fact no doubt that by means of custom man protects himself against the importunity of things, of the world”—for example, from hunger;

“and”—as quite naturally follows from this—

“founds a world of his own”—which “Stirner” has need of now—

“in which alone he feels in his native element and at home”,—“alone”, after he has first by “custom” made himself “at home” in the existing “world”—

“i.e., builds himself a heaven”—because China is called the Celestial Empire.

“For indeed heaven has no other significance than that of being the real homeland of man”—in this context, however, it signifies the imagined unreality of the real homeland—

“where nothing alien any longer prevails upon him”, i.e., where what is his own prevails upon him as something alien, and all the rest of the old story. “Or rather”, to use Saint Bruno’s words, or “it is easily possible”, to use Saint Max’s words, that this proposition should read as follows:

Stirner’s proposition without claim to thoroughness or even to authenticity

“There is in fact no doubt that by means of custom man protects himself against the importunity of things, of the world, and founds a world of his own, in which alone he feels in his native element and at home, i.e., builds himself a heaven.

Clarified proposition

“There is in fact no doubt” that because China is called the Celestial Empire, because “Stirner” happens to be speaking of China and as he is “accustomed” by means of ignorance “to protect himself against the importunity of things, of the world, and to found a
Sixth: "historical reflection". On page 90, Stirner imagines that in China everything is provided for; no matter what happens, the Chinese always knows how he should behave, and he has no need to decide according to circumstances; no unforeseen event will overthrow his celestial calm.

Nor any British bombardment either—he knew exactly "how he should behave", particularly in regard to the unfamiliar steamships and shrapnel-bombs.

Saint Max extracted that from Hegel’s Philosophie der Geschichte, pages 118 and 127, to which, of course, he had to add something unique, in order to achieve his reflection as given above.

"Consequently," continues Saint Max, "mankind climbs the first rung of the ladder of education by means of custom, and since it imagines that by gaining culture, it has gained heaven, the realm of culture or second nature, it actually mounts the first rung of the heavenly ladder" (p. 90).

"Consequently", i.e., because Hegel begins history with China, and because "the Chinese does not lose his equanimity", "Stirner" transforms mankind into a person who "mounts the first rung of the ladder of culture" and indeed does so "by means of custom", because China has no other meaning for Stirner than that of being the embodiment of "custom". Now it is only a question for our zealot against the holy of transforming the "ladder" into a "heavenly ladder", since China is also called the Celestial Empire. "Since mankind imagines" ("wherefrom" does Stirner "know everything that mankind imagines, see Wigand, page 189)—and this ought to have been proved by Stirner—firstly that it transforms "culture" into the "heaven of culture", and secondly that it transforms the "heaven of
culture” into the “culture of heaven”—an alleged notion on the part of mankind which appears on page 91 as a notion of Stirner’s and thereby receives its correct expression—“so it actually mounts the first rung of the heavenly ladder”. Since it imagines that it mounts the first rung of the heavenly ladder—so—it mounts it actually. “Since” the youth imagines that he becomes pure spirit, he does actually become such! See the youth and the “Christian” on the transition from the world of things to the world of the spirit, where the simple formula for this heavenly ladder of “unique” ideas already occurs.

Seventh historical reflection, page 90. “If Mongolism” it follows immediately after the heavenly ladder, whereby “Stirner”, through the alleged notion on the part of mankind, was able to ascertain the existence of a spiritual essence [Wesen], “if Mongolism has established the existence of spiritual beings [Wesen]” (rather—if “Stirner” has established his fancy about the spiritual essence of the Mongols), “then the Caucasians have fought for thousands of years against these spiritual beings, in order to get to the bottom of them”. (The youth, who becomes a man and “tries all the time” to penetrate behind thoughts”, the Christian who “tries all the time” to explore the depths of divinity”. Since the Chinese have noted the existence of God knows what spiritual beings (“Stirner” does not note a single one, apart from his heavenly ladder)—so for thousands of years the Caucasians have to wrangle with “these” Chinese “spiritual beings”; moreover, two lines below Stirner puts on record that they actually “stormed the Mongolian heaven, the tien”, and continues: “When will they destroy this heaven, when will they finally become actual Caucasians and find themselves?"

Here we have the negative unity, already seen earlier as man, now appearing as the “actual Caucasian”, i.e., not Negroid, not Mongolian, but as the Caucasian Caucasian. This latter, therefore, as a concept, as essence, is here separated from the actual Caucasians, is counterposed to them as the “idea” of the Caucasian”, as a “vocation” in which they should “find themselves”, as a “destiny”, as “task”, as “the holy”, as “the holy” Caucasian, “the perfect” Caucasian, “who indeed” is the Caucasian “in heaven—God”.

“In the sedulous struggle of the Mongolian race, men had built a heaven”—so “Stirner” believes (p. 91), forgetting that actual Mongols are much more occupied with sheep than with heaven—when the people of the Caucasian stock, so long as they ... have

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a In German a pun based on the words die Hammel—the sheep, and die Himmei—the heavens.—Ed.
to do with heaven ... undertook the business of storming heaven.” Had built a heaven, when ... so long as they have... [they] undertook. The unassuming “historical reflection” is here expressed in a consecutio temporum which also does not “lay claim” to classic form “or even” to grammatical correctness; the construction of the sentences corresponds to the construction of history. “Stirner’s” “claims” “are restricted to this” and “thereby achieve their final goal”.

Eighth historical reflection, which is the reflection of reflections, the alpha and omega of the whole of Stirner’s history: Jacques le bonhomme, as we have pointed out from the beginning, sees in all the movement of nations that has so far taken place merely a sequence of heavens (p. 91), which can also be expressed as follows: successive generations of the Caucasian race up to the present day did nothing but squabble about the concept of morality (p. 92) and “their activity has been restricted to this” (p. 91). If they had got out of their heads this unfortunate morality, this apparition, they would have achieved something; as it was, they achieved nothing, absolutely nothing, and have to allow Saint Max to set them a task as if they were schoolboys. It is completely in accordance with his view of history that at the end (p. 92) he conjures up speculative philosophy so that “in it this heavenly kingdom, the kingdom of spirits and spectres, should find its proper order”—and that in a later passage speculative philosophy should be conceived as the “perfect kingdom of spirits”.

Why it is that for those who regard history in the Hegelian manner the result of all preceding history was finally bound to be the kingdom of spirits perfected and brought into order in speculative philosophy—the solution of this secret “Stirner” could have very simply found by recourse to Hegel himself. To arrive at this result “the concept of spirit must be taken as the basis and then it must be shown that history is the process of the spirit itself” (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 91). After the “concept of spirit” has been imposed on history as its basis, it is very easy, of course, to “show” that it is to be discovered everywhere, and then to make this as a process “find its proper order”.

After making everything “find its proper order”, Saint Max can now exclaim with enthusiasm: “To desire to win freedom for the spirit, that is Mongolism”, etc. (cf. p. 17: “To bring to light pure thought, etc.—that is the joy of the youth”, etc.), and can declare hypocritically: “Hence it is obvious that Mongolism ... represents non-sensuousness and unnaturalness”, etc.—when he ought to have said: it is obvious that the Mongol is only the disguised youth who,
being the negation of the world of things, can also be called "unnaturalness", "non-sensuousness", etc.

We have again reached the point where the "youth" can pass into the "man": "But who will transform the spirit into its nothing? He, who by means of the spirit represented nature as the futile, the finite, the transitory" (i.e., imagined it as such—and, according to page 16 et seq., this was done by the youth, later the Christian, then the Mongol, then the Mongolid Caucasian, but properly speaking only by idealism), "he alone can also degrade the spirit" (namely in his imagination) "to the same futility" (therefore the Christian, etc.? No, exclaims "Stirner" resorting to a similar trick as on pages 19-20 in the case of the man). "I can do it, each of you can do it who operates and creates" (in his imagination) "as the unrestricted ego", "in a word, the egoist can do it" (p. 93), i.e., the man, the Caucasian Caucasian, who therefore is the perfect Christian, the true Christian, the holy one, the embodiment of the holy.

Before dealing with the further nomenclature, we also "should like at this point to include an historical reflection" on the origin of Stirner’s "historical reflection about our Mongolism"; our reflection differs, however, from Stirner’s in that it definitely "lays claim to thoroughness and authenticity". His whole historical reflection, just as that on the "ancients", is a concoction out of Hegel.

The Negroid state is conceived as "the child" because Hegel says on page 89 of his *Philosophie der Geschichte*:

"Africa is the country of the childhood of history." "In defining the African" (Negroid) "spirit we must entirely discard the category of universality" (p. 90)—i.e., although the child or the Negro has ideas, he still does not have the idea. "Among the Negroes consciousness has not yet reached a firm objective existence, as for example God, law, in which man would have the perception of his essence" ... "thanks to which, knowledge of an absolute being is totally absent. The Negro represents natural man in all his lack of restraint" (p. 90). "Although they must be conscious of their dependence on the natural" (on things, as "Stirner" says), "this, however, does not lead them to the consciousness of something higher" (p. 91).

Here we meet again all Stirner’s determinations of the child and the Negro—dependence on things, independence of ideas and especially of "the idea", "the essence", "the absolute" (holy) "being", etc.

He found that in Hegel the Mongols and, in particular, the Chinese appear as the beginning of history and since for Hegel, too, history is a history of spirits (but not in such a childish way as with "Stirner"), it goes without saying that the Mongols brought the spirit into history and are the original representatives of everything "sacred". In particular, on page 110, Hegel describes the "Mongolian kingdom" (of the Dalai-Lama) as the "ecclesiastical" realm, the
“kingdom of theocratic rule”, a “spiritual, religious kingdom”—in contrast to the worldly empire of the Chinese. “Stirner”, of course, has to identify China with the Mongols. In Hegel, on page 140, there even occurs the “Mongolian principle” from which “Stirner” derived his “Mongolism”. Incidentally, if he really wanted to reduce the Mongols to the category of “idealism”, he could have “found established” in the Dalai-Lama system and Buddhism quite different “spiritual beings” from his fragile “heavenly ladder”. But he did not even have time to look properly at Hegel’s Philosophie der Geschichte. The peculiarity and uniqueness of Stirner’s attitude to history consists in the egoist being transformed into a “clumsy” copier of Hegel.

b) **Catholicism and Protestantism**

(Cf. “The Economy of the Old Testament”)

What we here call Catholicism, “Stirner” calls the “Middle Ages”, but as he confuses (as “in everything”) the pious, religious character of the Middle Ages, the religion of the Middle Ages, with the actual, profane Middle Ages in flesh and blood, we prefer to give the matter its right name at once.

“The Middle Ages” were a “lengthy period, in which people were content with the illusion of having the truth” (they did not desire or do anything else), “without seriously thinking about whether one must be true oneself in order to possess the truth”.—“In the Middle Ages people” (that is, the whole of the Middle Ages) “mortified the flesh, in order to become capable of assimilating the holy” (p. 108).

Hegel defines the attitude to the divine in the Catholic church by saying

“that people’s attitude to the absolute was as to something purely external” (Christianity in the form of externality) (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 148, and elsewhere). Of course, the individual has to be purified in order to assimilate the truth, but “this also occurs in an external way, through redemptions, fasts, self-flagellations, visits to holy places, pilgrimages” (ibid., p. 140).

“Stirner” makes this transition by saying:

“In the same way, too, as people strain their eyes in order to see a distant object ... so they mortified the flesh, etc.”

Since in “Stirner’s” “book” the Middle Ages are identified with Catholicism, they naturally end with Luther (p. 108). Luther himself is reduced to the following definition, which has already cropped up in connection with the youth, in the conversation with Szeliga and elsewhere:

“Man, if he wants to attain truth, must become as true as truth itself. Only he who already has truth in faith can participate in it.”

Concerning Lutheranism, Hegel says:
"The truth of the gospel exists only in the true attitude to it.... The essential attitude of the spirit exists only for the spirit.... Hence the attitude of the spirit to the content is that although the content is essential, it is equally essential that the holy and consecrating spirit should stand in relation to this content" (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 234). "This then is the Lutheran faith—his (i.e., man's) "faith is required of him and it alone can truly be taken into account" (ibid., p. 230). "Luther... affirms that the divine is divine only inssofar as it is apprehended in this subjective spirituality of faith" (ibid., p. 138). "The doctrine of the" (Catholic) "church is truth as existent truth" (Philosophie der Religion, II, p. 331).

"Stirner" continues:

"Accordingly, with Luther the knowledge arises that truth, because it is thought, exists only for the thinking man; and this means that with regard to his object—thought—man must adopt a totally different standpoint, a pious (per appos.), scientific standpoint, or that of thinking" (p. 110).

Apart from the repetition which "Stirner" again "includes" here, only the transition from faith to thinking deserves attention. Hegel makes the transition in the following way:

"But this spirit" (namely, the holy and consecrating spirit) "is, secondly, essentially also thinking spirit. Thinking as such must also have its development in it", etc. (Geschichte der Philosophie, p. 234).

"Stirner" continues:

"This thought" ("that I am spirit, spirit alone") "pervades the history of the Reformation down to the present day" (p. 111).

From the sixteenth century onwards, no other history exists for "Stirner" than the history of the Reformation—and the latter only in the interpretation in which Hegel presents it.

Saint Max has again displayed his gigantic faith. He has again taken as literal truth all the illusions of German speculative philosophy; indeed, he has made them still more speculative, still more abstract. For him there exists only the history of religion and philosophy—and this exists for him only through the medium of Hegel, who with the passage of time has become the universal crib, the reference source for all the latest German speculators about principles and manufacturers of systems.

Catholicism = attitude to truth as thing, child, Negro, the "ancient".

Protestantism = attitude to truth in the spirit, youth, Mongol, the "modern".

The whole scheme was superfluous, since all this was already present in the section on "spirit".

As already mentioned in "The Economy of the Old Testament", it

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G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion.—Ed.
is now possible to make the child and the youth appear again in new "transformations" within Protestantism, as "Stirner" actually does on page 112, where he conceives English, empirical philosophy as the child, in contrast to German, speculative philosophy as the youth. Here again he copies out Hegel, who here, as elsewhere in the "book", frequently appears as "one".

"One"—i.e., Hegel—"expelled Bacon from the realm of philosophy." "And, indeed, what is called English philosophy does not seem to have got any farther than the discoveries made by so-called clear intellects such as Bacon and Hume" (p. 112).

Hegel expresses this as follows:

"Bacon is in fact the real leader and representative of what is called philosophy in England and beyond which the English have by no means gone as yet" (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 254).

The people whom "Stirner" calls "clear intellects" Hegel (ibid., p. 255) calls "educated men of the world"—Saint Max on one occasion even transforms them into the "simplicity of childish nature", for the English philosophers have to represent the child. On the same childish grounds Bacon is not allowed to have "concerned himself with theological problems and cardinal propositions", regardless of what may be said in his writings (particularly De Augmentis Scientiarum, a Novum Organum and the Essays b). On the other hand, "German thought ... sees life only in cognition itself" (p. 112), for it is the youth. Ecce iterum Crispinus!

How Stirner transforms Descartes into a German philosopher, the reader can see for himself in the "book", p. 112.

D. Hierarchy

In the foregoing presentation Jacques le bonhomme conceives history merely as the product of abstract thoughts—or, rather, of his notions of abstract thoughts—as governed by these notions, which, in the final analysis, are all resolved into the "holy". This domination of the "holy", of thought, of the Hegelian absolute idea over the empirical world he further portrays as a historical relation existing at the present time, as the domination of the holy ones, the ideologists, over the vulgar world—as a hierarchy. In this hierarchy, what previously appeared consecutively exists side by side, so that one of the two co-existing forms of development rules over the other. Thus, the

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a Francis Bacon, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum.—Ed.
b Francis Bacon, The Essays or Councels. Civill and Morall.—Ed.
c And there is Crispinus again—the opening words of Juvenal's fourth satire.—Ed.
youth rules over the child, the Mongol over the Negro, the modern over the ancient, the selfless egoist (*citoyen*) over the egoist in the usual sense of the word (bourgeois), etc.—see “The Economy of the Old Testament”. The “destruction” of the “world of things” by the “world of the spirit” appears here as the “domination” of the “world of thoughts” over the “world of things”. The outcome, of course, is bound to be that the domination which the “world of thoughts” exercises from the outset in history is at the end of the latter also presented as the real, actually existing domination of the thinkers—and, as we shall see, in the final analysis, as the domination of the speculative philosophers—over the world of things, so that Saint Max has only to fight against thoughts and ideas of the ideologists and to overcome them, in order to make himself “possessor of the world of things and the world of thoughts”.

“Hierarchy is the domination of thought, the domination of the spirit. We are still hierarchical to this day, we are under the yoke of those who rely on thoughts, and thoughts”—who has failed to notice it long ago?—“are the holy” (p. 97). (Stirner has tried to safeguard himself against the reproach that in his whole book he has only been producing “thoughts”, i.e., the “holy”, by in fact nowhere producing any thoughts in it. Although in the Wigand periodical he ascribes to himself “virtuosity in thinking”, i.e., according to his interpretation, virtuosity in the fabrication of the “holy”—and this we shall concede him.)—“Hierarchy is the supreme domination of spirit” (p. 467).

“The medieval hierarchy was only a weak hierarchy, for it was forced to allow all kinds of profane barbarism to exist unrestricted alongside it” (“how Stirner knew so much about what the hierarchy was forced to do”, we shall soon see), “and only the Reformation steeled the power of the hierarchy” (p. 310). “Stirner” indeed thinks that “the domination of spirits was never before so all-embracing and omnipotent” as after the Reformation; he thinks that this domination of spirits “instead of divorcing the religious principle from art, state and science, on the contrary, raised these wholly from actuality into the kingdom of the spirit and made them religious”.

This view of modern history merely dilates upon speculative philosophy’s old illusion of the domination of spirit in history. Indeed, this passage even shows how pious Jacques le bonhomme in all good faith continually takes the world outlook derived from Hegel, and which has become traditional for him, as the real world, and “manoeuvres” on that basis. What may appear as “his own” and “unique” in this passage is the conception of this domination of the spirit as a hierarchy—and here, again, we will “include” a brief “historical reflection” on the origin of Stirner’s “hierarchy”.

Hegel speaks of the philosophy of hierarchy in the following “transformations”:

“We have seen in Plato’s Republic the idea that philosophers should govern; now” (in the Catholic Middle Ages) “the time has come when it is affirmed that the spiritual should dominate; but the spiritual has acquired the meaning that the clerical, the clergy, should dominate. Thus, the spiritual is made a special being, the individual”
"Thereby actuality, the mundane, is forsaken by God ... a few individual persons are holy, the others unholy" (ibid., p. 136). "Godforsakenness" is more closely defined thus: "All these forms" (family, work, political life, etc.) "are considered nugatory, unholy" (Philosophie der Religion, II, p. 343).—"It is a union with worldliness which is unreconciled, worldliness which is crude in itself" (for this Hegel elsewhere also uses the word "barbarism"); cf., for example. Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 134) "and, being crude in itself, is simply subjected to domination." (Philosophie der Religion, II, pp. 342, 343).—"The true domination of the spirit, however, cannot be domination of the spirit in the sense that what opposes it should be something subordinate" (ibid., p. 131).—"The true meaning is that the spiritual as such" (according to "Stirner" the "holy") "should be the determining factor, and this has been so until our times; thus, we see in the French Revolution" (following in the wake of Hegel, "Stirner" sees it) "that the abstract idea should dominate: state constitutions and laws should be determined by it, it should constitute the bond between people, and people should be conscious that that which they hold as valid are abstract ideas, liberty and equality, etc." (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 132). The true domination of spirit as brought about by Protestantism, in contrast to its imperfect form in the Catholic hierarchy, is defined further in the sense that "the earthly is made spiritual in itself" (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 185); "that the divine is realised in the sphere of actuality" (the Catholic Godforsakenness of actuality, therefore, ceases to exist—Philosophie der Religion, II, p. 344); that the "contradiction" between holiness and worldliness "is resolved in morality" (Philosophie der Religion, II, p. 343); that "moral institutions" (marriage, the family, the state, earning one's livelihood, etc.) are "divine, holy" (Philosophie der Religion, II, p. 344).

Hegel expresses this true domination of spirit in two forms:

"State, government, law, property, civic order" (and, as we know from his other works, art, science, etc., as well), "all this is the religious... emerging in the form of the finite" (Geschichte der Philosophie, III, p. 185).

And, finally, this domination of the religious, the spiritual, etc., is expressed as the domination of philosophy:

"Consciousness of the spiritual is now" (in the eighteenth century) "essentially the foundation, and thereby domination has passed to philosophy" (Philosophie der Geschichte, p. 440).

Hegel, therefore, ascribes to the Catholic hierarchy of the Middle Ages the intention of wanting "to be the domination of spirit" and thereupon regards it as a restricted imperfect form of this domination of spirit, the culmination of which he sees in Protestantism and its alleged further development. However unhistorical this may be, nevertheless, Hegel is sufficiently historically-minded not to extend the use of the name "hierarchy" beyond the bounds of the Middle Ages. But Saint Max knows from this same Hegel that the later epoch is the "truth" of the preceding one; hence the epoch of the perfect domination of spirit is the truth of that epoch in which the domination of spirit was as yet imperfect, so that Protestantism is the truth of hierarchy and therefore true hierarchy. Since,
however, only true hierarchy deserves to be called hierarchy, it is clear that the hierarchy of the Middle Ages had to be "weakly", and it is all the easier for Stirner to prove this since in the passages given above and in hundreds of other passages from Hegel the imperfection of the domination of spirit in the Middle Ages is portrayed. He only needed to copy these out, the whole of his “own” work consisting in substituting the word “hierarchy” for “domination of spirit”. There was no need for him even to formulate the simple argument by means of which domination of spirit as such is transformed by him into hierarchy, since it has become the fashion among German theoreticians to give the name of the cause to the effect and, for example, to put back into the category of theology everything that has arisen out of theology and has not yet fully attained the height of the principles of these theoreticians—e.g., Hegelian speculation, Straussian pantheism, etc.—a trick especially prevalent in 1842. From the above-quoted passages it also follows that Hegel: 1) appraises the French Revolution as a new and more perfect phase of this domination of spirit; 2) regards philosophers as the rulers of the world of the nineteenth century; 3) maintains that now only abstract ideas have validity among people; 4) that he already regards marriage, the family, the state, earning one’s livelihood, civic order, property, etc., as “divine and holy”, as the “religious principle” and 5) that morality as worldly sanctity or as sanctified worldliness is represented as the highest and ultimate form of the domination of spirit over the world—all these things are repeated word for word in “Stirner”.

Accordingly there is no need to say or prove anything more concerning Stirner’s hierarchy, apart from why Saint Max copied out Hegel—a fact, however, for the explanation of which further material data are necessary, and which, therefore, is only explicable for those who are acquainted with the Berlin atmosphere. It is another question how the Hegelian idea of the domination of spirit arose, and about this see what has been said above.a

Saint Max’s adoption of Hegel’s world domination of the philosophers and his transformation of it into a hierarchy are due to the extremely uncritical credulity of our saint and to a “holy” or unholy ignorance which is content with “seeing through” history (i.e., with glancing through Hegel’s historical writings) without troubling to “know” many “things” about it. In general, he was bound to be afraid that as soon as he “learned” he would no longer be able to “abolish and dissolve” (p. 96), and, therefore, remain stuck in the

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a See this volume, pp. 59-62.—Ed.
“bustling activity of noxious insects”—a sufficient reason not to "proceed" to the "abolition and dissolution" of his own ignorance.

If, like Hegel, one designs such a system for the first time, a system embracing the whole of history and the present-day world in all its scope, one cannot possibly do so without comprehensive, positive knowledge, without great energy and keen insight and without dealing at least in some passages with empirical history. On the other hand, if one is satisfied with exploiting an already existing pattern, transforming it for one's "own" purposes and demonstrating this conception of one's own by means of isolated examples (e.g., Negroes and Mongols, Catholics and Protestants, the French Revolution, etc.)—and this is precisely what our warrior against the holy does—then absolutely no knowledge of history is necessary. The result of all this exploitation inevitably becomes comic; most of all comic when a jump is made from the past into the immediate present, examples of which we saw already in connection with "whimsy".

As for the actual hierarchy of the Middle Ages, we shall merely note here that it did not exist for the people, for the great mass of human beings. For the great mass only feudalism existed, and hierarchy only existed insofar as it was itself either feudal or anti-feudal (within the framework of feudalism). Feudalism itself had entirely empirical relations as its basis. Hierarchy and its struggle against feudalism (the struggle of the ideologists of a class against the class itself) are only the ideological expression of feudalism and of the struggles developing within feudalism itself—which include also the struggles of the feudally organised nations among themselves. Hierarchy is the ideal form of feudalism; feudalism is the political form of the medieval relations of production and intercourse. Consequently, the struggle of feudalism against hierarchy can only be explained by elucidating these practical material relations. This elucidation of itself puts an end to the previous conception of history which took the illusions of the Middle Ages in trust, in particular those illusions which the Emperor and the Pope brought to bear in their struggle against each other.

Since Saint Max merely reduces the Hegelian abstractions about the Middle Ages and hierarchy to "pompous words and paltry thoughts", there is no need to examine in more detail the actual, historical hierarchy.

From the above it is now clear that the trick can also be reversed and Catholicism regarded not just as a preliminary stage, but

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a See this volume, pp. 160-63.—Ed.
also as the negation of the real hierarchy; in which case Catholicism = negation of spirit, non-spirit, sensuousness, and then one gets the great proposition of Jacques le bonhomme—that the Jesuits "saved us from the decay and destruction of sensuousness" (p. 118). What would have happened to "us" if the "destruction" of sensuousness had come to pass, we do not learn. The whole material movement since the sixteenth century, which did not save "us" from the "decay" of sensuousness, but, on the contrary, developed "sensuousness" to a much wider extent, does not exist for "Stirner"—it is the Jesuits who brought about all that. Compare, incidentally, Hegel's *Philosophie der Geschichte*, p. 425.

By carrying over the old domination of the clerics to modern times, Saint Max interprets modern times as "clericalism"; and then by regarding this domination of the clerics carried over to modern times as something distinct from the old medieval clerical domination, he depicts it as domination of the ideologists, as "scholasticism". Thus clericalism = hierarchy as the domination of the spirit, scholasticism = the domination of the spirit as hierarchy.

"Stirner" achieves this simple transition to clericalism—which is no transition at all—by means of three weighty transformations.

Firstly, he "has" the "concept of clericalism" in anyone "who lives for a great idea, for a good cause" (still the good cause!), "for a doctrine, etc."

Secondly, in his world of illusion Stirner "comes up against" the "age-old illusion of a world that has not yet learned to disperse with clericalism", namely—"to live and create for the sake of an idea, etc."

Thirdly, "it is the domination of the idea, i.e., clericalism", that is: "Robespierre, for example" (for example!), "Saint-Just, and so on" (and so on!) "were out-and-out priests", etc. All three transformations in which clericalism is "discovered", "encountered" and "called upon" (all this on p. 100), therefore, express nothing more than what Saint Max has already repeatedly told us, namely, the domination of spirit, of the idea, of the holy, over "life" (ibid.).

After the "domination of the idea, i.e., clericalism" has thus been foisted upon history, Saint Max can, of course, without difficulty find this "clericalism" again in the whole of preceding history, and thus depict "Robespierre, for example, Saint-Just, and so on" as priests and identify them with Innocent III and Gregory VII, and so all uniqueness vanishes in the face of the unique. All of them, properly speaking, are merely different names, different disguises for one person, "clericalism", which made all history from the beginning of Christianity. As to how, with this sort of conception of history, "all cats become grey", since all historical differences are "abolished"
and "resolved" in the "notion of clericalism"—as to this. Saint Max at once gives us a striking example in his "Robespierre, for example, Saint-Just, and so on". Here we are first given Robespierre as an "example" of Saint-Just, and Saint-Just—as an "and-so-on" of Robespierre. It is then said:

"These representatives of holy interests are confronted by a world of innumerable 'personal', earthly interests."

By whom were they confronted? By the Girondists and Thermidorians, who (see "for example" R. Levasseur's Mémoires; "and so on", "i.e.", Nougaret, Histoire des prisons; Barère; "Deux amis de la liberté", et du commerce; Montgaillard, Histoire de France; Madame Roland, Abbé à la postérité; J. B. Louvet's Mémoires and even the disgusting Essais historiques by Beaufieu, etc., etc., as well as all the proceedings before the revolutionary tribunal, "and so on") constantly reproached them, the real representatives of revolutionary power, i.e., of the class which alone was truly revolutionary, the 'innumerable' masses, for violating "sacred interests", the constitution, freedom, equality, the rights of man, republicanism, law, sainte propriété, "for example" the division of powers, humanity, morality, moderation, "and so on". They were opposed by all the priests, who accused them of violating all the main and secondary items of the religious and moral catechism (see "for example" Histoire du clergé de France pendant la révolution, by M. R., Paris, libraire catholique, 1828, "and so on"). The historical comment of the bourgeois that during the règne de la terreur "Robespierre, for example, Saint-Just, and so on" cut off the heads of honnêtes gens" (see the numerous writings of the simpleton Monsieur Peltier, "for example", La conspiration de Robespierre par Montjoie "and so on") is expressed by Saint Max in the following transformation:

"Because the revolutionary priests and school-masters served Man, they cut the throats of men."

This, of course, saves Saint Max the trouble of wasting even one "unique" little word about the actual, empirical grounds for the cutting off of heads—grounds which were based on extremely worldy interests, though not, of course, of the stockjobbers, but of the "innumerable" masses. An earlier "priest", Spinoza, already in the seventeenth century had the brazen audacity to act the "strict
school-master” of Saint Max, by saying: “Ignorance is no argument.”* Consequently Saint Max loathes the priest Spinoza to such an extent that he accepts his anti-cleric, the priest Leibniz, and for all such astonishing phenomena as the terror, “for example”, the cutting off of heads, “and so on”, produces “sufficient grounds”, viz., that “the ecclesiastics stuffed their heads with something of the kind” (p. 98).

Blessed Max, who has found sufficient grounds for everything (“I have now found the ground into which my anchor is eternally fastened,”b in the idea, “for example”, in the “clericalism”, “and so on” of “Robespierre, for example, Saint-Just, and so on”, George Sand, Proudhon, the chaste Berlin seamstress, etc.)—this blessed Max “does not blame the class of the bourgeoisie for having asked its egoism how far it should give way to the revolutionary idea as such”. For Saint Max “the revolutionary idea” which inspired the habits bleus57 and honnêtes gens of 1789 is the same “idea” as that of the sansculottes of 1793, the same idea concerning which people deliberate whether to “give way” to it—but no further “space can be given”d to any “idea” about this point.

We now come to present-day hierarchy, to the domination of the idea in ordinary life. The whole of the second part of “the book” is filled with struggle against this “hierarchy”. Therefore we shall deal with it in detail when we come to this second part. But since Saint Max, as in the section on “whimsy”, takes delight in anticipating his ideas here and repeats what comes later in the beginning, as he repeats the beginning in what comes later, we are compelled already at this point to note a few examples of his hierarchy. His method of writing a book is the unique “egoism” which we find in the whole book. His self-delight stands in inverse proportion to the delight experienced by the reader.

Since the middle class demand love for their kingdom, their regime, they want, according to Jacques le bonhomme, to “establish the kingdom of love on earth” (p. 98). Since they demand respect for their domination and for the conditions in which it is exercised, and therefore want to usurp domination over respect, they demand, according to this worthy man, the domination of respect as such, their attitude towards respect is the same as towards the holy spirit dwelling within them (p. 95). Jacques le bonhomme, with his faith

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a Benedictus Spinoza, Ethica, Pars prima, Appendix.—Ed.
b The words are from a Protestant hymn.—Ed.
c Marie Wilhelmine Dähnhardt.—Ed.
d In German a pun: Raum geben—to give way, to yield to, and to give space to something.—Ed.
that can move mountains, takes as the actual, earthly basis of the bourgeois world the distorted form in which the sanctimonious and hypocritical ideology of the bourgeoisie voices their particular interests as universal interests. Why this ideological delusion assumes precisely this form for our saint, we shall see in connection with "political liberalism". a

Saint Max gives us a new example on page 115, speaking of the family. He declares that, although it is very easy to become emancipated from the domination of one's own family, nevertheless, "refusal of allegiance easily arouses pangs of conscience", and so people retain family affection, the concept of the family, and therefore have the "holy conception of the family", the "holy" (p. 116).

Here again our good man perceives the domination of the holy where entirely empirical relations dominate. The attitude of the bourgeois to the institutions of his regime is like that of the Jew to the law: he evades them whenever it is possible to do so in each individual case, but he wants everyone else to observe them. If the entire bourgeoisie, in a mass and at one time, were to evade bourgeois institutions, it would cease to be bourgeois—a conduct which, of course, never occurs to the bourgeois and by no means depends on their willing or running. b The dissolute bourgeois evades marriage and secretly commits adultery; the merchant evades the institution of property by depriving others of property by speculation, bankruptcy, etc.; the young bourgeois makes himself independent of his own family, if he can by in fact abolishing the family as far as he is concerned. But marriage, property, the family remain untouched in theory, because they are the practical basis on which the bourgeoisie has erected its domination, and because in their bourgeois form they are the conditions which make the bourgeois a bourgeois, just as the constantly evaded law makes the religious Jew a religious Jew. This attitude of the bourgeois to the conditions of his existence acquires one of its universal forms in bourgeois morality. One cannot speak at all of the family "as such". Historically, the bourgeois gives the family the character of the bourgeois family, in which boredom and money are the binding link, and which also includes the bourgeois dissolution of the family, which does not prevent the family itself from always continuing to exist. Its dirty existence has its counterpart in the holy concept of it in official phraseology and universal hypocrisy. Where the family is actually abolished, as with the proletariat, just the opposite of what

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a See this volume, pp. 193-97.—Ed.
“stirner” thinks takes place. There the concept of the family does not exist at all, but here and there family affection based on extremely real relations is certainly to be found. In the eighteenth century the concept of the family was abolished by the philosophers, because the actual family was already in process of dissolution at the highest pinnacles of civilisation. The internal family bond, the separate components constituting the concept of the family were dissolved, for example, obedience, piety, fidelity in marriage, etc.; but the real body of the family, the property relation, the exclusive attitude in relation to other families, forced cohabitation—relations determined by the existence of children, the structure of modern towns, the formation of capital, etc.—all these were preserved, although with numerous violations, because the existence of the family is made necessary by its connection with the mode of production, which exists independently of the will of bourgeois society. That it was impossible to do without it was demonstrated in the most striking way during the French Revolution, when for a moment the family was as good as legally abolished. The family continues to exist even in the nineteenth century, only the process of its dissolution has become more general, not on account of the concept, but because of the higher development of industry and competition; the family still exists although its dissolution was long ago proclaimed by French and English socialists and this has at last penetrated also to the German church fathers, by way of French novels.

One other example of the domination of the idea in everyday life. Since school-masters may be told to find consolation for their scanty pay in the holiness of the cause they serve (which could only occur in Germany), Jacques le bonhomme actually believes that such talk is the reason for their low salaries (p. 100). He believes that “the holy” in the present-day bourgeois world has an actual money value, he believes that the meagre funds of the Prussian state (see, inter alia, Browning on this subject) would be so increased by the abolition of “the holy” that every village school-master could suddenly be paid a ministerial salary.

This is the hierarchy of nonsense.

The “keystone of the magnificent cathedral”—as the great Michelet puts it—of hierarchy is “sometimes” the work of “One”

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a G. Browning, The domestic and financial Condition of Great Britain; preceded by a Brief Sketch of her Foreign Policy; and of the Statistics and Politics of France, Russia, Austria and Prussia.—Ed.
b Carl Ludwig Michelet, Geschichte der letzten Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland von Kant bis Hegel.—Ed.
"(One sometimes) divides people into two classes, the educated and the uneducated." The former, insofar as they were worthy of their name, occupied themselves with thoughts, with the spirit. They dominated in the post-Christian epoch and for their thoughts they demanded respect. The uneducated (the animal, the child, the Negro) are powerless against thoughts and are dominated by them. That is the meaning of hierarchy.

The "educated" (the youth, the Mongol, the modern) are, therefore, again only occupied with "spirit", pure thought, etc.; they are metaphysicians by profession, in the final analysis Hegelians. Hence the "uneducated" are the non-Hegelians. Hegel was indubitably the most educated Hegelian and therefore in his case it must become apparent what a longing for things particularly the most educated man possesses. The point is that the "educated" and "uneducated" are within themselves in conflict with each other, indeed, in every man the "uneducated" is in conflict with the "educated". And since the greatest longing for things, i.e., for that which belongs to the "uneducated", becomes apparent in Hegel, it also becomes apparent here that "the most educated" man is at the same time "the most uneducated".

"There" (in Hegel) "reality should be completely in accordance with thought and no concept be without reality."

This should read: there the ordinary idea of reality should receive its complete philosophical expression, while Hegel imagines, on the contrary, that "consequently" every philosophical expression creates the reality that is in accordance with it. Jacques le bonhomme takes Hegel's illusion about his own philosophy for the genuine coin of Hegelian philosophy.

The Hegelian philosophy, which in the form of the domination of the Hegelians over the non-Hegelians appears as the crown of the hierarchy, now conquers the last world empire.

"Hegel's system was the supreme despotism and autocracy of thought, the omnipotence and almightiness of the spirit." (p. 97).

Here, therefore, we find ourselves in the realm of spirits of Hegelian philosophy, which stretches from Berlin to Halle and Tübingen, the realm of spirits whose history was written by Herr Bayrhoffer and for which the great Michelet collected the statistical data.

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* Here the authors ironically use Berlin dialect words for educated, uneducated and most educated (Jebildete, Unjebildete, Allerjebildetste).—Ed.

* Karl Theodor Bayrhoffer, *Die Idee und Geschichte der Philosophie.*—Ed.
The preparation for this realm of spirits was the French Revolution, which "did nothing but transform things into ideas about things" (p. 115; cf. above Hegel on the revolution, p. [...])

"So people remained citizens" (in "Stirner", this occurs earlier, but "what Stirner says is not what he has in mind, and what he has in mind cannot be said", Wigand, p. 149) and "lived in reflection, they had their eye on an object, before which" (per appos.) "they felt reverence and fear". "Stirner" says in a passage on page 98: "The road to hell is paved with good intentions." But we say: the road to the unique is paved with bad concluding clauses, with appositions, which are his "heavenly ladder" borrowed from the Chinese, and his "rope of the objective" (p. 88) on which he makes his "flea-jumps". In accordance with this, for "modern philosophy or modern times"—since the emergence of the realm of spirits modern times are indeed nothing but modern philosophy—it is an easy matter to "transform the existing objects into notional objects, i.e., into concepts", page 114, a work which Saint Max continues.

We have already seen our knight of the rueful countenance even "before the mountains were brought forth", which he later moved by his faith, right at the beginning of his book, galloping headlong towards the great result of his "magnificent cathedral". His "donkey", apposition, could not jump swiftly enough for him; now, at last, on page 114, he has reached his goal and by means of a mighty "or" has transformed modern times into modern philosophy.

Thereby ancient times (i.e., the ancient and modern, Negroid and Mongolian but, properly speaking, only pre-Stirnerian times) "reached their final goal". We can now reveal why Saint Max gave the title "Man" to the whole of the first part of his book and made out his entire history of miracles, ghosts and knights to be the history of "man". The ideas and thoughts of people were, of course, ideas and thoughts about themselves and their relationships, their consciousness of themselves and of people in general—for it was the consciousness not merely of a single individual but of the individual in his interconnection with the whole of society and about the whole of the society in which they lived. The conditions, independent of them, in which they produced their life, the necessary forms of intercourse connected herewith, and the personal and social relations thereby given, had to take the form—insofar as they were
expressed in thoughts—of ideal conditions and necessary relations, i.e., they had to be expressed in consciousness as determinations arising from the concept of man as such, from human essence, from the nature of man, from man as such. What people were, what their relations were, appeared in consciousness as ideas of man as such, of his modes of existence or of his immediate conceptual determinations. So, after the ideologists had assumed that ideas and thoughts had dominated history up to now, that the history of these ideas and thoughts constitutes all history up to now, after they had imagined that real conditions had conformed to man as such and his ideal conditions, i.e., to conceptual determinations, after they had made the history of people's consciousness of themselves the basis of their actual history, after all this, nothing was easier than to call the history of consciousness, of ideas, of the holy, of established concepts—the history of “man” and to put it in the place of real history. The only distinction between Saint Max and all his predecessors is that he knows nothing about these concepts—even in their arbitrary isolation from real life, whose products they were—and his trivial creative work in his copy of Hegelian ideology is restricted to establishing his ignorance even of what he copies.—It is already evident from this how he can counterpose the history of the real individual in the form of the unique to his fantasy about the history of man.

The unique history takes place at the beginning in the Stoa in Athens, later almost wholly in Germany, and finally at the Kupfergraben in Berlin, where the despot of “modern philosophy or modern times” set up his imperial residence. That already shows how exclusively national and local is the matter dealt with. Instead of world history, Saint Max gives a few and, what is more, extremely meagre and biased comments on the history of German theology and philosophy. If on occasion we appear to go outside Germany, it is only in order to cause the deeds and thoughts of other peoples, e.g., the French Revolution, to “reach their final goal” in Germany, namely, at the Kupfergraben. Only national-German facts are given, they are dealt with and interpreted in a national-German manner, and the result remains a national-German one. But even that is not enough. The views and education of our saint are not only German, but of a Berlin nature through and through. The role allotted to Hegelian philosophy is that which it plays in Berlin, and Stirner confuses Berlin with the world and world history. The “youth” is a Berliner; the good citizens that we encounter throughout the book are Berlin beer-drinking philistines. With such premises for the starting-point, it is natural that the result arrived at is merely one
confined within the national and local framework. “Stirner” and his whole philosophical fraternity, among whom he is the weakest and most ignorant member, afford a practical commentary to the valiant lines of the valiant Hoffmann von Fallersleben:

In Germany alone, in Germany alone,
Would I for ever live.\(^a\)

The local Berlin conclusion of our valiant saint—that in Hegelian philosophy the world has “all gone”—enables him now without much expense to arrive at a universal empire of his “own”. The Hegelian philosophy transformed everything into thought, into the holy, into apparition, into spirit, into spirits, into spectres. “Stirner” will fight against them, he will conquer them in his imagination and will erect on their dead bodies his “own”, “unique”, “corporeal” empire, the empire of the “whole fellow”.

“For we\(^b\) wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places” (Ephesians 6:12).

Now “Stirner” has his “feet shod with the preparation” for waging the fight against thoughts. He has no need first to “take the shield of faith”, for he has never laid it down. Armed with the “helmet” of disaster and the “sword” of spiritlessness (see ibid.\(^b\)), he goes into battle. “And it was given unto him to make war with the holy” but not “to overcome” it. (Revelation of St. John 13:7.)

5. “Stirner” Delighted in His Construction

We now find ourselves again exactly where we were on page 19 in connection with the youth, who became the man, and on page 90 in connection with the Mongoloid Caucasian, who was transformed into the Caucasian Caucasian and “found himself”. We are, therefore, at the third self-finding of the mysterious individual whose “arduous life struggle” Saint Max depicts for us. Only the whole story is now behind us, and, in view of the extensive material we have worked through, we must take a retrospective look at the gigantic corpse of the ruined man.

Though on a later page, where he has long ago forgotten his history, Saint Max asserts that “genius has long since been regarded as the creator of new world-historic productions” (p. 214), we have

\(^a\) From the poem \textit{Auf der Wanderung} by Hoffmann von Fallersleben.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) Ephesians 6: 15, 16, 17 (paraphrased).—\textit{Ed.}
already seen that even his bitterest enemies cannot revile his history on that score, at any rate, for in it no individuals, let alone geniuses, make their appearance, but only ossified, crippled thoughts and Hegelian changelings.

*Repetitio est mater studiorum.* Saint Max, who expounded his whole history of “philosophy or time” only in order to find an opportunity for a few hurried studies of Hegel, finally repeats once again his whole unique history. However, he does it with a turn towards natural history, offering us important information about “unique” natural science, the reason being that for him, whenever the “world” has to play an important role, it immediately becomes transformed into nature. “Unique” natural science begins at once with the admission of its impotence. It does not examine the actual relation of man to nature, determined by industry and natural science, but proclaims a fantastic relation of man to nature.

“How little can man conquer! He has to allow the sun to trace its course, the sea to roll its waves, the mountains to tower to the sky” (p. 122).

Saint Max who, like all saints, loves miracles, but can only perform a logical miracle, is annoyed because he cannot make the sun dance the cancan, he grieves because he cannot still the ocean, he is indignant because he must allow the mountains to tower to the sky. Although on page 124 the world already becomes “prosaic” at the end of antiquity, it is still, for our saint, highly unprosaic. For him it still is the “sun” and not the earth that traces its course, and to his sorrow he cannot à la Joshua command “sun, stand thou still”. On page 123, Stirner discovers that

at the end of the ancient world, “spirit” “again foamed and frothed over irresistibly because gases” (spirits) “developed within it and, after the mechanical impact from outside became ineffective, chemical tensions, which stimulate in the interior, began to come into wonderful play”.

This sentence contains the most important data of the “unique” philosophy of nature, which on the previous page had already arrived at the conclusion that for man nature is the “unconquerable”. Earthly physics knows nothing about a mechanical impact which becomes ineffective—unique physics alone has the merit of this discovery. Earthly chemistry knows no “gases” which stimulate “chemical tensions” and, what is more, “in the interior”. Gases which enter into new combinations, into new chemical relations, do not stimulate any “tensions”, but at most lead to a fall of tension.

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*a* Repetition is the mother of learning.—*Ed.*

*b* Joshua 10:12.—*Ed.*
insofar as they pass into a liquid state of aggregation and thereby their volume decreases to something less than one-thousandth of their former volume. If Saint Max feels “tensions” “in” his own “interior” due to “gases”, these are highly “mechanical impacts”, and by no means “chemical tensions”. They are produced by a chemical transformation, determined by physiological causes, of certain mixtures into others, whereby part of the constituents of the former mixture becomes gaseous, therefore, occupies a larger volume and, in the absence of space for it, causes a “mechanical impact” or pressure towards the outside. [That] these nonexistent “chemical tensions” “come” into extremely “wonderful play” in Saint Max’s “interior”, namely, this time in his head, “we see” from the role they play in “unique” natural science. Incidentally, it is to be desired that Saint Max would no longer withhold from the profane natural scientists what nonsense he has in mind with the crazy expression “chemical tensions”, which moreover “stimulate in the interior” (as though a “mechanical impact” on the stomach does not “stimulate it in the interior” as well).

Saint Max wrote his “unique” natural science only because on this occasion he was unable to touch on the ancients in decent fashion without at the same time letting fall a few words about the “world of things”, about nature.

At the end of the ancient world the ancients, we are assured here, are all transformed into Stoics, “whom no collapse of the world” (how many times is it supposed to have collapsed?) “could put out of countenance” (p. 123). Thus, the ancients become Chinese, who also “cannot be thrown down from the heavens of their tranquillity by any unforeseen event” (or idea) (p. 90). Indeed, Jacques le bonhomme seriously believes that against the last of the ancients “the mechanical impact from outside became ineffective”. How far this corresponds to the actual situation of the Romans and Greeks at the end of the ancient world, to their complete lack of stability and confidence, which could hardly oppose any remnant of vis inertiae to the “mechanical impact”—on this point compare, inter alia, Lucian. The powerful mechanical shocks which the Roman empire received as a result of its division among several Caesars and their wars against one another, as a result of the colossal concentration of property, particularly landed property, in Rome, and the decrease in Italy’s population caused by this, and as a result of the [pressure of the] Huns and Teutons—these shocks, in the opinion of our saintly

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*a* In the German original a pun: Fall—event—and Einfall, which can mean idea, brain wave, invasion or collapse.— *Ed.*
historian, "became ineffective"; only the "chemical tensions", only the "gases" which Christianity "stimulated in the interior" overthrew the Roman Empire. The great earthquakes [in the West] and in the East, and other "mechanical impacts" which buried hundreds of thousands of people under the [ruins] of their towns and [which by no] means left the consciousness of people unchanged, were presumably, according to "Stirner", also "ineffective" or were chemical tensions. And "in fact" (!) "ancient history ends in this, that I have made the world my property"—which is proved by means of the biblical saying: "All things are delivered unto me" (i.e., Christ) "of my Father."a Here, therefore, I=Christ. In this connection, Jacques le bonhomme cannot refrain from believing the Christian that he could move mountains, etc., if he "only wanted to". As a Christian he proclaims himself the lord of the world, but he is this only as a Christian; he proclaims himself the "owner of the world". "Thereby egoism won its first full victory, since I elevated myself to be the owner of the world" (p. 124). In order to rise to the level of the perfect Christian, Stirner's ego had only to carry through the struggle to become poor in spirit as well (which he succeeded in doing even before the mountains arose). "Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven."b Saint Max has reached perfection as regards poverty of spirit and even boasts of it in his great rejoicing before the Lord.

Saint Max, poor in spirit, believes in the fantastic gas formations of the Christians arising from the decomposition of the ancient world. The ancient Christian owned nothing in this world and was, therefore, satisfied with his imaginary heavenly property and his divine right to ownership. Instead of making the world the possession of the people, he proclaimed himself and his ragged fraternity to be "God's own possession" (1 Peter 2:9). According to "Stirner", the Christian idea of the world is the world into which the ancient world is actually dissolved, although this is at most [a world] of fantasy into which the world of ancient ideas has [been transformed] and in which the Christian [by faith] can move mountains, can feel [all-powerful] and press forward to a position where the "mechanical impact is ineffective". Since for "Stirner" people are no longer determined by the [external] world, are no longer driven forward by the mechanical impact of the need to produce, since, in general, the mechanical impact, and with it the sexual act as well, has ceased to operate, it is only by a miracle that

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a Matthew 11:27.— Ed.
b Matthew 5:3.— Ed.
they have been able to continue to exist. Of course, for German prigs and school-masters with a gaseous content like that of "Stirner", it is far easier to be satisfied with the Christian fantasy about property—which is truly nothing but the property of Christian fantasy—than to describe the transformation of the real property relations and production relations of the ancient world.

That same primitive Christian who, in the imagination of Jacques le bonhomme, was the owner of the ancient world, actually belonged for the most part to the world of owners; he was a slave and could be sold on the market. But "Stirner", delighted in his construction, irrepressibly continues his rejoicing.

"The first property, the first splendour has been won!" (p. 124).

In the same way, Stirner's egoism continues to gain property and splendour and to achieve "complete victories". The theological attitude of the primitive Christian to the ancient world is the perfect prototype of all his property and all his splendour.

The following are the grounds given for this property of the Christian:

"The world has lost its divine character ... it has become prosaic, it is my property, which I dispose of as I (viz., the spirit) choose" (p. 124).

This means: the world has lost its divine character, therefore, it is freed from my fantasies for my own consciousness; it has become prosaic, consequently its relation to me is prosaic and it disposes of me in the prosaic way it favours, by no means to please me. Apart from the fact that "Stirner" here actually thinks that in ancient times the prosaic world did not exist and the divine principle held sway in the world, he even falsifies the Christian concept, which continually bemoans its impotence in relation to the world, and itself depicts its victory over the world in its fantasy as merely an ideal one, by transferring it to the day of judgment. Only when a great secular power took possession of Christianity and exploited it, whereupon, of course, it ceased to be unworldly, could Christianity imagine itself to be the owner of the world. Saint Max ascribes to the Christian the same false relation to the ancient world as he ascribes to the youth with regard to the "world of the child"; he puts the egoist in the same relation to the world of the Christian as he puts the man to the world of the youth.

The Christian has now nothing more to do than to become poor in spirit as quickly as possible and perceive the world of spirit in all its vanity—just as he did with the world of things—in order to be able to "dispose as he chooses" of the world of spirit also, whereby he becomes a perfect Christian, an egoist. The attitude of the Christian
to the ancient world serves, therefore, as the standard for the attitude of the egoist to the modern world. The preparation for this spiritual poverty was the content of "almost two thousand years" of life—a life whose main epochs, of course, took place only in Germany.

"After various transformations the holy spirit in the course of time became the absolute idea, which again in manifold refractions split up into the various ideas of love of mankind, civic virtue, rationality, etc." (pp. 125, 126).

The German stay-at-home again turns the thing upside-down. The ideas of love of mankind, etc.—coins whose impressions had already been totally worn away, particularly owing to their great circulation in the eighteenth century—were recast by Hegel in the sublimate of the absolute idea, but after this reminting they were just as little successful in retaining their value abroad as Prussian paper money.

The consistent conclusion—which has already appeared again and again—of Stirner's view of history is as follows:

"Concepts should play the decisive role everywhere, concepts should regulate life, concepts should rule. That is the religious world to which Hegel gave systematic expression" (p. 126),

and which our good-natured philistine so much mistakes for the real world that on the following page (p. 127) he can say:

"Now nothing but spirit rules in the world."

Stuck fast in this world of illusion, he can (on p. 128) build first of all an "altar" and then "erect a church" "round this altar", a church whose "walls" have legs for making progress and "move ever farther forward". "Soon this church embraces the whole earth." He, the unique, and Szeliga, his servant, stand outside, they "wander round these walls, and are driven out to the very edge". "Howling with agonising hunger", Saint Max calls to his servant: "One step more and the world of the holy has conquered." But Szeliga suddenly "sinks into the outermost abyss", which lies above him—a literary miracle! For, since the earth is a sphere, the abyss can only lie above Szeliga as soon as the church embraces the whole earth. So he reverses the laws of gravity, ascends backwards into heaven and thereby reflects honour on "unique" natural science, which is all the easier for him since, according to page 126, "the nature of the thing and the concept of relation" are a matter of indifference to "Stirner", "do not guide him in his treatment or conclusion", and the "relationship into which" Szeliga "entered" with gravity "is itself unique" by virtue of Szeliga's "uniqueness", and by no means "depends" on the nature of gravity or on how "others", for instance, natural scientists, "classify it". "Stirner" moreover objects to
Szeliga’s “action being separated from the real” Szeliga and “assessed according to human standards”.

Having thus arranged for decent accommodation in heaven for his faithful servant, Saint Max passes on to the subject of his own passion. On page 95 he discovers that even the “gallows” has the “colour of the holy”; “people loathe coming into contact with it, there is something uncanny, i.e., unfamiliar, strange about it”. In order to transcend this strangeness of the gallows, he transforms it into his own gallows, which he can only do by hanging himself on it. The lion of Juda makes also this last sacrifice to egoism. The holy Christian allows himself to be nailed to the cross, not to redeem the cross, but to redeem people from their impiety; the unholy Christian hangs himself on the gallows in order to redeem the gallows from holiness or to redeem himself from the strangeness of the gallows.

“The first splendour, the first property has been won, the first complete victory achieved!” The holy warrior has now conquered history, he has transformed it into thoughts, pure thoughts, which are nothing but thoughts—and at the end of time only a host of thoughts confront him. And so Saint Max, having taken his “gallows” on his back, just like an ass that carries a cross, and his servant Szeliga, who was welcomed in heaven with kicks and has returned to his master with his head hanging, set out to fight against this host of thoughts or, rather, against the mere halo of these thoughts. This time it is Sancho Panza, full of moral sayings, maxims and proverbs, who takes on himself the struggle against the holy, and Don Quixote plays the role of his pious and faithful servant. The honest Sancho fights just as bravely as the caballero Manchego did in the old days, and like him does not fail several times to mistake a herd of Mongolian sheep for a swarm of spectres. The plump Maritornes “in the course of time, after various transformations in manifold refractions”, is transformed into a chaste Berlin seamstress, dying of anaemia, a subject on which Saint Sancho composes an elegy, one which causes all young graduates and Guards lieutenants to remember Rabelais’ statement that the world-liberating “soldier’s prime weapon is the flap of his trousers”.

Sancho Panza achieves his heroic feats by perceiving the entire opposing host of thoughts in its nullity and vanity. All his great deed

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a Cf. Revelation of John 5:5.—Ed.
b Knight of La Mancha, i.e., Don Quixote.—Ed.
c Marie Wilhelmine Dähnhardt.—Ed.
d Cf. the heading of Chapter 8, Book 3 of Rabelais’ Gargantua and Pantagruel.—Ed.
is confined to mere perception which in the end leaves everything existing as it was, changing only his conception, and that not even of things, but of philosophical phrases about things.

Thus, after the ancients have been presented realistically as child, Negro, Negroid Caucasians, animal, Catholics, English philosophy, the uneducated, non-Hegelians, and the world of things, and the moderns have been presented idealistically as youth, Mongol, Mongoloid Caucasians, man, Protestants, German philosophy, the educated, Hegelians, and the world of thoughts—after everything has happened that was from time immemorial decided in the Council of Guardians, the time has at last arrived. The negative unity of the ancient and the modern, which has already figured as the man, the Caucasian, the Caucasian Caucasian, the perfect Christian, in servant's clothing, seen "through a glass darkly" (1 Corinthians 13:12), can now, after the passion and death of Stirner on the gallows and Szeliga's ascent to heaven in full glory, return to the simplest nomenclature and appear in the clouds of heaven endowed with great power and majesty.\(^a\) "And so it is said": what was previously "One" (see "Economy of the Old Testament") has become "ego"—the negative unity of realism and idealism, of the world of things and the world of spirit. Schelling calls this unity of realism and idealism "indifference" or, rendered in the Berlin dialect, "Jleichjiltigkeit"; in Hegel it becomes the negative unity in which the two moments are transcended. Saint Max who, being a proper German speculative philosopher, is still tormented by the "unity of opposites", is not satisfied with this; he wants this unity to be visible to him in the form of a "corporeal individual", in a "whole fellow", and he is encouraged in this by Feuerbach's views expressed in the *Anekdota*\(^b\) and in the *Philosophie der Zukunft*. This "ego" of Stirner's which is the final outcome of the hitherto existing world is, therefore, not a "corporeal individual", but a category constructed on the Hegelian method and supported by appositions, the further "flea-jumps" of which we shall trace in the New Testament. Here we shall merely add that in the final analysis this ego comes into existence because it has the same illusions about the world of the Christian as the Christian has about the world of things. Just as the Christian takes possession of the world of things by "getting into his head" fantastic nonsense about them, so the "ego" takes possession of the Christian world, the world of thoughts, by means of a series of fantastic ideas about it. What the Christian imagines about his own relation to the world,

\(^a\) Cf. Matthew 24:30.—Ed.

\(^b\) Ludwig Feuerbach, "Vorläufige Thesen zur Reformation der Philosophie".—Ed.
“Stirner" accepts in good faith, finds excellent, and good-naturedly repeats after him.

"Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds" (Epistle to the Romans 3:28).

Hegel, for whom the modern world was also resolved into the world of abstract ideas, defines the task of the modern philosopher, in contrast to that of the ancient, as consisting in the following: instead of, like the ancients, freeing himself from “natural consciousness” and “purging the individual of the immediate, sensuous method and making him into conceived and thinking substance” (into spirit), the modern philosopher should “abolish firm, definite, fixed ideas”. This, he adds, is accomplished by “dialectics” (Phänomenologie, pp. 26, 27). The difference between “Stirner” and Hegel is that the former achieves the same thing without the help of dialectics.

6. The Free Ones

What role “the free ones” have to play here is stated in the economy of the Old Testament. We cannot help it that the ego, which we had approached so closely, now recedes from us again into the nebulous distance. It is not at all our fault that we did not pass at once to the ego from page 20 of “the book”.

A. Political Liberalism

The key to the criticism of liberalism advanced by Saint Max and his predecessors is the history of the German bourgeoisie. We shall call special attention to some aspects of this history since the French Revolution.

The state of affairs in Germany at the end of the last century is fully reflected in Kant’s Critik der practischen Vernunft. While the French bourgeoisie, by means of the most colossal revolution that history has ever known, was achieving domination and conquering the Continent of Europe, while the already politically emancipated English bourgeoisie was revolutionising industry and subjugating India politically, and all the rest of the world commercially, the impotent German burghers did not get any further than “good will”. Kant was satisfied with “good will” alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of individuals, to the world beyond. Kant’s good will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and wretchedness of the German burghers, whose petty
interests were never capable of developing into the common, national interests of a class and who were, therefore, constantly exploited by the bourgeois of all other nations. These petty, local interests had as their counterpart, on the one hand, the truly local and provincial narrow-mindedness of the German burghers and, on the other hand, their cosmopolitan swollen-headedness. In general, from the time of the Reformation German development has borne a completely petty-bourgeois character. The old feudal aristocracy was, for the most part, annihilated in the peasant wars; what remained of it were either imperial petty princes who gradually achieved a certain independence and aped the absolute monarchy on a minute, provincial scale, or lesser landowners who partly squandered their little bit of property at the tiny courts, and then gained their livelihood from petty positions in the small armies and government offices—or, finally, Junkers from the backwoods, who lived a life of which even the most modest English squire or French gentilhomme de province would have been ashamed. Agriculture was carried on by a method which was neither parcellation nor large-scale production, and which, despite the preservation of feudal dependence and corvées, never drove the peasants to seek emancipation, both because this method of farming did not allow the emergence of any active revolutionary class and because of the absence of the revolutionary bourgeoisie corresponding to such a peasant class.

As regards the middle class, we can only emphasise here a few significant factors. It is significant that linen manufacture, i.e., an industry based on the spinning wheel and the hand-loom, came to be of some importance in Germany at the very time when in England those cumbersome tools were already being ousted by machines. Most characteristic of all is the position of the German middle class in relation to Holland. Holland, the only part of the Hanseatic League that became commercially important, tore itself free, cut Germany off from world trade except for two ports (Hamburg and Bremen) and since then dominated the whole of German trade. The German middle class was too impotent to set limits to exploitation by the Dutch. The bourgeoisie of little Holland, with its well-developed class interests, was more powerful than the far more numerous German middle class with its indifference and its divided petty interests. The fragmentation of interests was matched by the fragmentation of political organisation, the division into small principalities and free imperial cities. How could political concentration arise in a country which lacked all the economic conditions for it?

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1 Marx and Engels use the English word.—Ed.
The impotence of each separate sphere of life (one can speak here neither of estates nor of classes, but at most of former estates and classes not yet born) did not allow any one of them to gain exclusive domination. The inevitable consequence was that during the epoch of absolute monarchy, which assumed here its most stunted, semi-patriarchal form, the special sphere which, owing to division of labour, was responsible for the administration of public interests acquired an abnormal independence, which became still greater in the bureaucracy of modern times. Thus, the state built itself up into an apparently independent force, and this position, which in other countries was only transitory—a transition stage—it has maintained in Germany until the present day. This position of the state explains both the conscientiousness of the civil servant, which is found nowhere else, and all the illusions about the state which are current in Germany, as well as the apparent independence of German theoreticians in relation to the middle class—the seeming contradiction between the form in which these theoreticians express the interests of the middle class and these interests themselves.

The characteristic form which French liberalism, based on real class interests, assumed in Germany we find again in Kant. Neither he, nor the German middle class, whose whitewashing spokesman he was, noticed that these theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie had as their basis material interests and a will that was conditioned and determined by the material relations of production. Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests which it expressed: he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois into pure self-determinations of "free will", of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so converted it into purely ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates. Hence the German petty bourgeois recoiled in horror from the practice of this energetic bourgeois liberalism as soon as this practice showed itself, both in the Reign of Terror and in shameless bourgeois profit-making.

Under the rule of Napoleon, the German middle class pushed its petty trade and its great illusions still further. As regards the petty-trading spirit which predominated in Germany at that time, Saint Sancho can, inter alia, compare Jean Paul, to mention only works of fiction, since they are the only source open to him. The German citizens, who railed against Napoleon for compelling them to drink chicory and for disturbing their peace with military billeting and recruiting of conscripts, reserved all their moral indignation for Napoleon and all their admiration for England; yet Napoleon rendered them the greatest services by cleaning out
Germany’s Augean stables and establishing civilised means of communication, whereas the English only waited for the opportunity to exploit them à tort et à travers.\(^a\) In the same petty-bourgeois spirit the German princes imagined they were fighting for the principle of legitimism and against revolution, whereas they were only the paid mercenaries of the English bourgeoisie. In the atmosphere of these universal illusions it was quite in the order of things that the estates privileged to cherish illusions—ideologists, school-masters, students, members of the *Tugendbund*\(^b\)—should talk big and give a suitable highflown expression to the universal mood of fantasy and indifference.

The political forms corresponding to a developed bourgeoisie were passed on to the Germans from outside by the July revolution\(^5\)—as we mention only a few main points we omit the intermediary period. Since German economic relations had by no means reached the stage of development to which these political forms corresponded, the middle class accepted them merely as abstract ideas, principles valid in and for themselves, pious wishes and phrases, Kantian self-determinations of the will and of human beings as they ought to be. Consequently their attitude to these forms was far more moral and disinterested than that of other nations, i.e., they exhibited a highly peculiar narrow-mindedness and remained unsuccessful in all their endeavours.

Finally the ever more powerful foreign competition and world intercourse—from which it became less and less possible for Germany to stand aside—compelled the diverse local interests in Germany to adopt some sort of common attitude. Particularly since 1840, the German middle class began to think about safeguarding these common interests; its attitude became national and liberal and it demanded protective tariffs and constitutions. Thus it has now got almost as far as the French bourgeoisie in 1789.

If, like the Berlin ideologists, one judges liberalism and the state within the framework of local German impressions, or limits oneself merely to criticism of German-bourgeois illusions about liberalism, instead of seeing the correlation of liberalism with the real interests from which it originated and without which it cannot really exist—then, of course, one arrives at the most banal conclusions. This German liberalism, in the form in which it expressed itself up to the most recent period, is, as we have seen, even in its popular form, empty enthusiasm, ideological reflections about *real* liberalism. How easy it is, therefore, to transform its content wholly into philosophy,

\(^a\) At random, recklessly.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) 1830.—*Ed.*
into pure conceptual determinations, into “rational cognition”!
Hence if one is so unfortunate as to know even this bourgeoisified liberalism only in the sublimated form given it by Hegel and the school-masters who depend on him, then one will arrive at conclusions belonging exclusively to the sphere of the holy. Sancho will provide us with a pitiful example of this.

“Recently” in active circles “so much has been said” about the rule of the bourgeois, “that it is not surprising that news of it”, if only through the medium of L. Blanc (translated by the Berliner Buhl), etc., “has even penetrated to Berlin” and there attracted the attention of easy-going school-masters (Wigand, p. 190). It cannot, however, be said that “Stirner” in his method of appropriating current ideas has “adopted a particularly fruitful and profitable style” (Wigand, ibid.)—as was already evident from his exploitation of Hegel and will now be further exemplified.

It has not escaped our school-master that in recent times the liberals have been identified with the bourgeois. Since Saint Max identifies the bourgeois with the good burghers, with the petty German burghers, he does not grasp what has been transmitted to him as it is in fact and as it is expressed by all competent authors—viz., that the liberal phrases are the idealistic expression of the real interests of the bourgeoisie—but, on the contrary, as meaning that the final goal of the bourgeois is to become a perfect liberal, a citizen of the state. For Saint Max the bourgeois is not the truth of the citoyen, but the citoyen the truth of the bourgeois. This conception, which is as holy as it is German, goes to such lengths that, on page 130, “the middle class” (it should read: the domination of the bourgeoisie) is transformed into a “thought, nothing but a thought” and “the state” comes forward as the “true man”, who in the “Rights of Man” confers the rights of “Man”, the true solemnisation on each individual bourgeois. And all this occurs after the illusions about the state and the rights of man had already been adequately exposed in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher,* a fact

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* In the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher this was done, in view of the context, only in relation to the rights of man proclaimed by the French Revolution. [Cf. Karl Marx, “Zur Judenfrage” (see present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 161-65).—Ed.] Incidentally, this whole conception of competition as “the rights of man” can already be found among representatives of the bourgeoisie a century earlier (John Hampden, Petty, Boisguillebert, Child, etc.). On the relation of the theoretical liberals to the bourgeois compare what has been said [above] on the relation of the ideologists of a class to the class itself. [See p. 176 of this volume.—Ed.]

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* The reference is to Louis Blanc, Histoire de dix ans 1830-1840, which appeared in Berlin in 1844-45 in Ludwig Buhl’s translation under the title Geschichte der zehn Jahre.—Ed.
which Saint Max notices at last in his “Apologetical Commentary” anno 1845. Hence he can transform the bourgeois—having separated the bourgeois as a liberal from the empirical bourgeois—into a holy liberal, just as he transforms the state into the “holy”, and the relation of the bourgeois to the modern state into a holy relation, into a *cult* (p. 131)—and with this, in effect, he concludes his criticism of political liberalism. He has transformed it into the “holy”.*

We wish to give here a few examples of how Saint Max embellishes this property of his with historical arabesques. For this purpose he uses the French Revolution, concerning which a small contract to supply him with a few data has been negotiated by his history-broker, Saint Bruno.

On the basis of a few words from Bailly, obtained moreover through the intermediary of Saint Bruno’s *Denkwürdigkeiten*, the statement is made that through the convening of the States General “those who hitherto were subjects arrive at the consciousness that they are proprietors” (p. 132). On the contrary, *mon brave!* By the convening of the States General, those who hitherto were proprietors show their consciousness of being no longer subjects—a consciousness which was long ago arrived at, for example in the Physiocrats, and—in polemical form against the bourgeoisie—in *Linguet (Théorie des lois civiles, 1767)*, Mercier, Mably, and, in general, in the writings against the Physiocrats. This meaning was also immediately understood at the beginning of the revolution—for example by Brissot, Fauchet, Marat, in the *Cercle social* and by all the democratic opponents of Lafayette. If Saint Max had understood the matter as it took place independently of his history-broker, he would not have been surprised that “Bailly’s words certainly *sound* [as if each man were now a proprietor...]” and that the bourgeois ... express... the rule of the proprietors ... that now the proprietors have become the bourgeoisie *par excellence.*

[..] “As early as July 8 the statement of the Bishop of Autun and Barère [destroyed] the illusion that [each man], the individual, was of importance in the legislature; it [showed] the utter impotence of the constituents. The majority of the deputies has become master.” [Stirner, op. cit., p. 132 f.]

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] For him thereby criticism as a whole “achieves its final goal” and all cats turn grey, thereby he also admits his ignorance of the *real* basis and the real content of the rule of the bourgeoisie.

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*b I.e., Talleyrand, who was Bishop of Autun from 1788 to 1791.— *Ed.*
The "statement of the Bishop of Autun and Barère" is a motion tabled by the former on July 4 (not 8), with which Barère had nothing to do except that together with many others he supported it on July 8. It was carried on July 9, hence it is not at all clear why Saint Max speaks of "July 8". This motion by no means "destroyed" "the illusion that each man, the individual, was of importance", etc.; but it destroyed the binding force of the Cahiers given to the deputies, that is, the influence and the "importance", not of "each man, the individual", but of the feudal 177 bailliages and 431 divisions des ordres. By carrying the motion, the Assembly discarded the characteristic features of the old, feudal États généraux. Moreover, it was at that time by no means a question of the correct theory of popular representation, but of highly practical, essential problems. Broglie's army held Paris at bay and drew nearer every day; the capital was in a state of utmost agitation; hardly a fortnight had passed since the jeu de paume and the lit de justice, the court was plotting with the bulk of the aristocracy and the clergy against the National Assembly; lastly, owing to the still existing feudal provincial tariff barriers, and as a result of the feudal agrarian system as a whole, most of the provinces were in the grip of famine and there was a great scarcity of money. At that moment it was a question of an assemblée essentiellement active, as Talleyrand himself put it, while the Cahiers of [the] aristocratic and other reactionary groups provided the court with an opportunity to declare [the] decision of the Assembly [void by referring] to the wishes of the constituents. The Assembly proclaimed its independence by carrying Talleyrand's motion and seized the power it required, which in the political sphere could, of course, only be done within the framework of political form and by making use of the existing theories of Rousseau, etc. (Cf. Le point du jour, par Barère de Vieuuzac, 1789, Nos. 15 and 17.) The National Assembly had to take this step because it was being urged forward by the immense mass of the people that stood behind it. By so doing, therefore, it did not at all transform itself into an "utterly egoistical chamber, completely cut off from the umbilical cord and ruthless" [p. 147]; on the contrary it actually transformed itself thereby into the true organ of the vast majority of Frenchmen, who would otherwise have crushed it, as they later crushed "utterly egoistical" deputies who "completely cut themselves off from the umbilical cord". But Saint Max, with the help of his history-broker, sees here merely the solution of a theoretical question; he takes the Constituent Assembly, six days before the storming of the Bastille, for a council of church fathers debating a point of dogma! The question regarding the "importance of each man, the individual",
can, moreover, only arise in a democratically elected representative
tbody, and during the revolution it only came up for discussion in the
Convention, and for as empirical reasons as earlier the question of
the Cahiers. A problem which the Constituent Assembly decided also
theoretically was the distinction between the representative body of a
ruling class and that of the ruling estates; and this political rule of the
bourgeois class was determined by each individual's position, since it
was determined by the relations of production prevailing at the time.
The representative system is a very specific product of modern
bourgeois society which is as inseparable from the latter as is the
isolated individual of modern times.

Just as here Saint Max takes the 177 bailliages and 431 divisions des
ordres for "individuals", so he later sees in the absolute monarch and
his car tel est notre plaisir\(^a\) the rule of the "individual" as against
the constitutional monarch, the "rule of the apparition ["] (p. 141), and
in the aristocrat and the guild-member he again sees the "individu-
al" in contrast to the citizen (p. 137).

"The Revolution was not directed against reality, but against this reality, against
this definite existence" (p. 145).

Hence, not against the really existing system of landownership, of
taxes, of customs duties which hampered commerce at every turn,
and the [...]  
[...] "Stirner" thinks it makes no difference ["to 'the good
burghers' who defends them] and their principles, whether an
absolute or a constitutional king, a republic, etc.—For the "good
burghers" who quietly drink their beer in a Berlin beer-cellar this
undoubtedly "makes no difference"; but for the historical bourgeois
it is by no means a matter of indifference. The "good burgher"
"Stirner" here again imagines—as he does throughout this sec-
tion—that the French, American and English bourgeois are good
Berlin beer-drinking philistines. If one translates the sentence above
from the language of political illusion into plain language, it means:
"it makes no difference" to the bourgeoisie whether it rules
unrestrictedly or whether its political and economic power is
counterbalanced by other classes. Saint Max believes that an absolute
king, or someone else, could defend the bourgeoisie just as
successfully as it defends itself. And even "its principles", which
consist in subordinating state power to "chacun pour soi, chacun chez

\(^a\) For this is our will—the concluding words of royal edicts.—Ed.
\(^b\) A gap in the manuscript.—Ed.
and exploiting it for that purpose—an “absolute monarch” is supposed to be able to do that! Let Saint Max name any country with developed trade and industry and strong competition where the bourgeoisie entrusts its defence to an “absolute monarch”.

After this transformation of the historical bourgeois into German philistines devoid of history, “Stirner”, of course, does not need to know any other bourgeois than “comfortable burghers and loyal officials”(!)—two spectres who only dare to show themselves on “holy” German soil—and can lump together the whole class as “obedient servants” (p. 138). Let him just take a look at these obedient servants on the stock exchanges of London, Manchester, New York and Paris. Since Saint Max is well under way, he can now go the whole hog\(^a\) and, believing one of the narrow-minded theoreticians of the *Einundzwanzig Bogen* who says that “liberalism is rational cognition applied to our existing conditions”\(^c\), can declare that the “liberals are fighters for reason”. It is evident from these [...] phrases how little the Germans have recovered [from] their original illusions about liberalism. Abraham “against hope believed in hope” ... and his faith “was imputed to him for righteousness” (Romans 4:18 and 22).

“The state pays well, so that its good citizens can without danger pay poorly; it provides itself by means of good payment with servants from whom it forms a force—the police—for the protection of good citizens and the good citizens willingly pay high taxes to the state in order to pay so much lower amounts to their workers” (p. 152).

This should read: the bourgeois pay their state well and make the nation pay for it so that without risk they should be able to pay poorly; by good payment they ensure that the state servants are a force available for their protection—the police; they willingly pay, and force the nation to pay high taxes so as to be able without danger to shift the sums they pay on to the workers as a levy (as a deduction from wages). “Stirner” here makes the new economic discovery that wages are a levy, a tax, paid by the bourgeois to the proletarian; whereas the other, mundane economists regard taxes as a tribute which the proletarian pays to the bourgeois.

Our holy church father now passes from the holy middle class to the Stirnerian “unique” proletariat (p. 148). The latter consists of

\(^a\) Each for himself and the devil take the hindmost.—*Ed.*  
\(^b\) The words “the whole hog” are in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*  
\(^c\) From the article “Preussen seit der Einsetzung Arndt’s bis zur Absetzung Bauer’s” published anonymously in the *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz.*—*Ed.*
"rogues, prostitutes, thieves, robbers and murderers, gamblers, propertyless people with no occupation and frivolous individuals" (ibid.). They form the "dangerous proletariat" and for a moment are reduced by "Stirner" to "individual shouters", and then, finally, to "vagabonds", who find their perfect expression in the "spiritual vagabonds" who do not "keep within the bounds of a moderate way of thinking."...

"So wide a meaning has the so-called proletariat or" (per appos.) "pauperism"!

On page 151 ["on the other hand,] the state sucks the life-blood" of the proletariat. Hence the entire proletariat consists of ruined bourgeois and ruined proletarians, of a collection of ragamuffins, who have existed in every epoch and whose existence on a mass scale after the decline of the Middle Ages preceded the mass formation of the ordinary proletariat, as Saint Max can ascertain by a perusal of English and French legislation and literature. Our saint has exactly the same notion of the proletariat as the "good comfortable burghers" and, particularly, the "loyal officials". He is consistent also in identifying the proletariat with pauperism, whereas pauperism is the position only of the ruined proletariat, the lowest level to which the proletarian sinks who has become incapable of resisting the pressure of the bourgeoisie, and it is only the proletarian whose whole energy has been sapped who becomes a pauper. Compare Sismondi, a Wade, b etc. "Stirner" and his fraternity, for example, can in the eyes of the proletarians, in certain circumstances count as paupers but never as proletarians.

Such are Saint Max's "own" ideas about the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But since with these imaginations about liberalism, good burghers and vagabonds he, of course, gets nowhere, he finds himself compelled in order to make the transition to communism to bring in the actual, ordinary bourgeois and proletarians insofar as he knows about them from hearsay. This occurs on pages 151 and 152, where the lumpen-proletariat becomes transformed into "workers", into ordinary proletarians, while the bourgeois "in course of time" undergoes "occasionally" a series of "various transformations" and "manifold refractions". In one line we read: "The propertyed rule", i.e., the profane bourgeois; six lines later we read: "The citizen is what he is by the grace of the state", i.e., the holy bourgeois; yet another six lines later: "The state is the status of the middle class", i.e., the profane bourgeois; this is then ex-

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a Simonde de Sismondi, Nouveaux principes d'économie politique.—Ed.
b John Wade, History of the Middle and Working Classes.—Ed.
plained by saying that "the state gives the propertied" "their property in feudal possession" and that the "money and property" of the "capitalists", i.e., the holy bourgeois, is such "state property" transferred by the state to "feudal possession". Finally, this omnipotent state is again transformed into the "state of the propertied", i.e., of the profane bourgeois, which is in accord with a later passage: "Owing to the revolution the bourgeoisie became omnipotent" (p. 156). Even Saint Max would never have been able to achieve these "heart-rending" and "horrible" contradictions—at any rate, he would never have dared to promulgate them—had he not had the assistance of the German word "Bürger" [citizen], which he can interpret at will as "citoyen" or as "bourgeois" or as the German "good burgher".

Before going further, we must take note of two more great politico-economic discoveries which our simpleton "brings into being" "in the depths of his heart" and which have in common with the "joy of youth" of page 17 the feature of being also "pure thoughts".

On page 150 all the evil of the existing social relations is reduced to the fact that "burghers and workers believe in the 'truth' of money". Jacques le bonhomme imagines that it is in the power of the "burghers" and "workers", who are scattered among all civilised states of the world, suddenly, one fine day, to put on record their "disbelief" in the "truth of money"; he even believes that if this nonsense were possible, something would be achieved by it. He believes that any Berlin writer could abolish the "truth of money" with the same ease as he abolishes in his mind the "truth" of God or of Hegelian philosophy. That money is a necessary product of definite relations of production and intercourse and remains a "truth" so long as these relations exist—this, of course, is of no concern to a holy man like Saint Max, who raises his eyes towards heaven and turns his profane backside to the profane world.

The second discovery is made on page 152 and amounts to this, that "the worker cannot turn his labour to account" because he "falls into the hands" of "those who" have received "some kind of state property" "in feudal possession". This is merely a further explanation of the sentence on page 151 already quoted above where the state sucks the life-blood of the worker. And here everyone will immediately "put forward" "the simple reflection"—that "Stirner" does not do so is not "surprising"—how does it come about that the state has not given the "workers" also some sort of "state property" in "feudal possession". If Saint Max had asked himself this question he would probably have managed to do without his
construction of the "holy" burghers, because he would have been bound to see the relation in which the propertied stand to the modern state.

By means of the opposition of the bourgeoisie and proletariat—as even "Stirner" knows—one arrives at communism. But how one arrives at it, only "Stirner" knows.

"The workers have the most tremendous power in their hands ... they have only to cease work and to regard what they have produced by their labour as their property and to enjoy it. This is the meaning of the workers' disturbances which flare up here and there" (p. 153).

Workers' disturbances, which even under the Byzantine Emperor Zeno led to the promulgation of a law (Zeno, de novis operibvs constitutio\(^a\)), which "flared up" in the fourteenth century in the form of the Jacquerie and Wat Tyler's rebellion, in 1518 on the Evil May Day\(^b\) in London, and in 1549 in the great uprising of the tanner Kett,\(^67\) and later gave rise to Act 15 of the second and third year of the reign of Edward VI, and a series of similar Acts of Parliament; the disturbances which soon afterwards, in 1640 and 1659 (eight uprisings in one year), took place in Paris and which already since the fourteenth century must have been frequent in France and England, judging by the legislation of the time; the constant war which since 1770 in England and since the revolution in France has been waged with might and cunning by the workers against the bourgeoisie—all this exists for Saint Max only "here and there", in Silesia, Poznan, Magdeburg and Berlin, "according to German newspaper reports".

What is produced by labour, according to Jacques le bonhomme's imagination, would continue to exist and be reproduced, as an object to be "regarded" and "enjoyed", even if the producers "ceased work".

As he did earlier in the case of money, now again our good burgher transforms "the workers", who are scattered throughout the civilised world, into a private club which has only to adopt a decision in order to get rid of all difficulties. Saint Max does not know, of course, that at least fifty attempts have been made in England since 1830, and at the present moment yet another is being made, to gather all the English workers into a single association and that highly empirical causes have frustrated the success of all these projects. He does not know that even a minority of workers who combine and go on strike very soon find themselves compelled to act in a revolutionary way—a fact he could have learned from the 1842

\(^a\) Zeno, Decree on New Works.—Ed.
\(^b\) The words "Evil May Day" are in English in the manuscript.—Ed.
uprising in England and from the earlier Welsh uprising of 1839, in which year the revolutionary excitement among the workers first found comprehensive expression in the “sacred month”, which was proclaimed simultaneously with a general arming of the people.\textsuperscript{68} Here again we see how Saint Max constantly tries to pass off his nonsense as “the meaning” of historical facts (in which he is successful at best in relation to his “one”)—historical facts “on which he foists his own meaning, which are thus bound to lead to nonsense” (Wigand, p. 194). Incidentally, it would never enter the head of any proletarian to turn to Saint Max for advice about the “meaning” of the proletarian movements or what should be undertaken at the present time against the bourgeoisie.

After this great campaign, our Saint Sancho returns to his Maritornes with the following fanfare:

“The state rests on the slavery of labour. If labour were to become free, the state would be lost” (p. 153).

The \textit{modern} state, the rule of the bourgeoisie, is based on \textit{freedom of labour}. The idea that along with freedom of religion, state, thought, etc., and hence “occasionally” “also” “perhaps” with freedom of \textit{labour}, not I become free, but only one of my enslavers—this idea was borrowed by Saint Max himself, many times, though in a very distorted form, from the \textit{Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher}.\textsuperscript{3} Freedom of labour is free competition of the workers among themselves. Saint Max is very unfortunate in political economy as in \textit{all other} spheres. Labour \textit{is} free in all civilised countries; it is not a matter of freeing labour but of abolishing it.

\textbf{B. Communism}

Saint Max calls communism “social liberalism”, because he is well aware how great is the disrepute of the word liberalism among the radicals of 1842 and the most advanced Berlin “free-thinkers”.\textsuperscript{69} This transformation gives him at the same time the opportunity and courage to put into the mouths of the “social liberals” all sorts of things which had never been uttered before “Stirner” and the refutation of which is intended to serve also as a refutation of \textit{communism}.

Communism is overcome by means of a series of partly logical and partly historical constructions.

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. present edition, Vol. 3, p. 152.—\textit{Ed.}
First logical construction.

Because "we have seen ourselves made into servants of egoists", "we should" not ourselves "become egoists ... but should rather see to it that egoists become impossible. We want to turn them all into ragamuffins, we want no one to possess anything, in order that 'all' should be possessors.—So say the social [liberals].—Who is this person whom you call 'all'? It is 'society'" (p. 153).

With the aid of a few quotation marks Sancho here transforms "all" into a person, society as a person, as a subject=holy society, the holy. Now our saint knows what he is about and can let loose the whole torrent of his flaming anger against "the holy", as the result of which, of course, communism is annihilated.

That Saint Max here again puts his nonsense into the mouth of the "social [liberals]", as being the meaning of their words, is not "surprising". He identifies first of all "owning" as a private property-owner with "owning" in general. Instead of examining the definite relations between private property and production, instead of examining "owning" as a landed proprietor, as a rentier, as a merchant, as a factory-owner, as a worker—where "owning" would be found to be a quite distinct kind of owning, control over other people's labour—he transforms all these relations into "owning as such". a

[... ] political liberalism, which made the "nation" the supreme owner. Hence communism has no longer to "abolish" any "personal property" but, at most, has to equalise the distribution of "feudal possessions", to introduce égalité there.

On society as "supreme owner" and on the "ragamuffin", Saint Max should compare, inter alia, L'Egalitaire for 1840:

"Social property is a contradiction, but social wealth is a consequence of communism. Fourier, in contradistinction to the modest bourgeois moralists, repeats a hundred times that it is not a social evil that some have too much but that all have too little", and therefore draws attention also to the "poverty of the rich", in La fausse industrie, Paris, 1835. p. 410.

Similarly as far back as 1839—hence before Weitling's Garantien b—it is stated in the German communist magazine Die Stimme des Volks (second issue, p. 14) published in Paris:

"Private property, the much praised, industrious, comfortable, innocent 'private gain', does obvious harm to the wealth of life." c

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a Four pages of the manuscript are missing here which contained the end of the "first logical construction" and the beginning of the "second logical construction".—Ed.
b Wilhelm Weitling, Garantien der Harmonie und Freiheit.—Ed.
c This seems to be a quotation from the article "Politischer und Socialer Umschwung" published in Blätter der Zukunft, 1846, No. 5. Die Stimme des Volks was probably mentioned by mistake.—Ed.
Saint Sancho here takes as communism the ideas of a few liberals tending towards communism, and the mode of expression of some communists who, for very practical reasons, express themselves in a political form.

After “Stirner” has transferred property to “society”, all the members of this society in his eyes at once become paupers and ragamuffins, although—even according to his idea of the communist order of things—they “own” the “supreme owner”.—His benevolent proposal to the communists—“to transform the word ‘Lump’ into an honourable form of address, just as the revolution did with the word ‘citizen’”—is a striking example of how he confuses communism with something which long ago passed away. The revolution even “transformed” the word sansculotte “into an honourable form of address”, as against “honnêtes gens”, which he translates very inadequately as good citizens. Saint Sancho does this in order that there may be fulfilled the words in the book of the prophet Merlin about the three thousand and three hundred slaps which the man who is to come will have to give himself:

\[
\text{Es menester que Sancho tu escudero} \\
\text{Se dé tres mil azotes, y trecientos} \\
\text{En ambas sus valientes posaderas} \\
\text{Al aire descubiertas, y de modo} \\
\text{Que le escuezan, le amarguen y le enfaden.}
\]

(Don Quixote, tomo II, cap. 35.)

Saint Sancho notes that the “elevation of society to supreme owner” is a “second robbery of the personal element in the interests of humanity”, while communism is only the completed robbery of the “robbery of the personal element”. “Since he unquestionably regards robbery as detestable”, Saint Sancho “therefore believes for example” that he “has branded” communism “already by the” above “proposition” (“the book”, p. 102). “Once” “Stirner” has “detected” “even robbery” in communism, “how could he fail to feel ‘profound disgust’ at it and ‘just indignation’”? (Wigand, p. 156.) We now challenge “Stirner” to name a bourgeois who has written about communism (or Chartism) and has not put forward the same
absurdity with great emphasis. Communism will certainly carry out “robbery” of what the bourgeois regards as “personal”.

First corollary.

Page 349: “Liberalism at once came forward with the statement that it is an essential feature of man to be not property, but property-owner. Since it was a question here of man, and not of an individual, the question of how much, which was precisely what constituted the particular interest of individuals, was left to their discretion. Therefore, the egoism of individuals had the widest scope as regards this how much and carried on tireless competition.”

That is to say: liberalism, i.e., liberal private property-owners, at the beginning of the French Revolution gave private property a liberal appearance by declaring it one of the rights of man. They were forced to do so if only because of their position as a revolutionising party; they were even compelled not only to give the mass of the French [rural] population the right to property, [but also] to let them seize actual property, and they could do all this because thereby their own “how much”, which was what chiefly interested them, remained intact and was even made safe.

We find here further that Saint Max makes competition arise from liberalism, a slap that he gives history in revenge for the slaps which he had to give himself above. A “more exact explanation” of the manifesto with which he makes liberalism “at once come forward” can be found in Hegel, who in 1820 expressed himself as follows:

“In respect of external things it is rational” (i.e., it becomes me as reason, as a man) “that I should possess property ... what and how much I possess is, therefore, legally a matter of chance” (Rechtsphilosophie, § 49).

It is characteristic of Hegel that he turns the phrase of the bourgeois into the true concept, into the essence of property, and “Stirner” faithfully imitates him. On the basis of the above analysis, Saint Max now makes the further statement, that communism “raised the question as to how much property, and answered it in the sense that man should have as much as he needs. Can my egoism be satisfied with that?... No. I must rather have as much as I am capable of appropriating” (p. 349).

First of all it should be remarked here that communism has by no means originated from § 49 of Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie and its “what and how much”. Secondly, “communism” does not dream of wanting to give anything to “man”, for “communism” is not at all of the opinion that “man” “needs” anything apart from a brief critical elucidation. Thirdly, Stirner: foists on to communism the conception

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*G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. The preface to this work is dated June 25, 1820.—Ed.*
of "need" held by the present-day bourgeois; hence he introduces a distinction which, on account of its paltriness, can be of importance only in present-day society and its ideal copy—Stirner's union of "individual shouters" and free seamstresses. "Stirner" has again achieved great "penetration" into the essence of communism. Finally, in his demand to have as much as he is capable of appropriating (if this is not the usual bourgeois phrase that everyone should have as much as his ability permits him, that everyone should have the right of free gain), Saint Sancho assumes communism as having already been achieved in order to be able freely to develop his "ability" and put it into operation, which by no means depends solely on him, any more than his fortune itself, but depends also on the relations of production and intercourse in which he lives. (Cf. the chapter on the "Union".) Incidentally, even Saint Max himself does not behave according to his doctrine, for throughout his "book" he "needs" things and uses things which he was not "capable of appropriating".

Second corollary.

"But the social reformers preach a social law to us. The individual thus becomes the slave of society" (p. 246). "In the opinion of the communists, everyone should enjoy the eternal rights of man" (p. 238).

Concerning the expressions "law", "labour", etc., how they are used by proletarian writers and what should be the attitude of criticism towards them, we shall speak in connection with "True Socialism" (see Volume II). As far as law is concerned, we with many others have stressed the opposition of communism to law, both political and private, as also in its most general form as the rights of man. See the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, where privilege, the special right, is considered as something corresponding to private property inseparable from social classes, and law as something corresponding to the state of competition, of free private property (p. 206 and elsewhere); equally, the rights of man themselves are considered as privilege, and private property as monopoly. Further, criticism of law is brought into connection with German philosophy and presented as the consequence of criticism of religion (p. 72); further, it is expressly stated that the legal axioms that are supposed to lead to communism are axioms of private property, and the right of common ownership is an imaginary premise of the right of private

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\[a\] The German word *Vermögen* used several times in this passage means not only ability, capability but also wealth, fortune, means, property; the authors here play on the various meanings of the word.—*Ed.*

\[b\] See this volume, pp. 393-94.—*Ed.*
property (pp. 98, 99). Incidentally, even in the works of German communists passages appeared very early—e.g., in the writings of Hess, *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*, 1843, p. 326 and elsewhere—which could be appropriated and distorted “by Stirner” in his criticism of law.

Incidentally, the idea of using the phrase quoted above against Babeuf, of regarding him as the theoretical representative of communism could only occur to a Berlin school-master. “Stirner”, however, has the effrontery to assert on page 247 that communism, which assumes “that all people by nature have equal rights, refutes its own thesis and asserts that people by nature have no rights at all. For it does not want, for example, to admit that parents have rights in relation to their children; it abolishes the family. In general, this whole revolutionary or Babouvist principle (compare *Die Kommunisten in der Schweiz*, Kommissionalbericht, p. 3) is based on a religious, i.e., false, outlook”.

A Yankee comes to England, where he is prevented by a Justice of the Peace from flogging his slave, and he exclaims indignantly: “Do you call this a land of liberty, where a man can’t larrup his nigger?”

Saint Sancho here makes himself doubly ridiculous. Firstly, he sees an abolition of the “equal rights of man” in the recognition of the “equal rights by nature” of children in relation to parents, in the granting of the same rights of man to children as well as to parents. Secondly, two pages previously Jacques le bonhomme tells us that the state does not interfere when a father beats his son, because it recognises family rights. Thus, what he presents, on the one hand, as a particular right (family right), he includes, on the other hand, among the “equal rights of man by nature”. Finally, he admits that he knows Babeuf only from the Bluntschli report, while this report (p. 3), in turn, admits that its wisdom is derived from the worthy L. Stein, Doctor of Law. Saint Sancho’s thorough knowledge of communism is evident from this quotation. Just as Saint Bruno is his broker as regards revolution, so Saint Bluntschli is his broker as

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*b* This refers to Moses Hess’ article “Philosophie der That”, which was published in *Einundzwanzig Bogen aus der Schweiz*.—*Ed.*

*c* Johann Caspar Bluntschi, *Die Kommunisten in der Schweiz nach den bei Weitling vorgefundenen Papieren*.—*Ed.*

*d* This sentence is in English in the manuscript.—*Ed.*

*e* Lorenz von Stein, *Der Socialismus und Communismus des heutigen Frankreichs.*—*Ed.*
regards communists. With such a state of affairs we ought not to be surprised that a few lines lower down our rustic word of God\textsuperscript{a} reduces the \textit{fraternité} of the revolution to “equality of the children of God” (in what Christian dogma is there any talk of \textit{égalité}?).

Third corollary.

Page 414: Because the principle of community culminates in communism, therefore, communism = “apotheosis of the state founded on love”.

From the state founded on love, which is Saint Max’s own fabrication, he here derives communism which then, of course, remains an exclusively Stirnerian communism. Saint Sancho knows only egoism on the one hand or the claim to the loving services, pity and alms of people on the other hand. Outside and above this dilemma nothing exists for him at all.

Third logical construction.

“Since the most oppressive evils are to be observed in society, it is especially” (!) “the oppressed” (!) who “think that the blame is to be found in society and set themselves the task of discovering the right society” (p. 155).

On the contrary, it is “Stirner” who “sets himself the task” of discovering the “society” which is “right” for him, the holy society, the society as the incarnation of the holy. Those who are “oppressed” nowadays “in society”, “think” only about how to achieve the society which is \textit{right for them}, and this consists primarily in abolishing the present society on the basis of the existing productive forces. If, e.g., “oppressive evils are to be observed” in a machine, if, for example, it refuses to work, and those who need the machine (for example, in order to make money) find the fault in the machine and try to alter it, etc.—then, in Saint Sancho’s opinion, they are setting themselves the task not of putting the machine \textit{right}, but of discovering the \textit{right} machine, the holy machine, the machine as the incarnation of the holy, the holy as a machine, the machine in the heavens. “Stirner” advises them to seek the blame “\textit{in themselves}”. Is it not their fault that, for example, they need a hoe and a plough? Could they not use their bare hands to plant potatoes and to extract them from the soil afterwards? The saint, on page 156, preaches to them as follows:

“It is merely an ancient phenomenon that one seeks first of all to lay the blame anywhere but on oneself—and therefore on the state, on the selfishness of the rich, for which, however, we ourselves are to blame.”

The “oppressed” who seeks to lay the “blame” for pauperism on the “state” is, as we have noted above, no other than Jacques le

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. August Friedrich Ernst Langbein’s poem, \textit{Der Landprediger}.—\textit{Ed.}
bonhomme himself. Secondly, the “oppressed” who comforts himself by causing the “blame” to be laid on the “selfishness of the rich” is again no other than Jacques le bonhomme. He could have learned something better about the other oppressed from the Facts and Fictions of John Watts,\(^a\) tailor and doctor of philosophy, from Hobson’s Poor Man’s Companion, etc. And, thirdly, who is the person that should bear the “blame”? Is it, perhaps, the proletarian child who comes into the world tainted with scrofula, who is reared with the help of opium and is sent into the factory when seven years old—or is it, perhaps, the individual worker who is here expected to “revolt” by himself against the world market—or is it, perhaps, the girl who must either starve or become a prostitute? No, not these but only he who seeks “all the blame”, i.e., the “blame” for everything in the present state of the world, “in himself”, viz., once again no other than Jacques le bonhomme himself. “This is merely the ancient phenomenon” of Christian heart-searching and doing penitence in a German-speculative form, with its idealist phraseology, according to which I, the actual man, do not have to change actuality, which I can only change together with others, but have to change myself in myself. “It is the internal struggle of the writer with himself” (Die heilige Familie, p. 122, cf. pp. 73, 121 and 306).\(^b\)

According to Saint Sancho, therefore, those oppressed by society seek the right society. If he were consistent, he should make those who “seek to lay the blame on the state”—and according to him they are the very same people—also seek the right state. But he cannot do this, because he has heard that the communists want to abolish the state. He has now to construct this abolition of the state, and our Saint Sancho once more achieves this with the aid of his “ass”, the apposition, in a way that “looks very simple”:

“Since the workers are in a state of distress” [Notstand], “the existing state of affairs” [Stand der Dinge], “i.e., the state” [Staat] (status = state or estate) “must be abolished” (ibid.).

Thus:

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Conclusion: the state of distress = the State.

\(^a\) John Watts, The Facts and Fictions of Political Economists.—Ed.

\(^b\) See present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 83, 53, 82, 192.—Ed.
What could "look simpler"? "It is only surprising" that the English bourgeois in 1688 and the French in 1789 did not "put forward" the same "simple reflections" and equations, since in those times it was much more the case that estate=status=the State. It follows from this that wherever a "state of distress" exists, "the State", which is, of course, the same in Prussia and North America, must be abolished.

As is his custom, Saint Sancho now presents us with a few proverbs of Solomon.

Proverb of Solomon No. 1.

Page 163: "That society is no ego, which could give, etc., but an instrument from which we can derive benefit; that we have no social duties, but only interests; that we do not owe any sacrifices to society, but if we do sacrifice something we sacrifice it for ourselves—all this is disregarded by the social [liberals], because they are in thrall to the religious principle and are zealously striving for a—holy society."

The following "penetrations" into the essence of communism result from this:

1. Saint Sancho has quite forgotten that it was he himself who transformed "society" into an "ego" and that consequently he finds himself only in his own "society".
2. He believes that the communists are only waiting for "society" to "give" them something, whereas at most they want to give themselves a society.
3. He transforms society, even before it exists, into an instrument from which he wants to derive benefit, without him and other people by their mutual social relations creating a society, and hence this "instrument".
4. He believes that in communist society there can be a question of "duties" and "interests", of two complementary aspects of an antithesis which exists only in bourgeois society (under the guise of interest the reflecting bourgeois always inserts a third thing between himself and his mode of action—a habit seen in truly classic form in Bentham, whose nose had to have some interest before it would decide to smell anything. Compare "the book" on the right to one's nose, page 247).
5. Saint Max believes that the communists want to "make sacrifices" for "society", when they want at most to sacrifice existing society; in this case he should describe their consciousness that their struggle is the common cause of all people who have outgrown the bourgeois system as a sacrifice that they make to themselves.
6. That the social [liberals] are in thrall to the religious principle and
7. that they are striving for a holy society—these points have already been dealt with above. How "zealously" Saint Sancho
“strives” for a “holy society”, so as to be able to refute communism by means of it, we have already seen.

Proverb of Solomon No. 2.

Page 277: “If interest in the social problem were less passionate and blind, then one ... would understand that a society cannot be turned into a new one so long as those of whom it consists and who constitute it remain as of old.”

“Stirner” believes that the communist proletarians who revolutionise society and put the relations of production and the form of intercourse on a new basis—i.e., on themselves as new people, on their new mode of life—that these proletarians remain “as of old”. The tireless propaganda carried on by these proletarians, their daily discussions among themselves, sufficiently prove how little they themselves want to remain “as of old”, and how little they want people to remain “as of old”. They would only remain “as of old” if, with Saint Sancho, they “sought the blame in themselves”; but they know too well that only under changed circumstances will they cease to be “as of old”, and therefore they are determined to change these circumstances at the first opportunity. In revolutionary activity the changing of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances.—This great saying is explained by means of an equally great example which, of course, is again taken from the world of “the holy”.

“If, for example, the Jewish people was to give rise to a society which spread a new faith throughout the world, then these apostles could not remain Pharisees.”

The first Christians = a society for spreading faith (founded anno 1).

Congregatio de propaganda fide

(founded anno 1640).

Anno 1 = Anno 1640.

This society which should arise = These apostles.

These apostles = Non-Jews.

The Jewish people = Pharisees.

Christians = Non-Pharisees.

= Not the Jewish people.

What can look simpler?

Reinforced by these equations, Saint Max calmly utters the great historic words:\

“Human beings, by no means intending to achieve their own development, have always wanted to form a society.”

Human beings, by no means wanting to form a society, have, nevertheless, only achieved the development of society, because they

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Paraphrase of a line from Goethe’s Iphigenie auf Tauris, Act 1, Scene 3.—Ed.
have always wanted to develop only as isolated individuals and therefore achieved their own development only in and through society. Incidentally it would only occur to a saint of the type of our Sancho to separate the development of "human beings" from the development of the "society" in which they live, and then let his fantasy roam on this fantastic basis. Incidentally, he has forgotten his own proposition, inspired by Saint Bruno, in which just previously he set people the moral demand of changing themselves and thereby changing their society—a proposition, therefore, in which he identifies the development of people with the development of their society.

Fourth logical construction.

On page 156 he makes the communists say, in opposition to the citizens:

“Our essence” (!) “does not consist in all of us being equal children of the state” (!), “but in that we all exist for one another. We are all equal in that we all exist for one another, that each works for the other, that each of us is a worker.” He then regards “to exist as a worker” as equivalent to “each of us exists only through the other”, so that the other, “for example, works to clothe me, and I to satisfy his need of entertainment, he for my food and I for his instruction. Hence participation in labour is our dignity and our equality.

“What advantage do we derive from citizenship? Burdens. And what value is put on our labour? The lowest possible.... What can you put against us? Again, only labour!” “Only for labour do we owe you a recompense”; “only for what you do that is useful to us” “have you any claim on us”. “We want to be only worth so much to you as we perform for you; but you should be valued by us in just the same way.” “Deeds which are of some value to us, i.e., work beneficial to the community, determine value.... He who does something useful takes second place to no one, or—all workers (beneficial to the community) are equal. Since however the worker is worthy of his wage\(^a\), then let the wage also be equal” (pp. 157,158).

With "Stirner", "communism" begins with searchings for "essence"; being a good "youth" he wants again only to "penetrate behind things". That communism is a highly practical movement, pursuing practical aims by practical means, and that only perhaps in Germany, in opposing the German philosophers, can it spare a moment for the problem of "essence"—this, of course, is of no concern to our saint. This Stirnerian "communism", which yearns so much for "essence", arrives, therefore, only at a philosophical category, i.e., “being-for-one-another”, which then by means of a few arbitrary equations:

\[
\text{Being-for-one-another} \quad = \quad \text{to exist only through another} \\
\quad = \quad \text{to exist as a worker} \\
\quad = \quad \text{universal community of workers}
\]

\(^a\) Cf. Luke 10:7.— Ed.
is brought somewhat closer to the empirical world. We would, moreover, challenge Saint Sancho to indicate, for example, in Owen (who, after all, as a representative of English communism can serve as an example of "communism" just as well as, for example, the non-communist Proudhon,* from whom the greater part of the above propositions were abstracted and then rearranged) a passage containing anything of these propositions about "essence", universal community of workers, etc. Incidentally we do not even have to go so far back. The third issue of Die Stimme des Volks, the German communist magazine already quoted above, says:

"What is today called labour is only a miserably small part of the vast, mighty process of production; for religion and morality honour with the name of labour only the kind of production that is repulsive and dangerous, and in addition they venture to embellish such labour with all kinds of maxims—as it were words of blessing (or witchcraft)—'labour in the sweat of thy brow' as a test imposed by God; 'labour sweetens life' for encouragement, etc. The morality of the world in which we live takes very good care not to apply the term work to the pleasing and free aspects of human intercourse. These aspects are reviled by morality, although they too constitute production. Morality eagerly reviles them as vanity, vain pleasure, sensuality. Communism has exposed this hypocritical preaching, this miserable morality."

As universal community of workers, Saint Max reduces the whole of communism to equal wages—a discovery which is then repeated in the following three "refractions": on page 351, "Against competition there rises the principle of the society of ragamuffins—distribution. Is it possible then that I, who am very resourceful, should have no advantage over one who is resourceless?" Further, on page 363, he speaks of a "universal tax on human activity in communist society". And, finally, on page 350, he ascribes to the communists the view that "labour" is "the only resource" of man. Thus, Saint Max re-introduces into communism private property in its dual form—as

* Proudhon, who was as early as 1841 strongly criticised by the communist workers' journal La Fraternité for advocating equal wages, community of workers in general and also the other economic prejudices which can be found in the works of this outstanding writer; Proudhon, from whom the communists have accepted nothing but his criticism of property. [The note was left unfinished.]

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This seems to be a quotation from the article "Politischer und Socialer Umschwung" published in Blätter der Zukunft, 1846, No. 5. Die Stimme des Volks was probably mentioned by mistake.—Ed.

In this section the authors play on the different meanings of the word Vermögen and its derivatives vielvermögend, unvermögend, etc. Der Vielvermögende can denote a person who is able, capable, wealthy, powerful, resourceful, a man of property, etc.; der Unvermögende on the other hand, can mean unable, incapable, inept, powerless, impecunious, resourceless, etc.—Ed.
distribution and wage-labour. As before in connection with "robbery", Saint Max here again displays the most ordinary and narrow-minded bourgeois views as "his own" "penetrations" into the essence of communism. He shows himself fully worthy of the honour of having been taught by Bluntschli. As a real petty bourgeois, he is then afraid that he, "who is very resourceful", "should have no advantage over one who is resourceless"—although he should fear nothing so much as being left to his own "resources".

Incidentally, he "who is very resourceful" imagines that citizenship is a matter of indifference to the proletarians, after he has first assumed that they have it. This is just as he imagined above that for the bourgeoisie the form of government is a matter of indifference. The workers attach so much importance to citizenship, i.e., to active citizenship, that where they have it, for instance in America, they "make good use" of it, and where they do not have it, they strive to obtain it. Compare the proceedings of the North American workers at innumerable meetings, the whole history of English Chartism, and of French communism and reformism."

First corollary.

"The worker, being conscious that the essential thing about him is that he is a worker, keeps himself away from egoism and subordinates himself to the supremacy of a society of workers, just as the bourgeois adhered with devotion" (!) "to the state based on competition" (p. 162).

The worker is at most conscious that for the bourgeois the essential thing about him is that he is a worker, who, therefore, can assert himself against the bourgeois as such. Both these discoveries of Saint Sancho, the "devotion of the bourgeois" and the "state based on competition", can be recorded only as fresh proofs of the "resourcefulness" of the "very resourceful" man.

Second corollary.

"The aim of communism is supposed to be the 'well-being of all'. This indeed really looks as though in this way no one need be in an inferior position. But what sort of well-being will this be? Have all one and the same well-being? Do all people feel equally well in one and the same circumstances?... If that is so, then it is a matter of 'true well-being'. Do we not thereby arrive precisely at the point where the tyranny of religion begins?... Society has decreed that a particular sort of well-being is 'true well-being', and if this well-being were, for example, honestly earned enjoyment, but you preferred enjoyable idleness, then society ... would prudently refrain from making provision for what is for you well-being. By proclaiming the well-being of all, communism destroys the well-being of those who up to now have lived as rentiers", etc. (pp. 411, 412)."
If that is so", the following equations result from it:

The well-being of all = Communism
= One and the same well-being of all
= Equal well-being of all in one and the same circumstances
= True well-being
= [Holy well-being, the holy, the rule of the holy, hierarchy]  
= Tyranny of religion.

Communism = Tyranny of religion.

"This indeed really looks as though" Stirner" has said the same thing about communism as he has said previously about everything else.

How deeply our saint has "penetrated" into the essence of communism is evident also from the fact that he ascribes to communism the desire to bring about "true well-being" in the shape of "honestly earned enjoyment". Who, except "Stirner" and a few Berlin cobbler and tailors, thinks of "honestly earned enjoyment"! * And, what is more, to put this into the mouth of communists, for whom the basis of this whole opposition between work and enjoyment disappears. Let our highly moral saint put his mind at rest on this score. "Honest earning" will be left to him and those whom, unknown to himself, he represents—his petty handicraftsmen who have been ruined by industrial freedom and are morally "indignant". "Enjoyable idleness", too, belongs wholly to the most trivial bourgeois outlook. But the crowning point of the whole statement is the artful bourgeois scruple that he raises against the communists: that they want to abolish the "well-being" of the rentier and yet talk about the "well-being of all". Consequently, he believes that in communist society there will still be rentiers, whose "well-being" would have to be abolished. He asserts that "well-being" as rentier is inherent in the individuals who are at present rentiers, that it is inseparable from their individuality, and he imagines that for these individuals there can exist no other "well-being" than that which is determined by their position as rentiers.

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Who, except Stirner, is able to attribute such moral absurdities to the immoral revolutionary proletarians, who, as the whole civilised world knows (Berlin, being merely "educated" [jebildet], of course does not belong to the civilised world), have the wicked intention not "honestly to earn" their "enjoyment" but to take it by conquest!

a This passage is enclosed in square brackets in the manuscript.—Ed.
He believes further that a society which has still to wage a struggle against rentiers and the like, is already organised in a communist way.* The communists, at any rate, will have no scruples about overthrowing the rule of the bourgeoisie and abolishing its “well-being”, as soon as they are strong enough to do so.** It does not matter to them at all whether this “well-being” common to their enemies and determined by class relations also appeals as personal “well-being” to a sentimentality which is narrow-mindedly presumed to exist.

Third corollary.

On page 190, in communist society

“worry arises again in the form of labour”.

The good citizen “Stirner”, who is already rejoicing that he will again find his beloved “worry” in communism, has nevertheless miscalculated this time. “Worry” is nothing but the mood of oppression and anxiety which in the middle class is the necessary companion of labour, of beggarly activity for securing scanty earnings. “Worry” flourishes in its purest form among the German good burghers, where it is chronic and “always identical with itself”, miserable and contemptible, whereas the poverty of the proletarian assumes an acute, sharp form, drives him into a life-and-death struggle, makes him a revolutionary, and therefore engenders not “worry”, but passion. If then communism wants to abolish both the “worry” of the burgher and the poverty of the proletarian, it goes without saying that it cannot do this without abolishing the cause of both, i.e., “labour”.

We now come to the historical constructions of communism.

First historical construction.

“So long as faith was sufficient for the honour and dignity of man, no objection could be raised against any, even the most arduous labour.” ... “The oppressed classes

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] And finally he makes the moral demand that the communists should quietly allow themselves to be exploited to all eternity by rentiers, merchants, factory-owners, etc., because they cannot abolish this exploitation without at the same time destroying the “well-being” of these gentlemen. Jacques le bonhomme, who poses here as the champion of the gros-bourgeois, can save himself the trouble of preaching moralising sermons to the communists, who can every day hear much better ones from his “good burghers”.

** [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] ... and they will have no scruples about it precisely because for them the “well-being of all” regarded as “corporeal individuals” is more important than the “well-being” of the hitherto existing social classes. The “well-being” which the rentier enjoys as rentier is not the “well-being” of the individual as such, but of the rentier, not an individual well-being but a well-being that is general within the framework of the class.
could tolerate their misery only so long as they were Christians” (the most that can be said is that they were Christians so long as they tolerated their miserable position), “for Christianity” (which stands behind them with a stick) “keeps their grumbling and indignation in check” (p. 158).

“How ‘Stirner’ knows so well” what the oppressed classes could do, we learn from the first issue of the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, where “criticism in the form of a master-bookbinder” quotes the following passage from an unimportant book:a

“Modern pauperism has assumed a political character; whereas formerly the beggar bore his fate _submissively_ and regarded it as God’s will, the modern _ragamuffin_ asks whether he is forced to drag out his life in poverty just because he chanced to be born in rags.”

It was due to this power of Christianity that during the liberation of the feudal serfs the most bloody and embittered struggles were precisely those against the _spiritual_ feudal lords, and it was carried through despite all the grumbling and indignation of Christianity as embodied in the priests (cf. Eden, _History of the Poor_, Book Ib; Guizot, _Histoire de la civilisation en France_; Monteil, _Histoire des Français des divers états_, etc.), while, on the other hand, the minor priests, particularly at the beginning of the Middle Ages, incited the feudal serfs to “grumbling” and “indignation” against the temporal feudal lords (cf., _inter alia_, even the well-known capitulary of Charlemagnec). Compare also what was written above in connection with the “workers’ disturbances which flared up here and there”, about the “oppressed classes” and their revolts in the fourteenth century.c

The earlier forms of workers’ uprisings were connected with the degree of development of labour in each case and the resulting form of property; direct or indirect communist uprisings were connected with large-scale industry. Instead of going into this extensive history, Saint Max accomplishes a holy transition from the _patient_ oppressed classes to the _impatient_ oppressed classes:

“Now, when everyone _ought to develop into a man_” (“how,” for example, do the Catalanian workers 75 “know” that “everyone ought to develop into a man”?), “the confining of man to machine labour amounts to slavery” (p. 158).

Hence, prior to Spartacus and the uprising of the slaves, it was Christianity that prevented the “confining of man to machine

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a The passage is from August Theodor Woeniger’s book _Publicistische Abhandlungen_, quoted by Carl Ernst Reichardt—“the master-bookbinder”—in his article “Schriften über den Pauperismus” (cf. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, _The Holy Family_, in the present edition, Vol. 4, pp. 9-11).—*Ed.*

b Frederic Morton Eden, _The State of the Poor: or, an History of the Labouring Classes in England_.—*Ed.*

c See this volume, p. 204.—*Ed.*
labour” from “amounting to slavery”; and in the days of Spartacus it was only the concept of “man” that removed this relation and brought about slavery. “Or did” Stirner “perhaps” “even” hear something about the connection between modern labour unrest and machine production and wanted here to give an intimation of this? In that case it was not the introduction of machine labour that transformed the workers into rebels, but the introduction of the concept of “man” that transformed machine labour into slavery.—“If that is so” then “it indeed really looks as though” we have here a “unique” history of the workers’ movements.

Second historical construction.

“The bourgeoisie has preached the gospel of material enjoyment and is now surprised that this doctrine finds supporters among us proletarians” (p. 159).

Just now the workers wanted to realise the concept of “man”, the holy; now it is “material enjoyment”, the worldly; above it was a question of the “drudgery” of labour, now it is only the labour of enjoyment. Saint Sancho strikes himself here on *ambas sus valientes posaderas*—first of all on material history, and then on Stirner’s, holy history. According to material history, it was the aristocracy that first put the gospel of worldly enjoyment in the place of enjoyment of the gospel; it was at first for the aristocracy that the sober bourgeoisie applied itself to work and it very cunningly left to the aristocracy the enjoyment from which it was debarred by its own laws (whereby the power of the aristocracy passed in the form of money into the pockets of the bourgeoisie).

According to Stirner’s history, the bourgeoisie was satisfied to seek “the holy”, to pursue the cult of the state and to “transform all existing objects into imaginary ones”, and it required the Jesuits to “save sensuousness from complete decay”. According to this same Stirnerian history, the bourgeoisie usurped all power by means of revolution, consequently also its gospel, that of material enjoyment, although according to the same Stirnerian history we have now reached the point where “ideas alone rule the world”. Stirner’s hierarchy thus finds itself “entre ambas posaderas”.

Third historical construction.

Page 159: “After the bourgeois had given freedom from the commands and arbitrariness of individuals, there remained the arbitrariness which arises from the conjuncture of conditions and which can be called the fortuitousness of circumstances. There remained—luck and those favoured by luck.”

Saint Sancho then makes the communists “find a law and a new order which puts an end to these fluctuations” (the thingumbob),

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* His two most ample buttocks.—*Ed.*
about which order he knows this much, that the communists should now proclaim: “Let this order henceforth be holy!” (whereas he ought now rather to have proclaimed: Let the disorder of my fantasies be the holy order of the communists). “Here is wisdom” (Revelation of St. John, 13:18). “Let him that hath understanding count the number” of absurdities which Stirner—usually so verbose and always repeating himself—[here] squeezes into a few [lines].

In its most general form the first proposition reads: after the bourgeoisie had abolished feudalism, the bourgeoisie remained. Or: after the domination of individuals had been abolished in “Stirner’s” imagination, precisely the opposite remained to be done. “It indeed really looks as though” one could bring the two most distant historical epochs into a relationship which is the holy relationship, the relationship as the holy, the relationship in heaven.

Incidentally, this proposition of Saint Sancho’s is not satisfied with the above-mentioned mode simple of absurdity, it has to bring it to the mode composé and bicomposé of absurdity. For, firstly, Saint Max believes the bourgeoisie which liberates itself that, by liberating itself from the commands and arbitrariness of individuals, it has liberated the mass of society as a whole from the commands and arbitrariness of individuals. Secondly, in reality it liberated itself not from the “commands and arbitrariness of individuals”, but from the domination of the corporation, the guild, the estates, and hence was now for the first time, as actual individual bourgeois, in a position to impose “commands and arbitrariness” on the workers. Thirdly, it only abolished the more or less idealistic appearance of the former commands and former arbitrariness of individuals, in order to establish instead these commands and this arbitrariness in their material crudity. He, the bourgeois, wanted his “commands and arbitrariness” to be no longer restricted by the hitherto existing “commands and arbitrariness” of political power concentrated in the monarch, the nobility and the corporations, but at most restricted only by the general interests of the whole bourgeois class, as expressed in bourgeois legislation. He did nothing more than abolish the commands and arbitrariness over the commands and arbitrariness of the individual bourgeois (see “Political Liberalism”).

Instead of making a real analysis of the conjuncture of conditions, which with the rule of the bourgeoisie became a totally different conjuncture of totally different conditions, Saint Sancho leaves it in

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*These terms were used by Charles Fourier (see Ch. Fourier, Théorie de l'unité universelle).—Ed.*
the form of the general category “conjuncture, etc.”, and bestows on it the still more indefinite name of “fortuitousness of circumstances”, as though the “commands and arbitrariness of individuals” are not themselves a “conjuncture of conditions”. Having thus done away with the real basis of communism, i.e., the *definite* conjuncture of conditions under the bourgeois regime, he can now also transform this airy communism into his holy communism. “It indeed really looks” as though “Stirner” is a “man with only ideal”, imagined, historical “wealth”—the “perfect ragamuffin”. See “the book”, p. 362.

This great construction or, rather, its major proposition is once more and with great emphasis repeated on page 189 in the following form:

“Political liberalism abolished the inequality of master and servant; it made people *masterless, anarchic* (!); “the master was then separated from the individual, from the egoist, to become a *spectre*, the law or the state.”

Domination of spectres = (hierarchy) = absence of domination, equivalent to the domination of the “omnipotent” bourgeois. As we see, this domination of spectres is, on the contrary, the domination of the *many* actual masters; hence with equal justification communism could be regarded as liberation from this domination of the many. This, however, Saint Sancho could not do, for then not only his logical constructions of communism but also the whole construction of “the free ones” would be overthrown. But this is how it is throughout “the book”. A single conclusion from our saint’s own premises, a single historical fact, overthrows the entire series of penetrations and results.

Fourth historical construction. On page 350, Saint Sancho derives communism directly from the abolition of serfdom.

I. Major proposition:

“Extremely much was gained when people succeeded in being *regarded*” (!) “as property-owners. Thereby serfdom was abolished and everyone who until then had himself been *property* henceforth became a *master*."

(According to the *mode simple* of absurdity this means: serfdom was abolished as soon as it was abolished.) The *mode composé* of this absurdity is that Saint Sancho believes that people became “property-owners” by means of holy contemplation, by means of “regarding” and “being regarded”, whereas the difficulty consisted in becoming a “property-owner”, and consideration came later of itself. The *mode bicomposé* of the absurdity is that when the abolition of serfdom, which at first was still partial, had begun to develop its consequences and thereby became universal, people ceased to be
able to "succeed" in being "regarded" as worth owning (for the property-owners those they owned had become too expensive); consequently the vast mass "who until then had themselves been property", i.e., unfree workers, became as a result not "masters", but free workers.

II. Minor historical proposition, which embraces about eight centuries, although one "will of course not perceive how momentous" it is (cf. Wigand, p. 194).

"However, henceforth your having [Dein Haben] and what you have [Deine Habe] no longer suffices, and is no longer recognised; on the other hand, your working and your work increases in value. We now respect your mastery of things as previously" (?) "we respected your possession of them. Your labour is your wealth. You are now the master or possessor of what you have obtained by work and not by inheritance" (ibid.).

"Henceforth"—"no longer"—"on the other hand"—"now"—"as previously"—"now"—"or"—"not"—such is the content of this proposition.

Although "Stirner" has "now" arrived at this, that you (viz., Szeliga) are the master of what you have obtained by work and not by inheritance, it "now" occurs to him that just the opposite is the case at present—and so he causes communism to be born as a monster from these two distorted propositions.

III. Communist conclusion.

"Since, however, now everything is inherited and every farthing you possess bears not the stamp of work, but of inheritance" (the culminating absurdity), "SO everything must be remoulded."

On this basis Szeliga is able to imagine that he has arrived at both the rise and fall of the medieval communes, and the communism of the nineteenth century. And thereby Saint Max, despite everything "inherited" and "obtained by work", does not arrive at any "mastery of things", but at most at "having" nonsense.

Lovers of constructions can now see in addition on page 421 how Saint Max, after constructing communism from serfdom, then constructs it again in the form of serfdom under a liege lord—society—on the same model as he already, above, transformed the means by which we earn something into the "holy", by "grace" of which something is given to us. Now, in conclusion, we shall deal in addition only with a few "penetrations" into the essence of communism, which follow from the premises given above.

First of all, "Stirner" gives a new theory of exploitation which consists in this:

"the worker in a pin factory performs only one piece of work, only plays into the hand of another and is used, exploited by that other" (p. 158).
Thus, here "Stirner" makes the discovery that the workers in a factory exploit one another, since they "play into the hands" of one another; whereas the factory-owner, whose hands do not work at all, cannot, therefore, exploit the workers. "Stirner" here gives a striking example of the lamentable position in which communism has put the German theoreticians. Now they have to concern themselves also with mundane things like pin factories, etc., in relation to which they behave like real barbarians, like Ojibbeway Indians and New Zealanders.

Stirnerian communism "on the contrary says" (ibid.):

"All work should have the aim of satisfying 'man'. Therefore, he" ("man") "must become master of it, i.e., be able to perform it as a totality."

"Man" must become a master!—"Man" remains a maker of pin-heads, but he has the consolation of knowing that the pin-head is part of the pin and that he is able to make the whole pin. The fatigue and disgust caused by the eternally repeated making of pin-heads is transformed, by this knowledge, into the "satisfaction of man". O Proudhon!

A further penetration:

"Since communists declare that only free activity is the essence" (iterum Crispinus\(^a\)) "of man, they, like every workaday mode of thought, need a Sunday, a time of exaltation and devotion, in addition to their dull labour."

Apart from the "essence of man" that is dragged in here, the unfortunate Sancho is forced to convert "free activity", which is for the communists the creative manifestation of life arising from the free development of all abilities of the "whole fellow" (in order to make it comprehensible to "Stirner"), into "dull labour", for our Berliner notices that the question here is not one of the "hard work of thought". By this simple transformation the communists can now also be transposed into the "workaday mode of thought". Then, of course, together with the work-day of the middle class its Sunday also is to be found again in communism.

Page 161: "The Sunday aspect of communism consists in the communist seeing in you the man, the brother."

Thus, the communist appears here as "man" and as "worker". This Saint Sancho calls (loc. cit.) "a dual employment of man by the communists—an office of material earning and one of spiritual earning".

\(^a\) Crispinus again.—Ed.
Here, therefore, he brings back even “earning” and bureaucracy into communism which, of course, thereby “attains its final goal” and ceases to be communism. Incidentally he has to do this, because in his “union”, which he will construct later, each also is given a “dual position”—as man and as the “unique”. For the present he legitimises this dualism by foisting it on communism, a method we shall find again in his theory of feudalism and of utilisation.

On page 344 “Stirner” believes that the “communists” want to “settle the question of property amicably”, and on page 413 he even makes them appeal to the self-sacrifice of people [and to] the self-denying disposition of the capitalists!* The few non-revolutionary communist bourgeois who made their appearance since the time of Babeuf were a rare occurrence; the vast majority of the communists in all countries are revolutionary. All communists in France reproach the followers of Saint-Simon and Fourier with their peaceableness and differ from the latter chiefly in their having abandoned all hope of an “amicable settlement”, just as in Britain it is the same criterion which chiefly distinguishes the Chartists from the socialists. Saint Max could discover the communist view of the “self-denying disposition of the rich” and the “self-sacrifice of people” from a few passages of Cabet, the very communist who most of all could give the impression that he appeals for dévoûment, self-sacrifice. These passages are aimed against the republicans and especially against the attacks on communism made by Monsieur Buchez, who still commands the following of a very small number of workers in Paris:

“The same thing applies to self-sacrifice (dévoûment); it is the doctrine of Monsieur Buchez, this time divested of its Catholic form, for Monsieur Buchez undoubtedly fears that his Catholicism is repugnant to the mass of the workers, and drives them away. ‘In order to fulfil their duty (devoir) worthily’—says Buchez—‘self-sacrifice (dévoûment) is needed.’—Let those who can understand the difference between devoir and dévoûment.—‘We require self-sacrifice from everyone, both for great national unity and for the workers’ association ... it is necessary for us to be united, always devoted (dévoués) to one another.’—It is necessary, it is necessary—that is easy to say, and people have been saying it for a long time and they will go on saying it for a very long time yet without any more success, if they cannot devise other means! Buchez complains of the self-seeking of the rich; but what is the use of such complaints? All who are unwilling to sacrifice themselves Buchez declares to be enemies.

“If,” he says, “impelled by egoism, a man refuses to sacrifice himself for others, what is to be done?... We have not a moment’s hesitation in answering: society always

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Here Saint Max again ascribes to himself the wisdom of seizing and striking, as though his whole harangue about the rebellious proletariat were not an unsuccessful travesty of Weitling and his thieving proletariat—Weitling is one of the few communists whom he knows by the grace of Bluntschli.
has the right to take from us what our own duty bids us sacrifice to it.... Self-sacrifice is the only means of fulfilling one's duty. Each one of us must sacrifice himself, always and everywhere. He who out of egoism refuses to fulfil his duty of self-sacrifice must be compelled to do it.'—Thus Buchez cries out to all: sacrifice yourselves, sacrifice yourselves! Think only of sacrificing yourselves! Does this not mean to misunderstand human nature and trample it underfoot? Is not this a false view? We might almost say—a childish, silly view" (Cabet, Réfutation des doctrines de l'Atelier, pp. 19, 20).

Cabet, further, on page 22, demonstrates to the republican Buchez that he inevitably arrives at an “aristocracy of self-sacrifice” with various ranks, and then asks ironically:

“What then becomes of dévouement? What remains of hierarchy?... Such a system might originate in the mind of a man who would like to become Pope or Cardinal—but in the minds of workers!!!” — “M. Buchez does not want labour to become a pleasant diversion, nor that man should work for his own well-being and create new pleasures for himself. He asserts... ‘that man exists on earth only to fulfil a calling, a duty (une fonction, un devoir).’ ‘No,’ he preaches to the communists, ‘man, this great force, has not been created for himself (n’a point été fait pour lui-même).... That is a crude idea. Man is a worker (ouvrier) in the world, he must accomplish the work (œuvre) which morality imposes on his activity, that is his duty.... Let us never lose sight of the fact that we have to fulfil a high calling (une haute fonction)—a calling that began with the first day of man’s existence and will come to an end only at the same time as humanity.’—But who revealed all these fine things to [M.] Buchez? (Mais qui a révélé toutes ces belles choses à M. Buchez lui-même”—which Stirner would have translated: How is it that Buchez knows so well what man should do?)—“Du reste, comprenez qui pourra.” —Buchez continues: ‘What! Man had to wait thousands of centuries in order to learn from you communists that he was created for himself and has no other aim than to live in all possible pleasures.... But one must not fall into such an error. One must not forget that we are created in order to labour (faits pour travailler), to labour always, and that the only thing we can demand is what is necessary for life (la suffisante vie), i.e., the well-being that suffices for us to carry out our calling properly. Everything that is beyond this boundary is absurd and dangerous.’—But just prove it, prove it! And do not be satisfied merely with delivering oracles like a prophet! At the very outset you speak of thousands of centuries! And then, who asserts that people have been waiting for us down all the centuries? But have people perhaps been waiting for you with all your theories about dévouement, devoir, nationalité française, association ouvrière? ‘In conclusion,’ says Buchez, ‘we ask you not to take offence at what we have said.’—We also are polite Frenchmen and we, too, ask you not to take offence” (p. 31).—‘Believe us,’ says Buchez, ‘there exists a communauté which was created long ago and of which you too are members.’—Believe us, Buchez,” concludes Cabet, “become a communist!”

“Self-sacrifice”, “duty”, “social obligation”, “the right of society”, “the calling, the destiny of man”, “to be a worker the calling of man”, “moral cause”, “workers’ association”, “creation of what is indispensable for life”—are not these the same things for which Saint Sancho reproaches the communists, and for the absence of which the communists are reproached by M. Buchez, whose solemn

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a “However, let him who can understand it.” —Ed.
reproaches are ridiculed by Cabet? Do we not find here even Stirner’s “hierarchy”?

Finally, Saint Sancho deals communism the coup de grace on page 169, by uttering the following proposition:

“By taking away also property” (!) “the socialists do not take into account that its continuance is safeguarded by the peculiarities of human beings. Are only money and goods property, or is not every opinion also something that is mine, that belongs to me? Hence, every opinion must be abolished or made impersonal.”

Or does Saint Sancho’s opinion, insofar as it does not become the opinion of others as well, give him command over anything, even over another’s opinion? By bringing into play against communism the capital of his opinion, Saint Max again does nothing but advance against it the oldest and most trivial bourgeois objections, and he thinks he has said something new because for him, the “educated” Berliner, these hackneyed ideas are new. Destutt de Tracy among, and after, many others said the same thing much better approximately thirty years ago, and also later, in the book quoted below. For example:

“Formal proceedings were instituted against property, and arguments were brought forward for and against it, as though it depended on us to decide whether property should or should not exist in the world: but this is based on a complete misunderstanding of our nature” (Traité de la volonté, Paris, 1826, p. 18).

And then M. Destutt de Tracy undertakes to prove that propriété, individualité and personnalité are identical, that the “ego” [moi] also includes “mine” [mien], and he finds as a natural basis for private property that

“nature has endowed man with an inevitable and inalienable property, property in the form of his own individuality” (p. 17).—The individual “clearly sees that this ego is the exclusive owner of the body which it animates, the organs which it sets in motion, all their capacities, all their forces, all the effects they produce, all their passions and actions; for all this ends and begins with this ego, exists only through it, is set in motion through its action; and no other person can make use of these same instruments or be affected in the same way by them” (p. 16). “Property exists, if not precisely everywhere that a sentient individual exists, at least wherever there is a conative individual” (p. 19).

Having thus made private property and personality identical, Destutt de Tracy with a play on the words propriété and propre, like “Stirner” with his play on the words Mein and Meinung, Eigentum and Eigenheit, arrives at the following conclusion:

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a One’s own. — Ed.
b Mv, mine.— Ed.
c Opinion, view.— Ed.
d Property.— Ed.
e Peculiarity.— Ed.
“It is, therefore, quite futile to argue about whether it would not be better for each of us to have nothing of our own (de discuter s’il ne vaudrait pas mieux que rien ne fût propre à chacun de nous)... in any case it is equivalent to asking whether it would not be desirable for us to be quite different from what we are, and even to examining whether it would not be better for us not to exist at all” (p. 22).

“These are extremely popular”, now already traditional objections to communism, and for that very reason “it is not surprising that Stirner repeats them.

When the narrow-minded bourgeois says to the communists: by abolishing property, i.e., my existence as a capitalist, as a landed proprietor, as a factory-owner, and your existence as workers, you abolish my individuality and your own; by making it impossible for me to exploit you, the workers, to rake in my profit, interest or rent, you make it impossible for me to exist as an individual.—When, therefore, the bourgeois tells the communists: by abolishing my existence as a bourgeois, you abolish my existence as an individual; when thus he identifies himself as a bourgeois with himself as an individual, one must, at least, recognise his frankness and shamelessness. For the bourgeois it is actually the case, he believes himself to be an individual only insofar as he is a bourgeois.

But when the theoreticians of the bourgeoisie come forward and give a general expression to this assertion, when they equate the bourgeois’s property with individuality in theory as well and want to give a logical justification for this equation, then this nonsense begins to become solemn and holy.

Above “Stirner” refuted the communist abolition of private property by first transforming private property into “having” and then declaring the verb “to have” an indispensable word, an eternal truth, because even in communist society it could happen that Stirner will “have” a stomach-ache. In exactly the same way here his arguments regarding the impossibility of abolishing private property depend on his transforming private property into the concept of property, on exploiting the etymological connection between the words Eigentum and eigen and declaring the word eigen an eternal truth, because even under the communist system it could happen that a stomach-ache will be eigen to him. All this theoretical nonsense, which seeks refuge in etymology, would be impossible if the actual private property that the communists want to abolish had not been transformed into the abstract notion of “property”. This transformation, on the one hand, saves one the trouble of having to say

\[a\] Own, peculiar.— Ed.
anything, or even merely to know anything, about actual private property and, on the other hand, makes it easy to discover a contradiction in communism, since after the abolition of (actual) property it is, of course, easy to discover all sorts of things in communism which can be included in the concept “property”. In reality, of course, the situation is just the reverse.* In reality I possess private property only insofar as I have something vendible, whereas what is peculiar to me [meine Eigenheit] may not be vendible at all. My frock-coat is private property for me only so long as I can barter, pawn or sell it, so long [as it] is [marketable]. If it loses that feature, if it becomes tattered, it can still have a number of features which make it valuable for me, it may even become a feature of me and turn me into a tatterdemalion. But no economist would think of classing it as my private property, since it does not enable me to command any, even the smallest, amount of other people’s labour. A lawyer, an ideologist of private property, could perhaps still indulge in such twaddle. Private property alienates [entfremdet] the individuality not only of people but also of things. Land has nothing to do with rent of land, the machine has nothing to do with profit. For the landed proprietor, land has the significance only of rent of land; he leases his plots of land and receives rent; this is a feature which land can lose without losing a single one of its inherent features, without, for example, losing any part of its fertility; it is a feature the extent and even the existence of which depends on social relations which are created and destroyed without the assistance of individual landed proprietors. It is the same with machines. How little connection there is between money, the most general form of property, and personal peculiarity, how much they are directly opposed to each other was already known to Shakespeare better than to our theorising petty bourgeois:

Thus much of this will make black, white; foul, fair; Wrong, right; base, noble; old, young; coward, valiant. This yellow slave... Will make the hoar leprosy adored... This it is That makes the wappened widow wed again; She, whom the spital-house and ulcerous sores

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Actual private property is something extremely general which has nothing at all to do with individuality, which indeed directly nullifies individuality. Insofar as I am regarded as a property-owner I am not regarded as an individual—a statement which is corroborated every day by the marriages for money.
In a word, rent of land, profit, etc., these actual forms of existence of private property, are social relations corresponding to a definite stage of production, and they are "individual" only so long as they have not become fetters on the existing productive forces.

According to Destutt de Tracy, the majority of people, the proletarians, must have lost all individuality long ago, although nowadays it looks as if it was precisely among them that individuality is most developed. For the bourgeois it is all the easier to prove on the basis of his language the identity of commercial and individual, or even universal, human relations, as this language itself is a product of the bourgeoisie, and therefore both in actuality and in language the relations of buying and selling have been made the basis of all others. For example, *propriété*—property [*Eigentum*] and characteristic feature [*Eigenschaft*]; property—possession [*Eigentum*] and peculiarity [*Eigentümlichkeit*]; "eigen" ["one's own"]—in the commercial and in the individual sense; *valeur*, *value*, *Wert*; commerce, *Verkehr*; *échange*, *exchange*, *Austausch*\(^d\), etc., all of which are used both for commercial relations and for characteristic features and mutual relations of individuals as such. In the other modern languages this is equally the case. If Saint Max seriously applies himself to exploit this ambiguity, he may easily succeed in making a brilliant series of new economic discoveries, without knowing anything about political economy; for, indeed, his new economic facts, which we shall take note of later, lie wholly within this sphere of synonymy.

Our kindly, credulous Jacques takes the bourgeois play on the words *Eigentum* [property] and *Eigenschaft* [characteristic feature] so literally, in such holy earnest, that he even endeavours to behave like a private property-owner in relation to his own features, as we shall see later on.

Finally, on page 421, "Stirner" instructs communism that "actually it" (viz., communism) "does not attack property, but the alienation of property".

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\(^a\) William Shakespeare, *Timon of Athens*, Act IV, Scene 3.—Ed.

\(^b\) Worth, value.—Ed.

\(^c\) Intercourse, traffic, commerce, communication.—Ed.

\(^d\) Exchange, barter, interchange.—Ed.
In this new revelation of his, Saint Max merely repeats an old witticism already used repeatedly by, for example, the Saint-Simonists. Cf., for example, *Leçons sur l'industrie et les finances*, Paris, 1832, where, *inter alia*, it is stated:

"Property will not be abolished, but its form will be changed ... it will for the first time become true personification ... it will for the first time acquire its real, individual character" (pp. 42, 43).

Since this phrase, introduced by the French and particularly enlarged on by Pierre Leroux, was seized on with great pleasure by the German speculative socialists and used for further speculation, and finally gave occasion for reactionary intrigues and sharp practices—we shall not deal with it here where it says nothing, but later on, in connection with true socialism.

Saint Sancho, [following the] example of Woeniger, whom Reichardt [used], takes delight in turning the proletarians, [and hence] also the communists, into "ragamuffins". He defines his "ragamuffin" on page 362 as a "man possessing only ideal wealth". If Stirner's "ragamuffins" ever set up a vagabond kingdom, as the Paris beggars did in the fifteenth century, then Saint Sancho will be the vagabond king, for he is the "perfect" ragamuffin, a man possessing not even ideal wealth and therefore living on the interest from the capital of his opinion.

C. Humane Liberalism

After Saint Max has interpreted liberalism and communism as imperfect modes of existence of philosophical "man", and thereby also of modern German philosophy in general (which he was justified in doing, since in Germany not only liberalism but communism as well was given a petty-bourgeois and at the same time highflown ideological form), after this, it is easy for him to depict the latest forms of German philosophy, what he has called "humane liberalism", as perfect liberalism and communism, and, at the same time, as criticism of both of them.

With the aid of this holy construction we now get the following three delightful transformations (cf. also "The Economy of the Old Testament"):

1. The individual is not man, therefore he is of no value—absence of personal will, ordinance—"whose name will be named": "masterless"—political liberalism, which we have already dealt with above.

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\[a\] The author of these lectures is Isaac Pereire.—*Ed.*

\[b\] See this volume, p. 468.—*Ed.*
2. The individual has nothing human, therefore no validity attaches to mine and thine or property: "propertyless"—communism, which we have also already dealt with.

3. In criticism the individual should give place to man, now found for the first time: "godless" = identity of "masterless" and "propertyless"—humane liberalism (pp. 180-81).—In a more detailed exposition of this last negative unity, the unshakable orthodoxy of Jacques reaches the following climax (p. 189):

"The egoism of property loses its last possession if even the words 'my God' become meaningless, for" (a grand "for"!) "God only exists if he has at heart the salvation of each individual, just as the latter seeks his salvation in God."

According to this, the French bourgeois would only "lose" his "last" "property" if the word adieu were banished from the language. In complete accord with the preceding construction, property in God, holy property in heaven, the property of fantasy, the fantasy of property, are here declared to be supreme property and the last sheet-anchor of property.

From these three illusions about liberalism, communism and German philosophy, he now concocts his new—and, thanks be to the "holy", this time the last—transition to the "ego". Before following him in this, let us once more glance at his last "arduous life struggle" with "humane liberalism".

After our worthy Sancho in his new role of caballero andante, and in fact as caballero de la tristisima figura, has traversed the whole of history, everywhere battling and "blowing down" spirits and spectres, "dragons and ostriches, satyrs and hobgoblins, wild beasts of the desert and vultures, bitterns and hedgehogs" (cf. Isaiah, 34: 11-14), how happy he must now be, after his wanderings through all these different lands, to come at last to his island of Barataria,74 to "the land" as such, where "Man" goes about in puris naturalibus! Let us once more recall his great thesis, the dogma imposed on him, on which his whole construction of history rests, to the effect that:

"the truths which arise from the concept of man are revered as revelations of precisely this concept and regarded as holy"; "the revelations of this holy concept", even "with the abolition of many a truth manifested by means of this concept, are not deprived of their holiness" (p. 51).

We need hardly repeat what we have already proved to our holy author in respect of all his examples, namely, that empirical

\[\text{Knight-errant.}—\text{Ed.} \]
\[\text{Knight of the most rueful countenance.}—\text{Ed.} \]
\[\text{In the pure natural state.}—\text{Ed.} \]
relations, created by real people in their real intercourse and not at all by the holy concept of man, are afterwards interpreted, portrayed, imagined, consolidated and justified by people as a revelation of the concept "man". One may also recall his hierarchy. And now on to humane liberalism.

On page 44, where Saint Max "in brief" "contrasts Feuerbach's [theological] view with our view", at first nothing but phrases are advanced against Feuerbach. As we already saw in regard to the manufacture of spirits, where "Stirner" places his stomach among the stars (the third Dioscuros, a patron saint and protector against seasickness), because he and his stomach are "different names for totally different things" (p. 42), so, here, too, essence \([\text{Wesen}]\) appears first of all as an existing thing, and "so it is now said" (p. 44):

"The supreme being is, indeed, the essence of man, but precisely because it is his essence, and not man himself, it makes absolutely no difference whether we see this essence outside man and perceive it as 'God' or find it in man and call it the 'essence of man' or 'Man'. I am neither God nor Man, neither the supreme being nor my essence—and, therefore, in the main, it makes no difference whether I think of this essence as inside me or outside me."

Hence, the "essence of man" is presupposed here as an existing thing, it is the "supreme being", it is not the "ego", and, instead of saying something about "essence", Saint Max restricts himself to the simple statement that it makes "no difference" "whether I think of it as inside me or outside me", in this locality or in that. That this indifference to essence is no mere carelessness of style is already evident from the fact that he himself makes the distinction between essential and inessential and that with him even "the noble essence of egoism" finds a place (p. 71). Incidentally everything the German theoreticians have said so far about essence and non-essence is to be found already far better said by Hegel in his \(\text{Logik}.\)

We found the boundless orthodoxy of "Stirner" with regard to the illusions of German philosophy expressed in concentrated form in the fact that he constantly foists "Man" on history as the sole \(\text{dramatis persona}\) and believes that "Man" has made history. Now we shall find the same thing recurring in connection with Feuerbach, whose illusions "Stirner" faithfully accepts in order to build further on their foundation.

Page 77: "In general Feuerbach only transposes subject and predicate, giving preference to the latter. But since he says himself: 'Love is not holy because it is a predicate of God (nor have people ever held it to be holy for that reason) but it is a predicate of God because it is divine by and for itself,' he was able to conclude that the

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\(a\) \(\text{Wesen}\) can mean either essence or being.—\(\text{Ed.}\)
struggle had to be begun against the predicates themselves, against love and everything holy. How could he hope to turn people away from God, once he had left them the divine? And if, as Feuerbach says, the main thing for people has never been God, but only his predicates, he could after all have allowed them to keep this tinsel, since the puppet, the real kernel, still remained."

Since, therefore, Feuerbach "himself" says this, it is reason enough for Jacques le bonhomme to believe him that people have esteemed love because it is "divine by and for itself". If precisely the opposite of what Feuerbach says took place—and we "make bold to say this" (Wigand, p. 157)—if neither God nor his predicates have ever been the main thing for people, if this itself is only a religious illusion of German theory—it means that the very same thing has happened to our Sancho as happened to him before in Cervantes, when four stumps were put under his saddle while he slept and his ass was led away from under him.

Relying on these statements of Feuerbach, Sancho starts a battle which was likewise already anticipated by Cervantes in the nineteenth chapter, where the ingenioso hidalgo fights against the predicates, the mummers, while they are carrying the corpse of the world to the grave and who, entangled in their robes and shrouds, are unable to move and so make it easy for our hidalgo to overturn them with his lance and give them a thorough thrashing. The last attempt to exploit further the criticism of religion as an independent sphere (a criticism which has been flogged to the point of exhaustion), to remain within the premises of German theory and yet to appear to be going beyond them, and to cook from this bone, gnawed away to the last fibres, a thin Rumford beggar's broth [for "the] book"—this last attempt consisted in attacking material relations, not in their actual form, and not even in the form of the mundane illusions of those who are practically involved in the present-day world, but in the heavenly extract of their mundane form as predicates, as emanations from God, as angels. Thus, the heavenly kingdom was now repopulated and abundant new material created for the old method of exploitation of this heavenly kingdom. Thus, the struggle against religious illusions, against God, was again substituted for the real struggle. Saint Bruno, who earns his bread by theology, in his "arduous life struggle" against substance makes the same attempt pro aris et focis as a theologian to go beyond the limits of theology. His "substance" is nothing but the predicates of God united under one name; with the exception of personality, which he reserves to himself—these predicates of God are again nothing

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a For home and hearth.—Ed.
but deified names for the ideas of people about their definite, empirical relations, ideas which subsequently they hypocritically retain because of practical considerations. With the theoretical equipment inherited from Hegel it is, of course, not possible even to understand the empirical, material attitude of these people. Owing to the fact that Feuerbach showed the religious world as an illusion of the earthly world—a world which in his writing appears merely as a phrase—German theory too was confronted with the question which he left unanswered: how did it come about that people “got” these illusions “into their heads”? Even for the German theoreticians this question paved the way to the materialistic view of the world, a view which is not without premises, but which empirically observes the actual material premises as such and for that reason is, for the first time, actually a critical view of the world. This path was already indicated in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher—in the Einleitung zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie and Zur Judenfrage. But since at that time this was done in philosophical phraseology, the traditionally occurring philosophical expressions such as “human essence”, “species”, etc., gave the German theoreticians the desired reason for misunderstanding the real trend of thought and believing that here again it was a question merely of giving a new turn to their worn-out theoretical garment—just as Dr. Arnold Ruge, the Dottore Graziano of German philosophy, imagined that he could continue as before to wave his clumsy arms about and display his pedantic-farcesical mask. One has to “leave philosophy aside” (Wigand, p. 187, cf. Hess, Die letzten Philosophen, p. 8), one has to leap out of it and devote oneself like an ordinary man to the study of actuality, for which there exists also an enormous amount of literary material, unknown, of course, to the philosophers. When, after that, one again encounters people like Krummacher or “Stirner”, one finds that one has long ago left them “behind” and below. Philosophy and the study of the actual world have the same relation to one another as onanism and sexual love. Saint Sancho, who in spite of his absence of thought—which was noted by us patiently and by him emphatically—remains within the world of pure thoughts, can, of course, save himself from it only by means of a moral postulate, the postulate of “thoughtlessness” (p. 196 of “the book”). He is a bourgeois who saves himself in the face of commerce by the banqueroute cochenne,” whereby, of course, he becomes not a proletarian, but an impecunious, bankrupt bourgeois. He does not become a man of the world, but a bankrupt philosopher without thoughts.

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* See present edition, Vol. 3, pp. 146-87.—Ed.
The predicates of God handed down from Feuerbach as real forces over people, as hierarchs, are the monstrosity which is substituted for the empirical world and which "Stirner" finds in existence. So heavily does Stirner's entire "peculiarity" depend merely on "prompting". If "Stirner" (see also p. 63) reproaches Feuerbach for reaching no result because he turns the predicate into the subject and vice versa, he himself is far less capable of arriving at anything, [for] he faithfully accepts these Feuerbachian predicates, transformed into subjects, as real personalities ruling [the world], he faithfully accepts these phrases about relations as actual relations, attaching the predicate "holy" to them, transforming this predicate into a subject, the "holy", i.e., doing exactly the same as that for which he reproaches Feuerbach. And so, after he has thus completely got rid of the definite content that was the matter at issue, he begins his struggle—i.e., his "antipathy"—against this "holy", which, of course, always remains the same. Feuerbach has still the consciousness "that for him it is 'only a matter of destroying an illusion'"—and it is this with which Saint Max reproaches him (p. 77 of "the book")—although Feuerbach still attaches much too great importance to the struggle against this illusion. In "Stirner" even this consciousness has "all gone", he actually believes in the domination of the abstract ideas of ideology in the modern world; he believes that in his struggle against "predicates", against concepts, he is no longer attacking an illusion, but the real forces that rule the world. Hence his manner of turning everything upside-down, hence the immense credulity with which he takes at their face value all the sanctimonious illusions, all the hypocritical asseverations of the bourgeoisie. How little, incidentally, the "puppet" is the "real kernel" of the "tinsel", and how lame this beautiful analogy is, can best be seen from "Stirner's" own "puppet"—"the book", which contains no "kernel", whether "real" or not "real", and where even the little that there is in its 491 pages scarcely deserves the name "tinsel".—If, however, we must find some sort of "kernel" in it, then that kernel is the German petty bourgeois.

Incidentally, as regards the source of Saint Max's hatred of "predicates", he himself gives an extremely naive disclosure in the "Apologetic Commentary". He quotes the following passage from Das Wesen des Christenthums (p. 31): "A true atheist is only one for whom the predicates of the divine being, e.g., love, wisdom, justice are nothing, but not one for whom only the subject of these predicates is nothing"—and then he exclaims triumphantly: "Does this not hold good for Stirner?"—"Here is wisdom." In the above passage Saint Max found a hint as to how one should start in order to go "farthest
of all”. He believes Feuerbach that the above passage reveals the “essence” of the “true atheist”, and lets Feuerbach set him the “task” of becoming a “true atheist”. The “unique” is “the true atheist”.

Even more credulously than in relation to Feuerbach does he “handle” matters in relation to Saint Bruno or “criticism”. We shall gradually see all the things that he allows “criticism” to impose on him, how he puts himself under its police surveillance, how it dictates his mode of life, his “calling”. For the time being it suffices to mention as an example of his faith in criticism that on page 186 he treats “Criticism” and the “Mass” as two persons fighting against each other and “striving to free themselves from egoism”, and on page 187 he “accepts” both “for what they ... give themselves out to be”.

With the struggle against humane liberalism, the long struggle of the Old Testament, when man was a school-master of the unique, comes to an end; the time is fulfilled, and the gospel of grace and joy is ushered in for sinful humanity.

The struggle over “man” is the fulfilment of the word, as written in the twenty-first chapter of Cervantes, which deals with “the high adventure and rich prize of Mambrino’s helmet”. Our Sancho, who in everything imitates his former lord and present servant, “has sworn to win Mambrino’s helmet”—Man—for himself. After having during his various “campaigns” sought in vain to find the longed-for helmet among the ancients and moderns, liberals and communists, “he caught sight of a man on a horse carrying something on his head which shone like gold”. And he said to Don Quixote-Szeliga: “If I am not mistaken, there is someone approaching us bearing on his head that helmet of Mambrino, about which I swore the oath you know of.” “Take good care of what you say, your worship, and even greater care of what you do,” replied Don Quixote, who by now has become wiser. “Tell me, can you not see that knight coming towards us on a dapple-grey steed with a gold helmet on his head?”—“What I see and perceive,” replies Don Quixote, “is nothing but a man on a grey ass like yours with something glittering on his head.”—“Why, that is Mambrino’s helmet,” says Sancho.

a In the German original the word Auszüge is used which can mean departures, campaigns or extracts, abstracts.—Ed.
Meanwhile, at a gentle trot there approaches them Bruno, the holy barber, on his small ass, criticism, with his barber’s basin on his head; Saint Sancho sets on him lance in hand, Saint Bruno jumps from his ass, drops the basin (for which reason we saw him here at the Council without the basin) and rushes off across country, “for he is the Critic himself”. Saint Sancho with great joy picks up the helmet of Mambrino, and to Don Quixote’s remark that it looks exactly like a barber’s basin he replies: “This famous, enchanted helmet, which has become ‘ghostly’, undoubtedly fell into the hands of a man who was unable to appreciate its worth, and so he melted down one half of it and hammered out the other half in such a way that, as you say, it appears to be a barber’s basin; in any case, whatever it may look like to the vulgar eye, for me, since I know its value, that is a matter of indifference.”

“The second splendour, the second property, has now been won!”

Now that he has gained his helmet, “man”, he puts himself in opposition to him, behaves towards him as towards his “most irreconcilable enemy” and declares outright to him (why, we shall see later) that he (Saint Sancho) is not “man”, but an “unhuman being, the inhuman”. In the guise of this “inhuman”, he now moves to Sierra-Morena, in order to prepare himself by acts of penitence for the splendour of the New Testament. There he strips himself “stark naked” (p. 184) in order to achieve his peculiarity and surpass what his predecessor in Cervantes does in chapter twenty-five:

“And hurriedly stripping off his breeches, he stood in his skin and his shirt. And then, without more ado, he took two goat leaps into the air turning head over heels, thereby revealing such things as caused his trusty armour-bearer to turn Rosinante aside, so as not to see them.”

The “inhuman” far surpasses its mundane prototype. It “resolutely turns its back on itself and thus also turns away from the disquieting critic”, and “leaves him behind”. The “inhuman” then enters into an argument with criticism that has been “left behind”; it “despises itself”, it “conceives itself in comparison with another”, it “commands God”, it “seeks its better self outside itself”, it does penance for not yet being unique, it declares itself to be the unique, “the egoistical and the unique”—although it was hardly necessary for it to state this after having resolutely turned its back on itself. The “inhuman” has accomplished all this by its own efforts (see Pfister, Geschichte der Teutschen) and now, purified and triumphant, it rides on its ass into the kingdom of the unique.

End of the Old Testament
1. The Economy of the New Testament

Whereas in the Old Testament the object of our edification was "unique" logic in the framework of the past, we are now confronted by the present time in the framework of "unique" logic. We have already thrown sufficient light on the "unique" in his manifold antediluvian "refractions"—as man, Caucasian Caucasian, perfect Christian, truth of humane liberalism, negative unity of realism and idealism, etc., etc. Along with the historical construction of the "ego", the "ego" itself also collapses. This "ego", the end of the historical construction, is no "corporeal" ego, carnally procreated by man and woman, which needs no construction in order to exist; it is an "ego" spiritually created by two categories, "idealism" and "realism," a merely conceptual existence.

The New Testament, which has already been dissolved together with its premise, the Old Testament, possesses a domestic economy that is literally as wisely designed as that of the Old, namely the same "with various transformations", as can be seen from the following table:

1. **Peculiarity**= the ancients, child, Negro, etc., in their truth, i.e., development from the "world of things" to one's "own" outlook and taking possession of this world. Among the ancients this led to riddance of the world, among the moderns—riddance of spirit, among the liberals—riddance of the individual, among the communists—riddance of property, among the humane [liberals]—riddance of God: hence it led in general to the category of riddance (freedom) as the goal. The negated category of riddance is peculiarity, which of course has no other content than this riddance. Peculiarity is the philosophically constructed quality of all the qualities of Stirner's individual.

2. The owner—as such Stirner has penetrated beyond the untruthfulness of the world of things and the world of spirit; hence the moderns, the phase of Christianity within the logical development: youth, Mongol.—Just as the moderns divide into the triply determined free ones, so the owner falls into three further determinations:

   1. My power, corresponding to political liberalism, where the truth of right is brought to light and right as the power of "man" is resolved in power as the right of the "ego". The struggle against the state as such.
2. My intercourse, corresponding to communism, whereby the truth of society is brought to light and society (in its forms of prison society, family, state, bourgeois society, etc.) as intercourse mediated by "man" is resolved in the intercourse of the "ego".

3. My self-enjoyment, corresponding to critical, humane liberalism, in which the truth of criticism, the consumption, dissolution and truth of absolute self-consciousness, comes to light as self-consumption, and criticism as dissolution in the interests of man is transformed into dissolution in the interests of the "ego".

The peculiarity of the individuals was resolved, as we have seen, in the universal category of peculiarity, which was the negation of riddance, of freedom in general. A description of the special qualities of the individual, therefore, can again only consist in the negation of this "freedom" in its three "refractions"; each of these negative freedoms is now converted by its negation into a positive quality. Obviously, just as in the Old Testament riddance of the world of things and the world of thoughts was already regarded as the acquisition of both these worlds, so here also it is a matter of course that this peculiarity or acquisition of things and thoughts is in its turn represented as perfect riddance.

The "ego" with its property, its world, consisting of the qualities just "pointed out", is owner. As self-enjoying and self-consuming, it is the "ego" raised to the second power, the owner of the owner, it being as much rid of the owner as the owner belongs to it; the result is "absolute negativity" in its dual determination as indifference, "unconcern" and negative relation to itself, the owner. Its property in respect of the world and its riddance of the world is now transformed into this negative relation to itself, into this self-dissolution and self-ownership of the owner. The ego, thus determined, is—

III. The unique, who again, therefore, has no other content than that of owner plus the philosophical determination of the "negative relation to himself". The profound Jacques pretends that there is nothing to say about this unique, because it is a corporeal, not constructed individual. But the matter here is rather the same as in the case of Hegel's absolute idea at the end of the Logik and of absolute personality at the end of the Encyklopädie, about which there is likewise nothing to say because the construction contains everything that can be said about such constructed per-

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*In the manuscript the Berlin dialect form *Fleischjünglichkeit* (unconcern) is used.—*Ed.*
sonalities. Hegel knows this and does not mind admitting it, whereas Stirner hypocritically maintains that his “unique” is also something different from the constructed unique alone, but something that cannot be expressed, viz., a corporeal individual. This hypocritical appearance vanishes if the thing is reversed, if the unique is defined as owner, and it is said of the owner that he has the universal category of peculiarity as his universal determination. This not only says everything that is “sayable” about the unique, but also what he is in general—minus the fantasy of Jacques le bonhomme about him.

“O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of the unique! How incomprehensible are his thoughts, and his ways past finding out!”

“Lo, these are parts of his ways: but how little a portion is heard of him!” (Job 26:14.)

2. The Phenomenology of the Egoist in Agreement with Himself, or the Theory of Justification

As we have already seen in “The Economy of the Old Testament” and afterwards, Saint Sancho’s true egoist in agreement with himself must on no account be confused with the trivial, everyday egoist, the “egoist in the ordinary sense”. Rather he has as his presupposition both this latter (the one in thrall to the world of things, child, Negro, ancient, etc.) and the selfless egoist (the one in thrall to the world of thoughts, youth, Mongol, modern, etc.). It is, however, part of the nature of the secrets of the unique that this antithesis and the negative unity which follows from it—the “egoist in agreement with himself”—can be examined only now, in the New Testament.

Since Saint Max wishes to present the “true egoist” as something quite new, as the goal of all preceding history, he must, on the one hand, prove to the selfless, the advocates of dévoûment, that they are egoists against their will, and he must prove to the egoists in the ordinary sense that they are selfless, that they are not true, holy, egoists.—Let us begin with the first, with the selfless.

We have already seen countless times that in the world of Jacques le bonhomme everyone is obsessed by the holy. “Nevertheless it makes a difference” whether “one is educated or uneducated”. The educated, who are occupied with pure thought, confront us here as “obsessed” by the holy par excellence. They are the “selfless” in their practical guise.

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\[^{a}\text{Romans 11:33 (paraphrased).—Ed.}\]
"Who then is selfless? Completely" (!) "most" (!!!) "likely" (!!!) "he who stakes everything else on one thing, one aim, one purpose, one passion... He is ruled by a passion to which he sacrifices all others. And are these selfless not selfish, perhaps? Since they possess only a single ruling passion, they are concerned only with a single satisfaction, but the more ardently on that account. All their deeds and actions are egoistic, but it is a one-sided, concealed, narrow egoism; it is—obsession" (p. 99).

Hence, according to Saint Sancho, they possess only a single ruling passion; ought they to be concerned also with the passions which not they, but others possess, in order to rise to an all-round, un concealed, unrestricted egoism, in order to correspond to this alien scale of "holy" egoism?

In this passage are incidentally introduced also the "miser" and the "pleasure-seeker" (probably because Stirner thinks that he seeks "pleasure" as such, holy pleasure, and not all sorts of real pleasures), as also "Robespierre, for example, Saint-Just, and so on" (p.100) as examples of "selfless, obsessed egoists". "From a certain moral point of view it is argued" (i.e., our holy "egoist in agreement with himself" argues from his own point of view in extreme disagreement with himself) "approximately as follows":

"But if I sacrifice other passions to one passion, I still do not thereby sacrifice myself to this passion, and I do not sacrifice anything thanks to which I am truly myself" (p. 386).

Saint Max is compelled by these two propositions "in disagreement with each other" to make the "paltry" distinction that one may well sacrifice six "for example", or seven, "and so on", passions to a single other passion without ceasing to be "truly I myself", but by no means ten passions, or a still greater number. Of course, neither Robespierre nor Saint-Just was "truly I myself", just as neither was truly "man", but they were truly Robespierre and Saint-Just, those unique, incomparable individuals.

The trick of proving to the "selfless" that they are egoists is an old dodge, sufficiently exploited already by Helvétius and Bentham. Saint Sancho's "own" trick consists in the transformation of "egoists in the ordinary sense", the bourgeois, into non-egoists. Helvétius and Bentham, at any rate, prove to the bourgeois that by their narrow-mindedness they in practice harm themselves, but Saint Max's "own" trick consists in proving that they do not correspond to the "ideal", the "concept", the "essence", the "calling", etc., of the egoist and that their attitude towards themselves is not that of absolute negation. Here again he has in mind only his German petty bourgeois. Let us point out, incidentally, that whereas on page 99 our saint makes the "miser" figure as a "selfless egoist", on page 78,
on the other hand, the "avaricious one" is included among "egoists in the ordinary sense", among the "impure, unholy".

This second class of the hitherto existing egoists is defined on page 99 as follows:

"These people" (the bourgeois) "are therefore not selfless, not inspired, not ideal, not consistent, not enthusiasts; they are egoists in the ordinary sense, selfish people, thinking of their own advantage, sober, calculating, etc."

Since "the book" is not all of a piece, we have already had occasion, in connection with "whimsy" and "political liberalism", to see how Stirner achieves the trick of transforming the bourgeois into non-egoists, chiefly owing to his great ignorance of real people and conditions. This same ignorance serves him here as a lever.

"This" (i.e., Stirner's fantasy about unselfishness) "is repugnant to the stubborn brain of worldly man but for thousands of years he at least succumbed so far that he had to bend his obstinate neck and worship higher powers" (p. 104). The egoists in the ordinary sense "behave half clerically and half in a worldly way, they serve both God and Mammon" (p. 105).

We learn on page 78: "The Mammon of heaven and the God of the world both demand precisely the same degree of self-denial", hence it is impossible to understand how self-denial for Mammon and self-denial for God can be opposed to each other as "worldly" and "clerical".

On page 105-106, Jacques le bonhomme asks himself:

"How does it happen, then, that the egoism of those who assert their personal interest nevertheless constantly succumbs to a clerical or school-masterly, i.e., an ideal, interest?"

(Here, one must in passing "point out" that in this passage the bourgeois are depicted as representatives of personal interests.) It happens because:

"Their personality seems to them too small, too unimportant—as indeed it is—to lay claim to everything and be able to assert itself fully. A sure sign of this is the fact that they divide themselves into two persons, an eternal and a temporal; on Sundays they take care of the eternal aspect and on weekdays the temporal. They have the priest within them, therefore they cannot get rid of him."

Sancho experiences some scruples here; he asks anxiously whether "the same thing will happen" to peculiarity, the egoism in the extraordinary sense.

We shall see that it is not without grounds that this anxious question is asked. Before the cock has crowed twice, Saint Jacob (Jacques le bonhomme) will have "denied" himself thrice.a

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a Cf. Mark 14:30.— Ed.
He discovers to his great displeasure that the two sides prominently appearing in history, the private interest of individuals and the so-called general interest, always accompany each other. As usual, he discovers this in a false form, in its holy form, from the aspect of ideal interests, of the holy, of illusion. He asks: how is it that the ordinary egoists, the representatives of personal interests, are at the same time dominated by general interests, by school-masters, by the hierarchy? His reply to the question is to the effect that the bourgeois, etc., “seem to themselves too small”, and he discovers a “sure sign” of this in the fact that they behave in a religious way, i.e., that their personality is divided into a temporal and an eternal one, that is to say, he explains their religious behaviour by their religious behaviour, after first transforming the struggle between general and personal interests into a mirror image of the struggle, into a simple reflection inside religious fantasy.

How the matter stands as regards the domination of the ideal, see above in the section on hierarchy.

If Sancho’s question is translated from its highflown form into everyday language, then “it now reads”:

How is it that personal interests always develop, against the will of individuals, into class interests, into common interests which acquire independent existence in relation to the individual persons, and in their independence assume the form of general interests? How is it that as such they come into contradiction with the actual individuals and in this contradiction, by which they are defined as general interests, they can be conceived by consciousness as ideal and even as religious, holy interests? How is it that in this process of private interests acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behaviour of the individual is bound to be objectified [sich versachlichen], estranged [sich entfremden], and at the same time exists as a power independent of him and without him, created by intercourse, and is transformed into social relations, into a series of powers which determine and subordinate the individual, and which, therefore, appear in the imagination as “holy” powers?

Had Sancho understood the fact that within the framework of definite modes of production, which, of course, are not dependent on the will, alien [fremde] practical forces, which are independent not only of isolated individuals but even of all of them together, always come to stand above people—then he could be fairly indifferent as to whether this fact is presented in a religious form or distorted in the fancy of the egoist, above whom everything is placed in imagination, in such a way that he places nothing above himself. Sancho would then have descended from the realm of
speculation into the realm of reality, from what people fancy to what they actually are, from what they imagine to how they act and are bound to act in definite circumstances. What seems to him a product of thought, he would have understood to be a product of life. He would not then have arrived at the absurdity worthy of him—of explaining the division between personal and general interests by saying that people imagine this division also in a religious way and seem to themselves to be such and such, which is, however, only another word for "imagining".

Incidentally, even in the banal, petty-bourgeois German form in which Sancho perceives the contradiction of personal and general interests, he should have realised that individuals have always started out from themselves, and could not do otherwise, and that therefore the two aspects he noted are aspects of the personal development of individuals; both are equally engendered by the empirical conditions under which the individuals live, both are only expressions of one and the same personal development of people and are therefore only in seeming contradiction to each other. As regards the position—determined by the special circumstances of development and by division of labour—which falls to the lot of the given individual, whether he represents to a greater extent one or the other aspect of the antithesis, whether he appears more as an egoist or more as selfless—that was a quite subordinate question, which could only acquire any interest at all if it were raised in definite epochs of history in relation to definite individuals. Otherwise this question could only lead to morally false, charlatan phrases. But as a dogmatist Sancho falls into error here and finds no other way out than by declaring that the Sancho Panzas and Don Quixotes are born such, and that then the Don Quixotes stuff all kinds of nonsense into the heads of the Sanchos; as a dogmatist he seizes on one aspect, conceived in a school-masterly manner, declares it to be characteristic of individuals as such, and expresses his aversion to the other aspect. Therefore, too, as a dogmatist, the other aspect appears to him partly as a mere state of mind, dévoûment, partly as a mere "principle", and not as a relation necessarily arising from the preceding natural mode of life of individuals. One has, therefore, only to "get this principle out of one's head", although, according to Sancho's ideology, it creates all kinds of empirical things. Thus, for example, on page 180 "social life, all sociability, all fraternity and all that ... was created by the life principle or social principle". It is better the other way round: life created the principle.

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a Stirner has "love principle".—Ed.
Communism is quite incomprehensible to our saint because the communists do not oppose egoism to selflessness or selflessness to egoism, nor do they express this contradiction theoretically either in its sentimental or in its highflown ideological form; they rather demonstrate its material source, with which it disappears of itself. The communists do not preach morality at all, as Stirner does so extensively. They do not put to people the moral demand: love one another, do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary, they are very well aware that egoism, just as much as selflessness, is in definite circumstances a necessary form of the self-assertion of individuals. Hence, the communists by no means want, as Saint Max believes, and as his loyal Dottore Graziano (Arnold Ruge) repeats after him (for which Saint Max calls him "an unusually cunning and politic mind", Wigand, p. 192), to do away with the "private individual" for the sake of the "general", selfless man. That is a figment of the imagination concerning which both of them could already have found the necessary explanation in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. Communist theoreticians, the only communists who have time to devote to the study of history, are distinguished precisely by the fact that they alone have discovered that throughout history the "general interest" is created by individuals who are defined as "private persons". They know that this contradiction is only a seeming one because one side of it, what is called the "general interest", is constantly being produced by the other side, private interest, and in relation to the latter it is by no means an independent force with an independent history—so that this contradiction is in practice constantly destroyed and reproduced. Hence it is not a question of the Hegelian "negative unity" of two sides of a contradiction, but of the materially determined destruction of the preceding materially determined mode of life of individuals, with the disappearance of which this contradiction together with its unity also disappears.

Thus we see how the "egoist in agreement with himself" as opposed to the "egoist in the ordinary sense" and the "selfless egoist", is based from the outset on an illusion about both of these and about the real relations of real people. The representative of personal interests is merely an "egoist in the ordinary sense" because of his necessary contradiction to communal interests which, within the existing mode of production and intercourse, are given an independent existence as general interests and are conceived and vindicated in the form of ideal interests. The representative of the interests of the community is merely "selfless" because of his opposition to personal interests, fixed as private interests, and
because the interests of the community are defined as general and ideal interests.

Both the "selfless egoist" and the "egoist in the ordinary sense" coincide, in the final analysis, in self-denial.

Page 78: "Thus, self-denial is common to both the holy and unholy, the pure and impure: the impure denies all better feelings, all shame, even natural timidity, and follows only the desire which rules him. The pure renounces his natural relation to the world.... Impelled by the thirst for money, the avaricious person denies all promptings of conscience, all sense of honour, all soft-heartedness and pity; he is blind to all consideration, his desire drives him on. The holy person acts similarly: he makes himself a laughing-stock in the eyes of the world, he is 'hard-hearted' and 'severely just', for he is carried away by his longing."

The "avaricious man", shown here as an impure, unholy egoist, hence as an egoist in the ordinary sense, is nothing but a figure on whom moral readers for children and novels dilate, but that actually occurs only as an exception, and is by no means the representative of the avaricious bourgeois. The latter, on the contrary, have no need to deny the "promptings of conscience", "the sense of honour", etc., or to restrict themselves to the one passion of avarice alone. On the contrary, their avarice engenders a series of other passions—political, etc.—the satisfaction of which the bourgeois on no account sacrifice. Without going more deeply into this matter, let us at once turn to Stirner's "self-denial".

For the self which denies itself, Saint Max here substitutes a different self which exists only in Saint Max's imagination. He makes the "impure" sacrifice general qualities such as "better feelings", "shame", "timidity", "sense of honour", etc., and does not at all ask whether the impure actually possesses these properties. As if the "impure" is necessarily bound to possess all these qualities! But even if the "impure" did possess all of them, the sacrifice of these qualities would still be no self-denial, but only confirm the fact—which has to be justified even in morality "in agreement with itself"—that for the sake of one passion several others are sacrificed. And, finally, according to this theory, everything that Sancho does or does not do is "self-denial". He may or may not act in a particular manner [...].*

* [There is a gap here. An extant page, which has been crossed out and greatly damaged, contains the following:] he is an egoist, his own self-denial. If he pursues an interest he denies the indifference to this interest, if he does something he denies idleness. Nothing is easier [...] for Sancho than to prove to the "egoist in the ordinary sense"—his stumbling-block—that he always denies himself, because he always denies the opposite of what he does, and never denies his real interest.

In accordance with his theory of self-denial Sancho can exclaim on page 80: "Is perhaps unselfishness unreal and non-existent? On the contrary, nothing is more common!"
Although* on page 420 Saint Max now says:

"Over the portals of our [epoch] are written not the words ... 'know thyself', [but] 'turn yourself to account'" [Verwerte Dich]

(here our school-master again transforms the actual turning to account which he finds in existence into a moral precept about turning to account), nevertheless [for the] "egoist in the ordinary [sense] instead of for] the former "selfless egoist", "the [Apollonic] maxim should read:

"Only know yourselves], only know what [you] are in reality and give up your foolish endeavour to be something different from what you are!" "For": "This leads to the phenomenon of deceived egoism, in which I satisfy not myself, but] only one [of my desires, e. g., the [thirst for] happiness. [—All] your deeds and [actions are secret], concealed ... [egoism.] unconscious egoism, [but] for that very reason not egoism, but slavery, service, self-denial. You are egoists and at the same time not egoists, inasmuch as you deny egoism" (p. 217).

"No sheep, no dog, endeavours to become a real" egoist (p. 443); "no animal" calls to the others: "Only know yourselves, only know

We are really very happy [about the "unselfishness"] of the consciousness of the German petty [bourgeois]....

He immediately gives a good example of this unselfishness by [adducing] Orphanage-Francke, O'Connell, Saint Boniface, Robespierre, Theodor Körner...]

O'Connell [...], every [child] in Britain knows this. Only in Germany, and particularly in Berlin, is it still possible to believe that O'Connell is "unselfish". O'Connell, who "tirelessly works" to place his illegitimate children and to enlarge his fortune, who has not for love exchanged his lucrative legal practice (£10,000 per annum) for the even more lucrative job of an agitator (£20,000-30,000 per annum) (especially lucrative in Ireland, where he has no competition); O'Connell who, acting as middleman, "hard-heartedly" exploits the Irish peasants making them live with their pigs while he, King Dan, holds court in princely style in his palace in Merrion Square and at the same time laments continually over the misery of these peasants, "for he is carried away by his longing"; O'Connell, who always pushes the movement just as far as is necessary to secure his national tribute and his position as chief, and who every year after collecting the tribute gives up all agitation in order to pamper himself on his estate at Derrynane. Because of his legal charlatanism carried on over many years and his exceedingly brazen exploitation of every movement in which he participated, O'Connell is regarded with contempt even by the English bourgeoisie, despite his usefulness.

It is moreover obvious that Saint Max, the discoverer of true egoism, is strongly interested in proving that unselfishness has hitherto ruled the world. Therefore he puts forward the great proposition (Wigand, p. 165) that the world was "not egoistic for millennia". At most he admits that from time to time the "egoist" appeared as Stirner's forerunner and "ruined nations".

* [Marx made the following note at the beginning of this page:] III. Consciousness.
what you are in reality”.—“It is your nature to be” egoistical, “you are” egoistical “natures, i. e.”, egoists. “But precisely because you are that already, you have no need to become so” (ibid.). To what you are belongs also your consciousness, and since you are egoists you possess also the consciousness corresponding to your egoism, and therefore there is no reason at all for paying the slightest heed to Stirner’s moral preaching to look into your heart and do penance.

Here again Stirner exploits the old philosophical device to which we shall return later. The philosopher does not say directly: You are not people. [He says:] You have always been people, but you were not conscious of what you were, and for that very reason you were not in reality True People. Therefore your appearance was not appropriate to your essence. You were people and you were not people.

In a roundabout way the philosopher here admits that a definite consciousness is appropriate to definite people and definite circumstances. But at the same time he imagines that his moral demand to people—the demand that they should change their consciousness—will bring about this altered consciousness, and in people who have changed owing to changed empirical conditions and who, of course, now also possess a different consciousness, he sees nothing but a changed [consciousness].—It is just the same [with the consciousness for which you are secretly] longing; [in regard to this] you are [secret, unconscious] egoists—i.e., you are really egoists, insofar as you are unconscious, but you are non-egoists, insofar as you are conscious. Or: at the root of your present [consciousness lies] a definite being, which is not the [being] which I demand; your consciousness is the consciousness of the egoist such as he should not be, and therefore it shows that you yourselves are egoists such as egoists should not be—or it shows that you should be different from what you really are. This entire separation of consciousness from the individuals who are its basis and from their actual conditions, this notion that the egoist of present-day bourgeois society does not possess the consciousness corresponding to his egoism, is merely an old philosophical fad that Jacques le bonhomme here credulously accepts and copies.* Let us deal with Stirner’s “touching example” of the avaricious person. He wants to persuade this avaricious person,

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] This fad becomes most ridiculous in history, where the consciousness of a later epoch regarding an earlier epoch naturally differs from the consciousness the latter has of itself, e.g., the Greeks saw themselves through the eyes of the Greeks and not as we see them now; to blame them for not seeing themselves with our eyes—that is, “not being conscious of themselves as they really were”—amounts to blaming them for being Greeks.
who is not an "avaricious person" in general, but the avaricious "Tom or Dick"; a quite individually defined, "unique" avaricious person, whose avarice is not the category of "avarice" (an abstraction of Saint Max's from his all-embracing, complex, "unique" manifestation of life) and "does not depend on the heading under which other people" (for example, Saint Max) "classify it"—he wants to persuade this avaricious person by moral exhortations that he "is satisfying not himself but one of his desires". But "you are you only for a [moment], only as a momentary being are you real. What [is separated from you,] from the momentary being" is something absolutely higher, [e.g., money. But whether] "for you" money is "rather" [a higher pleasure], whether it is for you [something "absolutely higher" or] not [...] a perhaps ["deny"] myself […]?—He] finds that I am possessed [by avarice] day and night, [but] this is so only in his reflection. It is he who makes "day and night" out of the many moments in which I am always the momentary being, always myself, always real, just as he alone embraces in one moral judgment the different moments of my manifestation of life and asserts that they are the satisfaction of avarice. When Saint Max announces that I am satisfying only one of my desires, and not myself, he puts me as a complete and whole being in opposition to me myself. "And in what does this complete and whole being consist? It is certainly not your momentary being, not what you are at the present moment"—hence, according to Saint Max himself, it consists in the holy "being" (Wigand, p. 171). When "Stirner" says that I must change my consciousness, then I know for my part that my momentary consciousness also belongs to my momentary being, and Saint Max, by disputing that I have this consciousness, attacks as a covert moralist my whole mode of life.* And then—"do you exist only when you think about yourself, do you exist only owing to self-consciousness?" (Wigand, pp. 157-158.) How can I be anything but an egoist? How can Stirner, for example, be anything but an egoist—whether he denies egoism or not? "You are egoists and you are not egoists, inasmuch as you deny egoism,"—that is what you preach.

Innocent, "deceived", "unavowed" school-master! Things are just the reverse. We egoists in the ordinary sense, we bourgeois, know quite well: Charité bien ordonnée commence par soi-même,¹ and we have

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* [Here Marx repeats the remark:] III (Consciousness).

¹ The following passage is damaged.— Ed.
² Charity begins at home.— Ed.
long had the motto: love thy neighbour as thyself,^ interpreted in the sense that each is his own neighbour. But we deny that we are heartless egoists, exploiters, ordinary egoists, whose hearts cannot be lifted up to the exalted feeling of making the interests of their fellow-men their own—which, between ourselves, only means that we declare our interests to be the interests of our fellow-men. [You] deny the “ordinary” [egoism of the] unique egoist [only because] you [“deny”] your [“natural”] relations to the [world]. Hence you do not understand why we bring practical egoism to perfection precisely by denying the phraseology of egoism—we who are concerned with realising real egoistical interests, not the holy interest of egoism. Incidentally, it could be foreseen—and here the bourgeois coolly turns his back on Saint Max—that you German school-masters, if you once took up the defence of egoism, would proclaim not real, “mundane and plainly evident” egoism (“the book”, p. 455), that is to say, “not what is called” egoism, but egoism in the extraordinary, school-masterly sense, philosophical or vagabond egoism.

The egoist in the extraordinary sense, therefore, is “only now discovered”. “Let us examine this new discovery more closely” (p. 11).

From what has been just said it is already clear that the egoists who existed till now have only to change their consciousness in order to become egoists in the extraordinary sense, hence that the egoist in agreement with himself is distinguished from the previous type only by consciousness, i.e., only as a learned man, as a philosopher. It further follows from the whole historical outlook of Saint Max that, because the former egoists were ruled only by the “holy”, the true egoist has to fight only against the “holy”. “Unique” history has shown us how Saint Max transformed historical conditions into ideas, and then the egoist into a sinner against these ideas; how every egoistic manifestation was transformed into a sin [against these ideas], [the power of] the privileged into a sin [against the idea] of equality, into the sin of despotism. [Concerning the] idea of freedom [of competition,] therefore, it could be [said in “the book”] that [private property is regarded] by him [(p. 155) as”] the personal” [...] great, [...] [selfless] egoists [...] essential and invincible [...] only to be fought by transforming them into something holy and then asserting that he abolishes the holiness in them, i.e., his holy idea about them, [i.e.,] abolishes them only insofar as they exist in him as a holy one.^b

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^a Galatians 5:14.—Ed.

^b This paragraph is damaged.—Ed.
Page 50*: "How you are at each moment you are as your creation, and it is precisely in this creation that you do not want to lose yourself, the creator. You yourself are a higher being than yourself, i.e., you are not merely a creation, but likewise a creator; and it is this that you fail to recognise as an involuntary egoist, and for that reason the higher being is something foreign to you."

In a somewhat different variation, this same wisdom is stated on page 239 of "the book":

"The species is nothing" (later it becomes all sorts of things, see "Self-Enjoyment"), "and when the individual rises above the limitations of his individuality, it is precisely here that he himself appears as an individual; he exists only by raising himself, he exists only by not remaining what he is, otherwise he would be done for, dead."

In relation to these propositions, to his "creation", Stirner at once begins to behave as "creator", "by no means losing himself in them":

"You are you only for a moment, only as a momentary being are you real.... At each moment I am wholly what I am ... what is separated from you, the momentary being", is "something absolutely higher" ... (Wigand, p. 170); and, on page 171 (ibid.), "your being" is defined as "your momentary being".

Whereas in "the book" Saint Max says that besides a momentary being he has also another, higher being, in the "Apologetical Commentary" "the momentary being" [of his] individual is equated with his "complete [and whole] being", and every [being] as a "momentary being" is transformed [into an] "absolutely higher being".

In the "book" therefore he is, at every moment, a higher being than what he is at that moment, whereas in the Commentary", everything that he is not directly at a given moment is defined as an "absolutely higher being", a holy being.—And in contrast to all this division we read on page 200 of "the book":

"I know nothing about a division into an 'imperfect' and a 'perfect' ego."

"The egoist in agreement with himself" needs no longer sacrifice himself to something higher, since in his own eyes he is himself this higher being, and he transfers this schism between a "higher" and a "lower being" into himself. So, in fact (Saint Sancho contra Feuerbach, "the book", p. 243), "the highest being has undergone nothing but a metamorphosis". The true egoism of Saint Max consists in an egoistic attitude to real egoism, to himself, as he is "at each moment". This egoistic attitude to egoism is selflessness. From this aspect Saint Max as a creation is an egoist in the ordinary sense; as creator he is a selfless egoist. We shall also become acquainted with the opposite aspect, for both these aspects prove to be genuine determinations of reflection since they undergo absolute dialectics in which each of them is the opposite of itself.

* [Marx wrote at the top of this page:] II (Creator and Creation).
Before entering more deeply into this mystery in its esoteric form, one has to observe some of its arduous life battles.

[On pages 82, 83 Stirner achieves the feat of] bringing the most general quality, [the egoist,] [into agreement] with himself as creator, [from the standpoint of the world] of spirit:

["Christianity aimed] at [delivering us from natural determination (determination through nature), from desires as a driving force, it consequently wished that man should not allow himself to be] determined [by his desires. This does not mean that] he [should have] no [desires], but that [desires] should not possess [him,] that [they] should not become fixed, unconquerable, ineradicable. Could we not apply these machinations of Christianity against desires to its own precept, that we should be determined by the spirit...? ... Then this would signify the dissolution of spirit, the dissolution of all thoughts. As one ought to have said there ... so one would have to say now: We should indeed possess spirit, but spirit should not possess us."

"And they that are Christ's have crucified the flesh with the affections and lusts" (Galatians 5:24)—thus, according to Stirner, they deal with their crucified affections and lusts like true owners. He accepts Christianity in instalments, but will not let matters rest at the crucified flesh alone, wanting to crucify his spirit as well, consequently, the "whole fellow".

The only reason why Christianity wanted to free us from the domination of the flesh and "desires as a driving force" was because it regarded our flesh, our desires as something foreign to us; it wanted to free us from determination by nature only because it regarded our own nature as not belonging to us. For if I myself am not nature, if my natural desires, my whole natural character, do not belong to myself—and this is the doctrine of Christianity—then all determination by nature—whether due to my own natural character or to what is known as external nature—seems to me a determination by something foreign, a fetter, compulsion used against me, heteronomy as opposed to autonomy of the spirit. Stirner accepts this Christian dialectic without examining it and then applies it to our spirit. Incidentally, Christianity has indeed never succeeded in freeing us from the domination of desires, even in that juste milieu sense foisted on it by Saint Max; it does not go beyond mere moral injunctions, which remain ineffective in real life. Stirner takes moral injunctions for real deeds and supplements them with the further categorical imperative: "We should indeed possess spirit, but spirit should not possess us"—and consequently all his egoism in agreement with itself is reduced “on closer examination”, as Hegel would say, to a moral philosophy that is as delightful as it is edifying and contemplative.
Whether a desire becomes fixed or not, i.e., whether it obtains exclusive [power over us]—which, however, does [not] exclude [further progress]—depends on whether material circumstances, “bad” mundane conditions permit the normal satisfaction of this desire and, on the other hand, the development of a totality of desires. This latter depends, in turn, on whether we live in circumstances that allow all-round activity and thereby the full development of all our potentialities. On the actual conditions, and the possibility of development they give each individual, depends also whether thoughts become fixed or not—just as, for example, the fixed ideas of the German philosophers, these “victims of society”, qui nous font pitié, are inseparable from the German conditions. Incidentally, in Stirner the domination of desires is a mere phrase, the imprint of the absolute saint. Thus, still keeping to the “touching example” of the avaricious person, we read:

“An avaricious person is not an owner, but a servant, and he can do nothing for his own sake without at the same time doing it for the sake of his master” (p. 400).

No one can do anything without at the same time doing it for the sake of one or other of his needs and for the sake of the organ of this need—for Stirner this means that this need and its organ are made into a master over him, just as earlier he made the means for satisfying a need (cf. the sections on political liberalism and communism) into a master over him. Stirner cannot eat without at the same time eating for the sake of his stomach. If the worldly conditions prevent him from satisfying his stomach, then his stomach becomes a master over him, the desire to eat becomes a fixed desire, and the thought of eating becomes a fixed idea—which at the same time gives him an example of the influence of world conditions in fixing his desires and ideas. Sancho’s “revolt” against the fixation of desires and thoughts is thus reduced to an impotent moral injunction about self-control and provides new evidence that he merely gives an ideologically high-sounding expression to the most trivial sentiments of the petty bourgeois.*

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Since they attack the material basis on which the hitherto inevitable fixedness of desires and ideas depended, the communists are the only people through whose historical activity the liquefaction of the fixed desires and ideas is in fact brought about and ceases to be an impotent moral injunction, as it was up to now with all moralists “down to” Stirner. Communist organisation has a twofold effect on the desires produced in the

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a For whom we feel pity.—Ed.
Thus, in this first example he fights, on the one hand, against his carnal desires, and on the other against his spiritual thoughts—on the one hand against his flesh, on the other against his spirit—when they, his creations, want to become independent of him, their creator. How our saint conducts this struggle, how he behaves as creator towards his creation, we shall now see.

In the Christian “in the ordinary sense”, in the chrétien “simple”, to use Fourier’s expression,

“spirit has undivided power and pays no heed to any persuasion of the ‘flesh’. However, only through the ‘flesh’ can I break the tyranny of the spirit; for only when man perceives also his flesh does he perceive himself wholly, and only when he perceives himself wholly does he become perceptive or rational.... But as soon as the flesh speaks and—as cannot be otherwise—in a passionate tone ... then he” (the chrétien simple) “believes he hears devil voices, voices against the spirit... and with good reason comes out passionately against them. He would not be a Christian if he were prepared to tolerate them” (p. 83).

Hence, when his spirit wishes to acquire independence in relation to him, Saint Max calls his flesh to his aid, and when his flesh

individual by present-day relations; some of these desires—namely desires which exist under all relations, and only change their form and direction under different social relations—are merely altered by the communist social system, for they are given the opportunity to develop normally; but others—namely those originating solely in a particular society, under particular conditions of [production] and intercourse—are totally deprived of their conditions of existence. Which [of the desires] will be merely changed and [which eliminated] in a communist [society] can [only be determined in a practical] way, by [changing the real], actual [“desires”, and not by making comparisons with earlier historical conditions).

The two expressions: [“fixed” and “desires”], which we [have just used in order to be able] to disprove [this “unique” fact of] Stirner’s, [are of course] quite inappropriate. The fact that one desire of an individual in modern society can be satisfied at the expense of all others, and that this “ought not to be” and that this is more or less the case with all individuals in the world today and that thereby the free development of the individual as a whole is made impossible — this fact is expressed by Stirner thus: “the desires become fixed” in the egoist in disagreement with himself, for Stirner knows nothing of the empirical connection of this fact with the world as it is today. A desire is already by its mere existence something “fixed”, and it can occur only to Saint Max and his like not to allow his sex instinct, for instance, to become “fixed”; it is that already and will cease to be fixed only as the result of castration or impotence. Each need, which forms the basis of a “desire”, is likewise something “fixed”, and try as he may Saint Max cannot abolish this “fixedness” and for example contrive to free himself from the necessity of eating within “fixed” periods of time. The communists have no intention of abolishing the fixedness of their desires and needs, an intention which Stirner, immersed in his world of fancy, ascribes to them and to all other men; they only strive to achieve an organisation of production and intercourse which will make possible the normal satisfaction of all needs, i.e., a satisfaction which is limited only by the needs themselves.
becomes rebellious, he remembers that he is also spirit. What the Christian does in one direction, Saint Max does in both. He is the chrétien "composé", he once again reveals himself as the perfect Christian.

Here, in this example, Saint Max, as spirit, does not appear as the creator of his flesh and vice versa; he finds his flesh and his spirit both present, and only when one side rebels does he remember that he has also the other, and asserts this other side, as his true ego, against it. Here, therefore, Saint Max is creator only insofar as he is one who is "also OTHERWISE-determined", insofar as he possesses yet another quality besides that which it just suits him to subsume under the category of "creation". His entire creative activity consists here in the good resolution to perceive himself, and indeed to perceive himself entirely or be rational,* to perceive himself as a "complete, entire being", as a being different from "his momentary being", and even in direct contradiction to the kind of being he is "momentarily".

[Let us now turn to one of the "arduous] life battles” [of our saint]:

[Pages 80, 81: “My zeal] need not [be less than the] most fanatical, [but at the same] time [I remain] towards [it cold as ice, sceptical], and its [most irreconcilable enemy;] I remain [its judge, for I am its] owner.”

[If one desires to] give [meaning] to what Saint [Sancho] says about himself, then it amounts to this: his creative activity here is limited to the fact that in his zeal he preserves the consciousness of his zeal, that he reflects on it, that he adopts the attitude of the reflecting ego to himself as the real ego. It is to consciousness that he arbitrarily gives the name "creator". He is "creator" only insofar as he possesses consciousness.

“Thereupon, you forget yourself in sweet self-oblivion.... But do you exist only when you think of yourself, and do you vanish when you forget yourself? Who does not forget himself at every instant, who does not lose sight of himself a thousand times an hour?” (Wigand, pp. 157, 158).

This, of course, Sancho cannot forgive his "self-oblivion" and therefore "remains at the same time its most irreconcilable enemy".

Saint Max, the creation, burns with immense zeal at the very time when Saint Max, the creator, has already risen above his zeal by means of reflection; or the real Saint Max burns with zeal, and the reflecting Saint Max imagines that he has risen above this zeal. This

* Here, therefore, Saint Max completely justifies Feuerbach’s "touching example" of the hetaera and the beloved. In the first case, a man "perceives" only his flesh or only her flesh, in the second he perceives himself entirely or her entirely. See Wigand, pp. 170, 171.
rising in reflection above what he actually is, is now amusingly and
adventurously described in the phrases of a novel to the effect that
he allows his zeal to remain in existence, i.e., he does not draw any
serious consequences from his hostility to it, but his attitude towards
it is "cold as ice", "sceptical" and that of its "most irreconcilable
enemy".

Insofar as Saint Max burns with zeal, i.e., insofar as zeal is his true
quality, his attitude to it is not that of creator; and insofar as his
attitude is that of creator, he does not really burn with zeal, zeal is
foreign to him, not a quality of him. So long as he burns with zeal he
is not the owner of zeal, and as soon as he becomes the owner, he
ceases to burn with zeal. As an aggregate complex, he is at every
instant, in the capacity of creator and owner, the sum total of all his
qualities, with the exception of the one quality which he puts in
opposition to himself, the embodiment of all the others, as creation
and property—so that precisely that quality which he stresses as his
own is always foreign to him.

No matter how extravagant Saint Max's true story of his heroic
exploits within himself, in his own consciousness, may sound, it is
nevertheless an acknowledged fact that there do exist reflect­
ing individuals, who imagine that in and through reflection they
have risen above everything,* because in actual fact they never go
beyond reflection.

This trick—of declaring oneself against some definite quality as
being someone who is also-otherwise-determined, namely, in the
present example as being the possessor of reflection directed towards the
opposite—this trick can be applied with the necessary variations to any
quality you choose. For example, my indifference need be no less
than that of the most blasé person; but at the same time I remain
towards it extremely ardent, sceptical and its most irreconcilable
enemy, etc.

[It should] not be forgotten that [the aggregate] complex of all his
[qualities, the owner]—in which capacity [Saint] Sancho [by reflect­
ing opposes one particular] quality—is in this [case nothing but

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] All this is in fact merely
a highflying description of the bourgeois, who controls each of his emotions so that he
should not sustain any loss, and on the other hand boasts about numerous qualities,
e.g., philanthropic zeal, towards which he must remain "cold as ice, sceptical and an
irreconcilable enemy", in order not to lose himself as owner in his philanthropic zeal
but to remain the owner of philanthropy. Whereas the bourgeois sacrifices his
inclinations and desires always for a definite real interest, Saint Max sacrifices the
quality towards which he adopts the attitude of the "most irreconcilable enemy" for
the sake of his reflecting ego, his reflection.
Sancho's] simple [reflection about this] one quality, [which he has] transformed [into his ego by] putting forward, instead of the whole [complex, one] merely reflecting [quality and] putting forward in opposition to each of his qualities [and to] the series [merely the one] quality of reflection, an ego, and himself as the imagined ego.

Now he himself gives expression to this hostile attitude to himself, this solemn parody of Bentham's book-keeping\textsuperscript{81} of his own interests and qualities.

Page 188: "An interest, no matter towards what end it may be directed, acquires a slave in the shape of myself, if I am unable to rid myself of it; it is no longer my property, but I am its property. Let us, therefore, accept the directive of criticism that we should feel happy only in dissolution."

"We!"—Who are "We?" It never occurs to "us" to "accept" the "directive of criticism".—Thus Saint Max, who for the moment is under the police surveillance of "criticism", here demands "the same well-being for all", "equal well-being for all in one and the same [respect]", "the direct tyrannical domination of\textit{religion}"

His interestedness in the extraordinary sense is here revealed as a heavenly disinterestedness.

Incidentally, there is no need here to deal at length with the fact that in existing society it does not at all depend on Saint Sancho whether an "interest" "acquires a slave in the shape of himself" and whether "he is unable to rid himself of it". The fixation of interests through division of labour and class relations is far more obvious than the fixation of "desires" and "thoughts".

In order to outbid critical criticism, our saint should at least have gone as far as the dissolution of dissolution, for otherwise dissolution becomes an interest which he cannot get rid of, which in him acquires a slave. Dissolution is no longer his property, but he is the property of dissolution. Had he wanted to be consistent in the example just given, [he should] [have treated his zeal against his own "zeal" as [an "interest"] and [behaved] towards it [as an "irreconcilable] enemy". [But he should have] also considered his ["ice-cold" disinterestedness] in relation to his ["ice-cold" zeal] and become [just as wholly "ice-cold"]—and thereby, [obviously, he would have spared] his original ["interest"] and hence himself the "temptation" to turn [in a circle] on the [heel] of speculation.—Instead, he cheerfully continues (ibid.):

"I shall only take care to safeguard my own property for myself" (i.e., to safeguard myself from my property) "and, in order to safeguard it, I take it back into myself at
any time, I destroy in it any inclination towards independence and absorb it before it becomes fixed and can become a fixed idea or passion."

How does Stirner “absorb” the persons who are his property! Stirner has just allowed himself to be given a “vocation” by “criticism”. He asserts that he at once absorbs this “vocation” again, by saying on page 189:

“I do this, however, not for the sake of my human vocation, but because I call on myself to do so.”

If I do not call on myself to do so, I am, as we have just heard, a slave, not an owner, not a true egoist, I do not behave to myself as creator, as I should do as a true egoist; therefore, insofar as a person wants to be a true egoist, he must call himself to this vocation given him by “criticism”. Thus, it is a universal vocation, a vocation for all, not merely his vocation, but also his vocation.

On the other hand, the true egoist appears here as an ideal which is unattainable by the majority of individuals, for (p. 434) “innately limited intellects unquestionably form the most numerous class of mankind”—and how could these “limited intellects” be able to penetrate the mystery of unlimited absorption of oneself and the world.

Incidentally, all these terrible expressions—to destroy, to absorb etc.—are merely a new variation of the above-mentioned “ice-cold, most irreconcilable enemy”.

Now, at last, we are put in a position to obtain an insight into Stirner’s objections to communism. They were nothing but a preliminary, concealed legitimisation of his egoism in agreement with itself, in which these objections are resurrected in the flesh. The “equal well-being of all in one and the same respect” is resurrected in the demand that “we should [only] feel happy in [dissolution]. “Care” is resurrected [in the form of the unique “care”] to secure [one’s ego] [as one’s property]; [but “with the passage of time”] [“care”] again arises as to “how” [one can arrive] at a [unity—] viz., unity [of creator and creation.] And, finally, humanism re-[appears, which in the form of the true egoist confronts empirical individuals as an unattainable ideal. Hence page 117 of “the book” should read as follows: Egoism in agreement with itself really endeavours to transform every man into a “secret police state”. The spy and sleuth “reflection” keeps a strict eye on every impulse of spirit and body, and every deed and thought, every manifestation of life is, for him, a matter of reflection, i.e., a police matter. It is this dismemberment of man into “natural instinct” and “reflection” (the inner plebeian—
creation, and the internal police—creator) which constitutes the egoist in agreement with himself.*

Hess (Die letzten Philosophen, p. 26) reproached our saint:

"He is constantly under the secret police surveillance of his critical conscience .... He has not forgotten the 'directive of criticism ... to feel happy only in dissolution' .... The egoist—his critical conscience is always reminding him—should never become so interested in anything as to devote himself entirely to his subject", and so on.

Saint Max "empowers himself" to answer as follows:

When "Hess says of Stirner that he is constantly, etc.—what does this mean except that when he criticises he wants to criticise not at random" (i.e., by the way: in the unique fashion), "not talking twaddle, but criticising properly" (i.e., like a human being)?

"What it means", when Hess speaks of the secret police, etc., is so clear from the passage by Hess quoted above that even Saint Max’s "unique" understanding of it can only be explained as a deliberate misunderstanding. His "virtuosity of thought" is transformed here into a virtuosity in lying, for which we do not reproach him since it was his only way out, but which is hardly in keeping with the subtle little distinctions on the right to lie which he sets out elsewhere in "the book". Incidentally, we have already demonstrated—at greater length than he deserves—that "when he criticises", Sancho by no means "criticises properly", but "criticises at random" and "talks twaddle".

Thus, the attitude of the true egoist as creator towards himself as creation was first of all defined in the sense that in opposition to a definition in which he became fixed as a creation—for example, as against himself as thinker, as spirit—he asserts himself as a person also-otherwise-determined, as flesh. Later, he no longer asserts himself as really also-otherwise-determined, but as the mere idea of being also-otherwise-determined in general—hence, in the above example as someone who also-does-not think, who is thoughtless or indifferent to thought, an idea which he abandons again as soon as its nonsensicalness becomes evident. See above on turning round on the heel of speculation. Hence the creative activity consisted here in the reflection that this single determination, in the present case thought, could also be indifferent for him, i.e., it consisted in reflecting in general; as a result, of course, he creates only reflective

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Incidentally, if Saint Max makes "a Prussian officer of high rank" say: "Every Prussian carries his gendarme in his heart", it ought to read: the king's gendarme, for only the "egoist in agreement with himself" carries his own gendarme in his heart.

See this volume, p. 259. —Ed.
definitions, if he creates anything at all (e.g., the idea of antithesis, the simple essence of which is concealed by all kinds of fiery arabesques).

As for the content of himself as a creation, we have seen that nowhere does he create this content, these definite qualities, e.g., his thought, his zeal, etc., but only the reflective definition of this content as creation, the idea that these definite qualities are his creations. All his qualities are present in him and whence they come is all the same to him. He, therefore, needs neither to develop them—for example, to learn to dance, in order to have mastery over his feet, or to exercise his thought on material which is not given to everyone, and is not procurable by everyone, in order to become the owner of his thought—nor does he need to worry about the conditions in the world, which in reality determine the extent to which an individual can develop.

Stirner actually only rids himself of one quality by means of another (i.e., the suppression of his remaining qualities by this “other”). In reality, however, [as we] have [already shown,] he does this only insofar as this quality has not only achieved free development, i.e., has not remained merely potential, but also insofar as conditions in the world have permitted him to develop in an equal measure a totality of qualities, [that is to say,] thanks to the division of [labour,] a thus making possible the [predominant pursuit] of a [single passion, e.g., that of [writing] books. [In general], it is an [absurdity to assume], as Saint [Max does], that one could satisfy one [passion], apart from all others, that one could satisfy it without at the same time satisfying oneself, the entire living individual. If this passion assumes an abstract, isolated character, if it confronts me as an alien power, if, therefore, the satisfaction of the individual appears as the one-sided satisfaction of a single passion—this by no means depends on consciousness or “good will” and least of all on lack of reflection on the concept of this quality, as Saint Max imagines.

It depends not on consciousness, but on being; not on thought, but on life; it depends on the individual’s empirical development and manifestation of life, which in turn depends on the conditions obtaining in the world. If the circumstances in which the individual lives allow him only the [one]-sided development of one quality at the expense of all the rest, [if] they give him the material and time to develop only that one quality, then this individual achieves only a one-sided, crippled development. No moral preaching avails here.

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a See this volume, pp. 254-55—Ed.
And the manner in which this one, pre-eminently favoured quality develops depends again, on the one hand, on the material available for its development and, on the other hand, on the degree and manner in which the other qualities are suppressed. Precisely because thought, for example, is the thought of a particular, definite individual, it remains his definite thought, determined by his individuality and the conditions in which he lives. The thinking individual therefore has no need to resort to prolonged reflection about thought as such in order to declare that his thought is his own thought, his property; from the outset it is his own, peculiarly determined thought and it was precisely his peculiarity which [in the case of Saint] Sancho [was found to be] the “opposite” of this, a peculiarity which is peculiarity “as such”. In the case of an individual, for example, whose life embraces a wide circle of varied activities and practical relations to the world, and who, therefore, lives a many-sided life, thought has the same character of universality as every other manifestation of his life. Consequently, it neither becomes fixed in the form of abstract thought nor does it need complicated tricks of reflection when the individual passes from thought to some other manifestation of life. From the outset it is always a factor in the total life of the individual, one which disappears and is reproduced as required.

In the case of a parochial Berlin school-master or author, however, whose activity is restricted to arduous work on the one hand and the pleasure of thought on the other, whose world extends from Moabit to Köpenick and ends behind the Hamburger Tor, whose relations to this world are reduced to a minimum by his pitiful position in life, when such an individual experiences the need to think, it is indeed inevitable that his thought becomes just as abstract as he himself and his life, and that thought confronts him, who is quite incapable of resistance, in the form of a fixed power, whose activity offers the individual the possibility of a momentary escape from his “bad world”, of a momentary pleasure. In the case of such an individual the few remaining desires, which arise not so much from intercourse with the world as from the constitution of the human body, express themselves only through repercussion, i.e., they assume in their narrow development the same one-sided and crude character as does his thought, they appear only at long intervals, stimulated by the excessive development of the predominant desire (fortified by immediate physical causes, e.g. [stomach] spasm) and are manifested turbulently and forcibly, with the most brutal suppression of the
ordinary, [natural] desire [—this leads to further] domination over [thought.] As a matter of course, the school-master's [thinking reflects on and speculates about] this empirical [fact in a school]-masterly fashion. [But the mere announcement] that Stirner in general “creates” [his qualities] does not [explain] even their particular form of development. The extent to which these qualities develop on the universal or local scale, the extent to which they transcend local narrow-mindedness or remain within its confines, depends not on Stirner, but on the development of world intercourse and on the part which he and the locality where he lives play in it. That under favourable circumstances some individuals are able to rid themselves of their local narrow-mindedness is by no means due to individuals imagining that they have got rid of, or intend to get rid of their local narrow-mindedness, but is only due to the fact that in their real empirical life individuals, actuated by empirical needs, have been able to bring about world intercourse.*

The only thing our saint achieves with the aid of his arduous reflection about his qualities and passions is that by his constant crotchety and scuffling with them he poisons the enjoyment and satisfaction of them.

Saint Max creates, as already said, only himself as a creation, i.e., he is satisfied with placing himself in this category of created entity. His activity [as] creator consists in regarding himself as a creation, and he does not even go on to resolve this division of himself into [creator and] creation, which is his own [product]. The division [into the “essential” and] the “inessential” becomes [for him a] permanent life process, [hence mere appearance.] i.e., his real life exists only [in “pure”] reflection, is [not] even actual existence; [for since this latter is at every] instant outside [him and his reflection], he tries [in vain to] present [reflection as] essential.

“But [since] this enemy” (viz., the true egoist as a creation) “begets himself in his defeat, since conscious, by becoming fixed on him, does not free itself from him, but instead always dwells on him and always sees itself besmirched, and since this

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] This specifically revolutionary attitude of the communists to the hitherto existing conditions of the life of the individuals has already been described above [see this volume, pp. 246, 255]. In a later profane passage Saint Max admits that the ego receives an “impulse” (in Fichte's sense) from the world. That the communists intend to gain control over this “impulse”—which indeed becomes an extremely complex and multifariously determined “impulse” if one is not content with the mere phrase—is, of course, for Saint Max much too daring an idea to discuss.
content of his endeavour is at the same time the very lowest, we find only an individual
restricted to himself and his petty activity” (inactivity), “and brooding over himself, as
unhappy as he is wretched” (Hegel).

What we have said so far about the division of Sancho into creator and creation, he
himself now finally expresses in a logical form: the creator and the creation are
transformed into the presupposing and the presupposed ego, or (inasmuch as his
presupposition [of his ego] is a positing) into the positing and the posited ego:

“I for my part start from a certain presupposition since I presuppose myself: but my
presupposition does not strive for its perfection” (rather does Saint Max strive for its
abasement), “on the contrary, it serves me merely as something to enjoy and
consume” (an enviable enjoyment!). “I am nourished by my presupposition alone and
exist only by consuming it. But for that reason” (a grand “for that reason”!) “the
presupposition in question is no presupposition at all, for since” (a grand “for since”!) “I
am the unique” (it should read: the true egoist in agreement with himself), “I know
nothing about the duality of a presupposing and presupposed ego (of an ‘imperfect’
and ‘perfect’ ego or man)—it should read: the perfection of my ego consists in
this alone, that at every instant I know myself as an imperfect ego, as a creation—“but”
(a magnificent “but”!) “the fact that I consume myself signifies merely that I am.” (It
should read: The fact that I am signifies here merely that in me I consume in
imagination the category of the presupposed.) “I do not presuppose myself, because I
really only posit or create myself perpetually” (viz., I posit and create myself as the
presupposed, posited or created) “and I am I only because I am not presupposed, but
posited” (it should read: and I exist only because I am antecedent to my positing)
“and, again, I am posited only at the moment when I posit myself, i.e., I am creator
and creation in one.”

Stirner is a “posited man”, since he is always a posited ego, and his
ego is “also a man” (Wigand, p. 183). “For that reason” he is a posited man; “for since” he is never driven by his passions to excesses,
“therefore”, he is what burghers call a sedate man, “but” the fact that
he is a sedate man “signifies merely” that he always keeps an account
of his own transformations and refractions.

What was so far only “for us”—to use for once, as Stirner does, the
language of Hegel—viz., that his whole creative activity had no other
content than general definitions of reflection, is now “posited” by
Stirner himself. Saint Max’s struggle against “essence” here attains its
“final goal” in that he identifies himself with essence, and indeed
with pure, speculative essence. The relation of creator and creation
is transformed into an explication of self-presupposition, i.e., [Stirner
transforms] into an extremely “clumsy” and confused [idea] what
Hegel [says] about reflection in “the [Doctrine of Essence]”. [Since]

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a G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes. B. Selbstbewusstsein. 3. Das unglück-
lliche Bewusstsein.—Ed.
b In the German original this is a pun: gesetzter Mann can mean “sedate man” or
“posited man”.—Ed.
Saint Max takes out one [element of his] reflection, [viz., positing reflection, his fantasies become] "negative", [because he] transforms himself, etc., into "self-[presupposition", in] contradistinction to [himself as the positing] and himself as the posited, [and] transforms reflection into the mystical antithesis of creator and creation. It should be pointed out, by the way, that in this section of his Logik Hegel analyses the "machinations" of the "creative nothing", which explains also why Saint Max already on page 8 had to "posit" himself as this "creative nothing".

We shall now "episodically insert" a few passages from Hegel's explanation of self-presupposition for comparison with Saint Max's explanation. But as Hegel does not write so incoherently and "at random" as our Jacques le bonhomme, we shall have to collect these passages from various pages of the Logik in order to bring them into correspondence with Sancho's great thesis.

"Essence presupposes itself and is itself the transcendence of this presupposition. Since it is the repulsion of itself from itself or indifference towards itself, negative relation to itself, it thereby posits itself against itself... positing has no presupposition... the other is only posited through essence itself... Thus, reflection is only the negative of itself. Reflection in so far as it presupposes is simply positing reflection. It consists therefore in this, that it is itself and not itself in a unity" ("creator and creation in one") (Hegel, Logik, II, pp. 5, 16, 17, 18, 22).

One might have expected from Stirner's "virtuosity of thought" that he would have gone on to further researches into Hegel's Logik. However, he wisely refrained from doing so. For, if he had done so, he would have found that he, as mere "posited" ego, as creation, i.e., insofar as he possesses existence, is merely a seeming ego, and he is "essence", creator, only insofar as he does not exist, but only imagines himself. We have already seen, and shall see again further on, that all his qualities, his whole activity, and his whole attitude to the world, are a mere appearance which he creates for himself, nothing but "juggling tricks on the tightrope of the objective". His ego is always a dumb, hidden "ego", hidden in his ego imagined as essence.

Since the true egoist in his creative activity is, therefore, only a paraphrase of speculative reflection or pure essence, it follows, "according to the myth", "by natural reproduction", as was already revealed when examining the "arduous life battles" of the true egoist, that his "creations" are limited to the simplest determinations of reflection, such as identity, difference, equality, inequality, [opposition,] etc.—determinations [of reflection] which he [tries] to make clear for himself in ["himself"], concerning whom "the tidings have [gone] as far as [Berlin]". [Concerning] his presuppositionless
Max Stirner

Drawing by Engels

(The inscription in German reads: "Max Stirner. Drawn from memory by Frederick Engels. London, 1892 ")
[ego] we [shall] have occasion to "hear [a little] word" later on. See, *inter alia*, "The Unique".¹

As in Sanchô’s construction of history the later historical phenomenon is transformed, by Hegel’s method, into the cause, the creator, of an earlier phenomenon, so in the case of the egoist in agreement with himself the Stirner of today is transformed into the creator of the Stirner of yesterday, although, to use his language, the Stirner of today is the creation of the Stirner of yesterday. Reflection, indeed, reverses all this, and in reflection the Stirner of yesterday is the creation of the Stirner of today, as a product of reflection, as an idea—just as in reflection the conditions of the external world are creations of his reflection.

Page 216: “Do not seek in ‘self-denial’ the freedom that actually deprives you of yourselves, but seek yourselves” (i.e., seek yourselves in self-denial), “become egoists, each of you should become an all-powerful ego!”

After the foregoing, we should not be surprised if later on Saint Max’s attitude to this proposition is again that of creator and most irreconcilable enemy and he “dissolves” his lofty moral postulate: “Become an all-powerful ego” into this, that each, in any case, does what he can, and that he can do what he does, and therefore, of course, for Saint Max, he is “all-powerful”.

Incidentally, the nonsense of the egoist in agreement with himself is summarised in the proposition quoted above. First comes the moral injunction to seek and, moreover, to seek oneself. This is defined in the sense that man should become something that he so far is not, namely, an egoist, and this egoist is defined as being an “all-powerful ego”, in whom the peculiar ability has become resolved from actual ability into the ego, into omnipotence, into the fantastic idea of ability. To seek oneself means, therefore, to become something different from what one is and, indeed, to become all-powerful, i.e., nothing, a non-thing, a phantasmagoria.

We have now progressed so far that one of the profoundest mysteries of the unique, and at the same time a problem that has long kept the civilised world in a state of anxious suspense, can be disclosed and solved.

Who is Szeliga? Since the appearance of the critical *Literatur-Zeitung* (see *Die heilige Familie*, etc.) this question has been put by

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¹ See this volume, p. 433.—Ed.
everyone who has followed the development of German philosophy. Who is Szeliga? Everyone asks, everyone listens attentively when he hears the barbaric sound of this name—but no one replies.

Who is Szeliga? Saint Max gives us the key to this “secret of secrets”.

Szeliga is Stirner as a creation, Stirner is Szeliga as creator. Stirner is the “I”, Szeliga the “you”, in “the book”. Hence Stirner, the creator, behaves towards Szeliga, his creation, as towards his “most irreconcilable enemy”. As soon as Szeliga wishes to acquire independence in relation to Stirner—he made a hapless attempt in this direction in the Norddeutsche Blätter—Saint Max “takes him back into himself”, an experiment which was carried out against this attempt of Szeliga’s on pages 176-79 of the “Apologetic Commentary” in Wigand. The struggle of the creator against the creation, of Stirner against Szeliga, is, however, only a seeming one: [Now] Szeliga advances against his creator the phrases of this [creator himself]—for example, the assertion “that [the mere,] bare body is [absence of] thought” (Wigand, p. 148). Saint [Max,] as we have seen, [was thinking] only of [the bare flesh], the body before its [formation], and in [this connection] he gave the body the [determination] of being “the other of thought”, non-thought and the non-thinking being, hence absence of thought; and indeed in a later passage he bluntly declares that only absence of thought (as previously only the flesh—thus the two concepts are treated as identical) saves him from thoughts (p. 196).

We find a still more striking proof of this mysterious connection in Wigand. We have already seen on page 7 of “the book” that the “ego”, i.e., Stirner, is “the unique”. On page 153 of the “Commentary” he addresses his “you”: “You” ... “are the content of the phrase”, viz., the content of the “unique”, and on the same page it is stated: “he overlooks the fact that he himself, Szeliga, is the content of the phrase”. “The unique” is a phrase, as Saint Max says in so many words. Considered as the “ego”, i.e., as creator, he is the owner of the phrase—this is Saint Max. Considered as “you”, i.e., as creation, he is the content of the phrase—this is Szeliga, as we have just been told. Szeliga the creation appears as a selfless egoist, as a degenerate Don Quixote; Stirner the creator appears as an egoist in the ordinary sense, as Saint Sancho Panza.

Here, therefore, the other aspect of the antithesis of creator and creation makes its appearance, each of the two aspects containing its opposite in itself. Here Sancho Panza Stirner, the egoist in the

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a Szeliga, “Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, Von Max Stirner”.—Ed.
ordinary sense, is victorious over Don Quixote Szeliga, the selfless and illusory egoist, is victorious over him precisely as Don Quixote by his faith in the world domination of the holy. Who indeed was Stirner’s egoist in the [ordinary] sense if not Sancho [Panza,] and who his self-sacrificing egoist [if not] Don Quixote, and what was [their mutual] relation in the [form in which it has so far existed if] not the relation of [Sancho Panza Stirner] to Don Quixote [Szeliga? Now as] Sancho Panza [Stirner belongs to himself as] Sancho only [in order to make Szeliga as] Don Quixote [believe that] he surpasses him in Don [quixotry,] and [in accordance with this role, as] the presupposed universal Don [quixotry,] he takes [no steps] against the [Don quixotry of his] former master (Don quixotry, by which he swears with all the firm faith of a servant), and at the same time he displays the cunning already described by Cervantes. In actual content he* is, therefore, the defender of the practical petty bourgeois, but he combats the consciousness that corresponds to the petty bourgeois, a consciousness which in the final analysis reduces itself to the idealising ideas of the petty bourgeois about the bourgeoisie to whom he cannot attain.

Thus, Don Quixote now, as Szeliga, performs mental services for his former armour-bearer.

How greatly Sancho in his new “transformation” has retained his old habits, he shows on every page. “Swallowing” and “consuming” still constitute one of his chief qualities, his “natural timidity” has still such mastery over him that the King of Prussia and Prince Heinrich LXXII become transformed for him into the “Emperor of China” or the “Sultan” and he ventures to speak only about the “G...” chambers”; he still strews around him proverbs and moral sayings from his knapsack, he continues to be afraid of “spectres” and even asserts that they alone are to be feared; the only difference is that whereas Sancho in his unholiness was bamboozled by the peasants in the tavern, now in a state of saintliness he continually bamboozles himself.

But let us return to Szeliga. Who has not long ago discovered the hand of Szeliga in all the “phrases” which Saint Sancho put into the mouth of his “you”? And it is always possible to discover traces of Szeliga not only in the phrases of this “you”, but also in the phrases in which Szeliga appears as creator, i.e., as Stirner. But because Szeliga is a creation, he could only figure in Die heilige Familie as a “mystery”. The revelation of this mystery was the task of Stirner the creator. We surmised, of course, that some great, holy adventure was

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* German.— Ed.
at the root of this. Nor were we deceived. The unique adventure really has never been seen or heard of and surpasses the adventure with the fulling mills in Cervantes' twentieth chapter.

3. The Revelation of John the Divine, or "The Logic of the New Wisdom"

In the beginning was the word, the logos. In it was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shone in darkness and the darkness did not comprehend it. That was the true light, it was in the world, and the world did not know it. He came into his own, and his own received him not. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become owners, who believe in the name of the unique. [But who] has ever [seen] the unique [?]

[Let] us now [examine] this "light of the [world]" in "the] logic of the new wisdom [", for Saint] Sancho does not rest content with his previous [destructions].

[In the case of our] "unique" author, it is a matter [of course that] the basis of his [genius lies] in the brilliant [series of personal] advantages [which constitute] his special [virtuosity] of thought. [Since] all these advantages have already been extensively demonstrated, it suffices here to give a brief summary of the most important of them: carelessness of thought—confusion—incoherence—admitted clumsiness—endless repetitions—constant contradiction with himself—unequalled comparisons—attempts to intimidate the reader—systematic legacy-hunting in the realm of thoughts by means of the levers "you", "it", "one", etc., and crude abuse of the conjunctions for, therefore, for that reason, because, accordingly, but, etc.—ignorance—clumsy assertions—solemn frivolity—revolutionary phrases and peaceful thoughts—bluster—bombastic vulgarity and coquetting with cheap indecency—elevation of Name the loafer to the rank of an absolute concept—dependence on Hegelian traditions and current Berlin phrases—in short, sheer manufacture of a thin beggar's broth (491 pages of it) in the Rumford manner.

Drifting like bones in this beggar's broth are a whole series of transitions, a few specimens of which we shall now give for the amusement of the German public depressed as it is:

"Could we not—now, however—one sometimes shares—one can then—to the efficacy of ... belongs especially that which one frequently ... hears called—and that is to say—to conclude, it can now be clear—in the meantime—thus it can, incidentally, be

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a John 1:1, 4-5, 9-12, 18 (paraphrased).—Ed.
thought here—were it not for—or if, perhaps, it were not—progress from ... to the point that ... is not difficult—from a certain point of view it is argued approximately thus—for example, and so on", etc., and "it is to that" in all possible "transformations".

We can at once mention here a [logical] trick about which [it is impossible] to decide whether it owes [its] existence to the [lauded] efficiency of Sancho [or to] the inefficiency of his [thinking]. This [trick consists] in seizing on [one aspect], treating it as if it were the sole [and only] aspect so far known of an idea [or] concept which [has several well]-defined aspects, foisting this aspect [on the concept as] its sole characteristic and then setting [against it every other] aspect under a [new name, as] something original. This is how the concepts of freedom and peculiarity are dealt with, [as] we shall see later.

Among the categories which owe their origin not so much to the personality of Sancho, as to the universal distress in which the German theoreticians find themselves at the present time, the first place is taken by trashy distinction, the extreme of trashiness. Since our saint immerses himself in such "soul-torturing" antitheses as singular and universal, private interest and universal interest, ordinary egoism and selflessness, etc., in the final analysis one arrives at the trashiest mutual concessions and dealings between the two aspects, which again rest on the most subtle distinctions—distinctions whose existence side by side is expressed by "also" and whose separation from each other is then maintained by means of a miserable "insofar as". Such trashy distinctions, for instance, are: how people exploit one another, but none does so at the expense of another; the extent to which something in me is inherent or suggested; the construction of human and of unique work, existing side by side, what is indispensable for human life and what is indispensable for unique life; what belongs to personality in its pure form and what is essentially fortuitous, to decide which Saint Max, from his point of view, has no criterion at all; what belongs to the rags and tatters and what to the skin of the individual; what by means of denial he gets rid of altogether or appropriates, to what extent he sacrifices merely his freedom or merely his peculiarity, in which case he also makes a sacrifice but only inssofar as, properly speaking, he does not make a sacrifice; what brings me into relation with others as a link or as a personal relation. Some of these distinctions are absolutely trashy, others—in the case of Sancho at least—lose all meaning and foundation. One can regard as the peak of these trashy distinctions that between the creation of the world by the individual and the impulse which the individual receives from the world. If, for example, he had

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a See this volume, pp. 305-09.—Ed.
gone more deeply here into this impulse, into the whole extent and multifarious character of its influence on him, he would in the end have discovered the contradiction that he is as blindly dependent on the world as he [egoistically] and ideologically creates [it]. (See: “My Self-Enjoyment”.) He [would not then have put] side by side [his “] also” and “insofar as”, [any more than] “human” work [and] “unique” work; he would not have opposed one to the other, therefore one would [not have] attacked the other [in the rear,] and the “egoist in agreement [with himself]” would not be completely [subordinated to himself]—but we [know] that the latter did not need to be [presupposed] because from the outset this was the point of departure.

This trashy play with distinctions occurs throughout “the book”; it is a main lever also for the other logical tricks and particularly takes the form of a moral casuistry that is as self-satisfied as it is ridiculously cheap. Thus, it is made clear to us by means of examples how far the true egoist has the right to tell lies and how far he has not; to what extent the betrayal of confidence is “despicable” and to what extent it is not; to what extent the Emperor Sigismund and the French King Francis I had the right to break their oath and how far their behaviour in this respect was “disgraceful”, and other subtle historical illustrations of the same sort. Against these painstaking distinctions and petty questions there stands out in strong relief the indifference of our Sancho for whom it is all the same and who ignores all actual, practical and conceptual differences. In general we can already say now that his ability to distinguish is far inferior to his ability not to distinguish, to regard all cats as black in the darkness of the holy, and to reduce everything to anything—an art which finds its adequate expression in the use of the apposition.

Embrace your “ass”, Sancho, you have found him again here. He gallops merrily to meet you, taking no notice of the kicks he has been given, and greets you with his ringing voice. Kneel before him, embrace his neck and fulfil the calling laid down for you by Cervantes in Chapter XXX.

The apposition is Saint Sancho’s ass, his logical and historical locomotive, the driving force of “the book”, reduced to its briefest and simplest expression. In order to transform one idea into another, or to prove the identity of two quite different things, a few intermediate links are sought which partly by their meaning, partly by their etymology and partly by their mere sound can be used to establish an apparent connection between the two basic ideas. These links are then appended to the first idea in the form of an apposition,
and in such a way that one gets farther and farther away from the starting-point and nearer and nearer to the point one wants to reach. If the chain of appositions has got so far that one can draw a conclusion without any danger, the final idea is likewise fastened on in the form of an apposition by means of a dash, and the trick is done. This is a highly recommendable method of insinuating thoughts, which is the more effective the more it is made to serve as the lever for the main arguments. When this trick has been successfully performed several times, one can, following Saint Sancho’s procedure, gradually omit some of the intermediate links and finally reduce the series of appositions to a few absolutely essential hooks.

The apposition, as we have seen above, can also be reversed and thus lead to new, even more complicated tricks and more astounding results. We have seen there, too, that the apposition is the logical form of the infinite series of mathematics.¹

Saint Sancho employs the apposition in two ways: on the one hand, purely logically, in the canonisation of the world, where it enables him to transform any earthly thing into “the holy”, and, on the other hand, historically, in disquisitions on the connection of various epochs and in summing them up, each historical stage being reduced to a single word, and the final result is that the last link of the historical series has not got us an inch farther than the first, and in the end all the epochs of the series are combined in a single abstract category like idealism, dependence on thoughts, etc. If the historical series of appositions is to be given the appearance of progress, this is achieved by regarding the concluding phrase as the completion of the first epoch of the series, and the intermediate links as ascending stages of development leading to the final, culminating phrase.

Alongside the apposition we have synonymy, which Saint Sancho exploits in every way. If two words are etymologically linked or are merely similar in sound, they are made responsible for each other, or if one word has different meanings, then, according to need, it is used sometimes in one sense and sometimes in the other, while Saint Sancho makes it appear that he is speaking of one and the same thing in different “refractions”. Further, a special branch of synonymy consists of translation, where a French or Latin expression is supplemented by a German one which only half-expresses it, and in addition denotes something totally different; as we saw above, for example, when the word “respektieren” was translated “to experience reverence and fear”, and so on. One recalls the words Staat, Status,

¹ See this volume, p. 156.— Ed.
In the section on communism we have already had the opportunity of observing numerous examples of this use of ambiguous expressions. Let us briefly examine an example of etymological synonymy.

"The word ‘Gesellschaft' is derived from the word ‘Saal'. If there are many people in a Saal, then the Saal brings it about that they are in society. They are in society and they constitute at most a salon society, since they talk in conventional salon phrases. If real intercourse takes place, it should be regarded as independent of society" (p. 286).

Since the “word ‘Gesellschaft' is derived from ‘Saal” (which, incidentally, is not true, for the original roots of all words are verbs) then “Saal” must be equivalent to “Saal”. But “Saal” in old High-German means a building; Kisello, Geselle—from which Gesellschaft is derived—means a house companion; hence “Saal” is dragged in here quite arbitrarily. But that does not matter; “Saal” is immediately transformed into “salon”, as though there was not a gap of about a thousand years and a great many miles between the old High-German “Sal” and the modern French “salon”. Thus society is transformed into a salon society, in which, according to the German philistine idea, an intercourse consisting only of phrases takes place and all real intercourse is excluded.— Incidentally since Saint Max only aimed at transforming society into “the holy”, he could have arrived at this by a much shorter route if he had made a somewhat more accurate study of etymology and consulted any dictionary of word roots. What a find it would have been for him to discover there the etymological connection between the words “Gesellschaft” and “selig”; Gesellschaft—selig—heilig—das Heilige—what could look simpler?

If “Stirner's” etymological synonymy is correct, then the communists are seeking the true earldom, the earldom as the holy. As Gesellschaft comes from Sal, a building, so Graf (Gothic garâvjo) comes from the Gothic râvo, house. Sal, building=râvo, house; consequently Gesellschaft=Grafschaft. The prefixes and suffixes are the same in both words, the root syllables have the same meaning—hence the holy society of the communists is the holy earldom, the earldom as the holy—what could look simpler? Saint Sancho had an inkling of this, when he saw in communism the perfection of the feudal system, i.e., the system of earldoms.

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a See this volume, p. 212.—Ed.
b Society.—Ed.
c Hall, room.—Ed.
d Society—blessed—holy—the holy.—Ed.
e Earl.—Ed.
f Earldom.—Ed.
Synonymy serves our saint, on the one hand, to transform empirical relations into speculative relations, by using in its speculative meaning a word that occurs both in practical life and in philosophical speculation, uttering a few phrases about this speculative meaning and then making out that he has thereby also criticised the actual relations which this word denotes as well. He does this with the word *speculation*. On page 406, "speculation" "appears" showing two sides as one essence that possesses a "dual manifestation"—O Szeliga! He rages against *philosophical* speculation and thinks he has thereby also settled accounts with *commercial* speculation, about [which] he knows nothing. On the other hand, this synonymy enables him, a concealed petty bourgeois, to transform bourgeois relations (see what was said above in dealing with "communism" about the connection between language and bourgeois relations) into personal, individual relations, which one cannot attack without attacking the individuality, "peculiarity" and "uniqueness" of the individual. Thus, for example, Sancho exploits the etymological connection between *Geld* and *Geltung*, *Vermögen* and *vermögen*, etc.

Synonymy, combined with the apposition, provides the main lever for his conjuring tricks, which we have already exposed on countless occasions. To give an example how easy this art is, let us also perform a conjuring trick *à la* Sancho.

*Wechsel*, as *change*, is the law of phenomena, says Hegel, *This is the reason*, "Stirner" could continue, for the phenomenon of the strictness of the law against false *bills of exchange*; for we see here the law raised above phenomena, the law as such, holy law, the law as the holy, the holy itself, against which sin is committed and which is avenged in the punishment. Or in other words: *Wechsel* "in its dual manifestation", as a bill of exchange (*lettre de change*) and as change (*changement*), leads to *Verfall* (écéance and décadence). Decline as a result of *change* is observed in history, *inter alia*, in the fall of the Roman Empire, feudalism, the German Empire and the domination of Napoleon. The "transition from" these great *historical crises" to" the *commercial crises* of our day "is not difficult", and this explains also why these commercial crises are always determined by the *expiry* of *bills of exchange*.

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* See this volume, p. 231.—* Ed.
* Money.—* Ed.
* Worth, value, validity.—* Ed.
* Wealth, property, ability, capability.—* Ed.
* To be able, capable.—* Ed.
* Change, bill of exchange.—* Ed.
* Expiry, falling due (of bill); decline, decay.—* Ed.
Or he could also, as in the case of "Vermögen" and "Geld", justify the "Wechsel" etymologically and "from a certain point of view argue approximately as follows". The communists want, among other things, to abolish the Wechsel (bill of exchange). But does not the main pleasure of the world lie precisely in Wechsel (change)? They want, therefore, the dead, the immobile, China—that is to say, the perfect Chinese is a communist. “Hence” communist declamations against Wechselbriefe* and Wechsler. As though every letter were not a Wechselbrief, a letter that notes a change, and every man not a Wechselnder, a Wechsler.

To give the simplicity of his construction and logical tricks the appearance of great variety, Saint Sancho needs the episode. From time to time he “episodically” inserts a passage which belongs to another part of the book, or which could quite well have been left out altogether, and thus still further breaks the thread of his so-called argument, which has already been repeatedly broken without that. This is accompanied by the naive statement that “we” “do not stick to the rules”, and after numerous repetitions causes in the reader a certain insensitiveness to even the greatest incoherence. When one reads “the book”, one becomes accustomed to everything and finally one readily submits even to the worst. Incidentally, these episodes (as was only [to be] expected from Saint Sancho) are themselves only imaginary and mere repetitions under [other guises] of phrases encountered hundreds of times [already].

After Saint Max has [thus displayed] his personal qualities, and then revealed himself as [“appearance” and] as “essence” in the distinction, [in] synonymy and in the episode, [we] come [to the] true culmination and completion of logic, the “concept”.

[The] concept is the “ego” (see Hegel’s Logik, Part 3), logic [as the ego]. This is the pure relation [of the] ego to the world, a relation [divested] of all the real relations that exist for it; [a formula] for all the equations to [which the holy] man reduces mundane [concepts]. It was already [revealed] above that by applying this formula to all sorts of things Sancho merely makes an unsuccessful “attempt” to understand the various pure determinations of reflection, such as identity, antithesis, etc.

Let us begin at once with a definite example, e.g., the relation between the “ego” and the people.

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* Here and above the authors play on the different meanings of the words Wechsel (change, bill of exchange), Wechselbrief (bill of exchange), Wechsler (money-changer) and Wechselnder (a changing person).—Ed.
I am not the people.
The people = non-I
I = the non-people.

Hence, I am the negation of the people, the people is dissolved in me.
The second equation can be expressed also by an auxiliary equation:

The people's ego is non-existent,
or:

The ego of the people is the negation of my ego.

The whole trick, therefore, consists in: 1) that the negation which at the outset belonged to the copula is attached first to the subject and then to the predicate; and 2) that the negation, the “not”, is, according to convenience, regarded as an expression of dissimilarity, difference, antithesis or direct dissolution. In the present example it is regarded as absolute dissolution, as complete negation; we shall find that—at Saint Max's convenience—it is used also in the other meanings. Thus the tautological proposition that I am not the people is transformed into the tremendous new discovery that I am the dissolution of the people.

For the equations given above, it was not even necessary for Saint Sancho to have any idea of the people; it was enough for him to know that I and the people are “totally different names for totally different things”; it was sufficient that the two words do not have a single letter in common. If now there is to be further speculation about the people from the standpoint of egoistical logic, it suffices to attach any kind of trivial determination to the people and to “I” from outside, from day-to-day experience, thus giving rise to new equations. At the same time it is made to appear that different determinations are being criticised in different ways. We shall now proceed to speculate in this manner about freedom, happiness and wealth:

Basic equations: The people = non-I.

Equation No. 1: Freedom of the people = Not my freedom.
Freedom of the people = My non-freedom.
Freedom of the people = My lack of freedom.

(This can also be reversed, resulting in the grand proposition: My lack of freedom = slavery is the freedom of the people.)

Equation No. 2: Happiness of the people = Not my happiness.
Happiness of the people = My non-happiness.
Happiness of the people = My unhappiness.
(Reversed equation: My unhappiness, my distress, is the happiness of the people.)

Equation No. 3: Wealth of the people = Not my wealth.
Wealth of the people = My non-wealth.
Wealth of the people = My poverty.

(Reversed equation: My poverty is the wealth of the people.) This can be continued ad libitum and extended to other determinations.

For the formation of such equations all that is required, apart from a very general acquaintance with such ideas as Stirner can combine in one notion with "people", is to know the positive expression for the result obtained in the negative form, e.g., "poverty"—for "non-wealth", etc. That is to say, as much knowledge of the language as one acquires in everyday life is quite sufficient to arrive in this way at the most surprising discoveries.

The entire trick here, therefore, consisted in transforming not-my-wealth, not-my-happiness, not-my-freedom into my non-wealth, my non-happiness, my non-freedom. The "not", which in the first equation is a general negation that can express all possible forms of difference, e.g., it may merely mean that it is our common, and not exclusively my, wealth—this "not" is transformed in the [second] equation into the negation of my wealth, [my] happiness, etc., and ascribes to me [non-happiness], unhappiness, slavery. [Since] I am denied some definite form of wealth, [the people's] wealth but by no means [wealth] in general, [Sancho believes poverty] must be ascribed to me. [But] this is also [brought about] by expressing my non-freedom in a positive way and so transforming it into my ["lack of freedom"]. But [my non-freedom] can, of course, also mean hundreds [of other] things—e.g., my ["lack of freedom"], my non-freedom from [my] body, etc.

We started out just now from the second equation: the people = non-I. We could also have taken the third equation as our starting-point: I = the non-people, and then, in the case of wealth for example, according to the same method, it would be proved in the end that "my wealth is the poverty of the people". Here, however, Saint Sancho would not proceed in this way, but would dissolve altogether the property relations of the people and the people itself, and then arrive at the following result: my wealth is the destruction not only of the people's wealth but of the people itself. This shows how arbitrarily Saint Sancho acted when he transformed non-wealth into poverty. Our saint applies these different methods higgledy-piggledy and exploits negation sometimes in one meaning and sometimes in another. Even "anyone who has not read Stirner's book" "sees at once" (Wigand, p. 191) what confusions this is liable to produce.
In just the same way the "ego" "operates" against the state.

I am not the state.

State = non-I.

I = "Negation" of the state.

Nothing of the state = I.

Or in other words: I am the "creative nothing" in which the state is swallowed up.

This simple melody can be used to ring the changes with any subject.

The great proposition that forms the basis of all these equations is: I am not non-I. This non-I is given various names, which, on the one hand, can be purely logical, e.g., being-in-itself, other-being, or, on the other hand, the names of concrete ideas such as the people, state, etc. In this way the appearance of a development can be produced by taking these names as the starting-point and gradually reducing them—with the aid of equations, or a series of appositions—again to the non-ego, which was their basis at the outset. Since the real relations thus introduced figure only as different modifications of the non-ego, and only nominally different modifications at that—nothing at all need be said about these real relations themselves. This is all the more ludicrous since [the real] relations are the relations [of the individuals] themselves, and declaring them to be relations [of the non]-ego only proves that one knows nothing about them. The matter is thereby so greatly simplified that even "the great majority consisting of innately limited intellects" can learn the trick in ten minutes at most. At the same time, this gives us a criterion of the "uniqueness" of Saint Sancho.

Saint Sancho further defines the non-ego opposed to the ego as being that which is alien to the ego, that which is the alien. The relation of the non-ego to the ego is "therefore" that of alienation [Entfremdung]. We have just given the logical formula by which Saint Sancho presents any object or relation whatsoever as that which is alien to the ego, as the alienation of the ego; on the other hand, Saint Sancho can, as we shall see, also present any object or relation as something created by the ego and belonging to it. Apart, first of all, from the arbitrary way in which he presents, or does not present, any relation as a relation of alienation (for everything can be made to fit in the above equations), we see already here that his only concern is to present all actual relations, [and also] actual individuals, [as alienated] (to retain this philosophical [expression] for the time being), to [transform] them into the wholly [abstract] phrase of alienation. Thus [instead] of the task of describing [actual] individuals in their [actual] alienation and in the empirical relations of this
alienation, [purely empirical] relations, the same happens here—the setting forth is replaced by the [mere idea] of alienation, of [the Alien], of the Holy. [The] substitution of the category of alienation (this is again a determination of reflection which can be considered as antithesis, difference, non-identity, etc.) finds its final and highest expression in “the alien” being transformed again into “the holy”, and alienation into the relation of the ego to anything whatever as the holy. We prefer to elucidate the logical process on the basis of Saint Sancho’s relation to the holy, since this is the predominant formula, and in passing we note that “the alien” is considered also as “the existing” (per appos.), that which exists apart from me, that which exists independently of me, per appos., that which is regarded as independent owing to my non-independence, so that Saint Sancho can depict as the holy everything that exists independently of him, e.g., the Blocksberg.85

Because the holy is something alien, everything alien is transformed into the holy; and because everything holy is a bond, a fetter, all bonds and all fetters are transformed into the holy. By this means Saint Sancho has already achieved the result that everything alien becomes for him a mere appearance, a mere idea, from which he frees himself by simply protesting against it and declaring that he does not have this idea. Just as we saw in the case of the egoist not in agreement with himself3: people have only to change their consciousness to make everything in the world all right.4

Our whole exposition has shown that Saint Sancho criticises all actual conditions by declaring them “the holy”, and combats them by combating his holy idea of them. This simple trick of transforming everything into the holy was achieved, as we have already seen in detail above, by Jacques le bonhomme accepting in good faith the illusions of philosophy, the ideological, speculative expression of reality divorced from its empirical basis, for reality, just as he mistook the illusions of the petty [bourgeois concerning] the bourgeoisie for the “[holy essence” of the] bourgeoisie, and could therefore imagine that he was only dealing with thoughts and ideas. With equal ease people were transformed into the “holy”, for after their thoughts had been divorced from them themselves and from their empirical relations, it became possible to consider people as mere vehicles for these thoughts and thus, for example, the bourgeois was made into the holy liberal.

The positive relation of [Sancho]—who is in the final analysis

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85 See this volume, pp. 249-52.—Ed.
4 The words “all right” are in English in the manuscript.—Ed.
to the holy (a relation [he] calls \textit{respect}) figures also [under the] name of “love”. “Love” [is a ] relation that approves of “[man”], the holy, the ideal, the supreme being, or such a human, holy, ideal, essential relation. Anything that was elsewhere designated as the existence of the \textit{holy}, e.g., the state, prisons, torture, police, trade and traffic, etc., can also be regarded by Sancho as “another example” of “love”. This new nomenclature enables him to write new chapters about what he has already utterly rejected under the trade mark of the holy and respect. It is the old story of the goats of the shepherdess Torralva, in a holy form. And as at one time, with the aid of this story, he led his master by the nose, so now he leads himself and the public by the nose throughout the book without, however, being able to break off his story as wittily as he did in those earlier times when he was still a secular armour-bearer. In general, since his canonisation Sancho has lost all his original mother wit.

The first difficulty appears to arise because this holy is in itself very diverse, so that when criticising some definite holy thing one ought to leave the holiness out of account and criticise the definite content itself. Saint Sancho avoids this rock by presenting everything definite as merely an “\textit{example}” of the holy; just as in Hegel's \textit{Logik} it is immaterial whether atom or personality is adduced to explain “being-for-itself”, or the solar system, magnetism or sexual love as an example of attraction. It is, therefore, by no means an accident that “the book” teems with \textit{examples}, but is rooted in the innermost essence of the method of exposition employed in it. This is the “unique” possibility which Saint Sancho has of producing an appearance of some sort of content, the prototype of which is already to be found in Cervantes, since Sancho also speaks all the time in examples. Thus Sancho is able to say: “Another example of \textit{the holy}” (the uninteresting) “is labour”. He could have continued: another example is the state, another is the family, another is rent of land, another is Saint Jacob (Saint-Jacques, le bonhomme), another is Saint Ursula and her eleven thousand virgins. Indeed, in his imagination, all these things have this in common: that they are the “holy”. But at the same time they are totally different things, and it is just this that constitutes their specific nature. Insofar as one speaks of their specific nature, one does not speak of them as “the holy”.

[Labour is] not rent of land, and [rent of land] is not the state; [the main] thing, therefore, is to define [what] the state, land rent and labour are [apart from] their imagined holiness, [and Saint] Max achieves this in the following way. [He pretends to] be speaking about the state, [labour,] etc., and then calls [“the” state] the reality of some [sort of idea]—of love, of [being]-for-one-another, of the
existing, of power over [individuals], and—by means [of a] dash—of “the holy”, but [he could] have said [that at the] outset. Or [he says] of labour that it is regarded as a life task, [a vocation, a] destiny—“the holy”. That is to say, the state and labour are first of all brought under a particular kind of the holy which has been previously prepared in the same way, and this particular holy is then again dissolved in the universal “holy”; all of which can take place without saying anything about labour and the state. The same stale cud can then be chewed over again on any convenient occasion, because everything that is apparently the object of criticism serves our Sancho merely as an excuse for declaring that the abstract ideas and the predicates transformed into subjects (which are nothing but suitably assorted holies, a sufficient store of which is always kept in reserve) are what they were made to be at the outset, viz., the holy. He has in fact reduced everything to its exhaustive, classic expression, by saying of it that it is “another example of the holy”. The definitions which he has picked up by hearsay, and which are supposed to relate to content, are altogether superfluous, and on closer examination it is found, too, that they introduce neither definition nor content and amount to no more than ignorant banalities. This cheap “virtuosity of thought” which polishes off any subject-matter whatever even before knowing anything about it, can of course be acquired by anyone, and not in ten minutes, as previously [stated], but even in five. In the “Commentary” Saint Sancho threatens us with “treatises” about Feuerbach, socialism, bourgeois society, and only the holy knows what else. Provisionally we can already here reduce these treatises to their simplest expression as follows:

First treatise: Another example of the holy is Feuerbach.
Second treatise: Another example of the holy is socialism.
Third treatise: Another example of the holy is bourgeois society.
Fourth treatise: Another example of the holy is the “treatise” in the Stirner manner.
Etc., in infinitum.

A little reflection shows that the second rock against which Saint Sancho was bound to suffer shipwreck was his own assertion that every individual is totally different from every other, is unique. Since every individual is an altogether different being, hence an other-being, it is by no means necessary that what is alien, holy, for one individual should be so for another individual; it even cannot be so. And the common name used, such as state, religion, morality, etc., should not mislead us, for these names are only abstractions from the actual attitude of separate individuals, and these objects, in

a See this volume, p. 281.—Ed.
consequence of the totally different attitude towards them of the unique individuals, become for each of the latter unique objects, hence totally different objects, which have only their name in common. Consequently, Saint Sancho could at most have said: for me, Saint Sancho, the state, religion, etc., are the alien, the holy. Instead of this he has to make them the absolutely holy, the holy for all individuals—how else could he have fabricated his constructed ego, his egoist in agreement with himself, etc., how else could he at all have written his whole "book"? How little it occurs to him to make each "unique" the measure of his own "uniqueness", how much he uses his own "uniqueness" as a measure, as a moral norm, to be applied to all other individuals, like a true moralist forcing them into his Procrustean bed, is already evident, inter alia, from his judgment on the departed and forgotten Klopstock, whom he opposes with the moral maxim that he ought to have adopted an "attitude to religion altogether his own"; in that case he would have arrived not at a religion of his own, which would be the correct conclusion (a conclusion that "Stirner" himself draws innumerable times, e.g., in regard to money), but at a "dissolution and swallowing up of religion" (p. 85), a universal result instead of an individual, unique result. As though Klopstock had not arrived at a "dissolution and swallowing up of religion", and indeed at a quite individual, unique dissolution, such as only this unique Klopstock could have "achieved", a dissolution whose uniqueness "Stirner" could have easily seen even from the many unsuccessful imitations. Klopstock's attitude to religion is supposed to be not his "own", although it was altogether peculiar to him, and indeed was a relation to religion which made Klopstock Klopstock. His attitude to religion would have been "peculiar" only if he had behaved towards it not like Klopstock but like a modern German philosopher.

The "egoist in the ordinary sense", who is not so docile as Szeliga and who has already above put forward all sorts of objections, here makes the following retort to our saint: here in the actual world, as I know very well, I am concerned with my own advantage and nothing else, rien pour la gloire. Besides this, I enjoy thinking that I am immortal and can have advantages also in heaven. Ought I to sacrifice this egoistical conception for the sake of the mere consciousness of egoism in agreement with itself, which will not bring me in a farthing? The philosophers tell me: that is inhuman. What do I care? Am I not a human being? Is not everything I do human,

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* A play on the word eigen, which can mean one's own, belonging to oneself or peculiar, strange, etc.—Ed.

* Mere honour is worth nothing.—Ed.
and human because I do it, and is it any concern of mine how “others” “classify” my actions? You, Sancho, who indeed are also a philosopher, but a bankrupt one—and because of your philosophy you deserve no financial credit, and because of your bankruptcy you deserve no intellectual credit—you tell me that my attitude to religion is not one peculiar to me. What you say, therefore, is the same as what the other philosophers tell me, but in your case, as usual, it loses all meaning since you call “peculiar” what they call “human”. Could you speak of any other peculiarity than your own and transform your own relation again into a universal one? In my own way, my attitude to religion, if you like, is also a critical one. Firstly, I have no hesitation in sacrificing it, as soon as it attempts to interfere in my commerce; secondly, in my business affairs it is useful for me to be regarded as religious (as it is useful for my proletarian, if the pie that I eat here he eats at least in heaven); and, finally, I turn heaven into my property. It is *une propriété ajoutée à la propriété*, although already Montesquieu, who was of course a quite different type of man from you, tried to make me believe that it is *une terreur ajoutée à la terreur*. My attitude to heaven is not like that of any other person, and by virtue of the unique attitude that I adopt towards it, it is a unique object, a unique heaven. At most, therefore, you are criticising your idea of my heaven, but not my heaven. And now immortality! Here you become simply ridiculous. I deny my egoism—as you assert to please the philosophers—because I immortalise it and declare the laws of nature and thought null and void, as soon as they want to give my existence a determination which is not produced by me myself and is highly unpleasant for me, namely, death. You call immortality “tedious stability”—as though I could not always live an “eventful” life so long as trade is flourishing in this or the other world and I can do business in other things than your “book”. And what can be “more stable” than death, which against my will puts an end to my movement and submerges me in the universal, nature, the species, the holy? And now the state, law, police! For many an “ego” they may appear to be alien powers; but I know that they are my own powers. Incidentally—and at this point the bourgeois, this time with a gracious nod of the head, again turns his back on our saint—as far as I am concerned, go on blustering against religion, heaven, God and so on. I know all the same that in everything that interests me—private property, value, price, money, purchase and sale—you always perceive something “peculiar”.

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*a Property added to property.— Ed.*

*b Terror added to terror.— Ed.*
We have just seen how individuals differ from one another. But every individual again is diverse in himself. Thus, by reflecting himself in one of these qualities, i.e., by regarding, defining his "ego" through one of these determinations, Saint Sancho can define the object of the other qualities and these other qualities themselves as the alien, the holy; and so in turn with all his qualities. Thus, for example, that which is object for his flesh is the holy for his spirit, or that which is object for his need of rest is the holy for his need of movement. His transformation, described above, of all action and inaction into self-denial is based on this trick. Moreover, his ego is no real ego, but only the ego of the equations given above, the same ego that in formal logic, in the theory of propositions, figures as Caius.87

"Another example", namely, a more general example of the canonisation of the world, is the transformation of real collisions, i.e., collisions between individuals and their actual conditions of life, into ideal collisions, i.e., into collisions between these individuals and the ideas which they form or get into their heads. This trick, too, is extremely simple. As Saint Sancho earlier made the thoughts of individuals into something existing independently, so here he separates the ideal reflection of real collisions from these collisions and turns this reflection into something existing independently. The real contradictions in which the individual finds himself are transformed into contradictions of the individual with his idea or, as Saint Sancho also expresses it more simply, into contradictions with the idea as such, with the holy. Thus he manages to transform the real collision, the prototype of its ideal copy, into the consequence of this ideological pretence. Thus he arrives at the result that it is not a question of the practical abolition of the practical collision, but only of renouncing the idea of this collision, a renunciation which he, as a good moralist, insistently urges people to carry out.

After Saint Sancho has thus transformed all the contradictions and collisions in which the individual finds himself into mere contradictions and collisions of the individual with one or other of his ideas, an idea which has become independent of him and has subordinated him to itself, and, therefore, is "easily" transformed into the idea as such, the holy idea, the holy—after this there remains only one thing for the individual to do: to commit the sin against the Holy Spirit, to abstract from this idea and declare the holy to be a spectre. This logical swindle, which the individual performs on himself, our saint regards as one of the greatest efforts of the egoist. On the other hand, however, anyone can see how easy it is in this way to declare that from the egoistical point of view all historically occurring
conflicts and movements are subsidiary, without knowing anything about them. To do this one has only to extract a few of the phrases usually adopted in such cases, to transform them, in the manner indicated, into "the holy", to depict the individuals as being subordinated to this holy, and to put oneself forward as one who despises "the holy as such".

A further offshoot of this logical trick, and indeed our saint's favourite manoeuvre, is the exploitation of the words designation, vocation, task, etc., thereby immensely facilitating the transformation of whatever he likes into the holy. For, in vocation, designation, task, etc., the individual appears in his own imagination as something different from what he actually is, as the alien, hence as the holy, and in opposition to his real being he asserts his idea of what he ought to be as the rightful, the ideal, the holy. Thus, when it is necessary for him, Saint Sancho can transform everything into the holy by means of the following series of appositions: to designate oneself, i.e., to choose a designation (insert here any content you like) for oneself; to choose the designation as such; to choose a holy designation, to choose a designation as the holy, i.e., to choose the holy as designation. Or: to be designated, i.e., to have a designation, to have the designation, the holy designation, designation as the holy, the holy as designation, the holy for designation, the designation of the holy.

And now, of course, it only remains for him strongly to admonish people to select for themselves the designation of absence of any designation, the vocation of absence of any vocation, the task of absence of any task—although throughout "the book", "up to and including" the "Commentary", he does nothing but select designations for people, set people tasks and, like a prophet in the wilderness, call them to the gospel of true egoism, about whom, of course, it is said: many are called but only one—O'Connell—is chosen.\(^a\)

We have already seen above how Saint Sancho separates the ideas of individuals from the conditions of their life, from their practical collisions and contradictions, in order then to transform them into the holy. Now these ideas appear in the form of designation, vocation, task. For Saint Sancho vocation has a double form; firstly as the vocation which others choose for me—examples of which we have already had above in the case of the newspapers that are full of politics and the prisons that our saint mistook for houses of moral

\(^a\) Cf. Matthew 20:16 ("for many be called, but few chosen"). See also this volume, p. 249.—*Ed.*
 Afterwards vocation appears also as a vocation in which the individual himself believes. If the ego is divorced from all its empirical conditions of life, its activity, the conditions of its existence, if it is separated from the world that forms its basis and from its own body, then, of course, it has no other vocation and no other designation than that of representing the Caius of the logical proposition and to assist Saint Sancho in arriving at the equations given above. In the real world, on the other hand, where individuals have needs, they thereby already have a vocation and task; and at the outset it is still immaterial whether they make this their vocation in their imagination as well. It is clear, however, that because the individuals possess consciousness they form an idea of this vocation which their empirical existence has given them and, thus, furnish Saint Sancho with the opportunity of seizing on the word vocation, that is, on the mental expression of their actual conditions of life, and of leaving out of account these conditions of life themselves. The proletarian, for example, who like every human being has the vocation of satisfying his needs and who is not in a position to satisfy even the needs that he has in common with all human beings, the proletarian whom the necessity to work a 14-hour day debases to the level of a beast of burden, whom competition degrades to a mere thing, an article of trade, who from his position as a mere productive force, the sole position left to him, is squeezed out by other, more powerful productive forces—this proletarian is, if only for these reasons, confronted with the real task of revolutionising his conditions. He can, of course, imagine this to be his “vocation”, he can also, if he likes to engage in propaganda, express his “vocation” by saying that to do this or that is the human vocation of the proletarian, the more so since his position does not even allow him to satisfy the needs arising directly from his human nature. Saint Sancho does not concern himself with the reality underlying this idea, with the practical aim of this proletarian—he clings to the word “vocation” and declares it to be the holy, and the proletarian to be a servant of the holy—the easiest way of considering himself superior and “proceeding further”.

Particularly in the relations that have existed hitherto, when one

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] We have already earlier discussed at length this kind of vocation where one of the conditions of the life of a class is singled out by the individuals constituting this class and put forward as a general demand to all men, where the bourgeois makes politics and morals, the existence of which is indispensable to him, the vocation of all men.

See this volume, pp. 161-62.—Ed.

* See this volume, pp. 161-62.—Ed.
class always ruled, when the conditions of life of an individual always coincided with the conditions of life of a class, when, therefore, the practical task of each newly emerging class was bound to appear to each of its members as a *universal* task, and when each class could actually overthrow its predecessor only by liberating the individuals of *all* classes from certain chains which had hitherto fettered them—under these circumstances it was essential that the task of the individual members of a class striving for domination should be described as a universal human task.

Incidentally, when for example the bourgeois tells the proletarian that his, the proletarian’s, human task is to work fourteen hours a day, the proletarian is quite justified in replying in the same language that on the contrary his task is to overthrow the entire bourgeois system.

We have already repeatedly seen how Saint Sancho puts forward a whole series of tasks all of which resolve themselves into the final task, which exists for all people, that of true egoism. But even where he does not reflect, and does not see himself as creator and creation, he manages to arrive at a task by means of the following trashy distinction.

Page 466: “Whether you want to continue to occupy yourself with thinking depends on you. If you wish to achieve anything substantial in thinking, then” (the conditions and designations begin for you) “then ... anyone who wishes to think, therefore, certainly has a task, which by having that wish he sets himself, *consciously* or *unconsciously*, but no one has the task of thinking.”

First of all, apart from any other content of this proposition, it is incorrect even from Saint Sancho’s own viewpoint, since the egoist in agreement with himself, whether he wishes it or not, certainly has the “task” of thinking. He must think, on the one hand, to keep in check the flesh, which can be tamed only through the spirit, through thought, and, on the other hand, to be able to fulfil his reflective determination as creator and creation. Consequently he sets the whole world of deceived egoists the “task” of knowing themselves—a “task” which, of course, cannot be accomplished without thought.

In order to change this proposition from the form of trashy distinction into a logical form, one must first of all get rid of the term “substantial”. For each person the “substantial” that he wishes to achieve in thought is something different, depending on his degree of education, the conditions of his life and his aim at the time. Saint Max, therefore, does not give us here any firm criterion for determining *when* the task begins which one sets oneself by thinking and how far one can go in thought without setting oneself any task—he limits himself to the relative expression “substantial”. But
for me everything is "substantial" that induces me to think, everything about which I think is "substantial". Therefore instead of: "if you want to achieve anything substantial in thinking", it should read: "if you want to think at all". This depends, however, not at all on your wishing or not wishing, since you possess consciousness and can satisfy your needs only by an activity in which you have to use your consciousness as well. Further, the hypothetical form must be got rid of. "If you want to think"—then from the outset you are setting yourself the "task" of thinking; Saint Sancho had no need to proclaim this tautological statement with such pomposity. The whole proposition was only clothed in this form of trashy distinction and pompous tautology in order to conceal the content: as a definite person, an actual person, you have a designation, a task, whether you are conscious of it or not.* It arises from your need and the connection of the latter with the existing world. Sancho's real wisdom lies in his assertion that it depends on your will whether you think, live, etc., whether in general you possess any sort of determinateness. He is afraid that otherwise determination would cease to be your self-determination. When you equate your self with your reflection, or according to need, with your will, then it is obvious that in this abstraction everything that is not posited by your reflection or your will is not self-determination—therefore also, for example, your breathing, your blood circulation, thought, life, etc. For Saint Sancho, however, self-determination does not even consist in will but, as we saw already in regard to the true egoist, in the reservatio mentalis of indifference to any kind of determinateness—an indifference which reappears here as absence of determination. In his "own" series of appositions this would assume the following form: as opposed to all real determination, he chooses absence of determination as his determination, at each moment he distinguishes between himself and the undeterminated, thus at each moment he is also some other than he is, a third person, and indeed the other pure and simple, the holy other, the other counterposed to all uniqueness, the undeterminated, the universal, the ordinary—the ragamuffin.

If Saint Sancho saves himself from determination by his leap into absence of determination (which is itself a determination and indeed

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* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] You cannot live, eat, sleep, you cannot move or do anything at all without at the same time setting yourself a task, without designation—this is a theory, therefore, which, instead of getting away from the setting of tasks, from vocations, etc., as it pretends to do, is even more intent on transforming every manifestation of life, and even life itself, into a "task".

a See this volume, pp. 261-62.—Ed.
the worst of all), then the practical, moral content of this whole trick, apart from what was said above in connection with the true egoist, is merely an apology for the vocation forced on every individual in the world as it has existed so far. If, for example, the workers assert in their communist propaganda that the vocation, designation, task of every person is to achieve all-round development of all his abilities, including, for example, the ability to think, Saint Sancho sees in this only the vocation to something alien, the assertion of “the holy”. He seeks to free them from this by defending the individual who has been crippled by the division of labour at the expense of his abilities and relegated to a one-sided vocation against his own need to become different, a need which has been stated to be his vocation by others. What is here asserted in the form of a vocation, a designation, is precisely the negation of the vocation that has hitherto resulted in practice from the division of labour, i.e., the only actually existing vocation—hence, the negation of vocation altogether. The all-round realisation of the individual will only cease to be conceived as an ideal, a vocation, etc., when the impact of the world which stimulates the real development of the abilities of the individual is under the control of the individuals themselves, as the communists desire.

Finally, in the egoistical logic all the twaddle about vocation has moreover the purpose of making it possible to introduce the holy into things and to enable us to destroy them without having to touch them. Thus, for example, one person or another regards work, business affairs, etc., as his vocation. Thereby these become holy work, holy business affairs, the holy. The true egoist does not regard them as vocation; thereby he has dissolved holy work and holy business affairs. So they remain what they are and he remains what he was. It does not occur to him to investigate whether work, business affairs, etc., these modes of existence of individuals, by their real content and process of development necessarily lead to those ideological notions which he combats as independent beings, or, to use his expression, which he canonises.

Just as Saint Sancho canonises communism in order later, in connection with the union, the better to palm off his holy idea of it as his “own” invention, so, in exactly the same way, he blusters against “vocation, designation, task” merely in order to reproduce them throughout his book as the **categorical imperative**. Wherever difficulties arise, Sancho hacks his way through them by means of a categorical imperative such as “turn yourself to account”, “recognise yourself”, “let each become an all-powerful ego”, etc. On the categorical imperative, see the section on the “union”; on “vocation”, etc., see the section on “self-enjoyment”.\[292\] Karl Marx and Frederick Engels
We have now revealed the chief logical tricks Saint Sancho uses to canonise the existing world and thereby to criticise and consume it. Actually, however, he consumes only the holy in the world, without even touching the world itself. Hence it is obvious that he has to remain wholly conservative in practice. If he wanted to criticise, then earthly criticism would begin just where any possible halo ends. The more the normal form of intercourse of society, and with it the conditions of the ruling class, develop their contradiction to the advanced productive forces, and the greater the consequent discord within the ruling class itself as well as between it and the class ruled by it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the consciousness which originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it ceases to be the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the more do the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in which actual private interests, etc., etc., are expressed as universal interests, descend to the level of mere idealising phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy. But the more their falsity is exposed by life, and the less meaning they have for consciousness itself, the more resolutely are they asserted, the more hypocritical, moral and holy becomes the language of this normal society. The more hypocritical this society becomes, the easier it is for such a credulous man as Sancho to discover everywhere the idea of the holy, the ideal. From the universal hypocrisy of society he, the credulous, can deduce universal faith in the holy, the domination of the holy, and can even mistake this holy for the pedestal of existing society. He is the dupe of this hypocrisy, from which he should have drawn exactly the opposite conclusion.

The world of the holy is in the final analysis epitomised in “man”. As we have already seen throughout the Old Testament, Sancho regards “man” as the active subject on which the whole of previous history is based; in the New Testament he extends this domination of “man” to the whole of the existing, contemporary physical and spiritual world, and also to the properties of the individuals at present existing. Everything belongs to “man” and thus the world is transformed into the “world of man”. The holy as a person is “man”, which for Sancho is only another name for the concept, the idea. The conceptions and ideas of people, separated from actual things, are bound, of course, to have as their basis not actual individuals, but the individual of the philosophical conception, the individual separated from his actuality and existing only in thought, “man” as such, the concept of man. With this, his faith in philosophy reaches its culmination.

Now that everything has been transformed into “the holy” or into
what belongs to “man”, our saint is enabled to proceed further to appropriation, by renouncing the idea of “the holy” or of “man” as a power standing above him. Owing to the alien having been transformed into the holy, into a mere idea, this idea of the alien, which he mistakes for the actually existing alien, is of course his property. The basic formulas for the appropriation of the world of man (the way in which the ego gains possession of the world when it no longer has any respect for the holy) are already contained in the equations given above.

As we have seen, Saint Sancho is already master of his qualities as the egoist in agreement with himself. In order to become master of the world, all he has to do is to make it one of his qualities. The simplest way of doing so is for Sancho to proclaim the quality of “man”, with all the nonsense contained in this, directly as his quality. Thus he claims for himself, for example, as a quality of the ego, the nonsense of universal love of mankind by asserting that he loves “everyone” (p. 387) and indeed with the consciousness of egoism, for “love makes him happy”. A person who has such a happy nature, indubitably belongs to those of whom it is said: Woe unto you if you offend even one of these little ones!a

The second method is that Saint Sancho tries to preserve something as a quality of his, while he transforms it—when it seems necessary to him as a relation—into a relation, a mode of existence, of “man”, a holy relation, and thereby repudiates it. Saint Sancho does this even when the quality, separated from the relation through which it is realised, becomes pure nonsense. Thus, for example, on page 322 he wants to preserve national pride by declaring that “nationality is one of his qualities and the nation his owner and master”. He could have continued: religiousness is a quality of mine, I have no intention of renouncing it as one of my qualities—religion is my master, the holy. Family love is a quality of mine, the family is my master. Justice is a quality of mine, the law is my master; to engage in politics is a quality of mine, the state is my master.

The third method of appropriation is employed when some alien power whose force he experiences in practice is regarded by him as holy and spurned altogether without being appropriated. In this case he sees his own powerlessness in the alien power and recognises this powerlessness as his property, his creation, above which he always stands as creator. This, for example, is the case with the state. Here, too, he fortunately arrives at the point at which he has to deal not with something alien, but only with a quality of his own, against

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which he needs only to set himself as creator in order to overcome it. In an emergency, therefore, the lack of a quality is also taken by him as a quality of his. When Saint Sancho is starving to death it is not due to lack of food, but to his own hungriness, his own quality of starving. If he falls out of a window and breaks his neck, it happens not because the force of gravity plunges him downwards, but because absence of wings, inability to fly, is a quality of his own.

The fourth method, which he employs with the most brilliant success, consists in declaring that everything that is the object of one of his qualities, is, since it is his object, his property, because he has a relation to it by virtue of one of his qualities, irrespective of the character of this relation. Thus, what has up to now been called seeing, hearing, feeling, etc., Sancho, this inoffensive acquisitor, calls: acquiring property. The shop at which I am looking is, as something seen by me, the object of my eye, and its reflection on my retina is the possession of my eye. And now the shop, besides its relation to the eye, becomes his possession and not merely the possession of his eye—his possession, which is as much upside-down as the image of the shop on his retina. When the shopkeeper lets down the shutters (or, as Szeliga puts it, the “blinds and curtains”\(^a\)), his property disappears and, like a bankrupt bourgeois, he retains only the painful memory of vanished brilliance. If “Stirner” passes by the royal kitchen he will undoubtedly acquire possession of the smell of the pheasants roasting there, but he will not even see the pheasants themselves. The only persisting possession that falls to his share is a more or less vociferous rumbling in his stomach. Incidentally, what and how much he can see depends not only on the existing state of affairs in the world, a state of affairs by no means created by him, but also on his purse and on the position in life which falls to his lot owing to division of labour, which perhaps shuts away very much from him, although he may have very acquisitive eyes and ears.

If Saint Sancho had said simply and frankly that everything that is the object of his imagination, as an object imagined by him, i.e., as his idea of an object, is his idea, i.e., his possession (and the same thing holds with looking at something, etc.), one would only have marvelled at the childish naïveté of a man who believes that such a triviality is a discovery and a fortune. But the fact that he passes off this conjectural property as property in general was bound, of course, to have a magical attraction for the propertyless German ideologists.

\(^a\) The words are from Szeliga’s article “Eugen Sue: ‘Die Geheimnisse von Paris’”.—Ed.
Every other person in his sphere of action, too, is his object, and "as his object—his property", his creature. Each ego says to the other (see p. 184):

"For me you are only what you are for me" (for example, my exploiteur), "namely my object and, because my object, my property."

Hence also my creature, which at any moment as creator I can swallow up and take back into myself. Thus, each ego regards the other not as a property-owner, but as his property; not as "ego" (see [p. 184]) but as being-for-him, as object; not as belonging to himself, but as belonging to him, to another, as alienated from himself. "Let us take both for what they give themselves out to be" (p. 187), for property-owners, for something belonging to themselves, "and for what they take each other to be", for property, for something belonging to the alien. They are property-owners and they are not property-owners (cf. p. 187). What is important for Saint Sancho, however, in all relations to others, is not to take the real relation, but how each can see himself in his imagination, in his reflection.

Since everything that is object for the "ego" is, through the medium of one or other of his properties, also his object and, therefore, his property—thus, for example, the beatings he receives as the object of his members, his feelings and his mind, are his object and, therefore, his property—he is able to proclaim himself the owner of every object that exists for him. By this means he can proclaim that the world surrounding him is his property, and that he is its owner—no matter how much it maltreats him and debases him to the level of a "man having only ideal wealth, a ragamuffin". On the other hand, since every object for the "ego" is not only my object, but also my object, it is possible, with the same indifference towards the content, to declare that every object is not-my-own, alien, holy. One and the same object and one and the same relation can, therefore, with equal ease and with equal success be declared to be the holy and my property. Everything depends on whether stress is laid on the word "my" or on the word "object". The methods of appropriation and canonisation are merely two different "refractions" of one "transformation".

All these methods are merely positive expressions for negating what was posited as alien to the ego in the above equations; except that the negation is again, as above, taken in various determinations. Negation can, firstly, be determined in a purely formal way, so that it does not at all affect the content—as we saw above in the case of love of mankind and in all cases when its whole alteration is limited to introducing consciousness of indifference. Or the whole sphere of the object or predicate, the whole content, can be negated, as in the
case of religion and the state. Or, thirdly, the copula alone, my
hitherto alien relation to the predicate, can be negated and the stress
laid on the word “my” so that my attitude to what is mine is that of
property-owner—in the case of money, for instance, which becomes
coin of my own coining. In this last case both the quality of Man and
his relation can lose all meaning. Every one of the qualities of Man,
by being taken back into myself, is extinguished in my individuality.
It is no longer possible to say what the quality is. It remains only
nominally what it was. As “mine”, as determinateness dissolved in
me, it no longer has any determinateness whether in relation to
others or in relation to me, it is only posited by me, an illusory quality.
Thus, for example, my thought. Just as with my qualities, so with the
things which stand in a relation to me and which, as we have seen
above, are basically also only my qualities—as, for example, in the
case of the shop I am looking at. Insofar, [therefore,] as thought in
me is totally [different] from all [other] qualities, just as, for example,
a jeweller’s shop is totally different from a sausage shop, etc.—the
[difference] emerges again as a difference of appearance, and re­
asserts itself externally too in my manifestation for others. There­
by this annihilated determinateness is fortunately restored and,
insofar as it is at all possible to express it in words, must also be
reproduced in the old expressions. (Incidentally, we shall be hearing
a little more yet concerning Saint Sancho’s non-etymological illusions
about language.)

The simple equation encountered above is here replaced by the
antithesis. In its simplest form it is expressed, for example, as follows:

Man’s thought—my thought, egoistical thought,

where the word my means only that he can also be without thoughts,
so that the word my abolishes thought. The antithesis already becomes
more complicated in the following example:

Money as man’s means of | Money of my own coining as the
| exchange— | egoist’s means of exchange

where the absurdity stands revealed.

The antithesis becomes still more complicated when Saint Max
introduces a determination and wants to create the appearance of a
far-reaching development. Here the single antithesis becomes a
series of antitheses. First of all, for example, it is stated:

Right in general as the right
| Right is what is right for
| of man
| me,
where, instead of right, he might equally well have put any other word, since admittedly it no longer has any meaning. Although this nonsense continues to crop up all the time, in order to proceed further he has to introduce another, well-known determination of right which can be used both in the purely personal and in the ideological sense—for example, might as the basis of right. Only now, where the right mentioned in the first thesis has acquired yet another determination, which is retained in the antithesis, can this antithesis produce some content. Now we get:

$$\text{Right—might of Man } \{ \quad \{ \text{Might—my right}$$

which then again simply becomes reduced to:

$$\text{Might as my right=} \text{My might.}$$

These antitheses are no more than positive reversals of the above-mentioned negative equations, in which antitheses continually proved to be contained in the conclusion. They even surpass those equations in simple grandeur and great simple-mindedness.

Just as previously Saint Sancho could regard everything as alien, as existing independently of him, as holy, so now with equal ease he can regard everything as his own product, as only existing thanks to him, as his property. Indeed, since he transforms everything into his qualities, it only remains for him to behave towards them as he behaves towards his original qualities, in the capacity of the egoist in agreement with himself, a procedure we do not need to repeat here. In this way our Berlin school-master becomes the absolute master of the world—“this, of course, is also the case with every goose, every dog, every horse” (Wigand, p. 187).

The real logical experiment, on which all these forms of appropriation are based, is a mere form of speech, namely a paraphrase, expressing one relation as a manifestation, as a mode of existence of another. Just as we have seen that every relation can be depicted as an example of the relation of property, in exactly the same way it can be depicted as the relation of love, might, exploitation, etc. Saint Sancho found this manner of paraphrase ready-made in philosophical speculation where it plays a very important part. See below on the “theory of exploitation”.

The various categories of appropriation become emotional categories as soon as the appearance of practice is introduced and appropriation is to be taken seriously. The emotional form of assertion of the ego against the alien, the holy, the world of “Man”,

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*a See this volume, pp. 411-14.— Ed.*
is *bragging*. Refusal to revere the holy is proclaimed (reverence, respect, etc.—these emotional categories serve to express his relation to the holy or to some third thing as the holy), and this permanent refusal is entitled a deed, a deed that appears all the more comic because all the time Sancho is battling only against the spectre of his own sanctifying conception. On the other hand, since the world, despite his refusal to revere the holy, treats him in the most ungodly fashion, he enjoys the inner satisfaction of declaring to the world that he has only to attain power over it in order to treat it without any reverence. This threat with its world-shattering *reservatio mentalis* completes the comedy. To the first form of bragging belongs Saint Sancho's statement on page 16 that he "is not afraid of the anger of Poseidon, nor of the vengeful Eumenides", "does not fear the curse" (p. 58), "desires no forgiveness" (p. 242), etc., and his final assurance that he commits "the most boundless desecration" of the holy. To the second form belongs his threat against the moon (p. 218):

"If only I could seize you, I would in truth seize you, and if only I could find a means to get to you, you would in no way terrify me.... I do not surrender to you, but am only biding my time. Even if for the present I refrain from having designs on you, I still have a grudge against you"—

an apostrophe in which our saint sinks below the level of Pfeffel's pug-dog in the ditch. And likewise on page 425, where he "does not renounce power over life and death", etc.

Finally, the practice of bragging [can] again become mere [practice] within the sphere of theory [by] our holy man [asserting] in the [most] pompous language that he has performed actions that he has never performed, and [at the same time] endeavouring by means of high-sounding phrases to smuggle in traditional trivialities [as] his original creations. Actually this is characteristic of the *entire book*, particularly his construction of history—which is foisted on us as an exposition of his thought but is only a bad piece of copying out—then the assurance that "the book" "appears to be written against man" (*Wigand*, p. 168), and a multitude of separate assertions, such as: "With one puff of the living ego I blow down whole peoples" (p. 219 of "the book"), "I recklessly attack" (p. 254), "the people is dead" (p. 285), further the assurance that he "delves into the bowels of right" (p. 275), and, finally, the challenging call, embellished with quotations and aphorisms, for "a flesh-and-blood opponent" (p. 280).

Bragging is already in itself sentimental. But, in addition, *sentimentality* occurs in "the book" as a particular category, which plays a definite part especially in positive appropriation that is no longer mere assertion against the alien. However simple the methods
of appropriation so far examined, with a more detailed exposition
the appearance has to be given that the ego thereby acquires also
property “in the ordinary sense”, and this can only be achieved by a
forcible puffing-up of this ego, by enveloping himself and others in a
sentimental charm. Sentimentality cannot be avoided since, without
previous examination, he claims the predicates of “Man” as his
own—he asserts, for example, that he “loves” “everyone” “out of
egoism”—and thus gives his qualities an exuberant turgidity. Thus,
on page 351, he declares that the “smile of the infant” is “his
property” and in the same passage the stage of civilisation at which
old men are no longer killed off is depicted with the most touching
expressions as the deed of these old men themselves, etc. His attitude
to Maritornes also belongs wholly to this same sentimentality.

The unity of sentimentality and bragging is rebellion. Directed
outwards, against others, it is bragging; directed inwards, as
grumbling-in-oneself, it is sentimentality. It is the specific expression
of the impotent dissatisfaction of the philistine. He waxes indignant
at the thought of atheism, terrorism, communism, regicide, etc. The
object against which Saint Sancho rebels is the holy; therefore
rebellion, which indeed is also characterised as a crime, becomes, in
the final analysis, a sin. It is therefore by no means necessary for
rebellion to take the form of an action, as it is only the “sin” against
“the holy”. Saint Sancho, therefore, is satisfied with “getting”
“holiness” or the “spirit of alienation” “out of his head” and
accomplishing his ideological appropriation. But just as present and
future are altogether confused in his head, and just as he sometimes
asserts that he has already appropriated everything and sometimes
that it has still to be acquired, so in connection with rebellion also
at times it occurs to him quite accidentally that he is still confronted
by the actually existing alien even after he has finished with the halo of
the alien. In this case, or rather in the case of this sudden idea,
rebellion is transformed into an imaginary act, and the ego into
“we”. We shall examine this in more detail later (see “Rebel-
lion”\(a\)).

The true egoist, who from the description given so far has proved
to be the greatest conservative, finally collects up the fragments of
the “world of man”, twelve basketfuls; for “far be it that anything
should be lost!” Since his whole activity is limited to trying a few
hackneyed, casuistical tricks on the world of thoughts handed down
to him by philosophical tradition, it is a matter of course that the real
world does not exist for him at all and, therefore, too, remains in

\(a\) This volume, pp. 382-83.—Ed.
existence as before. The content of the New Testament will furnish us with detailed proof of this.

Thus, "we appear at the bar of majority and are declared of age" (p. 86).

4. Peculiarity

"To create for oneself one's own world, that means building a heaven for oneself" (p. 89 of "the book").*

We have already "penetrated" into the innermost sanctuary of this heaven; now we shall try to learn "more things" about it. In the New Testament, however, we shall rediscover the same hypocrisy that permeated the Old Testament. Just as in the latter the historical data were only names for a few simple categories, so here in the New Testament, too, all worldly relations are only disguises, different designations, for the meagre content which we have assembled in the "Phenomenology" and "Logic". Under the appearance of speaking about the actual world, Saint Sancho always speaks only about these meagre categories.

"You do not want the freedom to have all these fine things.... You want to have them in actuality ... to possess them as your property.... You ought to be not only a free person, but also an owner" (p. 205).

One of the oldest formulas arrived at by the early social movement—the opposition between socialism in its most miserable form and liberalism—is here exalted into an utterance of the "egoist in agreement with himself". How old this opposition is even for Berlin, our holy man could have seen if only from the fact that it is mentioned with terror already in Ranke's Historisch-politische Zeitschrift, Berlin, 1831.*

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] Up to now freedom has been defined by philosophers in two ways; on the one hand, as power, as domination over the circumstances and conditions in which an individual lives—by all materialists; on the other hand, as self-determination, riddance of the real world, as merely imaginary freedom of the spirit—this definition was given by all idealists, especially the German idealists.

Having seen in the "Phenomenology" above how Saint Max's true egoist seeks his egoism in dissolution, in achieving riddance, the idealist freedom, it seems strange that in the chapter on "Peculiarity" he puts forward against "riddance" the opposite definition, i.e., power over the circumstances which determine him, materialist freedom.

Leopold Ranke's "Einleitung" in Historisch-politische Zeitschrift. I. Band, Hamburg, 1832 (the place and date of publication are cited incorrectly in the text).—Ed.
“How I utilise it” (freedom) “depends on my peculiarity” (p. 205).

The great dialectician can also reverse this and say: “How I utilise my peculiarity depends on my freedom.”—Then he continues:

“Free—from what?”

Here, therefore, by means of a dash freedom is already transformed into freedom from something and, per appos., from “everything”. This time, however, the apposition is given in the form of a proposition that apparently provides a closer definition. Having thus achieved this great result, Sancho becomes sentimental.

“Oh, how much can be shaken off!”

First, the “yoke of serfdom”, then a whole series of other yokes, leading imperceptibly to the result that “the most perfect self-denial is nothing but freedom, freedom ... from one’s own ego, and the urge towards freedom as something absolute ... has deprived us of our peculiarity.”

By means of an extremely artless series of yokes, liberation from serfdom, which was the assertion of the individuality of the serfs and at the same time the abolition of a definite empirical barrier, is here equated with the much earlier Christian-idealist freedom of the Epistles to the Romans and Corinthians, thereby transforming freedom in general into self-denial. At this point we have already finished with freedom, since it is now indisputably the “holy”. Saint Max transforms a definite historical act of self-liberation into the abstract category of “freedom”, and this category is then defined more closely by means of a totally different historical phenomenon which can likewise be included under the general conception of “freedom”. This is the whole trick by which the throwing off of the yoke of serfdom is transformed into self-denial.

To make his theory of freedom as clear as noonday to the German burgher, Sancho now begins to declaim in the burgher’s own language, particularly that of the Berlin burgher:

“But the freer I become, the larger does compulsion loom before my eyes, and the more powerless do I feel. The unfree son of the wilds is not yet aware of all the limitations that trouble an ‘educated’ man, he imagines himself freer than the latter. In proportion as I achieve freedom for myself I create new limits and new tasks for myself; no sooner have I invented railways than I again feel myself weak because I still cannot sail through the air like a bird, and I have no sooner solved a problem that was perplexing my mind than countless others await me,” etc. (pp. 205, 206).

O “clumsy” story-writer for townsman and villager!

Not the “unfree sons of the wilds” but “educated people” “imagine” the savage freer than the educated man. That the “son of the wilds” (whom F. Halm brought on the stage\(^a\)) is ignorant of the

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\(^a\) Friedrich Halm, Der Sohn der Wildnis.—Ed.
limitations of the educated man because he cannot experience them is just as clear as that the "educated" citizen of Berlin, who only knows the "son of the wilds" from the theatre, knows nothing of the limitations of the savage. The simple fact is this: the limitations of the savage are not those of the civilised man. The comparison that our saint draws between them is the fantastic comparison of an "educated" Berliner whose education consists of knowing nothing about either of them. That he knows nothing of the limitations of the savage is explicable, although after the large number of new travel books, it is certainly easy enough to know something about them; but that he is also ignorant of the limitations of the educated man, is proved by his example of railways and flying. The inactive petty bourgeois, for whom railways dropped from the sky and who for that very reason imagines that he invented them himself, begins to indulge in fantasies about aerial flight after having once travelled by railway. Actually, the balloon came first and then the railways. Saint Sancho had to reverse this, for otherwise everyone would have seen that when the balloon was invented the demand for railways was still a long way off, whereas the opposite is easy to imagine. In general, Sancho turns empirical relations upside down. When hackney carriages and carts no longer sufficed for the growing requirements of communication, when, *inter alia*, the centralisation of production due to large-scale industry necessitated new methods to accelerate and expand the transport of its mass of products, the locomotive was invented and thus the use of railways for transport on a large scale. The inventor and shareholders were interested in their profits, and commerce in general in reducing production costs; the possibility, indeed the absolute necessity, of the invention lay in the empirical conditions. The application of the new invention in the various countries depended on the various empirical conditions; in America, for example, on the need to unite the individual states of that vast area and to link the semi-civilised districts of the interior with the sea and the markets for their products. (Compare, *inter alia*, M. Chevalier, *Lettres sur l'Amérique du Nord.*) In other countries, for example in Germany, where every new invention makes people regret that it does not complete the sum total of inventions—in such countries after stubbornly resisting these detestable railways which cannot supply them with wings, people are nevertheless compelled by competition to accept them in the end and to give up hackney carriages and carts along with the time-honoured, respectable spinning-wheel. The absence of other profitable investment of capital made railway construction the predominant branch of industry in Germany. The development of her railway construction
and reverses on the world market went hand in hand. But nowhere are railways built for the sake of the category "freedom from"; Saint Max could have realised this even from the fact that no one builds railways in order to free himself from his money. The real kernel of the burgher's ideological contempt for railways due to his longing to fly like a bird is to be found in his preference for hackney carriages, vans and country roads. Sancho yearns for his "own world" which, as we saw above, is heaven. Therefore he wants to replace the locomotive by Elijah's fiery chariot and be carried up to heaven.

After the actual tearing down of restrictions—which is at the same time an extremely positive development of the productive forces, real energy and satisfaction of urgent requirements, and an expansion of the power of individuals—after the actual tearing down of restrictions has been transformed in the eyes of this passive and ignorant spectator into simple freedom from a restriction, which he can again logically make into a postulate of freedom from restriction as such—at the conclusion of the whole argument, we arrive at what was already presupposed at the beginning:

"To be free from something means only to be relieved of something, to be rid of something" (p. 206).

He at once gives an extremely unfortunate example: "He is free of headache is equivalent to saying: he is rid of it"; as though this "riddance" of headache were not equivalent to a wholly positive ability to dispose of my head, equivalent to ownership of my head, while as long as I had a headache I was the property of my sick head.

"In 'riddance'—in riddance from sin, from God, from morality, etc.—we consummate the freedom that Christianity recommends" (p. 206).

Hence our "consummate Christian", too, finds his peculiarity only in "riddance" from "thought", from "determination", from "vocation", from "law", from "constitution", etc., and invites his brothers in Christ to "feel happy only in dissolution", i.e., in accomplishing "riddance" and the "consummate", "Christian freedom".

He continues:

"Ought we, perhaps, to renounce freedom because it turns out to be a Christian ideal? No, nothing should be lost" (voilà notre conservateur tout trouvé), "freedom too should not be lost, it should however become our own, and it cannot become our own in the form of freedom" (p. 207).

Here “our egoist” (toujours et partout) “in agreement with

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a There's the conservative all complete.—Ed.
b Always and everywhere.—Ed.
himself” forgets that already in the Old Testament, thanks to the Christian ideal of freedom, i.e., thanks to the illusion of freedom, we became “owners” of the “world of things”; he forgets, likewise, that accordingly we had only to get rid of the “world of thoughts” to become “owners” of that world as well, that in this context “peculiarity” was for him a consequence of freedom, of riddance.

Having interpreted freedom as the state of being free from something, and this, in turn, as “riddance”, and this as the Christian ideal of freedom, and hence as the freedom of “Man”, our saint can, with the material thus prepared, carry through a practical course of his logic. The first, simplest antithesis reads:

Freedom of Man—My freedom,

where in the antithesis freedom ceases to exist “in the form of freedom”. Or:

\[
\text{Riddance in the interests of Man} \quad | \quad \text{Riddance in my interests.}
\]

Both these antitheses, with a numerous retinue of declamations, continually appear throughout the chapter on peculiarity, but with their help alone our world-conquering Sancho would attain very little, he would not even attain the island of Barataria. Earlier, when observing the behaviour of people from his “own world”, from his “heaven”, he set aside two factors of actual liberation in making his abstraction of freedom. The first factor was that individuals in their self-liberation satisfy a definite need actually experienced by them. As the result of setting aside this factor, “Man” has been substituted for actual individuals, and striving for a fantastic ideal—for freedom as such, for the “freedom of Man”—has been substituted for the satisfaction of actual needs.

The second factor was that an ability that has hitherto existed merely as a potentiality in the individuals who are freeing themselves begins to function as a real power, or that an already existing power becomes greater by removal of some restriction. The removal of the restriction, which is merely a consequence of the new creation of power, can of course be considered the main thing. But this illusion arises only if one takes politics as the basis of empirical history, or if, like Hegel, one wants everywhere to demonstrate the negation of negation, or finally if, after the new power has been created, one reflects, as an ignorant citizen of Berlin, on this new creation.

By setting aside this second factor for his own use, Saint Sancho acquires a determinateness that he can counterpose to the remain-
ing, abstract \textit{caput mortuum} of "freedom". Thus he arrives at the following new antitheses:

\begin{align*}
\text{Freedom, the empty removal of} & \quad \text{Peculiarity, the actual possession of one's own power.} \\
\text{Or, even:} & \\
\text{Freedom, repulsion of alien} & \quad \text{Peculiarity, possession of one's own power.}
\end{align*}

To show the extent to which Saint Sancho has juggled his own "power", which he here counterposes to freedom, out of this same freedom and into himself, we do not intend to refer him to the materialists or communists, but merely to the \textit{Dictionnaire de l'académie}, where he will find that the word \textit{liberté} is most frequently used in the sense of \textit{puissance}. If, however, Saint Sancho should maintain that he does not combat "liberté", but "freedom", then he ought to consult Hegel on negative and positive freedom. As a German petty bourgeois, he might enjoy the concluding remark in this chapter.

The antithesis can also be expressed as follows:

\begin{align*}
\text{Freedom, idealistic striving for} & \quad \text{Peculiarity, actual riddance and pleasure in one's own existence.} \\
\text{and the struggle} & \\
\text{and against other-being} & \\
\end{align*}

Having thus, by means of a cheap \textit{abstraction}, distinguished peculiarity from freedom, Sancho pretends that he is only now beginning to analyse this difference and exclaims:

"What a difference there is between freedom and peculiarity!" (p. 207).

We shall see that, apart from the general antitheses, he has achieved nothing, and that peculiarity "in the ordinary sense" continues most amusingly to creep in side by side with this definition of peculiarity.

"In spite of the state of slavery, one can be inwardly free, although, again, only from \textit{various things}, but not from \textit{everything}; but the slave cannot be \textit{free} from the whip, from the despotic mood, etc., of his master."

"On the other hand, peculiarity is my \textit{whole} essence and existence, it is I myself. I am free from that which I have got \textit{rid of}; I am the owner of that which I have in my \textit{power} or which I have mastered. I am \textit{my own} at all times and under all circumstances, if only \textit{I know} how to possess myself and do not abandon myself to others. I cannot truly \textit{want} the state of being free, because I cannot ... achieve it; I can only wish for it and strive towards it, for it remains an ideal, a spectre. At every moment the fetters of actuality cut very deeply into my flesh. But I remain \textit{my own}. Belonging as a feudal serf

\footnote{G.W.F. Hegel, \textit{Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Einleitung.}—Ed.}
to some master, I think only of myself and of my own advantage; his blows, it is true, strike me; I am not free from them; but I endure them only for my own good, for example, in order to deceive him by an appearance of patience and to lull him into security or perhaps in order not to incur something worse by my defiance. But since I constantly have in mind myself and my own advantage” (while the blows retain possession of him and his back) “I seize on the first convenient opportunity” (i.e., he "wishes", he "strives" towards the first convenient opportunity, which, however, "remains an ideal, a spectre") “to crush the slave-owner. That I then become free from him and his whip is only a consequence of my previous egoism. It will, perhaps, be said here that even in the state of slavery I was free, namely 'in myself' or 'inwardly'; however, 'free in oneself' is not 'actually free', and 'inwardly' is not 'outwardly'. On the other hand, I was myself, my own wholly and completely, both inwardly and outwardly. Under the domination of a cruel master, my body is not 'free' from the pain of torture and the lashes of the whip; but it is my bones that crack under torture, my muscles that twitch under the blows, and it is I who groan because my body suffers. The fact that I sigh and tremble proves that I still belong to myself, that I am my own” (pp. 207, 208).

Our Sancho, who here again acts the story-teller for the petty bourgeois and villagers, proves here that, despite the numerous drubbings he has already received in Cervantes, he has always remained “owner” of himself and that these blows belonged rather to his “peculiarity”. He is “his own” “at all times and under all circumstances” provided he knows how to possess himself. Here, therefore, peculiarity is hypothetical and depends on his knowledge, by which term he understands a slavish casuistry. This knowledge later on becomes thinking as well, when he begins “to think” about himself and his “advantage”—this thinking and this imagined “advantage” being his imagined “property”. It is further interpreted in the sense that he endures the blows “for his own good”, where peculiarity once again consists in the idea of “good”, and where he “endures” the bad in order not to become the “owner” of “something worse”. Subsequently, knowledge is revealed also as the “owner” of the reservation about “the first convenient opportunity”, hence of a mere reservatio mentalis, and, finally, as the “crushing” of the “slave-owner”, in the anticipation of the idea, in which case he is the “owner” of this anticipation, whereas at present the slave-owner actually tramples him underfoot. While, therefore, he identifies himself here with his consciousness, which endeavours to calm itself by means of all kinds of maxims of worldly wisdom, in the end he identifies himself with his body, so that he is wholly “his own”, outwardly as well as inwardly, so long as he still retains a spark of life, even if it is merely unconscious life. Such phenomena as the cracking of his “bones”, the twitching of his muscles, etc., are phenomena which, when translated from the language of unique natural science into the language of pathology, can be produced with the aid of galvanism on his corpse, when freshly cut down from the gallows on
which he hanged himself, as we saw above, and which can be produced even in a dead frog—these phenomena serve him here as proof that he is “wholly and completely” “both inwardly and outwardly” still “his own”, that he still has control over himself. The very fact which demonstrates the power and peculiarity of the slave-owner, namely that it is precisely he who is flogged and not someone else, that it is precisely his bones that “crack”, his muscles that twitch, without his being able to alter it—this very fact here serves our saint as proof of his own peculiarity and power. Thus, when he lies trussed up in the *spanso bocko* torture of Surinam, unable to move hand or foot, or any other of his limbs, and has to put up with everything done to him, in such circumstances his power and peculiarity do not consist in his being able to make use of his limbs, but in the fact that they are *his* limbs. Here once again he has saved his peculiarity by always considering himself as otherwise-determined—sometimes as mere consciousness, sometimes as an unconscious body (see the “Phenomenology”\(^a\)).

At any rate, Saint Sancho “endures” his portion of blows with more dignity than actual slaves do. However often, in the interests of the slave-owners, missionaries may tell the slaves that they have to “endure” the blows “for their own good”, the slaves are not taken in by such twaddle. They do not coldly and timidly reflect that they would otherwise “incur something worse”, nor do they imagine that they “deceive the slave-owner by an appearance of patience”. On the contrary, they scoff at their torturers, they jeer at the latter’s impotence even to force them to humble themselves, and they suppress every “groan” and every sigh, as long as the physical pain permits them to do so. (See Charles Comte, *Traité de législation.*

They are therefore, neither “inwardly” nor “outwardly” their own “owners”, but only the “owners” of their defiance, which could equally well be expressed by saying that they are neither “inwardly” nor “outwardly” “free”, but are free only in one respect, namely that they are “inwardly” free from self-humiliation as they also show “outwardly”. Insofar as “Stirner” suffers blows, he is the owner of the blows and thus free from being not beaten; and this freedom, this riddance, belongs to his peculiarity.

From the fact that Saint Sancho assumes that the reservation about running away at “the first convenient opportunity” is a special characteristic of peculiarity and sees in the “liberation” thus obtained “merely the consequence of his previous egoism” *of his own* egoism, i.e., egoism in agreement with itself), it follows that he

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\(^a\) This volume, p. 273.— *Ed.*
imagines that the insurgent Negroes of Haiti and the fugitive Negroes of all the colonies wanted to free not *themselves*, but “man”. The slave who takes the decision to free himself must already be superior to the idea that slavery is his “peculiarity”. He must be “free” from this “peculiarity”. The “peculiarity” of an individual, however, can consist in his “abandoning” himself. For “one” to assert the opposite means to apply an “alien scale” to this individual.

In conclusion, Saint Sancho takes revenge for the blows he has received by the following address to the “owner” of his “peculiarity”, the slave-owner:

“My *leg* is not ‘free’ from the blows of the master, but it is *my* leg, and it *cannot be taken away*. Let him tear it from me and see whether he has possession of my leg! He will find in his hands nothing but the corpse of my leg, which is as little my leg as a dead dog is a dog” (p. 208).

But let him—Sancho, who imagines here that the slave-owner wants to have his *living* leg, probably for his own use—let him “see” what he still retains of his leg which “cannot be taken away”. He retains nothing but the loss of his leg and has become the one-legged owner of his torn-out leg. If he has to labour at a treadmill eight hours every day, then it is *he* who in the course of time becomes an idiot, and idiocy will then be *his* “peculiarity”. Let the judge who sentences him to this “see” whether he has still Sancho’s brain “in his hands”. But that will be of little help to poor Sancho.

“The first property, the first splendour has been won!”

After our saint, by means of these examples, which are worthy of an ascetic, has revealed the difference between freedom and peculiarity, at a considerable belletristical production cost, he quite unexpectedly declares on page 209 that

“between peculiarity and freedom there lies a still *deeper* gulf than the simple verbal difference”.

This “deeper gulf” consists in the fact that the above definition of freedom is repeated with “manifold transformations” and “refractions” and numerous “episodical insertions”. From the definition of “freedom” as “riddance” the questions arise: from what should people be free (p. 209), etc., disputes concerning this “from what” (ibid.) (here, too, as a German petty bourgeois, he sees in the struggle of actual interests only wrangling about the definition of this “from what”, in which connection, of course, it appears very strange to him that the “citizen” does not wish to be free “from citizenship”, page 210). Then the proposition is repeated that the removal of a barrier is the establishment of a new barrier, in the form that “the striving
for a definite freedom always includes the aim of a new rule”, page 210 (in which connection we learn that in the revolution the bourgeois was not striving for his own rule but for the “rule of law”—see above concerning liberalism); then follows the result that one does not wish to be rid of what “is wholly to one’s liking, e.g., the irresistible glance of the beloved” (p. 211). Further on, it turns out that freedom is a “phantom” (p. 211), a “dream” (p. 212); then we learn by the way that the “voice of nature” can sometimes also become “peculiarity” (p. 213); on the other hand the “voice of God and conscience” is to be considered “devil’s work”, and the author boasts: “Such godless people” (who consider it the work of the devil) “do exist; how will you deal with them?” (pp. 213, 214). But it is not nature that should determine me, but I who should determine my nature, says the egoist in agreement with himself. And my conscience is also a “voice of nature”.

In this connection it also turns out that the animal “takes very correct steps” (p. 213). We learn further that “freedom is silent about what should happen after I have become free” (p. 215). (See “Solomon’s Song of Songs”.b) The exposition of the above-mentioned “deeper gulf” is closed by Saint Sancho repeating the scene with the blows and this time expressing himself somewhat more clearly about peculiarity:

“Even when unfree, even bound by a thousand fetters, I nevertheless exist, and I exist not only just in the future, and in the hope, like freedom, but even as the most abject of slaves I am present” (p. 215).

Here, therefore, he counterposes himself and “freedom” as two persons, and peculiarity becomes mere existence, being present, and indeed the “most abject” presence. Peculiarity here is the simple registering of personal identity. Stirner, who in an earlier passage has already constituted himself the “secret police state”, here sets himself up as the passport department. “By no means” should “anything be lost” from “the world of human beings!” (See “Solomon’s Song of Songs”.)

According to page 218, one can also “give up” one’s peculiarity through “submissiveness”, “submission”, although, according to the preceding, peculiarity cannot cease so long as one is present at all, even in the most “abject” or “submissive” form. And is not the “most abject” slave the “most submissive”? According to one of the earlier descriptions of peculiarity, one can only “give up” one’s peculiarity by giving up one’s life.

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a This volume, pp. 221-22.— Ed.
b This volume, p. 435.— Ed.
On page 218, peculiarity as one aspect of freedom, as power, is once again set against freedom as riddance; and among the means by which Sancho pretends to protect his peculiarity, are mentioned "hypocrisy", "deception" (means which my peculiarity employs, because it had to "submit" to the conditions of the world), etc., "for the means that I employ are determined by what I am".

We have already seen that among these means the absence of any means plays a major role, as was evident also from his proceedings against the moon (see above "Logic"^3). Then, for a change, freedom is regarded as "self-liberation", "i.e., that I can only have as much freedom as I procure by my peculiarity", where the definition of freedom as self-determination, which occurs among all, and particularly German, ideologists, makes its appearance as peculiarity. This is then explained to us on the example of "sheep"; to whom it is of no "use" at all "if they are given freedom of speech" (p. 220). How trivial is his conception here of peculiarity as self-liberation is evident if only from his repetition of the most hackneyed phrases about granted freedom, setting free, self-liberation, etc. (pp. 220, 221). The antithesis between freedom as riddance and peculiarity as the negation of this riddance is now also portrayed poetically:

"Freedom arouses your wrath against everything that you are not" (it is, therefore, wrathful peculiarity, or have choleric natures, e.g., Guizot, in Saint Sancho's opinion, no "peculiarity"? And do I not enjoy myself in wrath against others?), "egoism calls on you to rejoice over yourself, to delight in yourself" (hence egoism is freedom which rejoices; incidentally, we have already become acquainted with the joy and self-enjoyment of the egoist in agreement with himself).

"Freedom is and remains a longing" (as though longing were not also a peculiarity, the self-enjoyment of individuals of a particular nature, especially of Christian-German individuals—and should this longing "be lost"?). "Peculiarity is a reality which of itself abolishes all the non-freedom which is an impediment and blocks your own path" (in which case, then, until non-freedom is abolished my peculiarity is a blocked peculiarity. It is characteristic again of the German petty bourgeois that for him all barriers and obstacles disappear "of themselves", since he never lifts a finger to achieve it, and by habit he turns those barriers which do not disappear "of themselves" into his peculiarity. It may be remarked in passing that peculiarity appears here as an acting person, although it is later demoted to a mere description of its owner) (p. 215).
The same antithesis appears again in the following form:

“As being your own, you are in actuality rid of everything, and what remains with you, you have yourself accepted, it is your choice and option. One who is his own is born free, one who is free on the other hand is only one who desires freedom.”

Nevertheless Saint Sancho “admits” on page 252 “that each is born as a human being; hence in this respect the newborn children are equal”.

What you as being your own have not “rid yourself of” is “your choice and option”, as in the case of the beatings of the slave mentioned above.—Banal paraphrase!—Here, therefore, peculiarity is reduced to the fantastic idea that Saint Sancho has voluntarily accepted and retained everything from which he has not “rid” himself, e.g., hunger when he has no money. Apart from the many things, e.g., dialect, scrofula, haemorrhoids, poverty, one-leggedness, forced philosophising imposed on him by division of labour, etc., etc.—apart from the fact that it in no way depends on him whether he “accepts” these things or not; all the same, even if for an instant we accept his premises, he has only the choice between definite things which lie within his province and which are in no way posited by his peculiarity. As an Irish peasant, for example, he can only choose to eat potatoes or starve, and he is not always free to make even this choice. In the sentence quoted above one should note also the beautiful apposition, by which, just as in jurisprudence, “acceptance” is directly identified with “choice” and “option”. Incidentally, it is impossible to say what Saint Sancho means by one who is “born free”, whether in the context or outside it.

And is not a feeling instilled into him, his feeling accepted by him? And do we not learn on pages 84, 85, that “instilled” feelings are not “one’s own” feelings? For the rest, it turns out here, as we have already seen in connection with Klopstock (who is put forward here as an example), that “one’s own” behaviour by no means coincides with individual behaviour, although for Klopstock Christianity seems to have been “quite right” and in no way to have obstructively blocked his path.

“One who is his own does not need to free himself, because from the outset he rejects everything except himself.... Although he remains in the confines of childish reverence, he already works to ‘free’ himself from this enthrallment.”

Since one who is his own does not need to free himself, already as a child he works to free himself, and all this because, as we have seen,

\(^a\) See this volume, p. 285.—Ed.
he is one who is "born free". "Although he remains in the confines of childish reverence" he already reflects without any restraint, namely in his own fashion, about this his own enthralment. But this should not surprise us: we already saw at the beginning of the Old Testament what a prodigy the egoist in agreement with himself was.

"Peculiarity works in the little egoist and secures him the desired 'freedom'."

It is not "Stirner" who lives, it is "peculiarity" that lives, "works" and "secures" in him. Here we learn that peculiarity is not a description of one who is his own, but that one who is his own is merely a paraphrase of peculiarity.

As we have seen, "riddance" at its climax was riddance from one's own self, self-denial. We saw also that on the other hand he put forward "peculiarity" as the assertion of self, as self-interestedness. But we have seen likewise that this self-interestedness itself was again self-denial.

For some time past we have been painfully aware that "the holy" was missing. But we rediscover it suddenly, on page 224, at the end of the section on peculiarity, where it stands quite bashfully and proves its identity by means of the following new turn of expression:

"My relation to something which I selfishly carry on" (or do not carry on at all) "is different from my relation to something which I unselfishly serve" (or which I carry on).

But Saint Max is not satisfied with this remarkable piece of tautology, which he "accepted" from "choice and option"; there suddenly reappears the long forgotten "one", in the shape of the night watchman who establishes the identity of the holy, and declares that he

"could put forward the following distinguishing mark: against the former I can sin or commit a sin" (a remarkable tautology!), "the other I can only lose by my folly, push away from myself, deprive myself of it, i.e., do something stupid" (it follows that he can lose himself by his folly, can deprive himself of himself, can be deprived of himself—can be deprived of life). "Both these points of view are applicable to freedom of trade, because it" is partly taken for the holy and partly not so taken, or, as Sancho himself expresses it more circumstantially, "because it is partly regarded as a freedom which can be granted or withdrawn depending on circumstances, and partly as a freedom which should be regarded as holy under all circumstances" (pp. 224, 225).

Here again Sancho reveals his "peculiar" "penetration" into the question of freedom of trade and protective tariffs. He is herewith given the "vocation" of pointing out just one single case where freedom of trade was regarded as "holy" 1) because it is a "freedom", and 2) "under all circumstances". The holy comes in useful for all purposes.

After peculiarity, by means of logical antitheses and the phenomenological "being-also-otherswise-determined", has been
constructed, as we have seen, from a "freedom" previously trimmed up for the purpose—Saint Sancho meanwhile having "dismissed" everything that happened to suit him (e.g., beatings) into peculiarity, and whatever did not suit him into freedom—we learn finally that all this was still not true peculiarity.

"Peculiarity," it is stated on page 225, "is not at all an idea, such as freedom, etc., it is only a description—of the owner."

We shall see that this "description of the owner" consists in negating freedom in the three refractions which Saint Sancho ascribes to it—liberalism, communism and humanism—comprehending it in its truth and then calling this process of thought, which is extremely simple according to advanced logic, the description of a real ego.

The entire chapter about peculiarity boils down to the most trivial self-embellishments by means of which the German petty bourgeois consoles himself for his own impotence. Exactly like Sancho, he thinks that in the struggle of bourgeois interests against the remnants of feudalism and absolute monarchy in other countries everything turns merely on a question of principles, on the question of from what "Man" should free himself. (See also above on political liberalism.\(^a\)) Therefore in freedom of trade he sees only a freedom and, exactly like Sancho, expatiates with a great air of importance about whether "Man" ought to enjoy freedom of trade "under all circumstances" or not. And when, as is inevitable in such conditions, his aspirations for freedom suffer a miserable collapse, then, again like Sancho, he consoles himself that "Man", or he himself, cannot "become free from everything", that freedom is a highly indefinite concept, and that even Metternich and Charles X were able to appeal to "true freedom" (p. 210 of "the book": and it need only be remarked here that it is precisely the reactionaries, especially the Historical School and the Romanticists\(^9\) who—again just like Sancho—reduce true freedom to peculiarity, for instance, to the peculiarity of the Tyrolean peasants, and in general, to the peculiar development of individuals, and also of localities, provinces and estates).—The petty bourgeois also consoles himself that as a German, even if he is not free, he finds compensation for all

\(^a\) This volume, pp. 200-01.—Ed.
sufferings in his own indisputable peculiarity. Again like Sancho, he does not see in freedom a power that he is able to obtain and therefore declares his own impotence to be power.

What the ordinary German petty bourgeois whispers to himself as a consolation, in the quiet depths of his mind, the Berliner trumpets out loudly as an ingenious turn of thought. He is proud of his trashy peculiarity and his peculiar trashiness.

5. The Owner

For the way in which the "owner" is divided into three "refractions": "my power", "my intercourse" and "my self-enjoyment", see "The Economy of the New Testament". We shall pass directly to the first of these refractions.

A. My Power

The chapter on power has in its turn a trichotomous structure in that it treats of: 1) right, 2) law, and 3) crime. In order to conceal this trichotomy, Sancho resorts very frequently to the "episode". We give here the entire content in tabular form, with the necessary episodical insertions.

I. Right

A. Canonisation in General

Another example of the holy is right.
Right is not ego

= not my right
= alien right
= existing right.

All existing right
= alien right
= right of others
= right given by others
= (right, which one gives me, which is meted out to me)

The holy

Note No. 1. The reader will wonder why the conclusion of equation No. 4 suddenly appears in equation No. 5 as the antecedent of the conclusion of equation No. 3, so that in the place of "right", "all existing right" suddenly appears as the antecedent. This is done to create the illusion that Saint Sancho is speaking of actual, existing
right which, however, he by no means intends to do. He speaks of right only insofar as it is represented to be a holy "predicate".

Note No. 2. After right has been determined as "alien right", it can be given any names you like, such as "Sultan's right", "people's right", etc., depending on how Saint Sancho wishes to define the alien from whom he receives the right in question. This allows Sancho to go on to say that "alien right is given by nature, God, popular choice, etc." (p. 250), hence "not by me". What is naive is only the method by which our saint through the use of synonymy tries to give some semblance of development to the above simple equations.

"If some blockhead considers me right" (what if he himself is the blockhead who considers him right?), "I begin to be mistrustful of my right" (it would be desirable in "Stirner's" interests that this were so). "But even if a wise man considers me right, this still does not mean that I am right. Whether I am right is quite independent of my being acknowledged right by fools or wise men. Nevertheless, up to now we have striven for this right. We seek right and to this end we appeal to the court... But what do I seek from this court? I seek Sultan's right, not my right, I seek alien right... before the high court of censorship I seek, therefore, the right of censorship" (pp. 244, 245).

One has to admire the cunning use of synonymy in this masterly proposition. Recognition of right in the ordinary conversational sense is identified with recognition of right in the juridical sense. Even more worthy of admiration is the faith capable of moving mountains in the idea that one "appeals to the court" for the sake of the pleasure of vindicating one's right—a faith which explains that courts are due to litigiousness.*

Notable, finally, is also the craftiness with which Sancho—as in the case of equation No. 5 above—smuggles in, in advance, the more

* [The following passage is crossed out in the manuscript:] What idea Saint Jacques le bonhomme really has of a court can even be deduced from the fact that as an illustration he mentions the high court of censorship, which at best can only be regarded as a court according to Prussian notions; a court which can merely introduce administrative measures, but is unable either to inflict penalties or to settle civil suits. What does it matter to a saint who is always concerned with real individuals, that two completely different systems of production form the basis of the individuals where court and administration are separate, and where they are combined in a patriarchal way.

The above equations are now transformed into the moral injunctions "vocation", "designation", and "task", which Saint Max shouts in a thunderous voice to his faithful servant Szeliga, who has an uneasy conscience. Like a Prussian non-commissioned officer (his own "gendarme" speaks through his mouth) Saint Max addresses Szeliga in the third person: he should see to it that his right to eat remains uncurtailed, etc. The right of the proletarians to eat has never been "curtailed", nevertheless it happens "of itself" that they are very often unable to "exercise" it.
concrete name, in this case “Sultan’s right”, in order to be able more confidently later to bring in his universal category of “alien right”.

Alien right = not my right.

My being right according to alien
right = not to be right
= to have no right
= to be rightless (p. 247).

My right = not your right
= your wrong.

Your right = my wrong.

Note. “You desire to be in the right against others” (it should read: to be in your right). “You cannot be this, in relation to them you will always remain in the ‘wrong’, for they would not be your opponents if they were not also in ‘their’ right. They will always ‘consider’ you ‘wrong’... If you remain on the basis of right, then you remain on the basis of litigiousness” (pp. 248, 253).

“Let us in the meantime consider the subject from yet another aspect.” Having thus given adequate evidence of his knowledge of right, Saint Sancho can now restrict himself to defining right once again as the holy, in this connection repeating some of the epithets previously given to the holy with the addition of the word “right”.

“Is not right a religious concept, i.e., something holy?” (p. 247).

“Who can ask about ‘right’ if he does not have a religious standpoint?” (ibid.).

“Right ‘in and for itself’. Therefore without relation to me? ‘Absolute right’! Therefore separated from me.—Something ‘being in and for itself’—An Absolute! An eternal right, like an eternal truth”—the holy (p. 270).

“You recoil in horror before others because you imagine you see by their side the spectre of right!” (p. 253).

“You creep about in order to win the apparition over to your side” (ibid.).

“Right is a whimsy, dispensed by an apparition” (the synthesis of the two propositions given above) (p. 276).

“Right is ... a fixed idea” (p. 270).

“Right is spirit ...” (p. 244).

“Because right can be dispensed only by a spirit” (p. 275).

Saint Sancho now expounds again what he already expounded in the Old Testament, viz., what a “fixed idea” is, with the only difference that here “right” crops up everywhere as “another example” of the “fixed idea”.

“Right is originally my thought, or it”\(^a\) (!) “has its origin in me. But if it\(^b\) has escaped from me” (in common parlance, abounded), “if the ‘word’ has been uttered, then it has become flesh”\(^b\) (and Saint Sancho can eat his fill of it), “a fixed idea”—for

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\(^a\) The German pronoun er, used in Stirner’s book, refers to “my thought”.—Ed.

\(^b\) Cf. John 1:14.—Ed.
which reason Stirner's whole book consists of "fixed ideas", which have "escaped" from him, but have been caught by us and confined in the much-praised "house for the correction of morals". "Now I can no longer get rid of the idea" (after the idea has got rid of him!); "however I twist and turn, it confronts me." (The pigtail, which hangs down behind him.) "Thus, people have been unable to regain control of the idea of 'right' that they themselves have created. Their creature runs away with them. That is absolute right, which is absolved" (a synonymy!) "and detached from me. Since we worship it as Absolute, we cannot devour it again and it deprives us of our creative power; the creation is more than the creator, it exists in and for itself. Do not allow right to run about freely any longer...." (We shall already in this sentence follow this advice and chain it up for the time being) (p. 270).

Having thus dragged right through all possible ordeals of sanctification by fire and water and canonised it, Saint Sancho has thereby destroyed it.

"With absolute right, right itself disappears, at the same time the domination of the concept of right" (hierarchy) "is wiped out. For one should not forget that concepts, ideas, and principles have up to now ruled over us and that among these rulers the concept of right or the concept of justice has played one of the most important parts" (p. 276).

That relations of right here once again appear as the domination of the concept of right and that Stirner kills right simply by declaring it a concept, and therefore the holy, is something to which we are already accustomed; on this see "Hierarchy". Right [according to Stirner] does not arise from the material relations of people and the resulting antagonism of people against one another, but from their struggle against their own concept, which they should "get out of their heads". See "Logic".

This last form of the canonisation of right comprises also the following three notes:

Note 1.

"So long as this alien right coincides with mine, I shall, of course, find the latter also in it" (p. 245).

Saint Sancho might ponder awhile over this proposition.

Note 2.

"If once an egoistic interest crept in, then society was corrupted ... as is shown, for example, by the Roman society with its highly developed civil law" (p. 278).

According to this, Roman society from the very outset must have been corrupted Roman society, since egoistic interest is manifested in the Ten Tables even more sharply than in the "highly developed civil law" of the imperial epoch. In this unfortunate reminiscence

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a The words are from Chamisso's poem "Tragische Geschichte".— Ed.
b This volume, pp. 180, 183.— Ed.
c This volume, pp. 282-84, 286-88.— Ed.
from Hegel, therefore, civil law is considered a symptom of egoism, and not of the holy. Here, too, Saint Sancho might well reflect on the extent to which civil law [Privatrecht] is linked with private property [Privateigentum] and to what extent civil law implies a multitude of other legal relations (cf. "Private Property, State and Right") about which Saint Max has nothing to say except that they are the holy.

Note 3.

"Although right is derived from the concept, nevertheless it only comes into existence because it serves men's needs."

So says Hegel (Rechtsphilosophie, par 209, Addition) from whom our saint derived the hierarchy of concepts in the modern world. Hegel, therefore, explains the existence of right from the empirical needs of individuals, and rescues the concept only by means of a simple assertion. One can see how infinitely more materialistically Hegel proceeds than our "corporeal ego", Saint Sancho.

B. Appropriation by Simple Antithesis

a) The right of man — My right.
b) Human right — Egoistic right.
c) Alien right = to be authorised by others
   = My right = to be authorised by myself.
d) Right is that which man considers right
   = Right is that which I consider right.

"This is egoistic right, i.e., I consider it right, therefore, it is right" (passim; the last sentence is on p. 251).

Note 1.

"I am authorised by myself to commit murder if I do not forbid myself to do so, if I myself am not afraid of murder as a wrong" (p. 249).

This should read: I commit murder if I do not forbid myself to do so, if I am not afraid of murder. This whole proposition is a boastful expansion of the second equation in antithesis c, where the word "authorised" has lost its meaning.

Note 2.

"I decide whether it is right within me; outside me, no right exists" (p. 249).—"Are we what is in us? No, no more than we are what is outside us.... Precisely because we are not the spirit which dwells in us, for that very reason we had to transfer it outside us ... think of it as existing outside us ... in the beyond" (p. 43).

Thus, according to his own statement on page 43, Saint Sancho has
again to transfer the right “in him” to “outside himself”, and indeed “into the beyond”. But if at some stage he wants to appropriate things for himself in this fashion, then he can transfer “into himself” morality, religion, everything “holy”, and decide whether “in him” it is the moral, the religious, the holy—“outside him there exists no” morality, religion, holiness—in order thereupon to transfer them, according to page 43, again outside himself, into the beyond. Thereby the “restoration of all things” according to the Christian model is brought about.

Note 3.

“Outside me no right exists. If I consider it right then it is right. It is possible that it is still not on that account right for others” (p. 249).

This should read: If I consider it right then it is right for me, but it is still not right for others. We have by now had sufficient examples of the sort of synonymical “flea-jumps” Saint Sancho makes with the word “right”. The right and right, legal “right”, moral “right”, what he considers “right”, etc.—all are used higgledy-piggledy, as it suits him. Let Saint Max attempt to translate his propositions about right into another language; his nonsense would then become fully apparent. Since this synonymy was dealt with exhaustively in “The Logic [of the New Wisdom]”, we need here only refer to that section.

The proposition mentioned above is also presented in the following three “transformations”:

A. “Whether I am right or not, of that there can be no other judge than I myself. Others can judge and decide only whether they agree with my right and whether it exists as right also for them” (p. 246).

B. “It is true that society wants each person to attain his right, but only right sanctioned by society, social right, and not actually his right” (it should read: “what is his”—“right” is a quite meaningless word here. And then he continues boastfully:) “I, however, give myself, or take for myself, right on my own authority.... Owner and creator of my right” (“creator” only insofar as he first declares right to be his thought and then asserts that he has taken this thought back into himself), “I recognise no other source of right but myself—neither God, nor the state, nor nature, nor man, neither divine nor human right” (p. 269).

C. “Since human right is always something given, in reality it always amounts to the right which people give to, i.e., concede, one another” (p. 251).

Egoistical right, on the other hand, is the right which I give myself or take.

However, “let us say in conclusion, it can be seen” that in Sancho’s millennium egoistical right, about which people “came to terms” with

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a Mark 9:12.—Ed.

b This volume, pp. 275-77.—Ed.
each other, is not so very different from that which people “give to” or “concede” one another.

Note 4.

“In conclusion, I have now still to take back the half-and-half mode of expression which I desired to use only while I was delving into the bowels of right and allowed at least the word to remain. In point of fact, however, together with the concept the word loses its meaning. What I called my right, is no longer right at all” (p. 275).

Everyone will see at a glance why Saint Sancho allowed the “word” right to remain in the above antitheses. For as he does not speak at all about the content of right, let alone criticise it, he can only by retaining the word right make it appear that he is speaking about right. If the word right is left out of the antithesis, all that it contains is “I”, “my” and the other grammatical forms of the first person pronoun. The content was always introduced only by means of examples which, however, as we have seen, were nothing but tautologies, such as: if I commit murder, then I commit murder, etc., and in which the words “right”, “authorised”, etc., were introduced only to conceal the simple tautology and give it some sort of connection with the antitheses. The synonymy, too, was intended to create the appearance of dealing with some sort of content. Incidentally, one can see at once what a rich source of bragging this empty chatter about right provides.

Thus, all the “delving into the bowels of right” amounted to this, that Saint Sancho “made use of a half-and-half mode of expression” and “allowed at least the word to remain”, because he was unable to say anything about the subject itself. If the antithesis is to have any meaning, that is to say, if “Stirner” simply wanted to demonstrate in it his repugnance to right, then one must say rather that it was not he who “delved into the bowels of right”, but that right “delved” into his bowels and that he merely recorded the fact that right is not to his liking. “Keep this right uncurtailed”, Jacques le bonhomme!

To introduce some sort of content into this void, Saint Sancho has to undertake yet another logical manoeuvre, which with great “virtuosity” he thoroughly shuffles together with canonisation and the simple antithesis, and so completely masks with numerous episodes that the German public and German philosophers, at any rate, were unable to see through it.

C. Appropriation by Compound Antithesis

“Stirner” now has to introduce an empirical definition of right, which he can ascribe to the individual, i.e., he has to recognise something else in right besides holiness. In this connection, he could