We believe we have published every important account of the battle of Magenta which has been given to the world by the Governments involved and by the leading European journals. That battle happened nearly a month ago; and even in the view of our rather rigid friends of The Evening Post, it may now be discussed in a newspaper without doing violence to either propriety, earnestness or honesty; and accordingly we proceed with all deference to set forth the truth in the form of a historical and, if we may be allowed the expression, a strategical study of that battle.\(^3\)

On the morning of June 4, the Austrians had completed their retreat across the Ticino, and were marching up toward Magenta and Abbiategrosso, in order to take in flank the French army advancing toward Milan; while Gen. Clam-Gallas, who had just arrived with a division of the 1st corps from Milan, was to oppose them in front with his division and the 2d corps (Liechtenstein's), which had joined him at Magenta. As a reserve, he had the Reischach division of the 7th corps (Zobel's) at Corbeta, a couple of miles behind Magenta. The line of the Ticino itself having been abandoned as indefensible, these seven or eight Austrian brigades were to hold the line of the Naviglio Grande, a large canal

\(^3\) In *Das Volk* the beginning of the article reads as follows: “The official reports, French and Austrian, on the battle of Magenta bear out the suppositions we ventured to make on the basis of the telegraphic dispatches.” (The dispatches in question are: “Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859”, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 161, June 10, 1859, and “Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859”, *The Times*, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.)—Ed.
running nearly parallel to the Ticino, and passable by bridges only. The two bridges to be defended were those of Boffalora and Magenta, on two roads leading both from Magenta to the bridge of San Martino over the Ticino. The division of the 1st corps (commanded by Gen. Cordon) advanced on the road to Turbigo; two brigades of the 2d corps were on the bridges; a third at Magenta; and Reischach's division, as we have said, at Corbetta.

The French advanced in two columns. The first, under the nominal command of Louis Napoleon, consisted of the division of grenadiers of the guard, of Canrobert's, Niel's and Baraguay d'Hilliers's corps, in all 9 divisions, or 18 brigades (117 battalions). It advanced on the direct road from Novara to Milan, by the bridge of San Martino, and was to take the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. The second, under McMahon, consisted of the division of voltigeurs\(^a\) of the guard, of McMahon's corps, and of the whole Piedmontese army—in all 8 divisions, or 16 brigades, and including 109 battalions, as the Piedmontese divisions count one battalion more than the French. The head of this body had passed the Ticino and Naviglio without serious resistance at Turbigo, and was now to support the front attack of the first column by a movement upon the flank of the Austrians, by marching straight upon Magenta from the north. This column was to attack first, and, after it had well engaged the Austrians, the first column was to assault the bridges.

About noon the attack was commenced by McMahon. With superior forces he drove the division of Cordon before him toward Magenta, and about 2 o'clock the grenadiers of the guard, who had driven in the Austrian outposts as far as the canal, attacked the bridges of Boffalora and Magenta. There were at the time 3\(^b\) French brigades on the battle-field, against what Louis Napoleon calls 125,000 Austrians, but what in reality was confined to 5 brigades (2 of the 1st and 3 of the 2d corps), or less than 30,000 men; for even Reischach's 2 brigades stood, as yet, at Corbetta.\(^c\) The French, by a violent effort, carried the bridges over the canal. Gyulay, who was at Magenta, ordered Reischach to advance and retake the bridge of Magenta, which he did; but

---

\(^a\) Soldiers of light infantry.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) \textit{Das Volk} has "8" here.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^c\) There is one more sentence here in the text published in \textit{Das Volk}: "The French 'secret general', following the example of Falstaff, turned less than 30,000 Austrians into more than 125,000" (see Shakespeare, \textit{King Henry IV}, The First Part, Act II, Scene 4).—\textit{Ed.}
Boffalora seems to have remained in the hands of the French. The battle came to a stand; McMahon’s corps, as well as the grenadiers, had been successfully repulsed; but also, every available man of the Austrians was engaged. Where were the other corps? They were everywhere except where they were wanted. The 2d division of the 1st corps was still on the road from Germany, and could not reasonably be expected to arrive. The remaining brigade of the 2d corps, for Gyulay distinctly says in his report, there were only 3 brigades of the 2d engaged, is not accounted for. The 2d division of the 7th corps, that of Gen. Lilia, was at Castelletto, 6 or 7 miles from Magenta. The 3d corps was at Abbiategrasso, 5 miles from Magenta. The 5th corps was on the march to Abbiategrasso, having come, probably, from Bereguardo, and when the battle began was at least 9 miles from Magenta. The 8th corps was on the march from Binasco to Bestazzo, 10 or 12 miles distant, and the 9th was actually on the Po, a below Pavia, 20 or 25 miles from the scene of action. By this precious scattering of his troops, Gyulay brought himself into the awkward predicament that with 7 brigades he had to resist the shock of the two French heads of columns from noon to somewhere about 4 or 5 o’clock in the afternoon, and these seven brigades would not have been able to do so if it had not been for the fact that the French marching on two roads only, with enormous masses of troops, could move but slowly.

While Reischach held the bridge of Magenta and took one of the new French rifled guns, Gyulay hurried to Robecco, a village on the canal about three miles below Boffalora, to hurry on the march of the 3d and 5th corps and to point out to them their directions of attack. Four brigades of the 3d corps were now thrown forward, the front line under Hartung and Ramming, and with Dürfeld in reserve, all three along the canal, and Wetzlar along the Ticino. They were to attack the right flank of the French. But in the mean time the latter had also obtained reenforcements. Picard’s brigade (of Renault’s division, and Canrobert’s corps) arrived to support the grenadiers, and drove Reischach back over the bridge. They were followed by Viny’s division (Niell’s corps), Jannin’s brigade (Renault’s division) and Trochu’s division (Canrobert’s corps). Thus the French concentrated on this point six brigades in addition to the two brigades of grenadiers, while of the four Austrian brigades of the 3d corps,

a Das Volk has here: “and the ninth corps, incredibile dictu! loafed its time away on the Po”. Ed.
only two or three were actually engaged. In spite of these odds, the Austrians again took and retook the bridge of Magenta over and over again; but at last it remained in the hands of the French.\(^a\)

While this was going on at the bridges, McMahon had prepared a second attack upon the troops opposed to him, consisting of four or five brigades of the 1st and 2d corps. His two divisions again advanced in two columns upon Magenta, followed, in second line, by Camou’s division of voltigeurs of the guard. The divisions of Espinasse and La Motterouge (McMahon’s corps) having been effectually stopped by the Austrians, the voltigeurs advanced to support them. The struggle now reached its crisis. The first of the French columns had passed the bridge of Magenta, and also advanced against the village, which was already hard pressed by McMahon’s column. The 5th Austrian corps having at last made its appearance on the battle-field, the Prince of Hesse’s brigade,\(^b\) almost at nightfall, made a fresh attempt to drive the French back over the bridge, but in vain. It was, indeed, too much to expect that a weak brigade (it had already fought at Montebello\(^c\)) should have arrested and hurled back that torrent of troops which came pouring over the bridge of Magenta. The Austrians in Magenta, assailed in front, flank, and rear, and having been under fire, without rest, since the beginning of the action, at last gave way, and after a violent struggle, Magenta was occupied by the French about nightfall.

Gyulay withdrew his troops through Corbeta, which had been occupied in the meantime by Lilia’s division from Carbelletto, and through Robecco, which was also strongly held by the 3d corps, the 5th corps bivouacking between the two places. He intended to continue the struggle on the 5th of June, but there appears to have been some blundering with regard to orders given, for in the middle of the night he learned that the 1st and 2d corps had, according to orders, as they understood it, retired several miles from the field of battle, and were to continue their retreat at 3 o’clock in the morning. This intelligence decided Gyulay to desist from another battle. A brigade of the 3rd corps again assaulted

---

\(^a\) In *Das Volk* the end of this sentence reads as follows: “... the bridge of Magenta, which the enemy’s superior forces retained only by dint of the most desperate efforts”.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) General Dormus was in command of the brigade at the time.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The *Volk* version reads: “decimated in the battle of Montebello”.—*Ed.*
Magenta to cover the retreat of the Austrian army, which took place in the most perfect order.

According to the Austrian report, there were engaged on their side:

- Of the 1st Corps, Cordon's Division ........................................ 2 Brigades.
- Of the 2nd Corps ................................................................. 3 Brigades.
- Of the 7th Corps, Reischach's Division .................................... 2 Brigades.
- Of the 3rd Corps ................................................................. 3 Brigades.
- Of the 5th Corps, late at nightfall ......................................... 1 Brigade.

In all, 11 brigades, equal to 55 battalions, with auxiliary arms, about 65,000 men.

According to the French account, the Allies had engaged:

- The Corps of Guards, 2 divisions ........................................... 4 Brigades.
- McMahon's Corps (2 divisions) ............................................. 4 Brigades.
- Of Canrobert's Corps, 2 divisions (Renault's & Trochu's) ... 4 Brigades.
- Of Niel's Corps, 1 division (Vinoy's) ................................. 2 Brigades.

In all 14 brigades, or 91 battalions, equal to at least 80,000 men.

But the French report, when speaking of the advance of Vinoy's division, says,

"the 85th of the line suffered most ... Gen. Martimprey received a wound while leading on his brigade."

Now, neither the 85th nor Gen. Martimprey's brigade belong to "Vinoy's division of Gen. Niel's corps." The 85th belongs to the 2nd brigade, commanded by Gen. Ladreitt de la Charrière of Ladmirault's division, and Gen. Martimprey commands the 1st brigade of that same division, which does not belong to Niel's corps, but to that of Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers. We thus find a decisive proof that more French troops were engaged than are enumerated in the report; and if Ladmirault's division, which swells the number of brigades to 16, and that of battalions to 104, and that of combatants to 90,000, is thus glibly passed over, we cannot but expect that still other troops contributed to the result of the day. The Austrians, too, say that they made prisoners belonging to almost every regiment forming part of the army of Italy, and it is,

---

a "Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859", The Times, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.—Ed.
b "Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859", Le Moniteur universel, No. 161, June 10, 1859.—Ed.
therefore, probable that at least 16 brigades were engaged. This gives the French a numerical superiority, which reflects the highest honor upon the bravery of the Austrian troops. They were beaten by just the width of the battle-field; they took one gun and lost four, and they must have left the battle-field with the certainty that if numbers had been even, victory would have been theirs.

But what shall we say of their General? He expects the attack on the 4th; within 8 miles of the battle-field he has 13 brigades (the 7 first engaged, 2 of Lilia's, 4 of the 3d corps); at 9 miles 4 more of the 5th; at 10 or 12 miles 4 more of the 8th corps. This was at 8:30 in the morning. Now, is it expecting too much, on a day of battle, that all these corps should have been united by 4, or at latest 5, in the afternoon close enough to Magenta to take part in the conflict? Is it expecting too much, that at 2 o'clock, when the battle became serious, 13 instead of 7 brigades should have been engaged? In that case, the position—held, as it was, till nightfall by 4—might have been easily maintained with 12 brigades, and the great losses which Cordon's division and the 2d corps must undoubtedly have suffered would have been avoided. On the arrival of the 5th corps, the offensive might have been taken, and the French driven back across the Ticino. But the old slowness of movement appears again to have got hold of the Austrians. As the greater Napoleon said of them, they lose the most precious moments in useless pomposity and idle formalities. Gyulay has done the same, and given Louis Napoleon a victory which would have been an easy and a decisive one but for the bravery of the Austrian troops, and which Gyulay might himself have had.

On the morning of the 5th, Gyulay had under his orders, of intact troops, that had not been engaged at Magenta:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division of the 3d Corps</th>
<th>2 Brigades</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Three Brigades of the 5th Corps</td>
<td>3 Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Division (Lilia's) of the 7th Corps</td>
<td>2 Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 8th Corps</td>
<td>4 Brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Eleven brigades, or a force equal to that with which he had fought the day before. Of the troops engaged the day before, only 3

---

\[a\] In *Das Volk* this sentence reads as follows: "Gyulay revived this tradition, and so letting his own victory slip from him he allowed the 'secret general' to score a victory which would have been easy and decisive but for the bravery of the Austrian soldiers and the utter incapacity of the chief of the Society of December 10." — Ed.
divisions (1st and 2d corps) were so disorganized as to be unable to fight—this appears to be the real meaning of the mysterious retreat of these troops. There remained 8 brigades, in all 19 brigades, or above 100,000 men. There were opposed to him the 16 brigades of French engaged on the 4th; 4 more divisions of the French army, which must have been ready to fight on the 5th, and 1 or 2 divisions of Piedmontese, as most of the latter were still very far to the rear. Thus, on the 5th, Gyulay would have had 19 brigades, and perhaps later in the day, 25 (counting the 1st and 2d corps, if brought up again), against about 28 Franco-Piedmontese brigades, which, perhaps, toward evening, might have been reenforced by 2 or 3 more Piedmontese brigades. Now we see what an egregious blunder Gyulay committed in sending the 9th corps so far away. With the 9th corps present, his 29 brigades would have been a match for the whole allied army, and it is not at all impossible that the battle of the 5th might have had a different result to that of the day before.

Gyulay's mistakes may be summed up as follows:

1. When Louis Napoleon made a flank march within reach of the Austrians, from Vercelli to Turbigo, Gyulay did not profit by the unfavorable position of his enemy, by pouncing at once, with all his forces, on their exposed line of march, by which he might have cut them in two and driven part of them toward the Alps—repeating Radetzky's maneuver of 1849.

2. Instead of this, he retired behind the Ticino, and thus marched round-about to cover Milan, to which the straight road was abandoned to the enemy.

3. He scattered his troops during this retreat, which he conducted with an ease and laziness scarcely pardonable in peace maneuvers.

4. His 9th corps was so far away that it was out of reach of concentration.

5. The concentration even during the battle was carried on with unpardonable slowness, in consequence of which the troops first engaged had to suffer unnecessarily, and moreover the battle was lost instead of won.

If, with such blunders, he did not suffer a total defeat, having the élite of the French army to fight, it is merely to be attributed to the conspicuous bravery of his troops, and not at all to any qualities in their commander.

It will also appear from this review of the battle that the desertions of Italian and Hungarian troops, on which some of our
friends have laid so much stress, were really very small, and had no calculable influence on the result of the day.\(^a\)

Written about June 16, 1859


---

\(^a\) The end of the article as given in Das Volk reads thus: "5. In the course of the battle itself the concentration was carried out so carelessly that the troops had to suffer unnecessarily and the victory was given to the enemy for nothing.

"If despite the many gross blunders Gyulay did not suffer a total defeat, though he was confronted by the \textit{élite} of the French army, this was due entirely to the bravery of his troops and the shrewdness of his enemy, the 'secret general'. Gyulay's troops displayed the invincible vitality of the people, and he himself the senile idiocy of the monarchy. On the other hand, the 'secret general' realises that with the Austrians' retreat to the Mincio the melodramatic part of the struggle ends and the real war begins. The correctness of the maxim that in war no hide-and-seek can save one from personal danger, which the real Napoleon impressed on his brother Joseph, was driven home to him. Finally, Canrobert, disgruntled by the preference given to MacMahon, has threatened to provide certain revelations concerning the exploits of the hero of Satory in this campaign. The hero therefore longs to be back with his beloved wife in Faubourg Poissonnière and yearns for peace at any price. If this is unattainable then he wants at least peace talks to justify 'his own retreat to Paris.'" — Ed.
Karl Marx

SPREE AND MINCIO

Voltaire, we know, kept four monkeys in Ferney, to which he had given the names of his four literary opponents, Fréron, Beaumelle, Nonnotte and Franc de Pompignan. Not a day passed without the writer's feeding them personally, kicking them liberally, pulling their ears, sticking pins in their noses, stepping on their tails, dressing them in clerical hoods and mistreating them in every possible way. The old man of Ferney needed these monkeys of criticism to draw off his bile, satisfy his hatred, and calm his fear of the weapons of polemics, just as much as Louis Bonaparte needs the monkeys of the revolution in Italy. And Kossuth, Klapka, Vogt and Garibaldi too are fed, given golden collars, kept under lock and key, cajoled or kicked, depending on whether hatred of the revolution or fear of it predominates in the mood of their master. The poor monkeys of the revolution are thus to be its hostages; they are to assure the man of December 2 an armistice on the part of the revolutionary party, so that he may, undisturbed, destroy the arsenals of Orsini-type bombs and fall on the enemy, whom he dreaded so long in the Tuileries, in his own camp, and strangle him.

The Empire must mean peace once more, or it will not have been worth the trouble to perpetrate so many outrages, commit so many perjuries and suffer so many humiliations to set it up. An Empire rendered insecure by revolutionary bombs, secret societies, insolent bourgeois and unrestrained soldiers is intolerable. Marchons! Here is fame, here are Napoleonic ideas, freedom, nationality, independence, anything you want; but marchons, marchons!

a Onward! — Ed.
The idea of making Italy a mousetrap of the revolution is sophisticated enough; the only thing is that it cannot be put into execution, for the reason that anyone who lets himself be caught in it, at the moment that he nibbles at the bait ceases to be of any significance for the revolutionary party. To want to seal up the crater of the revolution by tossing Messrs. Kossuth, Klapka, Vogt and Garibaldi into it, head over heels, is really childish and only helps to hasten the eruption.

Even if it were possible, with their help, to extinguish an Orsini bomb in Italy, another would go off in France, in Germany, in Russia, or wherever it might be; for the need and the natural necessity of the revolution is as general as the desperation of the downtrodden peoples on whom your throne rests, as the hatred of the despoiled proletarians with whose wretchedness you played such pleasant games. And only after the revolution has become an elemental force, incalculable and unavoidable as the lightning whose thunder you only hear when its deadly bolt has been sent out without recall, only then are you aware of its eruption.

Where and how this eruption may take place is of little importance. The main thing is that it should occur. This time Prussia seems to be called on to express, against its will, the general need for revolution. The Prince Regent, who on his own ‘never said a foolish thing and never did a wise one’, is forced by pure love for conservatism to play seriously the revolutionary role with which Louis Bonaparte only flirts out of fear, affectation and caprice.

Prussia’s armed mediation, i.e., its alliance with Austria, means revolution.

The general mood of the Berlin press proves that neutrality with mobilisation of the army has been given up as an untenable position. The National-Zeitung, the organ of the liberal trends in the Cabinet, says quite rightly:

“Neutrality may be a suitable role for Belgium, Holland or Switzerland under the present conditions; for Prussia neutrality is death.”

If Bonaparte succeeds in carrying out his noble-minded plans for Italy, the outcome would be, according to the same paper, nothing but a French military protectorate over the entire peninsula, even if the war is localised and does not produce any direct acquisition of territory by France. As a result the

---

a William, Prince of Prussia.—Ed.
Russo-French hegemony over the continent of Europe, which has already been so perceptible for the last three years, would be so much strengthened that it could lead at any moment to the division of rule proclaimed in St. Helena. The new Empire is said to show the same tendencies as the first Empire and to be in an even more advantageous position, since it is not under external pressure and can therefore choose at discretion the time, place and occasion to isolate its opponents and then annihilate them en détail. In order to thwart this battle plan, which has been conducted with such great skill up to the present, Prussia, the paper says, will be forced to go with Austria, not at all in order to support the policies of the Habsburgs but to fight for its own existence.

This is approximately the content of the article in question, which is regarded as the programme corresponding to the policy of the regency. No one believes that the latest attempt at mediation, entrusted to Herr von Werther, will succeed. If, however, Napoleon consented to a peace that at best would intensify the discontent of his officers and soldiers, it would no longer be necessary to fight him. One could then say of him what Horace Walpole said about the Marquis de Very, a Sardinian diplomat: He is dead but wants it to be kept secret for a few days. He would not succeed for long.

If this mediation, which has hardly been undertaken seriously, should fail, the battles between Napoleonic tyranny and Habsburg despotism would be fought out on the Mincio, but the battles for freedom would be fought on the Oder and the Vistula. Huge bodies of troops have already been massed at Kalisch, two miles from the Prussian border. A Prussian army corps has been announced in Hanover on the march towards the Rhine, another is moving south, and the commanders of the various federal corps have been summoned to a military conference in Berlin. All these steps concern merely the mobilisation of the advance guard. The army that must wage the war against France and Russia is not yet in existence and can only be recruited from the people, not the people that declaims the Teutonic poems of the Teutonic Ludwig, but the people that is rising with the entire devastating energy of revolutionary enthusiasm. If this enthusiasm cannot be aroused, then the mobilisation, armed mediation, declaration of war, warfare, etc., of the Hohenzollerns

---

a One by one.—*Ed.*
are no better than the puerile idea of the Gold Coast Negro who thinks that he is dealing a mortal blow at his adversary if he hangs himself on his enemy's doorpost.

Written about June 23, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 8, June 25, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
The fruits of a victory are gathered in pursuing the enemy. The more active the pursuit, the more decisive the victory. Prisoners, artillery, baggage, flags are not taken so much in the battle itself as in the pursuit afterwards. Further, the intensity of a victory is measured by the vigour of the pursuit. From this point of view, what are we to say of the “grande victoire” at Magenta? On the following day we find the French liberators “resting and reorganising”.\(^a\) Not the slightest attempt at pursuit. Through the march to Magenta the allied army had in fact concentrated all its forces. The Austrians, on the other hand, had some of their troops at Abbiategasso, some on the road to Milan, others again at Binasco, and finally others at Belgioioso—a heap of columns, so scattered, slogging along so disconnectedly as to extend a virtual invitation to the enemy to fall on them, to make a single effort and disperse them in all directions and then capture, with no great exertion, entire brigades and regiments that had been cut off from their line of retreat. Napoleon, the genuine Napoleon, would have known in such a case how to employ the 15 or 16 brigades that, according to the official French communiqué, had not taken part in the battle on the preceding day. What did the Brummagem\(^b\) Napoleon do, the Napoleon of Herr Vogt, of the Cirque Olympique, of St. James’s Street and the Astley Amphitheatre\(^3\) He had dinner on the battlefield.

The direct road to Milan was open to him. The stage effect was assured. That of course sufficed for him. June 5, 6 and 7, three

\(^a\) From Napoleon III’s telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859, Le Moniteur universel, No. 157, June 6, 1859.— Ed.

\(^b\) Engels uses the English word.— Ed.
whole days, were presented to the Austrians so that they could extricate themselves from their dangerous positions. They marched down towards the Po and moved along the north bank of the river towards Cremona, advancing on three parallel roads. At the northernmost point of these roads General Benedek covered the retreat with three divisions as he moved next to the line of march of the enemy. From Abbiategrasso, where he was on the 6th, he marched via Binasco to Melegnano. There he left two brigades to hold the position until the baggage and supply train of the central column had moved far enough ahead. On June 8 Marshal Baraguay d'Hilliers was ordered to drive these two brigades out, and to make things quite safe, MacMahon's corps was also placed under his command. Ten brigades against two! Close by the Lambro MacMahon's corps was detached to cut off the Austrians' retreat, while Baraguay's 3 divisions attacked Melegnano; two brigades attacked the city frontally, two turned it on the right flank and two on the left. Only one Austrian brigade, Roden's, stood in Melegnano, and General Boér's brigade stood on the opposite, east side of the Lambro River. The French attacked very vigorously, and their sixfold superiority in numbers forced General Roden, after stubborn resistance, to evacuate the city and pull back under the protection of Boér's brigade. It was just for that purpose that the latter had taken up a position in the rear. After achieving its purpose, it likewise fell back in perfect order. Boér was killed on this occasion. The loss of the one Austrian brigade mainly engaged was undoubtedly considerable, but the figures (about 2,400) given by the Decembrising crapauds are pure fantasy since the total strength of the brigade before the action was not over 5,000. Once more, the French victory bore no fruits. No trophies, not a single cannon!

In the meantime, Pavia was evacuated by the Austrians on the 6th, then for reasons unknown reoccupied on the 8th and evacuated again on the 9th, while Piacenza was abandoned on the 10th, only six days after the battle at Magenta. The Austrians retired in easy marches, following the Po until they reached the Chiese. Here they turned north and marched to Lonato, Castiglione and Castelgoffredo, where they took up a defensive position, in which they appear to await a new attack by the "liberators".

During this march by the Austrians, first southwards from Magenta to Belgioioso, then east to Piadena and then north again

---

a Literally, toads; here wretches, meaning the Bonapartist General Staff.—Ed.
to Castiglione—describing a complete semicircle—the liberators marched in a straight line along the diameter of this semicircle and thus had only about two-thirds of the distance to cover. Nevertheless, they never caught up with the Austrians, except at Melegnano and once near Castenedolo, where Garibaldi carried out an insignificant skirmish. Such indolence in pursuit is unheard of in military history. It is typical of the Quasimodo, who travesties his uncle (his uncle according to the principle of the Code Napoléon: “La recherche de la paternité est interdite”\(^a\)), even in his successes.

At the same time as the main body of the Austrians took up their positions behind the Chiese, between June 18 and 20, the Allies’ advance guard reached the Chiese front. They will need one or more days to bring up their main forces. If the Austrians actually accept battle, a second general engagement may be expected about June 24 or 26. The liberators cannot hesitate for long in the face of the Austrians if they want to keep the impetus of the victory alive in their troops and not give the enemy an opportunity of beating them in smaller encounters. The position of the Austrians is very favourable. A plateau runs to the Mincio from the southern end of Lake Garda at Lonato; its edge towards the plain of Lombardy is formed by the line Lonato-Castiglione-San Cassiano-Cavriana-Volta, a splendid position in which to lie in wait for an enemy. The plateau rises gradually towards the lake and provides a series of various good positions, each superior to its predecessor in strength and concentration, so that winning the height of the plateau does not yield a victory but only marks the end of the first act of a battle. The right wing is covered by the lake, and the left is bent back considerably, so that it leaves almost ten miles of the Mincio line unprotected. Instead of being a drawback, this is the most favourable aspect of the position, because at the Mincio the marshlands begin that lie enclosed between the four fortresses of Verona, Peschiera, Mantua and Legnago and in which no enemy can venture without overwhelming superiority in numbers. Since the line of the Mincio is controlled by Mantua at its southern end and the terrain beyond the Mincio is within the range of action of Mantua and Verona, any attempt to leave out of account the Austrians on the plateau and advance past them to the Mincio would soon be forced to a halt. The advancing army would see its lines of communication destroyed, without being able to endanger those of the Austrians. In addition, they would find nothing to attack on the other side of

---

\(^a\) “Inquiry into paternity is forbidden.” — Ed.
the Mincio (since there could be no question of siege operations under these circumstances) and would have to turn back again for lack of an objective. But the real danger of such a movement would be that it would have to be carried out in full view of the Austrians on the plateau, who would merely have to set their whole line in motion and fall on the enemy column, from Volta against Goito, from Cavriana against Guidizzolo and Ceresara, from Castiglione against Castelgoffredo and Montechiaro. The liberators would be fighting any such battle under frightfully unfavourable conditions, and it could end in a second Austerlitz, but with the roles reversed.

Magenta-Gyulay has been relieved of his command. Schlick has taken his place as commander of the Second Army, while Wimpffen remains at the head of the First Army. The two armies, massed at Lonato and Castiglione, make up the Austro-Italian army under the nominal command of Francis Joseph and with Hess as chief of the General Staff. Schlick seems, from his past in the war in Hungary, to be an able run-of-the-mill general. Hess is undoubtedly the greatest living strategist. The danger is the personal interference of the notorious Francis Joseph. He, like Alexander I at the time of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia, has surrounded himself with an assortment of old, philistine, hidebound know-alls, some of whom may be directly in the pay of Russia. If the French army left the Austrians undisturbed in their positions and marched past them directly to the Mincio, they could be seen most clearly indeed, regiment by regiment, from the plateau. The sense impression that the enemy was on the shorter road to the line of retreat might easily bewilder such a brain as Francis Joseph’s. The fretful comments of his know-alls in epaulettes might soothe his weak nerves and lead him to give up the well-chosen position and withdraw to between the fortresses.

When silly youths are at the head of an Empire, everything depends on their nerve-thermometer. The best-laid plans are at the mercy of subjective impressions, accidents, whims. With a Francis Joseph in the Austrian headquarters, there is hardly any other guarantee of victory than the Quasimodo in the enemy camp. But he at least has steeled his nerves among the professional gamblers in St. James’s Street and, although he is not a man of iron, as his admirers would have it, he is one of gutta-percha.

Written on June 23, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 8, June 25, 1859
Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
The arrival of the Asia adds nothing to the brief telegraphic report of the great victory on the Mincio, which was reported in our columns yesterday morning, by way of Newfoundland. The battle took place on Friday, June 24, lasting from 4 o'clock in the morning till 8 in the evening, and the steamers sailed the next day before any details could have been received. We must, therefore, wait for the arrival of the Arago here, or the Hungarian at Quebec, for the particulars, so anxiously expected by the public curiosity. Meanwhile, as the numbers of the combatants were about equal on both sides, the result seems to settle one point, at least, namely, that the Austrian soldier is not a match for the French.

The general impression of military men in England, as well as here, seems to have been that the Allies would not fight a great battle until the corps of Prince Napoleon, marching from Tuscany, had arrived to attack the Austrians in the rear, while it was supposed a flotilla would be launched on the Lake of Garda to enable the Allies also to make a flank attack in that quarter. Napoleon III has, however, waited for none of these things, but has fought and won the fight. It is also evident from the correspondence from the allied camp, of which we elsewhere give all that is important, that to fight was the only practicable course. Delay would have checked the victorious impulse of the allied troops, and would have given the Austrians opportunities to beat them by superiority of numbers in smaller encounters.

---

In the movements of the Austrian army, the same vacillating indecision is apparent under Schlick which had before resulted in the defeat and disgrace of Gyulay. They at first prepared for battle on the line from Lonato to Castiglione, San Cassiano, Cavriana, and Volta. Here a plateau gradually rises toward the lake and the Mincio, offering a succession of excellent positions, each stronger and more concentrated than the preceding one, so that the conquest of the edge of the plateau would not constitute a victory, but only the first act of a battle. Their right wing was covered by the lake; their left was drawn back considerably, leaving unguarded nearly ten miles of the line of the Mincio. But this, instead of being a disadvantage, was in fact the finest feature of the position, from the circumstance that beyond the Mincio lay the dangerous ground inclosed between the four fortresses, into which an enemy could not venture unless he possessed a great numerical superiority. The line of the Mincio being commanded at its southern extremity by Mantua, and the ground beyond the Mincio belonging to the spheres of action of both Mantua and Verona, every attempt to treat the Austrians in the position on the plateau with contempt by marching past them toward the Mincio, would soon have been brought to a standstill; the advancing army would have seen its communications annihilated without being able to endanger those of the Austrians. But the most dangerous part of such a move would have been that it must have been done under the eyes of the Austrians on the plateau, who would have had nothing to do but to set their whole line in motion and fall upon the straggling columns of the enemy, from Volta upon Goito, from Cavriana upon Guidizzolo and Ceresara, from Castiglione upon Castelgoffredo and Montechiaro. Such a battle would have been fought by the Allies under a tremendous disadvantage, and might have ended in a second Austerlitz with the parts reversed.

Such was the position which the Austrians had assumed; and they had in it the further advantage of perfectly knowing the whole ground, from the fact that for years it has been the scene of their annual army exercises, carried out upon the largest scale. As we have said, it was carefully prepared for the expected conflict; the towns and villages were fortified; and then, at the last moment, for some reason that, in a military point of view, is utterly inexplicable, they abandon the ground, retreat bag and baggage across the Mincio, where, on the 24th, they are attacked and finally beaten. Whether this sudden and important change in the plan of the campaign had anything to do with the action of
Prussia, which Power is said to consider the quadrangle of the Mincio and Adige as in some sort a part of the defenses of Germany, is a question on which we may hope for more light hereafter. One thing, however, is pretty certain with regard to Prussia, and that is, that her attitude must prevent Louis Napoleon from drawing many more troops from France to Italy. As our readers are already aware, that Power has mobilized six out of her nine army corps; that is, she has called into service the Landwehr, consisting of soldiers belonging to those corps which, having completed three years of regular service, are discharged on indefinite furlough. Of these six army corps, five are to take a position on the lower and middle Rhine. Thus some 170,000 Prussians must at about the present date be in line between Coblenz and Metz; and no doubt two other federal corps, that of Bavaria and that of Baden, Württemberg and Hesse-Darmstadt, will also take their position in Baden and the Palatinate, making from 100,000 to 120,000 men in addition. Against such forces Napoleon III will require almost every man now at his disposal in France. In this case he may find it advisable to have recourse to a Hungarian insurrection, and to the services of Kossuth; though we may be pretty sure that he will not call such agencies into requisition until he is compelled.

That Prussia now actually intends to take part in the war is very doubtful; but it will not be so easy for her to avoid it. Her military system, by making soldiers of the majority of the whole adult able-bodied population, puts such a strain upon the nation, from the moment the Landwehr—even of the first levy only—is called out, that the country cannot afford to stand by with arms grounded for any length of time. At the present moment, all able-bodied males, from 20 to 32 years of age, are under arms in six provinces out of eight. The derangement caused by this in the whole commercial and industrial organization of Prussia is enormous; and the country can only stand it on condition that the men are led before the enemy without delay; the men themselves could not stand it—in a couple of months the whole army would be in a state of mutiny. Beside this, national feeling is running so high in Germany, that Prussia, now that she has gone so far, cannot retreat. The recollections of the peace of Basel, and of the irresolutions of 1805 and 1806, and of the Confederation of the Rhine, are still so vivid that the Germans are determined not to allow themselves now to be beaten singly by their wary opponent. The Prussian Government cannot master this feeling; it may attempt to direct it, but if it does so, it is bound hand and foot to
the movement, and every trace of wavering will be considered as treason, and will recoil upon the waverer. There will, no doubt, be attempts at negotiation; but all parties are now so engaged that no road out of the labyrinth appears open in any direction.

If Germany, however, takes part in this war, there is no doubt that another actor will soon appear upon the scene. Russia has informed the lesser German States that she will interfere if the Germans do not sit quietly by while Austria is being dismembered. Russia is concentrating two army corps on the Prussian, two on the Austrian, one on the Turkish frontier. She may enter upon a campaign some time this year, but it will certainly be late. No recruits have been enlisted in Russia since the peace of Paris; the men on furlough, owing to the great losses during the war, cannot be numerous; and if the army corps, even after the recall of the men on furlough, reach 40,000 each, it will be much. Russia cannot undertake an offensive campaign before 1860, and then with not more than 200,000 or 250,000 men. Now, there are at present available in Germany, for use in the North, four Prussian corps, 136,000 men; the 9th and 10th Federal corps, with the reserve division, say 80,000 men; and at least three Austrian corps, or 140,000 men; so that, for a defensive war, or even an attack on Russian Poland, Germany has nothing to fear from Russia even now. But whenever Russia engages in this war, there will be appeals to national passions and to the opposed interests of classes, and the contest will take dimensions which will be likely to put the war of the first French Revolution into the shade.

Written about June 24, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The chivalrous Francis Joseph, who cannot sleep for thinking of the laurels of the pseudo-Napoleon, has shown us what it means when "a hereditary war-lord" takes the reins in his hands. We saw last week how the army first had to occupy the position on the heights of Castiglione and then, at the moment when everyone should have expected a battle, abandoned the position without fighting and without a reason, to retire behind the Mincio. But Francis Joseph did not feel that this was sufficient to prove his pitiful weakness and inconsistency. No sooner was the army behind the Mincio than the "young hero" thought up something better: it was unworthy of a Habsburg to quit the field in this way without resistance; the army had to make an about-face, cross the Mincio again and attack the enemy.

After Francis Joseph had adequately reinforced his troops' confidence in their Most Serene War-Lord by this puerile marching to and fro, he led them against the enemy. They were at most 150,000 in number; even Bonaparte, that lover of truth, does not set the figure higher. The Austrians attacked along a line at least 12 English miles long. Thus, there were at most 12,500 men for each mile (2,100 paces) of front, a concentration, to be sure, that is adequate for a shorter line under certain conditions but definitely too weak on so long a front, and completely unsuitable for an offensive, since the several main blows could not be delivered with sufficient power. In addition to that, the enemy was certainly superior in strength, so that the Austrian offensive was an error from the outset; an enemy with superior forces was fairly

---

*See this volume, pp. 384-87.—Ed.*
The Battle at Solferino

sure to break through such a thin line at some point. The general advance of the Austrians began on Thursday, June 23; they easily drove back the enemy outposts at all points, occupied Pozzolengo, Volta, Guidizzolo, and pressed on to Solferino and Castelgoffredo by nightfall. On the next morning they drove the enemy vanguard still further back, their left wing almost reaching the Chiese; now however they came up against the main forces of the enemy and the battle became general. Both wings of the Austrians had the upper hand, especially the right wing, which faced the Piedmontese and gave them rough treatment, so that the Austrians were clearly victorious here. But in the centre the defects of the plan came to light. Solferino, the key to the centre, finally remained in the hands of the French after stubborn fighting; at the same time they developed overwhelming pressure on the Austrian left wing. These two circumstances persuaded Francis Joseph, who had apparently thrown every last man into the fight, to give the order to retreat. The Austrians withdrew—obviously in perfect order and without being pursued—and crossed the Mincio un molested.

The details of the battle did not reach us in time to be discussed in this issue. This much is certain, however, that once again the Austrian troops fought with outstanding valour. This is proved by their steadfast resistance for 16 hours to a stronger enemy, and in particular by their orderly and undisturbed withdrawal. They do not seem to have any particular respect at all for messieurs the French; Montebello, Magenta and Solferino do not seem to have left any other impression on them than the conviction that, given equality in numbers, they can cope not only with the French but also with the stupidity of their own generals. The fact that they lost 30 guns and, allegedly, 6,000 prisoners is a pitiful result for the victor in such a major battle; the numerous engagements in villages could not yield him fewer spoils. But brilliantly as the troops conducted themselves in the face of superior strength, equally wretched was their leadership. Indecision, wavering, contradictory orders, as if the troops were to be quite intentionally demoralised—this is how Francis Joseph compromised himself irrevocably in the eyes of his army in three days. Nothing more woeful can be conceived than this arrogant youth presuming to command an army and yielding like a reed in the wind to the most contradictory influences, following old Hess today and taking Herr Grüne's contrary advice tomorrow, drawing back today and attacking suddenly on the morrow, and in general never knowing himself what he wishes. By now he has had enough of it, and is
going back, shamed and crestfallen, to Vienna, where he will get a beautiful reception.

But the war is only now beginning. The Austrian fortresses are only now coming into action; the French will now have to split up as soon as they cross the Mincio, and that will initiate a series of battles for single posts and positions, of minor secondary engagements in which the Austrians, who now at last have old Hess at their head, have better chances of victory despite their generally smaller forces. Once this, coupled with reinforcements, has reestablished the balance between the belligerents, the Austrians will be able to fall on the divided enemy with superior concentrations of forces and repeat the battles of Sommacampagna and Custozza\textsuperscript{309} on a ten times larger scale. This is the task of the next six weeks. By the way, they are only now beginning to bring up their reserves, which will provide the army in Italy with at least 120,000 men in reinforcements, whilst Louis Napoleon is at a loss as to where to get reinforcements from, now that Prussia has mobilised.

Accordingly, the Solferino affair has only slightly altered the chances of the war. But one great result has been achieved: One of our principal sovereigns has made an utter laughing-stock of himself, and his entire old-Austrian system is tottering. Discontent with the concordat business,\textsuperscript{310} with the centralisation, with rule by the bureaucracy, is breaking out all over Austria, and the people are demanding the overthrow of a system distinguished by oppression at home and defeats abroad. The mood in Vienna is such that Francis Joseph is hurrying there as fast as he can, to make concessions. At the same time our other sovereigns are making fools of themselves in the jolliest way; after the chivalrous Prince Regent\textsuperscript{a} has exhibited the same irresolution and lack of character as a politician that Francis Joseph has shown as a general, the small states have started to squabble with Prussia again over the passage of troops, and the military commission of the Confederation has declared that it can make a decision on Prussia's proposal of free federal corps on the Upper Rhine only after a good fortnight of reflection. Things are becoming splendidly complicated. This time the gracious princes can make fools of themselves without the menace of danger to our nationality; on the contrary, the German people, an entirely different people since the revolution of 1848, has become strong enough

\textsuperscript{a} William, Prince of Prussia.—\textit{Ed.}
to cope not only with the French and Russians but also with its own 33 sovereigns at the same time.

Written on June 30, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 9, July 2, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
We have now published every official account of the battle of Solferino which has reached us, with many letters from both camps,\textsuperscript{a} including the excellent special correspondence of the London \textit{Times}; and having laid these documents before our readers, it is perhaps not too soon to set forth clearly the real causes by which the battle was lost by Francis Joseph and won by Napoleon III.

When the Austrian Emperor recrossed the Mincio for the attack, he had nine army corps at his disposal, which might, after deducting the garrisons of the fortresses, appear on the field in an average strength of four brigades of infantry each, or thirty-six brigades in all—the brigade averaging between 5,000 and 6,000 men. His force for the attack thus amounted to about 200,000 infantry. This strength, though fully large enough to warrant the movement, was still inferior or scarcely equal to that of the enemy, for they, on their side, counted ten Piedmontese and twenty-six French brigades of infantry. Now, the French had, since Magenta, received large reinforcements of men on furlough, and drilled recruits, who had been distributed to their regiments, and their brigades were certainly stronger than those of the Austrians, whose reinforcements had consisted of two fresh army corps (the 10th and 11th), by which the number but not the strength of the brigades had been increased. The allied army may therefore be fairly estimated at its full complement of infantry (170,000 French, 75,000 Sardinians), less the losses since the beginning of the campaign, say 30,000, leaving about 215,000 infantry. The


\textsuperscript{b} "The Battle of Solferino", \textit{The Times}, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
Austrians, relying upon quickness of maneuvering and surprise, upon the ardent desire of their troops to revenge the defeat of Magenta, and to prove that they were not inferior to their opponents, and upon the strength of the positions which a quick advance to the heights behind Castiglione could again secure to them, were certainly justified in attacking, but only on condition that they should keep their troops as closely concentrated as possible, and that they should advance rapidly and energetically. Neither of these conditions was fulfilled.

Instead of advancing with their whole force between Peschiera and Volta, in order to secure the whole range of heights as far as Lonato and Castiglione, and leaving the plain of Guidizzolo to the cavalry and perhaps one corps of infantry, they left one corps, the 2d, in Mantua to guard against a possible surprise by Prince Napoleon's corps, which was believed to be near. Now, if the garrison of Mantua was not sufficient to hold the strongest fortress in Europe against an irregular attack without the assistance of an extra corps, it must have been a very curious sort of a garrison indeed. But this does not appear to have been the motive which fettered the second corps to Mantua. The fact is that two other corps, the 11th and 10th, had been detached to turn the right flank of the Allies by Asola, a town on the Chiese, some six miles south-west of Castelgoffredo, and so far away from the battle-field that they must have reached it too late under any circumstances. The second corps, it would almost seem, had been destined to cover the flanks and rear of this turning column against the possible arrival of Prince Napoleon, and thus to prevent it from being turned itself. The whole of this design is so thoroughly of the old Austrian school, so complicated, so ridiculous in the contemplation of any man accustomed to study plans of battles, that the Austrian staff must certainly be acquitted of all the responsibility of its invention. Nobody but Francis Joseph and his aide-de-camp, Count Grünne, could have conceived such an anachronism. Thus three corps were successfully put out of harm's way. The remaining seven were disposed of as follows: One, the 8th (Benedek), between Pozzolengo and the Lake of Garda, to hold a position on the hills, the center and key of which was San Martino. The 5th (Stadion) occupied Solferino; the 7th (Zobel) San Cassiano; the 1st (Clam-Gallas) Cavriana. To the south, in the plain, the 3d (Schwarzenberg) advanced on the high road from Goito to Castiglione by Guidizzolo, and the 9th (Schaffgotsch) further south toward Medole. This wing was thrown forward so as to press back the allied right, and to offer a
support to the 10th and 11th corps whenever, and if ever, they should happen to arrive.

Thus the six corps actually engaged, and which to all intents and purposes formed the Austrian fighting army, were drawn out on a line twelve miles long, giving on an average two miles, or 3,540 yards frontage to each corps. There could be no depth in such a long line. But this was not the only serious fault. The 3d and 9th corps advanced from Goito, to which place lay also their line of retreat; the 1st and 7th corps, the next adjoining, had their line of retreat to Valeggio. A glance at the map shows that this gives an eccentric retreat, a circumstance to which the slight effect produced by the two corps in the plain is no doubt mainly to be attributed.

This faulty disposition being laid out for the twenty-four, or if we suppose that Benedek was reenforced by some troops from the garrison of Peschiera, twenty-five or twenty-six Austrian brigades, was rendered still more faulty by the languor of the advance. A rapid march on the 23d, when the Mincio was recrossed, would have brought the concentrated Austrian army, by noon, upon the advanced positions of the Allies, about Desenzano, Lonato and Castiglione, and enabled it to drive them back by nightfall on the Chiese, so that the battle would have commenced with a preliminary success for the Austrians. But the furthest point reached on the hills was Solferino, only six miles from the Mincio. In the plain, the advanced troops got as far as Castelgoffredo, ten miles from the Mincio, and if so ordered, might have got to the Chiese. Then, on the 24th, instead of starting at daybreak, the advance was to begin by 9 o’clock! Thus it happened that the Allies, who started at 2 o’clock in the morning, fell upon the Austrians at between 5 and 6 o’clock. The consequences were inevitable. Thirty-three strong brigades against twenty-five or twenty-six weak ones (they had all been engaged before, and suffered heavy losses), could only result in the defeat of the Austrians. Benedek alone, with his five or six brigades, held out all day long against the Piedmontese army, of whose ten brigades every one, with the exception of the guard, was engaged; and he would have maintained his position, had not the general retreat of the center and left wing compelled him to fall back also. In the center, the 5th and 1st corps (8 brigades) held Solferino against Baraguay d’Hilliers’s corps (6 brigades) and the guard (4 brigades) till after 2 o’clock, while the 7th (4 brigades) was held in check by the four brigades of McMahon. Solferino being at last taken, the guard advanced against San Cassiano, and thus compelled the Austrian 7th corps to give up the position. Finally, the fall of
Cavriana, at about 5 o’clock in the afternoon, decided the fate of the battle in the center, and compelled the Austrians to retreat. On the Austrian left, the 3d and 9th corps were carrying on a desultory fight against Niel’s corps, and one division (Renault) of Canrobert’s; until, later in the afternoon, another division of this latter corps (Trochu’s) entered into line and drove the Austrians back toward Goito. Although opposed from the beginning to a nearly equal force, these eight Austrian brigades might have done much more than they did. By a resolute advance from Guidizzolo toward Castiglione they might have disengaged the 7th corps at San Cassiano and thus indirectly supported the defenders of Solferino; but their line of retreat being to Goito, every step in advance compromised it, and thus they acted with a caution which was entirely misplaced in such a battle; but the blame rests with those who ordered them to retreat to Goito.

The Allies had every man engaged with the exception of three brigades, two of Canrobert’s corps and one of Piedmontese Guards. Now, if the employment of all their reserves except these three brigades was necessary to win a hard-fought victory, after which there was no pursuit, how would the battle have stood if Francis Joseph had been able to avail himself of his three army corps, then wandering about far away to the south? Suppose he had given one to Benedek, placed another behind Solferino and San Cassiano as a reserve, and kept one behind Cavriana as a general reserve, what would the result of the battle have been? It cannot for a moment be doubtful. After repeated and vain efforts to take San Martino and Solferino, the Piedmontese and the French center would have been broken by a final and vigorous advance of the whole Austrian line, and instead of retiring toward the Mincio, the Austrians would have ended the day on the banks of the Chiese. They were beaten, not by the French, but by the arrogant imbecility of their own Emperor. Overwhelmed by both superior numbers from without, and contemptible management within, they still retired unbroken, giving up nothing but the battle-field, and as incapable of panic as any troops the world has ever seen.

Written about July 6, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The connection between the bloody defeat of Solferino and the obtrusive stupidity of Francis Joseph was already explained in the preceding number of Das Volk. Later dispatches giving the details of the battle show that we had still overestimated the "young hero's" perspicacity. The year 1859 puts the victors of 1849 through a state examination which they fail, one after the other.

On June 23 the Austrian army had no less than 9 army corps available; of them, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Eighth had already seen action, as a whole or partially, but the Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh were still intact, had not yet faced the foe. The first six might have had a total of 130,000 men, the last three, 75,000. Hence the enemy could have been attacked with a force of at least 200,000. What did Francis Joseph do? He sent the Tenth and Eleventh Corps from Mantua to Asola on the Chiese, to fall on the French from the rear, and to protect this manoeuvre from a possible attack by the French Fifth Corps (Prince Napoleon), which was believed to be nearby, he held the Second Corps at Mantua. This left him only 6 corps, that is, 24 brigades, with which he planned to attack the front of the Franco-Piedmontese. But the manoeuvre was carried out so slowly that the army bivouacked only some six English miles from the Mincio on the evening of June 23 and the march forward was to be made only at 9 a.m. on the 24th. The forward troops of the Allies, which had been driven back all along the line on the 23rd, and also their reconnaissance naturally alerted the French camp, with the result that the Austrians, instead of attacking at 9 o'clock, were

---

a See this volume, pp. 392-95.— Ed.
themselves attacked at 5 o'clock. Against the 24 Austrian brigades, which must have totalled about 136,000 men, the Allies deployed successively not less than 33 brigades (9 Piedmontese, with 45,000 men, and 24 French,* with 150,000), or at least 195,000 men; in addition, they held one Piedmontese brigade (Guard) and two French brigades (Bourbaki division) in reserve. Accordingly, they had at least 210,000 men on the field of battle. With such a superiority in numbers, the victory of the Allies was certain. Nonetheless, General Benedek, with the Austrian Eighth Corps, successfully beat back the attacks of the entire Piedmontese army and won a complete victory on the right wing, even though his own corps was only four brigades strong and he may at most have received a fifth brigade as reinforcements from the Peschiera garrison. The centre, held by 12 weak Austrian brigades, was attacked and driven back by 14 strong French brigades, and the left wing, 8 brigades, was also pushed back, after a long fight, by 10 stronger French brigades, to which the numerous French cavalry and artillery were added. On this wing, as well as in the centre, a massive concentration of Austrian artillery would have been in order, but Francis Joseph preferred to let the 13 batteries of reserve artillery (104 guns) rest quietly in Valeggio, without firing a shot! This gives a simple explanation of the superiority of the French artillery fire; it was not due to the excellence of the rifled guns but to the feeble and helpless confusion in the head of the Austrian emperor, who did not bring his reserve guns into action at all.

But where were the Tenth and Eleventh Corps? While fighting was going on from Lake Garda to Guidizzolo, they were wandering around in the flat country far to the south; the Eleventh Corps is said to have seen some enemy troops in the distance, the Tenth did not even get that far; and when the battle had been decided, neither of them had had a chance of firing a shot, in fact they were still so far off that Canrobert, who was to have faced this flanking movement, of which the French were aware, was able to use all his troops but one division against the

* Piedmontese: Mollard division, Fanti division, Durando division, each with 2 brigades, and the Savoy brigades, all engaged. French: Guard: 4 brigades; First Corps, Baraguay: 6 brigades; Second Corps, MacMahon: 4 brigades; Third Corps, Canrobert: 4 brigades engaged, 2 in reserve; Fourth Corps, Niel: 6 brigades engaged. In all, 33 brigades engaged, 3 in reserve. All these figures are taken from the official communiqué of Napoleon the Little. Incidentally, our figures enumerate only the infantry.
main Austrian army and decide the battle on the Austrian left wing.

In the meantime, the Second Corps was holding a front at Mantua against an imaginary attack by Prince Plon-Plon, who on that day had himself and his army fêted in Parma, eight days' march from the field of battle!

This gives us a brilliant demonstration of what it means to have a German hereditary "war-lord" in command. Two corps (50,000 men) sent strolling about far from the battlefield, a third corps (20,000 men) facing up to empty space at Mantua, and 104 guns parked uselessly at Valeggio, that is, a good third part of all the fighting forces and the entire reserve and artillery purposely removed from the battlefield so that the remaining two-thirds may be crushed to no purpose by much superior forces—only a German sovereign can commit such brilliant lunacy!

The Austrian troops fought with such remarkable bravery that the Allies, who were half as strong again, could drive them back at two out of three points only with the utmost exertion, and that even this superiority in strength was not able to bring them into disarray or make any attempt at pursuit possible. How would the battle have turned out if the 70,000 men and 104 guns that Francis Joseph had frittered away had been in position as a reserve between Volta and Pozzolengo? Without a doubt, the French would have been beaten, and the campaign would have shifted back again from the Mincio and the Chiese to the Ticino. The Austrian troops were not defeated by the Allies but by the stupidity and pretentiousness of their own emperor. If an Austrian soldier on outpost duty is guilty of the slightest fault, he gets a cudgelling of 50 blows. The least thing that Francis Joseph can do to atone in some measure for his gross blunders and idiocies is to report to General Hess and get his well-earned 50 blows.

The war is now being waged in the quadrilateral of fortresses, and we begin to see the first effects of the fortresses on the manoeuvres on the Allies: They must divide. One detachment has stayed behind at Brescia to observe the Tyrolean passes. The French Fifth Corps (Plon-Plon) has taken up a position against Mantua at Goito and has been reinforced by one division. A large part of the Piedmontese army has been assigned to besiege Peschiera. Peschiera, which was formerly a small fortress, is said (see Revue des deux Mondes, April 1, 1859a) to have been converted

---

a J.-J. Baude, "L'Autriche et sa puissance militaire en Italie".—Ed.
since 1849 into an entrenched camp by a semicircle of detached forts; if this is true, the Piedmontese will have their work cut out for them, and all that is left for the “operations” against Verona, pompously announced by Louis Bonaparte, is the French army, weakened by a division and the losses at Solferino (25 brigades, hardly much more than 130,000 men). If Hess has really taken over the command by now, and, indeed, with unlimited powers, he will soon find opportunities to win isolated engagements and thereby prepare a greater victory. The three divisions of the Lyons army are coming to reinforce the French, together with a division of the Paris army, it is said, in all 50,000 to 60,000 men. The Austrians are getting the Sixth Corps from the South Tyrol and the Fourth from Trieste and in addition to that the fourth field battalions of the regiments stationed in Italy, that is, at least 54 battalions of seasoned soldiers, which would bring the total Austrian reinforcements to almost 100,000. In the last analysis, however, the main thing for the Austrians is to restore the balance on the field of battle not so much by adding fresh troops as by forming a unified and rational command, and the only way in which that can be brought about is by removing the incompetent Francis Joseph and giving full command to Hess.

Written on July 7, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 10, July 9, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
Karl Marx

ERFURTERY IN THE YEAR 1859

Reaction carries out the programme of the revolution. On this apparent contradiction rests the strength of Napoleonism, which still today considers itself the mandatory of the Revolution of 1789; the success of the Schwarzenberg policy in Austria, which brought the vague 1848 dream of unity into a clear, positive focus; and the phantom of parliamentary reform of the Confederation, which is now current in Little Germany owing to Prussian initiative and performs a burlesque dance of ghosts with Citizens Jacobus Venedey and Zais on the graves of the 1848 revolution. In the hands of reaction, to be sure, this programme of the revolution turns into a satire on the relevant revolutionary efforts, and thus becomes a lethal weapon in the hands of an implacable enemy. Reaction fulfils the demands of the revolution just as Louis Bonaparte fulfils those of the Italian national party. What is tragicomical in this process is that the poor sinners that are to be hanged there on their own phrases and stupidities cry “Bravo!” at the top of their voice as the executor puts the noose round their necks, and wildly applaud their own execution.

Just as in 1848 the well-known March demands, which had been drawn up by the party then called “revolutionary” and had been spread far and wide by very skilful organisation, made the rounds from Diet to Diet and from riot to riot, so today a “Declaration” is making a triumphal tour of Central and South Germany, apparently the regency’s mot d’ordre for the “popular movement” wanted for the purpose of armed mediation. This regency programme which bears the very characteristic name of

---

a Slogan.— Ed.
the "Nassau Declaration", since it was first adopted by the sponging fathers of the fatherland under the leadership of our old friend Herr Zais, proclaims:

"Austria should not be left alone in the present war, which may eventually threaten German interests. On the contrary, it is the duty of Germany" (its calling, Herr von Schleinitz would say) "to insist on reforms by Austria, including assurance of a state of affairs in Italy that meets the just demands of our time. The military and political leadership in the impending struggle must be turned over to Prussia. That leadership, however, would not yet (!) satisfy the lasting need of a strong federal government; a reorganisation of the central power in Germany on the one hand, and the creation of a constitution on the other, with German popular representation as its conclusion" (point, as Herr von Gagern used to put it), "cannot be withheld from the German people."b

This Nassau Declaration, also given the name of "Manifesto", has already been adopted by the constitutional and democratic notables of Darmstadt, Frankfurt, Württemberg—here signed by Reyscher, Schott, Vischer, Duvernoy, Ziegler, etc., in harmonious confusion—and is preached by the "liberal" press of Southwest Germany, Franconia and Thuringia, as the wonder-working gospel that will save Germany, extirpate the French Empire root and branch, give Herr Venedey his daily allowances back and provide Citizen Zais with political significance.

So that is the gist of the matterc; by using this kind of shabby trick, speculating on the utter mental retardation and senile childishness of the philistines of the Empire, the advocates of Prussia’s calling hope to conjure away from the Federal Diet the laurels of Bronzell313 so chivalrously won and so dearly paid for! We must admit that we have very little respect for advocates of Prussia’s calling who, instead of openly slapping the gentlemen of the Eschenheimer Gasse,314 as one would like to do and dare not, insult them by throwing Messrs. Schott, Zais and Reyscher in their faces from a safe distance. If the statecraft of Berlin knows no other way of “saving Germany” than buying second-handd the effects of the lamented Herr von Radowitz and his un lamented men of Gotha, then it can after all make peace at any price and submit unresistingly to the Franco-Russian dictatorship, since it

---

a Here Marx plays on the word nassauisch (of Nassau) which is of common derivation with the word Nassauer (sponger, lickspittle).—Ed.
b "Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger", Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 176, June 25, 1859.—Ed.
c Marx has “des Pudels Kern”, an expression from Goethe’s Faust, Erster Teil, “Studierzimmer”.—Ed.
d Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
has not the slightest conception of the seriousness of the struggle that has been initiated by the Italian freedom campaign.

The fact that there are still patriotic notables who find an adequate expression of their insignificance in a "Nassau declaration" and live in the comforting conviction that by means of a feeble echo of the 1848 Imperial Parliament they can call into being a popular movement strong enough to take up the struggle against the combined despotisms of Russia and France, only proves how right H. Heine is when he says:

"True madness is as rare as true wisdom." 

For the madness of the Nassau declarers is false through and through, lying and cowardly, a Harlequin mask that these gentlemen put on to give the appearance of being lunatics not responsible for their actions, because in fact they are ashamed of their pitiable helplessness and inaction, and hope to evade responsibility by appealing for public sympathy as imbeciles.

"Reorganised central power" with "popular representation"—a splendid weapon against raving Bonapartism and a Tsarism that has been driven to desperation and has to fight on German soil for an existence threatened in its own interior! I should have thought we had had enough of both in 1848 and 1849 to have realised that any popular movement is dead when it loses its revolutionary power to a constituent popular representative assembly.

Written about July 9, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 10, July 9, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---
a Heinrich Heine, Die Bäder von Lucca, Kapitel I.—Ed.
The Italian war is finished. Napoleon has ended it as suddenly and unexpectedly as the Austrians began it.\textsuperscript{315} Though brief, it has been costly. It has concentrated into a few weeks not only the exploits, the invasions and counterinvasions, the marches, the battles, the conquests and the losses, but also the expenditures, both in life and money, of many much longer wars. Some of the results of it are palpable enough. Austria has lost territory; her reputation for military prowess has been seriously damaged; her pride has been deeply wounded. But the lessons she has learned, if any, are, we apprehend, rather military than political, and any changes she may be led to make in consequence of this war, will be changes in drill, discipline and arms, rather than in her political system or her methods of administration. She may have been made a convert to the efficacy of rifled cannon. She may perhaps introduce into her service some imitation of the French Zouaves. This is much more likely than that she will essentially modify the government of what remains to her of her Italian provinces.

Austria has lost, too, at least for the present, that guardianship over Italy her persistence in which, in spite of the remonstrances and complaints of Sardinia, was made the occasion of the late war. But, though Austria has been obliged for the present to relinquish this office, the office itself does not appear to be vacant. It is a very significant fact that the new settlement of the affairs of Italy was decided at a short interview between the Emperors of France and Austria, both strangers, each at the head of an army of strangers, and that this settlement was made not only without the formality of even seeming to consult the parties who were the subjects of it, but without the knowledge on their part that they
were thus being bargained away and disposed of. Two armies from beyond the Alps meet and fight in the plains of Lombardy. After a six weeks' struggle, the foreign sovereigns of these foreign armies undertake to settle and arrange the affairs of Italy without taking a single Italian into their councils. The King of Sardinia, who in a military point of view had been placed on the level of a French general, seems to have had no more share or voice in the final arrangement than if he had been, in fact, merely a French general.

It was the ground of the complaints so loudly urged by Sardinia against Austria, not merely that she claimed a general superintendence of Italian affairs, but that she was the advocate of all existing abuses; that it was her policy to keep things as they were, interfering with the internal administration of her Italian neighbors, and claiming the right to suppress by force of arms any attempt on the part of the inhabitants of those countries to modify or improve their political condition. And what more respect is paid to Italian sentiment and wishes, or to that right of revolution of which Sardinia was the patron, under the new arrangement than under the old one? The Italian duchies south of the Po, though their proffered aid in the war was accepted, are, it would seem, under the treaty of peace to be handed back to their expelled princes. In no part of Italy has misgovernment been more complained of than in the States of the Church. The maladministration of those States and the countenance and support given by Austria to that maladministration, have been prominently set forth as one of the worst features, if not the very worst feature, in the late condition of Italian affairs. But, though Austria has been obliged to relinquish her armed protectorate of the States of the Church, the unfortunate inhabitants of those Territories have gained nothing by the change. France supports the temporal authority of the Holy See to full as great an extent as Austria ever did; and since the abuses of the Roman Government are regarded by the Italian patriots as inseparable from its sacerdotal character, there seems to be no hope of improvement. France, in the position which she now holds of sole protector of the Pope, makes herself in fact more responsible for the abuses of the Roman Government than Austria ever was.

With respect to the Italian Confederation which forms a part of the new arrangement, there is this to be observed: Either that Confederation will be a political reality possessing a certain degree

---

a The Papal States. See this volume, pp. 148 and 357.—Ed.
of power and influence, or else a mere sham. If it be the latter, Italian union, liberty, and development can gain nothing by it. If it be a reality, considering the elements of which it is composed, what can be expected from it? Austria (sitting in it for the Province or Kingdom of Venice), the Pope and the King of Naples, combined in the interests of despotism, will easily carry the day against Sardinia, even if the other smaller States should side with her. Austria may even avail herself of this new standing ground to secure a control over the other Italian States quite as objectionable, to say the least, as that which she lately claimed to exercise under special treaties with them.\footnote{a}
A few days ago, a case was heard before the Court of Queen's Bench, which we must recount in detail. Ernest Jones, who was condemned to two years solitary confinement in 1848 for his revolutionary activities and, having served his sentence, reorganised the Chartist Party with as much self-sacrifice as talent, as is known, conceived a plan in the autumn of 1857 to establish an alliance of the proletariat with the middle class. In order to put this idea into practice, he invited representatives of the bourgeoisie and of the workers to a joint conference, which took place nominally at the beginning of last year in St. Martin's Hall. But only nominally. From the Chartists no man of weight turned up, and as "representatives of the bourgeoisie", instead of Messrs. Cobden, Bright, and so on, who had scornfully refused, a couple of ambiguous characters attended, like Mr. Coningham, the communist-Urquhartist Palmerstonian, and a certain Mr. Ingram, who has since been convinced of common fraud. The so-called conference drew up a "Programme of Alliance" and preached a proletarian and bourgeois crusade against the aristocrats. In vain. The proletariat protested, the bourgeois realised that there was nothing to be won, and Ernest Jones soon saw himself abandoned by his friends, old and new. The readership of *The People's Paper* and *The London News*, the two Chartist papers which he published, dwindled from day to day, and finally Jones decided to sell these newspapers to Mr. Baxter Langley, manager of Bright's *Star* —at best a case of excessive haste, which was all the less excusable since *The People's Paper* was at the time the only official organ of the

*The Morning Star.—Ed.*
Chartist Party. As was to be expected, this step aroused great indignation among some of the Chartists. Ernest Jones was violently attacked, and Reynolds’s Newspaper, among others, carried a series of articles in which he was said to have sold himself to the Manchester School, to have exploited the workers politically and financially, to be a corrupt traitor, and so on and so forth. Thereupon Jones brought a defamation suit against Mr. Reynolds. Owing to various circumstances the lawsuit was drawn out and did not come up for hearing before the Queen’s Bench until last Saturday. The plaintiff demonstrated most convincingly that by fighting for the Chartist principles he had ruined himself from the bourgeoisie’s point of view, that he had never received money for himself from the Chartists and that he had not been bribed by the bourgeoisie, but on the contrary had been cheated by them in respect of the selling price of The People’s Paper. Mr. Reynolds, who could furnish no proofs, solemnly retracted the accusations and was fined forty shillings for form’s sake, but at the same time—and this is no trifling matter—was ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings, which amounted to several hundred pounds sterling.

Ernest Jones has saved his personal honour, but he has not had his political honour restored to him by the verdict of the Queen’s Bench. He has already paid dearly for his ill-advised attempt at mediation, but the proletariat can never forgive mistakes.

Written on July 15, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 11, July 16, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
It seems from the intelligence received by the *Europa*, that the Italian Confederation announced by Napoleon III as one of the bases of his Peace with Francis Joseph, is a thing of most vague and precarious proportions. So far, it is simply a notion to which Austria has consented, but which has still to be submitted to the Italian Governments. It does not appear that even Sardinia, whose King, by the way, was apparently not consulted in the conclusion of the Peace, has agreed to join it, though he must of course do as he is told; while there is a rumor that the Pope, the proposed honorary head of the Federation, has written to Louis Napoleon that he shall seek the protection of the Catholic Powers—rather a doubtful refuge just at this moment, when it is against France that he wants to be protected.\(^a\) As for the lately banished Monarchs of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, it appears that they are to be restored to their thrones; and, under such circumstances, they will no doubt be ready to join any Confederation that may be dictated to them. But of the King of Naples,\(^b\) now the only independent sovereign in Italy, we hear nothing whatever; and it is not impossible that he may refuse outright. Thus, it is yet a question whether there will be any Federation at all, and still more a question what will be its nature, should it succeed in getting itself formed.

An important fact, now first made certain, is that Austria retains

---

\(^a\) Pius IX's Encyclical Letter of June 18 to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops in Communion with the Holy See, *The Times*, No. 23352, July 7, 1859.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) Francis II.— *Ed.*
all four of the great fortresses, the Mincio being made the western boundary of her territories. Thus she still holds the keys of Northern Italy, and can take advantage of any favorable emergency to regain what she has now had to abandon. This fact alone shows how utterly unfounded is Napoleon's pretense that he has virtually accomplished his purpose of driving Austria out of Italy. Indeed, it is not too much to say that if he has beaten Austria in the war, she has decidedly beaten him in concluding the peace. She has resigned simply what had been conquered from her, nothing more. France, at an expense of some hundred millions of dollars and the lives of some fifty thousand of her sons, has gained the control of Sardinia, much glory for her soldiers, and the renown of a very lucky and moderately successful General for her Emperor. For him it is much; for France, which has borne all the expense and suffered all the losses, it is little; and it is not surprising that there should be discontent in Paris.

The reason alleged by Napoleon for thus suddenly concluding the war is that it was assuming proportions incompatible with the interests of France. In other words, it was tending to become a revolutionary war, with an insurrection at Rome, and a rising in Hungary among its features. It is a curious fact that, just before the battle of Solferino, this same Napoleon actually urged Kossuth, who, at his invitation, had come to see him in the camp, to undertake a revolutionary diversion in favor of the Allies. Before that battle, then, he did not dread the dangers that terrified him immediately afterward. That circumstances alter cases is not a novel observation; but it is applicable in the present instance. However, it is needless to multiply evidence to prove that this man is as purely selfish as he is unscrupulous; and that, after having shed the blood of fifty thousand men to gratify his personal ambition, he is ready to forswear and abandon even the hypocrisy of every principle in the name of which he led them to the slaughter.

One of the first results of the present settlement, is the downfall of the Cavour ministry, which has had to quit office in Sardinia. Though one of the cleverest men in Italy, and not at all concerned in making the peace, Count Cavour could not stand before the public indignation and disappointment. It will probably be long before he rises to power again. And it will be long before Louis Napoleon can again delude even the sentimentals and enthusiasts into regarding him as a champion of Freedom. The

---

a Peschiera, Mantua, Verona and Legnago.—Ed.
Italians will now hate him worse than all other representatives of tyranny and of treachery; and we need not be surprised if the knives of Italian assassins should again seek the life of the man, who, promising and pretending to be the conqueror of Italian independence, has left Austria seated almost as firmly as ever on the neck of Italy.

Written on July 15, 1859
First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5698, July 28, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1479, July 29, 1859

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
TO THE "MEMOIR ON RUSSIA,
FOR THE INSTRUCTION
OF THE PRESENT EMPEROR"

Just after the settlement of the Regency question in Prussia, and
the dismissal of Manteuffel's ministry, his successors in office
discovered, among other official papers, a most curious "Memoir
on Russia," an extract of which, despite all precautions taken,
found its way into the hands of some outsiders who consider the
present moment opportune for the publication of such a State
paper.

All the passages literally quoted from the original are indicated
by quotation marks. Passing over the general considerations on
Russian history, with which the document opens, we begin with
what relates to the time of Peter the Great.⁴

Written on July 14, 1859
Reproduced from the New-York
Daily Tribune

First published in *Das Volk*, No. 12,
July 23, 1859; reprinted in the New-York
*Daily Tribune*, No. 5703, August 3, 1859

⁴ In *Das Volk* Marx introduced the text of the document with the following
lines: "Under this heading the Urquhartist Free Press publishes a document of so
great importance for Prussia and Germany that we reprint it in full. In one of our
next issues we shall deal with the secret strings of the drama whose stage player is
Bonaparte, but whose manager is Russia. For the present we let The Free Press
speak." — Ed.
If the war got up by Louis Napoleon on the false pretense of liberating Italy, gave rise to a general confusion of ideas, a shifting of positions, and a prostitution of men and things without parallel in the history of Europe, the peace of Villafranca has broken the fatal spell. Whatever may have been said of Louis Napoleon's astuteness, that peace has destroyed his prestige, and even alienated from him the French people and the French army, whom it was his chief purpose to attach to his dynasty. When he tells that army that he made peace from fear, both of Prussia and the Austrian quadrangle, he tells them what can only awaken disgust in their hearts. And when he tells that people, every one of whom is born a revolutionary, that he was checked in his victorious career only by the fact that the next step in advance must have been taken with Revolution as his ally, he may be sure that they will regard him with far greater distrust and aversion than the bugbear with which he seeks to terrify them. In all the Europe of to-day, there is no other such failure as Louis Bonaparte with his Italian war. The humbug exploded at Villafranca. The speculators of the Stock Exchange exult at it, the chopfallen demagogues stand aghast, the betrayed Italians tremble with rage, the "mediating powers" cut sorry figures, the British and American believers in Louis Bonaparte's democratic mission hide their shame in unmeaning protests and ingenious explanations; but those who dared to oppose a deluge of self-delusion, at the peril

---

a "Préliminaires de paix convenus entre l'Autriche et la France, à Villafranca le 11 juillet 1859." — Ed.
even of being accused of Austrian sympathies, are now proved to have been alone in the right.

Consider first the manner in which the treaty was concluded. The two Emperors meet; Francis Joseph surrenders Lombardy to Bonaparte, who makes a present of it to Victor Emmanuel, who, in his turn, although the apparent principal in the war, is not even admitted to the conference which settles the peace. The idea of consulting, even for appearance sake, the voice of the human chattels thus bartered away, is sneered at by the two contractors. Francis Joseph disposes of his property; so does Napoleon III. If the transfer of an estate had been in question, the presence of a law officer, and the fulfillment of some legal formalities, would have been indispensable. No such thing in the transfer of three millions of men. Not even the assent of Victor Emmanuel, the individual upon whom the property was finally settled, is asked for. Such humiliation was too much for a Minister, and Cavour resigned. A King, of course, may say of a country annexed what the Roman Emperor said of money raised: *Non olet.* There is about it, perhaps, no smell of injury for him.

This, we suppose, is what is called in the vocabulary of the *Idées Napoléoniennes,* the "restoration of nationalities." The Congress of Vienna itself, if its transactions be compared with the Villafranca job, may well be suspected of revolutionary principles and popular sympathies. Italian nationality is to be inaugurated by the studied insult of a convention which declares in broad characters, that Italy had no part in the war against Austria, and, by a necessary consequence, has no voice to utter in settling the peace with Austria. Garibaldi, with his bold mountaineers; the insurrections of Tuscany, Parma, Modena, and the Romagna; Victor Emmanuel himself with his country invaded, his finances dilapidated, and his army decimated; all this counts for nothing. There was a war between a Hapsburg and a Bonaparte. There was no Italian war. Victor Emmanuel cannot lay claim even to the honors of a subaltern ally. He was no party to the struggle; he was only an instrument, and is, therefore, excluded from those rights which, according to the law of nations, accrue to every co-belligerent, however diminutive. He falls short of the honors granted to the German mediatized princes at the peace of 1815. A modest poor

---

*a* Does not smell (the words said by the Roman Emperor Vespasian in connection with the tax on public conveniences).—*Ed.*

*b* Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, *Des idées napoléoniennes*, Chapitre IV, Question étrangère.—*Ed.*
relative, let him devour in silence the crumbs dropped from the table of his rich and powerful cousin.

If we come now to the contents—we mean the official contents—of the treaty of Villafranca, we shall find them quite in keeping with the method of its settlement. Lombardy is to be ceded to Piedmont, but the identical offer, in terms more favorable, and not clogged by drawbacks, Austria had proposed to Charles Albert and Lord Palmerston in 1848. At that time no foreign Power had sequestrated the Italian movement. The cession was to be made to Sardinia, not to France; Venice, too, was to be severed from the Austrian territories and to be constituted into an independent Italian State—not with the Austrian Emperor, but with an Austrian Archduke at its head. These conditions were then scornfully rejected by the magnanimous Palmerston, who stigmatized them as too lame a conclusion for the Italian war for independence. The same Lombardy is now given as a French gift to the Savoy dynasty, while Venice, with the quadrangle of fortresses, those on the Mincio included, is to remain in the clutch of Austria.

The independence of Italy is thus converted into the dependence of Lombardy on Piedmont and the dependence of Piedmont on France. While Austria's pride may be humiliated by the cession of Lombardy, her real power is rather strengthened by this evacuation of a territory which absorbed part of her military forces without being defensible against foreign invasion and without paying the costs of their maintenance. The resources vainly spent in Lombardy may now be turned to good account elsewhere. What Austria keeps is the domineering military position from which, on any favorable occasion, she may pounce on her weak neighbor, who has in fact only gained an increase of weakness—an exposed frontier with turbulent, disaffected and jealous subjects—while he has lost even the pretext of representing the rights of Italy. He has struck a dynastic bargain, but he has resigned his national mission. From an independent State, Sardinia has dwindled down to a State on sufferance which, to hold its own against its foe in the East, must cringe before its Protector in the West.

But this is not all. By the terms of the treaty Italy, after the pattern of the German Confederation, is to be constituted into an Italian Confederation, under the honorary presidency of the Pope. There now seems to be some difficulty in realizing this

---

\(^a\) Pius IX.—Ed.
The Treaty of Villafranca

Napoleonic Idea, and we have yet to learn how Napoleon III will deal with the hindrances that are rising in the way of his hobby. For, whatever be the event, there is no doubt that such a Confederacy, with the Pope at its head, is his hobby. But the overthrow of the papal power at Rome has always been considered as the conditio sine qua of Italian emancipation. Machiavelli, in his history of Florence,\(^a\) long ago, traced in the papal dominion the source of Italian degradation. Now, in the purpose of Louis Napoleon, instead of the Romagna being freed, the whole of Italy is to be subjected to the nominal sway of the Pope. In fact, if the Confederacy should ever be organized, the papal tiara will be but the emblem of Austrian domination. What did Austria aim at by her private treaties with Naples, Rome, Tuscany, Parma, Modena? At a confederation of Italian princes under Austrian leadership. The treaty of Villafranca with the Italian Confederation, in which the Pope, Austria, and the restored Dukes—if, indeed, they can get restored—will form one party, and Piedmont the other, exceeds the boldest hopes of Austria. She has desired, since 1815, to form a Confederacy of Italian Princes against Piedmont. She may now subject Piedmont itself. She may extinguish the vital principle of that little State in a Confederacy of which the Pope, who has excommunicated Sardinia,\(^b\) will be nominal head, and of which Sardinia’s unforgiving enemy will be the real leader. It is, therefore, not Italy that has been emancipated, but Piedmont that has been crushed. Face to face with Austria, Piedmont is set to play the part of Prussia, but without the resources that have enabled the latter State to paralyze her rival in the German Diet. France, on her part, may flatter herself with having assumed toward Italy the position which Russia holds with regard to the German Confederation, but, then, the Russian influence in Germany is based upon the balance of power between the Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns. The only way in which Piedmont can restore her prestige is clearly traced for her by her protector. In his proclamation to his soldiers, Louis Napoleon says:

“"The union of Lombardy with Piedmont creates for us (the Bonaparte family) a powerful ally who will owe to us its independence;"\(^b\)

thus declaring that independent Piedmont has given place to a Napoleonic satrapy. To extricate himself from this degrading

\(^a\) N. Machiavelli, Istorie fiorentine, Libro I, IX.— Ed.
position, Victor Emmanuel is without resources. He can only appeal to Italy, of which he has betrayed the confidence, or to Austria, with whose spoils he has been fed. Very possibly, however, an Italian Revolution may intervene to change the aspect of the whole peninsula, and to bring Mazzini and the Republicans once more upon the scene.

Written on July 19, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
Frederick Engels

THE ITALIAN WAR
Retrospect

I

The secret general\(^a\) has ordered his Guard back to Paris in great haste to make his triumphal entry at its head and then have his victorious troops parade before him on the Place du Carrousel. In the meantime, let us make another review of the main events of the war in order to clarify the real merits of the ape Napoleon.\(^{324}\)

On April 19 Count Buol committed the childish indiscretion of informing the English ambassador\(^b\) that on April 23 he would give the Piedmontese a three-days' ultimatum, at the expiry of which he would begin war and give the order to march in. Buol knew, to be sure, that Malmesbury was no Palmerston, but he forgot that the time for the general elections was approaching, that the narrow-minded Tories, fearful that they might be shouted down as "Austrians", actually became Bonapartists against their will. On the 20th the English government hastened to communicate this information to Mr. Bonaparte, and the concentration of French troops began at once\(^c\) and orders were given to form the fourth battalions of reserves. On the 23rd the Austrians did issue the ultimatum\(^d\)—on the eve of the English elections. Derby and Malmesbury hastened to label this action a "crime", against which they protested with the greatest energy. Bonaparte had his troops cross the Piedmontese border even before the ultimatum

\(^a\) Napoleon III.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^b\) Lord Augustus Loftus.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^c\) "Copie d'une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859", \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung}, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^d\) Lord Derby's speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859, \textit{The Times}, No. 23290, April 26, 1859 ("Lord Derby at the Mansion-House").—\textit{Ed.}
expired; on April 26 the French entered Savoy and Genoa. But the Austrians, restrained by the protests and threats of the Tory government, conceded two days more and marched into Piedmont only on the 29th, instead of on the 27th.

In this way the secret general was aware of the Austrians' plan a full nine days before they marched in and was able, because of the treachery of the English ministry, to arrive on the scene three days earlier than the Austrians. But the secret general had confederates not only in the English ministry but also in the Austrian army command. Everyone expected, and justifiably, that Hess would take over the supreme command of the army in Italy. Instead, the command was given to Gyulay, who had never confronted the enemy in 1848 and 1849—a totally incapable mind, with no understanding or will-power, this Gyulay. Hess is of middle-class origin and far from friendly to the reactionary pro-Jesuit clique of nobles that makes up Francis Joseph's camarilla. The Grünne-Thun-Bach triumvirate incited the feeble Francis Joseph, who had worked out with Grünne a strange operational plan, which Hess had sharply criticised, against the old strategist; and so the blue-blooded dunce Gyulay remained commander-in-chief and his plan of operations—invasion of Piedmont—was adopted. Hess had recommended remaining strictly on the defensive and avoiding any battle until the Mincio was reached. The Austrian army, held moreover up by torrential rains, first appeared on the Po and Sesia on May 3 or 4 and by then it was of course too late to venture a coup against Turin or one of the Piedmontese fortresses. The French were massed on the Upper Po; this gave the incompetent Gyulay a welcome excuse for inaction. In order to prove his helplessness beyond doubt, he undertook the reconnaissance in force of Montebello. The ensuing battle was fought with honour by thirteen Austrian battalions against sixteen French battalions until the second and third divisions of Baraguay d'Hilliers' corps appeared on the field, at which the Austrians, who had achieved their purpose, withdrew. But since this reconnaissance was not followed up in any way by the Austrians, it is obvious that the whole expedition could just as well have been omitted.

The secret general, meanwhile, had to wait for his supplies and his cavalry, and probably spent the time studying his favourite Bülow. Being fully informed as to the positions and strength of the Austrians, the French could easily draw up a plan of attack. There are in general only three ways to attack: either frontally for a breakthrough in the centre, or by turning the right or left flank.
The secret general decided to turn the right flank of the enemy. The Austrians were deployed on a long line from Biella to Pavia, after they had foraged the entire region between the Sesia and the Dora Baltea without hindrance. On May 21 the Piedmontese attacked the Sesia line and for several days fought minor engagements between Casale and Vercelli, while Garibaldi slipped by along Lago Maggiore with his Alpine riflemen, raised an insurrection in the Varesotto and advanced to the Comasco and Brianza. Gyulay’s troops remained scattered, and he even sent one of his six army corps (the Ninth) to the south bank of the Po. On May 29 the preparations had finally reached the point where the attack could begin. The actions at Palestro and Vinzaglio, in which the major part of the Piedmontese army was engaged against part of the Seventh Army Corps (Zobel), opened the road to the Allies to Novara, which Gyulay yielded without resistance. The Piedmontese, the French Second, Third and Fourth Corps and the Guard were dispatched there at once; the First Corps followed. The turning of the Austrian right flank was completed; the direct road to Milan was open.

This however put the armies into precisely the situation in which Radetzky won the victory of Novara in 1849. The Allies rolled on towards the Ticino in long columns on a small number of parallel roads. Their advance could only be slow. Gyulay had five army corps to work with, even deducting the dispersed Ninth Corps. As soon as the attack of the Piedmontese became serious, as it did on May 29 and 30, Gyulay had to concentrate his troops. Where exactly this took place did not really matter; one cannot march past 140,000-150,000 men in a concentrated position; moreover, it was essential not to make a passive defence but to strike an a tempo blow at the enemy. If Gyulay had massed between Mortara, Garlasco and Vigevano on May 31 and June 1, he could for one thing have fallen on the flank of the move to turn his own right wing at Novara, cut the enemy’s marching columns in two, drive some of them back to the Alps and take possession of the road to Turin. If, on the other hand, the enemy had crossed the Po below Pavia, Gyulay would still have been able to arrive in time to block their road to Milan.

Actually, concentration was begun. But before it was carried to completion, Gyulay was confused by the occupation of Novara. The enemy was closer to Milan than he was! In reality, that was just what was wanted; the moment for the a tempo blow had come;

a Timely.— Ed.
the enemy would have to fight in the most unfavourable conditions. But Gyulay, whatever his personal bravery, was a moral coward. Instead of going forward quickly, he drew back in order to bring his army in an arc around the enemy in forced marches and again block their direct road to Milan at Magenta. The troops were set in motion on June 2 and the headquarters shifted to Rosate in Lombardy. Master of Ordnance Hess came there at 5:30 on the morning of June 3. He took Gyulay to task for the unpardonable blunder and had all the troops called to a halt at once, since he considered it still possible to strike the blow in the direction of Novara. Two entire army corps, the Second and the Seventh, were already on Lombard soil, having marched from Vigevano to Abbiategrasso. The Third Corps had received the order to halt right on the bridge at Vigevano; it marched back and took up a position on the Piedmontese bank. The Eighth went via Bereguardo, the Fifth via Pavia. The Ninth was still far off and quite out of reach.

When Hess had exact information on the distribution of the troops, he found that it was too late to be able to count on success in the Novara direction; now only the Magenta direction remained. At 10 a.m. orders went out to the columns to continue their march on Magenta.

Gyulay blames the loss of the battle of Magenta on this interference by Hess and the loss of 4½ hours as a result of halting the columns. How groundless this excuse is can be seen from the following: The bridge at Vigevano is ten English miles from Magenta—a short day’s march. The Second and Seventh Corps were already in Lombardy when the order to halt came. They could therefore have had at most 7 to 8 miles to march, by and large. For all that, only one division of the Seventh Corps got to Corbetta and three brigades of the Second Corps to Magenta. The second division of the Seventh Corps did not get beyond Castelletto near Abbiategrasso on the 3rd; and the Third Corps, which received the order to set out from the bridge at Vigevano not later than 11 a.m., and so had a good part of the day still before it, does not appear even to have made the 5 or 6 English miles to Abbiategrasso, since it came into battle only about 4 p.m. on the following day near Robecco (5 miles from Abbiategrasso). The columns must have been held up on the roads, slowing down the march because of faulty arrangements. If a corps takes 24 hours and more to cover 8 to 10 miles, 4 or 5 hours more cannot be considered as decisive. The Eighth Corps, which had been sent via Bereguardo and Binasco, had to go such a roundabout way
that it could not have arrived on the battle-field in time even using the $4^{1/2}$ lost hours. The Fifth Corps, coming up from Pavia in two real forced marches, was able to join battle with one brigade on the evening of June 4.\textsuperscript{325} What it lost in time, it won in intensity of movement. Accordingly, the attempt to blame the scattering of the army on Hess falls to the ground altogether.

Strategically, therefore, the initial steps towards the victory of Magenta were, in the first place, a positive error made by Louis Bonaparte himself by executing a flanking march in the enemy's zone, and secondly an error by Gyulay, who instead of concentrating and falling on the long marching columns dispersed his army entirely by a countermarch and withdrawal, wretchedly planned at that, and brought his troops into battle tired and hungry. This was the first phase of the war. On the second phase in our next number.
II

We left our real secret Napoleon on the battle-field of Magenta. Gyulay had done him the greatest favour a general can do his opponent; he had brought his forces up so splintered that he was in the most decided minority at every moment of the battle, and even by evening did not have the troops on hand. The First and Second Corps pulled back towards Milan, the Eighth came from Binasco, the Fifth from Abiategrasso, the Ninth was out on a stroll far down on the Po. Here was a situation for a general; here was the chance to use the many fresh troops who had arrived during the night to penetrate between the isolated Austrian columns, to win a genuine victory and force whole units to lay down their arms with their flags and artillery! That was how the vulgar Napoleon acted at Montenotte and Millesimo, at Abensberg and Regensburg. But not the “higher” Napoleon. He is far above such crude empiricism. He knows from his Bülow that eccentric retreat is the most advantageous. And so he appreciated Gyulay’s masterly retreat arrangements to the full, and instead of riding roughshod over him he telegraphed to Paris: The army is resting and reorganising. He was sure that the world would not be so impolite as to regard his amateurish Magenta exercise as anything but a “great victory”!

Friend Gyulay, who had already made one trial, with such great success, of the manœuvre of marching round the enemy in an arc—Friend Gyulay performed this experiment once again, and this time on a large scale. He had his army march first southeast

---

to the Po, then along the Po in three columns on three parallel roads until opposite Piadena on the Oglio, then north again to Castiglione. He was not in any hurry at all about it. The distance he had to march to Castiglione came to something like 120 English miles, that is, 10 very comfortable or 8 good days' march. He could have been in position at Castiglione on the 14th, or on the 15th at the latest; but it was not until the 19th that there was any important part of the army on the heights south of Lake Garda. However, trust breeds trust. If the Austrians marched slowly, the higher Napoleon proved that he was superior to them in this as well. The vulgar Napoleon would have held it his most urgent task to have his troops advance by forced marches on the shorter, direct route to Castiglione, which amounts to hardly 100 English miles, in order to reach the position south of Lake Garda and on the Mincio before the Austrians and attack the Austrian marching columns on the flank again if possible. Not so the improved Napoleon. "Ever slowly onward"\(^a\) is his motto. It took him from the 5th to the 22nd to concentrate his troops on the Chiese. Seventeen days for 100 miles, or two short hours a day!

These were the colossal hardships that the French columns had to endure and which inspired the English newspaper correspondents with such admiration for the stamina and imperturbable good humour of the *pioupiou*.\(^b\) Only once was there an attempt at a rearguard action. The object was to drive an Austrian division (Berger) out of Melegnano. One brigade held the city; the other was already behind the Lambro to cover the retreat of the first and hardly got into the fighting. Now our secret general showed that he knew Napoleonic strategy too when it came down to it: Masses at the decisive point! Accordingly he sent two entire army corps, ten brigades, against this one brigade; the Austrian brigade (Roden), attacked by six brigades, held out for three or four hours and withdrew unpursued over the Lambro only after it had lost more than a third of its men; the presence of the second brigade (Boér) was enough to hold up the colossal superior numbers of the French. We see that the war was waged by the French with the utmost courtesy.

In Castiglione another hero came on the stage: Francis Joseph of Austria. Two worthy opponents! The first one has let it be

---

\(^a\) "Nur immer langsam voran"—the refrain of a German folk song, "Die Krähwinkler Landwehr" (the "Krähwinkler Landwehr" is the German equivalent of the Gotham Militia).—*Ed.*

\(^b\) Nickname for the French infantrymen.—*Ed.*
known everywhere that he is the most cunning fellow of all times; the other takes pleasure in proclaiming himself as chivalrous. The first one cannot but be the greatest general of his century, because it is his vocation to travesty the original Napoleon—for he has taken his original drinking cup and other relics into the field with him; the other is bound to secure victory for his banners, being the born "supreme war-lord" of his army. The epigone system that has been widespread in the intervals between the revolutions of the nineteenth century could not have more suitable representatives on the field of battle.

Francis Joseph opened his career as generalissimo by first having his troops take up a position south of Lake Garda and then pulling them back at once behind the Mincio; he had hardly got them behind the Mincio before he sent them out on the offensive again. Such a manoeuvre could not but surprise even an improved Napoleon, as his bulletin is gracious enough to admit openly. Since he happened to be on the march to the Mincio himself with his army on the same day, there was a collision between the two armies, the battle of Solferino. We shall not go into the details of this battle again, since we have presented them in a previous issue of this paper; and especially so because the official Austrian communiqué is intentionally couched in very vague terms, in order to cover up the strange blunders of the hereditary war-lord. This much emerges from it without any doubt, that the loss of the battle was due primarily to Francis Joseph and his camarilla. In the first place, Hess was purposefully and intentionally kept in the background. Secondly, Francis Joseph thrust himself into Hess' place. Thirdly, a mass of incompetent people, some of them even of dubious courage, were left in important commands through the influence of the camarilla. All these factors, even if we disregard the original plan, produced such confusion on the day of battle that control, interlocking of movements, order and sequence of manoeuvre, were quite out of the question. In the centre, in particular, hopeless confusion seems to have reigned. The three army corps in position there (First, Fifth and Seventh) performed such contradictory and disconnected movements and were always so lost to one another at the

---


b See this volume, pp. 400-03.—*Ed.*

moment of decision, while always in each other's way at other times, that the only thing that emerges from the Austrian report, but this with certainty, is the following: The battle was lost not so much because of numerical weakness as because of disgracefully poor leadership. One corps never supported the other at the right time; the reserves were everywhere except where they were needed; and so Solferino, San Cassiano, Cavriana fell, one after the other, whereas if they had been persistently and skillfully defended all three together, they would have constituted an impregnable position. But Solferino, the decisive point, was abandoned as early as two o'clock, and with Solferino, the battle; Solferino fell to concentric attack, which only offensive blows could ward off, but those blows were precisely what was lacking; and after Solferino the other villages fell, likewise to concentric attacks, which encountered but scanty passive defence. And yet there were still fresh troops on hand, for the Austrian casualty lists show that of 25 regiments of the line engaged eight (Rossbach, Archduke Joseph, Hartmann, Mecklenburg, Hess, Grüber, Wernhardt, Wimpffen), or one-third, lost less than 200 men per regiment, and so were engaged only insignificantly! Three of them, and likewise the Gradiskaner border regiment, did not lose 100 men per regiment, and of the riflemen most of the battalions (five) lost less than 70 men per battalion. Since the right wing (Benedek, Eighth Corps) was faced by greatly superior forces and had fully to engage all its troops, all these lightly engaged regiments and battalions belong to the centre and the left wing, and a good part must have been in the centre. This proves how wretched the leadership was there. Incidentally, the matter is very easily explained: Francis Joseph was there in person with his official camarilla, so that everything was bound to be confused and disorganised there. The 13 batteries of reserve artillery did not fire a single shot! A similar absence of leadership seems to have prevailed on the left wing. Here it was particularly the cavalry, commanded by old women, which did not come into action. Wherever an Austrian cavalry regiment appeared, the French cavalry wheeled about, but out of eight regiments only a single regiment of hussars made a regular charge and two regiments of dragoons and one uhlans regiment made lighter attacks. The Prussia hussars lost 110, the two dragoon regiments together 96 men; the losses of the Sicily uhlan are not known; the remaining four regiments lost only 23 men all together! The artillery lost only 180 men in all.

These figures prove, better than anything else, the uncertainty
and indecision with which the Austrian generals, from the emperor down to the corps commanders, led the troops against the enemy. If in addition we consider the numerical superiority of the French and the moral boost they got from their previous successes, we can see that the Austrians could not win. Only one corps leader, Benedek, was not cowed; he held the right wing all by himself and Francis Joseph did not have the time to interfere. The result was that he gave the Piedmontese a proper beating, despite their twofold superiority in numbers.

The higher Napoleon was no longer such a novice in warfare as Francis Joseph. He had won his spurs at Magenta and knew from experience how he should behave on the field of battle. He left it to old Vaillant to calculate the length of front to occupy, from which the distribution of the several corps follows automatically, and then he left it to the corps commanders to go ahead from there, since he could be fairly confident that they knew how to lead their corps. As for himself, he betook himself to the spots at which he would show up best in next Saturday's Paris Illustration and from there issued very melodramatic but also very indifferent orders concerning details.
Long ago there was a Russian painter at the academy in Düsseldorf, who later was relegated to Siberia for lack of talent and laziness. The poor devil was enthusiastic over his Emperor Nicholas and would say ecstatically: "Emperor very great! Emperor can everything! Emperor can paint too! But Emperor have no time to paint; Emperor buy landscapes and then paint soldiers in. Emperor very great! God is great but Emperor is still young!"

The higher Napoleon has this in common with Nicholas, that he believes the landscapes are there only to have soldiers painted into them. But as he does not even have the time to paint the soldiers in, he contents himself with sitting for the paintings. *Il pose.* Magenta, Solferino and all of Italy are only the accessories, only the pretext to get his interesting figure on this occasion in a melodramatic posture into the *Illustration* and the *Illustrated London News* again. Since this can be done with a little money, he has succeeded in this too. He told the Milanese:

"If there are people who do not understand their century" (the century of advertisement and humbug) "I am not one of those people."b

The old Napoleon was great, and the improved Napoleon is no longer young!

This latest realisation, that he is no longer young, put the thought into his mind that it was about time to make peace. He had now got as far as one can get with mere *succès d’estime.*c "In

---

a He poses.—*Ed.*  
b Napoleon III, "Proclamation [Milan, le 8 juin 1859]", *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 163, June 12, 1859.—*Ed.*  
c Success due to the sympathy of friends.—*Ed.*
four engagements and two battles," with a loss of over 50,000 men in action alone, not counting the sick, he had conquered the foreland up to the Austrian fortresses—the region that Austria itself, by the very location of its fortifications, had proclaimed to all the world was not to be defended earnestly against superior strength and that had been defended on this occasion only in order to vex Marshal Hess. The *via sacra*, along which the higher Napoleon had led his army thus far with such classic calm and such dubious success, was suddenly completely blocked. Beyond lay the promised land, which was not to be seen by today's "Army of Italy" but perhaps only by their grandsons—and perhaps not by them either. Rivoli and Arcole were not on the programme. Verona and Mantua were about to have a say, and the only fortress into which the higher Napoleon has yet entered with a military escort is the castle of Ham—and he was glad enough to get out of it again without the honours of war. Moreover, the stage effects came out *pauvre* enough: he did have *grandes batailles* but not even the telegraph wire believed the *grandes victoires*. A war for entrenched camps, against old Hess, a war with shifting success and decreasing chances, a war that called for serious work, a *real war*, that was no war for the Napoleon of the Porte Saint-Martin and Astley's Amphitheatre. There was the additional factor that one step further would have led to a war on the Rhine and that would have brought about complications which would have immediately put an end to the heroic grimaces and melodramatic *poses plastiques*. But the higher Napoleon does not let himself get involved in such matters—he made peace and swallowed his programme.

When the war began, our higher Napoleon at once brought up the Italian campaigns of the vulgar Napoleon, the *via sacra* of Montenotte, Dego, Millesimo, Montebello, Marengo, Lodi, Castiglione, Rivoli and Arcole. Let us compare the copy with the original a bit. The vulgar Napoleon took over the command of 30,000

---

*a* Napoleon III’s speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the *Corps législatif* in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—*Ed.*

*b* Poor.—*Ed.*

*c* Great battles.—*Ed.*

*d* Great victories.—*Ed.*

*e* Artificial poses.—*Ed.*

half-starved, barefoot, ragged soldiers at a time when France, financially ruined, unable to take out loans, had to maintain not only two armies in the Alps but also two armies in Germany. He did not have Sardinia and the other countries of Italy for him but against him. The army opposing him was superior to his in numbers and organisation. Nonetheless, he attacked, beat the Austrians and Piedmontese in six blows in rapid succession, in each of which he managed to have superior numbers on his side, forced Piedmont to make peace, crossed the Po, made a forced crossing of the Adda at Lodi and laid siege to Mantua. He defeated the first relief army of the Austrians at Lonato and Castiglione and, by means of bold manoeuvres, forced them in their second advance to take refuge in Mantua. He stopped the second relief army at Arcole and held it in check for two months until it received reinforcements and went forward again, only to be beaten at Rivoli. Thereafter he forced Mantua to surrender and the princes of Southern Italy to make peace, and pressed on over the Julian Alps to the foot of the Semmering, where he won the peace.

Such was the vulgar Napoleon. And what of the higher? He comes into a better and stronger army than France has ever had, and a financial situation that at least allows meeting the costs of the war easily by loans. He has six months time of complete peace in which to prepare for his campaign. He has on his side Sardinia, with strong fortresses and a large excellent army; he keeps Rome occupied; Central Italy is only waiting for a signal from him to rise and join him. His base of operations is not in the Maritime Alps but on the middle Po, at Alessandria and Casale. Where his predecessor had bridle-paths, he has railways. And what does he do? He throws five strong army corps into Italy, so strong that, combined with the Sardinians, he is always significantly stronger in numbers than the Austrians, so much stronger that he can detach the Sixth Corps to the tourist army of his cousin for a military jaunt. Despite all the railways, he takes a full month to concentrate his troops. Finally he moves. Gyulay's incapacity makes him a present of the undecided battle of Magenta, which is converted into a victory by the fortuitous strategic situation of the two armies after the battle—a situation for which by no means the higher Napoleon but Gyulay alone is responsible. In gratitude, he lets the Austrians escape, instead of pursuing them. At Solferino, Francis Joseph almost compels him to win; nonetheless, the result is hardly

---

a Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte.—Ed.
better than at Magenta. Now a situation is taking shape in which the vulgar Napoleon would just have begun to develop his resources; the war is being waged in a region where there is something more real to do, and is assuming dimensions from which a great ambition derives its advantage. Arrived at the point at which the via sacra of the vulgar Napoleon first begins, first opens a grand perspective, at that point—*the higher Napoleon sues for peace!*

Written on July 20 and 28 and about August 3, 1859

First published in *Das Volk*, Nos. 12, 13 and 14, July 23, 30 and August 6, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
Clausewitz remarks somewhere in his work on the Italian campaign of 1796 and '97 that, after all, war is not so theatrical an affair as people are apt to fancy, and that victories and defeats, if contemplated with the eye of science, look rather the reverse of the picture of them reflected on the brains of the political gossip.\(^a\)

The knowledge of this truth has enabled us to bear with some equanimity the fussy anger which our appreciation of the military events of the recent war has from time to time called forth from various zealous, if not intelligent, Bonapartist organs in this country, whether printed in the French or the English language. We now have the satisfaction of finding our judgment of these events confirmed much sooner than we could have expected, and by the principal belligerents themselves, by Francis Joseph and Louis Napoleon.

Leaving aside questions of mere detail, what was the pith of our criticism? On the one hand we traced the defeats of the Austrians not to any genius displayed on the part of the Allies—not to the fabulous effects of the rifled cannon—not to the imaginary defections of the Hungarian regiments—not to the vaunted dash of the French soldiers, but simply to the strategical faults committed by the Austrian generals, whom Francis Joseph and his personal advisers had put in the place of such men as Gen. Hess. It was this faulty strategy which not only contrived to oppose numerical minorities to the foe at every point, but, on the battle-field itself, was able to arrange the disposable forces in the most absurd manner. On the other hand, the stubborn resistance

---

\(^a\) The reference is to C. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, Bd. I, Kapitel I.—*Ed.*
exhibited even under such circumstances by the Austrian army; battles almost equally contested, notwithstanding the disproportion of the forces to each other; the strategical blunders committed by the French, and the unpardonable laziness, which paralyzed victory and almost abandoned its fruits by neglecting the opportunities of pursuit—all these things warranted us in stating that by the transfer of the supreme command of the Austrian army from incompetent into able hands, the positions of the belligerents were likely to be reversed. The second point, and the most important one, upon which we insisted, even before the outbreak of the war, was this: that from the moment the Austrians turned from the offensive to the defensive, the war would be divided into two parts; the melodramatic, carried on in Lombardy, and the serious, commencing behind the line of the Mincio, within the terrible network of the four fortresses. All the victories of the French, we said, weighed as nothing, when compared with the trials they still had to encounter, in a position which it had cost even the real Napoleon nine months to overcome, though in his time Verona, Legnago, and Peschiera were ciphers in a military sense, and Mantua alone had to bear the whole brunt of the attack. Gen. Hess, who, of course, was better acquainted than we with the status quo of Austrian generalship, had, as we now ascertain from the journals of Vienna, proposed in the outset of the war not to invade Piedmont, but rather to evacuate Lombardy and accept battle only behind the Mincio. Let us now hear what Francis Joseph and Louis Bonaparte say in their apologies—the one for having abandoned part of a province, and the other for having falsified the programme he put forth in beginning the war.

Francis Joseph states two facts in regard to the war in which he is not contradicted by the Moniteur. In his appeal to his army, he says that the Austrian forces were always opposed to superior numbers. The Moniteur dares not controvert this statement, which, when rightly considered, lays the greatest blame on the Austrian Emperor's own shoulders. However that may be, we may claim the merit of having, from the most contradictory statements of "own correspondents," from French lies and Austrian exaggerations, disengaged the real state of things, and, with the spare and

---

a Francis Joseph's manifesto of July 15, 1859, The Times, No. 23364, July 21, 1859 ("Austria").—Ed.
b Le Moniteur universel, No. 201, July 20, 1859 (Napoleon III's speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the Corps législatif in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859).—Ed.
uncertain means at our disposal, of having ascertained the relative forces of the contending parties in our critical reviews of the single battles, from Montebello to Solférino. Francis Joseph lays great stress upon another point which must sound rather strange to a certain class of newspaper writers. We give his very words:

"It is likewise a fact allowing of no doubt, that our enemies, in spite of their utmost exertions and the full employment of their superabundant resources, which had been long prepared for the intended conflict, have not been able, even at the price of immense sacrifices, to gain a decisive victory. All they have been able to gain in the field were secondary advantages. Austria's army, at the same time, with unshaken strength and fortitude, maintained a position, the possession of which offered a fair chance of success in all future attempts to regain lost ground."

What Francis Joseph dares not proclaim in his manifestoes, namely, that he and his camarilla have made a mess of the whole war by the intrusion of their pets and their crotches upon its direction, and by the imbecile obstructions they laid in the way of plebeian, but competent generals, even this sin is now openly confessed, if not in words, at least by deeds. Gen. Hess, whose advice was neglected during the whole campaign, and who was debarred from the position which his antecedents, his age, and even his rank in the Austrian rank list ought to have secured to him, is now appointed Field Marshal; the supreme command of the Italian forces is made over to him, and the first thing Francis Joseph did on his arrival at Vienna, was to pay an ostentatious visit to the old General's wife. In one word, the whole attitude now assumed by the Hapsburg autocrat toward the man who, by his plebeian birth, his liberal sympathies, his rude frankness, and his military genius, offended the pretensions of the aristocratic circles at Schönbrunn, implies a confession humiliating to men of all stations, but most so to the hereditary proprietors of mankind.

Let us now look at the counterpart of the Austrian manifesto, at Bonaparte's apology. Does he share the silly delusion of his admirers, that he has won decisive battles? Does he think that future reverses were out of the question? Does he even intimate that a decisive point was gained, and that perseverance was the only thing required to push his victories to a crowning result? Quite the contrary. He owns that the melodramatic part of the struggle had come to an end; that the war was about inevi-

---

^a See this volume, pp. 332-37, 338-40, 349-53, 360-63, 368-71.—Ed.
^b The reference is to Napoleon III's speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the Corps législatif in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859, Le Moniteur universel, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—Ed.
tably to change its aspect; that reverses were in store for him; that he was frightened, not only by the menacing Revolution, but by the power of "the enemy in front, intrenched behind great fortresses." He saw nothing before him but a "long and barren war." His words are these:

"Arrived beneath the walls of Verona, the struggle was inevitably about to change its nature, as well in a military as in a political aspect. Obliged to attack the enemy in front, who was intrenched behind great fortresses, and protected on his flanks by the neutrality of the surrounding territory, and about to begin a long and barren war, I found myself in face of Europe in arms, ready either to dispute our successes, or to aggravate our reverses."

In other words, Louis Napoleon not only made peace because he was afraid of Prussia and Germany, and of Revolution, but because he was afraid of the four great fortresses. To lay siege to Verona, he would have required, as we are told by a semi-official article in the \textit{Indépendance belge}, a reinforcement of 60,000 men; and these he could not bring from France and leave there the strength necessary for the northern army under Pélissier; and after he had done with Verona, Legnago and Mantua would remain to be disposed of. In fine, Napoleon III and Francis Joseph fully confirm, after the war, what we have said before it and during its progress, both as to the military resources of the two countries and the characteristics of the campaign. We cite these two witnesses as involuntarily vindicating common sense and historical truth against that swash of insane exaggeration and silly delusion, which for the last two months has obtained a currency, which it will not be likely soon again to enjoy.

Written on July 22, 1859 Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the \textit{New-York Daily Tribune}, No. 5704, August 4, 1859 as a leading article

\footnote{\textit{L'Indépendance belge}, No. 202, July 21, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}}
Of all the dogmas of the bigoted politics of our time, none has caused more harm than the one that says “In order to have peace, you must prepare for war”. This great truth, whose outstanding feature is that it contains a great lie, is the battle cry that has called all Europe to arms and generated such a belligerent fanaticism that every new peace pact is regarded as a new declaration of war, and greedily exploited. At a time when the states of Europe have become so many armed camps, whose mercenaries are burning with the desire to rush at one another and cut each other’s throats for the greater glory of peace, the only consideration before each new outbreak is merely the trifling detail of knowing which side one should be on. As soon as this incidental consideration has been satisfactorily disposed of by the diplomatic parlementaires with the help of the old reliable si vis pacem, para bellum, one of those wars of civilisation begins whose frivolous barbarity belongs to the best times of the robber knights, while their cunning perfidy belongs exclusively to the most modern period of the imperialist bourgeoisie.

Under such circumstances we need not be surprised if the general leaning towards barbarity acquires a certain method, immorality becomes a system, lawlessness gets its lawgivers and club-law its lawbooks. Hence, if people return so often to the idées napoléoniennes, the reason is that these senseless fantasies of the prisoner of Ham have become the Pentateuch of the modern

---

a Negotiators.— *Ed.*

b If you want peace, prepare for war.— *Ed.*
religion of trickery and the Revelation of imperial military and stock-exchange swindling.

Louis Napoleon stated in Ham:

“A great enterprise seldom succeeds at the first attempt.”

Convinced of this truth, he understands the art of pulling back in good time and beginning a new approach soon after, and repeating the manoeuvre long enough for his opponents to become careless and the issued *mots d’ordre* to have become trivial, ridiculous and precisely for that reason dangerous. This art of temporising in order to deceive public opinion, of retiring in order to advance all the more unimpeded, in a word, the secret of *ordre, contre-ordre, désordre* was his most powerful ally in the coup d’état.

He seems to want to follow the same tactics with respect to the Napoleonic idea of the invasion of England. This phrase, so often disavowed, so often ridiculed, so often drowned in Compiègne champagne, is more and more on the agenda of European gossip, despite all its apparent defeats. Nobody knows where it suddenly comes from, but everyone feels that its mere existence is a still undefeated power. Serious men, such as the 84-year-old Lord Lyndhurst and Ellerborough, who is certainly not lacking in courage, recoil from the mysterious power of this phrase. When a mere phrase is able to make such a powerful impression on government, Parliament and people, that only proves that it is instinctively felt and known that it has an army of 400,000 marching behind it, with whom a battle for life or death must be waged, or else the sinister phrase cannot be got rid of.

The article in the *Moniteur*, which makes a comparison of the English and French naval budgets in order to depict England as the party responsible for the costly armaments; the irritated tone of His Majesty’s introduction and conclusion to this document; the semi-official commentary of the *Patrie*, which positively contains an impatient threat; the order issued immediately thereafter to put the French armed forces on a peace footing—all these are such characteristic instances of Bonapartist tactics that

---

b Slogans.—Ed.
c An anonymous article dated Paris, July 25, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 207, July 26, 1859.—Ed.
d *La Patrie*, July 28, 1859.—Ed.
e Published in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 209, July 28, 1859.—Ed.
we can well understand the very serious attention that the English press and public opinion give to the question of invasion. If France “is not arming”, as Mr. Walewski, conscious of his misunderstood innocence, assured us emphatically before the outbreak of the Italian war, that gives rise to a three-month freedom campaign; but if it now even disarms the unarmed army, we may reckon with an extraordinary coup.a

Undoubtedly, Mr. Bonaparte could not lead his praetorian hordes to any enterprise that would be more popular in France and a large part of the continent of Europe than an invasion of England. When Blücher rode through the streets of London during his visit to England, he cried out in the instinctive joy of his soldier mentality: “Mein Gott, what a town for to sack!”b—a cry whose power of seduction the imperial praetorians will be able to appreciate. But the invasion would also be popular with the ruling bourgeoisie, for precisely the reasons that The Times gives for maintaining the entente cordiale,c saying:

“We are rather pleased than chagrined to see France powerful. While we are together as the guardians of order and the friends of civilisation, her power is our power, and her prosperity is our strength.”

With a fleet of 449 ships, of which 265 are steam warships, with an army of 400,000 men who have tasted blood and glory in Italy, with the St. Helena testament in his pocket and inevitable ruin facing him, Mr. Bonaparte is just the man to stake all on invasion. He must play va banque; sooner or later, but play he must.

Written on July 28, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 13, July 30, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---
a Le Moniteur universel, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—Ed.
b The Times, No. 23370, July 28, 1859 (leading article).—Ed.
c Ibid.—Ed.
d All or nothing.—Ed.
Karl Marx

THE FRENCH DISARMAMENT

The announcement of Napoleon III, in his Moniteur, that he is about to reduce his land and sea forces to a peace footing,\(^a\) might appear of little value with the fact before us that, on the very outset of the war, the same potentate, in the same Moniteur, solemnly declared that since 1856 his land and sea forces had never been put on a war footing.\(^b\) His purpose, by a clever paragraph in his official organ, to suddenly avert the naval and military armaments of England, is too transparent to be disputed. However, it would be a great mistake to regard the announcement in the Moniteur as a mere trick. His sincerity is a matter of compulsion; he does simply what he cannot help doing.

After the conclusion of the treaty of Villafranca, it was indispensable for Louis Napoleon to reduce his military and sea forces to dimensions consistent with a peace budget. The Italian adventure had cost France about $200,000,000, and 60,000 men of the very \textit{élite} of her army, without gaining for her anything beyond some military glory of a rather doubtful character. To back the disappointment of an unpopular peace with the continuance of war taxes would be a very dangerous experiment. To rush periodically beyond the frontiers of France, and to dispel civil disaffection by the excitement of warlike exploits, is one of the vital conditions of the restored Empire. To assume the attitude of the savior of France from a general European struggle, after

\(^{a}\) This announcement was published in \textit{Le Moniteur universel}, No. 209, July 28, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{b}\) The reference is to an anonymous article in \textit{Le Moniteur universel}, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
having carried her to its very confines, is another condition of life for the Man of December. After the forced interruption by war of industrial and commercial pursuits, peace, on whatever terms, appears not only as a blessing, but has also the charm of novelty. The tedium that renders peace burdensome under the monotonous rule of the Zouave and the spy is changed for lively sensations of pleasure after the scene has been diversified by war. The intense feeling of humiliation that must weigh upon the French mind, whenever it ponders the confiscation of a people by an adventurer without character, though not without cunning, has for the time been mitigated by the spectacle of foreign nations and foreign potentates submitting, if not in fact, at least in appearance, to the same superior sway. Production violently curtailed, now, by the law of elasticity, receives a new start: business transactions all at once broken off, are resumed with redoubled ardor; speculation, suddenly paralyzed, soars higher than before. Thus a peace following in the track of a Napoleonic war, again secures to the dynasty a respite of life for which the violation of peace was just before indispensable. Of course, after a certain interval of time the old dissolvents will again tend to produce a war. The essential antagonism between civil society and the coup d'état will revive; and, after the internal strife has again reached a certain degree of intensity, a new warlike interlude will be recurred to as the only practicable safety-valve. It is evident that the terms on which the "Savior of Society" has to save himself, must gradually become more and more dangerous. The adventure of Italy was far more perilous than that of the Crimea. Compared with the adventure of the Rhine, or the still remoter adventure, the invasion of England, both of which are undoubtedly cherished in the mind of Napoleon III and the passions of the more thoughtless among his subjects, this war in Italy may appear mere child's play.

However, it will be some time before these new enterprises are set on foot. Between the Crimean and the Italian war there was a pause of four years; but it is not likely that so long a respite can again intervene, while Louis Napoleon lives and rules. The fatal necessity under which he holds his power will come back upon him in shorter and shorter periods. The appetite of the army, and the very degradation which he enforces upon the people, will compel him to the next step more speedily than he was compelled to the last. War is the condition on which he keeps the throne, though, as he is after all only a counterfeit Bonaparte, it is likely always to be a barren war, waged on false pretexts, lavish of blood and treasure, and fruitless in benefits to his subjects. Such was the
Crimean war; such is that now concluded. On such terms only can France enjoy the advantage of being appropriated by this man. She must, as it were, forever reenact the days of December; only the scene of destruction is removed from the Boulevards of Paris to the plains of Lombardy, or the Crimean Chersonese; and the dwarfed descendants of the great revolution, instead of murdering their own countrymen, are employed in killing people of foreign tongues.

Written about July 30, 1859

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5711, August 12, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1484, August 16, 1859
I

General Clausewitz, in his work on the Austrian-French campaign of 1799, remarks that the reason why Austria was so often defeated was that its battle plans, strategically as well as tactically, were designed not so much for actually winning the victory as for exploiting the anticipated victory. Turning the enemy on both flanks, encirclement, dispersion of one's own army to the most distant places in order to block off all the places where the enemy, already imagined as defeated, might hide—these and similar measures for exploiting the fanciful victory were in every case the most practical way of ensuring defeat. What was true of Austria's way of waging war holds good for Prussia's diplomacy.

Prussia undoubtedly strove to play a big role with low costs of production. Some instinct told it that the moment was favourable for the inflation of mediocrities. The France of the Vienna treaties, the France of Louis Philippe, was rechristened from a kingdom to an empire by simple decree, without a single boundary stone being moved in Europe. In the place of the Italian campaign of 1796 and the expedition to Egypt, the establishment of the swindler Society of December 10 and the sausage parade of Satory sufficed to bring about December 2 as a travesty of the 18th Brumaire. Prussia knew that the illusion of the French peasants about the resurrection of the real Napoleon was not shared in its entirety by the great powers. It was tacitly agreed that the adventurer who had to play Napoleon in France had assumed

---

a C. Clausewitz, *Die Feldzüge von 1799 in Italien und der Schweiz.*—Ed.
b Napoleon III's decree of December 2, 1852, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 337, December 2, 1852.—Ed.
a dangerous role and therefore could become dangerous for official Europe at any moment. France could only endure the Brummagem empire on condition that Europe seemed to believe the farce. The thing was, therefore, to make the part easier for the comedian and ensure there was a vigorous claque in the stalls and the gallery. Whenever France's internal conditions became untenable—and two years seem to be the maximum period of rotation of the rococo empire on its axis—a foreign adventure had to be permitted to the ex-prisoner of Ham. The travesty of some article of the Napoleonic programme capable of execution beyond the French border then became part of Europe's agenda. The son of Hortense might wage war, but only under Louis Philippe's motto: "La France est assez riche pour payer sa gloire." The old king of Prussia, the man with the brainless head, once said that his Prussia differed from the Prussia of Frederick the Great in that the latter was in abstract opposition to Christianity, while his had overcome the transitional epoch of the insipid Enlightenment and penetrated to a deep inner understanding of revelation. So, the old Napoleon stuck to the superficial rationalistic prejudice that a war was only in France's favour when the foreign countries had the expenses of the war while France got the proceeds. His melodramatic successor, on the other hand, has penetrated to the depth of the perception that France itself must pay for its military glory, that the maintenance of its old frontiers is a law of nature and that all its wars must be "localised", i.e., take place within the narrow stage that Europe condescends to allow him to play on for each performance. Consequently, his wars are in fact only periodic blood-lettings for France, which enrich it by adding a new state debt and cost it an old army.

After every such war, however, certain inconveniences arise. France is dejected; but Europe hastens to do everything it can to cajole la belle France out of the blues. It plays the Barnum of the Dutchfish. After the Russian war, was he not clothed in all the theatrical attributes of the arbiter of Europe? Did not Baron von Seebach shuttle back and forth from Dresden to Paris and from Paris to Dresden? Was he not waited on by Orlov, the poisoner, and Brunnow, the forger? Did not the Prince of Montenegro

---

\(^{a}\) Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
\(^{b}\) "France is rich enough to pay for its glory."— Ed.
\(^{c}\) Frederick William III.— Ed.
\(^{d}\) Beautiful France.— Ed.
\(^{e}\) Here, Dutch boor.— Ed.
\(^{f}\) Danilo I.— Ed.
and Jacobus Venedey believe in his plenitude of power?\textsuperscript{338} Was he not allowed to put through Russia's demands in the name of perfidies towards England? The Russian treaty of peace, which Palmerston had sealed with the betrayal at Kars and the negative magnitude of his own General Williams,\textsuperscript{339} was it not denounced by \textit{The Times} as a betrayal of England by Bonaparte? Did he not shine, therefore, in the light of the slyest head in Europe? During the war, had he not occupied all the capitals, if not of the modern, at least of the ancient world,\textsuperscript{340} and did not his kind-hearted evacuation of the Dardanelles indicate deeper-lying plans? The old Napoleon seized what was at hand. The apparent resignation of the new-model Napoleon hints at unfathomable Machiavellianism. He only rejected the good because he sought the better. And finally the peace treaty of Paris, was it not crowned by a "notice" of Europe to the anti-Bonapartist newspaper writers of Belgium, the giant state?\textsuperscript{341}

In the meantime, the two normal years of the rotation of pseudo-Napoleonic France kept rolling on. The official representatives of Europe felt they had done enough for the man's image for the time being. He was allowed to sail to China in the wake of the English, and to put Colonel Cuza into the Danubian Principalities at the behest of the Russians.\textsuperscript{342} But as soon as the delicate borderline between the hero and the buffoon playing the hero was overstepped even tentatively, Louis Napoleon found himself relegated with mockery to his ordained territory. His intrigue against the United States of North America, his attempt at reviving the slave trade, his melodramatic threats against England, his anti-Russian demonstration over the Suez Canal, which he had to undertake on instructions from Russia to justify Palmerston's Russian opposition to the project in the eyes of John Bull—all those things collapsed. It was only against little Portugal that he could show his muscle,\textsuperscript{343} in order to put his feebleness as against the great powers in proper relief. Belgium itself began to fortify and even Switzerland declaimed William Tell.\textsuperscript{344} The official powers of Europe had obviously made the mistake that so often led astronomers astray in earlier times, miscalculating the period of rotation.

Meanwhile, the two years of the rotation period of the lesser empire\textsuperscript{a} had elapsed. During the first rotation—1852 to 1854—a silent decay had taken place, which could be smelt but not heard.

\textsuperscript{a} "Lesser empire" is in English in the original.—\textit{Ed.}
The Russian war was its safety valve. It was different during the cycle of 1856 to 1858. The pseudo-Bonaparte had been flung back to the moment of the coup d'état by the internal development of France. Orsini's bombs had flashed lightning. Miss Coutts' unlucky lover had to abdicate to his generals. France (an unheard-of event) was divided into five general capitanates in the Spanish manner—the operation being conducted under the auspices of tympanites-afflicted Eugénie. The establishment of a regency transferred the power in fact from the imperialist Quasimodo to Pélissier, the Orleanist roaster of Arabian human flesh. But the revived terreur did not produce any scare. The Dutch nephew of the battle of Austerlitz seemed not terrible but grotesque. N'est pas monstre qui veut. Montalembert could play Hampden in Paris, and Proudhon in Brussels proclaimed Louis-Philippism with an acte additionnel. The rebellion at Châlon proved that even the army viewed the restored empire as a pantomime whose finale was approaching.  

Louis Bonaparte had once more reached the fateful point at which official Europe had to realise that the danger of revolution could only be averted by travesty a new article of the old Napoleonic programme. The travesty had begun with Napoleon's end, the Russian campaign. Why not continue it with Napoleon's beginning, the Italian campaign? Of all the characters in the European drama, Austria was the least grata. Prussia had to avenge the Congress of Warsaw, the battle of Bronzell and the march to the North Sea. Palmerston had for a long time certified his striving for civilisation by hatred of Austria. Russia saw with terror that Austria had announced that its bank would resume payments in specie. When in 1846 Austria's treasury showed no deficit for the first time in human memory, Russia had given the signal for the Cracow revolution. Finally, Austria was the bête noire of liberal Europe. Therefore, Louis Bonaparte's second theatrical Attila campaign had to be against Austria, under the usual conditions: no war indemnities, no extension of the French frontiers, “localised” war within the bounds of common

---

a “Safety valve” is in English in the original.— Ed.
b “Not everybody can be a monster” (Victor Hugo, Napoléon le petit. Conclusion. Première partie).— Ed.
c P.-J. Proudhon, De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église, Paris, 1858.— Ed.
d Acceptable.— Ed.
e Bugbear.— Ed.
sense, i.e., within the territory necessary for a second glorious blood-letting for France.

Under these circumstances, since once again a comedy was being performed, Prussia believed the moment had come for it too to play a major part, with the agreement of its overlords and good assurance. The treaty of Villafranca put it in the pillory as a dupe before all Europe. In view of its great advance in constitutionalism, an advance demonstrable in the geometrical progression of its national debt, it believed it in order to plaster over the wound with a blue book of its own make. We shall listen to its apology in an article.

---

a "Blue book of its own make" is in English in the original.—Ed.
II

If the Prussia of the regency speaks as it writes, it is easy to explain its talent, newly proved in the European comedy of errors, not only to misunderstand but also to be misunderstood. In this it has a certain similarity with Falstaff, who not only was witty himself but was also the cause of other people's wit.

On April 14 Archduke Albrecht arrived in Berlin, where he stayed until April 20. He had a secret to tell the Regent\(^a\) and a proposal to make. The secret was the imminent Austrian ultimatum to Victor Emmanuel. The proposal was a war on the Rhine. Archduke Albrecht would operate beyond the Upper Rhine with 260,000 Austrians and the South German Confederate corps, while the Prussian and North German corps, under Prussian command, would form a northern army on the Rhine. Instead of a "Confederation Generalissimo" Francis Joseph and the Prince Regent would make the decisions jointly from a headquarters.

Prussia, with restrained indignation, not only rejected the war plan out of hand but "made the most pressing representations to Archduke Albrecht against the rash procedure of the ultimatum"\(^b\).

When Prussia brings the donkeypower (large machines are, as we know, rated by horsepower\(^c\)) of its verbose cunning into play, no one can stand up against it, least of all an Austrian. The regent and his four satellites—Schleinitz, Auerswald, Bonin and Herr Dr. Zabel—were "convinced" that they had "convinced" Austria.

---

\(^a\) William, Prince of Prussia.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) "Zur Mission des Erzherzogs Albrecht", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210, July 29, 1859.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) Marx uses the English words "donkeypower" and "horsepower".—*Ed.*
“When Archduke Albrecht,” says a semi-official Prussian statement, “left Berlin on April 20, it was believed that the bold plan had been put off for the moment. But—alas!—a few hours after his departure the telegraph from Vienna announced the dispatch of the ultimatum!”

After the war had broken out, Prussia refused to declare its neutrality. Schleinitz, in a “Dispatch to the Prussian missions at the German courts, dated Berlin, June 24”, reveals to us the secret of this heroic decision.

“Prussia,” he whispers, “has never abandoned its position as interceding power” (another dispatch says mediation power\(^b\)). “Its major effort since war broke out was, on the contrary, directed towards maintaining this position by declining to guarantee its neutrality, keeping clear of any commitment on any side and thus remaining completely impartial and free for interceding action.”

In other words: Austria and France, the contending parties, will exhaust one another in the war “localised” for the time being in Italy, while England as a neutral (!) stays far in the background. The neutrals have paralysed themselves, and the fighters’ hands are tied because they have to use their fists. Between the ones and the others Prussia floats “completely impartial and free”, a Euripidean deus ex machina. The middleman has always come off better than the extremes. Christ got further than Jehovah, St. Peter further than Christ, the priest further than the saints, and Prussia, the armed mediator, will get further than the rivals and the neutrals. Contingencies must arise in which Russia and England will give the signal to put an end to the comedy. Then they will slip their secret instructions into Prussia’s pocket from behind, while it wears its Brennus\(^c\) mask in front. France will not know whether Prussia is mediating on behalf of Austria; Austria will not know whether Prussia is mediating for France; neither will know whether Prussia is not mediating against both of them for Russia and England. Prussia will have the right to ask the confidence of “all sides” and arouse mistrust on every side. Its lack of commitment will commit everybody. If Prussia were to declare itself neutral, then nothing would prevent Bavaria and other members of the Confederation from taking sides with Austria. But as armed mediator, with the neutral great powers to protect it on its flanks and in the rear, with the misty image of its always menacing “German” great exploit in prospect, it might well

---
\(^a\) “Zur Mission des Erzherzogs Albrecht”, Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 210, July 29, 1859.—Ed.
\(^b\) Cf. this volume, p. 461.—Ed.
\(^c\) The Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 171, July 26, 1859.—Ed.
hope, while moving in strides as mysterious as they were long-measured to save Austria, by trickery eventually to gain hegemony in Germany at a discount. As the mouthpiece of England and Russia it could impose itself on the German Confederation, and as pacifier of the German Confederation insinuate itself into the good graces of England and Russia.

Not only a German great power but a European great power and also a “mediation power” and tyrant of the Confederation into the bargain! We shall see in the course of events how Schleinitz gets more and more entangled in this sequence of ideas, as cunning as it is noble. The fifth wheel of the European wagon of state up to now, the great power “by courtesy”, the character “on sufferance” in the European drama—this same Prussian is now entrusted with the grandiose position of the quos ego! And that not because he draws his sword but only shoulders his musket, without shedding anything more than the tears of the regent and the ink of his satellites. It was not really Prussia’s fault that the glory even of “Mittler” of Goethe’s Wahlverwandtschaften remained incomprehensible.

Prussia realised that in the first act the advisable course was to pinprick Austria, avoid the slightest suspicion on the part of Louis Napoleon and above all to recommend itself to Russia and England by good behaviour.

“It was not easy,” as Schleinitz admits in the above-mentioned dispatch, “to achieve this goal, so important for our own interests, given the agitation that prevailed in many German states. In addition, we need hardly mention that the direction of our policy in this diverged from that of a large number of German governments and that Austria in particular was not in agreement with it.”

Despite all these difficulties Prussia successfully played the part of the gendarme of the German Confederation. It developed its mediating action from the end of April to the end of May, forcing its fellow Confederation members to remain inactive.

“Our efforts,” Schleinitz says euphemistically, “were directed above all towards preventing premature involvement of the Confederation in the war.”

At the same time the Berlin Cabinet opened the sluices of the

---

a Marx uses the English phrases “by courtesy” and “on sufferance”.—Ed.
b “I’ll show you!”—Poseidon’s words from Virgil’s Aeneid, I, 135.—Ed.
c Marx plays on “Mittler”, the name of a character in Goethe’s novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften, and the German word for “middleman”.—Ed.
d Here and below Marx quotes from Alexander Schleinitz’s “Depesche an die preussischen Missionen an den deutschen Höfen”, dated Berlin, June 24, Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 171, July 26, 1859.—Ed.
liberal press, which assured the citizen, in black and white, that if Bonaparte was going into Italy, it was only for the purpose of freeing Germany from Austria and establishing German unity under the hero who certainly belongs to the nation, since he has already once been declared "national property".

What made Prussia's operation a little difficult was that it had the mission "in its own good time" not only to mediate but to mediate "under arms". While it was to suppress the cries for war, it had at the same time to call to arms. While it was issuing the arms, it had to warn against using them:

Don't play with the firearm,
It feels pain just like you.

"But if we," says Schleinitz, "simultaneously took all the steps for ensuring the security of Germany, which lies between the two warring great powers, and if, likewise, the Confederate agencies, with our cooperation, unremittingly took precautionary defence measures, then the new duty arose for us to see that these precautionary measures did not change suddenly into means of attack and thereby seriously compromise the Confederation's position and our own."

At the same time, the "mediation power" obviously could not always proceed unilaterally in the same direction. Moreover, dangerous symptoms appeared.

"There were," Schleinitz says, "to our great distress, indications of prospective special arrangements in the direction deviating from our policy, and here the seriousness of the situation could not but arouse the fear that this might increasingly strengthen the tendency towards a dissolution of the Confederation relationships."

In order to guard against these "inconveniences" and begin the second act of the "mediation", General Willisen went on a mission to Vienna. Its results are given in Schleinitz's dispatch, dated Berlin, June 14, addressed to Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna. So long as Schleinitz is only writing to the members of the German Confederation he uses the well-known Prussian government counsellor style in ordinary. If he is writing to foreign great powers, this is fortunately in a language he does not know. But his dispatches to Austria! Yard-long tapeworm sentences, steeped in the green sentimental soap of Gothaism, powdered with the dry bureaucratic sand of the Uckermark and half drowned in streams of the perfidious Berlin treacle.

---

a William, Prince of Prussia, Regent.— Ed.
b Published in the Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859.— Ed.
c Marx uses the English phrase "in ordinary".— Ed.
d Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
III

If we analyse a part of the Berlin blue book,\(^a\) which is now three weeks old, in greater detail, this is not because of an antiquarian whim or interest in Brandenburg history. Rather, these are documents that are now being trumpeted abroad by German liberals and democrats as proofs of Prussia's future imperial calling.

Schleinitz's last dispatch to General Willisen arrived in Vienna on May 27.\(^b\) Werther's dispatches to Schleinitz concerning Willisen's reception by the imperial Cabinet are dated May 29 and 31.\(^c\) They were left unanswered for half a month. In order to gloss over all the contradictions between the original "mission" and its subsequent "interpretation", both Schleinitz's dispatches to Willisen and Werther's dispatches to Schleinitz are suppressed in the Prussian blue book, as are all the negotiations between the Prince Regent and Boustrapa.\(^{356}\) Rechberg, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, could not in any way produce the original text, since Willisen and Werther were not to give him copies of the Prussian dispatches but only read them to him. One can imagine the position of a Minister who may not read a sentence construction like the following but has to hear it:

"Guided by the desire," says Schleinitz, "to have full clarity prevail in so important a matter, I had been careful in my letter directed to General von Willisen to indicate our position very definitely, both in relation to what we

\(^a\) Marx uses the English words "blue book".— Ed.
\(^b\) Schleinitz's dispatch of May 26, 1859 concerning mediation in the Italian war.— Ed.
\(^c\) The Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859. There is an error in the newspaper: the last dispatch is dated May 30.— Ed.
intended to do from our side under certain circumstances and in relation to the
assumptions that must necessarily underlie the action we had in view."a

Before Schleinitz set about making an official interpretation of
the Willisen mission to Vienna, he had, with characteristic
prudence, let events pass him by. The Austrian army had lost the
battle of Magenta, evacuated all the Lombard fortresses and was in
full retreat behind the Chiese. Gorchakov’s circular dispatch to the
small German states, in which he peremptorily orders strict
neutrality under menace of the knout, had found its way into the
press. b Derby, suspected of secret sympathy with Austria, resigned
and was replaced by Palmerston. Finally, on June 14, the date of
Schleinitz’s dispatch to Werther, the Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger
published an order for the mobilisation of six Prussian army
corps. c Willisen’s mission to Vienna, followed by this mobilisation!
All Germany was full of Prussia’s heroic prudence and prudent
heroism.

We come at last to Schleinitz’s dispatch to the Prussian
ambassador in Vienna. “Magnanimous words” had fallen from the
regent’s lips. Willisen had moreover oracularly uttered “the most
honourable intentions”, “the most unselfish plans” and “the most
trustful trust”, and Count Rechberg had “expressed his agreement
with the standpoint we have taken”, d but in the end that same
Rechberg, a Vienna Socrates, wanted to bring the debate down
from the heaven of phrases to solid earth. He attached “particular
value” to “seeing the Prussian intentions formulated”. And so
Prussia, through Schleinitz’s pen, prepares to bring the “inten-
tion” of the Willisen “mission” to “precision”. Accordingly, he
“sums up in what follows the intentions we made known to them
in the exchange of thoughts that took place in Vienna”, which
summing up we recapitulate in brief here. The point of Willisen’s
mission was this: To say that Prussia had “fixed intentions, on an
explicit assumption”. Schleinitz would have done better to say that

---

a Schleinitz’s dispatch to Karl Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, of
June 14, 1859, Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859.— Ed.
b A. Gortschakow, “Circularschreiben an die russischen Gesandtschaften vom
15. (27.) Mai 1859”, Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 167, June 16, 1859.— Ed.
betreffend die Mobilmachung von sechs Armee-Corps”, Königlich-Preussischer
Staats-Anzeiger, No. 142, June 19, 1859. (There is an inaccuracy in the text of the
article: the order was published on June 19, not June 14.)— Ed.
d Schleinitz’s dispatch to Karl Werther, the Prussian ambassador in Vienna, of
July 14, 1859. Below, on pp. 455-57, Marx sets forth the contents of this dispatch
(ending with the words “hope to find in the imperial court a trust corresponding
to ours”).— Ed.
Prussia had flexible intentions on a fixed assumption. The assumption was that Austria would leave the initiative in the German Confederation to Prussia, renounce separate treaties with German courts, in a word, temporarily abandon the hegemony in Germany to Prussia; the intention was to ensure Austria's "territorial possessions in Italy based on the treaties of 1815" and "work for peace on that basis". The relations of Austria to the other Italian states and "the relations among the latter" were regarded by Prussia as "an open question". Were Austria's "Italian possessions to be seriously threatened", Prussia would "attempt an armed mediation" and

"according to the success thereof in reaching the goal indicated above, act in such a way thereafter as its duties as a European power and the lofty calling of the German nation require".

"It is," says the disinterested Schleinitz, "in our own interest not to be too late with our intervention. But the choice of the moment, both for the mediation and for the further action of Prussia resulting therefrom, must be reserved to the free judgment of the royal court."

Schleinitz asserts, first, that this "exchange of thoughts" mediated by Willisen was designated as an "exchange of opinions" by Rechberg; secondly, that the intentions and assumptions of Prussia "had to have the approval of the imperial court", and thirdly, that Rechberg, an enemy of pure thought, as it appears, wanted the "exchange of thoughts" transformed into an "exchange of notes", "the agreement of the two cabinets authenticated in writing", in a word, wanted to see the Prussian "assumption" and the Prussian "intention" "stated" in black and white. At this point Schleinitz's noble consciousness\(^a\) revolts. What is Rechberg's unreasonable suggestion aimed at? Actually, the transformation of our "most secret political thoughts, revealed in confidence, into binding assurances". Schleinitz engages in real secret political exercises in thought, and Rechberg tries to tie down the unapproachable idea in profane notes! Quelle horreur for a Berlin thinker! What is more, such an exchange of notes would amount to a "guarantee" of the Austrian-Italian possessions. As if Prussia wanted to guarantee anything! What is more, the exchange of thoughts, wantonly transformed into an exchange of notes, could "immediately and logically be regarded by the French and Russian side as an engagement formel\(^b\) and as entry into the war". As if

---

\(^a\) The "noble consciousness" is a philosophical category in Hegel's *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (VI. Der Geist).— *Ed.*

\(^b\) Formal undertaking.— *Ed.*
Prussia would ever think of entering into a war or compromising itself on any side, and especially the French and Russian! Finally, though, and this is the main point, such an exchange of notes would "obviously make the contemplated attempt at mediation impossible". But Austria must realise that the question is not its Italian possessions, nor the 1815 treaties, nor French usurpation, nor Russian world domination, nor any kind of profane interests, but that the European complications were only introduced in order to improvise Prussia's new lofty "position" as "mediation power". Shakespeare's poor devil, who wakes up as a lord after having gone to sleep as a tinker,\(^a\) does not speak more movingly than Schleinitz, once he is overcome by the fixed idea of Prussia's calling to be the "armed mediation power" of Europe. He is stung and disturbed, as if by a tarantula, by the "uneasy conviction that he ought to act up to his newborn sublimity of character".\(^b\)

The "trust" with which Schleinitz whispers into Rechberg's ear the fixed idea of Prussia's calling as mediation power makes him, as he says, "hope to find in the imperial court a trust corresponding to ours".\(^c\) Rechberg, for his part, wants a copy of this curious note of Schleinitz. To document the Prussian trust Werther explains that he is, "according to his instructions", empowered to read the note orally but by no means to hand over the *corpus delicti*. Rechberg then requests that Werther accompany him to Francis Joseph in Verona, so that the latter "might at least orally obtain full and exact knowledge of Prussia's views". Prussian trust is averse to this unreasonable suggestion too, and Rechberg remarks, with ironical resignation, that if he in "his answer may not have been able to follow all the arguments of the Berlin dispatch completely and correctly", this would be due to the fact that he knew Schleinitz's constructions only by hearsay.

Rechberg's answer, directed to Koller, the Austrian ambassador in Berlin, is dated Verona, June 22. It suggests doubts as to the consonance of Willisen's mission at the end of May with the Berlin interpretation of that mission in mid-June.

\(^a\) The reference is to Christopher Sly, a character from Shakespeare's comedy *The Taming of the Shrew* (Induction, Scenes I and II).—*Ed.*

\(^b\) The entire phrase is quoted in English in the original.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) In the following passage, down to the words "must keep its freedom in the domain of relationships of the German Confederation undiminished" (pp. 457-59) Marx gives the contents of "Abschrift eines Erlasses des k. k. Ministers des Äussern Grafen Rechberg an Frhrn. v. Koller in Berlin, dd. Verona am 22. Jun. 1859", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 210 (supplement), July 29, 1859.—*Ed.*
"After my previous conferences with him" (Werther) "and General von Willisen," Rechberg says, "I had not believed that the Berlin Cabinet would still persist in aloofness to us to such an extent as even to avoid any written documentation of its intentions."

Even less had Willisen's mission prepared Rechberg for Prussia's lofty calling as the armed mediation power of Europe. The real point at issue, says Rechberg, is "Europe's independence as against the supremacy of France". The events themselves had disclosed the hollowness and triviality of the "pretexts"

"under which our opponents sought to gloss over their real intentions up to the moment of maturity". "In addition, Prussia had obligations as a member of the German Confederation with which the maintenance of the position of mediator could become incompatible at any moment."

Finally, Austria's hope had been to see Prussia "as a participant" on its side and it had therefore from the outset denied its calling as "mediator". Hence, if Austria had, since the beginning of the Italian complications, declared itself against Prussia's "attempts to occupy the position of mediator", obviously it could still less ever approve of an "armed mediation by Prussia".

"An armed mediation," Rechberg says, "includes, by the very meaning of the term, a case of war on both sides. Such a case fortunately does not exist between Prussia and Austria, so that we cannot conceive of the possibility of armed mediation by Prussia for the relation between these two powers. It would seem that the name, like the thing itself, must remain forever alien to this relation."

As we see, Rechberg contradicts Schleinitz's dispatch and its interpretation of the Willisen mission. He finds Prussia's tone altered since the end of May; he bluntly denies that Austria ever had recognised the lofty calling of Prussia as armed mediation power. Schleinitz owes an explanation of this misunderstanding No. 2 (the first occurred between Archduke Albrecht and the Prince Regent) by publishing his dispatches to Willisen and those of Werther to himself.

By the way, Rechberg replies as an Austrian, and why should the Austrian change his spots vis-à-vis the Prussian? Why should not Prussia "guarantee" Austria's possessions in Italy? Does not such a guarantee, Rechberg asks, correspond to the spirit of the Vienna treaties?

"In the period after the Congress of Vienna, and indeed down to our days, could France have hoped to find only a single opponent if it tried to contravene an important part of the European order set up by treaty? France could not think of infringing the relations of possession by a localised war."
Moreover, an “exchange of notes” is not a “treaty guarantee”. Austria only “wanted to have official notice” of Prussia’s good intentions. In the meantime, to please Schleinitz, it would keep his quite secret political thoughts quite secret. As regards peace, Rechberg remarks, Prussia could make as many proposals to France for peace as it liked,

“provided that these proposals leave intact the territorial status of 1815 and the sovereign rights of Austria and the other princes of Italy”.

In other words, Austria, in its “confidential communications to Prussia” as mediation power, was not inclined to go beyond meaningless commonplaces. But once Prussia

“came in as an active ally, there could be no question of drawing up peace conditions except by mutual understandings”.

Finally, Rechberg puts his finger on the Prussian scars. Austria had agreed to the “intention” of the Prussian initiative in the Diet on the “assumption” of the conversion of the Prussian exchange of thoughts into an exchange of notes. The conclusion falls with the premise. Even Schleinitz, with his curious comprehension, should “comprehend” that, since Berlin “has in no respect assumed binding obligations”, since it has itself pushed “the moment of its decisions to be taken in the form of armed mediation” back into the azure “future and reserved its freedom of option”, Vienna for its part “must keep its freedom in the domain of relationships of the German Confederation undiminished”.

Prussia’s attempt surreptitiously to usurp from Austria the supremacy in Germany and to get full powers for the sublime role of European mediation power, had thus decisively miscarried, whereas the mobilisation of the six Prussian army corps had taken place. Prussia owed Europe an explanation. And so, in a “circular dispatch dated June 19 to the Prussian embassies to the European powers”, Schleinitz states:

“By means of its mobilisation Prussia has taken a position more in keeping with the present situation, without abandoning the principles of moderation.... Prussia’s policy has remained the same as it has pursued from the beginning of the complication of the Italian question. But now Prussia has also brought its means for contributing to a solution to the level of the situation.”

And not to leave any doubt either as to the policy or the means, the dispatch ends by saying that it “is Prussia’s intention to forestall divisions of Germany”. The regency felt that it had to weaken even
this pitiful declaration by "very confidential" communications to France. Just before the war broke out, G., a painter of battle scenes,\(^a\) and a mutual friend of Boustrapa and the regent, had been entrusted with a mission from the former to Berlin. He brought back the friendliest of reassurances. At the time of the mobilisation, however, official and semi-official protestations had found their way to Paris, bearing this message:

"It is hoped that France will not interpret Prussia's military measures in a bad light. We have no illusions; we know how impolitic a war against France would be, what dangerous consequences it would have. But we hope the Emperor will realise the difficult position we are in. The Prince Regent's government is being pushed and shoved from all sides. We are confronted with mistrustful sensibilities and are compelled to spare them."

Or:

"We shall mobilise but it should not be believed that this is an offensive measure against France. In his capacity as quasi-head of the German Confederation the Regent has the duty not only to protect the Confederation's interests but also to adopt a position within it that would allow him to prevent precipitate actions and impose his policy of moderation on the other German states. We trust that the Emperor will understand this fully and do all he can to ease our task."

The Prussian fiddling took the comic course of suggesting to the French government:

"It is hoped that the government newspapers will not praise Prussia too much at the expense of Bavaria, Saxony, etc. That could only compromise Prussia."

Hence Walewski had a perfect right to say in his circular dispatch of June 20:

"The new military measures taken in Prussia cause us no concern.... The Prussian government states that it has no other intention, in mobilising a part of its army, than to protect Germany's security and put itself in a position to exert a just influence on further arrangements for agreement with the other two great powers."\(^b\)

Prussia's lofty calling as armed mediation power had become such a byword among the great powers that Walewski could make the poor witticism that Prussia was mobilising not against France but against "the other two great powers", which otherwise might deprive it of its "just" influence on the "arrangements for agreement".

Thus ended the second act of the Prussian mediation.

---

\(^a\) Probably Louis Eugène Ginain.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) "Note des Grafen Walewski an die französischen Gesandten bei den deutschen Regierungen", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 187, July 6, 1859.— *Ed.*
IV

The first act of the Prussian mediation, from the end of April to the end of May, sentenced Germany to *la mort sans phrase*.a In the second act, from the end of May to June 24, the hamstringing of the “great fatherland” was adorned by the empty words of the Willisen mission and the arabesque of the Prussian mobilisation. An afterpiece of this second act was played at the smaller German courts, who got to *listen* to a note from Schleinitz. Schleinitz, like Stieber, likes “mixed” oral procedure. We cite here only two passages from his above-mentioned note, dated Berlin, June 24, “to the Prussian missions at the German courts”.b Why did Prussia deny the Austrian wish to transform the “exchange of thoughts” into an “exchange of notes”?

“The fulfilment of this wish,” Schleinitz whispers to the German courts, “would be equivalent to a guarantee of Lombardy. Assuming such an obligation in the face of indefinite eventualities was something that Prussia could not do.”

Thus, from the point of view of Berlin the loss of Lombardy was neither “a serious menace to the Austrian possessions in Italy” nor “the definite eventuality” the Prussian sword was waiting for to spring from its scabbard.

“In addition,” Schleinitz continues, “*any commitment of a formal nature* that could affect our position as mediation power would have to be avoided.”

---

a “Death without qualification”—words allegedly uttered by Abbé Sieyès when voting in the French Convention on January 17, 1793 for Louis XVI’s execution.—*Ed.*

b See this volume, p. 451.—*Ed.*
It was not the purpose of Prussian mediation, therefore, to alter the “indefinite eventualities” in the interest of Austria; rather, it was the vocation of all possible eventualities to leave “the position of Prussia as mediation power” unaltered. While Prussia categorically demands that Austria give up the initiative in the German Confederation, it gives Austria the hypothetical equivalent of Prussian good will, guaranteed by Prussian good intentions. Onion soup with raisin sauce, as the Berlin errand-boy says.

In the third act of the mediation Prussia finally appears as a European great power, and Schleinitz prepares a dispatch in two copies, one addressed to Count Bernstorff in London, the other to Baron Bismarck in Petersburg, one to be read to Lord John Russell, the other to be read to Prince Gorchakov. Half the dispatch consists of obeisances and excuses. Prussia has mobilised a part of its armed forces, and Schleinitz is inexhaustible in his motivation of this bold deed. In the general circular letter to the European great powers, dated June 19, it was the security of the territory of the German Confederation, the role as armed mediation power, and particularly “forestalling divisions of Germany”. In the letter to the members of the German Confederation, “this measure” was to “tie down the military armed forces of France and alleviate Austria’s position considerably”. In the dispatch to England and Russia it is “the arming of the neighbours”, the “supervision of events”, the “approach of the war to the German frontier”, dignity, interests, calling and so forth. But “on the other hand” and “nonetheless” and “I repeat, Herr Graf, Herr Baron”, Prussia is arming in all good faith. It is “certainly not its intention to add new complications”. It strives for “no other goal than it strove for a short time ago in agreement with England and Russia”. Nous n’entendons pas malice: Schleinitz cries out.

“What we desire” is “peace”, and “we appeal in full confidence to the cabinets of London and Petersburg, so as to find out, together with them, the means of putting a stop to the bloodshed.”

---

\(a\) See this volume, p. 451.—\(Ed.\)

\(b\) Schleinitz’s dispatch of June 24, 1859 to Albrecht Bernstorff, Prussian ambassador in London, and Otto Bismarck, Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg, on mediation in the Italian war, Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 170, July 24, 1859.—\(Ed.\)

\(c\) See this volume, p. 459.—\(Ed.\)

\(d\) See this volume, p. 451.—\(Ed.\)

\(e\) We mean no harm.—\(Ed.\)
In order to show itself worthy of the confidence of England and Russia, Prussia swears to two Russian-English theses: the first is that Austria brought on the war by the ultimatums; the second, that the fight is over liberal-administrative reforms and the dissolution of the Austrian protectorate over neighbouring Italian states. Adjustment of the rights of the Austrian imperial house with a national liberal "work of reorganisation", that is what Prussia is aiming at. Finally, Prussia believes, as Schleinitz says, Louis Bonaparte's self-denying declarations.

And these platitudinous insipidities are all that Prussia, "with full confidence and candid openness", stutters out in embarrassment to the neutral great powers concerning its "mediation plans". Schleinitz, "the sober, modest youth", is afraid of "prejudicing the question to a certain extent if he should make his ideas more precise". Only the fixed idea finally pops up: Prussia believes itself "called to be an armed mediation power". May England and Russia recognise this vocation! May they

"express their views about a solution of the present complications and the way in which it could be made acceptable to the warring parties".

May they, in particular, furnish Prussia with instructions that permit it, under high sovereign licence, so to speak *avec garantie du gouvernement,* to take over the role of mediating lion! Prussia, thus, wants to play the European lion, but in the capacity of Snug the joiner.

*Lion:* Then know, that I, one Snug, the joiner, am
A lion-fell, nor else no lion's dam:
For if I should as lion come in strife
Into this place, 'twere pity on my life.

*Theseus:* A very gentle beast, and of a good conscience.

*Lysander:* This lion is a very fox for his valour.

*Theseus:* True; and a goose for his discretion.

Schleinitz's dispatch is dated June 24, the day of the battle of Solferino. Both copies of the dispatch were still lying on Schleinitz's desk when the news of the Austrian defeat arrived in Berlin. At the same time a dispatch of Lord John Russell came in

---

*a* "Self-denying declarations" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*

*b* With government guarantee.—*Ed.*

*c* Marx uses the English word.—*Ed.*


*e* Lord John Russell's dispatch of June 22, 1859 to Lord Bloomfield, British Ambassador at the Berlin Court, *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 199 (supplement), July 18, 1859. The original English text of this dispatch is not available.—*Ed.*
the mail, "in which Mr. Brougham's little man" of old, the "tom-tit of English liberalism", the herald of the Irish "coercion-bills", initiated Prussia into Palmerston's Italian ideas. Magdeburg is not on the Mincio nor Bückeburg on the Adige, any more than Harwich is on the Ganges or Salford on the Sutlej. But Louis Bonaparte has declared that he does not covet Magdeburg and Bückeburg. Then why irritate the Gallic cock by Teutonic crudeness? Jack Russell even discovers that when the "victory" has been "decided" on the battlefield, "the combatants will probably be very willing to put an end to the exhausting struggle". Supported by this ingenious discovery, chiding Germany's desire for war, praising Prussia's "moderate and enlightened conduct", Russell warns Schleinitz to imitate England "quite as exactly" "as conditions in Germany will permit"!! Finally "Jack of all trades" recalls Prussia's "lofty calling to mediation" and, with his customary little sweet-and-sour smirk, the little man leaves his pupil in constitutionalism with the consoling words:

"A time may perhaps come very soon when the voice of friendly and conciliatory powers can be successfully heard, and ideas of peace no longer remain without effect!" (Russell's dispatch to Lord Bloomfield in Berlin, dated London, June 22.)

Written between the end of July and the middle of August, 1859

First published in Das Volk, Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, July 30, August 6, 13 and 20, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Printed in English for the first time

---

a "Little man", "tom-tit of English liberalism" and "coercion-bills" are in English in the original.—Ed.

b "Jack of all trades" is in English in the original.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

KARL MARX, A CONTRIBUTION TO THE CRITIQUE
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY

PART ONE, FRANZ DUNCKER, BERLIN, 1859

1

The Germans have long since shown that in all spheres of science they are equal, and in most of them superior, to other civilised nations. Only one branch of science, political economy, had no German name among its leading figures. The reason is obvious. Political economy is the theoretical analysis of modern bourgeois society and therefore presupposes developed bourgeois conditions, conditions which for centuries, following the wars of the Reformation and the peasant wars and especially the Thirty Years' War, could not establish themselves in Germany. The separation of the Netherlands from the Empire forced Germany out of world trade and restricted its industrial development from the very beginning to the pettyest scale; and while the Germans painfully and slowly recovered from the devastations of the civil wars, while they used up all their civic energy, which had never been very great, in futile struggle against the customs barriers and absurd commercial regulations which every petty princeling and imperial baron imposed upon the industry of his subjects, while the imperial cities with their craft-guild practices and patrician spirit went to ruin—Holland, England and France meanwhile captured the leading positions in world trade, established one colony after another and brought manufactory production to the height of its development, until finally England, owing to steam power, which gave value to its coal and iron deposits, headed modern bourgeois development. But political economy could not arise in Germany so long as a struggle had still to be waged against such preposterously antiquated remnants of the Middle Ages as those which hampered the bourgeois development of its material forces until 1830. Only with the establishment of
the Customs Union\textsuperscript{360} were the Germans in a position to comprehend political economy at all. It was indeed at this time that English and French political economy began to be imported for the benefit of the German bourgeoisie. Men of learning and bureaucrats soon mastered the imported material and treated it in a way which does little credit to the “German spirit”. The motley crowd of pen-pushing knights of industry, merchants, schoolmasters and bureaucrats produced a German literature on economics which, for triteness, insipidity, shallowness, verbosity and plagiarism, is equalled only by the German novel. Among people pursuing practical objectives there arose first the protectionist school of the industrialists, whose chief spokesman, List, is still the best that German bourgeois literature on economics has produced,\textsuperscript{a} although his celebrated work is entirely copied from the Frenchman Ferrier,\textsuperscript{b} the theoretical creator of the Continental System. In opposition to this trend the free-trade school was formed in the forties by merchants from the Baltic provinces, who rehashed the arguments of the English Free Traders\textsuperscript{c} with childlike, but not disinterested, faith. Finally, among the schoolmasters and bureaucrats who had to handle the theoretical aspect of the subject there were desiccated and uncritical herbarium collectors, like Herr Rau,\textsuperscript{d} would-be clever speculators who translated foreign propositions into undigested Hegelian language, like Herr Stein,\textsuperscript{e} or gleaners with literary pretensions in the field of the “history of culture”, like Herr Riehl.\textsuperscript{f} The outcome of all this was cameralistics,\textsuperscript{361} a hotchpotch of sundry trivialities sprinkled with an eclectic economic sauce, the sort of stuff a junior civil servant might find useful to remember during his final examination.

While in this way in Germany the bourgeoisie, the schoolmasters and the bureaucrats were still exerting themselves to learn by rote, and in some measure to understand, the first elements of Anglo-French political economy, which they regarded as incontest-
Part of a page from Das Volk containing Frederick Engels' review of Karl Marx's work A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy
able dogmas, the German proletarian party appeared on the scene. The whole of its theory was derived from the study of political economy, and it is from the emergence of this party that German political economy as an independent science also dates. The essential foundation of this German political economy is the materialist conception of history, whose principal features are briefly outlined in the Preface\textsuperscript{a} to the above-named work. Since the Preface has in the main already been published in Das Volk,\textsuperscript{b} we refer to it. The proposition that “the process of social, political and intellectual life in general is determined by the mode of production of material life”; that all social and political relations, all religious and legal systems, all theoretical conceptions which arise in the course of history can only be understood if the material conditions of life obtaining during the relevant epoch have been understood and the former are traced back to these material conditions—this proposition was a revolutionary discovery not only for economics but also for all historical sciences (and all branches of science which are not natural sciences are historical). “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but their social being that determines their consciousness.” This proposition is so simple that it should be self-evident to anyone not bogged down in idealist humbug. But it leads to highly revolutionary consequences not only in the sphere of theory but also in that of practice. “At a certain stage in their development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or—what merely expresses the same thing in legal terms—with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an epoch of social revolutions. The change in the economic foundation leads sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.... The bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the social process of production—antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of life—but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism.”\textsuperscript{c} The prospect of a gigantic revolution, the most

\textsuperscript{a} See present edition, Vol. 30.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} Das Volk, No. 5, June 4, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{c} See present edition, Vol. 30.—\textit{Ed.}
gigantic revolution that has ever taken place, therefore presents itself to us as soon as we pursue our materialist thesis further and apply it to the present time.

However, closer consideration also shows immediately that, already in its first consequences, the apparently so simple proposition—that the consciousness of men depends on their being and not the other way round—is a fatal blow to all forms of idealism, even the most concealed. Through it, all the conventional and customary views of history are denied. The entire traditional manner of political reasoning falls to the ground; patriotic nobility indignantly resists such an unprincipled interpretation. It was thus inevitable that the new point of view should shock not only the exponents of the bourgeoisie but also the mass of French socialists who intended to revolutionise the world by the magic formula, liberté, égalité, fraternité. But it utterly enraged the vociferous German vulgar democrats. Nevertheless, they have been fond of trying to plagiarise the new ideas in their own interest, although with a rare lack of understanding.

The development of the materialist conception in respect of even a single historical example was a scientific task requiring years of quiet research, for it is evident that mere phrases can achieve nothing here and that only an abundance of critically examined historical material which has been completely mastered can make it possible to solve such a problem. Our party was propelled on to the political stage by the February Revolution and was thus prevented from pursuing purely scientific aims. The basic outlook, nevertheless, runs like an unbroken thread through all literary productions of the party. Every one of them shows that action in each particular case was initiated by direct material causes and not by the accompanying phrases, that on the contrary the political and legal phrases, like political action and its results, originated in material causes.

After the defeat of the Revolution of 1848-49, at a time when it became increasingly impossible to exert any influence on Germany from abroad, our party relinquished the field of emigrant squabbles—for that was the only feasible action left—to the vulgar democrats. While these were chasing about to their heart’s content, scuffling today, fraternising tomorrow and once more washing their dirty linen in public the day after, while they went begging throughout America and immediately afterwards started another row over the division of the few dollars they had collected—our party was glad to have peace once more for study. It had the great advantage that its theoretical foundation was a new scientific
outlook the elaboration of which kept it busy enough; for this reason alone it could never become so demoralised as the "great men" of the exile.\textsuperscript{a}

The book under consideration is the first result of these studies.

\textsuperscript{a} Cf. \textit{The Great Men of the Exile} by Marx and Engels (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 227-326).—\textit{Ed.}
II

The purpose of a work like the one under review cannot simply be a desultory criticism of separate propositions of political economy or a discussion of some economic issue or other in isolation. On the contrary, it is from the beginning designed to give a systematic résumé of the whole complex of political economy and a coherent elaboration of the laws governing bourgeois production and bourgeois exchange. This elaboration is at the same time a critique of all economic literature, for economists are nothing but interpreters of and apologists for these laws.

Since Hegel's death hardly any attempt has been made to develop any branch of science in its specific inner coherence. The official Hegelian school had assimilated only the most simple devices of the master's dialectics and applied them to everything and anything, often with ridiculous incompetence. Hegel's whole legacy was, so far as they were concerned, limited to a mere template, by means of which any subject could be shaped aright, and to a list of words and phrases whose only purpose was to turn up at the right moment, when ideas and positive knowledge were lacking. Thus it happened, as a professor at Bonn has said, that these Hegelians understood nothing but could write about everything. And that is what it came to. For all their conceit these gentlemen were, however, sufficiently conscious of their weakness to avoid major problems as far as possible. The old pedantic learning held its ground because of its superior positive knowledge, and then with Feuerbach's renunciation of the speculative method,
Hegelianism gradually fell asleep, and it seemed that science was once more dominated by the old metaphysics with its fixed categories.

For this there were quite natural reasons. The rule of the Hegelian Diadochi, which ended in empty phrases, was naturally followed by a period in which the positive content of science predominated once more over the formal aspect. But at the same time Germany applied itself with quite extraordinary energy to the natural sciences, according to the immense bourgeois development after 1848; and with the coming into fashion of these sciences, in which the speculative trend had never achieved any real importance, the old metaphysical mode of thinking, even down to the extreme platitude of Wolff, also regained its ground. Hegel was forgotten and a new materialism arose in the natural sciences; theoretically it differed very little from the materialism of the eighteenth century and its advantage consisted mostly in its greater stock of data relating to the natural sciences, especially chemistry and physiology. We find the narrow-minded philistine mode of thinking of the pre-Kantian period reproduced in its most banal form by Büchner and Vogt, and even Moleschott, who swears by Feuerbach, gets himself stuck most amusingly at every turn in the most simple categories. The jaded cart-horse of the commonplace bourgeois mind falters of course in confusion in front of the ditch separating substance from appearance, and cause from effect; but one should not ride cart-horses if one intends to go hunting over the very rough ground of abstract reasoning.

Here there was, therefore, a question to be solved which was not connected with political economy as such. How was science to be dealt with? There was, on the one hand, the Hegelian dialectic in the quite abstract, “speculative” form in which Hegel had left it, and on the other hand the ordinary, essentially Wolffian, metaphysical method, which had again come into vogue and which was used by bourgeois economists to write their bulky rambling volumes. The second method had been theoretically so demolished by Kant and particularly by Hegel that its continued use in practice could only be rendered possible by inertia and the absence of an alternative simple method. The Hegelian method, on the other hand, was in its existing form quite inapplicable. It was essentially idealist, while the task here was to elaborate a world outlook more materialist than any previous one. Hegel's method took as its point of departure pure thought, whereas here the starting point was to be inexorable facts. A method which,
according to its own avowal, “came from nothing through nothing to nothing”\(^a\) was in this shape by no means suitable. It was, nevertheless, the only element among the entire available logical material which could at least serve as a point of departure. It had not been subjected to criticism, had not been overthrown; none of the opponents of the great dialectician had been able to make a breach in its proud edifice. It has been forgotten because the Hegelian school did not know how to apply it. Hence, it was first of all essential to subject the Hegelian method to thoroughgoing criticism.

What distinguished Hegel’s mode of thinking from that of all other philosophers was the exceptional historical sense underlying it. However abstract and idealist the form employed, the development of his ideas runs always parallel to the development of world history, and the latter is indeed supposed to be only the proof of the former. Although this reversed the actual relation and stood it on its head, yet the real content was invariably incorporated in his philosophy, especially since Hegel—unlike his pupils—did not rely on ignorance, but was one of the most erudite thinkers of all time. He was the first to try to demonstrate that there is development, an intrinsic coherence in history, and however strange some things in his philosophy of history may seem to us now, the grandeur of the basic conception is still admirable today, compared with either his predecessors or those who following him ventured to advance general observations on history. This monumental conception of history pervades the *Phenomenology*, the *Aesthetics* and the *History of Philosophy*, and the material is everywhere set forth historically, in a definite historical context even if in an abstract distorted manner.

This epoch-making conception of history was the direct theoretical precondition of the new materialist outlook, and already this constituted a connecting link with the logical method as well. Since, even from the standpoint of “pure thinking”, this forgotten dialectics had led to such results, and had moreover with the greatest ease coped with the whole of the former logic and metaphysics, there had, at all events, to be more to it than sophistry and hairsplitting. But criticism of this method, which the entire official philosophy had evaded and still evades, was no small matter.

Marx was and is the only one who could undertake the work of extracting from the Hegelian logic the kernel containing Hegel’s

\(^a\) G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Th. 1, Abt. 2.—Ed.
real discoveries in this field, and of establishing the dialectical method, divested of its idealist wrappings, in the simple form in which it becomes the only correct mode of the development of thought. The working out of the method which underlies Marx's critique of political economy is, we think, a result hardly less significant than the basic materialist outlook.

Even after the determination of the method, the critique of political economy could still be arranged in two ways—historically or logically. Since in the course of history, as in its literary reflection, development proceeds by and large from the simplest to the more complex relations, the historical development of political economy constituted a natural clue, which the critique could take as a point of departure, and then the economic categories would appear on the whole in the same order as in the logical development. This form seems to have the advantage of greater lucidity, for it traces the actual development, but in fact it would thus become, at most, more popular. History often moves in leaps and bounds and in ziggags, and as this would have to be followed throughout, it would mean not only that a considerable amount of material of slight importance would have to be absorbed, but also that the train of thought would frequently have to be interrupted; it would, moreover, be impossible to write the history of political economy without that of bourgeois society, and the work would thus be endless because of the absence of all preliminary studies. The logical method of approach was therefore the only suitable one. This, however, is indeed nothing but the historical method, only stripped of the historical form and of interfering contingencies. The point where this history begins must also be the starting point of the train of thought, and its further progress will be simply the reflection, in abstract and theoretically consistent form, of the course of history, a corrected reflection, but corrected in accordance with laws provided by the actual course of history, since each moment can be examined at the stage of development where it reaches its full maturity, its classical form.

Using this method we begin with the first and simplest relation which is historically, actually available, thus in this context with the first economic relation to be found. We analyse this relation. The fact that it is a relation already implies that it has two aspects which are related to each other. Each of these aspects is examined separately; this reveals the nature of their attitude to one another, their reciprocal action. Contradictions will emerge which require a solution. But since we are not examining here an abstract mental
process that takes place solely in our mind, but an actual event which really took place at some time or other, or is still taking place, these contradictions, too, will have arisen in practice and have probably been solved. We shall trace the mode of this solution and find that it has been effected by establishing a new relation, whose two contradictory aspects we shall then have to set forth, and so on.

Political economy begins with commodities, with the moment when products are exchanged, either by individuals or by primitive communities. The product being exchanged is a commodity. But it is a commodity only because of the thing, the product being linked with a relation between two persons or communities, the relation between producer and consumer, who at this stage are no longer united in the same person. Here is at once an example of a peculiar fact, which pervades the whole of economics and has produced serious confusion in the minds of bourgeois economists: economics is not concerned with things but with relations between persons, and in the final analysis between classes; these relations, however, are always bound to things and appear as things. Some economists had an inkling of this connection in isolated instances, but Marx was the first to reveal its significance for the whole of economics, thus making the most difficult problems so simple and clear that even bourgeois economists will now be able to grasp them.

If we examine the various aspects of the commodity, i.e., of the fully evolved commodity and not as it at first slowly emerges in the spontaneous barter of two primitive communities, it presents itself to us from two angles, that of use value and of exchange value, and thus we come immediately to the sphere of economic debate. Anyone wishing to find a striking instance of the fact that the German dialectical method at its present stage of development is at least as superior to the old superficially glib metaphysical method as railways are to medieval means of transport, should look up Adam Smith or some other officially recognised economist of repute to see how much distress exchange value and use value caused these gentlemen, how much difficulty they had in distinguishing properly between the two and in grasping each of them in its peculiar determinateness, and then compare the clear, simple exposition given by Marx.

After use value and exchange value have been expounded, the commodity, seen as a direct unity of the two, is described as it enters the exchange process. The contradictions arising here may be
found on pp. 20 and 21. We merely note that these contradictions are not only of interest for theoretical, abstract reasons, but also reflect the difficulties arising from the nature of direct interchange, simple barter, and the impossibilities inevitably confronting this first crude form of exchange. The solution of these impossibilities is achieved by investing a specific commodity—money—with the attribute of representing the exchange value of all other commodities. Money or simple circulation is then analysed in the second chapter, namely 1) money as a measure of value, in which context value measured in terms of money, i.e. price, is more closely defined; 2) money as a means of circulation and 3) as the unity of the two aspects, as real money, which represents the entire bourgeois material wealth. This concludes the first part, the conversion of money into capital being left for the second part.

We see that with this method, logical development need by no means be confined to the purely abstract sphere. On the contrary, it requires historical illustration and continuous contact with reality. A great variety of such evidence is therefore included, comprising references both to the actual course of history at various stages of social development and to literature on economics, in which the working out of lucid definitions of economic relations is traced from the beginning. The criticism of particular, more or less one-sided or confused points of view is thus given essentially already in the logical exposition and can be kept quite short.

The economic content of the book itself will be discussed in a third article.

Written between August 3 and 15, 1859
First published in Das Volk, Nos. 14 and 16, August 6 and 20, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

---

a See present edition, Vol. 30.—Ed.
b Ibid.—Ed.
The British Board of Trade has just published returns of the exports for the first six months of the present year, while its table of the declared values of the imports embraces only the five months ending May 31. On comparing the corresponding periods of 1858 and 1859, it will be found that, with some small exceptions not worth mentioning, the British imports from the United States had generally decreased, in value at least, while the British exports to this country were increasing in quantity as well as in value. To illustrate this fact, we have extracted the following tabular statement from the official returns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Declared value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>£</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottons, yards</td>
<td>60,150,771</td>
<td>110,360,198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H'ware &amp; Cut., cwt.</td>
<td>35,349</td>
<td>78,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linens, yards</td>
<td>17,379,691</td>
<td>31,170,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron, Pig, tuns</td>
<td>22,745</td>
<td>39,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bar, Bolt and Rod</td>
<td>21,463</td>
<td>56,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wrought</td>
<td>9,153</td>
<td>19,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheet and nails, cwt.</td>
<td>5,293</td>
<td>15,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead, tuns</td>
<td>1,214</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a "Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1859"; "Real Value of the Principal Articles Imported. An Account of the Computed Real Value of the Principal Articles of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise Imported in the Five Months Ended 31st May 1859", The Economist, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—Ed.
The returns of the British Exports show, generally, an increase not only on 1858, but also on 1857, as will be seen from the following statement:

BRITISH IMPORTS FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR FIVE MONTHS ENDING MAY 31.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Quantities</th>
<th>Declared value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>£371,452</td>
<td>£7,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat and Corn Flour</td>
<td>693,847</td>
<td>14,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton (raw)</td>
<td>11,631,523</td>
<td>10,486,418</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On closer examination, however, it becomes evident that not only the total increase in the value of the exports of 1859 over those of 1857 is due to the extension of the commerce with India, but that there would have been a falling off of more than £2,000,000 in the general British export trade of 1859—as compared with that of 1857—if India had not made up more than the deficit. On the market of the world, therefore, all traces of the crisis of 1857 have not yet altogether disappeared. The most important and surprising feature of the Board of Trade Returns is, undoubtedly, the rapid development of the British export trade to the East Indies. Let us first by official figures, illustrate the fact:

---

\[ \text{Ed.} \]

\[ \text{"The Board of Trade Returns for the Half-Year Ending June 30, 1859", The Economist, No. 831, July 30, 1859.} \]
## EXPORTS TO BRITISH EAST INDIES,
### 6 MONTHS ENDING JUNE 30.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1856</th>
<th>1857</th>
<th>1858</th>
<th>1859</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beer and Ale</td>
<td>£210,431</td>
<td>£130,213</td>
<td>£474,438</td>
<td>£569,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cottons, Calicoes, &amp;c.</td>
<td>2,554,976</td>
<td>3,116,869</td>
<td>4,523,849</td>
<td>6,094,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Yarn</td>
<td>579,807</td>
<td>540,576</td>
<td>967,332</td>
<td>1,280,435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earthenware and Porcelain</td>
<td>30,374</td>
<td>23,521</td>
<td>43,975</td>
<td>43,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haberdashery and Millinery</td>
<td>39,854</td>
<td>70,502</td>
<td>77,319</td>
<td>105,723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardwares and Cutlery</td>
<td>84,758</td>
<td>101,083</td>
<td>139,813</td>
<td>153,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saddlery and Harness</td>
<td>12,339</td>
<td>15,587</td>
<td>35,947</td>
<td>19,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery—steam-engines</td>
<td>[37,503]</td>
<td>54,074</td>
<td>59,104</td>
<td>100,803[a]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other sorts</td>
<td>156,028</td>
<td>313,461</td>
<td>179,255</td>
<td>179,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron—bar, bolt, and rod (exclusive of railway iron)</td>
<td>506,201</td>
<td>228,838</td>
<td>166,321</td>
<td>172,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Iron</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>272,812</td>
<td>475,413</td>
<td>578,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iron—wrought (exclusive of railway iron)</td>
<td>266,355</td>
<td>217,484</td>
<td>192,711</td>
<td>242,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copper—unwrought</td>
<td>62,928</td>
<td>34,139</td>
<td>9,018</td>
<td>51,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheets and Nails</td>
<td>144,218</td>
<td>228,325</td>
<td>318,381</td>
<td>205,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td>23,995</td>
<td>31,119</td>
<td>21,849</td>
<td>4,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationery</td>
<td>66,495</td>
<td>79,968</td>
<td>86,425</td>
<td>89,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen Cloths</td>
<td>96,045</td>
<td>166,509</td>
<td>202,076</td>
<td>174,826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** ................................| £4,872,307 | £5,625,080 | £7,964,930 | £10,065,767

Recollecting the fact that for about 16 years—from 1840 to 1856—the British export trade to India was generally stationary, although there was sometimes a small rise beyond, sometimes a perceptible fall below the average figure of £8,000,000—one is rather startled to see this stationary trade doubled in the short interval of two years, and that sudden progress, too, taking place at the epoch of an atrocious servile war.\(^{363}\) The question whether this expansion of commerce is due to only temporary circumstances or to a bona fide development of Indian demand, derives its peculiar interest from the present conjuncture of Indian finances which forces the British Government to ask Parliament for leave to contract a new Indian loan in London, and which, simultaneously, induces even the London Times to moot the question whether, after all, England had not better confine

---

\(^{a}\) The figures in square brackets are missing in the New-York Daily Tribune and are given here according to The Economist, No. 831, July 30, 1859.—Ed.
herself to the three old provinces and restore the rest of the Peninsula to its native rulers. a

With the scanty materials before us, it would be impossible to arrive at a categorical judgment as to the real character of the sudden expansion of the British export trade to India, but all the data known incline us to the opinion that transitory circumstances have, so to say, swelled that trade beyond its organic dimensions. In the first instance, we are unable to discover any peculiar movement in the British imports from India which might have led to the increase of exports to that country. There has been an increase in some articles, but it is almost balanced by a decrease in others; and, altogether, the vacillations of the Indian exports are too feeble to account one way or the other for the sudden changes in the imports thither. The civil war may, however, have helped the English to explore countries formerly little known, and the soldier may thus have cleared the way for the merchant. Besides, an excessive import and accumulation of silver has of late years been going on in India, and even the Hindoo, somewhat vivified by the scenes of excitement just passed through, may have encroached upon his hoarding mania, and, to some degree, taken to spending silver instead of burying it. Still, we are not warranted in laying too great stress upon such hypotheses, especially as, on the other side, the positive fact stares us in the face of an extraordinary Government expenditure to the annual amount of about £14,000,000. This state of things, while it sufficiently accounts for the sudden growth of the English export trade to India, can hardly be thought to prognosticate a long continuance of this new movement. The most lasting effect will probably be the complete destruction of Indian native industry, since, as the reader will have seen from the last tabular statement, the surplus of British exports to India is principally due to the intrusion of British cottons and cotton-yarns. Overtrading on the part of Manchester may, to some degree, also have contributed to swell the figures of the British export table.

Written about August 5, 1859
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5717, August 19, 1859 as a leading article

---
a The Times, No. 23375, August 3, 1859 (leading article).—Ed.
Every day throws new light on the words and acts of Napoleon III in Italy, and helps us to understand what freedom “from the Alps to the Adriatic”\(^a\) means on his lips. The war, so far as he was concerned, was only another French expedition to Rome—on a grander scale in all respects, to be sure, but in motive and results not dissimilar to that “Republican” enterprise.\(^364\) Having “saved” France from a European war by concluding the treaty of Villafranca, the Liberator is now about to “save” Italian society by the compulsory restoration of the princes, whom a word from the Tuileries drove from power, and by the military suppression of popular movements in Central Italy and the Legations.\(^b\) While the British press was teeming with vague conjectures and on dits\(^c\) as to the probable changes which the stipulations of Villafranca were likely to undergo in the Conference at Zurich, and Lord John Russell, with the incorrigible indiscretion that induced Lord Palmerston to intrust the seals of the Foreign Office to him, felt himself warranted in the solemn declaration to the House of Commons\(^d\) that Bonaparte would abstain from lending his bayonets to the dethroned princes, the Wiener Zeitung of August 8 appeared, headed by the following official declaration:

“The Zurich Conference is about to meet, in order definitively to conclude the peace of which the main features were agreed upon at Villafranca. It is difficult for one who considers this evident significance of the Conference, to understand how

\(^{a}\) Napoleon III, “Proclamation, L’empereur au peuple français”, Le Moniteur universel, special edition, May 3, 1859.— Ed.
\(^{b}\) See this volume, p. 357.— Ed.
\(^{c}\) Rumours.— Ed.
\(^{d}\) John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons of July 22, 1859, The Times, No. 23366, July 23, 1859.— Ed.
the press, not only abroad but even in Austria, could have felt at liberty to express doubts with respect to the execution or the practicableness of the Villafranca stipulations. Sealed by the signs manual of the two Emperors, those peace preliminaries possess the guaranty of their execution in the pledges and the power of two monarchs."a

This is plain language. On the one hand, there are the vain declamations of the deluded Italians; on the other hand, there is the "Sic volo, sic jubeo"b of Francis Joseph and Louis Bonaparte, which is backed by bayonets, rifled cannon and other "armes de précision."c If the Italian patriots refuse to yield to oily persuasions, they must give way to brute force. There is no other alternative, Lord John Russell's declaration—which he probably uttered in perfect good faith, as it was only put in his mouth that it might help to get rid of the British Parliament during the period appointed for crushing Italy under the iron heel of the allied despots—to the contrary notwithstanding. As to the Pope's temporal power in the Legations, Louis Napoleon did not even wait for the end of the war to dictate its maintenance. The preliminaries of Villafranca stipulate for the restoration of the Austrian princes in Tuscany and Modena. The return of the Duchess of Parma to power was not included in the stipulations, for Francis Joseph wished to wreak his vengeance upon that princess for having declined openly to pin her fortunes to those of Austria. Yet with his native magnanimity Louis Napoleon has condescended to listen to the humble prayers of the donna errante.d

Through the instrumentality of Walewski he has pledged his word of honor to Sr. Mon, the Spanish Ambassador at Paris, who is also the Plenipotentiary of the Duchess, that she shall be restored to a throne over the same extent of territory as before, with the single exception, perhaps, of the fortress of Piacenza, which is to be made over to Victor Emmanuel in case he behave well at the Conference at Zurich. At the idea of playing protector to the sister of the Bourbons, the parvenu not only felt immensely flattered, but thought that he had at last hit upon a sure means of conciliating the good will of the Faubourg St. Germain, which had hitherto scornfully repulsed his advances and held toward him a haughty attitude of reserve.

---

a The declaration from the Wiener Zeitung of August 8, 1859 (evening edition) is quoted in the Allgemeine Zeitung, No: 223, August 11, 1859.— Ed.
b "Thus I wish it, thus I order it" (Juvenal. Satires, VI, 223).— Ed.
c Precision weapons (rifled guns).— Ed.
d Lady-errant.— Ed.
But how was the "Liberator of Nationalities" to become the missionary of "Law and Order," the savior of "instituted society"? How successfully assume this less poetic role? It was a long step downward. To create and protract the incertitude of the public as to the true meaning of the Villafranca preliminaries, and to indulge it with wild rumors and sage conjectures, was obviously one method gradually to prepare Europe for the worst. Lord Palmerston, who hates Austria, professes to love Italy, and is notoriously the confidant of Napoleon III, has helped the Man of December over this slippery ground. Having ousted the Derby Ministry, because of their Austrian sympathies, Palmerston seemed to have pledged himself to all Europe, and especially to Italy for the upright intentions of Napoleon III, his august ally. And so, he has quietly put Parliament out of the way, if, indeed, he has not sent it home with a deliberate falsehood in its ear. His positive declaration that England had not yet made up her mind whether or no to participate in the European Congress—a—which will probably sanction the conclusions of the Zurich Conference, and thus lighten the burden of odium which would otherwise rest upon Napoleon's shoulders, by distributing it among all the Powers of Europe,—is contradicted by the Prussian papers, which have published a semi-official note, stating that England and Russia have conjointly called upon the Court of Berlin, and demanded its concurrence in this European Congress.

Napoleon's second step, which he did not take until the feverish excitement of the public mind had been somewhat allayed, was in Sardinia. He strove to induce Victor Emmanuel to do his work for him—a thing not easily to be managed. Whatever Austria and her dependents had lost, Victor Emmanuel seemed to have gained. He had become, in point of fact though not yet in name, the regent of Central Italy and of the Legations, the inhabitants of which countries generally proclaimed his dynasty out of hatred to Austria, if not from love of Piedmont. The first demand which the French crusader of liberty made of his new vassal was that he should resign his official leadership of the popular movement. This Victor Emmanuel could not refuse. He withdrew the Sardinian commissioners from the Duchies and the Papal territories, recalling Boncompagni from Florence, Massimo d'Azeglio

---

a Lord Palmerston's speech in the House of Commons on August 8, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23380, August 9, 1859.—Ed.
b The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 223, August 11, 1859.—Ed.
from the Romagna, and Farini (in his official capacity at least) from Modena.366

But the Imperial liberator was not yet satisfied. From previous experience in France he had seen reason to conclude that under proper management popular suffrage forms the best machinery in the world by which to establish a despotism upon a firm and comely basis. The King of Sardinia was, consequently, requested to operate upon the popular elections in the insurgent provinces so as to make the restoration of their princes appear to be the will of the people. Victor Emmanuel would not, of course, hear of a request, the fulfillment of which was sure to blight forever the prospects of Italian freedom, and to change _evvivas_ into a general cry of execration throughout the Peninsula. He is said to have answered Count de Reiset, the French tempter, in these words:

"Monsieur, I am, first of all, an Italian Prince; do not forget that fact. The interests of Italy appear to me of more consequence than those of Europe, to which you have been pleased to allude. I cannot lend the authority of my name to the restoration of the dethroned princes; I will not do so. I have already been too indulgent in allowing things to follow their own course as they do."

And the chivalrous King is even said to have added:

"If armed intervention is determined upon, you will hear from me. As to the Confederation, my interest and my honor are alike opposed to it, and I will, therefore, combat it to the death."3

Soon after this reply was transmitted to Paris, the famous article of Granier de Cassagnac on Italian ingratitude,\(^b\) containing the sinister intimation that if the protection of a mighty hand was withdrawn, the Austrian eagle would soon perch on the royal palace of Turin, made its appearance. Victor Emmanuel was presently informed that his possession of Piacenza would depend on his good behavior, and that the relative influence of the Italian Princes in the proposed Confederation was still a matter of debate. And the final blow was given to him by bringing the question of the nationality of Savoy upon the carpet, accompanied with an intimation that, if Bonaparte had aided Victor Emmanuel in freeing Italy from the yoke of Austria, he could hardly refuse to free Savoy from the yoke of Sardinia. These menaces soon assumed a tangible shape in the agitation which, on a signal from Paris, broke out among the feudal and Catholic party of Savoy.

---

\(^a\) Cf. "Nouvelles d'Italie (Correspondance particulière de L'Indépendance belge). Turin, 5 août", L'Indépendance belge, No. 221, August 9, 1859.— _Ed._

\(^b\) A. Granier de Cassagnac, "Ingratitude de l'Italie", _Le Constitutionnel_, No. 215, August 3, 1859.— _Ed._
“The Savoyards,” exclaimed a Paris paper, “are weary of spending their money and shedding the blood of their sons for the Italian cause.”

This was a strong *argumentum ad hominem* to Victor Emmanuel and if he has not directly accepted the task set before him, there is some reason to fear that he has at least promised to pave the way for armed French intervention. If the intelligence contained in the telegram dated Parma, Aug. 9, according to which “the Piedmontese have been driven from the city, and the Red Republic proclaimed, while property-holders and the friends of order are taking flight,”\(^a\) is to be relied upon, it is ominous of the future. But true or false, it may well be the signal for the “Savior of Order and Property,” to intervene, to march his Zouaves against the “incorrigible anarchists,” and to clear the road for the returning princes, one of whom, the son in whose behalf the Grand Duke of Tuscany\(^b\) abdicated, has met with a “cordial reception” at the Tuileries. And the French troops, who are on their way home, have received orders to stay in Italy, so that the obstacles in the way of successful negotiations at Zurich will soon disappear.

Written in mid-August 1859  

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5725, August 29, 1859 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1488, August 30, 1859 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 938, September 3, 1859

---


\(^b\) The reference is to Ferdinand IV and his father Leopold II.—*Ed.*
A Blue Book, headed "Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in each of the last fifteen years from 1844 to 1858," was presented to both Houses of Parliament during the last session. Dry as the figures, arrayed in the close columns of the official print, may look, they contain, in fact, more valuable contributions to the history of the national movement than volumes of rhetorical claptrap and political gossip. The first item that calls for our attention, is the population tables, but, strange to say, the figures relating to the movement of the population of Ireland during the fifteen years are altogether omitted. The Scotch table shows but feeble oscillations which we shall not dwell upon. The following is an account of the population movement in England and Wales:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Estim'd Popula'n.</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Marriages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>16,520,000</td>
<td>540,763</td>
<td>356,950</td>
<td>132,249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>16,721,000</td>
<td>543,521</td>
<td>349,366</td>
<td>143,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>16,925,000</td>
<td>572,625</td>
<td>390,315</td>
<td>145,664</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>17,132,000</td>
<td>539,965</td>
<td>423,304</td>
<td>135,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>17,340,000</td>
<td>563,059</td>
<td>399,800</td>
<td>138,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>17,552,000</td>
<td>578,159</td>
<td>440,853</td>
<td>141,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>17,766,000</td>
<td>593,422</td>
<td>368,986</td>
<td>151,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>17,983,000</td>
<td>615,865</td>
<td>395,174</td>
<td>154,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>18,205,000</td>
<td>624,171</td>
<td>407,938</td>
<td>158,439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>18,403,000</td>
<td>612,391</td>
<td>421,097</td>
<td>164,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>18,618,000</td>
<td>634,506</td>
<td>438,239</td>
<td>159,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>18,787,000</td>
<td>635,123</td>
<td>426,242</td>
<td>151,774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>19,045,000</td>
<td>657,704</td>
<td>391,369</td>
<td>159,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>19,305,000</td>
<td>663,071</td>
<td>419,815</td>
<td>159,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>19,523,000</td>
<td>655,627</td>
<td>450,018</td>
<td>154,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Face to face with this population table we place the statements respecting crime and pauperism of England and Wales:

COMMITTED FOR TRIAL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>21,549</td>
<td>4,993</td>
<td>26,542</td>
<td>18,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>19,341</td>
<td>4,962</td>
<td>24,303</td>
<td>17,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>19,850</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>25,107</td>
<td>18,144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>22,903</td>
<td>5,930</td>
<td>28,833</td>
<td>21,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>24,586</td>
<td>5,763</td>
<td>30,349</td>
<td>22,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>22,415</td>
<td>5,401</td>
<td>27,816</td>
<td>21,001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>21,548</td>
<td>5,265</td>
<td>26,813</td>
<td>20,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>22,391</td>
<td>5,569</td>
<td>27,960</td>
<td>21,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>21,885</td>
<td>5,625</td>
<td>27,510</td>
<td>21,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>20,879</td>
<td>6,178</td>
<td>27,057</td>
<td>20,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>22,723</td>
<td>6,636</td>
<td>29,359</td>
<td>23,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>19,890</td>
<td>6,082</td>
<td>25,972</td>
<td>19,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>15,425</td>
<td>4,012</td>
<td>19,437</td>
<td>14,734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>15,970</td>
<td>4,299</td>
<td>20,269</td>
<td>15,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>13,865</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>17,855</td>
<td>13,246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The tabular statement relating to the number of paupers (exclusive of vagrants) in receipt of relief in the several unions and parishes under Boards of Guardians in England and Wales, begins with the year 1849:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total of Paupers</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total of Paupers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>934,419</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>818,337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>920,543</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>851,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>860,893</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>877,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>834,424</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>843,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>798,822</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>908,186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparing these three tables of population, crime and pauperism, it will be found that from 1844 to 1854 crime grew faster than population, while pauperism from 1849 to 1858 remained almost stationary, despite the enormous changes worked during that interval in the state of British society. Three great facts mark the decennial period of 1849-1858—facts which would almost justify us in comparing that period to the most illustrious epochs of the 16th century. The corn laws had been repealed, the gold fields discovered, and an immense emigration had taken place. There were, besides, other circumstances which gave a new start to industry and commerce. From revolutionary convulsions, Europe had turned to an industrial mania. The conquest of the Punjaub, and then the Russian war and the Asiatic wars, had
made accessible markets till then almost unknown. Finally, the United States’ import of British produce had developed itself in dimensions not even suspected ten years before. The whole market of the world had expanded and seemed to have doubled or trebled its powers of absorption. And with all this, during this memorable decennial epoch, the stationary million of English paupers is diminished only by 26,233 individuals. If we compare the years 1853 and 1858, it has even increased by 109,364.

There must be something rotten in the very core of a social system which increases its wealth without diminishing its misery, and increases in crimes even more rapidly than in numbers. It is true enough that, if we compare the year 1855 with the preceding years, there seems to have occurred a sensible decrease of crime from 1855 to 1858. The total number of people committed for trial, which in 1854 amounted to 29,359, had sunk down to 17,855 in 1858; and the number of convicted had also greatly fallen off, if not quite in the same ratio. This apparent decrease of crime, however, since 1854, is to be exclusively attributed to some technical changes in British jurisdiction; to the Juvenile Offenders’ act in the first instance, and, in the second instance, to the operation of the Criminal Justice act of 1855, which authorizes the Police Magistrates to pass sentences for short periods, with the consent of the prisoners. Violations of the law are generally the offspring of economical agencies beyond the control of the legislator, but, as the working of the Juvenile Offenders’ act testifies, it depends to some degree on official society to stamp certain violations of its rules as crimes or as transgressions only. This difference of nomenclature, so far from being indifferent, decides on the fate of thousands of men, and the moral tone of society. Law itself may not only punish crime, but improvise it, and the law of professional lawyers is very apt to work in this direction. Thus, it has been justly remarked by an eminent historian, that the Catholic clergy of the medieval times, with its dark views of human nature, introduced by its influence into criminal legislation, has created more crimes than forgiven sins.

Strange to say, the only part of the United Kingdom in which crime has seriously decreased, say by 50, and even by 75 per cent, is Ireland. How can we harmonize this fact with the public-opinion slang of England, according to which Irish nature, instead of British misrule, is responsible for Irish shortcomings? It is, again, no act on the part of the British ruler, but simply the consequence of a famine, an exodus, and a general combination of circumstances favorable to the demand for Irish labor, that has
worked this happy change in Irish nature. However that may be, the significance of the following tabular statements cannot be misunderstood:

I.—CRIMES IN IRELAND.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Convicted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>14,799</td>
<td>4,649</td>
<td>19,448</td>
<td>8,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>12,807</td>
<td>3,889</td>
<td>16,696</td>
<td>7,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>14,204</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>18,492</td>
<td>8,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>23,552</td>
<td>7,657</td>
<td>31,209</td>
<td>15,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>28,765</td>
<td>9,757</td>
<td>38,522</td>
<td>18,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>31,340</td>
<td>10,649</td>
<td>41,989</td>
<td>21,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>22,682</td>
<td>8,644</td>
<td>31,326</td>
<td>17,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>17,337</td>
<td>7,347</td>
<td>24,684</td>
<td>14,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>12,444</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>17,678</td>
<td>10,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>10,260</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td>15,144</td>
<td>8,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>7,937</td>
<td>3,851</td>
<td>11,788</td>
<td>7,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>6,019</td>
<td>2,993</td>
<td>9,012</td>
<td>5,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>5,097</td>
<td>2,002</td>
<td>7,099</td>
<td>4,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>5,458</td>
<td>1,752</td>
<td>7,210</td>
<td>3,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>4,708</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>6,308</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II.—PAUPERS IN IRELAND.a

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total of Paupers</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total of Paupers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>620,747</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>106,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>307,970</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>86,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>209,187</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>73,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>171,418</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>56,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>141,822</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>50,582</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is to be regretted that the emigration table does not specify the different parts of the United Kingdom, from which the movement started, and the ratio in which each part has

---

a The figures that follow were taken by the editors of the present edition from the "Statistical Abstract" used by Marx. In the New-York Daily Tribune the following table, referring to Scotland, was published under the heading "Paupers in Ireland":

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>No. of Parishes</th>
<th>Paupers</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>No. of Parishes</th>
<th>Paupers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>82,357</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>78,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>79,031</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>79,887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>76,906</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>79,973</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>75,111</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>79,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>75,437</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>883</td>
<td>79,199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Ed.
contributed to the general result. From the table, such as it is, it will be inferred, that from 1844 to 1847, the emigration to the British North American Colonies bade fair to approximate, if not to outstrip the emigration to the United States. From 1848, however, the emigration to British North America settles down into a mere appendage of the emigration to the United States. On the other hand, British emigration to Australia and New Zealand is developing itself during the 15 years from 1844 to 1858 in rapid strides. While the emigration to the North American Colonies reaches its climax in 1847, and that to the United States in 1851, the emigration to Australia and New Zealand stands on its apogee in 1852. From that time down to 1858, there is a continuous fall in the number of emigrants, the total number of which in 1852 had ascended to 368,764, being brought down, in 1858 to 113,972, or by more than 75 per cent. The following is the table alluded to:

### NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO VARIOUS DESTINATIONS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To the N.A.</th>
<th>To the</th>
<th>Australia and</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>22,924</td>
<td>43,660</td>
<td>2,229</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>70,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>31,803</td>
<td>58,538</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>93,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>43,439</td>
<td>82,239</td>
<td>2,347</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>129,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>109,680</td>
<td>142,154</td>
<td>4,949</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>258,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>31,065</td>
<td>188,233</td>
<td>23,904</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>248,089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>41,367</td>
<td>219,450</td>
<td>32,191</td>
<td>6,490</td>
<td>299,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>32,961</td>
<td>223,078</td>
<td>16,037</td>
<td>8,773</td>
<td>280,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>42,605</td>
<td>267,357</td>
<td>21,532</td>
<td>4,472</td>
<td>335,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>32,873</td>
<td>244,261</td>
<td>87,881</td>
<td>3,749</td>
<td>368,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>34,522</td>
<td>230,885</td>
<td>61,401</td>
<td>3,129</td>
<td>329,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>43,761</td>
<td>193,065</td>
<td>83,237</td>
<td>3,366</td>
<td>323,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>17,966</td>
<td>103,414</td>
<td>52,309</td>
<td>3,118</td>
<td>176,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>16,378</td>
<td>111,837</td>
<td>44,584</td>
<td>3,755</td>
<td>176,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>21,001</td>
<td>126,905</td>
<td>61,248</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>212,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>9,704</td>
<td>59,716</td>
<td>39,295</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>113,972</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Written on August 23, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5741, September 16, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper
Karl Marx

MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCE

London, Sept. 5, 1859

Having considered, in a former letter, the movement in the population of the Kingdom, we turn now to the movement of production. In the following tabular statements the exports are given for every year since 1844, while the figures relating to imports begin with the year 1854, an anomaly due to the circumstance that the computed real value of imports was not officially ascertained before 1854:

A—EXPORTS.

Total Declared Real Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>£</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>58,534,705</td>
<td>1852</td>
<td>78,076,854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>60,111,082</td>
<td>1853</td>
<td>98,933,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>57,786,876</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>97,184,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>58,842,377</td>
<td>1855</td>
<td>95,688,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>52,849,445</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>115,826,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>63,596,025</td>
<td>1857</td>
<td>122,066,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>71,367,885</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>116,608,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>74,448,722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a See this volume, pp. 487-91.—Ed.
b "Commerce of the British Empire. The Result of Recent Commercial Legislation. II. Declared Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom to Various Foreign Countries and British Possessions", The Economist, No. 803 (supplement), January 15, 1859; "The Customs Report. The Trade of 1857 and 1858", The Economist, No. 833, August 13, 1859.—Ed.
B—IMPORTS.

Total Computed Real Value of Merchandise Imported into the United Kingdom:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>£</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>152,389,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>143,542,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1856</td>
<td>172,544,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>187,844,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>163,795,803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the first table it will be seen that exports, and consequently production had more than doubled in the period from 1844 to 1857, while population, as may be proved from the figures quoted in my former letter, had, during the same interval, hardly increased by 18 per cent. A curious answer this to the doctrine of Parson Malthus, the sinecurist. Table A moreover illustrates a law of production which might be proved with mathematical nicety, by comparing the returns of British exports since 1797. The law is this: That if, by over-production and over-speculation, a crisis has been brought about, still the productive powers of the nation and the faculty of absorption on the market of the world, have, in the mean time, so much expanded, that they will only temporarily recede from the highest point reached, and that after some oscillations spreading over some years, the scale of production which marked the highest point of prosperity in one period of the commercial cycle, becomes the starting point of the subsequent period. Thus the year 1845 marks the summit of productive power developed during the commercial cycle of 1837 to 1847. In 1846 the reaction begins; there is a catastrophe in 1847, the consequences of which but fully manifest themselves in 1848, when the magnitude of exports falls even below 1844. In 1849, however, there takes place not only a recovery, but the figures of 1845, the year of highest prosperity during the last cycle, are already outstripped by three millions, and this year marks now the level to which exports will never again sink during the new cycle. The highest point is again reached in 1857, the year of the crisis, whose agonies are registered in the diminished exports of 1858. But already, in 1859, the summit of the period 1847-1857 has been converted into the starting point of a new commercial cycle—a point to which the productive powers are not likely again to recede.

---

By comparing tables A and B, it will be found that British exports do considerably fall below British imports, and that this disproportion is growing as regularly as the magnitude of the exports. Now, this phenomenon has been interpreted by some English writers as if the unhappy Britishers were running into debt with other nations, or selling cheap and buying dear, thus making a present to the outer world of part of their industry. The simple fact is, that Great Britain receives, in the shape of imports from other nations, some returns for no equivalent whatever, as is the case in the Indian tributes raised under different forms, and other returns for the interest on capital lent out at former periods. The growing disproportion between British imports and exports, therefore, does only prove that England, in regard to the markets of the world, develops its function as money-lender still more rapidly than its function as manufacturer and merchant.

Of the articles of import, there are four which claim some attention, viz.: bullion, corn, cotton, and wool. On former occasions, the movements in the British imports and exports of bullion have been explained in the *N.-Y. Tribune*, which, at the time of the last commercial crisis, proved, from official figures, that the amount of Bank of England notes in circulation had rather diminished than increased since the new gold fields came into play.\(^a\) We shall, therefore, not recur to this subject, but limit ourselves to stating a fact not yet, as far as we know, noticed by English writers. The amount of the metallic coin circulating in a nation may be fairly inferred from the operations of the national mint. In order, then, to ascertain the movement of the metallic currency in Great Britain during the operation of the Californian and Australian diggings, we give the following table, showing the amount of metal coined at the royal mint:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Gold.</th>
<th>Silver.</th>
<th>Copper.</th>
<th>Total.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1844</td>
<td>£3,563,949</td>
<td>£626,670</td>
<td>£7,246</td>
<td>£4,197,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1845</td>
<td>4,244,608</td>
<td>647,658</td>
<td>6,944</td>
<td>4,899,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1846</td>
<td>4,334,911</td>
<td>559,548</td>
<td>6,496</td>
<td>4,900,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>5,158,440</td>
<td>125,730</td>
<td>8,960</td>
<td>5,293,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>2,451,999</td>
<td>35,442</td>
<td>2,688</td>
<td>2,490,129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1849</td>
<td>2,177,955</td>
<td>119,592</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>2,299,339</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 8-12.—*Ed.*
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
1850 | £1,491,836 | £129,096 | £448 | £1,621,380
1851 | 4,400,411 | 87,868 | 3,584 | 4,491,863
1852 | 8,742,270 | 189,596 | 4,312 | 8,936,178
1853 | 11,952,591 | 701,544 | 10,190 | 12,664,325
1854 | 4,152,183 | 140,480 | 61,538 | 4,354,201
1855 | 9,008,665 | 195,510 | 41,091 | 9,245,264
1856 | 6,002,114 | 462,528 | 11,418 | 6,476,060
1857 | 4,859,860 | 373,230 | 6,720 | 5,239,810
1858 | 1,231,023 | 445,896 | 13,440 | 1,690,359

We shall compare the totals, since the silver and copper coins must be regarded as mere tokens replacing the gold coin, so that for the consideration of the general movement of the metallic currency, it becomes quite indifferent, whether the gold coin has been circulated itself or whether its fractional parts were represented by metallic marks.

The fifteen years over which the above tabular statement expands, may be divided into two almost equal periods, the one of which precedes the operation on Great Britain of the new gold countries while the other is characterized by the rapid influx of gold from new sources. The first period we date from 1844 to 1850, the second we date from 1851 to 1858; the year 1851 being remarkable for the beginning agency of the New South Wales and Victoria diggings, as well as for the immense development of the California gold supply, which from £11,700 in 1848, £1,600,000 in 1849, £5,000,000 in 1850, had swelled to £8,250,300 in 1851. By summing up the totals of metal coined in the period of 1844 to 1850 on the one hand, and in the period of 1851 to 1858 on the other, and then calculating the yearly average in each period, it will be found, that the yearly average coinage during the former seven years amounted to £3,643,144, while, for the latter eight years, it reached the sum of £7,137,782. The metallic currency of Great Britain, consequently, has almost increased by 100 per cent during the period falling into the operation of the new gold supplies. This would certainly prove the influence California and Australia exercised on the development of internal British commerce, but it would be quite incorrect to conclude that the metallic circulation was directly increased by the influx of new gold. The contrary is shown by comparing the single years of the two periods, before and after the gold discoveries. In 1854, for

---

*The figures published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* are inaccurate.—Ed.
instance, the coinage falls below that of 1845 and 1846, and in 1858 it sinks far below the level of 1844. The mass of gold entering the circulation in the shape of coin was, therefore, not determined by the import of gold bullion; but of the gold imports, a greater part was, on an average absorbed into the inner circulation during the second epoch, because commercial and industrial pursuits had generally expanded; an expansion, however, which to a great extent may be traced to the working of the new gold countries.

Written on September 5, 1859

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5747, September 23, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper
You will recollect that about a year ago I made, through the columns of the *Tribune*, some curious revelations in regard to a certain Bangya, his mission to Circassia and the squabbles hence arising between the Hungarian and Polish emigrations at Constantinople. Although the facts then stated by me afterward found their way into the European press, no attempt to dispute their accuracy has ever been ventured upon. I have now to call the attention of your readers to another secret chapter of contemporaneous history; I mean the connection between Kossuth and Bonaparte. It cannot longer be tolerated that the same men should receive with the one hand the pay of the assassin of the French Republic, and in the other hand hoist the banner of liberty; that they should play the part of both martyrs and courtiers; that, having become the tools of an atrocious usurper, they should still exhibit themselves as the organs of an oppressed nation. I think the moment the more opportune for revealing facts long known to me, as Bonaparte and his sycophants, Kossuth and his partisans, are equally busy in throwing a vail over transactions which could not fail to compromise the one before the monarchs, and the other before the peoples of the world.

It will be admitted by the most prejudiced admirers of Mr. Kossuth that, whatever his other accomplishments may be, he has always sadly lacked one great quality—that of consistency. During the whole course of his life he has more resembled the *improvisatore* receiving his impressions from his audience than the author imprinting his own original ideas upon the world. This

---

*See this volume, pp. 21-27.—Ed.*
inconsistency of thought could not but reflect itself in duplicity of action. A few facts may illustrate the truth of this assertion. At Kutaya, Mr. Kossuth entered into an intimate liaison with Mr. David Urquhart, and, accepting at once the prejudices of that romantic Highlander, he did not hesitate to pass sentence on Mazzini as a Russian agent. He formally pledged himself to keep aloof from Mazzini. But he had hardly arrived at London when he formed a triumvirate with Mazzini and Ledru-Rollin.\textsuperscript{371} The incontestable proofs of this double-dealing have been laid before the British public in the correspondence carried on between L. Kossuth and David Urquhart, which the latter gentleman has printed in the London \textit{Free Press}.\textsuperscript{a} In the first speech Mr. Kossuth made on landing on the English coast, he called Palmerston the friend of his bosom. Palmerston, through the instrumentality of a well-known member of Parliament,\textsuperscript{b} intimated to Kossuth his desire to receive the latter at his mansion. Kossuth demanded to be received by the British Minister as Governor of Hungary, a request which, of course, was at once scornfully rejected. Mr. Kossuth, on his part, now gave, through Mr. Urquhart and other acquaintances of his, the British public to understand that he had rejected Palmerston’s invitation because he had made sure, from a close study at Kutaya of the Blue Book relating to Hungarian affairs,\textsuperscript{c} that Palmerston, the “friend of his bosom,” had, in secret understanding with the Court of St. Petersburg, played the traitor to “dear Hungary.” In 1853, when a Mazzinin \textit{émeute}\textsuperscript{d} broke out at Milan, there appeared on the walls of that town a proclamation addressed to the Hungarian soldiers, calling upon them to side with the Italian insurrectionists,\textsuperscript{e} and bearing the signature of Lajos Kossuth.\textsuperscript{372} The \textit{émeute} turning out a failure, Mr. Kossuth, through the medium of the London newspapers, hastened to declare the proclamation a forgery, thus giving a public \textit{démenti} to his friend Mazzini. Nevertheless, the proclamation \textit{was} genuine. Mazzini \textit{had} acted in concert with Kossuth.

Proceeding upon the settled conviction that to subvert Austrian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[a] Lajos Kossuth’s letter to David Urquhart of January 22, 1852, Pittsburg, and Urquhart’s reply to Kossuth of February 14, 1852, London, \textit{The Free Press}, No. 16, May 12, 1858.— \textit{Ed}.
\item[b] Dudley Stuart.— \textit{Ed}.
\item[c] See \textit{Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary 1847-1849}.— \textit{Ed}.
\item[d] Revolt.— \textit{Ed}.
\item[e] L. Kossuth, “In the Name of the Hungarian Nation. To the Soldiers Quartered in Italy, February 1853”, \textit{The Times}, No. 21348, February 10, 1853.— \textit{Ed}.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
tyranny the united action of Hungary and Italy was indispensable, Mazzini for some time tried to replace Kossuth by a more trustworthy Hungarian leader, but his efforts splitting on the dissensions of the Hungarian emigration, he magnanimously pardoned his uncertain ally, and spared him an exposure that would have ruined Kossuth's position in England.

To draw nearer to present times, I may call to your recollection that, in the Autumn of 1858, Mr. Kossuth made a tour through Scotland, delivering lectures in different towns, and solemnly warning the British against Louis Bonaparte's treacherous designs. Take, for instance, the following extract of a lecture delivered at Glasgow, on Nov. 20, 1858:

"I have," said Mr. Kossuth, "already alluded, in my other lecture, to the broth of national hatred which Louis Bonaparte is brewing. I do not mean to insinuate that he is meditating an invasion of this country: no doubt he would; only, like the fox in the fable, a he does not like sour grapes. It is not long ago that, with the exception, perhaps, of the gentlemen of St. Petersburg, who very likely know all about the mystery, Louis Bonaparte put the whole diplomacy of the world to their wits' end by his gigantic preparations at Cherbourg, pushed on to the last shilling of his empty treasury, and with a haste as if his existence was depending on a minute gained.... Cherbourg remains a structure solely against England.... He meditates a new conflict in the East, in company with Russia. In this conflict he means to check the free movement of the English navy by binding a goodly portion of it to your shores, while he proposes to strike a deadly blow at your vital interests in the East.... The Crimean war—was it concluded according to the interests of Great Britain and Turkey? Wallachia and Moldavia got a constitution devised in the den of secret diplomacy, that curse of our age; a constitution devised by Bonaparte with the concurrence of Russia and Austria—each and all of them ardent friends of popular freedom, forsooth! It is in reality no more nor less than a charter granted to Russia for the purpose of disposing of the Principalities.... Nay, more; has not Bonaparte, the dear ally, sent his officers to Montenegro to teach rifle practice to the wild mountaineers!... His mind is bent on a new treaty of Tilsit, if he has it not already in his pocket." b

Such were Kossuth's public strictures on Bonaparte, his dear ally, in the Autumn of 1858. Still more; in the beginning of 1859, when Bonaparte's plans for his Italian crusade of liberty had begun to take shape and figure, this same Kossuth, in Mazzini's Pensiero ed Azione, denounced the Dutch trickster in glowing language, and warned all true Republicans—Italians, Hungarians, and Germans even—from making themselves the cat's-paws of the Imperial Quasimodo. In a word, he reechoed Mazzini's views, which the latter again proclaimed in his manifesto of the 16th of

---

a Aesop. "The Fox and Grapes".—Ed.
b L. Kossuth. L'Europe, l'Autriche et la Hongrie.—Ed.
May, which he clung to during the Bonaparte crusade, and repeated victoriously at the end of the war in another manifesto reprinted by the Tribune.

Kossuth then, in January, 1859, not only saw through the Bonapartist sham, but did all in his power to lay it bare before the world. He goaded "the liberal press" into that direction afterward wondered at by Bonaparte's tools as "a sudden outbreak" of "anti-Napoleonic rage," and stigmatized by them as a symptom of morbid "sympathy for Austria." But, in the interval, between January, 1859, and May, 1859, a strange revolution occurred in the feelings and ideas of the grand *improvisatore*. He who, to warn the British against Bonaparte's atrocious designs, had made a lecturing tour through Scotland in the Autumn of 1858, set out in the month of May, 1859, on another lecturing tour, from the London Mansion House to the Free-Trade Hall at Manchester, to preach confidence in the Man of December, and, under the false pretense of standing up for neutrality, inveigle the British over to the side of the Imperial blackleg. His own neutrality he soon after evinced in a manner not to be misunderstood.

Now, these recollections, which I might multiply at pleasure, ought to raise some misgivings in the minds of Kossuth's honest admirers—such men as are neither blind worshipers of a name, nor bound to the democratic grandee by sordid interest. At all events, they will not deny that the facts I am now about to relate appear by no means incompatible with the past of the presumed hero of liberty. There were three Hungarian leaders at Paris, paying court to the illustrious Plon-Plon, alias the *Prince Rouge*, the scion of the Bonapartist family, upon whom has fallen the lot of coquetting with revolution, in the same way that his bigger cousin dailles with "religion, order, and property." Those three men were Col. Kiss, Count Teleki, and Gen. Klapka. Plon-Plon, be it said, *en passant*, is a Heliogabalus as to morals, an Ivan III for personal cowardice, a real Bonaparte for falsehood; but, with all that, an *homme d'esprit*, as the French say. These three gentlemen prevailed upon Plon-Plon, who, probably, was not at all taken by surprise, to enter into negotiations with Kossuth, to summon him to Paris, and even to hold out the promise of presenting the ex-Governor of Hungary to the insidious ruler of the Tuileries.

Accordingly, Mr. Kossuth, having been provided with an English passport wherein he was designated as Mr. Brown, left London for Paris in the beginning of May. At Paris he had at first

---

a See this volume, pp. 354-59.—Ed.
a long interview with Plon-Plon, to whom he exposed his views about insuring Hungary by landing 40,000 Frenchmen, to be backed by a corps of Magyar refugees, on the coast of Fiume, and a point that seemed uppermost in his patriotic mind, of forming, if only for appearance sake, a provisional Government with Mr. Kossuth at its head. In the evening of May 3, Plon-Plon, in his own carriage, conducted Mr. Kossuth to the Tuileries, there to introduce him to the Man of December. During this interview with Louis Bonaparte, Mr. Kossuth for once refrained from using his great rhetorical powers, and allowed Plon-Plon to act as his spokesman. He afterward paid a gracious compliment to the almost literal fidelity with which the Prince had reproduced his views.

Having attentively listened to the exposition of his cousin, Louis Bonaparte declared that there was one great obstruction to the acceptance on his part of Mr. Kossuth's projects, viz., the latter's Republican principles and Republican connections. It was then that Mr. Kossuth most solemnly abjured the Republican faith, declaring that he neither was nor ever had been a Republican, and that political necessities only, and a strange combination of circumstances, had compelled him to side for a while with the Republican part of the European emigration. Simultaneously, in proof of his anti-Republicanism, he, in the name of his country, offered the Hungarian crown to Prince Plon-Plon. It is true that the crown he thus disposed of had not yet become vacant, while his power of attorney to barter it away was altogether wanting; but whoever has carefully watched Mr. Kossuth's proceedings in foreign countries, must have become aware that he has long been used to speak of "dear Hungary" somewhat in the way in which a country gentleman speaks of his estates.

As to Mr. Kossuth's repudiation of Republicanism, I consider it to have been sincere. A civil list of 300,000 florins, which he claimed at Pesth for keeping up the splendor of the Executive; the patronage of the hospitals, transferred from an Austrian Archduchess to his own sister; the attempt to give his name to some regiments; his desire to surround himself with a camarilla; the tenacity with which, when on foreign soil, he clung to the title of Governor, although resigned by him at the epoch of the Hungarian catastrophe; the airs assumed by him of a pretender, rather than an exile—all this points to tendencies the reverse of

---

a Sophia.—Ed.
b Zsuzsanna Meszleny.—Ed.
Republicanism. However that may be, I positively affirm that Louis Kossuth abjured Republicanism before the French usurper, and in the presence of the Man of December offered the Hungarian crown to Plon-Plon, the Bonapartist Sardanapalus. Some rather loose gossip about this incident of his interview with Bonaparte at the Tuileries may have given rise to the notoriously false rumor that Kossuth had betrayed the secret plans of his Republican ex-confederates. He was not called upon to reveal their supposed secrets, nor would he have listened to such an infamous proposal. Having succeeded in completely destroying Louis Napoleon's apprehensions as to his Republican tendencies, and having pledged himself to act in the dynastic interest of the Bonapartes, a bargain was struck, by which three millions of francs were placed at Mr. Kossuth's disposal. There would appear nothing strange in this stipulation, since, to organize militarily the Hungarian emigration, money was wanted, and why should Mr. Kossuth not receive subsidies from his new ally, the same as all the despotic powers of Europe had received subsidies from England during the whole course of the Anti-Jacobin war? However, I cannot suppress the fact that, of the millions thus put at his disposal, Mr. Kossuth at once appropriated for his own personal expenses the rather handsome figure of 75,000 francs, stipulating, besides, in case the Italian war should end without leading to the invasion of Hungary, for one year's pension for himself. Before he left the Tuileries, it was agreed that Mr. Kossuth was to counteract the suspected Austrian tendencies of the Derby Ministry, by opening a neutrality campaign in England. It is generally known how, on his return to perfidious Albion, the spontaneous support of the Whigs and the Manchester school enabled him to successfully perform this preliminary part of his engagement.

Since 1851, the greater part of the Hungarian exiles of any distinction and political standing had separated from Mr. Kossuth, but what with the vista of an invasion of Hungary by the aid of French troops; what with the logical horse-power of three millions of francs—the world, as the real Napoleon in one of his fits of cynicism said, being governed by "le petit ventre," a save some honorable exceptions the whole of the Hungarian emigration in Europe flocked to the Bonapartist banners hoisted by Louis Kossuth. That the transactions which he entered upon with them had some Decembrist smack of corruption cannot be denied, since, to bestow a greater lot of French money upon his new-fangled

---

partisans, he promoted them to higher military grades: lieutenants, for instance, being advanced to the rank of majors. In the first instance, every one received his traveling expenses to Piedmont, then a rich uniform (the cost of a major's costume amounted to £150), and six months' pay in advance, with the promise of pay for one year's service on the conclusion of peace. The so-called Commander-in-Chief received a salary of 10,000 fr., the Generals 6,000 fr. each, the Brigadiers 5,000 fr., the Lieutenant-Colonels 4,000 fr., the Majors 3,000 fr., and so forth.

The names of the more prominent individuals who associated themselves with Kossuth and pocketed Bonapartist money are the following: Generals Klapka, Perczel, Vetter, Czecz; the Colonels Szabó, Imre and István; Kiss, Count S. Teleki, Count Bethlen, Mednyánszky, Ihász, and some lieutenant-colonels and majors. Among the civilians I may mention Count L. Teleki, Puky, Pulszky, Irányi, Ludvigh, Simonyi, Henszlmann, Veress, and others—in fact, all the Hungarian refugees residing in England and on the Continent, with the single exception of S. Vukovics (at London or Axminster), Rónay (at London, a Hungarian savant), and B. Szemere (at Paris, formerly President of the Hungarian Ministry).

Now, it would be unjust to think that all these men acted from corrupt motives. The majority probably consist of simple dupes—patriotic soldiers who cannot be supposed to possess distinct political principles, or the acumen to look through diplomatic webs. Some, like Gen. Perczel, withdrew as soon as events had shed light upon the Bonapartist imposture. Louis Kossuth, however, who as late as January, 1859, by his articles in Mazzini's Pensiero ed Azione, had shown himself a competent judge of Bonaparte's schemes, can by no means be exculpated in the same way.

Written on September 5, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
Karl Marx

THE FUTURE OF ITALY

The famous article on Italian affairs, in the Moniteur of the 9th of September, supposed to come directly from Louis Napoleon himself, and which has been the occasion of so much comment, may be considered as including three principal topics. The first of these topics is an apology for the treaty of Villafranca, and especially for that part of it which provided for the restoration of the expelled Archdukes. The second topic is a confession that the treaty, and the expensive war which preceded it, have wholly failed to bring about any settlement of Italian affairs, and an attempt to shift the blame of that failure from the treaty itself to the shoulders of those who have stood in the way of the stipulated restoration of the expelled sovereigns. The third topic is a warning to the Italians, that since they are unwilling to conform to the arrangements which the French Emperor saw fit to make for them, they have nothing more to expect from him, and that they must prepare themselves to see Austria resume her old position, without any further interference on the part of France, of the oppressor of the Italians under her immediate rule, and the jealous, bitter, and ever watchful enemy of Italian nationality, impending over Italy with a great army and keeping it in a constant state of unquiet and distrust.

The excuse given for treating at all, and for leaving Austria by that treaty in the possession of an important part of Italy, contrary to the programme with which the war commenced, is—first, the

---

a Le Moniteur universel, No. 252, September 9, 1859.—Ed.
strength of Austria herself, notwithstanding her defeats with forces still numerically superior, and now backed by formidable fortresses; and, secondly and principally, the impending danger of an interference on the part of Germany, which would have compelled the Emperor Napoleon to transfer his military efforts to the banks of the Rhine, thus seriously risking the loss of the advantages already gained in Italy. In excuse for the agreement that the banished Archdukes should be restored, Napoleon pleads that it was only by this concession that he could induce the Emperor of Austria\(^a\) to come into the proposed Italian Confederation, and in so doing to recognize Italian nationality, and voluntarily to abandon the supremacy and control which she had acquired over the Italian peninsula, and which had been the occasion of the late war. He also sets forth as another reason for his consent to the restoration of the Archdukes, a counter-stipulation on the part of Austria, now heard of for the first time, to give Venetia a government of its own, distinct from the general administration of the Austrian Empire—in fact, to convert it from an Austrian Province, held by the hand of a conqueror with military force, into an Italian Principality, with a distinct local administration, and, as a member of the Italian Confederation, participating in the advantages of Italian nationality. He sets up also this further excuse for a stipulation which seemed like betraying and abandoning those whom he had stimulated to act, and by which his Italian popularity has so severely suffered, that it was by no means intended to bring back the Archdukes by the assistance of foreign troops, but to effect their return with the consent of the people, and with guaranties as to the future.

The article proceeds to draw a glowing picture of what might have been expected had the arrangements agreed upon for Italy by the two Emperors been frankly adopted by the people of Italy and carried into effect. Austria, from the dread and terror of Italy, would have been at once converted into a friendly or at least a harmless power. The Italian Confederation, in giving to Italian nationality a practical existence, would have, as its most influential member, Sardinia, the representative of the cause of Italy. But greatly to the chagrin of the Imperial penman of the Moniteur all these hopes have been dashed, by the narrow-mindedness and selfishness, as he alleges, of those who have stood and still stand in the way of the restoration of the banished Archdukes; and by reason of their conduct he pronounces the war and the treaty to

\(^a\) Francis Joseph.—Ed.
be a complete failure. Since this part of the treaty has failed of its
effect, he declares Austria to be released from her stipulations on
behalf of Venetia, and as to the Italian Confederation. She is now
at liberty, as to both those points, to pursue her old policy—to
make the armaments kept up on the south bank of the Po a
reason for maintaining her own forces on the opposite bank upon
a war footing, and, in fact, to assume, as to all the rest of Italy, the
very same position which was made the occasion of the late war,
and which cannot fail in the end to lead to fresh troubles and
disasters.

The statement that it was not intended at Villafranca that an
armed force should be employed for the restoration of the
expelled Archdukes, seems to be understood in Italy as amounting
to a declaration on the part of Napoleon that he will not allow a
foreign armed force to be employed for that purpose, and in that
point of view this Moniteur article has been received there with
satisfaction. But it does not admit of any such construction. The
most that it amounts to is, that Napoleon did not pledge himself to
interfere by force for the carrying out of that provision of the
treaty, and that he does not intend to do so. But there is not the
least intimation that should Austria see fit to cross the Po, for
which she might easily find pretenses, he considers himself bound
to interfere. On the other hand he can only be understood as
giving notice that he has played out his game of Italian
intervention, and as washing his hands of any responsibility for
what may hereafter take place in Italy. In referring to the
proposed European Congress on Italian affairs, he even suggests
that nothing can be got from Austria without compensation. At
least the only other alternative is war. In that respect France has
done all she intends, and the Italians will look in vain for anybody
else willing to go to war for them.

In truth, this article appears to hold out this alternative to the
Italians, either to submit to the restoration of the Archdukes, or to
abandon all hopes of further French interference, and to prepare
themselves to deal with Austria as they may. In truth, from the
complimentary tone in which the article alludes to the Emperor of
Austria, and his readiness, for the sake of a good understanding
with France, to make the sacrifices he did at the peace of
Villafranca, there certainly would seem just now not the least
disposition to engage in a new quarrel with him. On the other
hand, the main object of this manifesto would seem to be to give
notice to Austria that so far as France is concerned she is at liberty
to deal with Italy as she may deem fit. Having spent a hundred
millions of dollars and used up 50,000 men to establish an Italian Confederation, which proves a chimera, the French Emperor proposes to withdraw from all further special concern in Italian affairs.

Written about September 12, 1859

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5752, September 29, 1859 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
I

London, Sept. 13, 1859

At the time when England was generally congratulated upon the extortion from the Celestials of the treaty of Tien-tsin, I tried to show that, Russia being in point of fact the only power benefited by the piratical Anglo-Chinese war, the commercial advantages accruing from the treaty to England were rather nugatory, while, in a political point of view, so far from establishing peace, that treaty, on the contrary, rendered resumption of war unavoidable. The march of events has fully confirmed these views. The treaty of Tien-tsin has become a thing of the past, and the semblance of peace has vanished before the stern realities of war.

Let me first state the facts as reported by the last Overland Mail.

The Hon. Mr. Bruce, accompanied by M. de Bourboulon, the French Plenipotentiary, set out with a British expedition destined to ascend the Peiho, and to accompany the two ambassadors on their message to Pekin. The expedition, under the orders of Admiral Hope, consisted of seven steamships, ten gun-boats, two troop and storeships, and several hundred marines and royal engineers. The Chinese, on their part, had objected to the mission taking that particular route. Admiral Hope, consequently, found the entrance of the Peiho barred by booms and stakes, and having stayed for nine days, from the 17th till the 25th June, at the mouth of that river, attempted its forcible passage, the Plenipotentiaries having joined the squadron on the 20th of June. On his

---

a See this volume, pp. 46-50 and 82-86.—Ed.
arrival off the Peiho River, Admiral Hope had made sure of the Taku forts, razed during the last war, having been rebuilt—a fact which, be it said en passant, he ought to have known before, since it had been officially announced in the *Pekin Gazette.*

On the 25th of June, while the British attempted to force the Peiho passage, the Taku batteries, supported by a Mongol force of apparently 20,000 men, were unmasked, and opened a destructive fire on the British vessels. An engagement on land and water took place, resulting in the utter discomfiture of the aggressors. The expedition had to withdraw, after the loss of three English vessels of war, the *Cormorant,* the *Lee,* and *Plover,* and with a loss of 464 killed and wounded on the part of the British, while of the 60 Frenchmen present 14 were killed or wounded. Five English officers were killed and 23 wounded, the Admiral himself escaping not unhurt. After this defeat, Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon returned to Shanghai, while the British squadron was to station off Chin-hae, Ningpo.

On the receipt in England of these unpleasant tidings, the Palmerstonian press at once bestrode the British lion, and unanimously roared for wholesale revenge. The London *Times,* of course, affected some dignity in its appeals to the bloody instincts of its countrymen; but the lower class of Palmerstonian organs were quite grotesque in acting the part of *Orlando Furioso.* Listen, for instance, to the London *Daily Telegraph*:

"Great Britain must attack the seaboard of China throughout its whole extent, invade the capital, expel the Emperor from his palace, and possess herself of a material guaranty against future aggression.... We must cat-o'-nine-tail any dragon-decorated official who presumes to treat our national symbols with contumely.... Every one of them (the Chinese Generals) must be hanged as a pirate and a homicide to the yard-arms of a British man-of-war. It would be a refreshing and salutary spectacle—that of a dozen bebuttoned villains, with the countenances of ogres, and the apparel of buffoons, swinging in the sight of the population. Terror must be struck, by one means or the other; and we have already had more than enough of leniency.... The Chinese must now be taught to value the English, who are their superiors, and ought to be their masters.... The least that can be attempted is to capture Pekin; while, if a bold policy were adopted, the confiscation in perpetuity of Canton would follow. We might retain Canton as we held Calcutta, make it the center of our ultra Eastern trade, compensate ourselves for the influence of Russia on the Tartar frontiers of the Empire, and lay the basis of a new dominion."

---

*On this fact see D. Macgowan, "To the Editor of The Times", *The Times,* No. 23410, September 13, 1859.—Ed.*

*These data are taken from Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan.—Ed.*
Now, from these ravings of Palmerston's penmen, let me return to the facts and, as far as it is possible with the present meager information, try to unravel the true bearings of the untoward event.

The first question to be answered is, whether, on the supposition that the treaty of Tien-tsin stipulates for the immediate access to Pekin of the British Ambassador, the Chinese Government have committed an infraction of that treaty, wrung from them by a piratical war, in withstanding the forcible passage by a British squadron of the Peiho River? As will be seen from the news conveyed by the Overland Mail, the Chinese authorities had objected, not to the British mission to Pekin, but to the British armament ascending the Peiho. They had proposed that Mr. Bruce should travel by land, divested of an armament which, with a fresh recollection of the Canton bombardment, the Celestials could but consider the instrument of invasion. Does the right of the French Ambassador to reside at London, involve the right of forcing the river Thames at the head of an armed French expedition? It must certainly be allowed that this interpretation put by the British on the admission to Pekin of their Ambassador, sounds at least as strange as the discovery made by them during the last Chinese war, that in bombarding the town of an Empire, you are not waging war upon that Empire itself, but only exchanging local hostilities with one of its dependencies. In answer to the reclamations of the Celestials, the British had "taken," according to their own statement, "every precaution to force, if necessary, admission to Pekin," by ascending the Peiho with a rather formidable squadron. Even if bound to admit their pacific Ambassador, the Chinese were certainly warranted in resisting their armed expedition. In thus acting they did not infringe a treaty, but baffled an encroachment.

In the second instance, it may be questioned whether, although the abstract right of legation had been accorded to the British by the treaty of Tien-tsin, the actual enjoyment of that right had, for the present, at least, not been waived by Lord Elgin? A reference to "the correspondence relating to the Earl of Elgin's special mission to China, printed by command of her Majesty," will convince every impartial inquirer that, first, the admission to Pekin of the English Ambassador was to take place not now, but at a more remote period; secondly, that his right of residence at Pekin was qualified by various clauses; and, finally, that the peremptory article III in the English text of the treaty, relating to the Ambassador's admission, was, on the request of the Chinese envoys, altered in the Chinese
text of the treaty. This discrepancy between the two versions of
the treaty is admitted by Lord Elgin himself, who, however, was,
as he says,

“compelled by his instructions to require the Chinese to accept, as the
authoritative version of an international agreement, a text of which they did not
understand a syllable.”

Can the Chinese be impeached for acting on the Chinese text of
the treaty, instead of the English one, which, according to Lord
Elgin’s admission, somewhat diverges from “the correct sense of
the stipulation”?

In conclusion, I will state that Mr. T. Chisholm Anstey, the late
British Attorney-General at Hong Kong, formally declares in a
letter addressed by him to the editor of the London Morning Star:

“The treaty itself, be it what it may, has been long since abrogated by the
violent acts of the British Government and its subordinates, to the extent at least of
depriving the Crown of Great Britain of every advantage or privilege conferred by
the treaty.”

Being on the one hand harassed by the Indian difficulties, and
on the other hand arming for the eventuality of a European war,
England is likely to incur great dangers from this new Chinese
catastrophe, probably of Palmerston’s own cooking. The next
result must be the break up of the present Administration, whose
head was the author of the last Chinese war, while its principal
members had passed a vote of censure on their present chief for
undertaking that war. At all events, Mr. Milner Gibson and the
Manchester school581 must either withdraw from the present Liberal
coalition, or, a thing not very probable, in unison with Lord John
Russell, Mr. Gladstone and his Peelite582 colleagues, compel their
chief to submit to their own policy.
A Cabinet Council is announced for to-morrow in order to decide upon the course to be taken in regard to the Chinese catastrophe. The lucubrations of the French Moniteur and the London Times leave no doubt as to the resolutions arrived at by Palmerston and Bonaparte. They want another Chinese war. I am informed from an authentic source that at the impending Cabinet Council Mr. Milner Gibson, in the first instance, will contest the validity of the plea for war; in the second instance, will protest against any declaration of war not previously sanctioned by both Houses of Parliament; and if his opinion be overwhelmed by a majority of votes, will secede from the Cabinet, thus again giving the signal for a new onslaught on Palmerston's administration and the break up of the Liberal coalition that led to the ousting of the Derby Cabinet. Palmerston is said to feel somewhat nervous as to the intended proceedings of Mr. Milner Gibson, the only one of his colleagues whom he is afraid of, and whom he has characterized more than once as a man peculiarly able "in picking holes." It is possible that simultaneously with this letter you may receive from Liverpool the news of the results of the Ministerial Council. Meanwhile, the real bearing of the case in question may be best judged, not from what has been printed, but from what has been willfully suppressed by the Palmerston organs in their first publications of the news conveyed by the last overland mail.

a "Chine. Aux embouchures du Pei-Ho, 1er juillet 1859", Le Moniteur universel, No. 258, September 15, 1859; "The Disaster in China", The Times, No. 23411, September 14, 1859; the leading article in The Times, No. 23413, September 16, 1859.—Ed.
First, then, they suppressed the statement that the Russian treaty had already been ratified, and that the Emperor of China\textsuperscript{a} had given instructions to his mandarins to receive and escort the American Embassy to the capital for the exchange of the ratified copies of the American treaty.\textsuperscript{383} These acts were suppressed with a view to stifle the suspicion that would naturally arise, that the English and French Envoys, instead of the Court of Pekin, are responsible for meeting obstacles in the transaction of their business, which were not encountered either by their Russian or American colleagues. The other, still more important, fact that was at first suppressed by The Times, and the other Palmerston organs, but is now avowed on their part, is that the Chinese authorities had given notice of their willingness to conduct the English and French Envoys to Pekin; that they were actually in waiting to receive them at one of the mouths of the river, and offered them an escort if they only consented to leave their vessels and troops. Now, as the treaty of Tien-tsin contains no clause granting to the English and French the right of sending a squadron of men-of-war up the Peiho, it becomes evident that the treaty was violated, not by the Chinese, but by the English, and that on the part of the latter there existed the foregone conclusion to pick a quarrel just before the period appointed for the exchange of the ratifications. Nobody will fancy that the Hon. Mr. Bruce acted on his own responsibility in thus baffling the ostensible end aimed at by the last Chinese war, but that, on the contrary, he only executed secret instructions received from London. Now, it is true that Mr. Bruce was dispatched not by Palmerston, but by Derby; but, then, I have only to remind you that during the first administration of Sir Robert Peel, when Lord Aberdeen kept the seals of the Foreign Office, Sir Henry Bulwer, the English Ambassador at Madrid, picked a quarrel with the Spanish Court, resulting in his expulsion from Spain,\textsuperscript{384} and that, during the debates in the House of Lords on this "untoward event," it was proved that Bulwer, instead of obeying the official instructions of Aberdeen, had acted up to the secret instructions of Palmerston, who then sat on the Opposition benches.

A maneuver has also been carried out during these last days in the Palmerstonian press, which leaves no doubt, at least to those acquainted with the secret history of English diplomacy during the last thirty years, as to the real author of the Peiho catastrophe and the impending third Anglo-Chinese war. The Times intimates that

\textsuperscript{a} Hien-Fung.—\textit{Ed.}
the guns planted on the forts of Taku which caused such havoc among the British squadron were of Russian origin, and were directed by Russian officers. Another Palmerstonian organ is still more plain spoken. I quote:

"We now perceive how closely the policy of Russia is interwoven with that of Pekin; we detect great movements on the Amoor; we discern large Cossack armies maneuvering far beyond Lake Baikal, in the frozen dreamland on the twilight borders of the Old World; we trace the course of innumerable caravans; we espy a special Russian envoy (Gen. Mouravieff, the Governor of Eastern Siberia) making his way, with secret designs, from the remoteness of Eastern Siberia to the secluded Chinese metropolis; and well may public opinion in this country burn at the thought that foreign influences have had a share in procuring our disgrace and the slaughter of our soldiers and sailors."

Now, this is one of Lord Palmerston's old tricks. When Russia wanted to conclude a treaty of commerce with China, he drove the latter by the opium war into the arms of her northern neighbor.385 When Russia requested the cession of the Amoor, he brought it about by the second Chinese war,386 and now that Russia wants to consolidate her influence at Pekin, he extemporises the third Chinese war. In all his transactions with the weak Asiatic States, with China, Persia, Central Asia, Turkey, it has always been his invariable and constant rule to ostensibly oppose Russia's designs by picking a quarrel, not with Russia, but with the Asiatic State, to estrange the latter from England by piratical hostilities, and by this roundabout way drive it to the concessions it had been unwilling to yield to Russia. You may be sure that on this occasion the whole past Asiatic policy of Palmerston will be again sifted, and I draw, therefore, your attention to the Afghan papers, ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on the 8th June, 1859.a They throw more light on Palmerston's sinister policy, and the diplomatic history of the last thirty years, than any documents ever before printed. The case is, in a few words, this: In 1838 Palmerston commenced a war against Dost Mohammed, the ruler of Cabul, a war that led to the destruction of an English army,387 and was commenced on the plea of Dost Mohammed having entered into a secret alliance against England with Persia and Russia. In proof of this assertion, Palmerston laid, in 1839, before Parliament, a Blue Book, chiefly consisting of the correspondence of Sir A. Burnes, the British envoy at Cabul, with the Government at Calcutta.b Burnes had been assassinated during an

---

a Papers. East India (Cabul and Affghistan). Ordered by the House of Commons, to be Printed 8 June 1859 [London, 1859].—Ed.
b Correspondence Relating to Persia and Affghistan, London [1839].—Ed.
insurrection at Cabul against the English invaders, but, distrustful of the British Foreign Minister, had sent copies of some of his official letters to his brother, Dr. Burnes, at London. On the appearance, in 1839, of the "Afghan papers," prepared by Palmerston, Dr. Burnes accused him of having "garbled and forged the dispatches of the late Sir A. Burnes," and, in corroboration of his statement, had some of the genuine dispatches printed. But it was only last Summer that the murder came out. Under the Derby Ministry, on the motion of Mr. Hadfield, the House of Commons ordered all the Afghan papers to be published in full, and this order has been executed in such a form as to constitute a demonstration, to the meanest capacity, of the truth of the charge of garbling and forgery, in the interest of Russia. On the title-page of the Blue Book appears the following:

"NOTE.—The correspondence, only partially given in former returns, is here given entire, the omitted passages being marked by brackets. [ ]"

The name of the official, which appears as a guaranty for the fidelity of the return, is "J. W. Kaye, Secretary in Political and Secret Departments," Mr. Kaye being the "upright historian of the War in Afghanistan."

Now, to illustrate the real relations of Palmerston with Russia, against which he pretended to have set up the Afghan war, one instance may suffice for the present. The Russian agent, Vitkavich, who came to Cabul in 1837, was the bearer of a letter from the Czar to Dost Mohammed. Sir Alexander Burnes obtained a copy of the letter, and sent it to Lord Auckland, the Governor-General of India. In his own dispatches, and various documents inclosed by him, this circumstance is referred to over and over again. But the copy of the Czar's letter was expunged altogether from the papers presented by Palmerston in 1839, and in every dispatch in which it is referred to, such alterations were made as were necessary to suppress the circumstance of the connection of the "Emperor of Russia" with the mission to Cabul. This forgery was committed in order to suppress the evidence of the Autocrat's connection with Vitkavich, whom, on his return to St. Petersburg, it suited Nicholas to formally disavow. For instance, at page 82 of the Blue Book will be found the translation of a letter to Dost Mohammed, which reads now as follows, the brackets showing the words originally suppressed by Palmerston:

---

*a* James Burnes' statements about the forgery of the dispatches of Sir Alexander Burnes, *The Free Press*, No. 5, February 3, 1858.—*Ed.*
"The Ambassador on the part of [the] Russia [or Emperor] came [from Moscow] to Teheran, and has been appointed to wait on the Sirdar at Candahar, and thence to proceed to the presence of the Ameer.[...] He is the bearer of [confidential messages from the Emperor and of the] letters from the Russian Ambassador at Teheran. The Russian Ambassador recommends this man to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiations, [on the part of the Emperor and himself], etc., etc."

These, and similar forgeries committed by Palmerston in order to protect the honor of the Czar, are not the only curiosity exhibited by the "Afghan papers." The invasion of Afghanistan was justified by Palmerston on the ground that Sir Alexander Burnes had advised it as a proper means for baffling Russian intrigues in Central Asia. Now Sir A. Burnes did quite the contrary, and consequently all his appeals in behalf of Dost Mohammed were altogether suppressed in Palmerston’s edition of the "Blue Book;" the correspondence being by dint of garbling and forgery, turned quite to the reverse of its original meaning. Such is the man now about to enter on a third Chinese war, on the ostensible plea of thwarting Russia’s designs in that quarter.
III

London, Sept. 20, 1859

That there is to be another civilization war against the Celestials seems a matter now pretty generally settled with the English press. Still, since the meeting of the Cabinet Council on Saturday last, a remarkable change has come over those very papers that were foremost in the howl for blood. At first the London Times, in an apparent trance of patriotic fury, thundered\(^a\) at the double treachery committed—by cowardly Mongols who lured on the bonhomme\(^b\) of the British Admiral by studiously falsifying appearances and screening their artillery—by the Court of Pekin, which, with deeper Machiavellism, had set those Mongol ogres to their damnable practical jokes. Curiously to say, although tossed on a sea of passion, The Times had, in its reprints, contrived to carefully expunge from the original reports all points favorable to the doomed Chinaman. To confound things may be the work of passion, but to garble them seems rather the operation of a cool head. However that be, on Sept. 16, just one day before the meeting of the Ministers, The Times veered round,\(^c\) and, without much ado, cut one head off its Janus-headed impeachment.

"We fear," it said, "that we cannot accuse the Mongols who resisted our attack on the forts of the Peiho of treachery;"

but then, to make up for that awkward concession, it clung the more desperately to "the deliberate and perfidious violation of a solemn treaty by the Court of Pekin." Three days later, after the

\(^a\) The Times, No. 23409, September 12, 1859 (leading article).— Ed.
\(^b\) Simpleton.— Ed.
\(^c\) The Times, No. 23413, September 16, 1859 (leading article).— Ed.
Cabinet Council had been held, *The Times*, on further consideration, even

"found no room for doubt" that if Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon had solicited the Mandarins to conduct them to Pekin, they would have been permitted to effect the ratification of the treaty."¹

What, then, remains there of the treachery of the Court of Pekin? Not a shadow even, but in its place there remain two doubts on the mind of *The Times*.

"It is," says it, "perhaps doubtful whether, as a military measure, it was wise to try with such a squadron, our way to Pekin. It is still more doubtful whether, as a diplomatic measure, it was desirable to use force at all."

Such is the lame conclusion of all the indignation-bluster indulged in by the "leading organ," but, with a logic of its own, it drops the reasons for war without dropping the war itself. Another semi-Governmental paper, *The Economist*, which had distinguished itself by its fervent apology for the Canton bombardment, seems to take a more economical and less rhetorical view of things now that Mr. J. Wilson has got his appointment of Chancellor of the Exchequer for India. *The Economist* brings two articles on the subject, the one political, the other economical;² the first one winding up with the following sentences:

"Now, all these things considered, it is obvious that the article of the treaty which gave our Embassador a right of visiting or residing at Pekin, was one literally forced upon the Chinese Government; and if it were thought absolutely essential to our interests that it should be observed, we think there was much room for the display of consideration and patience in exacting its fulfillment. No doubt it may be said that with such a Government as the Chinese, delay and patience are interpreted as signs of fatal weakness, and therefore the most unsound policy we could pursue. But how far are we entitled, on this plea, to vary the principles on which we should assuredly act toward any civilized nation in our treatment of these Oriental Governments? When we have wrung out an unwelcome concession from their fears, it may be perhaps the most consistent policy to wring out, also from their fears, the immediate execution of the bargain in the way most convenient to ourselves. But if we fail in so doing—if, in the mean time, the Chinese overcome their fears, and insist, with a suitable display of force, on our consulting them as to the mode to be taken for giving our treaty effect—can we justly accuse them of treachery? Are they not rather practising upon us our own methods of persuasion? The Chinese Government may—and it is very likely that it is so—have intended to

---

¹ Here and below see *The Times*, No. 23415, September 19, 1859 (leading article).—*Ed.*

² The reference is to the articles "The Disaster in China" and "The Trade of China. Its Importance, Direct and Indirect", *The Economist*, No. 838, September 17, 1859.—*Ed.*
entrap us into this murderous snare, and never have purposed to execute the treaty at all. If this should prove to be so, we must and ought to exact reparation. But it may also prove that the intention to defend the mouth of Peiho against the recurrence of such a violent entry as was made good by Lord Elgin in the previous year, was not accompanied by any desire to break faith on the general articles of the treaty. As the hostile initiative came entirely from our side, and it was, of course, at any moment competent to our commanders to retire from the murderous fire, opened only for the defense of the forts, we cannot certainly prove any intention of breaking faith on the part of China. And, till proof of a deliberate intention to break the treaty reaches us—we think we have some reason to suspend our judgment, and ponder whether we may not have been applying to our treatment of barbarians, a code of principles not very widely different from that which they have practised toward ourselves."

In a second article, on the same subject, _The Economist_ dwells on the importance, direct and indirect, of the English trade to China. In the year 1858, the British exports to China had risen to £2,876,000, while the value of the British imports from China had averaged upward of £9,000,000 for each of the last three years, so that the aggregate direct trade of England with China may be put down at about £12,000,000. But beside these direct transactions there are three other important trades with which, less or more, England is intimately connected in the circle of exchanges, the trade between India and China, the trade between China and Australia, and the trade between China and the United States.

"Australia," says _The Economist_, "takes from China large quantities of tea annually, and has nothing to give in exchange which finds a market in China. America also takes large quantities of tea and some silk of a value far exceeding that of their direct exports to China."

Both these balances in favor of China have to be made good by England, who is paid for this equalization of exchanges by the gold of Australia and the cotton of the United States. England, therefore, independent of the balance due by herself to China, has also to pay to that country large sums in respect to gold imported from Australia and cotton from America. Now this balance due to China by England, Australia, and the United States is, to a great extent, transferred from China to India, as a set-off against the amount due by China to India, on account of opium and cotton. Be it remarked, _en passant_, that the imports from China to India have never yet reached the amount of £1,000,000 sterling, while the exports to China from India realize the sum of nearly £10,000,000. The inference _The Economist_ draws from these economical observations is, that any serious interruption of the British trade with China would "be a calamity of greater magnitude than the mere figures of exports and imports might at
first sight suggest,” and that the embarrassment consequent upon such a disturbance would not be felt in the direct British tea and silk trade only, but must also “affect” the British transactions with Australia and the United States. *The Economist* is, of course, aware of the fact that during the last Chinese war, the trade was not so much interfered with by the war as had been apprehended; and that, at the port of Shanghai, it was even not affected at all. But then, *The Economist* calls attention upon “two novel features in the present dispute” which might essentially modify the effects of a new Chinese war upon trade—these two novel features being the “Imperial,” not “local” character of the present conflict, and the “signal success” which, for the first time, the Chinese have effected against European forces.

How very different sounds this language from the war-cry *The Economist* so lustily shouted at the time of the Lorch affair.388

The Ministerial Council, as I anticipated in my last letter, witnessed Mr. Milner Gibson’s protest against the war, and his menace of seceding from the Cabinet, should Palmerston act up to the foregone conclusions betrayed in the columns of the French *Moniteur*. For the moment Palmerston prevented any rupture of the Cabinet, and the Liberal Coalition, by the statement that the force indispensable for the protection of British trade should be gathered in the Chinese waters, while before the arrival of more explicit reports on the part of the British Envoy, no resolution should be taken as to the war question. Thus the burning question was put off. Palmerston’s real intention, however, transpires through the columns of his mob-organ, *The Daily Telegraph*, which in one of its recent numbers says:

“Should any event lead to a vote unfavorable to the Government, in the course of next year, an appeal will certainly be made to the constituencies... The House of Commons will test the result of their activity by a verdict on the Chinese question, seeing that to the professional malignants, headed by Mr. Disraeli, must be added the Cosmopolitans, who declare that the Mongols were thoroughly in the right.”

The fix in which the Tories are hemmed up, by having allowed themselves to become inveigled into the responsible editorship of events planned by Palmerston and enacted by two of his agents, Lord Elgin and Mr. Bruce (Lord Elgin’s brother), I shall, perhaps, find another occasion of remarking upon.
In a former letter I asserted that the Peiho conflict had not sprung from accident, but, on the contrary, been beforehand prepared by Lord Elgin, acting upon Palmerston’s secret instructions, and fastening upon Lord Malmesbury, the Tory Foreign Minister, the project of the noble Viscount, then seated at the head of the Opposition benches. Now, first, the idea of the “accidents” in China arising from “instructions” drawn up by the present British Premier is so far from being new, that, during the debates on the Lorcha war, it was suggested to the House of Commons, by so well informed a personage as Mr. Disraeli, and, curious to say, confirmed by no less an authority than Lord Palmerston himself. On February 3, 1857, Mr. Disraeli warned the House of Commons in the following terms:

“I cannot resist the conviction that what has taken place in China has not been in consequence of the alleged pretext, but is, in fact, in consequence of instructions received from home, some considerable time ago. If that be the case, I think the time has arrived when this House would not be doing its duty unless it earnestly considered whether it has any means of controlling a system, which if pursued, will be one, in my mind, fatal to the interests of this country.”

And Lord Palmerston most coolly replied:

“The right hon. gentleman says the course of events appeared to be the result of some system predetermined by the Government at home. Undoubtedly it was.”

---

a Benjamin Disraeli’s speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, The Times, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—Ed.

b Lord Palmerston’s speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1857, The Times, No. 22595, February 4, 1857.—Ed.
In the present instance, a cursory glance at the Blue Book, entitled: "Correspondence relative to the Earl of Elgin's special missions to China and Japan, 1857-59" will show, how the event, that occurred at the Peiho, on the 25th June, was already preceded by Lord Elgin on the 2d of March. Page 484 of the said correspondence, we find the following two dispatches:

"THE EARL OF ELGIN TO REAR-ADMIRAL SIR MICHAEL SEYMOUR

"Furious, March 2, 1859

"Sir: With reference to my dispatch to your Excellency of the 17th ult. I would beg leave to state that I entertain some hope that the decision come to by her Majesty's Government on the subject of the permanent residence of a British Ambassador at Pekin, which I communicated to your Excellency in a conversation yesterday, may induce the Chinese Government to receive, in a becoming manner, the representative of her Majesty, when he proceeds to Pekin for the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin. At the same time, it is no doubt possible that his hope may not be realized, and, at any rate, I apprehend that Her Majesty's Government will desire that our Ambassador, when he proceeds to Tien-tsin, be accompanied by an imposing force. Under these circumstances, I would venture to submit, for your Excellency's consideration, whether it would not be expedient to concentrate at Shanghai, at the earliest convenient period, a sufficient fleet of gunboats for this service, as Mr. Bruce's arrival in China cannot long be delayed. I have, etc.

Elgin and Kincardine"

"THE EARL OF MALMESBURY TO THE EARL OF ELGIN

"Foreign Office, May 2, 1859

"My Lord: I have received your Excellency's dispatch of the 7th of March, 1859, and I have to inform you that her Majesty's Government approve of the note, of which a copy is therein inclosed, and in which your Excellency announced to the Imperial Commissioner that her Majesty's Government would not insist upon the residence of her Majesty's Minister being permanently fixed at Pekin.

"Her Majesty's Government also approve of your having suggested to Rear-Admiral Seymour that a fleet of gunboats should be collected at Shanghai in order to accompany Mr. Bruce up the Peiho.

"I am,

Malmesbury"

Lord Elgin, then, knows beforehand that the British Government "will desire" that his brother, Mr. Bruce, be accompanied by "an imposing force" of "gunboats" up the Peiho, and he orders Admiral Seymour to make ready "for this service." The Earl of Malmesbury, in his dispatch dated May 2, approves of the
suggestion intimated by Lord Elgin to the Admiral. The whole correspondence exhibits Lord Elgin as the master, and Lord Malmesbury as the man. While the former constantly takes the initiative and acts upon the instructions originally received from Palmerston, without even waiting for new instructions from Downing street, Lord Malmesbury contents himself with indulging "the desires" which his imperious subaltern anticipates him to feel. He nods assent, when Elgin states that the treaty being not yet ratified, they had not the right to ascend any Chinese river; he nods assent, when Elgin thinks they ought to show much forbearance toward the Chinese in regard to the execution of the article of the treaty relating to the embassy to Pekin; and, nothing daunted, he nods assent when in direct contradiction to his own former statements, Elgin claims the right to enforce the passage of the Peiho by an "imposing fleet of gunboats." He nods assent in the same way that Dogberry nodded assent to the suggestions of the sexton.a

The sorry figure cut by the Earl of Malmesbury, and the humility of his attitude, are easily understood if one calls to mind the cry raised on the advent of the Tory Cabinet, by the London Timesb and other influential papers, as to the great peril threatening the brilliant success which Lord Elgin, under the instructions of Palmerston, was about to secure in China, but which the Tory Administration, if for pique only, and in order to justify their vote of censure on Palmerston's Canton bombardment, were likely to baffle. Malmesbury allowed himself to be intimidated by that cry. He had, moreover, before his eyes and in his heart the fate of Lord Ellenborough, who had dared openly to counteract the Indian policy of the noble Viscount, and in reward for his patriotic courage, was sacrificed by his own colleagues of the Derby Cabinet.389 Consequently, Malmesbury resigned the whole initiative into the hands of Elgin, and thus enabled the latter to execute Palmerston's plan on the responsibility of his official antagonists, the Tories. It is this same circumstance which for the present has put the Tories in a very dismal alternative as to the course to be taken in regard to the Peiho affair. Either they must sound the war-trumpet with Palmerston, and thus keep him in office, or they must turn their backs on Malmesbury, upon whom they heaped such sickening flatteries during the last Italian war.

---

a Shakespeare, Much Ado About Nothing, Act IV, Scene 2.—Ed.
b No. 22930, March 2, 1858 (leading article).—Ed.
The alternative is the more trying since the impending third China war is anything but popular with the British mercantile classes. In 1857 they bestrode the British lion, because they expected great commercial profits from a forcible opening of the Chinese market. At this moment, they feel, on the contrary, rather angry at seeing the fruits of the treaty obtained, all at once snapped away from their hold. They know that affairs look menacing enough in Europe and India, without the further complication of a Chinese war on a grand scale. They have not forgotten that in 1857, the imports of tea fell by upward of 24 millions of pounds, that being the article almost exclusively exported from Canton, which was then the exclusive theater of war, and they apprehend that this interruption of trade by war may now be extended to Shanghai and the other trading ports of the Celestial Empire. After a first Chinese war undertaken by the English in the interest of opium smuggling, and a second war carried on for the defense of the lorange of a pirate, nothing was wanted for a climax but a war extemporized for the purpose of pestering China with the nuisance of permanent Embassies at its Capital.

Written on September 13, 16, 20 and 30, 1859

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, Nos. 5750, 5754, 5761 and 5768, September 27, October 1, 10 and 18, 1859; reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, Nos. 1496 and 1498, September 27 and October 4, 1859, and the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 942, October 1, 1859

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
September 16, 1859

Sir,—You will have seen that the Times\textsuperscript{a} of to-day intimates that the cannon planted on the forts of Taku, were of Russian make, and directed by Russian officers. Lord Palmerston’s mob paper, the Daily Telegraph, in its summary, says:—

“It is now proved, as mercantile circulars show, and as is conclusively set forth in the interesting statement of our Correspondent at St. Petersburg, dated September 7, long before the news of the attack was known, that the conspiracy had an imperial origin—that it had been schemed for months—that it was rumoured abroad before our flotillas could have entered the Gulf of Pecheli.... We now perceive, moreover, how closely the policy of Russia is interwoven with that of Pekin; we detect great movements on the Amoor; we discern large Cossack armies manoeuvring far beyond lake Baikal, in the frozen dreamland on the twilight borders of the Old World; we trace the course of innumerable caravans; we espy a special Russian envoy\textsuperscript{b} making his way, with secret designs, from the remoteness of Eastern Siberia to the secluded Chinese Metropolis; and well may public opinion in this country burn at the thought that foreign influences have had a share in procuring our disgrace and the slaughter of our soldiers and sailors.”

Lord Palmerston is again at his antiquated tricks. He will make a new war on China in order to thwart the designs of Russia, in the same way that he made his war upon Afghanistan.

Written on September 16, 1859

First published in The Free Press, No. 10, Reproduced from the newspaper September 28, 1858

\textsuperscript{a} “The Disaster in China”, The Times, No. 32413, September 16, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} N. N. Muravyev.—\textit{Ed.}
ELECTORAL CORRUPTION IN ENGLAND

London, Oct. 18, 1859

The Commissions appointed to investigate the state of the Parliamentary constituencies of Gloucester and Wakefield only confirm, by their daily disclosures, the saying of old Coppock, the late electoral agent of the Reform Club, that the real Constitution of the British House of Commons might be summed up in the word Corruption. The present inquiry derives a peculiar interest from the circumstance that Gloucester is a rotten borough of old standing, while Wakefield is a constituency created by the Reform act, and that the Gloucester briber is an outrageous Tory, Sir Robert Carden, of Dogberry memory, while the Wakefield briber is a Radical, Mr. Leatham, the brother-in-law of Mr. Bright. In both cases, the childlike innocence of the Parliamentary candidates is something refreshing in this wicked age of skepticism. Both candidates find the money for the purchase of votes, but both take good care not to know where the money goes. From the beginning of the election to its end, their solicitors’ bills run up in a geometrical progression, but at the same ratio increases their belief in the immaculate purity of the constituencies which to represent in Parliament they confess the highest aim of their worldly ambition. Take, first, that pattern of a Quaker, honest Mr. Leatham. In 1857, he stood for Wakefield, and employed a solicitor of the name of Wainwright as his “legal friend.” This Wainwright, in a fit of openheartedness, takes his friend the Quaker aside and surprises him, innocent Leatham,

a Here and below Marx quotes Robert Carden’s testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 12, 1859, The Times, No. 23436, October 13, 1859.—Ed.
who had considered himself l’homme qu’on aime pour lui-même, and the candidate to be elected pour le roi de Prusse, by the shakingly shrewd remark that an election was a question of £. s. d., and that consequently the “needful” ought to be found. Wainwright fixed the amount of cash required at £1,000. Leatham exclaims: “I have not got it, but I will borrow it,” and, as true as his word, has £1,000 sent over to Wainwright by Overend & Gurney, the Quaker bankers of Lombard street, London. Shortly after, Wainwright, who seems given to confidential pourparlers takes Leatham again “aside,” whispers in his ear that he had found out the election would grow more expensive than at first contemplated, and insists upon another £500. Innocent Leatham “thinks this rather strange,” but, on further consideration, and remembering that the election of 1852 had cost £1,600, he extended the credit to £500 more, but the most curious thing is that he feels not quite sure as to the source from which these £500 flowed. Again, two weeks later, stern Wainwright insists upon another supply of £1,000, and now Purity Leatham waxes quite melodramatic.

“I was,” says he, “much vexed at this, and said as much to him, and also said that there were a great many things I did not like about his office. I had noticed a great many strange people about the office, and hoped there was nothing wrong going on. He said, ‘You must leave that to me and ask no questions. You must give me the command of another £1,000, though I don’t think I shall want it.’ I was foolish enough to consent, and I believe the money was obtained from the same source as before.”

The mysterious stranger who “obtained the money” is Mr. Leatham’s partner, being not present at the pending inquiry because, at this rather unseasonable time of the year, he has caught the whim of setting out upon a trip over the Continent.

If Quaker Leatham, despite his credulous temper, has misgivings of his own, but contrives to comfort his conscience by “asking no questions,” Sir R. Carden, on the other hand, since “to the pure all things are pure,” felt so much edified by his Gloucester election experiments in 1857, that, in 1859, he stood again for the same borough, although this time unsuccessfully. The very reason that induced him to walk into St. Stephen’s on the shoulders of Gloucester was, that he thought Gloucester to be so pure that it

---

a A man who is loved for his own sake, for his personal qualities.—Ed.
b Literally: for the King of Prussia; here: just to gratify a person.—Ed.
c Negotiations.—Ed.
d From William Leatham’s testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 11, 1859, The Times, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—Ed.
e The Epistle of Paul to Titus 1:15.—Ed.
would be an honor and distinction to represent it in Parliament, "whereas Coppock and his myrmidons\textsuperscript{395} used to call Gloucester the cheese," because it was "so deliciously decayed"; in one word, so fully-flavored a sink of corruption. From £500, at which the necessary electoral expenses were at first settled, they were by sudden expansions swelled to something like £6,000, but still, and even after the Auditor's return fixing the legal expenses at £616 8s. 1d., Sir R. Carden's conviction of the purity of the Gloucester proceedings remained unshaken.

"He had believed the election had been pure until only a day or two ago, when he was positively shocked to hear the horrible revelations that had been made. Those revelations had taken him quite by surprise."

The electoral philosophy of the Parliamentary candidates, then, consists simply in allowing their left hand not to know what their right hand does, and thus they wash both hands in the water of innocence. To open their breeches' pockets, ask no questions, and believe in the general virtue of mankind, serves best their purpose.

As to the legal gentry, solicitors, attorneys, and barristers, employed in the electoral business, they, of course, have a legal claim to their professional fees. They cannot be expected to spend their time and "manage" the thing for nothing. Why, exclaimed one of the Gloucester M.P. makers,

"I bean't a-going to let'em have my vote for nothing. Look at the twenty-four lawyers having their £25 down and five guineas a day a piece, and I bean't a-going to let'em have mine for nothing."

And, says Mr. George Buchanan, a gentleman who canvassed in company with Sir R. Carden,

"In fact, it was a general scramble for money, and I do not like to hear so much obloquy thrown on poor men who took 3s. 6d. a day, while the professional men who made heavy charges for doing nothing, escaped."\textsuperscript{a}

Now, as to the M.P.'s makers themselves, a few examples will suffice to characterize them. Mr. W. Clutterbuck, a solicitor, and canvasser in behalf of Sir R. Carden, chuckles in his sleeves while stating that

"Gloucester is as corrupt a place as any in England."\textsuperscript{b}

\textsuperscript{a} Here and below Marx quotes George Buchanan's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 10, 1859. The Times, No. 23434, October 11, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Here and below Marx quotes W. Clutterbuck's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859. The Times, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
He had set his eyes upon "the Coopeys." There are eight or nine of the Coopeys, a family that, from immemorial times, have played a prominent part in the Gloucester elections. They are, says Clutterbuck, "people you must amuse," and, consequently, he went to the Coopeys, and smoked a pipe with the Coopeys, and gossiped with the Coopeys, and held out to them no direct promises, by no means, but "led them to believe so and so." In his track, there followed Mr. John Ward, a builder, who offered the Coopeys £5 each. Two of the Coopeys, he says, were bribed. One of them was dead, but somebody polled in his stead.

"I," says Mr. John Ward, builder, "gave to nine of them £5 each, and the dead man £3. The man was dead at the election of 1857, but he polled for Sir R. Carden there."

Then comes Mr. Maysey.

"I," says he, "I keeps a general shop, and are a hairdresser." 

He found "bribery was going on to any extent" and consequently he bought electors from £2 to £12 the piece. The fortunate mortal who fetched £12 was one Evans.

"The man," says our venerable hairdresser, "was well acquainted with all the low voters. Evans was worth £20, both as a voter and a spy."

It appears that Maysey, the heroic hairdresser, instructed a number of roughs with one Clements at their head, on the nomination day, to forcibly carry off an old voter named Wathen from the White Lion, but he (Maysey) did not see that lion's "coat torn off his back." The man, he says, by way of examination, "was too old and blind to resist, and was drunk beside." At Wakefield, higher prices were paid than at Gloucester, one vote costing from £5 to £70. At the same time, more violent means were here resorted to by the contending parties. One Mr. Smith, whose experience extends over a great many years, expressed his opinion that Wakefield was the most corrupt constituency in Europe, and

---

* The Times has here: "gave nine of them £7 each*. From John Ward's testimony at a sitting of the commission of inquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—Ed.

* Here and below Marx quotes J. Maysey's testimony at a sitting of the commission of inquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 8, 1859. *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—Ed.
that money and beer would carry any election there. In the latter stage of the fight going on between Quaker Leatham, the Radical, and Mr. Charlesworth, the Conservative, "it was known all over town that there was plenty of money to be got at the office of Wainwright," the immaculate Quaker's agent. The one great feature that distinguished the Conservatives from the Liberals, was that the latter did not occasionally refrain from issuing "flash notes," while the former paid in sterling money. About half a dozen Wakefield voters formed a club, with a view of turning the scale whichever way they liked when the poll should come to a close. One J. F. Tower, a barber, voted for Mr. Leatham because one of Mr. Leatham's canvassers gave him £40 for a hair-brush. John Wilcox, a peculiarly conscientious fellow, did not vote at all, having received £25 to vote for Leatham and £30 to vote for Leatham's rival. "So he balanced it by staying away altogether." One Benjamin Ingham, who voted for Leatham, could not say how much money he got, since "he was generally drunk at the time." The Tories inveigled one James Clark, a fortune-teller and planet-ruler, into an inn, where they got him drunk, and "kept him for some days in a room of the hotel, with plenty to eat and to drink." He, nevertheless, tried at last to escape, and voted for Leatham, "partly a desire to spite the Blues for keeping him locked up, and partly to get £50."

There was, furthermore, one William Dickinson, a plumber by profession, and at work in the morning at Mr. Teal's bleach-works.

"On going into a room upstairs, to get some more piping to finish his job, the door was suddenly banged to from the outside, locked and nailed. There were three men and a boy in the room to keep him quiet, and they had a rope to tie him with if necessary." Altogether, if the Liberals excelled by their "flash-notes," the Conservatives were remarkable for their resort to main force.

\[a\] Here and below Marx quotes J. Burtenshaw's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 7, 1859. The Times, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—Ed.

\[b\] Here and below Marx quotes James Clark's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859. The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—Ed.

\[c\] Benjamin Ingham's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859, The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—Ed.

\[d\] William Dickinson's testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859, The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—Ed.
Now, with respect to these disgusting disclosures of the English electoral system, old Lord Brougham thought fit to make a long speech at Bradford,\(^a\) wherein he confesses that the offense of bribery has been growing rapidly, that it was comparatively rare before 1832, but had increased fast since the Reform Act of that year and that he intended to diminish it. And what is the curious remedy hit upon by Lord Brougham? To withhold the Franchise from the \textit{working classes} until the lower-middle class, which is bribed, and the higher classes that bribe them, shall have mended their ways! The dotage of old age can alone account for such a paradox.

Written on October 18, 1859


---

\(^a\) Henry Brougham's speech at the Third Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Bradford, October 10, 1859, \textit{The Times}, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
The treaty of peace concluded at Zurich between the Plenipotentiaries of France and Austria, appears, in its main features, a simple reproduction of the articles stipulated at Villafranca. The negotiations for the definitive peace consuming about twice as much time as the operations of the war that stopped short before the walls of Mantua, there were a great many sanguine people ready to account for the slow-coach progress of the peacemakers by a deep-laid scheme on the part of Louis Bonaparte, who, they said, wanted to give to the Italians full scope for taking their affairs in their own hands, so that, Italian unity having once consolidated itself, the French liberator might, with good grace, back out of the awkward concessions made to Francis Joseph, and, from the word of his bond, appeal to the superior force of a fait accompli. Political contracts are not exempt from the casualties besetting civil contracts, which, according to the Code Napoléon, get nullified by the interference of a force majeure. The people arguing in this way have again betrayed their woful ignorance, not only of their pet hero's character, but of the traditional diplomacy of France, from the Red Cardinal down to the Man of December, and from the profligates of the Directory down to the Blues of 1848. The first article of that traditional diplomacy proclaims it the first duty of France to prevent the formation on her confines of mighty States, and, consequently, under all circumstances, to keep up the anti-Unitarian Constitutions of Italy and Germany. It is the same policy that dictated the peace of Münster, and the peace of Campoformio. The real
purpose aimed at by the time-killing Zurich transactions has now
become as plain as daylight. If, in the beginning of July, Louis
Bonaparte had tried to enforce the Villafranca stipulations, at a
time when his own army was flushed with victory, when popular
passion ran high in Italy, and when France was soothing her
wounded pride by the fanciful dream that she bore with slavery at
home in order to impart freedom abroad, the Dutch usurper
would have let loose upon himself fierce antagonistic powers more
difficult to be grappled with than even the stubborn quadrilateral
between the Mincio and the Adige. He could not have relied upon
his own army, he would have roused Italy to action, and he might
have given the signal for an insurrection in Paris. From
melodramatic sublimity, got up for the occasion, to pass over to
the matter-of-fact vulgarity of an imposture preconcerted, nothing
was wanted but time. There is still a French army quartered on
Italian soil, but from an army of liberation, it has turned into an
army of occupation, whose everyday intercourse with the natives is
anything but amiable—familiarity having, as usual, bred contempt.
France, on her part, has awoke from her short-lived dream,
shuddering at the danger of a European coalition, pondering over
an old army lost and a new public debt created, and more
distrustful than ever of the idées Napoléoniennes. As to Italy herself,
we must judge her state from facts, not from proclamations.
There is Garibaldi unable to get the money to be laid out in arms
for the army of volunteers,\textsuperscript{401} and there is this very army whose
force appears almost ludicrous if one compares it to the numbers
flocking to the standards in Prussia, during the war of independ-
ence,\textsuperscript{402} at a time when Prussia had become of more diminutive
dimensions than Lombardy.

Mazzini himself, in his appeal to Victor Emmanuel,\textsuperscript{a} confesses
that the national stream of enthusiasm is rapidly congealing in
provincial ponds, and that the conditions of a return to the old
state of things, are in the finest way of maturing.\textsuperscript{403} It is true that
the dreary \textit{intermezzo} between the treaty of Villafranca and the
peace of Zurich was filled up, in the Duchies and the Romagna, by
some great state actions,\textsuperscript{404} under the management of Piedmontese
stage directors; but, despite the noisy plaudits from all the
galleries of Europe, those political tricksters played only into the
hands of their secret foes. The Tuscanese, Modenese, Parmesans
and Romagnoles, were welcome to establish Provisional Govern-
ments, to depose their absentee Princes from their diminutive

\textsuperscript{a} G. Mazzini, \textit{A Vittorio Emanuele lettera}.—\textit{Ed.}
thrones, and to proclaim Victor Emmanuel the *Re eletto*; but, at the same time, they were strictly enjoined to content themselves with these formalities, keep quiet, and leave the rest to the French providence just about to settle their destinies at Zurich, and peculiarly averse to freaks of enthusiasm, outbreaks of popular passions, and *allures révolutionnaires* in general. They were to expect everything, not from the vigor of their exertions, but from the modesty of their behavior—not from their own power, but from a foreign despot's grace. A landed estate could not be more calmly transferred from one proprietor to another than Central Italy was to pass from the foreign yoke to national self-government. Nothing was changed in the internal administration, all popular agitation was hushed, the liberty of the press itself stifled, and, for the first time perhaps in the history of Europe, the fruits of a revolution seemed to be gathered without the trials of a revolution being undergone. With all this the political atmosphere of Italy had sufficiently cooled down to allow Louis Bonaparte to come out with his foregone conclusions and leave the Italians to their own angry impotence. With a French army at Rome, another French army in Lombardy, one Austrian army frowning down from the Tyrol, another Austrian army holding the quadrilateral, and, above all, with the extinguisher so successfully put upon popular enthusiasm by its Piedmontese managers, there remains at present but small hope for Italy. As to the peace of Zurich itself, we call particular attention to two articles not to be found in the first edition of the treaty. By one of the articles Sardinia is saddled with a debt of 250,000,000 frs., partly to be paid to Francis Joseph, partly accruing from the responsibility thrown upon her for three-fifths of the liabilities of the Lombardo-Venetian bank. With this new debt of 250,000,000 frs. added to the debts contracted during the Crimean expedition and the last Italian war, beside a little bill for his armed patronage which Louis Bonaparte presented a few days since, Sardinia will soon find herself on a level of financial prosperity with her hated antagonist. The other article alluded to stipulates that

"the territorial limits of the Independent States of Italy, which did not take part in the last war, can be changed only with the assent of the other Powers of Europe, which took part in forming and guaranteeing the existence of these States." At the

---

*a* Elected King.— *Ed.*

*b* Revolutionary ways.— *Ed.*

*c* The reference is to Articles 7 and 8 of the treaty.— *Ed.*
same time, "the rights of the Princes of Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, are expressly reserved by the high contracting Powers."

Thus the provisional Italian Governments, having played the part cut out for them, are most scornfully ignored, and the populations, whom they have contrived to keep in such a normal state of passiveness, may, if they like, go a-begging at the doors of the framers of the treaty of Vienna.

Written on October 20, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
At a time when very wild views obtained as to the impulse American and British commerce were sure to receive from the throwing open, as it was called, of the Celestial Empire, we undertook to show, by a somewhat elaborate review of Chinese foreign commerce since the commencement of this century, that those high-flown anticipations had no solid ground to stand upon. Quite apart from the opium-trade, which we proved to grow in an inverse ratio to the sale of Western manufactures, we found the main obstacle to any sudden expansion of the import trade to China in the economical structure of Chinese society, depending upon the combination of minute agriculture with domestic industry. We may now, in corroboration of our former statements, refer to the Blue Book entitled, "Correspondence Relative to Lord Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan."

Wherever the real demand for commodities imported into Asiatic countries does not answer the supposed demand—which, in most instances, is calculated on such superficial data as the extent of the new market, the magnitude of its population, and the vent foreign wares used to find at some outstanding seaports—commercial men, in their eagerness at securing a larger area of exchange, are too prone to account for their disappointment by the circumstance that artificial arrangements, invented by barbarian Governments, stand in their way, and may, consequent-ly, be cleared away by main force. This very delusion has, in our epoch, converted the British merchant, for instance, into the reckless supporter of every Minister, who, by piratical aggressions, promises to extort a treaty of commerce from the barbarian. Thus the artificial obstacles foreign commerce was supposed to encounter on the part of the Chinese authorities, formed, in fact, the

---

*a* See this volume, pp. 46-50.—Ed.
great pretext which, in the eyes of the mercantile world, justified every outrage committed on the Celestial Empire. The valuable information contained in Lord Elgin's Blue Book, will, with every unprejudiced mind, go far to dispel such dangerous delusions.

The Blue Book contains a report, dated in 1852, of Mr. Mitchell, a British agent at Canton, to Sir George Bonham, from which we quote the following passage:

"Our commercial treaty with this country (China) has now (1852) been nearly ten years in full work, every presumed impediment has been removed, one thousand miles of new coast have been opened up to us, and new marts established at the very threshold of the producing districts, and at the best possible points upon the seaboard. And yet, what is the result as far as the promised increase in the consumption of our manufactures is concerned? Why, plainly this: that at the end of ten years the tables of the Board of Trade show us that Sir Henry Pottinger found a larger trade in existence when he signed the supplementary treaty in 1843, than his treaty itself shows us at the end of 1850!—that is to say, as far as our home manufactures are concerned, which is the sole question we are now considering."

Mr. Mitchell admits that the trade between India and China, consisting almost exclusively in an exchange of silver for opium, has been greatly developed since the treaty of 1842, but, even in regard to this trade, he adds:

"It developed itself in as fast a ratio, from 1834 to 1844, as it has done from the latter date to the present, which latter period may be taken as its working under the supposed protection of the treaty; while, on the other hand, we have the great fact staring us in the face, in the tables of the Board of Trade, that the export of our manufacturing stuffs to China was less by nearly three-quarters of a million sterling at the close of 1850, than it was at the close of 1844."

That the treaty of 1842 had no influence at all in fostering the British export trade to China will be seen from the following tabular statement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECLAIMED VALUE.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woolen Goods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                  | 1854. | 1855. | 1856. | 1857. |
| Cotton Goods     | 640,820 | 883,985 | 1,544,235 | 1,731,909 |
| Woolen Goods     | 156,959 | 134,070 | 268,642  | 286,852  |
| Other articles   | 202,937 | 259,889 | 403,246  | 431,221  |
| **Total**        | 1,000,716 | 1,277,944 | 2,216,123 | 2,449,982 |
Now, comparing these figures with the Chinese demand for British manufactures in 1843, stated by Mr. Mitchell to have amounted to £1,750,000, it will be seen that in five out of the last nine years the British exports fell far below the level of 1843, and in 1854 were only 10-17 of what they had been in 1843. Mr. Mitchell, in the first instance, explains this startling fact by some reasons which appear too general to prove anything in particular. He says:

"The habits of the Chinese are so thrifty, and so hereditary, that they wear just what their fathers wore before them; that is to say, just enough and no more of anything, no matter how cheap it may be offered them." "No working Chinaman can afford to put on a new coat which shall not last him at least three years, and stand the wear and tear of the roughest drudgery during that period. Now, a garment of that description must contain at least three times the weight of raw cotton which we put into the heaviest goods we import to China; that is to say, it must be three times as heavy as the heaviest drills and domestics we can afford to send out here."

Absence of wants, and predilection for hereditary modes of dress, are obstacles which civilized commerce has to encounter in all new markets. As to the thickness and strength of drills, might British and American manufacturers not adapt their wares to the peculiar requirements of the Chinese? But here we come to the real point at issue. In 1844, Mr. Mitchell sent samples of the native cloth of every quality to England, with the prices specified. His correspondents assured him that they could not produce it in Manchester, and much less ship it to China, at the rates quoted. Whence this inability in the most advanced factory system of the world to undersell cloth woven by hand in the most primitive looms? The combination we have already pointed to, of minute agriculture with domestic industry, solves the riddle. We quote again from Mr. Mitchell:

"When the harvest is gathered, all hands in the farm-houses, young and old together, turn to carding, spinning, and weaving this cotton; and out of this homespun stuff a heavy and durable material, adapted to the rough handling it has to go through for two or three years, they clothe themselves, and the surplus they carry to the nearest town, where the shopkeeper buys it for the use of the population of the towns, and the boat people on the rivers. With this homespun stuff, nine out of every ten human beings in this country are clothed, the manufacture varying in quality from the coarsest dungaree to the finest nanking, all produced in the farm-houses, and costing the producer literally nothing beyond the value of the raw material, or rather of the sugar which he exchanged for it, the produce of his own husbandry. Our manufacturers have only to contemplate for a moment the admirable economy of this system, and, so to speak, its exquisite dove-tailing with the other pursuits of the farmer, to be satisfied, at a glance, that they have no chance whatever in the competition, as far as the coarser fabrics are concerned. It is, perhaps, characteristic of China alone, of all countries in the
world, that the loom is to be found in every well-conditioned homestead. The
people of all other countries content themselves with carding and spinning, and at
that point stop short, sending the yarn to the professional weaver to be made into
cloth. It was reserved for the thrifty Chinaman to carry the thing out to perfection.
He not only cards and spins his cotton, but he weaves it himself, with the help of
his wives and daughters, and farm servants, and hardly ever confines himself to
producing for the mere wants of his family, but makes it an essential part of his
season's operations to produce a certain quantity of cloth for the supply of the
neighboring towns and rivers.

"The Fukien farmer is thus not merely a farmer, but an agriculturist and a
manufacturer in one. He produces his cloth literally for nothing, beyond the cost
of the raw material; he produces it, as shown, under his own roof-tree, by the
hands of his women and farm servants; it costs neither extra labor nor extra time.
He keeps his domestics spinning and weaving while his crops are growing, and
after they are harvested, during rainy weather, when out-of-door labor cannot be
pursued. In short, at every available interval throughout the year does this model
domestic industry pursue his calling, and engage himself upon something
useful."

As a complement of Mr. Mitchell's statement, may be considered
the following description Lord Elgin gives of the rural population
he met with during his voyage up the Yang-tse-kiang:

"What I have seen leads me to think that the rural population of China is,
generally speaking, well-doing and contented. I worked very hard, though with
only indifferent success, to obtain from them accurate information respecting the
extent of their holdings, the nature of their tenure, the taxation which they have to
pay, and other kindred matters. I arrived at the conclusion that, for the most part,
they hold their lands, which are of very limited extent, in full property from the
Crown, subject to certain annual charges of no very exorbitant amount, and that
these advantages, improved by assiduous industry, supply abundantly their simple
wants, whether in respect of food or clothing."

It is this same combination of husbandry with manufacturing
industry, which, for a long time, withstood, and still checks, the
export of British wares to East India; but there that combination
was based upon a peculiar constitution of the landed property
which the British, in their position as the supreme landlords of the
country, had it in their power to undermine, and thus forcibly
convert part of the Hindoo self-sustaining communities into mere
farms, producing opium, cotton, indigo, hemp, and other raw
materials, in exchange for British stuffs. In China the English
have not yet wielded this power, nor are they likely ever to do so.
Karl Marx

TROUBLE IN GERMANY

Paris, Nov. 15, 1859

There is now on the tapis a querelle allemande,\(^a\) which, diminutive as it must appear to the general public, may, nevertheless, result in a German, and even a European, catastrophe. The little country which affords the pretext of quarrel to the ruling Teutonic Powers has acquired a bad renown in the history of the United States. It is generally known that of the thousands of drilled slaves whom England bought in Germany, to ship over the Atlantic and let loose on her revolted Colonies, the principal stock was supplied from Hesse-Cassel, where a paternal Archlector used to derive revenue from the exchange of British gold for his faithful yeomen. Ever since that memorable epoch, the relations between the Arch-electors and their subjects seem to have grown progressively inimical, until, in 1830, the French Revolution of July gave the signal to a revolution in Hesse-Cassel.\(^b\) That revolution was secretly fostered by the present Arch-elector,\(^b\) who felt rather anxious to share with his beloved father\(^c\) the responsibilities of supreme power. The little revolution paved the way to the Hessian Constitution of Jan. 5, 1831,\(^d\) which affords now the grand battle-cry between Austria and Prussia; had, in 1850, driven them to the bloodless battle of Bronzell; and, circumstances helping, may soon induce Louis Bonaparte to study the "German question" after he has contrived to make a bore of the "Italian question."\(^e\)

\(^a\) German quarrel.—\(Ed.\)
\(^b\) Frederick William I.—\(Ed.\)
\(^c\) William II.—\(Ed.\)
\(^d\) Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831.—\(Ed.\)
\(^e\) Paraphrase of Napoleon III's statement: "To study questions does not mean to create them." ("Etudier les questions, ce n'est pas les créer"), \textit{Le Moniteur universel}, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—\(Ed.\)
To explain the present conflict, a short sketch of the Hessian Constitution of 1831, of the metamorphoses it underwent, and the events which mixed up with its fate the rival claims of Austria and Prussia, may prove opportune.

With the exception of the method of election it ordains, that is, the election of representatives by the old estates (nobles, citizens, peasants), the Hessian Constitution of 1831 may be regarded as the most liberal fundamental law ever proclaimed in Europe. There is no other Constitution which restrains the powers of the executive within limits so narrow, makes the Administration more dependent on the Legislature, and confides such a supreme control to the judicial benches. To account for this strange fact, it may be said that the Hessian revolution of 1831 was, in point of fact, a revolution against the Prince on the part of the lawyers, the civil service and the military officers acting in harmony with the malcontents of all “estates.” By the first paragraph, every Hessian prince is excluded from the succession to the throne, who should decline taking an oath to the Constitution. The law on Ministerial responsibility, so far from being an unmeaning phrase, enables the representatives to remove, through the State tribunal, every Minister declared guilty of having even misinterpreted any resolution of the Legislature. The Prince is divested of the right of grace. He enjoys neither the privilege of pensioning or removing the members of the Administration against their will, there being always open to them an appeal to the courts of law. The latter are invested with the right of final decision in all questions of bureaucratic discipline. The Representative Chamber selects out of its members a permanent committee, forming a sort of Areopagus, watching and controlling the Government, and impeaching the officials for violation of the Constitution, no exception being granted on behalf of orders received by subalterns from their superiors in rank. In this way, the members of the bureaucracy were emancipated from the Crown. On the other hand, the Courts of law, empowered to decide definitively upon all the acts of the Executive, were rendered omnipotent. Communal Councillors, nominated by popular election, had to administer not only the local, but also the general police. The military officers, before entering the service, are bound by oath to obedience to the Constitution, and, in all respects, enjoy the same privileges against the Crown as the civilians. The representation, consisting of one single Chamber, possesses the right of stopping all taxes, imposts and duties, on every conflict with the executive.

Such is the Constitution of 1831 for Hesse-Cassel, which the
Arch-elector, William II, the father of the now reigning Prince, proclaimed,

"in perfect agreement with his estates," and which "he hoped would still, in distant centuries, flourish as a solid monument of the harmony between the sovereign and his subjects."\(^a\)

A draft of the Constitution was then, on the part of the Government, communicated to the German Diet, which, if it gave no guaranty, seemed to accept it as a fait accompli. It could be foreseen that despite all pia desideria,\(^b\) the Constitutional machinery was not to run smoothly in Hesse-Cassel. From 1832 to 1848 there sat not less than ten legislatures, of which not two contrived to last their natural terms of life. The revolution of 1848 and 1849 impregnated the Constitution of 1831 with a more democratic spirit by abolishing the election by estates, by putting the nomination of the members of the Supreme Court into the hands of the Legislature, and, lastly, by taking out of the hands of the Prince the supreme control of the army, and making it over to the Minister of War, a personage responsible to the representatives of the people.

In 1849—on the meeting of the first Hessian Legislature, elected according to the new electoral law—a general reaction had already broken in upon Germany; but, nevertheless, things were still in a state of fermentation. The old German Diet had been washed away by the revolutionary waves, while the German National Assembly, and its mock Executive, had been laid low at the point of the bayonet. So there no longer existed a center of the whole German Federation. Under these circumstances, Austria demanded the restoration of the old Diet at Frankfort, where its influence had always been paramount, while Prussia wanted to form a Northern Union,\(^410\) for her own use and under her own control. Austria, backed by the four German Kingdoms and Baden, contrived, in fact, to gather around her in Frankfort-on-the-Main the relics of the old German Diet, while Prussia made a weak attempt at holding a Union-Diet at Erfurt,\(^411\) with some of the smaller States. Hesse-Cassel, under the direction of its liberal Legislature, was, of course, foremost among the opponents of Austria, and the partisans of Prussia. As soon, however, as the Arch-elector had ascertained that Austria was backed by Russia, and was likely to win the race, he threw off the mask, declared for the Austrian Diet against the Prussian Union, installed a reaction-

\(^a\) Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831, p. 1.—Ed.
\(^b\) Pious wishes.—Ed.
ary Ministry with the ill-famed Hassenpflug at its head, dissolved the opposing Legislature, which had refused to grant taxes, and, having vainly tried to raise the taxes on his own authority, finding no support in the ranks of the army, the bureaucracy and the law courts, declared Hesse-Cassel in a state of siege. He had taken the good precaution of running away and resorting to Frankfort-on-the-Main, there to live under the immediate protection of Austria. Austria, in the name of the old Diet, restored by herself, dispatched a federal corps on the errand of putting down the Hessian Constitution, and raising up the throne of the Arch-elector. Prussia, on her part, was forced to declare for the Hessian Constitution against the Arch-elector, in order to maintain her own protest against the revival of the German Diet, and her attempt of establishing a Northern Union under her own auspices. Thus the Hessian Constitution was converted into a battle-cry between Austria and Prussia. Things drew meanwhile to a crisis. The vanguards of the Federal and the Prussian armies confronted each other at Bronzell, but only to sound the retreat on both sides. The President of the Prussian Ministry, Herr von Manteuffel, met the Prince of Schwarzenberg, the Austrian Minister, at Olmütz, on the 29th of November, 1850, to resign into his hands all Prussian claims to a policy of her own with regard to the Diet, Hesse-Cassel and Schleswig-Holstein. Prussia returned to the Diet a downcast and penitent sinner. Her humiliation was embittered by the triumphant march of an Austrian army to the coasts of the Northern Sea. The Hessian Constitution of 1831 was of course abolished without further ado, to be replaced at first by martial law, and subsequently, in 1852, by a most reactionary Constitution, hatched out by Hassenpflug, doctored by the Elector, and emendated and sanctioned by the German Diet. This Constitution of 1852 formed, then, the standing topic of quarrel between the country and the Elector—all attempts at conciliation proving futile. The late events in Italy, and the consequent movements in Germany, were considered by the Prussian Government to afford the best opportunity of revenge for the defeat of Olmütz, and the renewal of its old feud with Austria. Prussia knows that Russia, who, in 1850, turned the balance on the side of Austria, will this time move in the opposite direction. Till now nothing has been exchanged between the two rivals except paper bullets. That the Hessian Constitutions of 1831 and 1852 form only the pretext of their fight, is shown by the simple circumstance that Austria

---

\[a\] Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 13ten April 1852.—Ed.
declares for a modification of the Constitution of 1852, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of 1831, while Prussia insists on the restoration of the Constitution of 1831, after its having been remodeled in conformity to the general (monarchic) principles of the German Diet. The people and the Chambers in Hesse-Cassel, relying on Prussian support, ask for the restoration of the old Constitution. The whole business, properly managed by interested counselors from without, may end in a German civil war, if the German people turn not, at the opportune moment, against "both their houses."[a]

Written on November 15, 1859

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5807, December 2, 1859

---

[a] Cf. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Scene 1.—Ed.
Panics appear to have become in these latter days as regular incidents of English political life, as they long ago were of the English industrial system. Panics, if properly managed, form a great resource for governments in so-called free countries. When people are frightened out of their senses their minds are easily diverted from dangerous crotchets. Take, for instance, the Reform question in England. At the very time when England was considering whether she would resign forever the control of North America, Lord Grey proposed a sweeping Reform bill which was to do away with all the traditional influence of the Lords on the Lower House. In 1780 the Duke of Richmond brought in a Reform bill which positively went the length of demanding annual Parliaments and universal suffrage. Pitt, himself, whose centenary birthday has passed away without being noticed by his country-men, then just occupied in celebrating the secular anniversary of Handel's death—this same Pitt had originally inscribed on his banners the words: "Parliamentary Reform." How, then, came it to pass that the Reform movement of the eighteenth century, having seized the most intellectual representatives of the governing classes, even died away without leaving any traces behind? It was swept away by the French Revolution panic, in the train of which followed the Anti-Jacobin war, the Public Debt monster, and the ignominious Gagging Acts. Some years ago, the Russian panic killed two Reform bills, and now-a-days the French invasion panic is likely to do the same service. We can, therefore, estimate at their just value the dark apprehensions of the English Radicals, under Mr. Bright's leadership, who profess to consider the oligarchs and their organs in the public press as interested
panic-mongers, bent upon defeating Reform, and perpetuating
misrule, by the specter of a French invasion. There are, indeed,
upon the face of the thing some ugly, suspicious-looking features.
The Palmerstonian press is the main vehicle of the invasion panic,
while Palmerston is apparently Louis Bonaparte's most intimate
friend. The same man who was dismissed from one Cabinet
because he acknowledged the coup d'état, without the sanction of
his colleagues, and was driven from another Cabinet because he
introduced the French Conspiracy bill, would he be the most
proper personage to cross Bonapartist schemes? At the same time
that the Palmerstonian press warns the English people against
Bonaparte's perfidy, it calls upon them to embark with the same
man into a new Chinese expedition.

Nevertheless it cannot be denied that the present war panic in
England, though it may turn to the profit of aristocratic party
policy, is not altogether divested of rational grounds. Whenever
Bonaparte concludes a new peace, England asks herself instinctive-
ly whether her turn for bearing the brunt of war has at last come.
Thus a war between France and England appears a question of
time only. For fear of the revolution, official Europe accepted the
regime of Louis Bonaparte, but a periodical renewal of war is one
of the vital conditions of that regime. It only delivers the Cabinets
from the bugbear of revolution on the express understanding that
they allow themselves to be successively conquered. He had hardly
sat two years upon his usurped throne when the Russian war had
become necessary to his prolonged tenure of power. Two years
had not yet elapsed since the conclusion of the Russian peace
when the Italian adventure alone could save him from an
ignominious catastrophe. His difficulties have certainly not de-
creased by a succession of wars, resulting in nothing but delusions
on the one hand, in public debts, and the growing insolence of a
Pretorian guard on the other, not to speak of the opposition of
the clergy, added to the other elements of internal insecurity
already existing. After the Russian war, some time elapsed before
Orleanist disaffection dared to mutter its sarcasms, and revolu-
tionary despair to launch its grenades. The evidence of disappoint-
ment that characterized the last war shows most conspicuously in
the dead lock of French commerce, the complete failure of the
Imperial amnesty, the recrudescence of severity against the press,

\[a\] The Times, No. 23473, November 25, 1859 (leading article).—Ed.

\[b\] Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned
for criminal and political offences, Le Moniteur universel, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16
and 17, 1859.—Ed.
and the revived hopes of the Orleanists. While the mass of the French people grumble at a barren war that has cost them the savings of peace, the mass of the army rail at a peace that, in their judgment, has cheated them out of the fruits of war. Some months more will develop to their full extent the difficulties Louis Bonaparte labors under, and from which there is only one issue—that of a new war. The successive wars, however, which his position compels him to enter upon grow gradually more dangerous for himself and for Europe, as whose most powerful representative England may be regarded. The war in the Crimea was hardly carried on on European soil. The war in Italy could only be localized by its abrupt termination. A war on the Rhine, and still more an invasion of England, would in its very beginning, be tantamount to a general European war. But it is only between Prussia and England, as the respective objects of his next attack, that Louis Bonaparte has to choose. In both cases England will become a party, in the one as principal, in the other as subsidiary. The latter eventuality is the more probable, but it is impossible to foresee what direct collisions between France and England may grow out of a war between France and Prussia. On another occasion we propose reviewing the military preparations England is making with an eye to the impending conflict.

Written on November 25, 1859

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5813, December 9, 1859

Reproduced from the newspaper
We have long been waiting for some decided move on the part of the Spanish army in Morocco, which might bring to a close the first or preparatory period of the war. But in vain. Marshal O'Donnell seems to be in no hurry to leave his camp on the heights of Serrallo, and so we are compelled to review his operations while they have hardly yet begun.

On Nov. 13, the first division of the Spanish active army, under Gen. Echagüe, embarked at Algeciras, and a few days afterward was landed at Ceuta. On the 17th it marched out of the town and occupied the Serrallo or White House, a large building about a mile and a half in front of the lines of Ceuta. The ground in that vicinity is very rugged and broken, and very favorable for skirmishing and irregular fighting. The Moors, after an unsuccessful attempt, on the same night, to reconquer the Serrallo, retired, and the Spaniards began to construct an intrenched camp to serve as a base for future operations.

On the 22d, the Serrallo was attacked by the Anjerites, the Moorish tribe occupying the country near the Ceuta. This engagement opened a series of fruitless fights which fill up the whole of the campaign to the present moment, and of which every one is exactly like all the rest. The Moors attack the Spanish lines in greater or lesser force, and try by surprise or feint, to get possession of part of them. According to the Moorish reports, they generally succeed in this, but abandon the redoubts because they have no artillery. According to the Spaniards, no Moor ever saw the inside of a Spanish redoubt, and all their attacks have proved utterly unsuccessful. On the first attack the Anjerites counted no more than 1,600 men. They received the next day a reenforce-
ment of 4,000 men, and at once returned to the attack. The 22d and 23d were filled up with skirmishing, but on the 25th, the Moors advanced with all their forces, and a severe combat took place, in which Gen. Echagüe was wounded in the hand. This attack by the Moors was so serious, that it spurred a little the sleepiness with which Cid Campeador O'Donnell had so far carried on the war. He ordered at once that the second division, under Gen. Zabala, and the reserve division, under Gen. Prim, should be embarked, and left himself for Ceuta. On the night of the 27th, the whole Spanish active army was concentrated before that place. On the 29th, there was another attack by the Moors, repeated on the 30th. After this, the Spaniards began to think of their confined position; the object of their first move was to be Tetuan, about 20 miles south of Ceuta, and four miles from the sea. They commenced making a road toward this town; the Moors offered no opposition till Dec. 9. On the morning of that day they surprised the garrisons of the two principal redoubts, but as usual, abandoned them later in the day. On the 12th, another engagement took place in front of the Spanish camp, about four miles from Ceuta; and on the 20th O'Donnell telegraphs that the Moors had again attacked the two redoubts, but were, as usual, gloriously defeated. Thus, on Dec. 20, matters had not advanced one jot further than on Nov. 20. The Spaniards were still on the defensive, and, in spite of announcements made a fortnight or three weeks before, there were no symptoms of an advance.

The Spaniards, with all the reenforcements received up to the 8th December, were from 35,000 to 40,000 strong, and 30,000 men might be available for offensive operations. With such a force, the conquest of Tetuan ought to be easy. There are certainly no good roads, and the provisions of the army must all be carried from Ceuta. But how did the French manage in Algeria, or the English in India? Besides, Spanish mules and cart-horses are not so spoiled by good roads in their own country as to refuse to march on Moorish ground. No matter what O'Donnell may say by way of apology, there can be no excuse for this continued inactivity. The Spaniards are as strong now as they can reasonably expect to be at any time in the campaign, unless unexpected reverses should bring on extraordinary exertions. The Moors, on the contrary, are daily getting stronger. The camp at Tetuan, under Hadji Abd Saleem, which furnished the bodies

---

a O'Donnell's order was reported in *L'Indépendance belge*, No. 334, December 1, 1859 ("Nouvelles d'Espagne").—*Ed.*
attacking the Spanish line on Dec. 3, had been swelled to 10,000 already, beside the garrison of the town. Another camp, under Muley-Abbas, was at Tangier, and reenforcements were arriving constantly from the interior. This consideration alone ought to have induced O'Donnell to advance as soon as the weather permitted it. He has had good weather, but he has not advanced. There can be no doubt that this is a sign of sheer irresolution, and that he has found the Moors less despicable enemies than he expected. There is no question that the latter have fought uncommonly well, and the great complaints arising from the Spanish camp of the advantages the ground in front of Ceuta gives to the Moors is a proof of it.

The Spaniards say that in brushwood and ravines the Moors are very formidable, and, besides, they know every inch of the ground; but that, as soon as they get into the plains, the solidity of the Spanish infantry will soon compel the Moorish irregulars to face about and run. This is a rather doubtful way of arguing in an epoch where three-fourths of the time spent in every battle is devoted to skirmishing in broken ground. If the Spaniards, after halting six weeks before Ceuta, do not know the ground as well as the Moors, so much the worse for them. That broken ground is more favorable to irregulars than a level plain, is clear enough. But even in broken ground, regular infantry ought to be vastly superior to irregulars. The modern system of skirmishing, with supports and reserves behind the extended chain, the regularity of the movements, the possibility of keeping the troops well in hand, and making them support each other and act all toward one common end—all this gives such superiority to regular troops over irregular bands, that in the ground best adapted for skirmishing, no irregulars ought to be able to stand against them, even if two to one. But here at Ceuta the proposition is reversed. The Spaniards have the superiority of numbers, and yet they dare not advance. The only conclusion is that the Spanish army do not understand skirmishing at all, and that thus their individual inferiority in this mode of fighting balances the advantages which their discipline and regular training ought to give them. In fact, there seems to be an uncommonly great deal of hand-to-hand fighting with yataghan and bayonet. The Moors, when the Spaniards are close enough, stop firing and rush upon them, sword in hand, in the same way as the Turks used to do, and this is certainly not very pleasant for young troops like the Spaniards. But the many engagements that have occurred ought to have made them familiar with the peculiarities of Moorish fighting and
the proper mode to meet it; and when we see the commander still hesitate and remain in his defensive position, we cannot form a very high estimate of his army.

The Spanish plan of campaign as it is shadowed forth by the facts appears to start with Ceuta as the base of operations, and Tetuan as the first object of attack. That part of Morocco immediately opposite the Spanish coast forms a kind of peninsula, some 30 or 40 miles broad by 30 long. Tangier, Ceuta, Tetuan, and Larache (El-Araish) are the four principal towns on this peninsula. By occupying these four towns, of which Ceuta already is in the hands of the Spaniards, this peninsula might be easily subjected, and made a base of further operations against Fez and Mequinez. The conquest of this peninsula, therefore, appears to be the object of the Spaniards, and the taking of Tetuan the first step toward it. This plan seems sensible enough; it confines operations to a narrow region, bounded on three sides by the sea and by two rivers (Tetuan and Lukkos) on the fourth, and, therefore, far more easy to take than the country further south. It also obviates the necessity of going into the desert, which would be unavoidable if Mogador or Rabat had been taken for the base of operations; and it brings the field of action close to the frontiers of Spain, there being only the Straits of Gibraltar between them. But whatever may be the advantages of this plan, they are all of no use unless the plan be carried out, and if O'Donnell goes on as he has done hitherto, he will cover himself and the reputation of the Spanish army with disgrace, in spite of the high-sounding language of his bulletins.

Written about December 10, 1859


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The campaign in Morocco has at last fairly begun, and with this beginning disappear all the romantic hues in which the Spanish press and Spanish popular enthusiasm had dressed out O'Donnell, who sinks down into a passable average general; instead of the chivalry of Castile and León, we have the Princesa Hussars, and instead of Toledo blades, rifled cannon and cylindro-conoidal shot do the work.

About the 20th of December the Spaniards began to construct a road, practicable for artillery and carriages, which was to lead across the hilly ground south of the camp before Ceuta. The Moors never attempted to destroy the road; they attacked, sometimes, Gen. Prim, whose division covered the working parties, sometimes the camp; but always without success. None of these engagements rose beyond the dimensions of skirmishes of the advance guard; and in the most serious of them, on Dec. 27, the Spanish loss did not exceed 6 killed and 30 wounded. Before the close of the year the road, itself not more than two miles long, was completed; but a fresh onset of storms and rain prevented the army from moving. In the mean time, as if it was meant to give the Moorish camp notice of the impending movements of the army, a Spanish squadron of one sailing vessel of the line, 3 screw frigates, 3 paddle steamers, in all 246 guns, ran up to the mouth of the Tetuan River, and bombarded, on the 29th December, the forts at its mouth. They were silenced, and the earthworks destroyed in about three hours; it is not to be forgotten that they were the same forts which the French had bombarded about a month before with a far inferior force.
The weather having become fair on the 29th, the Spanish army at last began to move on the 1st of January. The First Corps of two divisions, under Echagüe, which had been the first to land in Africa, remained in the lines in front of Ceuta. Although it had suffered much by disease in the first weeks, it was now pretty well acclimatized, and, with reinforcements received since, numbered 10,000 men, considerably more than either the Second or the Third Corps. These two corps, commanded, the Second by Zabala, and the Third by Ros de Olano, together with Prim's réserve division, in all 21,000 to 22,000 men, marched out on the first day of the new-year. Every man carried six days' rations, while a million of rations, or one months' provisions for the army, were shipped on board transports to accompany the army. With Prim for an advance guard, supported by Zabala, and Ros de Olano bringing up the rear, the high ground south of Ceuta was passed. The new road led down toward the Mediterranean within two miles from the camp. There a semicircular plain extended for some distance, the chord being formed by the sea, and the periphery by broken ground rising gradually into rugged mountains. No sooner had Prim's division fairly debouched from the camp than the skirmishing began. The Spanish Light Infantry easily drove back the Moors into the plain, and thence into the hills and brushwood, which flanked their line of march. Here it was that by some misunderstanding two weak squadrons of Princessa Hussars were led to charge, and did so with such a spirit that they passed right through the Moorish line into their camp; but getting everywhere into broken ground, and finding nowhere either cavalry or infantry in practicable ground at which they could charge they had to turn back with a loss of seven or nearly all of their officers, beside privates. So far, the fight had been carried on principally by the infantry in skirmishing order, and a battery or two of mountain artillery, supported here and there by the effect—more moral than physical—of the fire of a few gunboats and steamers. It appears that O'Donnell intended to halt in the plain, without occupying permanently, as yet, the ridge forming the boundary of this plain to the south. In order, however, to secure his position for the night, he ordered Prim to dislodge the Moorish skirmishers from the northern slope of the ridge and then to fall back about dusk. Prim, however, who is the greatest fighting man in the Spanish army, engaged in a serious

---

encounter, which ended in his taking possession of the whole top of the ridge, though not without severe loss. His advance guard encamped on the ridge and threw up field-works on its front. The Spanish loss amounted, that day, to 73 killed and 481 wounded.

The position gained that day was the one known by the name of Castillejos, from two white buildings, the one on the inner slope near the plain, and the other on the ridge conquered, in the afternoon, by Prim. The official designation of this camp, however, appears to be Campamento de la Condesa. On the same day, the Moors had attempted a slight diversion against the camp before Ceuta, by attacking both the extreme right redoubt and the interval between the two extreme left redoubts. They were, however, easily repulsed by Echagüe's infantry and artillery fire.

The active army remained three days in the Camp de la Condesa. The field artillery and a rocket battery, as well as the remainder of the cavalry (the whole cavalry brigade consists of eight squadrons of hussars, four of cuirassiers without cuirasses, and four of lancers, in all 1,200 men), arrived in the camp. The siege train alone (among which was a battery of rifled 12-pounders) was still behind. On the 3d, O'Donnell reconnoitred toward Monte Negro, the next range of mountains to the south. The weather continued fine, hot at noon, with very heavy dews at night. Cholera was still rife among one or two divisions, and some corps had suffered severely from sickness. The two battalions of engineers, for instance, who had been very severely worked, were reduced from 135 men to 90 men per company.

So far, we have detailed accounts; for what follows, we are reduced to meager and not quite consistent telegrams. On the 5th, the army advanced. On the 6th, it was encamped "to the north of the Negro valley, having traversed the passes without opposition." Whether this means that the Monte Negro Ridge had been passed, and the army was encamping on its southern slope, is very uncertain. On the 9th, the army was, we are told, one league from Tetuan, and an attack of the Moors had been repulsed. On the 13th, the whole of the positions of Cabo Negro were carried, a complete victory was obtained, and the army was before Tetuan; so soon as the artillery could be brought up, the town would be attacked. On the 14th, the division of Gen. Rios, ten battalions strong, which had been concentrated at Malaga, landed at the

---

a Telegraphic message from Madrid of January 7, L'Indépendance belge, No. 10, January 10, 1860.—Ed.

b The Spanish league is equal to about 5.5 kilometres.—Ed.
mouth of the Tetuan River, and occupied the forts destroyed by the fleet a fortnight before. On the 16th, we are informed that the army was on the point of passing the river and attacking Tetuan.

To explain this, we may state that there are four distinct ridges of hills to be passed between Ceuta and Tetuan. The first immediately south of the camp and leading to the plain of Castillejos; the second closing that plain to the south. These two were taken by the Spaniards on the 1st. Still further south, and running perpendicular to the Mediterranean shore, is the ridge of Monte Negro, and parallel to this range, only further south still, comes another and higher ridge ending on the coast, in the Cape called Cabo Negro, south of which flows the Tetuan River. The Moors, after hanging on the flanks of the invading army during the 1st, changed their tactics, removed further south, and attempted to bar the road to Tetuan in front. It was expected that the decisive fight for the possession of this road was to come off in the passes of the last or Cabo Negro ridge, and such seems to have been the case on the 13th.

The tactical arrangements of these combats do not appear very creditable to either party. From the Moors we cannot expect anything but irregular fighting, carried on with the bravery and cunning of semi-savages. But, even in this they appear deficient. They do not seem to show that fanaticism which the Kabyles of the Algerian coast-ridges, and even of the Rif, have opposed to the French; the long, unsuccessful skirmishing in front of the redoubts near Ceuta seems to have broken the first ardor and energy of most of the tribes. Again, in their strategical arrangements they do not come up to the example of the Algerians. After the first day, they abandon their proper plan, which was to harass the flank and rear of the advancing column, and to interrupt or menace its communication with Ceuta; instead of this, they work hard to gain a march upon the Spaniards, and to bar their road to Tetuan in front, thus provoking what they ought to avoid—a pitched battle. Perhaps they may yet learn that with such men, and in such a country as they have, petty warfare is the proper way to wear out an enemy who, whatever his superiority in discipline and armament, is hampered in all his movements by immense impedimenta, unknown to them, and which it is no easy matter to move in a roadless and inhospitable country.

The Spaniards have gone on as they commenced. After lying idle two months at Ceuta, they have marched twenty-one miles in sixteen days, advancing at the rate of five miles in four days! With all due allowance for difficulties of roads, this is still a degree of
slowness unheard of in modern warfare. The habit of handling large bodies of troops, of preparing extensive operations, of marching an army which, after all, scarcely equals in strength one of the French army corps in the last Italian campaign, seems to have become quite lost with Spanish Generals. Otherwise how could such delays arise? On the 2d of January O'Donnell had all his artillery at Castillejos, with the exception of the siege train, but still he waited two days longer, and only advanced on the 5th. The march of the column itself appears to be pretty well arranged, but with such short marches this could scarcely be otherwise. When under fire the Spaniards appear to fight with that contempt of their enemy which superior discipline and a series of successful combats cannot fail to give; but it remains to be seen whether this certainty of victory will hold good when the climate and the fatigues of a campaign, which is sure to end in harassing, petty warfare, will have reduced both the *morale* and the *physique* of the army. As to the leadership, we can, so far, say very little, the details of all but the first engagement in the field being still deficient. This first fight, however, exhibits two conspicuous blunders—the charge of the cavalry, and the advance of Gen. Prim beyond his orders; and if these things should turn out to be regular features of the Spanish army, so much the worse for them.

The defense of Tetuan will very likely be a short but an obstinate one. The works are no doubt bad, but the Moors are capital soldiers behind ramparts, as has been proved in Constantine and many other Algerian towns. The next mail may bring us the news that it has been stormed. If so, we may expect a lull in the campaign, for the Spaniards will require time to improve the road between Tetuan and Ceuta, to form Tetuan into a second base of operations, and to await reenforcements. Thence, the next move will be upon Larache or Tangier.

Written about January 18, 1860

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5863, February 8, 1860 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
While the Governor of Chambéry has positively declared that the King of Sardinia has never contemplated the cession of Savoy to France, we have from the Foreign Minister of England the assurance, delivered in the House of Commons on the 2d inst., that the project was disavowed last Summer by Count Walewski in behalf of the Emperor of the French. These statements of Lord John Russell, however, refer to a period of several months ago; and what was then denied may now be very nearly consummated. Certainly it is difficult, or rather impossible, to believe that the movement for annexation to France, which has recently been developed among the people of Savoy, is purely of native origin. It must have been fomented by French agents, and must be sanctioned, or at least tolerated, by the Government of King Victor Emmanuel.

Savoy is a province of thorough and decided French nationality, as much as the western cantons of Switzerland. The people speak a Southern French (Provençal or Limousin) dialect; but the written and official language is everywhere French. This, however, is no proof whatever that the Savoyards wish to be annexed to France, and particularly to Bonapartist France. According to the notes of a German officer who made a military tour through the country in January, 1859, the French party is nowhere of any importance, except in Chambéry and the other towns of Lower Savoy, while

a "The Annexation of Savoy", The Times, No. 23530, January 31, 1860.—Ed.
b John Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 2, 1860, The Times, No. 23533, February 3, 1860.—Ed.
Upper Savoy, Maurienne and Tarentaise would prefer to remain as they are, and Chablais, Faucigny and Genévois, the three northern districts, would prefer to form a new Canton of the Swiss Confederation. Still Savoy, being thoroughly French, will undoubtedly more and more gravitate toward the great center of French nationality, and ultimately be united to it, so that it is a mere question of time.

With Nice the case is different. The people of the county of Nice also speak a Provençal dialect but here the written language, the education, the national spirit, everything is Italian. The relation between the Northern Italian and the Southern patois is so close that it is almost impossible to say where one ends and the other begins. Even the patois of Piedmont and Lombardy is, in its inflections, thoroughly Provençal, while the way in which the words are formed from the Latin, is essentially Italian. To claim Nice on the strength of this patois would never do; consequently, it is now claimed on the ground of supposed sympathies for France, the existence of which, however, is more than problematical. That Nice, in spite of these sympathies and of its patois, is thoroughly Italian, there can be no better proof than that it produced the soldier, par excellence, of Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi. The notion of Garibaldi becoming a Frenchman, is ludicrous enough.

The cession of both these Provinces would not much weaken Piedmont in a merely financial point of view. Savoy is a poor country, which, although it produces the best soldiers in the Sardinian army, yet never pays the expense of its own administration. Nice is not much better off, and, besides, is but a small strip of land. Apparently the loss would not be great. Nice, though Italian, might be sacrificed to the consolidation of Northern and Central Italy; and the loss of a foreign province like Savoy might even be considered an advantage, so long as the chances of Italian unity are thereby promoted. But things take a far different aspect when examined from a military point of view.

From Geneva to Nice, the present frontier between France and Sardinia forms almost a straight line. On the south, the sea, on the north, neutral Switzerland, cut off all communication. So far, the position of the parties in a war between Italy and France would appear equal. But both Savoy and Nice are situated beyond the main ridge of the Alps, which surround Piedmont proper in a vast arc, and both are open toward France. While, therefore, on the frontier of Piedmont and France, each party holds one side of the Alpine chain, Italy holds, on the northern and southern parts of
the frontier, both sides, and thereby completely commands the passes.
Moreover, while from want of traffic all the roads across the Alps leading from Piedmont into France have become quite neglected, the road over Mont Cenis from Piedmont to Savoy, and that over the Col di Tenda from Piedmont to Nice, are main roads of European traffic, and in capital order. The consequence is, that in all wars between France and Italy, both Nice and Savoy, when the attack came from the Italian side, have formed natural bases of operation for an invasion of France; and when France attacked, she had to conquer these two provinces before she could assail transalpine Italy. And although neither Nice nor Savoy could be held by the Italians against a superior army, they have still afforded time for a concentration of the Italian forces in the plains of Piedmont, and thus served as a safeguard against surprise.

If the military advantages resulting to Italy from the possession of Savoy and Nice were confined to these positive ones, they might still be sacrificed without any severe inconvenience. But the negative advantages are by far the greatest. Let us imagine Mont Blanc, Mont Iseran, Mont Cenis, and the Col di Tenda, to be gigantic stone pillars marking the frontier of France. The frontier, instead of being a straight line as now, would sweep around Piedmont in an immense arc. Chambéry, Albertville, Moutiers, the points where the chief roads converge, would be turned into French depots. The northern slope of the Mont Cenis would be guarded and fortified by the French; the outposts of the two nations would meet on its height, two marches from Turin. On the south, Nice would be the center of the French depots, and their outposts would stand at Oneglia, four marches from Genoa. Thus, the French would be, even in time of peace, at the very gates of the two largest towns of Northwestern Italy, and as their territory would almost surround Piedmont on three sides, they could render impossible the concentration of an Italian army in the plain of the Upper Po. Any attempt to concentrate the Italian forces west of Alessandria would be exposed to an attack before the concentration was complete—in other words to a series of defeats in detail. Thus, the center of defense of Piedmont would at once be removed from Turin to Alessandria; in other words, Piedmont proper would become incapable of serious defense, and would be at the mercy of the French. This is what Louis Napoleon calls

"a free and grateful Italy, which, to France alone, will owe her independence."
If we turn to the North, what is a standing menace to Italy would be a death blow to Switzerland. Savoy becoming French, the whole of Western Switzerland, from Basel to the Great St. Bernard, would be hemmed in by French territory, and untenable for a day in case of war. This is so conspicuous, that the Vienna Congress resolved to neutralize Northern Savoy as much as Switzerland, and in case of war to give the Swiss the right to occupy and defend that district.\(^a\) Sardinia, a paltry State of four millions, could not object to such a regulation; but could or would France allow part of her territory to be thus placed in military subjection to another and a smaller State? Could Switzerland attempt, in the event of war, to occupy and take under her military control a French province? Certainly not. And then, whenever it might suit France, the whole of French Switzerland, the Bernese Jura, Neuchâtel, Vaud, Geneva, with as much of Fribourg and Valais as might be deemed expedient, might be annexed as easily and comfortably as Savoy and Nice; and until such time Switzerland would be as much under the control and influence of France, as if she were a mere satellite. As to Swiss neutrality in case of war, that will have ceased from the same moment. There can be no neutrality when a great and warlike power is able at all times to crush its neutral neighbor.

This innocent-looking plan for the annexation of Savoy and Nice has no other meaning than to establish French domination in Italy and Switzerland—to make France paramount on the Alps. This little step once accomplished, how long will it be before we behold the attempt to make France paramount on the Rhine also?

Written in early February 1860 Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5874, February 21, 1860 as a leading article

\(^a\) "Declaration des Puissances rassemblées au Congrès de Vienne au sujet de la Suisse. Annexe N° 11 de l'acte du Congrès de Vienne".—*Ed.*
Frederick Engels

THE MOORISH WAR

As the first, and possibly at the same time the last act of the Spanish war in Morocco has now been brought to a close, and as all the detailed official reports have arrived,\textsuperscript{a} we may once more return to the subject.

On the first of January the Spanish army left the lines of Ceuta, in order to advance upon Tetuan, which is only 21 miles distant. Though never at any time seriously attacked, or stopped by the enemy, it took Marshal O'Donnell not less than a month to bring his troops to within sight of that town. The absence of roads, and the necessary caution are not sufficient motives for this unparalleled slowness of march; and it is plain that the command of the sea possessed by the Spaniards, was not utilized to the full extent. Nor is it an excuse that a road had to be made for heavy guns and provisions. Both should have been principally carried by the ships, while the army, provided with a week's provision, and no other guns than the mountain artillery (carried on the backs of mules), could have reached the heights above Tetuan in five days at the utmost, and waited with the Rios division, which then, as well as three weeks afterward, could not be prevented from landing at the mouth of the Wahad el Jelu. The battle of the 4th of February might have been fought, and probably under still more favorable aspects for the Spaniards, on the 6th or 7th of January; thus thousands of men lost through sickness would have been spared, and by the 8th of January Tetuan might have been taken.

\textsuperscript{a} This refers to the reports of the special correspondent of \textit{The Times} from the Camp of Guad el Jelu, \textit{The Times}, Nos. 23531, 23535 and 23548, February 1, 6 and 21, 1860.—\textit{Ed.}
This seems a bold assertion. Surely, O'Donnell was as eager to get to Tetuan as any of his soldiers; he has shown bravery, circumspection, coolness, and other soldierly qualities. If it took him a month to arrive before it, how could he have done the same thing in a week? O'Donnell had two ways before him to bring up his troops. First, he might rely chiefly on the communication by land, and use the ships merely as auxiliaries. This is what he did. He organized a regular land transport for his provisions and ammunition, and took with the army a numerous field-artillery of 12-pounders. His army was to be entirely independent of the ships, in case of need; the ships were to serve merely as a second line of communication with Ceuta, useful, but anything but indispensable. This plan, of course, entailed the organization of an immense train of carriages, and this train necessitated the construction of a road. Thus a week was lost until the road from the lines to the beach had been constructed; and almost at every step, the whole column, army, train and all, was halted, until another piece of road had been made for the next day’s advance. Thus, the duration of the march was measured by the miles of road which the Spanish engineers could construct from day to day; and this appears to have been done at the rate of about half a mile per day. Thus the very means selected to transport the provisions necessitated an immense increase of the train, for the longer the army remained on the road, the more, of course, it must consume. Still, when, about the 18th January, a gale drove the steamers from the coast, the army was starving, and that within sight of their depot at Ceuta; another stormy day, and one-third of the army would have had to march back to fetch provision for the other two. Thus it was that Marshal O'Donnell managed to promenade 18,000 Spaniards along the coast of Africa for a whole month at the rate of two-thirds of a mile a day. This system of provisioning the army once adopted, no power in the world could have very materially shortened the length of this unparalleled march; but was it not a mistake to adopt it at all?

If Tetuan had been an inland town, situated twenty-one miles from the coast instead of four miles, no doubt there would have been no other choice. The French in those expeditions to the interior of Algeria found the same difficulties and overcame them in the same way, though with greater energy and quickness. The English in India and Afghanistan were saved this trouble by the comparative facility of finding beasts of burden and provender for them in those countries; their artillery was light, and required no
good roads, as the campaigns were carried on in the dry season only, when armies can march straight across the country. But it was left to the Spaniards and to Marshal O'Donnell to march an army along the sea-shore for a whole month, and to accomplish in this time the immense distance of twenty-one miles.

It is evident from this that both appliances and ideas in the Spanish army are of a very old-fashioned character. With a fleet of steamers and sailing transports always within sight, this march is perfectly ridiculous, and the men disabled during it by cholera and dysentery, were sacrificed to prejudice and incapacity. The road built by the engineers was no real communication with Ceuta, for it belonged to the Spaniards nowhere except where they happened to encamp. To the rear, the Moors might any day render it impracticable. To carry a message, or escort a convoy back to Ceuta, a division of 5,000 men at least was required. During the whole of the march, the communication with that place was carried on by the steamers alone. And with all that, the provisions accompanying the army were so insufficient that before twenty days had passed the army was on the point of starvation, and saved only by the stores from the fleet. Why, then, build the road at all? For the artillery? The Spaniards must have known for certain that the Moors had no field-artillery, and that their own rifled mountain guns were superior to anything the enemy could bring against them. Why, then, trail all this artillery along with them, if the whole of it could be carried by sea from Ceuta to San Martin (at the mouth of the Wahad el Jelu or Tetuan river) in a couple of hours? For any extremity, a single battery of field-guns might have accompanied the army, and the Spanish artillery must be very clumsy, if they could not march it over any ground in the world at the rate of five miles a day.

The Spaniards had shipping to carry at least one division at a time, as the landing of the Rios division at San Martin proved. Had the attack been made by English or French troops, there is no doubt that this division would have been landed at once at San Martin, after a few demonstrations from Ceuta to attract the Moors to that place. Such a division of 5,000 men, entrenched by slight field-works, such as might be thrown up in a single night, could have fearlessly awaited the attack of any number of Moors. But a division could have been landed every day, if the weather was favorable, and thus the army could have been concentrated within sight of Tetuan in six or eight days. We may, however, doubt whether O'Donnell would have liked to expose one of his divisions to an isolated attack for possibly three or four days—his
troops were young, and not accustomed to war. He cannot be blamed for not having adopted this course.

But this he might undoubtedly have done. With every man carrying a week's provisions, with all his mountain guns—perhaps a battery of field guns, and as many stores as he could carry on the backs of his mules and horses, he might have marched off from Ceuta, and approached Tetuan as quickly as possible. Take all difficulties into consideration, eight miles a day is certainly little enough. But say five; this would give four days marching. Say two days for engagements, although they must be poor victories that do not imply a gain of five miles of ground. This would give six days in all, and would include all delays caused by the weather, for an army without a train can certainly do four or five miles a day in any weather almost. Thus the army would arrive in the plain of Tetuan before the provisions it carried were consumed; in case of need, the steamers were there to land fresh supplies during the march, as they actually did. Morocco is no worse country for ground or weather than Algeria, and the French have done far more there in the midst of Winter, and far away in the hills, too, without any steamers to support and supply them. Once arrived on the heights of the Monte Negro, and master of the pass to Tetuan, the communication with the fleet in the roads of San Martin was safe, and the sea formed the base of operations. Thus, with a little boldness, the period during which the army had no base of operations but itself, would have been shortened from a month to a week, and the bolder plan was therefore the safer of the two; for the more formidable the Moors were, the more the slow march of O'Donnell became dangerous. And if the army had been defeated on the road to Tetuan, its retreat was far easier than if it had been encumbered with baggage and field-artillery.

O'Donnell's progress from the Monte Negro, which he passed almost without opposition, was quite in keeping with his former slowness. There was again a throwing up and a strengthening of redoubts, as if the best organized army had been opposed to him. A week was thus wasted, although against such opponents, simple field-works would have sufficed; he could not expect to be attacked by any artillery equal to six of his mountain guns, and for the construction of such a camp one or two days ought to have been sufficient. At last, on the 4th, he attacked the intrenched camp of his opponents. The Spaniards appear to have behaved very well during this action; of the merits of the tactical arrangements we are unable to judge, the few correspondents in the Spanish camp dropping all the dry military details in favor of
good painting and exaggerated enthusiasm. As the correspondent of the London Times says, what is the use of my describing to you a piece of ground which you ought to see, in order to judge of its nature! The Moors were completely routed, and the following day Tetuan surrendered.

This closes the first act of the campaign, and if the Emperor of Morocco is not too obstinate, it will very likely close the whole war. Still, the difficulties incurred hitherto by the Spaniards—difficulties increased by the system on which they have conducted the war—show that if Morocco holds out, Spain will find it a very severe piece of work. It is not the actual resistance of the Moorish irregulars—that never will defeat disciplined troops so long as they hold together and can be fed; it is the uncultivated nature of the country, the impossibility of conquering anything but the towns, and to draw supplies even from them; it is the necessity of dispersing the army in a great many small posts, which, after all, cannot suffice to keep open a regular communication between the conquered towns, and which cannot be victualed, unless the greater part of the force be sent to escort the convoys of stores over a roadless country, and across constantly reappearing clouds of Moorish skirmishers. It is well known what it was for the French, during the first five or six years of their African conquest, to revictual even Blidah and Médéa, not to speak of stations further from the coast. With the rapid wear and tear of European armies in that climate, six or twelve months of such a war will be no joke for a country like Spain.

The first object of attack, if the war be continued, will naturally be Tangier. The road from Tetuan to Tangier lies across a mountain pass, and then down the valley of a river. It is all inland work—no steamers near to furnish stores, and no roads. The distance is about 26 miles. How long will it take Marshal O'Donnell to do this distance, and how many men will he have to leave in Tetuan? He is reported to have said that it will take 20,000 men to hold it; but this is evidently much exaggerated. With 10,000 men in the town, and a local brigade in an intrenched camp at San Martín, the place should be safe enough; such a force might always take the field in sufficient strength to disperse any Moorish attack. Tangier might be taken by bombardment from the sea, and the garrison brought thither by sea also. It would be the same with Larache, Salé, Mogador. But if the Spaniards intended to act in this way, why the long march to

---

a Sidi Mohammed.—Ed.
Tetuan? This much is certain: The Spaniards have much to learn yet in warfare before they can compel Morocco to peace, if Morocco holds out for a year.

Written in early February 1860

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5896, March 17, 1860
Frederick Engels

SAVOY, NICE AND THE RHINE

421
Savohen, Nizza
und
der Rhein.

Vom Verfasser von „Po und Rhein.“

Berlin, 1860.

G. Behrend (Falkenberg'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung).
Lindenstraße Nr. 33.

Title-page of Frederick Engels' pamphlet
Savoy, Nice and the Rhine
It is a year now since the Bonapartist-Piedmontese-Russian conspiracy began to unfold before the public. First the New Year's speech, then the mating of the "Italian Iphigenia", then the cry of distress from Italy, finally Gorchakov's admission that he had entered into written undertakings with Louis Napoleon. And in between, arming, troops marching, threats, attempts at mediation. At that time, in the first moment, an instinctive feeling ran through all of Germany: What is at stake here is not Italy, but our own skin. The beginning is on the Ticino, the end is on the Rhine. The final aim of any Bonapartist war can only be the reconquest of France's "natural frontier", the Rhine frontier.

But that section of the German press that was most furious over the covert French claim to the natural border of the Rhine, that same section, with the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung at its head, defended the Austrian domination in Upper Italy with equally violent fanaticism, on the pretext that the Mincio and the Lower Po formed Germany's natural boundary against Italy. Herr Orges of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung set all his strategic apparatus in motion to prove that Germany is lost without the Po and the Mincio, that giving up Austrian domination in Italy was a betrayal of Germany.

---


b Cf. the anonymous article "Die Lage der italienischen Frage und die Interessen Deutschlands (Schluss)", Allgemeine Zeitung (supplement), No. 56, February 25, 1860.— Ed.
This turns the matter upside down. Here it was equally evident that the threat concerning the Rhine was only a pretext, that the purpose was to maintain Austria's despotic rule in Italy. The threat concerning the Rhine was only meant to get Germany to join in the subjection of Upper Italy by Austria. Then too there was the ludicrous contradiction of asserting the same theory on the Po and condemning it on the Rhine.

At that time the author of these lines wrote a work which he published under the title Po and Rhine. In the interest of the national movement itself, this pamphlet protested against the Mincio frontier theory; it tried to show, in terms of military science, that Germany does not need any part of Italy for its defence and that France, if only military considerations counted, would certainly have much stronger claims to the Rhine than Germany to the Mincio. In a word, it tried to make it possible for the Germans to go into the expected struggle with clean hands.

How far the pamphlet succeeded in this is for others to judge. No attempt has been made, to our knowledge, to give a scientific refutation of its theses and their development. The Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, against which it was directed in the first place, promised to print an article of its own on the subject but instead gave three pieces reprinted from the Ost-Deutsche Post, whose criticism was limited to declaring the author a "Little Germany" man because he wanted to give up Italy. In any case, the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung has not mentioned the theory of the Mincio frontier again since then, so far as we are aware.

In the meantime the attempt to make Germany into a supporter of the domination and the policy of Austria in Italy had given the North German Gothaist philistines a welcome pretext for attacking the national movement. The original movement was really national, much more national than all the Schiller festivals from Archangel to San Francisco; it arose spontaneously, instinctively, directly. Whether Austria was right or wrong in Italy, whether Italy had a claim to independence, whether the Mincio line was needed or not—all of that was a matter of indifference to it at the outset. One of us was attacked, and by a third party who had nothing to do with Italy but had all the more interest in capturing the left bank of the Rhine—and against him, against Louis Napoleon, against the traditions of the first French Empire, we all had to stand together. The people felt this instinctively, and they were right.

---

a See this volume, pp. 211-55.—Ed.
But for years the Gotha-liberal philistines had ceased to regard German Austria as any longer “one of us”. They welcomed the war because it could weaken Austria and so make possible the final establishment of the Little German or Great Prussian Empire. They were joined by the bulk of the North German vulgar democrats, who speculated on Louis Napoleon's demolishing Austria and then permitting them to unite all of Germany under Prussian domination; they were joined by a small part of the German emigration in France and Switzerland, which was shameless enough to ally itself openly with Bonapartism. The strongest ally, however—let us make no bones about this—was the cowardice of the German petty bourgeoisie, which never dares to face up to danger, which, in order to get a year's reprieve, will leave its faithful allies in the lurch, so that, without them, it will later be all the more certain of being defeated itself. Hand in hand with this cowardice went the notorious super-cunning that always has a thousand excuses for not doing anything, cost what it may, but therefore must do all the more empty talking; that is sceptical about everything except these excuses; the same super-cunning that rejoiced over the Basle peace treaty that ceded the left bank of the Rhine to France; that silently rubbed its hands in glee when the Austrians were defeated at Ulm and Austerlitz; the same super-cunning that never sees its Jena approaching, and whose seat is Berlin.425

This alliance triumphed; Germany left Austria in the lurch. But the Austrian army fought on the Lombard plain with a heroism that astonished its enemies and compelled the admiration of the world—only not of the Gothaites and their hangers-on. No parade drill, no garrison spit and polish, no corporal's stick could destroy the inexhaustible combativity of the German in them. Despite their tight clothing and their heavy packs these young troops, who had never been under fire, held like veterans against the war-tried, lightly clothed and lightly equipped French, and it was only with the greatest show of incompetence and disunity that the Austrian command managed to have such troops beaten. And beaten how? No trophies, no flags, almost no guns, almost no prisoners—the only flag captured was found on the battlefield under a heap of dead, and the unwounded prisoners were Italian or Hungarian deserters. From private to major the Austrian army covered itself with glory—and this glory belongs particularly to the German Austrians. The Italians were unusable and were for the most part rejected, the Hungarians defected in crowds or were very unreliable, the Croats fought decidedly worse than usual in this
campaign.* The German Austrians may claim this glory with full justice; even though it was they in the first place who were to blame for the bad leadership.

This leadership was truly Old Austrian. What Gyulay's incompetence could not accomplish by itself was achieved by the lack of unity in the command ensured by the camarilla and the presence of Francis Joseph. Gyulay invaded the Lomellina and was brought to a sudden stop when he reached the Casale-Alessandria region; the entire offensive miscarried. The French joined up with the Sardinians unhindered. To show his helplessness completely, Gyulay orders the Montebello reconnaissance, as if he wanted to prove, right from the outset, that the old Austrian spirit of uncertain groping and serious scruples in waging war is still as much alive as in the days of the late Hofkriegsrat.\(^426\) He leaves the initiative entirely to his opponent. He disperses his army from Piacenza to Arona, in order to cover everything immediately, in the manner favoured by the Austrians. The traditions of Radetzky are already forgotten after ten years. When the enemy attacks at Palestro, the Austrian brigades come into battle one after the other so slowly that one is always knocked out of its position before the others arrive. When the enemy now engages in the manoeuvre whose possibility was the only thing that gave meaning to the entire position in the Lomellina—the flanking march from Vercelli to Boffalora—, when finally the opportunity came to parry this hazardous manoeuvre by striking against Novara and thereby take advantage of the unfavourable position the enemy was in—Gyulay loses his head and hurries back across the Ticino in order—by a detour—to place himself diagonally in front of the attacker. In the middle of this withdrawal Hess appears—on June 3, at four in the morning—in the headquarters at Rosate. The resurrected Hofkriegsrat in Verona had apparently come to have its doubts about Gyulay's ability just at the decisive moment. Now, therefore, there were two supreme commanders. At Hess' suggestion all the columns halt until Hess is convinced that the moment for the attack on Novara has passed and that things have to be allowed to run their course. In the meantime, nearly five hours have gone by with all this, during which the troops had

---

\(^{*}\) See the report on Solferino of the Times correspondent in the Austrian camp.\(^a\) At Cavriana, Nugent, the old Master of Ordnance, who was present as an onlooker, tried in vain to bring up several battalions of border troops.\(^b\)

\(^a\) "The Battle of Solferino", The Times, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—Ed.

\(^b\) Loc. cit.—Ed.
broken their march.* In the course of the 4th they arrived in Magenta separated, hungry and tired; they fight splendidly nevertheless and with excellent results until MacMahon against his orders, which call for a direct march from Turbigo to Milan, turns towards Magenta and falls on the Austrian flank. In the meantime the other French corps arrive, those of the Austrians fail to appear, and the battle is lost. The retreat of the Austrians goes so slowly that at Melegnano one of their divisions is attacked by two whole French army corps. One brigade holds the town for several hours against six French brigades and gives way only after it has lost over half its men. Finally, Gyulay is recalled. The army marches in a great arc from Magenta around Milan and finds time (so far from there being any question of pursuit!) to reach the position of Castiglione and Lonato before the enemy, who marched along the shorter chord. It was said that Francis Joseph personally picked out this position, which the Austrians had been reconnoitering in the greatest detail for years, for his troops. The fact is that it had long been included in the defence system of the quadrilateral of fortresses and provided an excellent position for a defensive battle with an offensive counter-thrust. Here the army joined up at last with the reinforcements that had arrived meanwhile or had been held in reserve; but as soon as the enemy has reached the other bank of the Chiese, the signal for retreat is sounded again, and withdrawal is made across the Mincio. Hardly has this operation been carried out when the Austrian army again goes back over that same Mincio, to take from the enemy that same position which they have just voluntarily left him. Its confidence in the high command considerably weakened by this maze of ordre, contre-ordre, désordre, the Austrian army goes into the battle of Solferino. It is an uncontrollable slaughter on both sides; no question of tactical leadership on the part of either the French or the Austrians; greater incompetence, confusion and fear of

* See the report of Captain Blakeley, the first correspondent of The Times in the Austrian camp, in that paper, reporting this fact. The Darmstadt Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung presents a defence of Gyulay giving as the reason for the five-hour halt an event which cannot be revealed owing to official considerations and with which Gyulay had nothing to do, and ascribing the loss of the battle to this event. But Blakeley had already reported on the nature of the event.

---

a Presumably the reference is to his letter from Novara of June 4, 1859, The Times, No. 23329; June 10, 1859.—Ed.

b Comments on Austrian and French reports about the battle of Magenta, The Times, No. 23330, June 11, 1859.—Ed.
responsibility of the Austrian generals, the greater confidence of the French brigade and division commanders, the natural superiority of the French in dispersed and street fighting, developed to its highest point in Algeria, finally drove the Austrians from the field of battle. That concluded the campaign, and who was happier than poor Herr Orges, who had to praise the Austrian high command through thick and thin in the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung and discover rational strategic motives for their actions.

Louis Napoleon too had had enough. The meagre glory of Magenta and Solferino was still more than he had a right to expect, and in among the vexatious four fortresses a time might come when the Austrians would no longer let themselves be defeated by their own generals. Furthermore, Prussia was mobilising, and neither the French army of the Rhine nor the Russians were prepared for war. In short, the idea of an Italy free to the Adriatic Sea was dropped; Louis Napoleon offered peace, and the document of Villafranca was signed. France did not get an inch of land; it magnanimously gave Lombardy, which had been ceded to it, to Piedmont; France had waged war for an idea; how could it have thought of the Rhine border!

Meanwhile Central Italy had provisionally annexed itself to Piedmont, and the kingdom of Upper Italy represented, for the time being, quite a respectable power.

The previous provinces of the mainland and the island of Sardinia represented a population of 4,730,500

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lombardy, excluding Mantua, about</td>
<td>2,651,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuscany</td>
<td>1,719,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parma and Modena</td>
<td>1,090,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romagna (Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna and Forli)</td>
<td>1,058,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (as of 1848)</strong></td>
<td><strong>11,251,800</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The area of the state rose from 1,373 to 2,684 German square miles. Hence, the kingdom of Upper Italy, if it were definitively constituted, would be the foremost power in Italy. Against it there would remain only:

---

* The German square mile is equal to 55.063 sq. km.—Ed.
so that Upper Italy alone would have almost as large a population as all the other Italian territories put together. With its financial and military power and the civilisation of its inhabitants, such a state could claim a place in Europe ahead of Spain, and directly after Prussia, and would undoubtedly claim it, certain as it would be of the growing sympathy of the rest of Italy.

That, however, was not what the Bonapartist policy had desired. It had openly declared that France never could or would tolerate a unified Italy. What it meant by the independence and freedom of Italy was a kind of Italian Confederation of the Rhine under Bonapartist protection and the honorary presidency of the Pope, replacement of the Austrian hegemony by French. Along with this went the good-hearted intention of setting up an Etrurian kingdom, an Italian Kingdom of Westphalia, in Central Italy for the heir of Jérôme Bonaparte. All these plans were brought to an end by the consolidation of the Upper Italian state. Jérôme Bonaparte junior had won nothing for himself on his tour through the duchies, not even a single vote; Bonapartist Etruria was as impossible as the Restoration, and there was nothing left but annexation to Piedmont.

To the same extent that the inevitability of the unification of Northern Italy became evident, the “idea” came to light for which France had waged war this time. This was the idea of annexing Savoy and Nice to France. Even during the war voices had been raised to assert that this was the price of the French intervention in Italy. But they were not heard. And did not the document of Villafranca contradict them? Nonetheless, the world suddenly learned that under the national and constitutional regime of the regalantuomo two provinces were suffering under foreign rule—two French provinces who turned their tearful eyes with longing towards the great fatherland, from which only brute force kept them—and that Louis Napoleon could no longer close his ears to the anguish of cry of Savoy and Nice.

---

* The king-gallant, the appellation given to King Victor Emmanuel II by one of his Ministers and under which the King ordered himself to be listed in the register of Turin's eminent citizens. — *Ed.*
It now came to light that Nice and Savoy were the price for which Louis Napoleon had undertaken to unite Lombardy and Venice with Piedmont and that, since Venice was not to be had for the moment, he asked for the two provinces as his price for consenting to the annexation of Central Italy. Now the disgusting manoeuvres of Bonapartist agents began in Savoy and Nice, along with the cries of the paid Paris press that the Piedmontese Government was suppressing the will of the people in those provinces, which were calling out loudly to be joined to France; now at last it was said in Paris, the Alps are France's natural border, France has a right to them.\footnote{Review of the French press, Paris, February 2, \textit{Allgemeine Zeitung}, No. 35, February 4, 1860.—\textit{Ed.}}
When the French press asserts that Savoy is French in language and customs, that is at least as true as if the same were said of French Switzerland, the Walloon part of Belgium and the Anglo-Norman islands in the Channel. The people of Savoy speak a Southern French dialect, and the cultivated and written language is French everywhere. So far from there being any question of an Italian element in Savoy, the French (that is, the Southern French or Provençal) vernacular is spoken on the other side of the Alps deep into Piedmont, as far as the upper valleys of the Dora Riparia and the Dora Baltea. Nevertheless, before the war there was hardly a trace of sympathy for being joined to France; that sort of thought was entertained only by isolated individuals in the lowlands of Savoy, which have commercial relations with France, but was as alien to the mass of the population here as in all the other French-speaking lands bordering on France. It is noteworthy that none of the countries that were incorporated into France from 1792 to 1812 has the slightest desire to come under the wings of the eagle again. People had assimilated the fruits of the first French Revolution, but were sick and tired of the rigid centralisation of the administration, the rule by prefects, the infallibility of the apostles of civilisation sent down from Paris. The sympathies that had been revived by the July and February revolutions were at once suppressed again by Bonapartism. No one has any wish to import Lambessa, Cayenne, the loi des suspects. In addition, there is the Chinese walling-off of France from almost all import trade, which is felt most keenly on the border. The First Republic found, on all its borders, provinces oppressed and sucked dry, peoples that had been dismembered
and robbed of all common natural interests, and it brought them emancipation of the peasantry, agriculture, industry and trade. The Second Empire comes up, on all its borders, against greater freedom than it has to offer; in Germany and Italy it comes up against stronger national feeling, and in the smaller countries against consolidated separate interests, which have grown big in forty-five years of unprecedentedly rapid industrial development and are interwoven with world trade on all sides; it brings with it nothing but the despotism of the age of the Roman Caesars, the incarceration of trade and industry in the huge prison of its customs line, and at best, in addition, free passage to the country where pepper grows.

Savoy, separated from Piedmont by the main chain of the Alps, supplies almost all its needs from the north, from Geneva and in part from Lyons, just as on the other hand the canton of Ticino, which lies south of the Alpine passes, draws on Genoa and Venice. If this circumstance is a motive for separation from Piedmont, it is not one for annexation to France, for the commercial metropolis of Savoy is Geneva; that was taken care of, apart from the geographical situation, by the wisdom of the French tariff laws and the chicanery of the French customs.

But despite the language, the blood relationship and the chain of the Alps, the Savoyards do not seem to have the slightest desire to be blessed with the imperialist institutions of the great French motherland. They have the traditional feeling that Italy has not conquered Savoy, but Savoy Piedmont. Starting from little Lower Savoy, the small nation of warlike mountaineers of the entire province concentrated themselves into a state and then descended into the Italian plain and, by conquest and policy, annexed Piedmont, Monferrato, Nice, the Lomellina, Sardinia and Genoa, one after the other. The dynasty settled in Turin and became Italian, but Savoy remained the cradle of the state, and today the cross of Savoy is the coat of arms of North Italy from Nice to Rimini and from Sondrio to Siena. France conquered Savoy in the campaigns of 1792 to 1794, and until 1814 the country was called the Département du Mont-Blanc. But in 1814 it was not at all inclined to remain French; the only question was whether to join Switzerland or to return to the old relationship to Piedmont. Nonetheless, the lowlands remained French until after the Hundred Days, at which time they were given back to Piedmont. Naturally, the old historical tradition had faded with time; Savoy was neglected, as the Italian provinces of the state gained too great a predominance; the interests of Piedmontese
policy pointed more and more south and east. It is all the more remarkable that precisely *that* class of the population harboured separatist desires most which professed to be the primary bearer of historical tradition: the old conservative and ultramontane nobility; and these desires aimed at union with Switzerland, so long as the old oligarchical patrician constitutions prevailed there; only since the general introduction of democracy in Switzerland do they seem to have taken a different orientation; under Louis Napoleon France became reactionary and ultramontane enough to be regarded by the nobility of Savoy as a refuge from the revolutionary policy of Piedmont.

The state of affairs seems at present to be as follows: In general there is no desire to separate Savoy from Piedmont. In the uplands, in Maurienne, Tarentaise and Upper Savoy, the population is decidedly for the *status quo*. In the Genévois, Faucigny and Chablais, union with Switzerland is preferred to anything else, if any change at all is to be made. It is only here and there in Lower Savoy, and then only among the local reactionary nobility, that any desire for union with France can be observed. But these voices are so isolated that even in Chambéry the vast majority of the population is strongly opposed to them and the reactionary nobility (see the statement of Costa de Beauregard) does not dare to admit its sympathies.

So much on the question of nationality and the will of the people.

Now what is the situation as regards the military question? What strategic advantages does possession of Savoy give Piedmont, and what advantages would it give France? And how does a change of mastery in Savoy affect the third contiguous state, Switzerland?

From Basle to Briançon the French border forms a large markedly inward-bending arc; a good bit of Switzerland and all of Savoy project into French territory here. If we draw the chord of this arc, we find that the segment of the circle is almost exactly filled by French Switzerland and Savoy. If France’s frontier were pushed forward up to this chord, it would make, by and large, just as straight a line from Lauterburg to Fréjus as from Lauterburg to Dunkirk; but this line would be of much different significance for defence. Whereas the northern frontier is quite open, the northern part of the eastern frontier would be covered by the

---


*b* The *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 39, February 8, 1860.—*Ed.*
Rhine and the southern part by the Alps. Between Basle and Mont Blanc, no section of land would mark the borderline; rather, the "natural frontier" would be formed here by the Jura down to Fort de l'Ecluse and from there on by the branch of the Alps bounding the Arve valley in the south from Mont Blanc onwards and likewise ending at Fort de l'Ecluse. But if the natural frontier forms a concave arc bending inward, it no longer fulfils its purpose and so is no longer a natural frontier. And if it happens that this inward-bending segment of a circle, pressing our frontier so unnaturally back, is inhabited by people, into the bargain, who are French "by language, customs and civilisation", a must not the mistake that Nature made here be rectified, must not the theoretically required convexity or at least rectilinearity be restored in practice here, can the French living on the other side of the natural frontier be sacrificed to a *lusus naturae*? b

That this sort of Bonapartist reasoning is not entirely without significance is proved by the First Empire, which went on from annexation to annexation until an end was put to it; the most perfect frontier has its weak points, where it can be improved and given a push; and if one does not have to stand on ceremony, one can go on annexing without end. At any rate, it follows from the foregoing line of argument that what can be said for the annexation of Savoy, either as regards nationality or the military interests of France, holds good for French Switzerland as well.

The Alps, which run north-northwest from the Col di Tenda, turn by and large north-northeast at Mont Thabor, which marks the boundary between Piedmont, Savoy and France, and then bend still more eastward at Mont Géant, the boundary point between Piedmont, Savoy and Switzerland. Accordingly, from Mont Thabor to Mont Géant the Alps can only form the natural frontier of France if this frontier proceeds in a straight line from Mont Géant to Basle. In other words: The demand for the annexation of Savoy to France entails the demand for the annexation of French Switzerland.

Along the entire sector in which the main ridge of the Alps forms the present border of the two states, there is only one paved pass, Mont Genèvre. Besides this, only the Col d'Argentera, which leads from Barcelonnette into the valley of the Stura, is passable by artillery, and it might be possible, with some difficulty, to make

---

b Freak of nature.— Ed.
still more bridle-paths practicable for all arms. But so long as Savoy and Nice each provide two paved passes over the main chain of the Alps, any French attacker, if he is not yet in possession of these provinces, must conquer at least one of them before he crosses the Alps. Now there is the additional factor that for an attack from France, the Mont Genève permits only a direct thrust at Turin, whereas the Mont Cenis and still more the Little St. Bernard, the two Savoy passes, have a flanking effect; and that the Mont Genève makes a large detour necessary for an attacking Italian army aiming at the heart of France, while the Mont Cenis is the great high road from Turin to Paris. Accordingly, no commander would dream of using the Mont Genève except for auxiliary columns; the major operational line will always pass through Savoy.

Possession of Savoy would therefore at once give France a terrain that is essential to it for an aggressive war against Italy, and which it would otherwise have to conquer first. An Italian army on the defensive would of course never defend Savoy by a decisive battle, but it could hold up the attacker to some extent by vigorously conducted mountain warfare and destruction of the roads, even as early as in the upper valleys of the Arc and the Isère (through which the Mont Cenis and St. Bernard roads run), and then hold the northern slope of the main chain of the Alps for some time more, backed up by the forts blocking the passes. Of course, there cannot be any question of an absolute defence here any more than in mountain warfare in general; the decisive battle is reserved for the descent of the enemy into the plain. But time will certainly be won, which can be decisive for concentrating forces for the main battle, and which is particularly important for so elongated a country with so few railways as Italy, as opposed to a compact country like France, covered with an excellent strategic railway network; and this time will certainly be lost if France already possesses Savoy before the war. But Italy will never wage war alone against France; and if it has Allies, there is the possibility that the two armies in Savoy could already keep the balance. The consequence of this would be that the struggle for control of the Alpine chain would be long drawn out; that at the worst the Italians could hold the northern slope of the ridge for some time and, after losing it, fight the French for the southern slope, for only he is master of a ridge who controls both slopes and can cross it. Whether the attacker would then still be strong and decided enough to follow the defender into the plain is very uncertain.
The campaigns in Savoy from 1792 to 1795 provide an example of such an indecisive mountain war, even though the action on both sides was loose, uncertain and fumbling.

On September 21, 1792 General Montesquiou invaded Savoy. The 10,000 Sardinians defending it were so dispersed in a chain of posts, as was the favourite custom of the time, that they could not bring sufficient forces together to resist anywhere. Chambéry and Montmélian were occupied and the French passed through the valleys up to the foot of the main chain of the Alps. The ridge itself remained entirely in the hands of the Sardinians, who, under General Gordon, after some minor engagements, on August 15, 1793 pushed back the French, who had been weakened by sending detachments to the siege of Lyons, and drove them back out of the Arc and Isère valleys to Montmélian. There the beaten columns were joined by their reserves; Kellermann returned from Lyons, went over to the attack immediately (September 11) and threw the Sardinians back again to the Alpine passes without much trouble; but here his strength too was exhausted and he had to come to a standstill at the foot of the range. But in 1794 the army of the Alps was brought up to 75,000 men, to which the Piedmontese could oppose only 40,000, with a possibly available reserve of 10,000 Austrians. Despite this, the first attacks of the French were unsuccessful at both the Little St. Bernard and the Mont Cenis, until finally the St. Bernard was taken on April 23 and the Mont Cenis on May 14, which put the entire ridge into their hands.

Thus, it took three campaigns to wrest entrance into Italy from the Piedmontese on this side. Even though today it would be impossible to conduct such an indecisive war on such a limited terrain, and have it drag out over several campaigns, it still will always be difficult for the French, given any sort of balance of forces, not only to force the Alpine passes but also to remain strong enough to descend at once into the plain. Savoy does not offer more than that to Italy, but that is already enough.

Now let us assume that Savoy is united with France. How does Italy stand then? The northern slope of the Alpine chain is in the hands of the French, and the Italians can only defend the southern slope, whose strong points and positions are dominated by the high ridge or else can be observed and in most cases turned at a fairly short distance. Defence of the mountains is reduced to its last, weakest and also most costly act. The opportunities for gathering intelligence that mountain warfare in Savoy gives disappear. And that is not all. So long as Savoy had to be
conquered, France might under certain circumstances be content
with doing that and thereby confining Italy to the passive
defensive; one result would already be in hand; the troops might
perhaps be better used elsewhere; France would have an interest
in not engaging too great forces in that theatre of war. If on the
other hand Savoy is definitively a French province, it is worth
while to defend it offensively, in the French manner. Passive
defence could cost as many losses in a campaign as an attack on
Italy; not so very many more troops would be needed for the
attack, and what entirely different results would be in prospect!

The day after annexation, French general staff officers will be
seen travelling up the valleys of the Arc and Isère, investigating
the lateral valleys, climbing the mountain ridges, questioning the
best Alpine guides, pacing off distances, measuring gradients and
noting everything down carefully; all of this not out of tourists' whisms but according to a visible plan, probably already prepared
by now. They will soon be followed by engineers and contractors,
and it will not be long before roads have been laid and masonry
structures built in the highest mountains of which neither the
inhabitants nor travellers will be able to say what they are for.
They do not concern either peasants or tourists; their only
purpose is to develop the natural strategic capabilities of Savoy.

Both the Mont Cenis pass and that of the Mont Genèvre lead to
Susa. If the southern slopes of both are attacked by French
columns, the Italian detachments defending them will be com-
pletely cornered. They will have no way of knowing which side the
main attack will come from; but they will know this much in
advance, that if one of the two passes is forced and Susa taken, the
troops defending the other pass will be cut off. If the Mont Cenis
is forced first, the troops at the Mont Genèvre can at the worst
escape by footpaths into the valley of Fenestrelle, leaving behind
their artillery, baggage and horses; but if the attackers push to
Susa over the Mont Genèvre, the troops at the Mont Cenis have
no way of retreat. Under such circumstances, defence of these two
passes is reduced to a mere demonstration. Now, into the bargain,
the operational lines of the two French forces, the roads from
Grenoble to Briançon and from Chambéry to Lans-le-Bourg, run
parallel on the whole and are separated only by a mountain ridge
which branches from the Mont Thabor and over which there are
many foot- and bridle-paths. As soon as the French have cut over
this ridge a side road, which need be no more than four German
miles in length, they can shift their masses from one road to the
other at will, the cornering will be even more effective, and the
defence of the line of the Alps against an attack from Italy will
become enormously stronger on this side.

Let us go further. Savoy has still another pass over the Alps, the
Little St. Bernard. Many French authorities hold that Napoleon
would have done better to take this pass for his crossing of the
Alps instead of the Great St. Bernard. The pass is lower, and so is
free of snow earlier in the spring and is in general easier to
negotiate. The columns from Lyons and Besançon converge on
Albertville at least as easily as on Lausanne; and both passes lead
to Aosta and Ivrea. The mere fact that a polemic could arise as to
the advisability of one or the other pass for Napoleon's purposes
in the 1800 campaign proves how important this Little St. Bernard
is for warfare. Quite special conditions, to be sure, are presup-
posed before the Little St. Bernard can be used to repeat the
strategic outflanking of Marengo. Armies are larger today, and
they could never pass through high mountains in a single column;
nowadays a flanking manoeuvre with only 30,000 men would in
most cases lead to disaster. All this is true for the first and second
campaigns. But if, as seems likely, all wars waged pertinaciously by
both sides assume a different, protracted character because of
modern groups of fortresses and entrenched camps, when a war
can really no longer be fought out until the combatants have
slowly ground one another down in a number of campaigns, the
armies will also get gradually smaller. Let us assume that a war has
moved to and fro in the upper Italian plain for several years; that
the French, who in the process had taken Casale or Alessandria or
both, have been thrown back across the Alps, and the struggle has
come to a standstill there with fairly depleted forces on both sides.
Will it then be such a feat, with our railways and with the artillery
now lighter in all armies, quickly to throw 30,000 to 40,000 men
and even more over the Little St. Bernard to Ivrea? From Ivrea
they will be within reach of their permanent depot in the plain,
where they will find their essential supplies and can get
reinforcements from the garrison; if this should not be possible,
their road to Turin and their line of retreat over the two
adjoining passes could certainly not be blocked by a stronger
force. But at such a time these 30,000 to 40,000 men, with the
garrisons, would be a very respectable force, and at the worst,
after crushing the nearest corps of the enemy, could carry the war
on from their entrenched camp with every prospect of success. It
should be recalled how the armies had already shrunk in 1814 and
with what slender forces Napoleon accomplished such great things
in that year.
The road over the St. Bernard leads, as has been said, into the valley of the Isère, as the one over the Mont Cenis into that of the Arc. Both rivers rise on the Mont Iseran. Above Bourg-Saint-Maurice the St. Bernard road leaves the river and turns straight over the mountain, while the gorge (Val de Tignes) goes to the right southward. Below Lans-le-Bourg, at Termignon, a small lateral valley (Val Saint-Barthélemy) runs into the Arc valley. From the Val de Tignes there are three footpaths over the ridge, between the Mont Iseran and the Mont Chaffequarré, into the Val Saint-Barthélemy. One of these three saddle-shaped passes must certainly be capable of being paved. If a road were built here, then, in conjunction with the previously mentioned side road, the strategic road system of Savoy—as a French border province—would already be fairly well developed. A road would run just behind the main ridge of the Alps linking the three most important passes and making it possible to shift the main bodies of troops from the St. Bernard and the Mont Genèvre to the neighbourhood of the Mont Cenis in two days, and from one flank to the other in four to five days. If the system is further completed by a road from Moutiers over the Pralognan pass to Saint-Barthélemy and Lans-le-Bourg and another one from Moutiers to Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, there will hardly be anything to add. Then it will only be necessary to set up the fortifications needed for support—not for absolute blocking—and to ensure the security of Moutiers, the principal highway hub, as the central depot before the powerful attack. In this there will be a total of less than twenty-five German miles of new road construction.

If these or similar arrangements are made—and there can be no doubt that the French general staff has already prepared a plan for the total strategic utilisation of Savoy—what happens then to the defence of the southern slope of the Alps? And, in the case of defence, what powerful strokes could not a new Lecourbe, relying on a secure central depot and small forts, deliver when his mobility was assured by such a network of roads? It should not be argued that mountain warfare cannot occur any longer with the great armies of today. So long as the armies are really large and there is decisive superiority on one side, that is true enough. But the armies will soon be ground down on the modern fortresses, and there will be plenty of cases in which superiority will give way to equilibrium. Naturally, no one will take to the mountains if he can help it, but the way from Paris to Italy and from Italy to Paris will always lead through Savoy or the Valais.
We sum up. Because of its geographical location and especially because of its Alpine passes, Savoy as a French province would allow an only slightly superior French army to take possession of the Italian slope of the Alps, make sweeps into the valleys and take on an importance much greater than its actual military forces would indicate. But if the theatre of war had been prepared to some extent, the French army would be so favourably situated that with otherwise fully equal forces it would have immediate superiority over its adversary; and in addition the Little St. Bernard would force the Italians to send off a detachment to a long distance, while the same pass would under certain circumstances give the French the opportunity to make more decisive offensive thrusts.

Savoy in French hands is, as against Italy, an exclusively offensive tool.

Now what is the situation as regards the interests of Switzerland?

In the present state of affairs Switzerland cannot be attacked by any of its neighbours except frontally. In saying this we count South Germany without Austria as one bordering state and Austria as another, for we have just seen that the two do not always of necessity act together. South Germany can attack only on the Basle-Constance line, Austria only on the Rheineck-Münster line, Italy on the Poschiavo-Geneva line and France on the Geneva-Basle line. Everywhere the Swiss army has its line of retreat perpendicularly behind its front; everywhere neutral border territory more or less covers its flanks. Consequently, strategic outflanking cannot be started before fighting has begun, so long as only one of the countries bordering on Switzerland is attacking. Only Austria has an advantageous position for outflanking the Grisons, but the Swiss would in any case never fight their decisive battle against an Austrian attack in the Grisons, but more to the northwest, in the spurs of the Alps. Austria's cession of Lombardy has greatly reinforced this advantage of the Swiss; up to a year ago Austria certainly had the means for a concentric attack on Southwestern Switzerland that would not be negligible in the high mountains, given superior forces. At the same time the effect of such an attack would be limited to only the Grisons, Ticino, Uri and Glarus, that is, the most thinly populated and poorest part of the country, and would presuppose that the enemy forces were already badly dispersed if they were to go over the St. Gotthard coming from Italy. The existing favourable distribution of the bordering countries is worth more to Switzerland than the
European guarantees of neutrality. It gives it the chance in the event of an attack by only one of its neighbours to prolong the defence as long as possible, and that is after all the only thing that so small a country can count on.

From the moment that Savoy becomes French or even is only occupied by French troops, there is no question any more of defending all of French Switzerland, from the Bernese Jura to the Lower Valais. Even now Geneva can be turned into a French depot within 24 hours; the Jura is turned, as well as the line of the Zihl and the lakes of Neuchâtel and Biel; the French, instead of having to struggle in the defiles and then force the narrow way between the two lakes and through the Grosse Moos, will march at their ease through the rich hilly land of the Vaud, and the first position for serious resistance coincides with the position in which the first main battle will have to be fought, before Berne behind the Saane and the Sense; for a flanking column from Savoy via Villeneuve and Vevey would make any resistance in the Vaud useless.

Up to now Switzerland's first defence line against France has been the Jura, an excellent terrain for raw militiamen who know the country and are supported by the population. It cannot be held effectively, however, if only because of the much-indented frontier which often cuts across its parallel ridges. The second, and more important, line is that of the Zihl, which connects the lakes of Neuchâtel and Biel and flows from of the Lake of Biel into the Aare. On the right the line is continued by the lower course of the Aare, and on the left by the Orbe, which flows into the Lake of Neuchâtel at its upper end, at Yverdon. The Zihl is only a half mile long between the lakes and only a mile from the Lake of Biel to the Aare. The true front of the position lies between the lakes and is further strengthened by the Grosse Moos in the low ground, extending from the Lake of Neuchâtel to near Aarberg and passable only on the main road. A right flanking of this front via Bürglen could be paralysed by the reserve at Aarberg; a flanking manoeuvre with a wider swing presupposes throwing a bridge over the Aare and tends to expose its lines of communication. A left flanking movement can only be carried out through the Vaud and can be held up successively at the Orbe, the Mentue and the Broye. This resistance cannot be undermined by a flanking operation along the Lake of Geneva towards Fribourg because the Swiss drawing back along the Lake of Neuchâtel would always have the shorter road to travel to get there. Thus the position on the Zihl can be used for a major battle only under
special conditions, if the enemy makes serious mistakes, but it still
does everything that Switzerland could demand of it: It gives an
opportunity to hold up the enemy and, in particular, to bring up
the contingents from Southwestern Switzerland.

But once Savoy is in the hands of the enemy, a column
advancing from Saint-Gingolph via Villeneuve and Châtel-Saint-
Denis would make all resistance in the Vaud useless, for even at
Vevey the column would be hardly two miles further from
Fribourg than the Swiss on the Orbe and could therefore bar their
retreat. From Saint-Gingolph to Fribourg is about twelve miles;
Fribourg lies a day's march behind the left flank of the position on
the Zihl between the lakes and three miles from Peterlingen
(Payerne), where the French columns marching through the Vaud
could join up with the column from Savoy. Thus, in three or four
days the attacker can, if Savoy is at his disposal, cut the line of
communication of the Valais through the valley of the Rhône,
capture Geneva, the Vaud and Fribourg up to the Saane and
emerge with his main forces in the rear of the Zihl position, which
would let Basle, Solothurn, the Bernese Jura and Neuchâtel fall
into his hands. And these are no barren high mountain districts
but the richest and most industrial cantons of Switzerland.

Switzerland felt the strategic pressure Savoy exerts on it so
strongly that in 1814 it effected the well-known neutralisation of
its northern portion and in 1816 obtained from Sardinia the
contractual undertaking never to cede the Chablais, Faucigny and
Genévois to another power than Switzerland itself. Louis Napoleon
also has the rumour spread about everywhere that he wants only
Southern Savoy; the Chablais, Faucigny and a part of the
Genévois, up to the Usses brook, are to go to Switzerland. Since
one gift deserves another, he uses Herr Vogt, according to The
Times, to inquire confidentially of the Swiss National Assembly
whether he could not get free use of the Simplon road in
exchange. A first hint that the Simplon too is a natural frontier
post of France, as in fact it was under the First Empire.

Let us assume that Switzerland is enriched by the new canton of
North Savoy. The frontier would be formed by the mountain
ridge that separates from the main chain between the Little St.
Bernard and the Mont Blanc and extends to the Rhône defile (Fort
de l'Ecluse); it would thus appear to be quite "natural". But the
following roads run from the valleys of the Isère and Rhône over
this ridge: (1) Seyssel to Geneva; (2) Annecy to Geneva;
(3) Annecy to Bonneville; (4) Albertville to Sallanches. Roads run
from Bonneville and from Sallanches over the north ridge of the
Arve valley to Thonon. Thus, the region lies quite open to an
offensive directed against Thonon on the south bank of the Lake
of Geneva, and since the distances from Seyssel or Albertville to
Thonon are not over fifteen miles, possession of North Savoy
would only give the Swiss defensive five days more at most. But
since it is out of the question that this new canton could be
defended by any other troops than the Landsturm, the attacking
column could just as well go directly from Geneva to Thonon—
five miles—at which place it would be only some four miles from
Saint-Gingolph. In this case North Savoy would provide Switzerland
with only three days grace. In addition, it could only have the
effect of dividing the Swiss defensive forces. The line of retreat of
a Swiss army attacked from France obviously goes through Berne
and the lowlands, where possible along the Aare to Zurich, and
where that is not possible, to Lucerne, and from those two places
into the Upper Rhine valley. Accordingly, the army cannot take
up a position so far to the south that it can be forced out of these
lines and up into the high mountains. As we saw, the Vaud can be
incorporated to advantage into the Swiss defensive system; North
Savoy and the Valais, laid open by the abrogation of the neutrality
of Savoy, can certainly not be. We know, however, that in a
threatened federative state defended by militias everyone will want
to have his own home district defended. We know that the troops
will grumble, the national assemblies will cry out, if entire cities
and cantons are given up without resistance, and especially in the
case of a new canton, which Switzerland will have received only
for the sake of its defence! In the general staff itself everyone will
do what he can to see that his district is specially protected, and in
a militia army, in which the discipline is lax enough at best because
of the comfortable tavern atmosphere of peacetime, all these
influences will make it hard enough for the commander to hold
his troops together. In nine cases out of ten it is a good bet that
the commander will let himself be swayed or have to give way, and
that North Savoy will be occupied by troops who will be no use at
all for its defence but will in any event suffer during the retreat
and be thrown in part into the Valais, where they may then try to
see how they can get back to the main army over the Gemmi or
the Furka.

The only security for Switzerland is that North Savoy belong
neither to it nor to France; in that case it would really be neutral
in a war between those two states, and really cover Switzerland.
However, if it belonged to Switzerland this would not be much
better for the Swiss than if it belonged to France. Its value comes
to a gain of three, or at most five, days, the greater part of which, however, would be lost again in defending the Vaud. What is that against the security that they could be attacked, under any circumstances, only between Basle and the Lake of Geneva?

North Savoy is a gift of the Greeks\(^a\) for the Swiss; it is more than that: This gift implies a threat. In the case that has been presumed, France is militarily master of all of French Switzerland and interdicts any even half serious defence of it. Annexation of South Savoy by France immediately raises the demand for incorporation of French Switzerland.

\(^a\) Cf. Virgil, \textit{Aeneid}, II, 49: "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes" (I fear the Greeks, even when bringing gifts).—\textit{Ed.}
As we know, the county of Nice lies at the foot of the Maritime Alps, and its border towards the district of Genoa drops to the sea a mile east of Oneglia, at Cervo. The western half speaks a Provençal dialect and the eastern half, beyond the Roya, an Italian one. With the exception of some villages on the Var, however, Italian is the written language everywhere; only in the city of Nice, because of the large influx of foreigners, is it counterbalanced by French.

If we are to treat the national question correctly here, we must go into the language relationships of the Western Alps for a moment.

At every point at which Italian competes with other languages in the Alps it is proved to be the weaker. There is no point at which it crosses the Alps; the Romance dialects of the Grisons and the Tyrol are entirely independent of Italian. On the other hand, all the bordering languages have won territory from it south of the Alps. Krain-Slovenian is spoken in the western mountain districts of the Venetian province of Udine. In the Tyrol the German element is master of the entire southern slope and all of the Upper Adige valley; further to the south, in the middle of the Italian region, there are the German-language islands of the Sette comuni and the Tredici comuni, at the southern foot of the Gries Pass, as well as in the Val di Cavergno in the Ticino and the Val Formazza in Piedmont, in the Upper Valdi Vedro at the foot of the Simplon, and finally on the entire southeastern slope of the Monte Rosa, in the Val de Lys, the Upper Val Sesia and Val Anzasca, German is spoken. From the Val de Lys on the French language border begins; it comprises the entire Val d'Aosta and the eastern slope of the Cottian Alps, from the Mont Cenis Pass on, so that the
common understanding is that the sources of all the rivers of the Upper Po basin belong to it. It is usually accepted that this border runs from Demonte (on the Stura) somewhat westerly from the Col di Tenda to the Roya and follows that river down to the sea.

There can be no doubt as to the boundaries between Italian and German or Slavic-speaking peoples. It is different, however, where two Romance languages meet, and to be sure not the Italian literary language, *il vero toscano,* nor the cultured North French, but the Piedmontese dialect of Italian and the South French of the troubadours, degenerated into a thousand patois, which we shall designate, for the sake of brevity, with the imprecise but familiar name of Provençal. Anyone who has ever studied, even superficially, the comparative grammar of the Romance languages or Provençal literature, must be struck immediately by the great similarity of the vernacular in Lombardy and Piedmont to Provençal. In Lombard, it is true, this similarity is limited to the external habitus of the dialect; the dropping of the masculine vowel endings, while the feminine ones are kept in the singular, as well as of most of the vowel endings in conjugation, give it a Provençal ring, while on the other hand the nasal *n*, the pronunciation of the *u* and *oeu* are reminiscent of North French. But the word formation and phonology are essentially Italian, and where divergences occur they are often strangely reminiscent, as in Rhaeto-Romanc, of Portuguese.* The Piedmontese dialect agrees fairly well with the Lombard in its basic features, while coming closer to the Provençal and no doubt approaching it so closely in the Cottian and Maritime Alps that it would be hard to draw a definite line.** Further, most of the South French patois are not much closer to the North French written language than

* Lat. *clavis*, Ital. *chiave*, Port. *chave*, Lomb. *ciàu* (pron. *chow*=key. The Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung had an account written to it from Verona last summer (see the reports from the Austrian headquarters) to the effect that people in the street greeted each other with “Chow, chow”. The wise newspaper, which has a fondness for language errors, was obviously baffled by this *Chow, chow*. The word is *s-ciàu* (*stchow*) and is the analogue in Lombard for *schiavo*=slave, servant, as we too use the greeting: “Your servant, obedient servant”, etc.—Only two actual Provençal forms in Lombard occur to us: the feminine past participle in *-da* (*amà, amada*) and the first person of the present in *-i* (*ami*=I love, *saludi*=I greet).

** Decisive criteria for the Italian and Provençal dialects would be: (1) the Italian vocalisation of *l* after consonants (*fiore, piu, bianco*), which does not occur in Provençal; (2) formation of the plural of nouns from the Latin nominative (*donne, cappelli*). Provençal and Old French did have this formation of the nominative in

---

*a* True Tuscan.—*Ed.*
Piedmontese itself. Here, therefore, the vernacular can hardly be
decisive for nationality; the Provençal-speaking Alpine peasant
learns Italian as easily as French and uses one as seldom as the
other; Piedmontese is perfectly comprehensible to him, and he
gets along well enough with it. If some point of support had to be
found, it could be only the written language, and this is Italian in
all of Piedmont and Nice, the only exception being probably the
Val d’Aosta and the Waldensian valleys, where French is the
dominant written language here and there.

To try to assert the French nationality of Nice on the basis of a
Provençal patois, which covers only half the province at that, is,
therefore, nonsense from the start. The assertion becomes still
more nonsensical if we recall that the Provençal language extends
across the Pyrenees as well, covers Aragon, Catalonia and
Valencia, and in these Spanish provinces, despite some Castilian
echoes, not only is preserved on the whole in a much purer form
than anywhere in France, but also still has an existence as a
written language in the popular literature. What would become of
Spain if Louis Bonaparte one day claimed these three regions too
as being of French nationality?

It seems to be even harder to create French sympathies in the
county of Nice than in Savoy. One hears nothing from the
country; in the city every attempt falls even flatter than in
Chambéry, although it is much easier to concentrate a crowd of
Bonapartists in this seaside resort. The idea of making Garibaldi,
the man from Nice, into a Frenchman is not at all bad.

If Savoy is of supreme importance for the defence of Piedmont,
Nice is still more so. Three roads lead from Nice to Italy: the
Corniche road along the coast to Genoa, the road over the Col di
Nava from Oneglia to the valley of the Tanaro and Ceva, and the
road over the Col di Tenda to Cuneo (Coni). The first one is, to
be sure, finally barred by Genoa, but as early as at Albenga and
again at Savona gives an advancing column the opportunity of
crossing the Apennines on good paved roads, and in addition
provides a number of bridle-paths and footpaths over the
mountains; in 1796 Napoleon gave an example of how they are to
be used in war. The third one, over the Col di Tenda, is for Nice
what the Mont Cenis is for Savoy; it leads directly to Turin, but

the Middle Ages, while all the other cases were derived from the Latin accusative
(ending -s). All modern Provençal dialects have only the latter form, so far as we
know. Nonetheless, it could seem doubtful at the border whether the nominative
form that has been handed down comes from the Italian or the Provençal.
affords few or no flanking advantages. On the other hand, the middle road over the Col di Nava leads straight to Alessandria and so has the same sort of effect in the south that the Little St. Bernard has in the north, only much more directly and with far fewer obstacles. It has the additional advantage that it is near enough to the coast road to get significant support from it in the attack. As early as at Garessio the column advancing on the Nava road can make contact again with the column which has advanced to Albenga on the coast road, since the crossroad from Albenga comes out there; if it has passed Ceva, the road to Alessandria leads through Carcare, where the road from Savona comes out and which is half way between Ceva and Savona. However, there are high mountains between Ceva, Savona and Oneglia, where the defence cannot make a stand. In addition, the north slope of the Col di Nava, with the sources of the Tanaro, lies in the territory of Nice, so that the pass belongs from the outset to whoever has Nice before the war.

A French army that had control of Nice even before war broke out threatens, from there, the flank, rear and lines of communication of any Italian force thrust forward westward from Alessandria. Cession of Nice to France would therefore mean, in war, drawing the assembly point of the Italian forces to Alessandria and abandoning the defence of Piedmont proper, which can only be conducted in Nice and Savoy.

Here too the history of the revolutionary war affords the best example.

On October 1, 1792 General Anselme crossed the Var with a division of 9,000 men, while at the same time the French fleet (12 ships of the line and frigates) cast anchor within 1,000 paces of Nice. The inhabitants, who favoured the revolution, rose in revolt and the weak Piedmontese garrison (2,000 men) retreated in haste to the Col di Tenda, where they took up a position at Saorge. The city of Nice received the French with open arms, but they plundered the entire country, burned the peasants' houses, raped their women and could not be kept within bounds either by Anselme's orders of the day or by the proclamations of the commissaries of the Convention. This was the original core of the later Army of Italy with which General Bonaparte won his first laurels. Bonapartism in its initial stages always seems to have to base itself on riff-raff; without a Society of December 10 it cannot get to its feet anywhere.

For a long time the warring parties remained inactive facing one another; the French held the city and its surroundings; the
Piedmontese, reinforced by an Austrian division, remained masters of the mountains and had a strong entrenched position with its centre at Saorge. In June 1793 the French made some attacks, on the whole fruitless; in July they took the Col d'Argentera, which leads into the rear of the enemy position. After the capture of Toulon (December 1793) the army of Italy received considerable reinforcements and General Bonaparte was attached to it. The following spring he mounted an attack on the camp at Saorge, which was executed with complete success on April 28 and gave the French possession of all the passes in the Maritime Alps. Now Bonaparte proposed to combine the army of the Alps with the army of Italy in the valley of the Stura and to conquer Piedmont; but the plan was not accepted. Soon after Bonaparte lost his most powerful protector, the younger Robespierre, as a result of the ninth Thermidor, and with that his influence in the Council of War; he was left a simple divisional general. The army went over to the defensive, and it was only when the Austrian General Colloredo moved against Savona with habitual slowness in order to cut off the very important French line of communication with neutral Genoa that Bonaparte found an opportunity to fall upon and defeat him. Nonetheless, the road to Genoa remained in danger, and the campaign of 1795 began with the expulsion of the French from the entire Genoese Riviera. In the meantime the peace treaty with Spain had made the army of the Eastern Pyrenees available; it was sent to Nice, where it was fully assembled by November. Schérer, who was now in command in the Maritime Alps, went over to the attack immediately under a plan worked out by Masséna. While Sérurier kept the Piedmontese busy at the Col di Tenda, Masséna advanced in the high mountains to flank Loano, which Augereau attacked frontally (November 23). The plan succeeded completely; the Austrians lost 2,000 killed, 5,000 prisoners and 40 guns and were totally separated from the Piedmontese. The line of communication with Genoa was now secure again, and the mountains remained firmly in French hands during the winter. In spring 1796 Bonaparte at last received command of the army of Italy, and now things took a different turn. Supported by possession of Nice and the Riviera di Ponente, he went up into the mountains from Savona, beat the Austrians at Montenotte, Millesimo and Dego and thereby separated them from the Piedmontese, who now, outflanked by superior French forces and isolated, signed a treaty of peace immediately after a couple of rearguard actions. Thus, four successful engagements in the upper valleys of the Bormida and
the Tanaro yielded the French military control of all Piedmont, without a direct thrust at Turin being required; the seat of war shifted at once to Lombardy, and Piedmont became a part of the French base of operations.

So during the first three years of the war Italy was completely protected by Nice. Only in the third campaign were the passes of the Maritime Alps lost, and only in the fourth did they come into play—but then in an immediately decisive manner. After the mountain engagements of the first week a strong demonstration against the Piedmontese was enough to make them realise their helpless position and the necessity of capitulation. The thrust itself could have continued almost without interruption in the direction of Milan; all the territory between the Bormida, the Ticino and the Alps fell without a fight into the hands of the French.

If Nice is a French province, Italy is in the same position vis-à-vis France that it was in at the end of the 1794 campaign. Not only is the valley of the Stura open to the French through the Col di Tenda, and the valley of the Tanaro through the Col di Nava; the way to Albenga and Savona cannot be contested to a superior attacking French army, and consequently, three or four days after the beginning of the campaign, it would be back where the campaign of 1796 started. Where should the main body of the Italians stand up against it? In the Genoese Riviera it has no room to deploy; westward of the Belbo and Tanaro its communications with Alessandria, Lombardy and the peninsula are endangered. The only thing it can do is to advance southward from Alessandria and fall, with joint forces, on the individual columns debouching from the mountains. This, however, presupposes that the defence of the Alpine frontier has been abandoned from the outset, since otherwise all the detachments at the Col di Tenda and west and northwest of it would be cut off. In other words, possession of Nice gives France mastery of the Alps, which then will no longer be a protective wall for Italy, and hence military mastery over Piedmont.

Nice gives France the same flank advantages in the south that Savoy gives it in the north, only still more completely and directly. Now if either Nice or Savoy by itself lays Piedmont proper totally open to a French attack, what power would France have over Piedmont if it had both provinces! Piedmont would be in their grip as in pincers; along the entire line from the Little St. Bernard down to the Col di Nava and the mountain roads above Savona, the inexorable game of feinting attacks could be played in endless variations until finally the real attack comes at a point on the
flanks and cuts off all the Italian detachments that have dug in too deeply in the mountains. The only course left to an Italian army would be to concentrate at Alessandria and Casale, to leave the Alps only under observation and, as soon as the main direction of the attack was ascertained, to throw all its forces at it. If this is conceded, it means that not only the chain of the Alps but the entire Piedmontese Po basin is given up to the enemy in advance and that the first defensive position of an Italian army against France is behind the ramparts of Alessandria. With Savoy and Nice as advanced bulwarks Piedmont is the first base of operations of the Italian army; without them Piedmont, militarily speaking, belongs to the French offensive and must first be recovered from it by a victory on Piedmontese soil and by capturing the passes of Savoy and Nice.

The annexation of Savoy and Nice is equivalent, if not to the political, to the military annexation of Piedmont to France. When in the future Victor Emmanuel looks out from the Villa della Regina at Turin at the mighty chain of the Alps, not one of whose mountains will belong to him any more, this will be clear enough to him.

But, it will be said, if a powerful military state takes shape in Upper Italy, France needs Nice and Savoy for its own defence.

It is true, as we have seen, that Savoy would significantly strengthen the French defensive system. Nice would reinforce it further only to the extent that this province too would have to be conquered before the present French Alpine departments could be attacked. The question is, however, whether a strong Italian military state could in any way so threaten France that special protection against it would be required.

Italy, even if entirely united, could, with its 26 million inhabitants, never wage an aggressive war against France except in alliance with Germany. In such a war, however, Germany would always provide the bulk of the military forces and Italy would be the subordinate power. This alone would suffice to shift the main stress of the attack from the Alps to the Rhine and the Meuse. In addition, there is the position of Paris, the decisive point of attack, in North France. The most dangerous attack on France will always be the one from Belgium; if Belgium is neutral, the one from the German left bank of the Rhine and Baden on the Upper Rhine. Any other attack makes a detour and is more or less eccentric, not aimed directly at Paris. And if Clausewitz (Vom Kriege, Book VI, Chap. 23) already made fun of the way in which in 1814 an army of 200,000 men, instead of marching straight on Paris, let a silly
Frederick Engels

theory lead them by the nose on the detour through Switzerland to the plateau of Langres, what would he now say of campaign plans that would aim the main attack on Paris through Upper Italy and Savoy, or even Nice? Any attack through Savoy is far inferior to the attack from the Rhine because of the longer line of communication, going across the Alps into the bargain, because of the greater distance to Paris, and finally because of the attractive power of the big fortified camp of Lyons, which would bring it to a halt in most cases. Accordingly, the corps invading France through Italy in the 1814 campaign played virtually no role.

With such means of defence, France does not in fact need any extension of its terrain on this, the best protected of its frontiers, and against one of its weakest neighbours. If France's present frontiers were everywhere as far removed from Paris—and as strong by nature and art and owing to difficulties in enemy communications—as its frontier with Italy, France would be unassailable. But if Bonapartism seeks out precisely this point to raise the question of the so-called natural borders on the pretext that they are indispensable to France's defence—how much easier will it be to establish its claims to the Rhine!

Nice will always remain Italian, even if it be temporarily ceded to France. Savoy may, and probably will at some future time, desire to be incorporated into France, when the great European nationalities have further consolidated themselves. But it is quite another matter whether Savoy will voluntarily become French when Germany and Italy have realised their national unity politically and militarily as well and thereby considerably strengthened their position as European powers—or whether a ruler like Louis Napoleon, depending on conquest, wrests it from a still divided Italy in order to perpetuate his mastery over Italy and at the same time provide a first precedent for the theory of natural borders.

---


b This refers to the anonymous article "Das Wachsen der Opposition", *Allgemeine Zeitung*, No. 58, February 27, 1860.—Ed.
In this huckstering over Savoy and Nice, there are three factors that mainly concern us Germans.

In the first place, Louis Napoleon's practical version of Italian independence: Italy divided into at least three states, if possible four, Venice Austrian, and France master of Piedmont by virtue of possessing Savoy and Nice. The Papal lands, after the subtraction of the Romagna, will completely separate Naples from the Upper Italian state and block any expansion of the latter southward, since the Pope is to be "guaranteed" possession of his remaining territories. At the same time Venice is held out as the nearest bait to the Upper Italian state, and in Austria the Italian national movement retains its most immediate and primary adversary; and to make sure that the new kingdom can be set in motion against Austria at the pleasure of Louis Napoleon, the French take over all the positions dominating the Western Alps and shift their advance posts to within nine miles of Turin. This is the position that Bonapartism has got for itself in Italy, and it is worth an army in the event of a war over the Rhine border. It gives Austria the best of excuses to supply at most its federal contingent—if that. In this situation there is only one thing that can help: a complete reversal of German policy with respect to Italy. We believe that we have proved elsewhere that Germany has no need of the territory of Venice up to the Mincio and the Po. Likewise, we have no interest in the continuance of the Papal and Neapolitan rule, but we do have one in the establishment of a strong and unified Italy which can have a policy of its own. Under certain circumstances, we can therefore offer Italy more than
Bonapartism can; the time may soon come when it will be important to bear this in mind.

In the second place, the outright proclamation of the theory of France's natural frontiers. No one can have any doubt that this theory has been trumpeted by the French press not only with the permission of the Government but at its direct orders. For the time being the theory is being applied only to the Alps; this is still relatively innocuous; Savoy and Nice are small regions, with only 575,000 and 236,000 inhabitants respectively, so that the population of France would be increased by only 811,000, and their political and military significance is not obvious at first glance. But the fact that with the claim to these two provinces the notion of natural frontiers is again brought to the fore and recalled to the French people, that Europe is to get used to the slogan again, as to other Bonapartist slogans that have been proclaimed and dropped and proclaimed and dropped for ten years—that is what particularly concerns us Germans. In the French language of the First Empire, which the republicans of the National subsequently continued so diligently to speak, the natural frontier _par excellence_ of France was understood to be the Rhine. Even today, when a natural frontier is spoken of, no Frenchman thinks of Savoy or Nice but only of the Rhine. What government, and one at that which is based on the traditions of conquest and the lust for conquest in the nation, would dare to revive the call for the natural frontiers and then expect to satisfy France with Savoy and Nice?

The renewed proclamation of the theory of France's natural frontiers is a direct threat to Germany and a fact which can no longer be misunderstood, one that justifies the national feeling that was expressed in Germany a year ago. Louis Napoleon does not say so, to be sure, but the press he directs is explaining to anyone who will listen that nothing else was and is involved than the Rhine.

In the third place, and most important, _Russia's attitude towards the whole intrigue_. When the war broke out last year, when Gorchakov himself admitted that Russia had contracted "written obligations" to Louis Napoleon, rumours reached the public as to the content of these obligations. The rumours came from various sources and confirmed each other in essentials. Russia bound itself to mobilise four army corps and station them on the Prussian and Austrian borders in order to help Louis Napoleon's game. For the

---

*a See this volume, p. 600.—* Ed.
course of the war itself, it was said, three cases were envisaged:

Either Austria makes peace on the Mincio; in this case it loses Lombardy and, isolated from Prussia and England, will be easy to persuade to enter the Russo-French alliance, whose further aims (partition of Turkey, cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France) can then be pursued in another way.

Or Austria continues to fight for possession of Venetia; in that case it will be driven out of Italy altogether, and an insurrection will be started in Hungary, which under certain circumstances will be given to the Russian Grand Duke Constantine; Lombardy and Venice will go to Piedmont, Savoy and Nice to France.

Or else Austria continues to fight and the German Confederation stands by it; then Russia will enter the war actively, France will get the left bank of the Rhine and Russia will have a free hand in Turkey.

We repeat: These data on the essential content of the Russo-French alliance were already known and published by the time war broke out. A considerable part of them have been confirmed by events. What of the rest?

Documentary proof of them cannot, of course, be provided at present owing to the very nature of the case. Such documents only come to light when the relevant events themselves are history. Only the policy of Russia, as established by facts and documents concerning previous periods of history (e.g., the Russian archives found in Warsaw in 1830\(^a\)), can serve as a guide in this tangle of intrigue; but that it does thoroughly.

Russia has allied itself with France twice during this century, and in each case the alliance had the partition of Germany as its aim or basis.

The first occasion was on the raft at Tilsit.\(^440\) Russia gave Germany over entirely into the hands of the French Emperor, and even took a piece of Prussia as security for it. In exchange it got a free hand in Turkey; it hastened to conquer Bessarabia and Moldavia and send its troops across the Danube. The fact that Napoleon soon after “studied the Turkish question” and significantly changed his opinion on the matter was one of Russia’s main grounds for the war of 1812.

\(^a\) This refers to documents from the Grand Duke Constantine’s archives seized by the Polish insurgents during the 1830-31 uprising in Warsaw. Some of them were published by David Urquhart in his series of diplomatic documents *The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers...*, Vol. III, London, 1836, some appeared in *Recueil des documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle*, Paris, 1854.— *Ed.*
The second occasion was in 1829. Russia entered into a treaty with France according to which France was to get the left bank of the Rhine and in exchange Russia was to get a free hand in Turkey again. This treaty was torn up by the July revolution; Talleyrand found the relevant documents as the case against the Polignac Ministry was being prepared, and threw them into the fire in order to spare French and Russian diplomacy the colossal scandal. Diplomats of all countries constitute a secret league as against the exoteric public and will never compromise one another openly.

In the 1853 war Russia relied on the Holy Alliance, which it had reestablished by the intervention in Hungary and the humiliation of Warsaw and believed to be strengthened by Austria's and Prussia's mistrust of Louis Napoleon. It was mistaken. Austria astonished the world by the extent of its ingratitude (in the meantime it had repaid its debt to Russia with usurious interest in Schleswig-Holstein and Warsaw) and by its consistent resumption of its traditional anti-Russian policy on the Danube. The Russian calculations went astray in this sector; in another, they were saved again by treachery in the enemy camp.

This much was clear: The fixed idea of conquering Constantinople could now be put into execution only by an alliance with France. On the other hand there had never yet been a government in France that so badly needed to conquer the frontier on the Rhine as the Government of Louis Napoleon. The situation was even more favourable than in 1829. Russia had the game in hand. Louis Napoleon could do nothing but pull its chestnuts out of the fire.

Above all else the task was to annihilate Austria. With the same tenacity with which Austria resisted the French on the field of battle from 1792 to 1809, with that same tenacity from 1814 onward it had offered diplomatic resistance to Russian lust for conquest on the Vistula and the Danube—and this is its only, but undeniable merit. In 1848-49, when the revolution in Germany, Italy and Hungary brought Austria to the brink of ruin, Russia saved Austria—it was not to be ruined by a revolution, for that would have taken control of the liberated parts out of the hands of Russian policy. Nonetheless, the movement of the various nationalities had become independent and from 1848 on made it impossible for Austria to resist Russia any longer, thereby removing the last internal, historical reason for the existence of Austria.

This same anti-Austrian national movement was now to become
the lever with which to unhinge Austria. First in Italy; later, if necessary, in Hungary. Russia does not operate as the first Napoleon did, that is, against the West, when it comes up against dense populations of higher civilisation than that of its own people, it proceeds only slowly. The beginnings of the subjection of Poland date from Peter the Great, and the process is only partially completed. Slow but sure successes are just as welcome to Russia as swift decisive blows with great results; but both possibilities are always kept in view. The Russian hand is plain to see in the use made of the Hungarian insurrection in the 1859 war, in its being put back into reserve for the second act.

But if Russia was satisfied, in one case, with the weakening of Austria by the short campaign of 1859, did it not foresee any other eventualities? Did it mobilise its first four army corps only for the pleasure of it? What if Austria had not yielded? What if military and political combinations had forced Prussia and the rest of Germany to intervene on Austria's side—and if the war had continued this was the only possibility? What then? What obligations could Russia have entered into with France for that event?

The treaties of Tilsit and of 1829 give the answer. France must have its share of the booty too if Russia extends on the Danube and rules directly or indirectly in Constantinople. The only compensation that Russia can offer France is the left bank of the Rhine; the sacrifices must again be borne by Germany. The natural and traditional policy of Russia towards France is: to promise France possession of the left bank of the Rhine or to help it to get it in a given case, in exchange for the consent to and support of Russian conquests on the Vistula and the Danube; and then to support Germany, which in gratitude will recognise the Russian conquests, in its reconquest of the territory lost to France. Execution of this programme will naturally be possible only in great historical crises, but that does not in any way prevent such eventualities from being envisaged in 1859 as they were in 1829.

It would be ridiculous today to try to prove yet again that the conquest of Constantinople is the unchangeable goal of Russian foreign policy and that any means is good towards reaching that goal. We recall only one thing here. Russia can never bring about the partition of Turkey except through an alliance with France or England. When direct offers to England seemed suitable in 1844, the Emperor Nicholas went to England and personally brought a Russian memoir on the partition of Turkey, in which, among
other things, the English were promised Egypt. The offers were rejected, but Lord Aberdeen put the memoir into a box, which he handed over, sealed, to his successor in the Foreign Office; and every successive Foreign Secretary read the document, resealed it and handed it over to his successor in the same manner, until the matter finally came out into the open in the debates in the House of Lords in 1853. At the same time the well-known conversation of the Emperor Nicholas with Sir Hamilton Seymour about the "sick man" came to light, in which England was likewise offered Egypt and Crete, while Russia apparently was willing to be satisfied with small benefits. The Russian promises to England were thus the same in 1853 as in 1844; would the promises to France have been less generous in 1859 than in 1829?

Louis Napoleon's personality and his position both fit him for serving the purposes of Russia. The pretended heir to a great military tradition, he also inherited the consequences of the defeats of 1813 to 1815. The army is his main support and he must satisfy it by new military successes, by punishing the powers that crushed France in those years, by restoring the country's natural frontiers. Only when the French tricolour waves on the entire left bank of the Rhine, only then will the disgrace of the two captures of Paris be wiped out. And in order to achieve all this, a strong ally is needed; the choice is only between England and Russia. England, with its frequent changes of Ministries, cannot be relied on, to say the least, even if an English Minister were to lend himself to such projects. But Russia? Already twice it had, for a reasonable equivalent, proved its readiness for an alliance on such a basis.

Never was a man more suitable to Russian policy than Louis Napoleon; never was a situation more favourable to it than his. A ruler on the French throne who must wage war, who must make conquests, just to survive, who needs an alliance and for this alliance must rely on Russia alone—this was something Russia had never been offered before. Since the meeting in Stuttgart, the mainsprings of French policy are to be found no longer in Paris, in Louis Napoleon's head, but in St. Petersburg, in the cabinet of Prince Gorchakov. The "mysterious" man, who produces such awe in the German philistine, is reduced to a tool with which Russian diplomacy plays and which it allows to be plastered over with all the appearance of a great man, while contenting itself with the real advantages. Russia, which never sacrifices a kopeck or a soldier unless it is absolutely necessary, but lets the other European powers mangle and weaken one another as far as
possible, Russia had to give its permission through Gorchakov’s treaty before Louis Napoleon could give himself airs as the liberator of Italy. And when the reports on the mood in Russian Poland sounded too bad to allow any armed rising in Hungary nearby; when the attempted mobilisation of the first four Russian army corps proved that the exhaustion of the country had not yet been overcome; when the peasant movement as well as the resistance of the nobility assumed dimensions that could be dangerous in a foreign war—an adjutant general of the Russian Emperor appeared in the French headquarters and the Treaty of Villafranca was concluded. For the time being Russia had achieved enough. Austria had been severely punished for its “ingratitude” in 1854, more severely than Russia could ever have expected. Its finances, which before the war had been on the point of being put in order, ruined for decades, its entire internal system of government hopelessly collapsed, its domination in Italy wiped out, its territory diminished, its army discouraged, deprived of confidence in its leaders; the Hungarians, Slavs and Venetians so heightened in their national movement that secession from Austria was now openly expressed as their aim; from now on Russia could entirely disregard Austria’s resistance and count on gradually converting it into a tool. These were the successes for Russia; Louis Napoleon brought home nothing but very meagre glory for his army, very dubious glory for himself and a very precarious claim to Savoy and Nice—two provinces that are at best gifts of the Greeks and chain him still more firmly to Russia.

The broader plans are put off for the moment, not given up. For how long, will depend on the development of international relations in Europe, on how long Louis Napoleon will be able to keep his praetorian army quiet, and on the greater or lesser interest Russia has in a new war.

What kind of role Russia intends to play in relation to us Germans is clear enough from the well-known circular that Prince Gorchakov sent to the smaller German states last year. Such language has never been used to Germany before. Let us hope that the Germans will never forget that Russia dared to try to forbid them to come to the aid of a German state that was being attacked.

---

a P. A. Shuvalov.— Ed.
b Alexander II.— Ed.
c A. Gortschakov, “Circularschreiben an die russischen Gesandtschaften vom 15. (27.) Mai 1859”, Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 167, June 16, 1859.— Ed.
Let us hope that the Germans will not forget many other things in connection with Russia.

In the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807 Russia had a bit of the territory of its ally, Prussia—the Bialystok district—ceded to it and abandoned Germany to Napoleon.

In 1814, when even Austria (see Castlereagh’s memoirs) upheld the necessity of an independent Poland, Russia incorporated into itself almost the entire Grand Duchy of Warsaw (i.e., former Austrian and Prussian provinces) and thereby took up an offensive position against Germany that will be a threat to us until we have driven Russia out of it. The fortress group of Modlin, Warsaw and Ivangorod, built since 1831, is conceded even by the Russophile Haxthausen to be a direct threat to Germany.

In 1814 and 1815 Russia did everything it could to achieve the constitution of the German Confederation in its present form and thereby perpetuate Germany’s external impotence.

From 1815 to 1848 Germany was under the direct hegemony of Russia. Austria may have opposed it on the Danube, but at the congresses of Laibach, Troppau and Verona it carried out every wish of Russia’s in Western Europe. This Russian hegemony was the direct result of the constitution of the German Confederation. When Prussia tried for a moment to break away in 1841 and 1842, it was at once forced back into its previous status. The result was that at the outbreak of the 1848 revolution Russia issued a circular in which the movement in Germany was treated as a revolt in the nursery.

In 1829 Russia concluded with the Polignac ministry a treaty that had been prepared from 1823 by Chateaubriand (and openly admitted by him) and that bartered the left bank of the Rhine away to France.

In 1849 Russia supported Austria in Hungary only on condition that Austria reestablished the Federal Diet and crushed the resistance of Schleswig-Holstein; the London Protocol assured Russia of the succession to the entire Danish monarchy in the near future and gave it the prospect of realising the plan it had nurtured since Peter the Great of entering the German Confederation (formerly the Empire).

---


In 1850 Prussia and Austria were summoned to Warsaw by the Tsar, who sat in judgment on them. The humiliation was no less for Austria than for Prussia, although in the eyes of the café politicians Prussia alone bore it.

In 1853 the Emperor Nicholas, in his conversation with Sir Hamilton Seymour, disposed of Germany as though it was his hereditary property. Austria, he said, he was sure of. Prussia he did not even mention.a

And finally, in 1859, when the Holy Alliance seemed to have been altogether dissolved, the treaty with Louis Napoleon, the French attack on Austria with Russian consent and support, and Gorchakov's circular forbidding the Germans to give any help to Austria, in the most shameless manner.

This is what we have to thank the Russians for since the beginning of this century and what, we hope, we Germans will never forget.

At this moment the Russo-French alliance still threatens us. France itself can endanger us only at special conjunctures, and even then only through the alliance with Russia. But Russia threatens and insults us at all times, and if Germany rises against that, Russia sets the French gendarme in motion with the prospect of the left bank of the Rhine.

Should we allow this game to be played with us any longer? Should the forty-five million of us tolerate any longer that one of our fairest, richest and most industrial provinces should serve as a lure held out by Russia to the praetorian rule in France? Does the Rhineland have no other function than to be overrun in war so that Russia may have a free hand on the Danube and Vistula?

That is the question. We hope that Germany will soon answer it sword in hand. If we stand together, we shall soon send the French praetorians and the Russian kapustnikib about their business.

In the meantime we have obtained an ally in the form of the Russian serfs. The contest that has now broken out in Russia between the ruling and the oppressed classes of the rural population is already undermining the entire system of Russian foreign policy. That system was only possible so long as Russia had no internal political development. But that time is past. Industrial

---

a "Communications Respecting Turkey Made to Her Majesty's Government by the Emperor of Russia, with the Answers Returned to Them. January to April 1853", Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey, London, 1854.—Ed.

b Cabbage-eaters, from the Russian word kapusta (cabbage).—Ed.
and agricultural development fostered in every way by the government and the nobility, has reached a point where the existing social conditions can no longer be endured. Elimination of these conditions is a necessity, on the one hand, but an impossibility without violent change, on the other. With the Russia that existed from Peter the Great to Nicholas, the foreign policy of that Russia collapses as well.

As it would seem, it is reserved for Germany to make this fact clear to the Russians not only with the pen but with the sword as well. If it comes to that, it will be a rehabilitation of Germany that will outweigh the centuries of political ignominy.
FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS
People in this city are generally so much bored with the progress of liberty abroad that they almost forget minding the progress of servitude at home. Still, now and then, symptoms of returning internal life appear on the surface of the social body.

Take for instance M. Berryer's vigorous denunciation of the decay of the barreau\(^1\) and of the growing servility of the French Courts of Justice. Another instance is the efforts made by liberals of every shade of opinion to rally and make a literary stand at least against the streams of turpitude daily poured over the country through the floodgates of the Decembrist press. Thus at Paris Messrs. d'Haussonville, Jules Simon, Barthélemy-St.-Hilaire, Odilon Barrot, Duvergier de Hauranne, Barni, Hauréau and others, are trying their best in this direction. In the department de la Meurthe a cluster of independent writers have started a periodical publication under the title of Varia with a view to combat the monster centralisation that envelops France in its deadly embrace, as the serpents did the body of Laocoon; and similar undertakings are set on foot in Alsace. The Courrier du Dimanche, however, a weekly Paris paper, now evidently takes the lead of the new liberal opposition. On casting a glance on its sheets, one becomes at once aware of the enormous difficulties its way is beset with, and, moreover, its writers appear more or less tainted with the exhalations of the corrupt medium they breathe.

\(^1\) The Bar.—Ed.
in. Still there is a great effort made to emerge and, consequently, I propose giving a summary of their recent strictures on the Bonapartist pamphlet literature.a

Written on November 9, 1858
Printed according to the original
Published in English for the first time

a The manuscript breaks off here.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE ITALIAN WAR. 1859

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 1</td>
<td>Bonaparte's New-Year speech.(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26</td>
<td>Cowley's mission(^b) aimed at appeasement and evacuation of the Papal States by both [states].(^c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>Austria arms and reinforces the army in Italy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 23</td>
<td>Austrian <em>ultimatum</em> to Turin: immediate disarming or hostilities. Cavour appeals to the Congress, to which, on England's proposal, France, Prussia and Russia agree.(^d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 24</td>
<td>Sentries on the border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 25</td>
<td><em>French troops land in Genoa.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 26</td>
<td>Austrians <em>cross the Ticino, begin hostilities.</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 27</td>
<td><em>Flight of the Grand Duke of Tuscany</em>(^d) owing to revolution. Provisional Government, replaced by Piedmontese Commission(^e) on May 11. According to reports from Vienna, offensive and defensive alliance between France and Russia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 29</td>
<td>Austria definitively in Lomellina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1</td>
<td><em>Duchess of Parma</em> forced to flee, returned for a few days, but then left for good.*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

\(^a\) Napoleon III's address to the Austrian Ambassador von Hübner at a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the Tuileries, January 1, 1859, *The Times*, No. 23196, January 6, 1859. See this volume, p. 149.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) See this volume, p. 304.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) France and Austria.—*Ed.*

\(^d\) Leopold II.—*Ed.*

\(^e\) "For good" is in English in the original.—*Ed.*
May 10  Bonaparte [goes] to Italy.
" 20  Fighting at Montebello.
" 31  Ditto at Palestro.

June 4  Battle of Magenta.
"  7  Fighting at Melegnano.
" 24  Solferino.\(^a\)

July  5  In a dispatch Lord Russell advises against annexation of Savoy.\(^454\)
"  7  Villafranca armistice.
" 11  Ditto peace preliminaries.\(^b\)

Written about July 19, 1859


Printed according to the original

Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) On the fighting at Montebello, Palestro, Magenta and Solferino see this volume, pp. 338-40, 360-63, 368-71, 372-79, 392-95, 396-99, 400-03.—Ed.
\(^b\) See this volume, pp. 407-09, 412-14, 416-20, and also Engels' letter to Marx of July 14, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40).—Ed.
Karl Marx

[ON THE DIVISION OF LABOUR]

...forming a [social] whole. My labour thus appears as an independent part of all social labour. The various kinds of labour represent various parts of social labour, and taken together all appear thus as the division of labour, and through exchange they constitute a whole, mutually supplementary parts, links in a system of social labour....

In this division of labour which is manifested in exchange of the various kinds of useful labour, two things are to be distinguished.

First: What here relates the various kinds of labour to one another is their variety, and not their sameness, their manifoldness, and not their unity. The division of social labour is an aggregate of manifold kinds of labour, which are mutually supplementary precisely through their difference, their variety.

The shoemaker wants to exchange the bootmaking labour contained in boots for bread, tea, sugar, coal, meat, clothes, a hat, etc., that is, for the baker's labour, the labour of the tea-grower, the labour of the sugar-refiner, the labour of the butcher, the labour of the tailor, the labour of the hat-maker, and so on. He exchanges his labour for that of the others because the kinds of labour performed by the others are different from his, and therefore satisfy needs which his own labour does not satisfy; they are realised in means of subsistence in which his own labour is not realised. If the others' labour were of the same kind as his own, he would not need it, and would not exchange his labour for theirs. Hence, the kinds of labour are exchanged for one another, insofar as they are useful labour, because they are different from one another, to the extent that they differ from one another and belong to different systems of human needs.
Second: If I myself performed all the kinds of labour which I need in order to live, consequently produced all my means of subsistence myself, then I would not need the labour of others and would not exchange my kinds of labour for those of others, who would likewise themselves perform all the kinds of labour necessary for their sustenance. If I not only made boots, but also baked my own bread, brewed my own beer, grew my own wheat, wove my own garments, I would not have to exchange my bootmaking labour for baker's, beer-brewer's, peasant's, weaver's labour.

My labour is one-sided; but it satisfies a social need, the need of other members of society. I could not perform exclusively this one-sided labour if I did not know that other members of society perform other necessary kinds of labour and thereby complement mine. Labour for the satisfaction of a social need is thus exclusive labour of separate definite individuals who make it their profession.

Written in the autumn of 1859


Printed according to the original

Published in English for the first time
THE FRENCH SLAVE TRADE

It is a little odd, not to say a little suspicious, that all the recent movements in defense of the maritime rights of nations have been made, or at least have the appearance of having been made, in the interest of the African slave-trade. Such was the unfortunate color of the zealous efforts of Mr. Cass—both those which he made when Ambassador to France, as well as his more recent labors—to protect slavers sailing under the American flag from search and seizure by British cruisers; and such is the late alleged vindication by Napoleon III of the rights of national vessels not to be interrupted by the authorities of any other nation, within whose waters they may happen to be in the pursuit of that traffic. For, as we understand it, the ground taken by the Emperor of the French in the case of the Charles et Georges goes that full length. He does not deny the jurisdiction of Portugal over that portion of the African coast whence the cargo of pretended voluntary emigrants was obtained, nor over the harbor in which the vessel was seized. What he denies is, that these people, being embarked, no matter by what means, on board a vessel sailing under a special Imperial commission, Portugal had no longer any right to inquire whether the people on board, though professedly taken from Portuguese territory, were kidnapped or not; and that, even granting that they were kidnapped, Portugal had no other remedy except a representation to and a reclamation upon the French Government.

In putting his case upon this ground, the Emperor places in a new light the scheme for supplying the French colonies with African labor. That scheme no longer appears as a mere private speculation on the part of M. Regis and the French planters; it
would seem to have been a direct Government operation, the enterprise being undertaken not merely with the bare assent and permission of the French Emperor, but being in fact adopted as his own and carried on by vessels specially commissioned, so as to be clothed, in the view of the Emperor, with a national character sufficient to protect them against any direct responsibility to the authorities of any country into whose waters the pursuit of their traffic might carry them.

Having thus recognized this scheme as a Government operation, and made himself directly and personally responsible, not only for the general character of the scheme, but for all the details of its execution, the Emperor has certainly acted with judgment and good sense in appointing a commission to inquire personally on the coast of Africa into the real character of the business in which the French Government has thus engaged itself. The Portuguese Government, considered by itself alone, is not a formidable adversary. The Emperor has already, with the strong hand, wrested away from that feeble Power the vessel they had seized, upon a charge of kidnapping and slave-trading. But Portugal not only possesses the common privilege of the weak, that of protest and complaint, which in this case she has not hesitated to exercise—she has in England, not merely a sympathizing friend, but an ally bound by treaty to protect her, in case it can be made to appear that her rights have been invaded. Even allowing the doctrine of national maritime rights set up by the Emperor, and conceding as a matter of fact the national character with which he has undertaken to clothe the vessels engaged in the execution of the Regis contract, the Emperor feels, and rightly, that he never can stand justified in the eyes of the civilized world except by refuting the charge upon which the Portuguese Government based its proceedings, or else abandoning an enterprise, the true character of which has thus been detected and revealed. That a fair and impartial inquiry into the proceedings under the Regis contract will prove the whole speculation to have been, in the words of the Emperor addressed to his Colonial Minister, "nothing more than a disguised slave-trade," can hardly admit of a doubt. The very circumstance of the numerous mutinies soon after the embarkation of these pretended free emigrants, would seem to be, in itself alone, sufficient to establish that fact. Nor, taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, do we imagine that the appointment of this commission is merely for white-washing purposes. No doubt, the Commissioners will be apt to feel it a part of their duty to gloss
over or veil from view some of the more revolting features of the transaction, but we are strongly inclined to think that the main object of the commission is to afford the Emperor an opportunity to retreat from an undertaking which not only exposes him to great obloquy, but which, in a mere mercantile point of view, has proved, we suspect, a decided failure.\(^a\)

Written on November 1, 1858

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5495, December 1, 1858 as a leading article; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1411, December 3, 1858

---

\(^a\) Further comes an addition made by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*: "The suggestion at the close of the Emperor's letter that it might be well to fall back upon the resource of coolies from India is a little remarkable. This whole scheme of obtaining laborers from Africa originated in the rigid rules established and enforced by the English Government to prevent the exportation of coolies from India, except upon fair contracts, fully explained to and understood by the intended emigrants. The emigration of coolies from India to the British colonies, and to a certain extent also to the French island of Réunion, must not be confounded with the importation of Chinese coolies, principally in American and British vessels, to the Spanish colonies. The whole business in these cases is conducted in a totally different way. The Chinese cooly traffic is but little different from a pure slave-trade. The victims of it are entrapped on board under false pretenses, if not often kidnapped. On their arrival at their port of destination—those that do arrive—they are sold to the highest bidder under a contract for a term of years, which is little better than a mere mockery. In the case of the Indian coolies, the British Government takes care that the contract shall be fairly made and fully understood, and also, that it shall be fulfilled. It was this obstacle in the way of obtaining, on their own terms, as many coolies as they wished, that led the French to resort to their African experiment. The Emperor seems now inclined to be content to get coolies from India upon such terms as the English may prescribe."—*Ed.*
STATEMENT BY THE EDITORIAL BOARD
OF THE NEWSPAPER DAS VOLK

In order to put a stop to all the false rumours and wild combinations that have been circulated with reference to the editorship of our paper, we must state that there has been, and will be, no change in the editorial personnel. The circle of our collaborators has, however, widened, and we are pleased to inform our readers that Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Ferdinand Freiligrath, W. Wolff, H. Heise, and thus the most significant literary forces of our party, are determined to grant their support to Das Volk and, by their contributions, to enable the editorial staff to represent the interests of our party in a worthy and comprehensive manner.

First published in Das Volk, No. 6, June 11, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
“Our readers are clever people—sometimes, when their criticisms of the
Hermann reach our ears, one could almost believe that the *incalculable majority*
(the incalculable *majority* of 600 readers might come to 599). “of readers are much
cleverer than we ourselves” (*Hermann*).\(^a\)

Self-knowledge is good in all things, even when, as here, it
comes rather late. However—

You greybeards, muster all your forces,
Let there be more heat in your blood!
In your last, holiest of causes,
For digging trenches you're still good,
You must bring up the soil in baskets...\(^b\)
(Thusnelda consoles Hermann.)\(^{460}\)

“Wisconsin, the staunchest Republican state, has sent its clearest and soundest
speaker, Herr Karl Schurz, to Massachusetts to agitate with bold words.... In an
excellent and fiery speech he proved...”

what—is hard to say, unless, as is said later,

“that he does not consider himself a representative of that great nation of
thinkers that is called the German nation”\(^c\) (*Student Schurz as calculable minority
and autobiographer*).\(^{461}\)

\(^a\) From the leading article “Furor Teutonicus”, *Hermann*, No. 21, May 28,
1859.— *Ed*.

\(^b\) Here and below Kathinka Zitz’s poem “Das Vaterland ist in Gefahr!” is
quoted, ibid.— *Ed*.

\(^c\) Quoted from a report from New York of May 11, 1859, “Der europäische
Krieg. Karl Schurz in Boston”, ibid.— *Ed*.
You young men, sharpen up your sword-blades,
Be brave, as brave as Hermann was.

(Thursnelda.)

“We have seen a sample of this fireproof muslin and tested it with a candle. If it is drawn slowly through the flame, it does not burn at all; if it is held in the flame for a longer time, it chars, but the fire does not spread. But an English lady who had seen the larger piece at the exposition remarked that the stuff did not look as clear and fresh as untreated muslin” (Hermann—editorial note).a

And you, O women, let the calling
Be piety for each and all!

(Thursnelda.)

It did our cosmopolitan heart good to read that Arminius, mindful of that sublime moment in which he presented Mr. Kossuth with the revolution in the West in exchange for the one in the East,462 takes the

“17 million Slavs” of Austria under his protection and “therefore has not only given space for the correspondent in question directly after this leading article but has even invited him to speak in the Hermann as representative of his nationality”.

As “it must remain an open question for republicans on which side one will stand in the Italian war”,b half will declare for Prussia, half for Louis Napoleon, half for Italy, half for Little Germany, half for Great Germany, half for regency, half for the Imperial parliament, but all for Herr Bender, 8, Little Newport Street, Leicester Square, to whom “any one who has learned to read” (“Presse und Werkstatt”) need only apply to be initiated into the secrets of natural science without “laborious studies and lectures”.c

* * *

A Czech says in the last number of the Hermann:

“We were ... the first champions ... of the social idea.”d

---

a The Hermann’s editorial note to the article “Die Society of Arts, und die elfte Ausstellung neuer Erfindungen in ihrem Gebäude: John Street, Adelfi. Schluss”, ibid.—Ed.

b From the leading article “Furor Teutonicus”.—Ed.

c Quoted from the unsigned article “Deutsche Naturwissenschaft, für das praktische Verständniss und Leben”, published in the section “Presse und Werkstatt”, Hermann, No. 21, May 28, 1859.—Ed.

d From the unsigned article “Der Germanismus in Böhmen”, Hermann, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—Ed.
To this the spiritual gentleman\textsuperscript{463} who holds that "Salon" remarks:

"Was it not the Swiss before the Czechs?"\textsuperscript{a}

The only social idea that the Swiss have championed is summed up in the words: *Point d'argent, point de Suisses (*Kein Kreuzer, keine Schweizer).*\textsuperscript{b} The "New-Swiss" Vogt and the "New-Kreuzer" Kinkel\textsuperscript{464} know how to evaluate this "social idea" in its world-historical significance.

In the same "Salon" it is said:

"We find it understandable that English insurance companies are no longer willing to accept (!) German goods intended for overseas world markets."\textsuperscript{c}

Well, how many "world markets" does the "spiritual" gentleman know?

Sample of coherence in the *Wochenblatt aus London*, alias the *Hermann*:

"A pair of swallows is nesting on the laurel-covered grave of Humboldt. The dreadful region of juvenile crime, whose germs should be rooted out phrenologically and physiatically at the outset, has been recently illustrated again by a nine-year-old boy in Schmiedeberg."\textsuperscript{d}

**Hermann's judgment on Metternich.**—The judgment on Metternich's policy is formulated as follows:

"Where Metternich and his men have committed infamy and crime for almost an entire century, for a long time no child of peace can sleep sweetly by the brook, as Schiller says.\textsuperscript{e} Just let him" (viz., Schiller) "try, e.g., on the Mincio."\textsuperscript{f}

To change the Mincio into a "brook" is something that only the inventor of "overseas world markets" could succeed in doing.

**Hermann** explains in an article on

"the vacancy at the Savoy Church in London" that "he" (*Hermann*) "makes himself dearer to his countrymen in London and at home every day".\textsuperscript{g}

True enough. He gives less each week for 3d. This may be connected with the exact enumeration of the vacant "emolu-

\textsuperscript{a} The *Hermann*’s editorial note to the above-quoted article.—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{b} "No money, no Swiss"—allegedly said by the Swiss mercenaries who refused to serve the French King Francis I when his treasury was empty. The words were used by Jean Baptiste Racine in *Les Plaideurs*, Act I, Scene 1.—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{c} From the unsigned article "Unsere Politik. London, 17. Juni", *Hermann*, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{d} ibid.—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{e} Cf. Schiller, *Die Braut von Messina*.—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{f} From the article "Unsere Politik".—*Ed.*

\textsuperscript{g} From the unsigned article "Die Vacanz an der Savoy-Kirche in London", *Hermann*, No. 24, June 18, 1859.—*Ed.*
ments," an enumeration through which there shines the desire to transfer the "Salon" to the "Savoy Church".

** **

No. 26 of the Gottfried brings Hermann's letter of resignation. It runs as follows:

"To our readers:

"With the present number my activity as editor of this paper ends. The only reason for my withdrawal is the condition of my health, which does not permit me to continue, along with my previous profession of teacher, this other and so diversifying activity." (So the profession of teacher is one activity along with this other activity.) "Since I accordingly" (according to what?) "am no further responsible for the content of the paper" (he will rather not be responsible for its further contents), "I have also let the ownership pass into other hands. The enterprise, whose success is now" (viz., by Kinkel's removal) "assured, will be carried on in the same spirit as previously" (cheap prices and real service) "and while I previously hardly found time and space even to write for it" (viz., the enterprise), "I will henceforward" (later), "free from the burdens of outside work, submit all the more numerous contributions as correspondent." (If Gottfried appears "all the more numerously" as correspondent, the less "space" he found previously, what will become of the success of the enterprise, which now was to be "assured" by his disappearance as editor?) "I take leave of readers and co-workers with friendly thanks for their participation and support.

"Gottfried Kinkel"

The last Gottfried carries an editorial announcement as final sample of the "so diversifying activity" to which Hermann bids such a friendly farewell:

"We" (namely Gottfried) "feel a kind of malicious joy every time one of our correspondents once comes a regular cropper; for as a rule someone (!) will be found among our readers for whom the blunder is an occasion" (why not rather a shock?) "to make a penetrating and instructive communication about the thing" (penetrating about the thing) "aimed at" (rather, the thing hit, namely the blunder). "It is to such an oversight that we owe in this" (which?) "case as well the valuable correction from which every reader" (but certainly no correspondent!) "will soon see that its author, as they say on the Rhine, is a man who sticks to his guns." (Isn't that so, fair reader?) "Unfortunately the urgent political material, especially the wretched high politics of our correspondents, only today gave us the possibility of printing this article" (to wit, this editorial note).c

We see that, despite his deeply-felt thanks, Hermann does not part from the "correspondents" without bitterness. In his own

---

a Ibid.—Ed.
b It was dated London, June 30, 1859, Hermann, No. 26, July 2, 1859.—Ed.
c Editorial note to the article "Ueber die Verunreinigungen der Luft", Hermann, No. 26, July 2, 1859.—Ed.
salon the poor man hardly found the space “earlier” to place “this article” on “the cropper” and “the man who sticks to his guns”.

And here we say in respect of the “former” editor of the Gottfried: De mortuis nil nisi bene. But to the “later” correspondent, Hermann: We shall meet again at Philippi.

A diplomatic-strategic discovery.

The Hermann says:

“Prussia’s armed mediation, it is said, takes the Mincio line as its basis; well, after the battle of Solferino this line stands out in clearer relief. Only the shadows of the walls of Mantua and Peschiera still darken it. A siege must bring light into this darkness.”

The skilful columnist of the Hermann sends his articles, after they have been worn out in London, to Leipzig as well, to the Gartenlaube. To spice the report of the Humboldt festival arranged by the Association of German Men we are informed that

“a communist association, which now publishes a weekly paper, has made it its special task to vilify not only Kinkel’s journal but him personally, in the most offensive way, not stopping at the baldest lies, etc.”

On this we remark only that our journal, as the columnist must know from our repeated statements, is not a paper published by any kind of association and that the charges we have made against Herr Kinkel cannot be branded as lies until they have been refuted, and that has not happened yet and will never happen. By the way, we are indebted to the honourable reporter for the news that Kinkel’s sermon,

“the finest fragrance of the festivities”, took as its text, “As thou forgettest Zion, so shalt thou be forgotten” and that he began it “raising his hand to the black-red-gold flag”.

The Hermann makes a joke. In a Hermann article on Austria, we hear that the Habsburgs have always been stepfathers for their hereditary lands but stepmothers for the German Empire. The author of the article in question, full of excerpts from Pölitz’s Weltgeschichte for German maidens, has adequately demonstrated that an old or a young man can be an old woman, but that a

---

a Of the dead say nothing but good. See Diogenes Laertius, De vita philosophorum, I, 3, 70.— Ed.

b Cf. Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, Act IV, Scene 3.— Ed.


d Heinrich Beta.— Ed.

e Cf. Psalms 137:5.— Ed.
stepfather can be a stepmother is something we had not previously believed to be possible.

* * *

The rejuvenated Hermann under the editorship of E. J. Juch & Co. merits an exhaustive review. Let us begin at once with the first leader on “Prussia’s position.”

In the event that peace is concluded between France and Austria

“Prussia will remain for some time pretty much the same as it has been. At the same time it will gradually come into another position. Still more rapidly” (than gradually), “however, it must change its position, provided (!) the war continues; for it would then be (!) forced to act and, if it does not seek (!) a secure position for itself in good time, lose every solid foundation, in order to go under with the rest of the states of the German Confederation.” (Prussia might perhaps not be unwilling to lose “the solid foundation in order to go under”.)

The author now brings Prussia on in various more or less enticing poses plastiques. Firstly, Prussia could act as a European great power, and, indeed, in a double fashion.

“Prussia could, by behaving as an independent great power, act completely on its own” (independently?). “This” (action!) “would be a purely European standpoint, whose purpose” (the purpose of a standpoint) ... “would prove to be a question of power; for preservation of the equilibrium, which the treaties will subserve, is the balancing of the power available to the” (which?) “national interest. In that case Prussia could take as its starting point the violation of the 1815 treaties caused by the present war, treaties to which it was a contracting party” (a father instead of one of the fathers), “while it sought to indemnify itself by material guarantees for the services it hereby” (by the violation of the treaties?) “rendered to the monarchical order of Europe.” Besides this crafty proceeding “Prussia could also as a European great power place itself on purely political ground, by opposing, for reasons of self-preservation, the overstrengthening of its French rival” (non bis in idem; the balance of power has come up already). “It could plead on its own behalf that because England be (!!) still an open and Russia an already secret Ally of France, the enemy of Austria, etc.”

After Prussia has thus in so many ways proved itself as a European great power,

“it can thereafter take up an exclusively German standpoint. Here too it has a choice. That is, it can either take a place as a German great power above the other

a The English words “first leader” are used in the original.—Ed.
b “Die Stellung Preussens”, Hermann, No. 27, July 9, 1859. The quotations that follow are from this article.—Ed.
c Artificial poses.—Ed.
d Not the same thing twice.—Ed.
In other words, either Prussian Kaiser rule or continuance of the German Confederation.

The first "would mean taking its place seriously at the head of Germany, like a power that knows that necessity makes a law" (for ordinary people necessity knows no law, for Gothaists it makes a law, and a very unpretentious one at that), "wherefore it" (necessity), "since its existence is at stake" (the existence of necessity is at stake), "must depart from inhibiting forms, etc."

The reasons that "Prussia could adduce for such a revolutionary policy" involve our author in a true embarrass de richesses. Among other things:

"The foreign countries hostile to the unity of Germany—Russia and England, which with the complicated seesaw system of German counterbalancing hindered the power development of the German great powers by continual mutual weakening—worked rather for themselves than for Germany in the establishment of the Confederation, etc." (A strange plan of Russia and England, the foreign countries, to weaken each other in order to prevent the power development of Prussia) "Finally, it" (Prussia) "shows that it completely understands the essential nature of the present war, which, like the Thirty Years' War, has as its purpose the termination of the 1848 revolution." "For these reasons" (that is, because the Thirty Years' War had the purpose of terminating the revolution of 1848) "Prussia no longer recognises the Federal Diet ... and regards the sovereignty of all the other German princes for extinguished, etc." Finally, however, "the Prussian Government, if this revolutionary policy seemed too precarious to it" (i.e. Prussia), "could choose the conservative standpoint. It could choose it ... because the Prussian reigning dynasty as an equal" (to what?) "has to respect the maintenance of the others" (what others?), ... "because Prussia, while it is not independent, governs its conduct by those of neutral England, etc."

Up to now it has "wavered". It let "rival Austria" be defeated.

"It sought constantly to pull over the small states by means of treaties." (To put one over on them, pull the wool over their eyes, or to win them over?) "It came back to Frankfurt" (from Erfurt466) "with almost the identical proposals which, if they came from Hanover or Bavaria, Prussia would not have sanctioned."

In the end the author designates this as a "routine procedure", although it shows little routine in the consecutio temporum.a

Unfortunately, the treaty of Villafranca at one blow brushed away all the Prussian positions that Gotha fantasy could arrive at. Accordingly, we turn from the "high policy" of Messrs. Juch & Comp. to Tyrtaeus, who sings of the battle of Solferino in the

---

a Sequence of tenses.—Ed.
rejuvenated Hermann. This Tyrtaeus seems to be an easy-going fellow. He does not doubt for a moment that the Zouaves, Turcos, Croats, Raizen, Czechs et autres Zéphres, who fought at Solferino,

“were it not for the two emperors would have, everywhere in the world that chance might have brought them together, eaten and drunk, treated and greeted one another as harmless, amiable people”. (They would have eaten and drunk one another! What cannibalistic amiability!)

The metre in which the battle is sung is that of the heroic epic, hexameter. Kleist, as we know, enlarged the hexameter with a short anacrusis. Our singer outdoes Kleist; a couple of anacrustic or complementary syllables more or less make no difference to him. On the other hand, these are hexameters that come straight from battle, and should be pardoned if here and there a foot is lacking or a member dislocated.

And so, a few samples:

“So mortally sickened
By exhaustion, heat, and by thirst with its merciless torture.”

“Only at last this recent decade burdened with curses.”

“Out in blistering sunshine, all blood and thirst, some struck by
The coup de grace from a bayonet blade of a sudden descending,
In most cases only, however, by
Slashes and blows on wide-open wounds,
Tō a horrible death pain waking them.”

“Thē hōt ānd nāked sūmmits flowed with steaming red blōod, in
Which there wallowed mutilated men.”

“Ān ārm missing hēre, thēre ā lég, ār
Āll thē jāw frōm ā face, ār āll thē
Sīde ēf ē hēad.”

“Then it all went
Still ānd sōmb rē. Frōm hills ānd frōm dāles cāme shuddērings, criēs ānd
Moaning amain, now here, now there, everywhere hour-broad.”

“On the day of battle
Āll hōt ānd būrning, thēy hād nōt ā drōp ēf wātēr tō ēase thēm.”

“Others panted and
Gūrglēd ānd shōwēd thē whites ēf thēir glāzing eyēs
To the tardy surgeon.”

After the battle song, historical criticism. In an article from Paris the “thinker” of the rejuvenated Hermann reveals to us Louis Bonaparte’s relation to the revolution.

— Ed.

a And other.— Ed.
b Napoleon III and Francis Joseph I.— Ed.
c “Solferino”, Hermann, No. 27, July 9, 1859.— Ed.
"The revolution is justified as long as it is under the wing of the emperor and is permitted by him.... But it retains its original shape and must be crushed to the ground as soon as it counters the emperor's interests or interferes with his plans."\textsuperscript{a}

Here is wisdom:

I have now seen the ground wherein
My anchor shall hold fast forever.\textsuperscript{b}

Rushing down from the "wretched regions of high politics", of cannon thunder and historical criticism, we come upon a modest, isolated "Workshop", the quiet retreat in which our old friend Gottfried has settled as new correspondent. He grumbles to us:

"Up to now, because of all the war and politics, this paper could not find space, etc."\textsuperscript{c}

We know the old complaint. He offers, as an artistic cicerone, to take us through the "Exhibition of the Academy on Trafalgar Square". In the familiar "golden" flow of language of the

"almost heroic man who like the bee sucks drops of honey even from poisonous flowers" (see the Gartenlaube),

he whispers to us that

"Leslie's bright little pictures ... are true little pearls of fine art".

But what he is concerned with most of all are the Pre-Raphaelites,\textsuperscript{468} and since example is better than precept, he has set out some Pre-Raphaelite wordpaintings\textsuperscript{d} in his own "Workshop" which save us the walk to Trafalgar Square.

\textit{Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 1.}

"From 11 o'clock on and throughout the whole afternoon fashionable crinoline reigned in the hall, and the favourite pictures of the public were then continually lounged around."

\textit{Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 2.}

"Everything has value that is done perfectly \textit{in its kind}. A pair of trousers, e.g., if it is well made and \textit{doesn't pinch}."

\textsuperscript{a} "Walewski's Note. Vom Kriegsschauplatz. Paris, 6. Juli", Hermann, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Words from a Protestant hymn.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} Here and below the quotations are from Gottfried Kinkel's article "Die Ausstellung der Kunst-Akademie auf Trafalgar Square", published in the section "Presse und Werkstatt", Hermann, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{d} The English word is used in the original.—\textit{Ed.}
Pre-Raphaelite painting No. 3.

"In the convent cemetery two nuns are occupied in making a grave.... They are two robust figures of women, who take turns at the gloomy work of the twilight" (the two robust figures take turns while the twilight does the work for them): "One standing in the grave as she, with the muscular arms of a washerwoman, throws up the heavy, wet, black earth, grown through with tree roots, a quite prosaic, ordinary, indifferent person."

A person grown through with tree roots may be quite prosaic but is extraordinary in any case. Still the sans-gêne with which that same person uses the arms of a washerwoman instead of her own for the digging does suggest a certain indifference.

From these samples, however, the "craftsman" will realise what Gottfried gives him urgently to "think over", namely that the eunuch school of art

"would help him more in his business" (utile cum dulci) "than Sunday excursions to Epping Forest or the Botanical Gardens at Kew", more than "all the jolly taverns in the suburbs", more than "evening gatherings" and "threshing out the great problem of whether at the next revolution the thousand-year rule of the tailor journeymen will dawn under the title of the workers' dictatorship".

We, however, despite all the Pre-Raphaelites, stick to the old wise saw: Cacatum non est pictum. c

Written on June 3 and 24, July 8 and 15, 1859
First published in Das Volk, Nos. 5, 8, 10 and 11, June 4 and 25, July 9 and 16, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

a Unceremoniousness.— Ed.
b The useful with the pleasant (cf. Horace, Epistula ad Pisones, 343).— Ed.
c Shitted is not painted.— Ed.
We only published the poem by G. Herwegh in our last issue\(^a\) to show what can happen to the once-admired art of political-poetic declamation if it is brought low by Swiss republicanism. The relevant editorial comment was however omitted due to a mistake.

Written about July 29, 1859
First published in *Das Volk*, No. 13, July 30, 1859

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) Georg Herwegh’s poem written on the occasion of the Federal Marksmen’s Festival in Zurich, *Das Volk*, No. 12, July 23, 1859.—*Ed.*
London. The strike of the building workers, or, more correctly, the lockout by the builders, is continuing\(^471\) without any essential change in the positions of the two opposed sides. On Tuesday the workers’ delegates held a meeting, which was also attended by representatives from the other trades, at which it was decided unanimously not to take up work with any master who demanded a promise not to join the “society”\(^a\). At the same time the “associated” masters got together in the Freemasons’ Tavern, no reporters being allowed. It was learned later that the light-shunning gentlemen, after a stormy debate, agreed that no member of the association should open his establishment until the building workers had formally broken with the “society” and before “Mr. Trollope’s hands had put an end to their strike”\(^b\). The last point might well be settled shortly, since Mr. Trollope recently engaged in negotiations with the workers and gave most positive assurances that the complaints made against him (discharge of a worker who handed the nine-hour petition, etc.) were based on a misunderstanding. As for the other condition, however, the “locked-out” men will not consent to it by any means unless forced to by extreme distress; they feel that breaking with the “society”, renouncing any organisation, would mean making themselves downright serfs of the capitalists and abandoning the last bit of independence left to the modern proletarian. The brutal obstinacy of the masters, who are arrogating for themselves the

---

\(^a\) “Meeting of Trades’ Delegates”, The Times, No. 23387, August 17, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) “The Nine Hours Movement”, The Times, No. 23387, August 17, 1859.—\textit{Ed.}
same authority over their “hands” as the American planter over his slaves, has aroused the disapproval even of a section of the bourgeois newspaper writers. Naturally, we have no reason to be displeased with the masters; they are doing everything in their power to make the already deep rift between labour and capital even wider and to produce that concentrated, conscious class hatred that is the surest guarantee of a social revolution.

London has a total of over 1,000 building establishments. Of them only 88, but the largest, are locked out. The number of “locked-outs” comes to 19,000-20,000, not 40,000, as was asserted at first. Money contributions are pouring into the “society” plentifully from every part of the country, but up to now the unemployed workers have declined to draw relief. Honour to the brave! Would the bourgeoisie be capable of such sacrifice in its class interest?

In the last days of the session, which ended on Saturday, the Lower House was concerned almost exclusively with election scandals, which have sprung up like mushrooms out of the ground and covered every wall of the Houses of Parliament. There was a fearful stench of corruption, which harmonised excellently with the odours of the Thames and would have nauseated the honorable members if they had not been accustomed to such things. In some cases it was a question of individuals who had bought or sold herds of British voters openly (and that was the offence) like so many herds of sheep; in other cases it was some poor wight who voluntarily gave up his dearly-paid seat because he could not afford to defend it against a petition that would have cost at least £3,000,—but let us leave this. Why wallow in the filth? We will only add that almost all the members who were proved guilty of bribery belong to the “Liberal” Party.472

There is almost nothing to be said about the speech from the throne. It is a completely vapid document. On the projected European congress it states that Her Majesty has not yet arrived at any definite decision. That is a lie. Immediately after the signing of the Treaty of Villafranca Lord Palmerston declared to the Russian Government that he was prepared to send representatives to the congress Russia had proposed. That is, he had already “arrived at a definite decision” four weeks earlier.

Paris. We spare our readers an account of the victory celebration in Paris. Despite the complicated machinery set in motion to make

---

472 Queen’s speech in the House of Lords, August 13, 1859, The Times, No. 23385, August 15, 1859.—Ed.
people forget the defeat at Villafranca, to divide the attention of the population of Paris and to bring the throats of the interested parties to shouting, the Emperor personally is said to have been so little pleased with his reception that he took the desperate step of the amnesty, even though his Decembrist advisers urgently advised against it. The Paris press also received an amnesty; all "warnings" have been revoked.\(^a\)

From Berlin nothing but the old empty phrases and continuation of the woebegone agitation for reform of the Confederation under Prussian hegemony. The merging of the Gotha party with the democrats is now an accomplished fact, as will be seen from the following notices.—The condition of the King\(^b\) has not improved.

In Eisenach another meeting of "German patriots" was held on August 14, to proclaim, with the approval of the high authorities, that Gothaism is the only means of salvation.\(^c\) Among the assembled celebrities we find mentioned: Herr von Bennigsen from Hanover; Zabel from Berlin (seest thou how thou art?); Siegel, editor of the Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung; Titus from Bamberg; Schulze from Delitzsch, etc. Of course, the programme drawn up for the newly formed German Party contains: reform of the Confederation, Prussian hegemony, repeal of the Federal Diet's decrees against freedom of the press and assembly, etc. Finally, Frankfurt was chosen to be the venue of the next assembly, probably in order to be near St. Paul's Church.\(^d\)

On the other hand, it is reported from Hanover that the government there, in order to compete with its Prussia-loving patriots, against whom it is beginning to take police action, has raised the question of Schleswig-Holstein again.

Written about August 19, 1859
First published in Das Volk, No. 16, August 20, 1859
Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned for criminal and political offences, Le Moniteur universel, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16 and 17, 1859; Napoleon III's decree of August 16, 1859 revoking administrative warnings to the press, Le Moniteur universel, No. 230, August 18, 1859.—Ed.

\(^b\) Frederick William IV.—Ed.

\(^c\) "Eisenach (die Kundgebung für preußische Hegemonie)", Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 242, August 30, 1859.—Ed.
This volume covers the period from early August 1858 to early February 1860, when Marx's intensive contribution to the *New-York Daily Tribune*, the organ of the US Republican Party, ended.

Marx worked as a correspondent of the *Tribune* from August 1851 to March 1862, but a large number of the articles he sent were written at his request by Engels. Marx began to send his own articles to New York in August 1852. Initially, he wrote them in German and his friends, most frequently Engels, translated them into English. But by January 1853 he had sufficiently mastered the English language to write in English.

Marx's and Engels' articles in the *New-York Daily Tribune* mainly dealt with the most important questions of foreign and home policy, the working-class movement, the economic development of the major European countries, colonial expansion and the national liberation movement in the oppressed and dependent countries.

In the autumn of 1857, in view of the economic crisis in the USA, which had also affected the newspaper's finances, and the waning interest there in European affairs, Marx had to reduce the number of his articles. Subsequent events in Europe, however, compelled the *Tribune* editors to devote more space to his reports.

From mid-1855 onwards, most of Marx's articles were published as editorials, without his signature. For this reason their authorship and date of writing have been determined mainly by means of Marx's Notebook for 1858-60 and the letters of Marx and Engels to each other and to third persons. Additional information was obtained from study of the sources used by Marx and Engels for their reports, from the schedules of transatlantic ships by which Marx sent his reports during this period, and from other indirect data.

Marx's wife, Jenny, and sometimes Marx himself entered in the Notebook the dates on which the articles were written before dispatching them from London to New York. This was necessary above all for the accounts with the *Tribune*. Apart from the dates, these entries often contained remarks disclosing the content of the articles.

The article with which this volume opens is one of a series written in August and September 1858 and dealing with the 1857 financial crisis in Britain.

In his letter to Engels of September 21, 1858, Marx writes: "By way of
evaluating the Report of the Committee on the late crisis I sent the paper [the N.Y.D.T.] several articles, which it printed as leaders, specifically relating to banking, currency, etc..." (see present edition, Vol. 40).

The article is entered in Marx’s Notebook for 1858 as “6 Friday Bankact”.

2 The Bank Charter Act (An Act to Regulate the Issue of Bank-Notes, and for Giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England Certain Privileges for a Limited Period) was introduced by Robert Peel on July 19, 1844. It provided for the division of the Bank of England into two separate departments, each with its own cash account—the Banking Department, dealing exclusively with credit operations, and the Issue Department, issuing bank-notes. The Act limited the quantity of bank-notes in circulation and guaranteed them with definite gold and silver reserves which could not be used for the credit operations of the Banking Department. Further issues of bank-notes were allowed only in the event of a corresponding increase in the precious metal reserves. The issue of bank-notes by provincial banks was stopped. The Act was suspended several times by the government itself, in particular, during the monetary crises of 1847 and 1857.


3 Rich gold deposits were discovered in California in 1848 and Australia in 1851. Apart from their great importance for the commercial and industrial development of the European and American countries, these discoveries whipped up stock-exchange speculation there.

4 This article was preceded by Marx’s report which is entered in his Notebook for 1858 as “27 Friday. China. Peace treaty. Russia. ‘Times’”. It was heavily edited and published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5428, September 14, 1858 as a leading article. Owing to the Tribune editors’ interference, the report became purely informative and lost features typical of Marx’s articles, it has therefore not been included in this volume.

As for the article in question, it is entered in the Notebook for 1858 as “10 Tuesday Bankact”.

In his letter to Engels of September 21, 1858, Marx mentions a letter written by a Tribune reader in connection with this article and published in the newspaper on September 4 under the signature “A bullionist”. Marx writes: “Along comes a banker, a self-styled ‘bullionist’, and writes a letter to the Tribune in which he 1. says that never has so comprehensive a summary of the whole subject been penned, etc., but 2. raises all kinds of objections and invites the editors to reply. So reply the poor devils must and indeed very sad work they made of it” (see present edition, Vol. 40).

Here is what the banker wrote about the article: “A more comprehensive summary of banking, credit currency, prices and fluctuations, was probably never penned.” The author makes “a few suggestions on the general subject and on the use of terms which are not generally understood”. He goes on to say that “with the increase of currency, prices rise; with its decrease, they fall”, therefore it is the duty of the banks to regulate the amount of currency in the country. He concludes: “I entertain the ‘vulgar notion’ that over-issues of bank-notes set in motion an over-issue of bank credits, inflate prices, ruin our
home industry, produce disastrous fluctuations, prostrate the business and industrial occupations of the great masses of the people, and tend to divide our population into two great divisions—a very few men of princely wealth on the one hand, and a nation of poverty-stricken laborers or dependents on the other.”

The Tribune's reply in the same issue of the newspaper deals with particular questions concerning money circulation: the dependence of export and prices on the currency, the relation of import and export in countries with paper and metallic currency.

The heading is given according to Marx's Notebook for 1858, where the following entry is made: “31 Tuesday. History of the Opium Trade.” p. 8

This refers to the unequal treaties signed in Tientsin in June 1858 by Britain and France with China during the second Opium war (1856-60). The treaties made new ports available to foreign commerce: on the River Yangtze, in Manchuria and on the islands of Taiwan and Hainan, also the port of Tientsin. Foreign diplomatic representatives were authorised in Peking; foreigners were allowed to travel freely in the country for commercial or other purposes. Britain and France received economic privileges through the introduction of new commercial rules legalising the opium trade, and were paid indemnities. The Peking treaties of 1860 which ended the second Opium war increased the indemnities to be paid out by China. The British received the right to recruit Chinese for work in colonies and other places. Britain obtained the southern part of the Tsulung (Koulung) peninsula. The Peking treaties confirmed the remaining, unchanged, articles of the Tientsin treaties, which were ratified simultaneously with the signing of the Peking treaties. Though the USA did not officially take part in the war, it rendered aid, above all diplomatic, to Britain and France. This gave the USA the possibility to sign with China the Tientsin Treaty of June 1858 which guaranteed it a number of commercial privileges, the most-favoured-nation treatment and freedom of activity for US missionaries.

The British East India Company was founded at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It had the monopoly of trade with the East Indies and played a decisive part in establishing the British colonial empire.

The East India Company's trade monopoly was abolished in 1813. The only exception was trade with China, the main articles of which were opium and tea. The Company was finally liquidated in 1858, during the popular Indian uprising of 1857-59. Marx gave a detailed description of the Company in his article “The East India Company—Its History and Results” (see present edition, Vol. 12).

The heading is given in accordance with the following entry in Marx's Notebook for 1858: “3 Friday. History of the Opium Trade.”

In the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune and the New-York Weekly Tribune the article was published under the heading “The British Opium Monopoly”.

Hong—a privileged merchants' guild, founded in China in 1721, whose members, for payment of a large entrance fee to the treasury, obtained a monopoly of trade with foreigners. It was dissolved after the conclusion of the Nanking Treaty in 1842.

This article is entered in the Notebook for 1858 as “7 Tuesday. Bangya”.

Notes
11 The reference is to the manifesto published in *The Star* on June 28, 1858 and signed by Majors Kalmár and Tüköry, and Veress, in which the Hungarian emigration at first doubted Bangya's guilt and then virtually dissociated themselves from him, considering this affair as Bangya's personal business, and called for unity and brotherhood between the Hungarians and Poles.

The manifesto was reprinted in *The Free Press* on June 30, 1858, and Marx presumably used this publication for his article. p. 23

12 This article was published as an editorial, without any title. It is entered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "10 Friday. China". p. 28

13 The *Continental System*, or the *Continental blockade*, proclaimed by Napoleon I in 1806, after Prussia's defeat, prohibited trade between the countries of the European Continent and Great Britain. Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812 put an end to the Continental System. p. 30

14 In 1850 popular unrest spread over a number of southern provinces in China and developed into a powerful peasant war. The insurgents established a state of their own over a considerable part of Chinese territory. It was called the Celestial Empire (Taiping Tankaoh, hence the name of the movement—the Taiping uprising). The leaders of the uprising put forward a utopian programme calling for the existing social order to be transformed into a militarised patriarchal system based on the egalitarian principle. The movement, which was also anti-colonial in character, was weakened by internal strife and the formation of its own aristocracy in the Taiping state. It was dealt a crushing blow by the armed intervention of Britain and France. The Taiping uprising was put down in 1864. p. 31

15 The reference is to the second Opium war of Britain and France against China in 1856-60. p. 31

16 In Carthage money capital was obtained by means of customs taxes imposed on the provinces dependent on Carthage.

In Ancient Rome money capital was provided by contributions and the spoils of war. p. 32

17 The reference is to the Polish emigrants who settled in Turkey after the 1848-49 events. During the Crimean war some of them decided to fight on the side of the Turks. p. 38

18 The ruling classes of Moldavia and Wallachia sought to create a single Rumanian state through diplomacy, thinking this the most convenient and the safest way. p. 38

19 During the Crimean war of 1853-56, Greece became the scene of a movement for the reunification with Greece of Thessaly, Epirus and other Greek lands ruled by Turkey. The peasants' uprisings in these regions were supported by the Greek army which occupied Thessaly and Epirus in 1854. Turkey responded with military operations. It was supported by Britain and France which occupied part of Greek territory. p. 38

20 The reference is to the *Vienna treaties*—the treaties and agreements concluded at the Congress of Vienna held by the European monarchs and their ministers in 1814-15. They established the borders and status of the European states after the victory over Napoleonic France and sanctioned, contrary to the national interests and will of the peoples, the reshaping of Europe's political
map and the restoration of the “legitimate” dynasties overthrown as a result of
the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The Vienna treaties confirmed
France’s territory within the borders of 1790 and the restoration of the
Bourbons in France.

21 In the battle of Marathon (Attica) in 490 B.C., during the Greco-Persian wars,
the Greeks defeated the Persians. Using a more progressive army formation the
Greek general Miltiades secured a victory over the far more numerous but less
organised Persian army.

22 In this article Marx analyses a pamphlet by the French petty-bourgeois
democrat Félix Pyat, *Lettre aux mandarins de la France*. Marx always took a
negative attitude to Pyat, who in England in the 1850s and 1860s called for the
assassination of Napoleon III and for “regicide” in general, thus giving the
English police a pretext to deport revolutionary refugees, and the French police
a pretext for persecuting participants in the working-class and democratic
movement in France. Pyat always opposed an independent movement by the
workers and was later an enemy of the First International. But this pamphlet
attracted Marx’s attention because it contained “one or two facts that are
interesting” (see Marx’s letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, present edition, Vol.
40), viz., signs of the growing self-consciousness of the proletariat and its acting as
a class. Besides, Marx quotes passages which testify to the crisis of the Bonapartist
empire and show that the French bourgeoisie has exhausted its revolutionary
potentials.

The dispatch of the article to New York is registered in Marx’s Notebook
for 1858 as “24 Friday. Pyat’s *Lettre aux mandarins*”.

The editors of the present edition do not have Pyat’s pamphlet at their
disposal.

23 *Ixion* (Greek Myth.), King of the Lapithae, tried to seduce the Goddess Hera
but was deceived by Zeus who substituted for her a cloud in her own image.
Here Pyat alludes to Guizot’s ideal of a representative monarchy and, in
particular, to his *Cours d’Histoire moderne. Histoire des origines du gouvernement
représentatif en Europe*.

24 Fusionism—a policy which favoured the union of the Legitimists, supporters of
the elder branch of the Bourbons, with the Orleanists, supporters of the
younger branch.

25 The *Fronde*, a movement in France against the absolutist regime from 1648 to
1653, involved various social sections, which in many cases pursued opposite
aims, from radical peasant and plebeian elements and oppositional bourgeoisie,
to high-ranking officials and aristocrats. The defeat of the Fronde led to the
strengthening of absolutism.

Marx alludes to Victor Cousin’s *Madame de Longueville, Madame de Sablé,
Madame de Chevreuse et madame de Hautefort*, and other works written in the
1850s under the general subtitle “Etudes sur les femmes illustres et la société du
XVIIe siècle”.

26 Thiers was Prime Minister when Napoleon I’s remains were transferred from
St. Helena to Paris in 1840 and buried in the Dôme des Invalides.

Pyat also has in mind Thiers’ twenty-volume *Histoire du Consulat et de
l’Empire*.

27 *Cent-gardes*—the Emperor’s special privileged guard formed in France by a
decree of March 24, 1854.
28 The reference is to the *Charte octroyée* granted in 1814 by Louis XVIII. It was the Bourbons' fundamental law which introduced a regime of moderate constitutional monarchy with wide powers for the king and high electoral qualifications ensuring above all political privileges for the landed aristocracy.

p. 42

29 An allusion to the fact that Catholic and Bonapartist circles were displeased with Louis Veuillot, editor of the Catholic newspaper *L'Univers religieux*, in which he conducted a scandalous polemic against all those who professed other beliefs, and appealed to the Pope against them.

p. 42

30 An allusion to the closing of Lamennais' newspaper *Le peuple constituant*. His words "silence au pauvre" ("silence for the poor") appeared in its last issue, on July 10, 1848.

p. 42

31 In his will Lamennais asked to be buried in a cemetery for the poor without any church rites.

p. 42

32 The reference is to the discussion and adoption in Belgium and Piedmont on February 18, 1858 of laws punishing instigation to attempts on people's life and participation in them. They were adopted to please Napoleon III after an attempt on his life on January 14, 1858 by the Italian revolutionary Orsini.

p. 43

33 *Belle Isle*—an island in the Bay of Biscay, where political prisoners were detained in 1849-57; among others, workers who took part in the Paris uprising in June 1848 were imprisoned there.

p. 43

34 *Cayenne*—the reference is to French Guiana where political prisoners were sent for penal servitude.

p. 43

35 In Jiddah (a Red Sea port) a fierce clash took place between Moslems and Christians in 1858.

p. 43

36 An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's words spoken in Bordeaux on October 9, 1852, shortly before the plebiscite and the proclamation of the Second Empire. In an effort to win the people's sympathy he declared demagogically: "L'Empire c'est la paix" ("The Empire is peace").

p. 43

37 *Levites*—Hebrew priests in the service of the temple of Jerusalem for whose benefit tithes were collected.

p. 43

38 This refers to the trial of a group of republicans who made two attempts on the life of Napoleon III in the summer of 1853 (on June 7 on the way to the Hippodrome and on July 6 at the Comic Opera).

p. 44

39 The secret republican society *Marianne* established in 1850 made numerous attempts to organise opposition to the Bonapartist regime. On the night of August 26, 1855, the Angers quarry workers, on receipt of the false news of the victory of the republic in Paris, marched to the city but were dispersed by government troops.

In 1858, following Orsini's abortive attempt on Napoleon III's life on January 14, attempts at republican coups were made in a number of French towns, in particular, in Châlons-sur-Saône on March 6 (on the Châlons-sur-Saône events see present edition, Vol. 15).

p. 44

40 In connection with this article Marx wrote to Engels on December 17, 1858 that for months the *Tribune* had been publishing his articles about China as leaders.
He went on to say: "But when the official text of the Anglo-Chinese treaty was finally released, I wrote an article in which I said among other things that the Chinese would now legalise the import of opium, likewise impose an import duty on opium and, lastly, probably also permit the cultivation of opium actually inside China, and thus the 'second Opium war' would sooner or later deal a deadly blow to the English opium trade, and notably to the Indian Exchequer. . . . Mr. Dana printed this article as being from an 'occasional correspondent' in London, and himself wrote a bombastic leader refuting his 'occasional correspondent'" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

This leader, published in the same issue in which Marx's article was printed, reads in part: "We do not, however, consider as very probable, at least not at an early day, the consequence which our correspondent anticipates of the opening of the ports of China to the legal importation of opium and still less the legalizing of its cultivation in China."

In the above-mentioned letter Marx goes on to say that he wrote another article to the Tribune "qua 'occasional correspondent', "somewhat mocking, though of course restrained, about my 'castigator'".

This article was not published by the New-York Daily Tribune. p. 46

41 The Treaty of Nanking, concluded between Britain and China in 1842, was the first of a series of unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers on China, which reduced it to the status of a semi-colony. The Nanking Treaty made China open five of its ports to British commerce—Canton, Shanghai, Amoy, Ningpo and Fu-chou, cede the Island of Hongkong to Britain "in perpetuity" and pay a large indemnity. It introduced import and export tariffs advantageous to Britain. The latter did not succeed in legalising the import of opium, though the Nanking Treaty did not oblige the British Government to prohibit British subjects to trade in opium.

The supplementary protocol of 1843 concerning the general rules for trading in the five open ports contained articles (2, 7, 13) envisaging cooperation between the British and Chinese authorities in inspecting the goods brought to the ports and in organising their work.

Similar treaties with China were also signed by the USA and France. On the Tientsin Anglo-Chinese Treaty see Note 6. p. 46

42 This refers to the incident which sparked off the second Opium war: the seizure by the Chinese authorities of the British lorch Arrow with contraband opium in Canton in 1856. The British Ministry responded by sending to China a corps of 5,000 men under the command of Lord Elgin. Canton was brutally bombarded and on December 29, 1857 captured by the British. p. 46

43 See silver—ingots of silver of definite weight used in China at that time as coins called taels (liangs). In international trade 750 taels were equal to 1,000 dollars. p. 47

44 The reference is to the Aigun and Tientsin treaties concluded between China and Russia.

The establishment of the first ties between Russia and China dates back to the thirteenth century and that of official contacts to the early seventeenth century, when the Russians began the economic development of the Amur (Amoor) Region. In the 1680s an Albazin Voivodeship was set up embracing the Amur Valley, from the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun.

The Manchu dynasty which established itself in Peking in the mid-seventeenth century and subjugated the Chinese people sought to take
possession of the Amur Region developed by the Russians. The policy of expansion pursued by the Ching Government resulted in a military conflict with Russia in the 1680s. The necessity to settle the armed clashes of Russian Cossacks and peasants in the Amur Region with Manchu armed detachments which attacked them and tried to drive away the local population led to the dispatch, in 1686, of a mission under F. A. Golovin to Nurchinsk to negotiate with the Ching Government. The Ching troops, who had actually occupied the Albazin Voivodeship and were near Nurchinsk during the talks, totalled 15,000 men, while Golovin's guard numbered 2,000. Under the Nurchinsk Treaty signed on August 29, 1689, Russia was forced to give up the large territory of the Albazin Voivodeship. No border-line in the proper sense of the word was established for lack of precise geographical reference points and because the Russian, Latin and Manchu copies of the treaty were not identical.

Under the Aigun Treaty of May 28 (16), 1858, the left bank of the Amur, from the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun to the sea, was recognised as Russian territory, while the question of the Ussuri Area, from the confluence of the Ussuri and the Amur to the sea, was left open until the final fixing of the frontier between Russia and China. Navigation on the Amur, Sungari and Ussuri was prohibited to all states except Russia and Ching China. The treaty thus returned to Russia the left bank of the Amur developed by the Russians in the seventeenth century and taken from it under the Nurchinsk Treaty of 1689. Besides, it thwarted the British diplomats' attempt to aggravate Russo-Chinese relations and closed the Amur to West-European shipping.

The Tientsin Treaty of June 1 (13), 1858 confirmed the articles of the Aigun Treaty. Russia's frontier on its eastern part was finally defined by the supplementary Peking Treaty, signed on November 2 (14), 1860, under which the land on the eastern banks of the Ussuri and Sungach was recognised as Russian territory and the land on the western banks as that of Ching China.

See also Note 6.

45 This article is entered in Marx's Notebook for 1858 as "October 1. Friday. Russian serfs".

46 The Chief Peasant Question Committee is the name given in January 1858 to the Secret Committee "for discussing measures to arrange the life of the landowners' peasants" which began its sittings on January 3, 1857 with Alexander II as chairman. The aim of the Chief Committee was to consider "the decisions and proposals concerning serfdom". The Grand Duke Constantine was among its members.

In November 1857 a rescript was issued inviting each gubernia to form landowners' committees for the purpose of drafting the conditions for the abolition of serfdom. Such committees were set up in all gubernias in the course of 1858. Their composition varied, the majority consisting of big serfowners and the minority, of liberal landowners.

47 By an 1807 edict the Prussian Government granted personal freedom to the peasants, abolishing their hereditary subjection (Erbuntertänigkeit) to the landowners. However, all feudal obligations of the peasants connected with the use of landowners' lands remained in force. The conditions for the redemption of these obligations were defined by a number of successive edicts. In 1808 the landowners succeeded in acquiring the right to appropriate peasant plots. The "regulating" edict of 1811 contained extremely harsh conditions for redemption. It concerned only those peasants who had hereditary or lifelong rights to
their plots of land. The masses of leaseholders continued to be in bondage. It was not until 1850 that defeudalisation was completed. p. 52

48 The reference is to Alexander I's edict “On the Freeing of His Peasants by the Landowner on Conditions Based on Mutual Consent” adopted on February 20, 1803, and to Nicholas I's edicts of 1842, 1844, 1846 and 1847. p. 52

49 This article is marked “Berlin” but was written by Marx in London. By agreement with the *Tribune* editors, Marx marked some of his articles on the different European countries “Paris”, “Berlin” or “Vienna” respectively, sometimes indicating an earlier date than that of their actual writing. p. 54

50 On March 18, 1848, during the dispersal of a demonstration before the king’s palace in Berlin, two shots were fired. This provocation on the part of the Prussian military command served as a signal for armed barricade fighting which ended in the defeat of the royal troops. As a result of the street fighting several hundred Berliners were killed and many wounded. The insurgents took over the guard of the palace, and on the morning of March 19 they forced the king to go out on to the balcony and bare his head before the corpses of the fallen fighters. p. 55

51 According to Greek mythology, Dionysus, a god of wine, in order to avenge himself on Pentheus, King of Thebes, for not acknowledging him as god, led all the Theban women away to the Cithaeron mountains where they indulged in orgiastic and bacchanalian rites, and in their frenzy killed Pentheus. p. 55

52 In 1843 Frederick William IV, who wanted to revive the romantic aspect of feudalism, issued a decree on the rebirth of the Order of the Swan, a medieval religious order of Knights (founded in 1440 and dissolved during the Reformation). The King's intention did not materialise, however. p. 57

53 The heading is given according to the following entry in Marx's Notebook for 1858: “8 Friday. Russian Progress in Central Asia.” As we see from Marx's letter to Engels of October 8, 1858, Marx also published this article in *The Free Press* on November 24 but changed its beginning and end. It appeared in *The Free Press* under the heading: “Russian State Papers Respecting Her Recent Advance to Our Indian Frontiers.” p. 59

54 This refers to General Perovsky's abortive expedition organised in 1839 to conquer Khiva, and to the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42. When speaking of the British reverses, Engels seems to have in mind the difficulties experienced by the British army during the seizure of and withdrawal from Kabul in 1839-42. p. 59

55 The Khanate of Khiva acknowledged its dependence on Russia only as a result of the treaty signed by Russia and Khiva on August 12, 1873. Between 1853 and 1857 Perovsky erected a number of fortifications on the Syr-Darya River. p. 59

56 On its arrival in Bukhara, after the negotiations in Khiva, the Russian mission on October 11, 1858 reached an agreement with the Emir of Bukhara on freedom of navigation for Russian ships on the Amu-Darya, on the reduced duties on Russian goods and on authorisation of a temporary commercial agent in Bukhara. Under the 1868 treaty concluded after the capture of Samarkand by the Russians and the defeat of the Emir's army, and supplemented by the 1873 treaty, Bukhara acknowledged Russia's protectorate.
The Koko and Khanate was finally annexed to Russia in February 1876.

During the March 1848 revolution in Germany the Prince of Prussia fled to England. As commander-in-chief of the Prussian forces he took part in suppressing the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849.

The Seehandlung is short for the Preussische Seehandlungsgesellschaft (Prussian Maritime Trading Company). It was founded as a commercial and banking company in 1772 and granted a number of important privileges by the state. It advanced big loans to the government and in fact became its banker and broker.

Chambre introuvable—the name of the French Chamber of Deputies in 1815-16 given to it by Louis XVIII. Its extreme conservatism, expressed in the ultra-reactionary actions of its majority, forced the King to disband the chamber.

During the so-called Warsaw Conference in October 1850, the Russian Tsar Nicholas I spoke in a sharp and threatening tone to Prussia's Prime Minister, the Count of Brandenburg. Upon his return from Warsaw the Count suddenly died, which was attributed to Nicholas' insulting behaviour and to the Count's emotions caused by Prussia's national humiliation.

The laws of Manu—an ancient Indian collection of instructions defining the duties of each Hindu in accordance with the dogmas of Brahminism. According to Indian tradition, these laws were drafted by Manu, the mythical father of people, approximately between the second century B.C. and the first century A.D.

This refers to the Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen (Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen) adopted by the French Constituent Assembly on August 26, 1789, during the French Revolution. It proclaimed the main principles of the revolution: sovereignty of the people and the natural rights of man—the right to freedom, property, security and resistance to oppression.

Patrimonial jurisdiction deals with the transfer of patrimony (from patrimonium, a term of the Roman law), property inherited from one's father. This right belonged to the feudal lord who performed judicial functions in his estate.

Roman tradition associates the name of Servius Tullius with the reforms which led to the establishment of the state system in Rome. The most important of these was the centurial reform which put an end to the gentile constitution and completed the transition to the slave-owning system. According to this reform, gentile tribes were replaced by territorial, and the plebs became part of the Roman people (populus Romanus). The entire population of Rome was divided into five classes according to property qualifications. Each class provided a definite number of centuries (centurie), or army companies of a hundred men each, which were also political divisions. Of great importance were the assemblies of centurie, where each class received a number of votes corresponding to the number of centurie it placed in the field. This system made it possible for the more propertied classes to influence the settlement of major political questions.
65 In the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune this article is published under the heading “Russia in China”.

66 The Heracleatic peninsula—part of the Crimean peninsula west of Inkerman up to Balaklava—was one of the major theatres of military operations during the siege of Sevastopol. When Marx says that Russia was deprived of “a small slice of territory”, he refers to that part of Bessarabia which Russia had to cede under the Paris Treaty of 1856.

67 This is what Nicholas I called Turkey in his talk with the British envoy G. Seymour in St. Petersburg on January 9, 1853. He suggested that Turkey should be divided between Russia and Britain, but Britain rejected the proposal for it did not want to see Russia become stronger and was interested in preserving the weak Ottoman Empire. Marx deals with this question in his article “The Documents on the Partition of Turkey” (see present edition, Vol. 13). See Correspondence Respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, Part I, “Eastern Papers. Seymour to Russell, January 11, 1853”, London, 1854, pp. 875-78.

68 See Note 41.

69 This article, published in the New-York Daily Tribune as a leader, bears signs of the editors' interference; in particular, they heavily edited the first paragraph and added the last one. The enthusiastic epithets used to describe Bright also belong to them. The heading is given according to the beginning of the article.

In the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune it appeared under the heading “Radicalism in England”.

70 On June 11, 1858 Marx wrote in his article “Political Parties in England.—The Situation in Europe”: “The fact is that the two ruling oligarchic parties of England were long ago transformed into mere factions, without any distinctive principles. Having in vain tried first a coalition and then a dictatorship they are now arrived at the point where each of them can only think of obtaining a respite of life by betraying their common interest into the hands of their common foe, the radical middle-class party, who are powerfully represented in the Commons by John Bright” (present edition, Vol. 15).

71 The reference is to the war waged by Britain and France against China in 1856-60 (the second Opium war). In his article “The British Quarrel with China” (present edition, Vol. 15) Marx described in detail the events which served as the casus belli.

On the defeat of the Manchester school in the elections to the House of Commons in March 1857 see Marx's article “The Defeat of Cobden, Bright and Gibson” (present edition, Vol. 15).

72 On January 20, 1858 Count Walewski, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, sent a Note to the British Government expressing dissatisfaction with Britain's granting of the right of asylum to political refugees. In view of this, on February 8 Palmerston introduced the Conspiracy to Murder Bill in the House of Commons. During the second reading of the Bill on February 19, Milner Gibson proposed an amendment censuring Palmerston's Government for not replying to the Note. Adopted by the majority, the amendment was actually a vote of no-confidence in the government and forced it to resign.

73 This sentence was inserted by the Tribune editors.
Marx gave an assessment of Bright's programme in his letter to Engels of November 29, 1858: "As regards the reform movement in England, all I have discussed latterly is Bright's meeting in Birmingham, the gist of the article being that his programme is a reduction of the People's Charter to the middle-class standard" (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 88

Marx refers to Point 4 of the People's Charter, which was the Chartists' political programme. It reads: "Voting by ballot to prevent bribery and intimidation by the bourgeoisie" (see present edition, Vol. 4, p. 518). p. 88

The reference is to the Reform Bill which was finally passed by the British Parliament in June 1832. The Reform Act of 1832 consisted of three acts adopted accordingly for England and Wales on June 7, for Scotland on July 17, and for Ireland on August 17, 1832. It was directed against the political monopoly of the landed and finance aristocracy and enabled the industrial bourgeoisie to be duly represented in Parliament. The proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, the main forces in the struggle for the reform, remained disfranchised. p. 88

The Birmingham Political Union for the Protection of Public Rights, founded by Thomas Attwood in 1830, played an important role in the struggle for the 1832 reform. p. 89

Roundheads—the nickname given by the Royalists to the Parliamentarians during the seventeenth-century English revolution. p. 89

In the New-York Daily Tribune this is followed by a paragraph inserted by its editors: "For our part, regarding the question as one of political justice and popular progress, and as tending, in its solution, to a more democratic government of England, we hail Mr. Bright's movement with joyful hope, and bid him God-speed in his manly and noble efforts." p. 90

The party referred to is the Party of Order which united the rival monarchist groups—the Legitimists, Orleanists and Bonapartists—and supported Louis Napoleon. The Legitimists and Orleanists, exponents of the interests of the elder and the younger branch of the Bourbons, hoped with Louis Napoleon's aid to pave the way for the restoration of the monarchy. Their hopes, however, proved fruitless: the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851 put an end to the activities of the Party of Order.

For details on this see Marx's work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 99-197). p. 91

This refers to the republican uprisings which broke out at the end of 1851 in Southeast, Southwest and Central France in response to the Bonapartist coup d'état. Their main participants were artisans and workers of small towns, local peasants, traders and intelligentsia. The uprisings involved some twenty departments, but being local and isolated they were soon put down by the police and troops.

By a decree of January 9, 1852, sixty-six republican deputies of the Legislative Assembly, including Victor Hugo, were banished from France. p. 94

The office of Lord President of the Council (later the Privy Council), introduced in England in the seventeenth century, remained in the British Cabinet as an honorary office, the holder of which had no direct influence on government affairs. p. 96
This refers to Louis Napoleon's plans in the latter half of 1852 to marry a representative of a European ruling dynasty. One supposed candidate was a daughter of Karl Anton von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. These plans did not materialise.

Under the treaty of December 7, 1849, the Principality of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was annexed to Prussia. This was called forth by the 1848 revolutionary events in the principality, as a result of which Prussian forces were brought in.

_Hudibras_- the title character of a satirical poem by the English poet Samuel Butler written in 1663-78. Hudibras was distinguished by his inclination to absurd reasoning and disputes and his ability to prove the most absurd propositions by means of syllogisms. The poem was directed against the hypocrisy and bigotry of the English bourgeoisie.

The _Crédit Mobilier_ is short for the _Société générale du Crédit Mobilier_- a French joint-stock bank founded in 1852 by the Péreire brothers. The bank was closely connected with the Government of Napoleon III and, protected by it, engaged in speculation. It went bankrupt in 1867 and was liquidated in 1871.

On June 26, 1849 the liberal deputies of the Frankfurt National Assembly, who had walked out after the Prussian King's refusal to accept the Imperial Crown, met in Gotha for a three-day conference which resulted in the formation of the so-called _Gotha party_. This party expressed the interests of the pro-Prussian German bourgeoisie and supported the policy of the Prussian ruling circles aimed at uniting Germany under the hegemony of Hohenzollern Prussia (see present edition, Vol. 11, p. 22).

This refers to the war waged by Prussia against Denmark in 1848-50. Being defeated, Prussia was forced to conclude a treaty with Denmark (1850) under which Schleswig and Holstein remained within the Kingdom of Denmark.

The _Financial Reform Association_ was founded in April 1848 in Liverpool. It advocated economical government, just taxation and perfect freedom of trade.

_Demagogues_ in Germany were participants in the opposition movement of intellectuals. The name became current after the Karlsbad Conference of Ministers of the German states in August 1819, which adopted a special decision against the intrigues of "demagogues".

The centralisation of the Austrian monarchy, undermined by the 1848-49 revolution, was restored by patent of the Emperor of Austria on December 31, 1851.

In the _New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune_ this article was published under the heading "Napoleon's Last Scheme".

See Note 86.

_Treubund_ (the Union of the Loyal)—a Prussian monarchist society founded in Berlin at the end of 1848. Late in 1849 it split into ultra-royalists and constitutional monarchists.

The _Orangemen_- members of the Orange Society (Order), a militant Protestant organisation founded in Ireland in 1795 and used by the authorities,
Protestant landlords and the clergy against the Irish national liberation movement. The name was derived from William III, Prince of Orange, who suppressed the Irish uprising of 1688-91. The Order had an especially strong influence in Ulster, Northern Ireland, where the population was mainly Protestant.

The reference is to Touchard-Lafosse's eight-volume *Chroniques de l'oeil-de-boeuf* published in Paris in 1829-33. The oeil-de-boeuf was a large ante-room to the bedroom of the French king in the palace of Versailles, lighted only by a small round window (oeil-de-boeuf). Here the courtiers waited for the king and could engage in all sorts of intrigue.

The heading is given according to the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*.

The insurrection at Milan on February 6, 1853 was raised by the followers of the Italian revolutionary Mazzini and supported by the Hungarian revolutionary elements in the Austrian army. Marx analysed it in a number of articles (see present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 508-09, 513-16 and 535-37).

The landing at Sapri (province of Salerno) of a small detachment for the purpose of raising a revolt in the south of Italy took place late in June 1857. The republican uprising in Châlon-sur-Saône took place on the night of March 5, 1858.

This attempt on the life of Napoleon III was made by the Italian revolutionary Orsini on January 14, 1858.

The reference is to the party of radical Free Traders.

The Italian actress Adelaide Ristori played the title-role in Giacometti's drama *Judith*. At the end of the play she sang a hymn containing the words:

```italian
"Sappian essi che sacra è la guerra
Se straniero minaccia la terra"
("Let them know that sacred is the war
if the foreigner threatens the country").
```

The *Kreuz-Zeitung's* party (*Kreuzzeitungspartei*)—a name given from 1851 to the end of the nineteenth century to the extreme Right wing of the Prussian conservative party grouped round the *Neue Preussische (Kreuz-) Zeitung*.

The reference is to the "German Catholics"—members of a religious movement which arose in a number of German states in 1844 and involved considerable sections of the middle and petty bourgeoisie. The "German Catholics" did not recognise the supremacy of the Pope, rejected many dogmas and rites of the Roman Catholic Church and sought to adapt Catholicism to the needs of the German bourgeoisie.

This refers to the battle of Jena on October 14, 1806, in which the Prussian troops were defeated by Napoleon's army. This resulted in Prussia's capitulation.

In 1797 the Ionian Islands which formerly belonged to the Venetian Republic, came under French rule. During the war of the second European coalition against Napoleonic France a combined Russo-Turkish squadron under F. F. Ushakov was sent to the Mediterranean in 1798 and freed the Ionian Islands from the French. But under the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, which acknowledged the French territorial conquests, the Ionian Islands were returned to France.
The Vienna Treaty of 1815 established Britain’s protectorate over the Ionian Islands. In the 1850s national movement for union with Greece was mounting in these islands and in Greece itself. In November 1858 Gladstone was sent to the Ionian Islands on a special mission. Though the Legislative Assembly of Corfu, the main Ionian island, voted unanimously for union with Greece, the British Government managed to drag out the solution of the question, and it was not until 1864 that the Ionian Islands were transferred to Greece.

By calling Gladstone “Homeric” Marx may be alluding to the fact that Gladstone was the author of the Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age published a short time previously.

On November 24, 1858 The Free Press (London) published a number of documents on the Ionian Islands which Marx used for his article.

After being liberated from French rule, the Ionian Islands were proclaimed, in 1799, the Republic of the Seven United Islands, and a Provisional Plan for Establishing Government was introduced, known as the Ushakov Constitution. But the latter was not approved by the guarantors of the Ionian Republic. The Provisional Plan of 1799 found its continuation in the 1803 Constitution, also drawn up with the direct participation of Russia’s representatives. This Constitution was annulled by the French administration in 1807 (see Note 103).

Having received the protectorate over the Ionian Islands, Britain introduced a new Constitution in 1817 which invested its representative—the Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands—with unlimited powers.

The mounting movement for the independence of the Ionian Islands and their unification with Greece compelled the British Government (in which Henry Grey was Secretary for the Colonies) to carry out a reform in 1849 extending local self-government and the electoral rights of the Ionians.

When Lord Derby was the Chief Secretary for Ireland (1830-33) he pursued a policy of repression against the Irish people. An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous Associations in Ireland (Coercion Act) which Derby managed to pass through Parliament in 1833 abolished freedom of assembly and introduced a state of emergency and military tribunals, and suspended the Habeas Corpus Act.

The Orange Lodges—see Note 94.

Clearance of estates—eviction of peasants from their lands by the landlords, typical of nineteenth-century England. Marx gave a detailed description of this process in his Capital (Vol. I, Ch. XXVII).

“True blues”—the term that appeared in Great Britain in the seventeenth century to designate the representatives of the moderate wing of the Puritans who chose blue as their colour in contrast to the red of the monarchy. Later it was applied to members of the British Conservative Party.

While Chief Secretary for Ireland in 1797-1801, Castlereagh supported the Orangemen’s policy of terror in respect of Ireland’s Catholic population.

Green Erin—an ancient name for Ireland.

The Phoenix Club—a secret society founded on the basis of a local literary club in Skibbereen, County Cork, in the mid-1850s by the Irish poet and writer Jeremiah O’Donovan Rossa, later one of the leaders of the revolutionary Fenians who fought for Ireland’s independence. This society was the first step
towards setting up in Ireland a nation-wide Fenian organisation. By that time
the Fenian movement had developed among the Irish emigrants in the USA.
In 1858 the police authorities discovered the Phoenix Club and instigated court
proceedings against its leaders.

109 Ribbomism—a peasant movement that arose in Northern Ireland at the close of
the eighteenth century. The peasants united in secret organisations (Ribbon
Societies) and wore a green ribbon as their emblem.

110 Peep-o’day boys—members of Protestant organisations formed in Northern
Ireland in the 1780s to fight the Catholics.

Defenders—members of the Irish Catholic organisations set up in the 1780s
to defend themselves against the peep-o’day boys.

111 See Note 46.

112 On the night of August 3, 1789, during the French Revolution, the French
Constituent Assembly, under pressure from the growing peasant movement,
announced the abolition of a number of feudal services, which had actually
already been abolished by the insurgent peasants. But the laws subsequently
issued abolished without redemption only personal services.

On the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen see Note 62.

113 Soon after his election, in 1846, Pius IX initiated a number of liberal reforms
(partial amnesty for political prisoners, abolition of preliminary censorship, etc.)
to prevent the growth of the popular movement.

114 Marx draws an analogy between the “Regulations on Governing the Landown-
ers’ Peasants of the St. Petersburg Gubernia Drawn up by the St. Petersburg
Nobility Committee”, which appeared about December 5, 1857, and the
Petition of Right presented by the Parliamentary opposition to Charles I on
May 28, 1628, which demanded a considerable limitation of the king’s power.

115 The États généraux (States General)—the supreme body representing the social
estates in feudal France—were convened on May 5, 1789, after a 175-year
interval (from 1614), and existed until June 17. Their convocation was
demanded by the French nobility who wished to preserve the existing system in
view of the approaching bourgeois revolution.

116 See Note 47.

117 In the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune this article was published under the
heading “Italians”.

118 The reference is to Aesop’s fable “The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf”, in which
the shepherd boy repeatedly raised a false alarm by shouting that wolves were
attacking the flock. After a number of such incidents, nobody responded to his
cries for help when wolves really did attack the flock.

119 French and Austrian troops had been present in Rome and in the Papal States
ever since the suppression of the 1848-49 revolution in Italy, and the Swiss
mercenaries formed the Pope’s guard.

120 At the end of 1847 and the beginning of 1848 a mass anti-Austrian movement
took place in Venice and Lombardy. One of its centres was the Pavia University
closed by the Austrian authorities early in 1848. The people boycotted Austrian
manufactures and tobacco; secret republican circles organised demonstrations, which frequently led to clashes with the military and the police. p. 149

121 On March 18-22, 1848, a popular uprising took place in Milan. The five-day struggle resulted in the withdrawal of the Austrian troops from Milan and the formation, on March 22, of a Provisional Government consisting of representatives of the Italian liberal bourgeoisie. p. 149

122 At a reception of the diplomatic corps in the Tuileries on January 1, 1859, Napoleon III said to the Austrian Ambassador J. A. Hübner: "I regret that our relations with your Government are not as good as formerly." This statement led to a diplomatic conflict with Austria, war against which had long ago been decided on: in July 1858, in Plombières, a secret agreement had been reached between France and Piedmont, under which France was promised Savoy and Nice in exchange for participation in the forthcoming war against Austria. p. 149

123 Between 1842 and 1846 Garibaldi took part in the struggle of the Uruguayan people for national liberation and played an important role in the defence of Montevideo. From February to July 1849 Garibaldi virtually directed the defence of the Roman Republic set up as a result of a popular uprising. p. 149

124 In August 1858 an agreement was concluded between Russia and Piedmont granting the Russian Steamship and Trading Company the right to use temporarily the eastern part of the Villafranca harbour, near Nice, for mooring, refuelling and repairing its ships. p. 150

125 Marx alludes to Austria's "gratitude" to Tsarist Russia for its help in suppressing the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49. With the aggravation of the Eastern Question in the early 1850s, Austrian foreign policy took an anti-Russian turn which was reflected in the following words ascribed to the Austrian Prime Minister Schwarzenberg: "We will astonish the world by the greatness of our ingratitude." p. 150

126 Albion—an old name of the British Isles; the expression "perfidious Albion", current from the time of the French Revolution, was borrowed from a poem by Marquis de Ximénès. Britain was so called for its government's numerous intrigues against the French Republic and organisation of anti-French coalitions. p. 150

127 The reference is to the abolition of the Roman Republic and the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope in July 1849, as a result of French military intervention initiated by Louis Bonaparte after his election as President of the French Republic. p. 151

128 This refers to the Italian National Committee set up by Giuseppe Mazzini in London in October 1850. The main demand of its programme was struggle for the independence and unification of Italy by means of a national uprising. p. 152

129 After the victorious March 1848 revolution in Milan and Venice the Piedmontese King Charles Albert, fearing the spread of republican ideas and establishment of a democratic system in Lombardy, declared war on Austria on March 23. His main aim being to annex Lombardy to the Kingdom of Sardinia, Charles Albert did his utmost to hinder the creation of a united national front against Austria and thus weakened the military efforts of the Piedmontese
army itself. Following the defeat of the Piedmontese army at Custozza (July 25-26, 1848) he concluded an armistice with Austria on August 9. Military operations were resumed on March 20, 1849 and on March 23 the Piedmontese army suffered a serious defeat at Novara. On March 26 an armistice was signed there with Austria on terms that were harsh for Piedmont and the whole of Italy.

In 1849 Engels wrote a number of articles for the Neue Rheinische Zeitung exposing the Piedmontese monarchy (see present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 148-51, 156-57, 164-66, 169-77).

This refers to Napoleon III, the son of Napoleon I's brother Louis Bonaparte who was King of the Netherlands from 1806 to 1810. In calling Napoleon III the "Dutch cousin to the battle of Austerlitz" Marx alludes to the fact that the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 took place on the anniversary of the battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805) in which Napoleon I routed the allied armies of Russia and Austria.

In his speech at the opening of the Sardinian Parliament on January 10, 1859 Victor Emmanuel II said that "Sardinia respects treaties, but is not insensible to Italy's cry of anguish".

The reference is to the "liberal" course proclaimed by William, Prince of Prussia (King of Prussia from 1861), in October 1858, when he took up the regency; in the bourgeois press this course was described as a "new era". Actually he did not carry out a single reform expected by the bourgeoisie, but in 1860 a previously prepared military reform was effected abolishing the democracy remaining in the Prussian army since the national liberation war against Napoleon I in 1813-15. This reform stipulated that henceforth the Landwehr would be used only for garrison duties and considerably increased the strength of the army in peacetime.

See Note 86.

Louis Bonaparte was nicknamed "the Little" by Victor Hugo in a speech in the Legislative Assembly in November 1851; the nickname became popular after the publication of Hugo's pamphlet Napoléon le Petit (1852).

See Note 36.

Teut—an ancient Germanic god invented in the late eighteenth century by the Klopstock school and named after the Teutons. Ancient sources make no mention of such a god.

The reference is to the expression l'âne de Buridan attributed to the French fourteenth-century scholastic philosopher Jean Buridan. To prove the absence of free will he cites the example of an ass dying of starvation through inability to choose between two equidistant and equally desirable stacks of hay.

An allusion to Frederick William IV's devotion to medieval social ideals and mystical sentiments typical of the German romantic school of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See also Note 52.

Frederick III, Elector of Brandenburg, became the first king of Prussia under the name of Frederick I in 1701.

Mortmain—in the Middle Ages the right of the feudal lord to inherit the property of a dead serf peasant. Since the property and the land of the dead
peasant usually went to his heirs the latter were obliged to pay a special onerous fee for it to the lord.

140 In the period of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (962-1806) the reichsunmittelbarer Fürst was the German sovereign directly subordinated to the Emperor. The king of Prussia was such a sovereign from 1701.

141 This refers to the 1857 monetary crisis in Hamburg. Trade in Hamburg was expanded by increasing promissory-note circulation, which led to the large-scale forging of such notes and the use of all kinds of fictitious, accommodation and financial bills. As a result, the beginning of the crisis in November 1857 was accompanied by numerous bankruptcies in Hamburg, as Engels wrote to Marx on December 7, 1857 (see present edition, Vol. 40). Marx made use of this fact in his article “The Crisis in Europe” (Vol. 15).

142 As can be seen from Marx’s letter to Engels written between January 13 and 15, 1859, Engels’ article was edited and enlarged by Marx before being dispatched to the USA.

143 This peace treaty was signed at the Paris Congress on March 18 (30), 1856 by France, Britain, Austria, Sardinia, Prussia and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other; it ended the Crimean war of 1853-56.

144 The Supreme Venta of the Italian Carbonari—the leading body of the Carbonari, a secret society which appeared in Italy in the early nineteenth century and fought for national independence and liberal reforms. While in Italy in 1831 Louis Bonaparte joined the Carbonari and for a short time took part in their activities.

145 The reference is to Felice Orsini’s letters of February 11 and March 10, 1858, addressed, according to the official version, to Napoleon III from the Mazas and La Roquette prisons, where the Italian revolutionary was confined after an abortive attempt on the life of Napoleon III. The first letter was read at the Orsini trial the next day, and on February 27, 1858 it was published in Le Moniteur universel; the second letter was published after Orsini’s execution. Historians still question whether Orsini addressed Louis Napoleon with these letters.

146 The Crédit Foncier, a French joint-stock bank set up in 1852, granted short- and long-term loans on the security of immovable property. Between 1854 and 1859 it made loans amounting to 2,000 million francs to the Government of Napoleon III.

147 The German Confederation (der Deutsche Bund)—a short-lived confederation of German states founded in 1815 by decision of the Congress of Vienna.

148 On October 10, 1850 Louis Bonaparte, then President of the French Republic, held a general review of troops on the plain of Satory (near Versailles). During this review Bonaparte, who was preparing a coup d’état, treated the soldiers and officers to sausages in order to win their support.

149 This refers to Louis Bonaparte’s attempts during the July monarchy to stage a coup d’état by means of a military mutiny. On October 30, 1836 he succeeded, with the help of several Bonapartist officers, in inciting two artillery regiments of the Strasbourg garrison to mutiny, but they were disarmed within a few hours. Louis Bonaparte was arrested and deported to America. On August 6,
1840, taking advantage of a partial revival of Bonapartist sentiments in France, he landed in Boulogne with a handful of conspirators and attempted to raise a mutiny among the troops of the local garrison. This attempt likewise failed. He was sentenced to life imprisonment, but escaped to England in 1846. p. 168

Napoleon I married Marie Louise, daughter of the Emperor of Austria, out of political considerations. p. 169

On July 21, 1858, at Plombières, a secret agreement was reached between Napoleon III and the Piedmontese Prime Minister Cavour which envisaged the liquidation of Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venice, the creation of a North-Italian state headed by the Savoy dynasty, and the cession of Savoy and Nice to France. In January 1859 the agreement was formalised by a Franco-Sardinian treaty concluded in Turin. p. 169

The Palais-Royal in Paris was the residence of Prince Joseph Bonaparte (Plon-Plon) in the 1850s. p. 170

See Note 20. p. 170

Zouaves—French colonial troops first formed in 1830. Originally they were composed of Algerians and French colonists and later of Frenchmen only while Algerians were formed into special regiments of riflemen.

Zéphires—an unofficial name of African infantry units of the French army formed of criminals. p. 173

The guard was formed by Napoleon III in 1854 on the pattern of Napoleon I's imperial guard disbanded in 1815. p. 175

The reference is to the special regiments supplied by what was known as the Military Border Area, i.e. the southern border region of the Austrian Empire under military administration. The area included part of Croatia and Southern Hungary. Its population (the borderers) consisted of Serbs, Croats and other nationalities who were allotted land in return for military service, the fulfilment of other obligations and payment of fees. p. 177

The army referred to consisted of Slavs and took part in the storm of revolutionary Vienna by the Austrian troops on October 30-November 1, 1848. p. 178

The Swiss armed forces were formed on the militia basis; in peacetime all citizens capable of military service underwent a short period of training and in the event of war general mobilisation was declared. p. 180

That is, the army of the German Confederation (see Note 147). p. 180

The peace of Basle was concluded on April 5, 1795 separately between France and Prussia, the latter being a member of the first anti-French coalition. The treaty was the consequence of the French victories as well as of the differences between the members of the coalition, in particular between Prussia and Austria.

At the battle of Jena on October 14, 1806 the Prussians were routed by Napoleon I and this led to the capitulation of Prussia.

The battle of Austerlitz on December 2 (November 20), 1805 between the Russian and Austrian forces (the third coalition) and the French ended in a victory for Napoleon I.

At the battle of Wagram on July 5-6, 1809 Napoleon I won a decisive victory over the Austrians. p. 181
161 These are battles in the initial stage of Bonaparte's Italian campaign of 1796-97 against the first anti-French coalition. The Austrians lost the battles of Montenotta (April 12, 1796), Millesimo (April 13-14), Dego (April 14-15) and Mondovi (April 22).

162 The siege of Mantua was laid by Bonaparte in June 1796. The main body of the French forces fought against the Austrian troops trying to relieve the fortress. On August 5, 1796 the Austrians were defeated at Castiglione; in the first half of September 1796, in the Brenta valley; on November 15-17, at Arcole; on January 14-15, 1797, at Rivoli. On February 2, 1797, after a nine-month siege, Mantua capitulated.

163 The siege of Danzig (Gdansk) by Napoleon's army lasted from March 1807 to the end of May 1807.

164 The battle of Marignano (September 13-14, 1515)—one of the major battles in the wars waged by France, Spain and the German Empire in Italy in 1494-1559; in this battle the army of the French King Francis I defeated the Duke of Milan's Swiss mercenaries. On February 24, 1525 the army of Francis I was defeated at Pavia by the forces of the German Emperor Charles V.

On September 7, 1706 at the battle of Turin the Italians routed the French army which had besieged the city for 117 days.

At the battle of Navi (August 15, 1799) the Russo-Austrian forces under A. V. Suvorov routed the French army under General Joubert and finally drove the French out of Northern Italy.

At the battle of Marengo on June 14, 1800 Bonaparte's army defeated the Austrians.

At the battle of Custozza on July 25, 1848 the Austrian army under Radetzky inflicted a heavy defeat on the Piedmontese.

At Novara the Piedmontese were defeated by the Austrians on March 23, 1849.

165 The reference is to Louis Bonaparte who lived in Switzerland for a long time, became a Swiss citizen and in 1834 enlisted as a captain in the artillery regiment of the Berne Canton.

166 In 1830 the French began a war of conquest in Algeria which lasted, with intervals, forty years.

167 This refers to the 1800 campaign in Italy. The commander-in-chief of the Austrian forces, Melas, at first successfully attacked the French right flank at the Var River, but in the latter part of May 1800 Bonaparte crossed the Alps and appeared in the rear of the Austrians. After the capture of Milan on June 2 and the French crossing of the Po, the Austrian army was routed at Marengo on June 14, 1800.

168 The reference is to the Act to Regulate the Labour of Children and Young Persons in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom (1833) and the Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Labour in Factories (1844) on the employment of children, juveniles and women in the English textile industry.

Under the 1833 law the working day for children from nine to thirteen years of age was nine hours (48-hour week). Juveniles from fourteen to eighteen worked twelve hours a day (69-hour week). Children from nine to thirteen years of age had to attend school (two hours a day).

The 1844 law forbade the employment of children under eight years of age.
and introduced for children from eight to thirteen years a half-shift work (six
and a half hours a day). It restricted for the first time the working day for
women: it was the same as for juveniles under the 1833 law.  

160 Marx wrote to Engels on April 19, 1859 that the New-York Daily Tribune of
April 5 had printed a reader's comments on this article.

The author of the comments in a letter signed "Asbouth" referred to his
first letter concerning Engels' article "The Austrian Hold on Italy" (see this
volume, pp. 183-89). This first letter was signed "A" and published in the
Tribune on March 11, 1859.

The second letter largely repeats the first. The author considers the
assessment of Austria's possibilities in the impending war given by Engels in his
two articles to be insufficiently thorough and therefore exaggerated.  

170 The battles of Abensberg and Eckmühl were two stages in the five-day fighting
in the region of Regensburg (Bavaria) in April 1809 between Napoleon I's
army and the Austrian forces during the Austro-French war of 1809.  

171 In the battle at Sommacampagna on July 23, 1848 the Austrian army under
Radetzky defeated the Piedmontese; this battle was followed by the rout of the
Piedmontese army at Custozza on July 25, 1848.  

172 Besides this article, Marx wrote two more articles on the 1859 Reform Bill, on
March 22 and April 1, 1859, but they were not printed in the New-York Daily
Tribune and have not reached us.  

173 Locke King's Bill, introduced in the House of Commons in February 1851,
envisaged the reduction of franchise qualification for people renting land
from £50 to £10 annual income, thus giving them the same rights as house
tenants in the towns; the Bill was defeated.  

174 Freeholders—a category of English small landowners dating from feudal times.
They paid to the landlord a fixed money rent and had the right to dispose
freely of their plots of land. Under the Reform Bill of 1832, the smallest
property qualification for them was fixed at forty shillings (£2) annual income.  

175 See Note 76.  

176 In February 1852 Lord Russell made a preliminary statement of his intention
to introduce an electoral Bill. It envisaged measures aimed at strengthening the
political power of the industrial bourgeoisie: abolition of the so-called rotten
boroughs (having a population of less than 500 and sending deputies to
Parliament) that continued to exist even after the 1832 Reform, redistribution
of seats in favour of the big towns, and reduction of property qualifications.
The Bill was not debated.

In February 1854 Lord Russell introduced a new Bill envisaging equal
rights for rural and urban boroughs, the right to vote for all citizens whose
annual salary was not less than £100, who received not less than £10 dividend
from state securities, bank or East India Company stocks, or had not less than £50
savings in savings banks; the Bill also envisaged the right to vote for people with a
University degree. This Bill was rejected by the House of Commons.  

177 This refers to what was known as the Government of India Bill drawn up by
Ellenborough and introduced in the House of Commons in April 1858.
envisaged an extremely complex procedure for electing the Indian Council and was finally adopted by the two Houses in July 1858.

\[\text{p. 203}\]

178 *Leaseholders*—small holders of land by right of a lease, the period and terms of which were determined by an agreement between the landlord and the lessee.

\[\text{p. 204}\]

179 At its second reading in March-early April 1859 the electoral Bill failed to receive a majority vote and was rejected by the House of Commons.

\[\text{p. 205}\]

180 See Note 168.

\[\text{p. 206}\]

181 The reference is to the changes in the 1833 law as a result of the 1844 law, which allowed children of over eleven years employed in the silk industry not to attend school (see Note 168).

\[\text{p. 207}\]

182 Engels was prompted to write his *Po and Rhine* by the impending military conflict in Italy and the necessity to determine the stand of the proletarian revolutionaries and the European democrats as opposed to that of the bourgeoisie, above all German, on the ways of unifying Germany and Italy. He also wanted to expose the various chauvinistic theories by which the European ruling circles tried to justify the policy of aggression and conquest, and to show that they were untenable from the point of view of military strategy.

Conceived in February 1859, this work had been written by Engels by March 9 and sent to be read by Marx, who appreciated it highly. "Exceedingly clever," he wrote to Engels on March 10, 1859, "the political side is also splendidly done and that was damned difficult." On Marx's advice *Po and Rhine* was published in Germany anonymously to avoid a conspiracy of silence. It was printed in April 1859 in Berlin by the publisher Franz Duncker (in 1,000 copies).

The work exerted a great influence on public opinion in Germany, and was also a success among the military men. No less than ten reviews of it appeared in the German press. All the reviewers approved the military content of the pamphlet and many of them thought it was written by a big military expert. But conflicting opinions were expressed on the author's political conclusions, particularly the one that a united Germany would not need to hold on to Italian territory for its defence. While liberal newspapers such as the *Grenzboten* (Leipzig), the *Preussische Jahrbücher* (Berlin) and *Die Reform* (Hamburg) agreed—though not quite consistently—with the author's political arguments, the conservative press—the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, the *Aachener Zeitung* and the *Berliner Revue*—adopted a chauvinist standpoint and declared that they would not agree to give up Italian territory.

In May 1859, Marx and Engels decided the time had come to inform the public at large on the origin of the work and wrote in *Das Volk*, No. 2, that the author of *Po and Rhine* was a well-known leader of the proletarian party; Engels' name was not given till later, in issue No. 5 (June 4).

In his letter to Lassalle of April 19, 1859, Marx enclosed a list of misprints in the *Po and Rhine* pamphlet. In this edition they are corrected in accordance with Marx's instructions.

\[\text{p. 211}\]

183 Under the Peace Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which ended the Thirty Years' War, Alsace and part of Lorraine, which had hitherto belonged to the Habsburgs, were transferred to France; Lorraine as a whole was annexed to France in 1766.
The *Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* (982-1806) included, at different times, German, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian and Bohemian lands, Switzerland and the Netherlands, forming a motley conglomeration of feudal kingdoms and free towns with different political structures, legal standards and customs.

The *Austrian Netherlands*—the territory of the present Belgium and Luxemburg, which belonged to the Austrian Habsburgs from 1714 to 1797.

---

184 See Note 164.

185 The *Seven Years' War* (1756-63)—a war between the two European coalitions: the Anglo-Prussian and the Franco-Russian-Austrian. The war was caused by the conflict of interests of the feudal absolutist powers (Prussia, Austria, Russia and France) and the colonial rivalry between France and Britain. The war resulted in the expansion of the British colonial empire at the expense of the French possessions and in the growth of Russia's might; Austria and Prussia retained in the main their pre-war frontiers.

186 See Note 121.

187 In March 1848, under pressure from the masses who had risen throughout Italy against Austrian rule, Pope Pius IX and Ferdinand II of Naples were compelled to send troops to Northern Italy to fight the Austrians. But the participation of these forces in the liberation struggle was brief for soon Pius IX and Ferdinand II openly went over to the enemies of the Italian revolution.

188 On May 15, 1848 the King Ferdinand II of Naples brutally suppressed a popular uprising in Naples and carried out a coup d'état. He recalled to Naples the Neapolitan corps which was in Lombardy to help the revolutionary army, thus easing Radetzky’s position in Northern Italy.

189 On the siege of Danzig by Napoleon’s troops see Note 163.

Engels enumerates the battles between the French and Austrian armies during the siege of Mantua by the French (see also Note 162) in Napoleon’s Italian campaign of 1796-97. In the battle at Medole the Austrians were defeated; in the first battle at Calliano, on September 4, 1796, the French were victorious but in the second, on November 6-7, they were driven back by the Austrians; at Bassano on September 8, 1796 the French were victorious but the battle on November 6 was undecided.

190 The reference is to the national liberation struggle against the Napoleon yoke waged by the Tyrolese peasants under Andreas Hofer in 1809. In this insurrectional war the Tyrolese widely used guerrilla methods of fighting in the mountains. In October 1809 the Austrian Government signed peace with Napoleonic France, in consequence of which the Tyrolese peasants, receiving no support from the Austrian regular army, were routed by the French and Italians in 1810.

191 At the battle of Hohenlinden, that took place on December 3, 1800, during the war between France and the second European coalition, the French army under Moreau defeated the Austrian army of Archduke John.

192 The reference is to the Spanish people's national liberation struggle against the French invaders between 1808 and 1814, during which the Spaniards made wide use of the guerrilla methods of fighting in the mountains.
The Confederation of the Rhine (Rheinbund)—an association of sixteen states in Southern and Western Germany established in July 1806 under the protectorate of Napoleon I, after the latter had defeated Austria in 1805. Later twenty other states in Western, Central and Northern Germany joined the Confederation. It fell apart in 1813, after the defeat of Napoleon's army in Germany.  

Under the Treaty of Pressburg (Bratislava) concluded on December 26, 1805 between France and Austria, the latter acknowledged France's seizure of part of Italian territory (Piedmont, Genoa, Parma, Piacenza, etc.) and yielded to the Kingdom of Italy (i.e. to Napoleon I who became King of Italy) the Adriatic coast—the Venetian region, Istria and Dalmatia—keeping only Triest. The Tyrol was given by Napoleon I to his ally Bavaria.

The reference is to the swift and practically unhindered march of Napoleon I's army in Prussia after its victory over the Prussians at Jena and Auerstädt on October 14, 1806; on October 29 the French entered Stettin (Szczecin).

In 321 B.C., during the second Samnite war, the Samnites defeated the Roman legions in the Caudine pass, near the ancient Roman town of Caudine, and compelled them to go under the "forks", which was the greatest shame for the defeated army. Hence the expression "to go under the Caudine forks", i.e. to undergo extreme humiliation.

In July 1820 the Carbonari revolted against the absolutist regime in the Kingdom of Naples and succeeded in having a moderate liberal constitution introduced. In March 1821 there was a rising in Piedmont headed by liberals who proclaimed a constitution and attempted to make use of the anti-Austrian movement in Northern Italy to unify the country under the aegis of the Savoy dynasty then ruling in Piedmont. Interference by the powers of the Holy Alliance and the occupation of Naples and Piedmont by Austrian troops led to the restoration of absolutist regimes in both states.

By the autumn of 1808, when Napoleon I arrived in Erfurt to negotiate with the Russian Tsar Alexander I, almost the whole of Germany had been subjected to France. The German Princes assembled in Erfurt confirmed their loyalty to Napoleon.

In May and October 1850 Warsaw was the scene of conferences in which representatives of Russia, Austria and Prussia took part. They were convened on the initiative of the Russian Tsar in view of the intensification of the struggle between Austria and Prussia for mastery in Germany. The Russian Tsar acted as arbiter in the dispute between Austria and Prussia and used his influence to make Prussia abandon its attempts to form a political confederation of German states under its own aegis.

The battle of Bronzell was an unimportant skirmish between Prussian and Austrian detachments on November 8, 1850, during an uprising in Kurhessen. Prussia and Austria contended for the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Kurhessen to suppress the uprising. In this conflict with Prussia Austria again received diplomatic support from Russia and Prussia had to yield.

Paris was twice captured by the forces of the anti-Napoleonic coalition: on March 30-31, 1814 and July 6-8, 1815.

The battle of Oudenarde took place on July 11, 1708, during the War of the
Spanish Succession. The French were defeated by the allied Anglo-Austrian forces.

At the battle of Jemappes on November 6, 1792 the French revolutionary army won a big victory over the Austrians.

At the battle of Fleurus on June 26, 1794 the French defeated the Austrians. This victory made it possible for the French to enter Belgium and occupy it.

At the battle of Ligny on June 16, 1815 the Prussians were routed by the French. This was the last battle won by Napoleon I.

At the battle of Waterloo on June 18, 1815 Napoleon's army was defeated by the allied forces of Britain, Holland and Prussia.

201 At the battles of Montmirail, Château-Thierry, Reims and others, in February and March 1814 Napoleon defeated superior forces of the sixth anti-French coalition. p. 243

202 Denmark up to the Eider! —the slogan advanced by the members of the Danish liberal party of the 1840s to 1860s (Eider Danes) who supported the union of Schleswig (up to the River Eider), populated mainly by Germans, with Denmark. p. 244

203 Under this name Engels ironically unites here two dwarf German states, Reuss-Greiz and Reuss-Gera-Schleiz-Lobenstein-Ebersdorf, belonging to the elder and younger branches of the Reuss dynasty. p. 250

204 By decision of the Vienna Congress of 1815 Belgium and Holland were incorporated into the united Kingdom of the Netherlands, Belgium being actually under the control of Holland. Belgium became an independent constitutional monarchy as a result of the 1830 revolution. p. 251

205 The Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung, whose editor-in-chief was Dr. Gustav Kolb, was at the time in favour of Germany seizing Alsace and Lorraine (see also this volume, p. 216). p. 252

206 At the battle of Rossbach on November 5, 1757 during the Seven Years' War (1756-63), Prussian King Frederick II's army defeated the Franco-Austrian forces.

On August 25, 1758, at Zornsdorf, Frederick II gave battle to the Russian army, as a result of which both armies suffered serious losses without achieving anything.

At the battle of Hohenfriedeberg on June 4, 1745, during the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48), the Prussian army commanded by Frederick I defeated the Austro-Saxon forces.

Prussian cavalry played an important role in all these battles. p. 252

207 The Holy Alliance—an association of European monarchs founded in September 1815 on the initiative of the Russian Tsar Alexander I and the Austrian Chancellor Metternich to suppress revolutionary movements and preserve feudal monarchies in the European countries. p. 253

208 On the national liberation movement in the Ionian Islands see Note 103.

In 1857-59 India was the scene of a big popular uprising against the British. It flared up in the spring of 1857 among the Sepoy units of the Bengal army and spread to large areas in Northern and Central India. Its main strength was in the peasants and the poor urban artisans. Directed by local feudal lords it was put down owing to the country's disunity, religious and caste differences and also because of the military and technical superiority of the colonisers. p. 254
Engels' views on the historical destiny of small nations were inaccurate: he held that as a rule small nations were not capable of independent national existence and were bound to be absorbed, in the course of centralisation, by larger, more viable nations. Correctly noting the tendency towards centralisation and the creation of large states, which is inherent in capitalism, Engels did not give due consideration to another tendency, namely, the struggle of small nations against national oppression, for their independence and the establishment of their own states. History has shown that many small nations proved capable of independent national development and played a considerable role in the progress of humanity.

This article and the next, "A Sigh from the Tuileries", were written by Marx as a single article but were published by the Tribune as two independent leading articles in two different issues. The first sentence bears signs of the editors' interference.

The French diplomats made use of the strivings of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia to merge in a single state in order to strengthen France's influence in the Balkans. With the assistance of France and Russia Colonel Alexandru Cuza was elected hospodar (ruler) of Moldavia (in January 1859) and of Wallachia (in early February 1859). A united Romanian state was set up in 1862.


The reference is to Louis Bonaparte's abortive attempts to raise a mutiny in the French army in 1836 and 1840 (see Note 149).

The reference is to the national liberation and anti-feudal uprising in the city of Cracow, which had been under the joint control of Austria, Russia and Prussia since 1815. The insurgents seized power on February 22, 1846 and set up a National Government, which issued a manifesto abolishing feudal services. The uprising was put down in early March 1846. In November 1846, Austria, Prussia and Russia signed a treaty incorporating Cracow in the Austrian Empire.

In 1848 an acute financial crisis in Austria led to an enormous increase of the national debt, devaluation of the currency and mass issues of paper money.

The reference is to Napoleon III's anti-Austrian declaration at a New-Year reception in the Tuileries (see Note 122).

In 1852 the French Government drew up a plan for the immigration of Negroes from Africa, including Portugal's African colonies, for work on the plantations in the French West Indies. The implementation of this plan which actually revived the slave trade resulted in a conflict between France and Portugal. In November 1857 the French ship Charles et Georges, with Negroes on board, was detained near the shores of the Portuguese colonies in Eastern Africa. This led to the conflict here referred to (see also this volume, pp. 621-23).
220 The *peace of Lunéville* of 1801 between France and Austria and the *peace of Amiens* of 1802 between France and Britain ended the war between France and the second coalition. But peace did not last long. Soon Napoleon I resumed the war under the pretext of Britain's failure to fulfil one of the conditions of the Amiens peace according to which it was to evacuate Malta, which it had occupied in 1800 and return it to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At a reception in the Tuileries in March 1803 Napoleon I ended a talk with the British Ambassador Whitworth by exclaiming: “Malta or War!”

p. 263

221 In the autumn of 1858, Palmerston, then head of the Whig opposition to the Derby-Disraeli Tory Cabinet, was invited by Napoleon III to Compiègne in order to clarify his position in the impending Franco-Austrian war. At the meeting Palmerston did not object to the Austrians being driven out of Italy, but in his speech at the opening of Parliament on February 3, 1859, he condemned France's action.

p. 263

222 The younger sons of English dukes received the title of lord “by courtesy”, i.e. they acquired it only by tradition, but by law they had no hereditary right to it or to membership of the House of Lords.

p. 264

223 On July 15, 1840, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a convention to support the Sultan of Turkey against the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali who was supported by France. This resulted in a threat of war between France and an anti-French coalition, but Louis Philippe decided against war and denied his support to Mehemet Ali.

p. 264

224 In its Note of February 22, 1859, addressed to Prussia and communicated to the other states of the German Confederation, Austria called on Prussia to abide by its obligations as an ally and take part in the impending struggle against France.

p. 265

225 An allusion to the Carbonari (see Note 144).

_Feme*_—courts in medieval Germany which passed sentences after secret investigations, both in and without the presence of the accused, and themselves carried them out.

p. 265

226 The concordat of 1855 between Austria and Pius IX restored to the Catholic Church a number of privileges abolished during the 1848-49 revolution.

p. 265

227 *Lambessa* (*Lambèse*)—a French penal colony founded on the ruins of the ancient Roman town of Lambessa in Northern Africa; from 1851 to 1860 it was a place of exile for political prisoners.

_Cayenne_*—see Note 34.

p. 267

228 On the Warsaw Conferences and the battle of Bronzell see Note 198.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was one of the causes that aggravated Austro-Prussian relations in 1848-50. From March 1848 these duchies were the scene of a national liberation struggle against Denmark with Prussia taking part on the side of the insurgents. Austria and other European powers supported the Danish monarchy and brought pressure to bear upon Prussia by compelling it to sign a treaty with Denmark in July 1850. In the winter of 1851 the forces of the German Confederation, which included Austrian units, undertook a punitive expedition against the insurgents and forced them to surrender.

During the Crimean war (1853-56) Prussia, manoeuvring between Russia and the Western powers, was forced, in 1854, by Austria, Britain and France
to join Austria in demanding the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians. At the end of the war Prussia was also to support the Austrian ultimatum to Russia which impelled the Tsarist Government to accept the Allies’ terms as the basis for peace negotiations. p. 268

229 The reference is apparently to the treaties of alliance imposed by Austria on Modena and Parma in 1847 and 1848, the 1850 treaty on the maintenance of Austrian forces in Tuscany, and the 1814 treaty between Austria and Naples. p. 268

230 Marx refers to Prussia’s anti-Austrian position at the Paris Conference of Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Prussia and Sardinia (May to August 1858) at which Prussia, contrary to the will of Austria, supported the proposal to unite Moldavia and Wallachia (see Note 212).

By the German Diet Marx means the Federal Diet (Bundestag), the central body of the German Confederation (see Note 147), which consisted of representatives of German states and sat in Frankfurt am Main. It served as an instrument of the reactionary policy of the German governments.

Prussia’s plenipotentiary in the Federal Diet from 1851 onwards was Otto Bismarck. At the beginning of his career he sought an alliance with Austria but later adopted a pronounced anti-Austrian stand. In early 1859 he was replaced by Usedom. p. 269

231 The Zollverein (Customs Union), a union of German states which established a common customs frontier, was set up in 1834 under the aegis of Prussia. Owing its existence to the need for an all-German market, the Customs Union subsequently embraced all the German states except Austria and a few of the smaller ones. p. 269

232 See Note 160.

233 See Note 122.

234 Boeotians were inhabitants of Boeotia, an economically and culturally backward region in Ancient Greece. p. 270

235 Archduke John of Austria was proclaimed Regent of Germany by the Frankfurt National Assembly in June 1848. He was invested with executive power until an Imperial Constitution was introduced. Being Regent up to December 1849 he was the vehicle of the counter-revolutionary policy of the German princes. p. 270

236 See Note 36.

237 Napoleon III and Empress Eugénie visited England in April 1855. p. 271

238 The reference is to the Lombardy crown. p. 272

239 The economically favourable years of 1836 and 1856 were followed by crises in 1837 and 1857. p. 272

240 At the beginning of the 1848-49 revolution in Italy the dukes of Tuscany, Modena and Parma fled from their duchies.

241 In March 1859 the Russian Government proposed that an international congress should be held to discuss the Italian question. Britain, France, Prussia
and Piedmont supported the idea, but the congress did not take place because of the Austrian demand to debar Piedmont from participation in it and to make it disarm. p. 274

Under the Peace of Paris (see Note 143) Russia was deprived of the Danube estuary region and part of Southern Bessarabia and was compelled to give up its protectorate over the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia. Later, in order to strengthen its influence in the Balkans, Russia supported the national liberation movement of the Balkan peoples against the Turkish rule. Together with France it supported Moldavia's and Wallachia's desire to form a united Rumanian state. Russia also backed the dynastic coup d'état in Serbia in late November 1858, as a result of which the Karageorgević dynasty whose foreign policy was oriented on Austria and Turkey was replaced by the Obrenović dynasty. p. 277

On the Indian rebellion of 1857-59 see Note 208. p. 279

The prize money was awarded by the government to the crews of ships which destroyed or seized enemy ships or neutral vessels engaged in contraband. p. 279

The year 1854 saw the beginning of a bourgeois revolution in Mexico followed by a civil war which lasted until the end of 1860 and ended in the defeat of the reactionary feudal landowners and clergymen. p. 282

Marx here refers to Bombay. According to the administrative division of British India, Bombay, with Bengal and Madras, was given the status of a Presidency headed by a governor. p. 283

Marx ironically calls the British governors of India the Great Mogul's successors. The Empire of the Great Moguls founded in 1526 by the Moguls, invaders of Turkish descent, became very powerful in the mid-seventeenth century when it conquered the greater part of India and part of Afghanistan. Later, however, the Empire began to decline due to popular movements and increasing separatist tendencies. In the early half of the eighteenth century the Empire of the Great Moguls practically ceased to exist. Formally the Great Moguls continued to be considered as rulers of India until 1858, when the English authorities put an end to the dynasty. p. 284

The reference is to the Shanghai British-Chinese commercial agreement of November 8, 1858, concluded on Clause 26 of the Tientsin Treaty of 1858. The agreement legalised the import of opium to China under the guise of foreign medicine. p. 286

Marx dated this article "April 15", the day when it was sent from London to New York. p. 287

Cracow was annexed to the Austrian Empire after the suppression of the 1846 uprising (see Note 215). After the suppression of the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary the Austrian authorities established a regime of severe terror there: they abrogated all the laws adopted during the revolution and, moreover, liquidated the partial autonomy enjoyed by Hungary even before the revolution. p. 288

The reference is to the demands presented by the Western powers to Russia in a Note of August 8, 1854 as preliminary conditions for peace negotiations.
Russia was to give up its protectorate of Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, which was to be replaced by a European guarantee, to allow free passage of ships on the Danube, to consent to the revision of the 1841 London Convention on the Straits, and to renounce its protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey. At first the Tsarist government rejected these Four Points but in November 1854 it was compelld to accept them as the basis of future peace negotiations.

252 This right was granted to Austria by the Vienna Treaty of 1815. p. 288

253 An allusion to the policy of King Frederick II of Prussia (1712-1786) whose enlightened absolutism was, to use Marx's words, a "hodge-podge rule of despotism, bureaucracy and feudalism" (Capital, Vol. I, Moscow, 1977, p. 684). p. 289

254 The protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle (Aachen) (Protocole signé à Aix-la-Chapelle le 15 novembre 1818 par les plénipotentiaires des cours d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie) of November 15, 1818 was signed by Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia and France at the first congress of the Holy Alliance. It confirmed the state structure of Europe as established at the Vienna Congress of 1815. p. 291

255 As is evident from Marx's letter to Engels of April 22, 1859, this article written by Engels was edited and enlarged by Marx as new material had been received. p. 295

256 The reference is to the Laibach Congress of the Holy Alliance held in 1821. It proclaimed the principle of intervention by the powers of the Holy Alliance in the internal affairs of other states in support of feudal-monarchist regimes there. Accordingly, the Laibach Congress decided to send Austrian troops to Italy to crush the revolutionary and national liberation movement there. Representatives of the monarchist circles in the Italian states attended the congress in accordance with the restrictive clause inserted in the 1818 protocol of Aix-la-Chapelle on the insistence of the British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh. It stipulated that intervention in the home affairs of other states should be practised only "on the wish" of those states, which were also to be given the right to take part in the talks. p. 296

257 In November 1850 Prussia declared a general mobilisation in view of the worsening of the Austro-Prussian relations caused by the struggle for mastery in Germany. The mobilisation revealed serious shortcomings in the Prussian military system and insufficient equipment of the army; this made the government take vigorous measures to eliminate these shortcomings. p. 298

258 In his letter to Engels of May 6, 1859 Marx wrote about this article: "I deleted the whole of the preamble to your last Friday's article, firstly because I had my misgivings about Austria; secondly because it is absolutely essential that we do not identify our cause with that of the present German governments." p. 299

259 See Note 169. p. 299

260 Consols is short for consolidated annuities, i.e. government securities consolidated in 1751 into a single stock at three per cent. Up to the First World War they made up a large part of the British national debt. p. 303
261 The reference is to the secret Paris treaty of February 19 (March 3), 1859 concluded between France and Russia. Russia undertook to adopt a "political and military stand which most easily proves its favourable neutrality towards France" (Article I) and not to object to the enlargement of the Kingdom of Sardinia in the event of a war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other. Information about this secret treaty leaked into the press but the Russian Foreign Minister Gorchakov officially denied the existence of any written obligations to France. As was proved later, Denmark did not take part in the negotiations.  

p. 303

262 The reference is to the Austrian ultimatum to Sardinia of April 23, 1859 which marked the beginning of the 1859 war between France and Sardinia on the one hand and Austria on the other.  

p. 304

263 The Stuttgart meeting of the Emperors, Alexander II and Napoleon III, took place on September 25, 1857. It was a sign of rapprochement between France and Russia after the Crimean war.  

p. 304

264 Under the Treaty of Paris (see Note 143) the autonomy of the Danubian Principalities within the Ottoman Empire was guaranteed by the countries which took part in the Paris Congress of 1856. Austria, which occupied the principalities in 1854, was to withdraw its troops from them. In 1858 a special conference was convened in Paris to decide finally on the status and rights of the Danubian Principalities (see Note 242).  

p. 304

265 In mid-February 1859 the Derby government in Britain offered to mediate in settling the Franco-Austrian conflict. With this aim in view Lord Cowley was sent, with Napoleon III's consent, to Vienna at the end of February for talks with Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. His mission, however, failed.  

p. 304

266 In the spring and summer of 1859 popular insurrections flared up in Tuscany, Modena and Parma. The members of the ruling dynasties fled from their duchies to seek the protection of the Austrian army. The national assemblies set up as the result of the insurrections declared that the population of the duchies wished to be incorporated in Piedmont. This question was settled in March 1860 by a plebiscite.  

p. 306

267 See Note 265.  

p. 307

268 See Note 87.  

p. 312

269 An allusion to the treating of soldiers to sausages during the military review in Satory (see Note 148).  

p. 312

270 These words ("Let the consuls beware lest the Republic suffer harm") used to be addressed by the Roman Senate to the consuls in time of danger for the state; the meaning was that they were empowered to appoint a dictator.  

p. 312

271 The reference is to Karl Vogt (for details about him see Marx's work Herr Vogt, present edition, Vol. 17).  

p. 313

272 Marx is referring to Prussia's defeat at Jena and Auerstädt in 1806 (see also Note 102).  

p. 314

273 See Note 160.  

p. 314
In March 1848 a revolution broke out in Venice. The Austrians were driven out and power went over to the Provisional Government headed by Daniel Manin. The Provisional Government proclaimed a republic, which existed until August 1849. p. 321

On June 28, 1849, during the 1848-49 national liberation war in Hungary, the Austrians routed the Hungarians at Raab (Győr) and seized the town. p. 321

The Austrian troops were defeated by the Hungarian revolutionary forces at Acs (near Komárno) on August 3, 1849. p. 322

The *Order of the Golden Fleece*, an order of Knighthood in the Austrian monarchy, was founded in 1429. p. 322

The *Legionaries* were members of the Academic Legion, an armed student organisation set up in Vienna during the March 1848 revolution. p. 322

The Austrian Lloyd— the name given by Marx to a steamship company founded in Trieste in 1833. Many maritime insurance companies in Europe began to be named Lloyd's, after Edward Lloyd, the owner of a coffee-house in London where the first English maritime insurance company was established (late seventeenth century). p. 325

Marx is referring to the foundation of the Guarantee Discount Society in Hamburg in November 1857, during one of the cyclic crises, and to the issue of interest-bearing securities to the amount of 15,000,000 marks to subsidise the purchase of commodities or state securities; the subsidies were to cover from 50 to 66 2/3 per cent of the value of the mortgaged commodities (see Marx's article "The Financial Crisis in Europe", present edition, Vol. 15). p. 325

The reference is to the policy of the Austrian ruling circles during a big peasant uprising in Galicia in February and March 1846 which coincided with the Cracow national liberation uprising (see Note 215). Taking advantage of class and national contradictions, the Austrian authorities provoked clashes between the insurgent Galician peasants and the Polish lesser nobility (szlachta) who were trying to come to the assistance of Cracow. The peasant uprising began with the disarming of the insurgent szlachta detachments, and grew into a mass sacking of landowners' estates. After dealing with the insurgent szlachta, the Austrian Government also suppressed the peasant uprising in Galicia. p. 337

The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation founded by King Otto 1 in 962 lasted until August 1806. p. 344

This article, written at Marx's request, was Engels' first contribution to *Das Volk*.

*Das Volk*— a German-language weekly published in London from May 7 to August 20, 1859— was founded as the official organ of the German Workers' Educational Society in London (see Note 455). Its first issue appeared under the editorship of the German journalist and petty-bourgeois democrat Eïlard Biscamp. Beginning with issue No. 2 Marx took an active part in its publication: he gave it advice, edited articles, organised material support, and so on. In issue No. 6 of June 11, the Editorial Board officially named Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Ferdinand Freiligrath, Wilhelm Wolff and Heinrich Heise as its contributors (see this volume, p. 624).
Marx's first article in the paper—"Spree and Mincio"—was printed on June 25. Under Marx's influence *Das Volk* began to turn into a militant revolutionary working-class newspaper. In the beginning of July Marx became its virtual editor and manager.

*Das Volk* reflected the elaboration by Marx and Engels of questions concerning the revolutionary theory and tactics of the working-class struggle, described the class struggles of the proletariat, and relentlessly fought the exponents of petty-bourgeois ideology. It analysed from the standpoint of proletarian internationalism the events of the Austro-Italian-French war of 1859 and the questions of German and Italian unification, exposed the foreign policy of Britain, Prussia, France, Russia and other reactionary states, and consistently opposed Bonapartism and its overt and covert supporters.

*Das Volk* carried Marx's preface to his work *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, six of his articles, including the unfinished series *Quid pro Quo*, seven articles by Engels and his review of Marx's *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, and reviews of the newspaper of the German petty-bourgeois democrats, the *Hermann*, by Marx and Biscamp (they appeared in the section "Gatherings from the Press"). Besides, many articles and political reviews written by different authors were edited personally by Marx. In all, sixteen issues appeared. The newspaper ceased publication for lack of money.

284 *Danzig* (Gdańsk), held by a French garrison after the defeat of Napoleon's army in Russia in 1812, was besieged by sea and land by the Russians and Prussians in early 1813. It withstood three sieges but finally had to capitulate. On January 2, 1814 the Allies entered the city.

On the quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy (Peschiera, Mantua, Verona and Legnago) see this volume, pp. 227-29.

In 1849, during the national liberation war in Hungary, the fortress of Komárnó was a strong point of the Hungarian revolutionary army: twice (in January-April and July-September) it withstood a siege by the Austrians.

On the defence of Sevastopol during the Crimean war see the series of Engels' articles in Vol. 14 of the present edition.

285 In the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* the article was published under the title "Progress of the War". It was abridged.

In the *New-York Weekly Tribune* two Engels' articles—"Strategy of the War" and "The Battle of Montebello"—were united under the title "The War".

286 On July 2, 1849, shortly before the downfall of the Roman Republic (see Note 127) and after the Roman Constituent Assembly had decided to cease the struggle, Garibaldi left Rome with a detachment of 4,000 volunteers and went to the aid of the Venetian Republic, which was fighting against the Austrian forces. Garibaldi manoeuvred skilfully in the Austrian rear and many times broke out of encirclement but failing to reach besieged Venice, he was forced to enter the neutral Republic of San Marino on July 30, 1849 and to disband his detachment.

287 The reference is to the anti-Austrian actions of a 5,000-strong detachment of Lombard volunteers under General Allemandi who in April 1848 blocked the Tyrol passes from Tonale to Stelvio.
Marx's introductory remarks to Mazzini's manifesto "The War" published in the present volume show that Marx and Engels supported Mazzini in his correct stand on the question of Bonaparte's interference in the liberation of Italy. At the same time they continued to criticise Mazzini's views and tactics as a whole.  

In March 1849 Mazzini became the head of the triumvirate (Mazzini, Saffi, Armellini) invested by the Constituent Assembly of the Roman Republic with full executive authority and extraordinary powers for the defence of the republic.

The Italian poet and patriot Goffredo Mameli was killed in July 1849, during the defence of the Roman Republic against the French troops sent by Louis Bonaparte.

This refers to the treaties Emperor Charles V concluded with Pope Clement VII in Barcelona in 1529 and in Bologna in 1530. From then on the imperial government and the Catholic Church acted hand in hand to abolish the remnants of the Italian cities' independence.

See Notes 151 and 263.

See Note 127.

The reference is to an anti-Austrian uprising in Tuscany that began on April 27, 1859, on the eve of the Austro-Piedmontese war.

As a result of this uprising Duke Leopold II and the Austrian occupation forces were driven out of Tuscany.

The Treaty of Campoformio, signed on October 17, 1797, concluded the victorious war of the French Republic against Austria, a member of the first anti-French coalition. Under this treaty part of the Venetian Republic's territory, including Venice and Istria and Dalmatia, was given to Austria in exchange for concessions on the Rhine frontier. Another part went to the Cisalpine Republic formed by Napoleon I in the summer of 1797 out of lands he had captured in Northern Italy. The Ionian Islands and the Venetian Republic's possessions on the Albanian coast were also annexed to France.

Engels is referring to the reports on the battle of Novara on March 23, 1849 (see Note 129), which he analysed in a series of articles entitled "The Defeat of the Piedmontese" (present edition, Vol. 9, pp. 169-77). One of the causes of the defeat of the Piedmontese at Novara was the cowardly behaviour of Charles Albert, King of Sardinia and Piedmont, whose "valour" had been lauded up to then by monarchist circles, advocates of Italy's unification under the Savoy dynasty, who even named him "spada d'Italia" ("Italy's Sword"). After the abdication of Charles Albert his son Victor Emmanuel, the new King, concluded a peace treaty with the Austrians in Milan in August 1849, under which Austria retained all its possessions in Italy and was paid by Piedmont indemnities amounting to 65 million francs.

As a result of his abortive attempt to land with a handful of conspirators at Boulogne in August 1840 and effect a coup d'état (see Note 149), Louis Bonaparte was tried by the French Chamber of Peers and in October of the
same year was sentenced to life imprisonment; he escaped to England in 1846.
p. 364

298 The battle of Lützen (Saxony) between Napoleon I's army and the Russian and Prussian forces took place on May 2, 1813.
p. 365

299 This article ("A Chapter of History") was first published in the newspaper Das Volk under the title "Die Schlacht von Magenta" ("The Battle of Magenta"). In this volume it is reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune. The most important different readings are given in footnotes. It is possible that the Tribune editors made changes in the article.
p. 372

300 An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's words: "The Empire is peace" (see Note 36).
p. 380

301 An ironical allusion to Louis Bonaparte's book Des idées napoléoniennes which he wrote in England and published in 1839 in Paris and Brussels.
p. 380

302 An allusion to the book Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous Napoléon, écrits à Ste Hélène, sous la dictée de l'empereur, published in 1822-25, in which Napoleon I expressed his hostility to England and expounded his views on the necessity of an alliance with Russia.
p. 382

303 The poems of King Ludwig I of Bavaria, popular among German philistines, are examples of meaningless pretentious poetry.
p. 382

304 Cirque olympique—a theatre in Paris.
St. James's Street—a street in London containing clubs and gambling-houses.
Astley Amphitheatre—a London circus.
p. 384

305 See Note 160.
p. 387

306 In Das Volk this passage is provided with the following editorial note: "According to the latest reports the Austrians did retreat behind the Mincio, in the region of their fortresses. Even if nothing is lost strategically through this withdrawal, it is bound to exert a harmful influence on the morale of the army." p. 387

307 This article, especially the beginning, shows signs of interference by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune.
p. 388

308 By "irresolutions of 1805 and 1806" Engels means the policy of the Prussian King Frederick William III who manoeuvred between the third anti-French European coalition and Napoleon I. These tactics helped the latter to defeat first Austria in 1805 and then Prussia itself in 1806.

On the Peace of Basle see Note 160.
On the Confederation of the Rhine see Note 193.
p. 390

309 See Notes 164 and 171.
p. 394

310 See Note 226.
p. 394

311 This refers to the attempts made by Prussia, in alliance with the sovereigns of Hanover, Saxony and other German states, to unite Germany, excluding Austria, under Prussian hegemony and thus realise the plan for creating a "Little Germany". This plan was backed by the liberal bourgeoisie who formed the so-called Gotha party (see Note 87). The latter took an active part in the elections to the German parliament which met in Erfurt on March 20, 1850 to
adopt the draft German Constitution revised to suit pro-Prussian circles. Under pressure from the Austrian Court and the Russian Emperor the Prussian Government had to abandon its unification plans temporarily and dissolve the Erfurt parliament on April 29, 1850.

Below Marx quotes from the "Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger" published by a number of German newspapers. The full text of this declaration appeared in the *Rhein und Lahnzeitung* on June 21, 1859. It was the political programme of the German bourgeoisie striving to unite Germany under Prussian supremacy.

The *March demands*—four principal political demands expressing the mood of the people. They were formulated by the petty-bourgeois democrats of Baden in February 1848 and soon became known in the whole of South-Western Germany. These were: 1) arming of the people with the right to elect their officers, 2) unrestricted freedom of the press, 3) judgment by jury, and 4) immediate convocation of a German Parliament. Under pressure from the people, the liberal bourgeoisie of German states made these demands its programme in the struggle against the monarchy but when it came to power as a result of the revolution, it made a compromise with the monarchist circles.

---

312 The *March demands*—four principal political demands expressing the mood of the people. They were formulated by the petty-bourgeois democrats of Baden in February 1848 and soon became known in the whole of South-Western Germany. These were: 1) arming of the people with the right to elect their officers, 2) unrestricted freedom of the press, 3) judgment by jury, and 4) immediate convocation of a German Parliament. Under pressure from the people, the liberal bourgeoisie of German states made these demands its programme in the struggle against the monarchy but when it came to power as a result of the revolution, it made a compromise with the monarchist circles.

313 See Note 198.

314 *Eschenheimer Gasse*—a street in Frankfurt am Main where the German Federal Diet had its premises in 1816-66.

315 On July 8, 1859 the emperors of France and Austria held a separate meeting—without the King of Piedmont—in Villafranca, at which they reached an agreement on an armistice. The meeting was initiated by Napoleon III, who feared that the protracted war might give a fresh impulse to the revolutionary and national liberation movements in Italy and other European states. On July 11 France and Austria signed a preliminary peace under which Austria was to cede to France its rights to Lombardy and France was to transfer this territory to Piedmont. Venice was to remain under the supreme power of Austria and the rulers of the states of Central Italy were to be restored to their thrones. It was intended to create a confederation of Italian states under the honorary chairmanship of the Pope.

The Villafranca preliminaries formed the basis of the peace treaty concluded in Zurich on November 10, 1859 between France, Austria and Piedmont.

316 See Note 229.

317 Political reviews (*politische Rundschauen*) were published in each issue of *Das Volk.* They were presumably written by Elard Biscamp and Wilhelm Liebknecht.

When Marx became the virtual editor of the newspaper (see Note 283), he also began to take part in editing this section. The passage on Jones in this review was written and inserted in the text by Marx himself. This can be proved by comparing this passage with Marx's letters to Engels of November 24, 1857 and September 21, 1858 and to Weydemeyer of February 1, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40).

318 The *Court of Queen's Bench* is one of the high courts in England; in the nineteenth century (up to 1873) it was an independent supreme court for
Marx refers to the conference organised by the Chartists. Ernest Jones proposed to convene such a conference as early as April 1857. It was to be attended by Chartists and bourgeois radicals. By agitating in 1857 for an alliance with bourgeois radicals to fight jointly for an electoral reform, Jones hoped to revive the mass Chartist movement in the country. However, he made serious political concessions to the bourgeois radicals by renouncing almost all the points of the People's Charter when working out a common platform for uniting with the bourgeois radicals. Of the six points of the Charter (universal suffrage, annual Parliaments, vote by secret ballot, equal constituencies, abolition of property qualifications for candidates to Parliament, and payment of M.P.s.) Jones retained only the demand for universal adult male suffrage. Jones' departure from revolutionary positions caused discontent among rank-and-file Chartists, many of whom opposed their leader's conciliatory policy. After repeated postponements the joint conference of Chartists and bourgeois radicals was convened in London on February 8, 1858.

Marx and Engels regarded Jones' conciliation with the radicals as a manifestation of his political vacillation and decline into reformist positions, and broke friendly relations with him. They resumed them only a few years later when Jones again adopted a revolutionary proletarian stand.

---

This text was written by Marx as an introductory note to his report “The Foreign Policy of Russia. Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor—Drawn up by the Russian Cabinet in 1837” published in the New-York Daily Tribune. In this report marked “Correspondence of the N.-Y. Tribune. Berlin, July 14, 1859” Marx reproduced the document—“Memoir on Russia, for the Instruction of the Present Emperor. Drawn up by the Cabinet in 1837”—published by The Free Press on July 13, 1859. This document attracted Marx’s attention in connection with the intensified struggle over the problem of German and Italian unification and the fight against Bonapartism. Marx intended to briefly sum up Russia’s part in this tragically profound story and at the same time to expose Bonaparte’s intrigues (see Marx’s letter to Engels of July 19, 1859). Marx expressed the same idea in the introductory note to another publication of this document which appeared in Das Volk and was a German translation from The Free Press. When Marx and Engels read this document they expressed doubts as to the authenticity of some passages (see Engels’ letter to Marx of July 18, 1859 and Marx’s letter to Engels of July 19, 1859). And indeed, from subsequent issues of The Free Press (of July 27 and 31, 1859) it appeared that the publication was based not on the original document but on material published in the German conservative newspaper Preussisches Wochenblatt and allegedly a review of this document with large quotations from it (Preussisches Wochenblatt zur Besprechung politischer Tagesfragen, Nos. 23, 24 and 25, June 9, 16 and 23, 1855). This publication quoted neither the source from which the document had been taken nor its title or the full text. In his memoirs (Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck, Stuttgart, 1898, Bd. 1, S. 111-12) Bismarck says outright that this publication was forged.

The introductory note to the German publication in Das Volk (July 23 and 26 and August 6 and 13, 1859) is reproduced in the footnote to this item.
321 The reference is to the petty German princes who lost their power and saw their possessions annexed by larger German states as a result of the reshaping of the political map of Germany during the Napoleonic wars and at the Vienna Congress (1814-15). p. 417

322 In 1848 Palmerston wanted Lombardy to be annexed to the Kingdom of Piedmont in order to check the spread of the revolutionary movement in Italy and to meet the interests of the traditional British policy of “European equilibrium.” Frightened by the revolutionary events in Austria and the national liberation struggle in Italy, the Austrian Government was forced to agree, in its memorandum of May 24, to the cession of Lombardy and the separation of Venetia into an independent state under the Archduke of Austria, but after Piedmont’s defeat Austria retracted its agreement. p. 418

323 In view of the growing movement in Northern Italy and the Papal States for incorporation with Piedmont, Pius IX issued an encyclical in June 1859 threatening to excommunicate those who encroached on the Pope’s temporal power, referring above all to Victor Emmanuel II. p. 419

324 Engels is referring here to what Napoleon I said to General Charles de Montholon on St. Helena on April 17, 1821 as a testament to his son: “All his efforts should be aimed at ruling in peace. Should he want to recommence my wars, by pure imitation and without absolute necessity, he would be only an ape.” p. 421

325 Here the editors of Das Volk inserted in Engels’ text the following sentence, which is not reproduced in this volume: “Without this 4 1/2 hours’ halt the corps would hardly endure the extreme exertion with which it hastened to the battle-field.” In connection with this Engels wrote to Marx on July 25, 1859: “Some nonsense was edited into my last article. I said that, during the march from Pavia, the 5th corps so exerted itself on the 3rd and 4th that, had the 4 1/2 hours lost through the halt been put to use, the result would not have been materially different, nor would the corps have arrived on the battle-field appreciably earlier. In print it says that it was the halt alone which made that exertion possible, which 1. is just the opposite and 2. is nonsense. In the first place the troops were not in the least tired at 6 o’clock in the morning of the 3rd, having only just moved off, so that the halt could be of no benefit to them, and secondly the halt deprived them of the cool hours of the morning and forced them to march when the midday heat was at its greatest. To any military man, the sentence as it now stands would seem quite preposterous” (see present edition, Vol. 40). p. 425

326 Via sacra (Holy Road)—the road in ancient Rome along which the triumphal marches of the victorious troops took place; the expression “via sacra” has come to denote in general a victorious campaign or march. p. 432

327 An allusion to the imprisonment of Louis Bonaparte in the fortress of Ham in 1840, following the failure of the military putsch in Boulogne; Louis Bonaparte escaped from the fortress in 1846 (see Note 149). p. 432

328 Porte Saint-Martin—a gate of triumph on the boulevards in Paris. During the coup d’état of December 1851 it witnessed the massacre of the republicans by the Bonapartist soldiery. The Théâtre de la Porte Saint-Martin is situated on the boulevard St. Martin. On the Astley Amphitheatre see Note 304. p. 432
329 The reference is to Napoleon III's appeal to the army from Genoa of May 12, 1859 on the occasion of his assumption of the post of commander-in-chief. It said among other things: "On the Holy Road of ancient Rome inscriptions were carved in marble to remind the people of its feats: now too when passing through Mondovi, Marengo, Lodi, Castiglione, Arcole, Rivoli you will march along another Holy Road, among these glorious memories" (see also this volume, pp. 330-31).

330 In his letter to Engels of July 22, 1859, Marx advised him: "In your second article on the war you will not, I am sure, forget to stress the inadequate strength of the pursuit after victory had been won, and the pitiful whining of Bonaparte, who had at last got to the point where Europe did not, as hitherto, out of fear of revolution, permit him to play the old Napoleon within given limits. In this connection it would be pertinent to recall the 1796-97 campaign, when France was not able to take its time preparing all its resources for 'a localised war' but, with its finances completely disrupted, had to fight not only beyond the Rhine, but also beyond the Mincio and the Adige. Bonaparte is actually complaining that his 'succès d'estime' are now begrudged him" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

331 Schönbrunn—a palace in Vienna, the Emperor's summer residence. p. 437

332 On "idées napoléoniennes" see Note 301.
On Louis Bonaparte's imprisonment in Ham see Note 327. p. 439

333 The relations established between Britain and France after the July revolution of 1830 and known in history as the entente cordiale were not confirmed by treaty until April 1834, when the so-called Quadruple Alliance was concluded between Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. But at the conclusion of this treaty disagreements between Britain and France became apparent which subsequently led to a worsening of relations between the two countries.

p. 441

334 "Quid pro Quo" ("Confusion of one thing with another")—the title of a series of articles published by Marx in Das Volk at the end of July and the middle of August 1859; the series remained unfinished, as the newspaper ceased publication.

p. 445

335 The expedition to Egypt—the reference is to the landing of the French army, commanded by General Bonaparte, in Egypt in the summer of 1798 and to this army's subsequent campaigns to subdue Egypt and Syria. Napoleon's expedition to Egypt ended in failure in 1801.
The Society of December 10—a secret Bonapartist organisation founded in 1849 and consisting mainly of declassed elements. For a detailed account of this society see Marx's work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (present edition, Vol. 11).
On the parade in Satory see Note 148.
The 18th Brumaire (November 9, 1799)—the day of the coup d'état which led to the establishment of Napoleon Bonaparte's military dictatorship.

p. 445

336 The reference is to the secret peace negotiations between France and Russia in 1855 which were conducted through Baron Seebach, Saxony's envoy in Paris and son-in-law of Russia's Foreign Minister, Count Nesselrode. p. 446
At the Paris Congress of 1856, Count Orlov, head of the Russian delegation, and Brunnow, a member of the delegation, played on Anglo-French contradictions; the congress saw the beginning of rapprochement between France and Russia. p. 446

In 1856-60 Napoleon III, in an effort to consolidate his influence in the Balkans, supported Danilo I, Prince of Montenegro, in his opposition to Turkey's encroachments on Montenegro. Accordingly, Danilo I sought personal friendship with Napoleon III and the latter became the godfather of the Montenegro heir.

In 1851-52 Jakob Venedey published a number of articles on Louis Bonaparte and his coup d'état in the Hanover Zeitung für Norddeutschland. p. 447

The Turkish fortress of Kars, fortified by the British, was surrendered to the Russians in November 1855. Despite the fact that British officers headed by General Williams directed the defence of the fortress, the conduct of the British Government towards the Kars defenders was rather ambiguous, for secretly it was interested in weakening "allied" Turkey. For details on this see Marx's article "The Fall of Kars" (present edition, Vol. 14). Upon Williams' return from Russian captivity in 1856, the British Government arranged a pompous reception and gave him awards and honorary titles. p. 447

The reference is to Athens and Constantinople where French troops were stationed during the Crimean war. p. 447

At one of the last sittings of the Paris Congress of 1856 the French Foreign Minister Walewski demanded that the Belgian newspapers should stop attacking Napoleon III. He was supported by representatives of other states. p. 447

An allusion to France's participation in the second Opium war (1856-60) against China.

On the election of Colonel Alexandru Cuza hospodar of Moldavia and Wallachia see Note 212. p. 447

See Note 219. p. 447

An allusion to Switzerland's discontent with Napoleon III's interference in the internal affairs of the country. In early 1858 Napoleon III demanded that the Swiss Government extradite political refugees accused of taking part in Orsini's plot. p. 447

By the decree of January 27, 1858, the territory of the Second Empire was divided, in the Spanish manner, into five military districts headed by marshals. p. 448

The decree on the regency and the establishment of the Privy Council was issued on February 1, 1858, soon after Orsini's attempt on Napoleon III. Pélissier was a member of the Council, which was to become the Regency Council if the Emperor's minor son acceded to the throne.

Marx refers to Pélissier's barbarous actions in 1845, during the suppression of an uprising in Algeria, when he ordered a thousand Arab insurgents who had hidden in mountain caves to be suffocated by smoke from fires. p. 448

At the end of 1858 the French journalist Montalembert was put on trial for writing an article condemning the regime of the Second Empire. Montalembert
was pardoned by Napoleon III but rejected the pardon and demanded his acquittal (see this volume, pp. 91-95 and 122). Marx draws a parallel between this trial and that of John Hampden, a prominent figure in the English seventeenth-century revolution, who refused to pay “ship money”—a tax not authorised by the House of Commons—and was put on trial in 1637. The Hampden trial increased the opposition to absolutism in England.

*Acte additionnel*—constitutional regulations introduced by Napoleon I in France in 1815 upon his return from the island of Elbe. Drawing a parallel between the Bonaparte and Orleans dynasties, in his pamphlet *De la justice dans la révolution et dans l'église*, Proudhon gave preference to the principles of government proclaimed by the Orleanists but with reservations concerning the necessity of certain democratic reforms. Marx ironically compares these reservations with the *Acte additionnel*.

On the rebellion at Châlon see Note 39. p. 448

348 On the negotiations in Warsaw between Prussia and Austria, and on the battle of Bronzell see Note 198.

By the “march to the North Sea” Marx means the entry of the Austrian troops in Holstein in the winter of 1851. See Note 228. p. 448

349 See Note 215. p. 448

350 See Note 315. p. 449

351 The “blue books of its own make” is what Marx, by analogy with the English Blue Books, calls the diplomatic documents of the Austro-Italo-French war of 1859, published in July 1859 in a number of German newspapers. Many of them were, for example, published in the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*, Nos. 170, 171 and 174, July 24, 26 and 29, 1859. A more complete collection was published in the Augsburg *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Nos. 210 (supplement), 211 and 212 (supplement), July 29, 30 and 31, 1859. p. 449

352 The Gauls who invaded Rome in 390 B.C. are said to have agreed, after a prolonged siege of the Capitol, to leave the city in return for a big ransom. But when the gold was being weighed, the Gauls’ leader Brennus cried “Vae victis!” (Woe to the defeated!) and threw his heavy sword on the scales, thus violating the agreement. p. 451

353 By courtesy—see Note 222.

On sufferance—in English law, the condition of one who continues to hold property without express leave from the owner. p. 452

354 After the flight of the Prince of Prussia to England during the March 1848 revolution his palace in Berlin was declared “national property”. See also Note 57. p. 453

355 Gothaisms is what Marx calls the pompous declarations of the Gotha party (see Note 87).

Uckermark—a northern part of the Brandenburg Province (Prussia), the mainstay of the reactionary Prussian Junkers. p. 453

356 Boustrapa—nickname of Louis Bonaparte, composed of the first syllables of the names of the places where he and his supporters staged Bonapartist putsches: Boulogne (August 1840), Strasbourg (October 1846) and Paris (the coup d’état of December 2, 1851). p. 454
357 Coercion bills—exceptional laws adopted by the British Parliament to suppress the revolutionary movement in Ireland. Marx is referring, in particular, to the 1833 law (see Note 105) and the 1848 law: An Act for the Better Prevention of Crime and Outrage in Certain Parts of Ireland.

358 Engels' review of Marx's book *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (present edition, Vol. 30) remained unfinished. Only two parts were published. The third part, in which Engels intended to analyse the economic content of the book, did not appear in print, and the manuscript has not been found.


359 Holland was part of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation from 1477 until the mid-1550s, when after the partition of the empire it came under Spain's rule. Towards the end of the sixteenth-century bourgeois revolution Holland was freed of Spanish rule and became an independent republic.

359 See Note 231.

360 See Note 231.

361 Cameralistics—a university course of administrative, financial, economic and other sciences taught in the Middle Ages and later.

362 An ironical allusion to the Right Hegelians, who in the 1830s and 1840s held many chairs in German universities and used their position to attack representatives of a more radical trend in philosophy; they gave a reactionary interpretation of Hegel's teaching.

Diadochi—generals of Alexander the Great, who, after his death, fought one another in a fierce struggle for power. In the course of this struggle (end of the fourth and the beginning of the third century B.C.) Alexander's Empire, an unstable military and administrative union, disintegrated into several independent states.

363 This refers to the Indian uprising of 1857-59 against British rule (see Note 208).

364 The reference is to the dispatch of an expeditionary corps to Italy in April 1849 under the pretext of defending the Roman Republic. Initiated by the President of the French Republic, Louis Bonaparte, this invasion of the Roman Republic aimed at restoring the Pope's temporal power (see K. Marx, *The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*, present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 45-145).


366 The Sardinian commissioners were sent by Victor Emmanuel to Florence, Modena and Romagna (the Papal states) which were in revolt against Austrian rule, to prepare the annexation of these territories to Piedmont. Following the conclusion of the Villafranca Peace Treaty (see Note 315) which aroused a protest movement throughout Italy, and under pressure from France, Victor Emmanuel recalled the commissioners.

367 The reference is to the repeal of the Corn Laws in June 1846 by the Peel Government in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie.
The Corn Laws (first introduced in the fifteenth century) imposed high import duties on agricultural produce in the interests of the landowners in order to maintain high prices for these products on the home market. The struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy over the Corn Laws ended in their repeal.

The discovery of rich gold deposits in California in 1848 and in Australia in 1851 greatly influenced the economic development of Europe and America. See also Note 3.

368 The Punjab (North-Western India) was conquered by the British East India Company as a result of the Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-46 and 1848-49. The conquest of the Punjab completed the British colonisation of India. p. 488

369 This refers to the Reformatory School Act of 1854 which instituted reformatory schools in England for delinquents from 12 to 16 years old. p. 489

370 This article is first mentioned in Marx’s letter to Engels of September 5, 1859: “I have written today ... about Italy and Hungary.” In a letter to Engels written on September 28, 1859 Marx gives more details about this subject: “The particulars about Kossuth in The Free Press are mine. (I have made two articles out of it for the Tribune and shall see whether it accepts them)” (see present edition, Vol. 40).

The item for The Free Press mentioned by Marx was published on September 28, 1859 (issue No. 10) under the title “Particulars of Kossuth’s Transaction with Louis Napoleon” (unsigned). The facts given in this item were used by Marx in an article in the New-York Daily Tribune whose editors probably combined Marx’s two articles into one.

Later, in his letter to Bertalan Szemere of October 8, 1859, Marx wrote: “I received today the New-York Daily Tribune ... which, under the title ‘Kossuth and Louis Napoleon’, brings an elaborate article of mine, filling two and a half columns ... this publication is a real success.”

In a letter to Engels, of November 19, 1859, Marx described the reaction of the Hungarian refugees in America to this article as follows: “The Hungarians in New York, Chicago, New Orleans, etc., have held meetings at which they resolved to send Kossuth a letter citing my article in the New-York Daily Tribune and suggesting he vindicate himself” (see present edition, Vol. 40).

371 This refers to Kossuth’s participation in the Central Committee of European Democracy set up in London in June 1850 on Mazzini’s initiative. The Committee united bourgeois and petty-bourgeois refugees from different countries. Extremely heterogeneous in its composition and ideological stand, the organisation only survived for a short time. It virtually ceased to exist by March 1852 because of the strained relations between Italian and French democratic refugees.

372 See Note 97. p. 498

373 Mansion House—residence of Lord Mayor in London. Free-Trade Hall—a hall in Manchester where Free Traders met. p. 500

374 The Manchester school—a trend in economic thought reflecting the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. It advocated Free Trade and non-interference by the
state in economic affairs. In the 1840s and 1850s the Free Traders constituted the Left wing of the Liberal Party in England. p. 502

375 The authorship of this article has been established by comparing its content with that of Marx's other articles on Italian affairs written in 1859 (see this volume, pp. 354-59, 380-83, 407-09, 416-20, 482-86) and on the basis of his correspondence which makes it possible to assert that in September 1859 Marx continued to write about Italy for the New-York Daily Tribune. The Tribune editors made some changes in the article. p. 504

376 See Note 315. p. 504

377 The article was published in full in the New-York Daily Tribune. The New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune published only the first two parts, and the New-York Weekly Tribune—only the first part. p. 508

378 See Notes 6 and 248. p. 508

379 As a result of the incident on the Peiho River in the summer of 1860, described in the text below, hostilities were resumed in the second Opium war which had been suspended by the Tientsin negotiations. The war ended in the signing, in October 1860, of the unequal Peking treaties. See Note 6. p. 508

380 The reference is to the bombardment of Canton by the British in October 1856. See Note 42. p. 510

381 See Note 374. p. 511

382 Peelites—moderate Tories, adherents of Robert Peel, who favoured concessions to the trading and industrial bourgeoisie in the sphere of economics and the continued political supremacy of the big landowners and financial magnates. In 1846 Peel secured the repeal of the Corn Laws in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie; this aroused great discontent among the Protectionist Tories and led to a split in the Tory Party and the formation of an independent group by the Peelites. After Peel’s death in 1850 the Peelites had no definite programme. At the end of the 1850s and the beginning of the 1860s they joined the Liberal Party which was then being formed. p. 511

383 See Note 6. p. 513

384 The English ambassador to Madrid, Sir Henry Bulwer, grossly interfered in the internal affairs of Spain. As a result he was expelled from the country on May 19, 1848 and diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off. p. 513

385 The reference is to the Kulju Treaty concluded between Russia and China in July 1851. Under it Russian merchants were allowed to trade in Kulju and Chuguchak. This treaty opened up regular and stable trade between Russia and China on their common Central Asian borders. p. 514

386 During the second Opium war, before the conclusion of the Tientsin Treaty with Britain and France, the Chinese Government signed the Aigun Treaty with Russia in May 1858. See Note 44. p. 514

387 The first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42) started with the invasion of Afghanistan by British occupation troops in Sind. The invasion was carried out under the pretext of rendering assistance to the pretender, Emir Dost Mohammed’s brother Shuja. However, a popular uprising in November 1841 against the British invaders and
their puppet Shuja compelled the British, who sustained a severe defeat, to withdraw.

388 The reference is to the arrest by the Chinese authorities in October 1856 of the lorcha Arrow sailing under the British flag with contraband opium. See Note 42.

389 This refers to the conflict between Lord Ellenborough, President of the Board of Control, and Lord Canning, Governor-General of India. In his dispatch of April 19, 1858 Ellenborough, who advocated a more flexible policy towards the Indian top feudal strata, sharply criticised Canning's proclamation of March 3, 1858 confiscating the lands of the Oudh feudal lords who had joined a national liberation uprising. However, Ellenborough's dispatch was not approved of by the British ruling classes and in May 1858 he had to resign his post as President of the Board of Control. Ellenborough was sacrificed to maintain the Derby Cabinet in power.

390 The item was written by Marx during his work on the second part of his article "The New Chinese War" (this volume, pp. 508-24) and included almost textually in it.

In The Free Press it was published under the title "Russia's Part in the Defence of the Pei-ho" (signed K. M.).

391 Reform Club—a liberal political club in London founded in 1834, the centre of the Liberals' struggle against the Conservatives.

392 Rotten boroughs—sparsely populated or depopulated small towns and villages in England which enjoyed the right to send representatives to Parliament since the Middle Ages. These representatives were practically appointed by the landed aristocracy, who controlled the handful of "free voters" who formally elected them. The "rotten boroughs" were disfranchised by the electoral reforms of 1832, 1867 and 1884.

393 See Note 175.

394 St. Stephen's Chapel—part of Westminster Palace, where the House of Commons has sat since 1547.

395 Myrmidons is the name given to a legendary tribe in South Thessaly whose warriors fought in the Trojan War under Achilles; it also means base servants, hired ruffians.

396 See Note 107.

397 On October 16, 1859 Austria, France and Sardinia met in conference in Zurich to work out the terms for a final peace treaty. Signed on November 10, the Zurich Peace Treaty was based, with certain changes, on the terms of the Villafranca preliminary peace treaty (see Note 315) and consisted of three separate diplomatic documents: the Austro-French treaty, the Franco-Sardinian treaty on the transfer of Lombardy to Sardinia, and a general Austro-Franco-Sardinian treaty.

398 Force majeure—circumstances beyond control, unforeseen circumstances; from Article 1148 of the Napoleonic code which reads: "There are no grounds for damages and interests when, as a result of circumstances beyond control or a chance happening, the debtor is prevented from giving or doing what he was obliged to, or has done what he was forbidden to do."
399 The Directory (consisting of five directors, one of whom was reelected every year)—the leading executive body in France instituted in accordance with the 1795 Constitution which was adopted after the fall of the revolutionary Jacobin dictatorship in 1794. Until the 1799 Bonapartist coup d'état the Directory was the government of France. It maintained a regime of terror against democratic forces and defended the interests of the big bourgeoisie.

The "blues" of 1848—the name given in France to bourgeois republicans as distinct from the "reds" (petty-bourgeois republicans and socialists, the so-called Montagne party) and the "whites" (monarchists, united in the Party of Order). The dictatorship of the "blues", headed by Cavaignac, was established during the suppression of the uprising of the Paris proletariat in June 1848 and lasted until the presidential elections in December of the same year.

400 The Münster Peace Treaty of October 24, 1648—one of the treaties known in history under the general title of the Treaty of Westphalia which ended the European Thirty Years' War (1618-48). Under this treaty concluded between the representatives of the German Empire and the German princes on the one hand and France on the other, France received Alsace (without Strasbourg) and had its rights to the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun confirmed; the German princes were acknowledged as sovereigns with the right to conclude political treaties and agreements with other countries independently of the German Emperor. The Münster Treaty led to a further weakening of the German Empire and consolidated France's dominant position in Central and Western Europe.

On the Treaty of Campoformio see Note 295.

401 Fearing the growth of the revolutionary movement in the country, Victor Emmanuel II did all he could during the war with Austria to restrict the actions of the Garibaldi volunteer corps which was supported by the people by submitting it to the most unfavourable conditions. After the conclusion of the Villafranca Treaty between France and Austria Garibaldi proposed continuing the struggle against the Austrians, but the volunteer corps was disbanded on Victor Emmanuel's insistence in November 1859.

402 The reference is to Prussia's national liberation war against Napoleonic France in 1813-15.

403 In this letter Mazzini suggested that the King should lead the struggle for the liberation and unification of Italy, arouse the South of Italy to the struggle with Garibaldi's help and organise a march on Rome. No action was taken on Mazzini's letter.

404 The reference is presumably to Haupt- und Staatsaktionen ("principal and spectacular actions"). The term has a double meaning. First, in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth century, it denoted plays performed by German touring companies. The plays were rather formless historical tragedies, bombastic and at the same time coarse and farcical.

Second, this term can denote major political events. It was used in this sense by a trend in German historical science known as "objective historiography". Leopold Ranke was one of its chief representatives. He regarded Haupt- und Staatsaktionen as history's main subject-matter.

405 The reference is to the Villafranca preliminary peace treaty.
Article 4 of the Franco-Sardinian treaty on the transfer of Lombardy to Sardinia stipulated that Sardinia would pay France 60 million francs "so as to diminish the expenses France contracted on the occasion of the last war".

See Note 41.

This refers to people engaged mainly in fishing and ferrying and living on the deltas of large rivers or in floating homes on the rivers.

In the autumn of 1830 the people of Hesse-Cassel rose against the heavy taxes and the government's customs policy.

The reference is to a union taking shape between Prussia, Saxony and Hanover.

Representatives of Prussia, Saxony and Hanover met in Erfurt from March 20 to April 29, 1850 to draw up a constitution for this union of states under Prussian supremacy. But the union did not materialise. See also Note 311.

England's rapid industrial development in the latter half of the eighteenth century intensified the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy. The parliamentary reform Bills mentioned in this article were one of the forms of its manifestation. The Bills were introduced by representatives of the ruling aristocratic circles who advocated a compromise with the industrial bourgeoisie. The Bill proposed by the Duke of Richmond in 1780 envisaged annual Parliaments, electoral rights for the adult male population and redistribution of constituencies. The Bill proposed by Pitt the Younger in 1785 provided for abolition of "rotten boroughs" (see Note 392) and redistribution of constituencies in favour of industrial centres. The Reform Bill introduced by Charles Grey in 1797 among other things also proposed abolition of "rotten boroughs" and an increase in the number of electors in rural constituencies. All these Bills were rejected by Parliament.

The reference is to the six emergency acts adopted by the British Parliament in 1819, abrogating inviolability of the person and limiting freedom of the press and assembly.

This refers to the Bills introduced by Locke King and John Russell (see Notes 173 and 176).

In a conversation with the French Ambassador in London, shortly after the Bonapartist coup d'état in France on December 2, 1851, the British Foreign Secretary Palmerston expressed approval of Louis Bonaparte's usurpation without consulting the other members of the Whig Ministry. This led to Palmerston's dismissal in December 1851. The British Government was nevertheless the first to recognise Bonaparte. In February 1858 Palmerston, who was then Prime Minister, was forced to resign in connection with his Conspiracy to Murder Bill (see Note 72).

In October 1859 Spain declared war on Morocco, and a Spanish force under General O'Donnell invaded Morocco. The campaign, which lasted until March 1860, met with stubborn resistance and brought the Spaniards no success. In April 1860 a peace treaty was concluded under which Spain received indemnities and insignificant territorial concessions.
Princésa Hussars—a light cavalry regiment in the Spanish army. p. 552

In November 1859 the French Government made a further attempt to violate Morocco's frontier with Algeria, but encountered Moroccan resistance. In reply a French squadron bombarded Fort Tetuan. p. 552

The reference is to France's aggressive wars in Algeria and Morocco in the 1830s-1850s, in particular to the military expeditions in Algeria in 1830 and in Morocco in 1851 and 1859. p. 555

In the autumn of 1836 at Constantine an Algerian force under Bey Haji Ahmed repulsed the attacks of the French troops trying to take the city by storm, and inflicted heavy losses on them. It was not until the autumn of 1837, during the second military expedition, that the French managed to capture the city after a siege. p. 556

Savoy, Nice and the Rhine was written by Engels in February 1860 and was a continuation of his Po and Rhine (see this volume, pp. 211-55). Engels was prompted to write it by Napoleon III's declaration about France's claims to Savoy and Nice. Engels' article "Savoy and Nice" (this volume, pp. 557-60) deals with the same subject. Engels used his excellent knowledge of military science, history and linguistics to lay bare the groundlessness of Bonaparte's claims to Savoy and Nice and to the left bank of the Rhine. He also wanted to prove, by analysing the course and results of the Austro-Italian French war, the correctness of the revolutionary proletarian positions on foreign policy questions which Marx and he advocated.

The Berlin publisher Duncker, who had printed Engels' pamphlet Po and Rhine anonymously, agreed to publish this new work only on condition that the author's name appeared on the title-page, as he disagreed this time with Engels' assessment of the positions of the German political parties. But Engels considered it necessary merely to point out that the new pamphlet belonged to the author of Po and Rhine: he did not want to reveal his authorship before it was necessary and thereby admit to military readers that both pamphlets had been written by a civilian. The pamphlet was published anonymously in Berlin by G. Behrend in April 1860. p. 567

The reference is to Napoleon III's New Year's statement to the Austrian ambassador (see Note 122); the marriage of Napoleon III's cousin, Prince Napoleon (Plon-Plon), to Princess Clotilde (see this volume, p. 168) whom Marx ironically calls Iphigenia, the name of the daughter of King Agamemnon, who according to Greek mythology, sacrificed her to the Gods before the Greeks' Trojan campaign; the Russo-French treaty of 1859 (see Note 261). p. 571

See Note 87. p. 572

These festivals were arranged in 1859 on the occasion of the centenary of Schiller's birth. p. 572

On the Basle Peace Treaty see Note 160.

At Ulm on October 17, 1805 the Austrians capitulated to Napoleon I. On the battle of Austerlitz see Note 130.

On the battle of Jena see Note 160. p. 573

Hofkriegsrat—the Court military council of Austria (1556-1848) controlling the military department and exercising the supreme leadership of military operations.
during the war. It remained far from the theatres of war and hindered the
commanders-in-chief by its constant interference. p. 574

427 See Note 315. p. 576

428 See Note 193. p. 577

The Kingdom of Westphalia was set up by Napoleon I on the territory of
Central Germany in 1807 and existed until 1813. The Westphalian throne was
given to Napoleon I's youngest brother Jérôme Bonaparte, the father of Prince
Napoleon (Plon-Plon). p. 577

The treaties of Villafranca and Zurich provided for the restoration of the
dukes of Modena, Parma and Tuscany who had been deposed as a result of the
insurrections in these duchies in 1859 (see Note 266). However, the growing
popular movement there for the incorporation in Piedmont made the
restoration of the former sovereigns impossible, and in 1860 Modena, Parma
and Tuscany were annexed to Piedmont. p. 577

431 The reference is to the "Loi relatif à des mesures de sûreté générale" (Law on
Public Security Measures) adopted by the Corps législatif on February 19, 1858.
It gave the Emperor and his government unlimited power to exile to different
parts of France or Algeria or to banish from French territory in general anyone
suspected of hostility to the Second Empire.
On Lambessa and Cayenne see Note 227. p. 579

432 The Hundred Days—the period of the short-lived restoration of Napoleon I's
empire, which lasted from the moment of his arrival in Paris from Elbe on
March 20, 1815 to his second deposition on June 22 of the same year,
following his defeat at Waterloo. p. 580

433 Sette comuni (Seven Communes) and Tredici comuni (Thirteen Communes)—
the names of small mountain areas with a German population in the southern
spurs of the Alps in Northern Italy. German settlements appeared there in the
second half of the thirteenth century. Their dialects have been preserved only
in a few villages. p. 593

434 The Rhaeto-Romanic language (from Rhaetia, a province of the Roman Empire)
belongs to the Romance group of languages and is spoken in the high-
mountain regions of South-Eastern Switzerland and North-Eastern Italy. p. 594

435 See Note 335. p. 596

436 The Ninth Thermidor (July 27-28, 1794)—counter-revolutionary coup d'état
which overthrew the Jacobin government and established the rule of the big
bourgeoisie. p. 597

437 This treaty was concluded in Basle on July 22, 1795 between France and Spain,
a member of the first anti-French coalition. p. 597

438 See Note 161. p. 597

439 See Note 147. p. 603

440 The reference is to the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807. The first meeting between
Napoleon I and Alexander I took place on a raft moored in the middle of the
Niemen. p. 603
Engels is referring here to conferences in Warsaw in May and October 1850 in which Russia, Austria and Prussia took part. See also p. 609 of this volume and Note 198.

On the Schleswig-Holstein question see Note 228.

On Austria's anti-Russian policy see Notes 125 and 228.

On the negotiations between the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg Lord Seymour and the Russian Emperor Nicholas I on the Turkish question which took place in early 1853 see Marx's articles "The Documents on the Partition of Turkey" and "The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence" (present edition, Vol. 13).

See Note 199.

See Note 263.

On the Russo-French treaty of 1859 see Note 261.

The Duchy of Warsaw—a vassal state formed by Napoleon I in 1807, under the Treaty of Tilsit, on a small Polish territory formerly annexed to Prussia. After the defeat of Austria in 1809 some of the Polish lands belonging to Austria were added to the Duchy. By decision of the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15 the territory of the Duchy of Warsaw was divided between Prussia, Austria and Russia.

The Bundesakte (Federal Act) adopted by the Congress of Vienna on June 8, 1815 proclaimed the formation of a German Confederation (see Note 147).

On the Congress of Laibach see Note 256.

At the Congress of Troppau—the second congress of the reactionary Holy Alliance (October-December 1820)—Russia, Austria and Prussia, in connection with the revolution in the Kingdom of Naples, signed a protocol proclaiming the right of armed interference in the internal affairs of other states. In particular, Austria was allowed to send troops to the Kingdom of Naples.

The Congress of Verona—the last congress of the Holy Alliance—was held from October to December 1822. It adopted a decision on French intervention in Spain, prolonged Austria's occupation of Italy and condemned the Greek insurgents.

The efforts of all these congresses were aimed at suppressing bourgeois revolutions and national liberation movements in Europe.

On May 8, 1852, representatives of Russia, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia and Sweden jointly with representatives of Denmark signed the London protocol on the integrity of the Danish monarchy. It was based on a protocol establishing the principle of the indivisibility of the domains of the King of Denmark, including the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and which was adopted on July 4, 1850 and finally signed on August 2, 1850 by the above-mentioned participants in the London Conference (with the exception of Prussia). In the London protocol the Tsar of Russia, being a descendant of the Duke Karl Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp who reigned in Russia under the name of Peter III, was referred to as one of the lawful pretendents to the throne of Denmark, who had renounced their right in favour of Duke Christian of Glücksburg, proclaimed successor to King Frederick VII. This created a
precedent for the Russian Tsar to lay claim to the Danish throne in the event of the extinction of the Glücksburg dynasty.

This unfinished draft of the article "Symptoms of the Revival of France's Internal Life" shows what great attention Marx paid to the growth of opposition sentiments in Bonaparte's empire and supplements his articles on the mounting financial, economic and political crisis in France published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* in 1858. Though Marx himself put only the day and month on the manuscript, the facts contained in the draft allow it to be dated 1858. The passages crossed out in the manuscript are not reproduced in this volume.

The chronological notes "The Italian War. 1859" were written by Engels probably on July 19, 1859 in response to Marx's request to write an article for the newspaper *Das Volk* "summing up the campaign" of Napoleon III in Italy (see Marx's letter to Engels of July 18, 1859 in Vol. 40 of the present edition). The notes were used by Engels for his article "The Italian War. Retrospect" (see this volume, pp. 421-34).

For an assessment of the true intentions of the European powers which favoured convening the congress and peaceful settlement of the conflict, see Engels' articles "The Proposed Peace Congress" and "War Inevitable" (this volume, pp. 274-78 and 287-89), Marx's article "The Proposed Peace Congress" (pp. 290-94), their joint article "The State of the Question.—Germany Arming" (pp. 295-98), and Marx's letter to Engels of April 22, 1859 (present edition, Vol. 40).

The revolution in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany (part of the Italian bourgeois revolution of 1859-60) began on April 27, 1859. The Provisional Government of Tuscany set up after the revolution was replaced on May 1, 1859 by a Cabinet of Ministers headed by Count Carlo Boncompagni, whom Victor Emmanuel appointed extraordinary royal commissioner in Tuscany. Engels calls this government the "Piedmontese commission".

See Note 151, and also this volume, pp. 557-60 and 567-608.

This is the draft of one of the lectures on political economy which Marx delivered to the German Workers' Educational Society in London from the autumn of 1859, after the publication of *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. This draft has something in common with the section on the division of labour in the original text of Chapter II of Marx's book (see present edition, Vol. 30).

The *German Workers' Educational Society in London* was founded in 1840 by German worker refugees, members of the League of the Just. After the founding of the Communist League in 1847 representatives of its local communities played the leading role in the Society, which had branches in various working-class districts in London. In 1847 and 1849-50 Marx and Engels took an active part in the Society's work, but in September 1850 they temporarily withdrew because the Willich-Schapper sectarian-adventurist group had increased its influence in the Society. In the late 1850s, when Marx's followers (Georg Eccarius, Friedrich Lessner, Karl Schapper, who had rejected his sectarian views, and others) prevailed again, Marx and Engels resumed their
activities in the Educational Society, which existed up to 1918, when it was closed by the British Government.

456 That this article was written by Marx is proved by his letter to Engels of November 2, 1858, in which Marx said that he had written about "the Portuguese affair" (see present edition, Vol. 40).

Informing Engels of the themes he dealt with in his work for the New-York Daily Tribune at that period (see the letter of November 29, 1858), Marx mentioned once more that he had written about "England's sham provocation in the Portuguese affair" (see present edition, Vol. 40). Marx touches on this subject in an earlier article, "The War Prospect in France" (this volume, pp. 261-66).

The editors of the New-York Daily Tribune probably cut out some passages of the article and distorted its concluding part by omitting criticism of the British colonial policy (see footnote on p. 623 of this volume). Since this article has been heavily edited it is given here in the Appendices.

457 The reference is to the conflict between France and Portugal caused by the seizure of the French merchant vessel Charles et Georges by the Portuguese authorities in Mozambique on November 29, 1857. The vessel had on board a number of East-African Negroes who were to be shipped, allegedly as free emigrants, to the French island of Réunion.

The Franco-Portuguese talks continued for almost a year but brought no results. On October 13, 1858 Napoleon III sent a special Note to the Portuguese Government demanding the return of the confiscated vessel and the release of its captain. The demand was backed by the dispatch of two French warships to the Portuguese capital. Portugal was compelled to yield.

458 The Lisbon Treaty of 1703 on the political and military alliance between England and Portugal against Spain and France, concluded during the war of the Spanish Succession of 1701-14, proclaimed an "eternal alliance" between Portugal and England.

459 These reviews printed in Das Volk (see Note 283) in the section “Gatherings from the Press” were directed against the newspaper Hermann published in London by the petty-bourgeois democrat Gottfried Kinkel. Besides Marx, Elard Biscamp also took part in writing them. Because of the Italian war of 1859 and the revival of the activities of the petty-bourgeois democratic refugees, Marx maintained that one of the most important tasks of Das Volk should be to combat the influence of the petty-bourgeois ideology on the workers. In these reviews Marx sharply criticised the political unprincipledness and illusions of the petty-bourgeois ideologists, their philistinism and ignorance. His reviews forced Kinkel to withdraw from the editorial board of the Hermann.

The reviews published in this volume criticise the contents of issues Nos. 21, 24, 26 and 27 of the Hermann for May 28, June 18, and July 2 and 9, 1859.

460 The reference is to the author of the poem quoted, which was printed in the newspaper over the signature of Kathinka Zitz, and the editor of the Hermann Gottfried Kinkel.

461 An ironical allusion to the ties between the petty-bourgeois democrat Schurz and Kinkel. On this see Marx’s and Engels’ pamphlet The Great Men of the Exile (present edition, Vol. 11).
The reference is to Kinkel's activity in the period of reaction in Europe which followed the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution. As a leader of the German petty-bourgeois democratic refugees, Kinkel proceeded in his policy not from the objective economic and socio-political conditions prevailing in Europe at the time, but from his own subjective, voluntarist idea that revolution in Europe might be started at any moment. In their pamphlet *The Great Men of the Exile* (present edition, Vol. 11), Marx and Engels denounced the illusory views and adventurist tactics of Kinkel and other leaders of the petty-bourgeois refugees.

This refers to Gottfried Kinkel, who began his career as a pastor's assistant.

Marx alludes to Vogt's naturalisation in Switzerland where he emigrated after the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution in Germany.

By calling Kinkel a Kreuzer (a German small coin) Marx derides his pettiness in money questions.

The reference is to the meetings held to mourn the death of the outstanding German scientist Alexander Humboldt (May 6, 1859), in which German refugees' organisations as well as the newspaper *Hermann* took part.

An allusion to the Erfurt Parliament (see Note 311).

See Note 154.

The Pre-Raphaelites—a school of painting in England in the second half of the nineteenth century. The Pre-Raphaelites imitated the style of the painters of the pre-Raphael Renaissance (hence the name of the school). Their creative work expressed a Romantic protest against the ugly reality of capitalism which they contrasted to the Middle Ages with their religiosity and mysticism.

In issue No. 12 of *Das Volk* (July 23, 1859) Biscamp, without notifying Marx, printed Georg Herwegh's arch-patriotic poem written on the occasion of the Federal Marksmen's Festival in Zurich. On July 30, 1859 Marx published an ironical editorial note (*Das Volk*, No. 13), which is given below.

In connection with the publication of Herwegh's poem Engels wrote to Marx on July 25, 1859: "How, by the way, could you permit Herwegh's lousy poem to be included?" (see present edition, Vol. 40). In his reply to Engels Marx wrote on August 1, 1859: "Herwegh's rotten poem got in without my knowing about it. I therefore compelled Biscamp to give an explanation in the last issue and, into the bargain, I got him to publish the Landwehr soldier's song (as a fitting sequel to Herwegh)" (ibid.).

In the summer of 1859 a mass movement for a nine-hour working day began in England. In London it embraced the building workers organised in trade unions. At the end of July 1859, when the employers refused to satisfy their demands for a shorter working day for the same pay, the building workers of the Trollop firm went on strike. The strike movement in London and other towns gained in strength, especially after the employers declared open war on the workers' unions at a joint meeting on July 27 by unanimously deciding not to employ workers belonging to trade unions and on August 6 declared a lockout of more than twenty thousand workers. The builders on strike and those affected by the lockout were aided by other workers, not only in London but in eighty other towns throughout the country. The strike continued until
February 1860 and ended in a compromise: the employers agreed to employ workers belonging to trade unions, but the workers had to give up their demand for a nine-hour working day.

472 In the late 1850s and early 1860s there emerged in England a Liberal Party composed of Whigs, Manchesterites (representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie) and Peelites (moderate Tories). The Liberals, who replaced the Whigs in the English two-party system, were opposed by the Conservative Party, which also took shape at this period and replaced the Tory Party.

473 The reference is to a meeting of representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie from the states of Northern and Central Germany in Eisenach on August 14, 1859. It discussed the main points of the liberal bourgeoisie’s programme providing for a reform of the German Confederation, the establishment of a strong centralised government headed by the King of Prussia, the formation of united armed forces, etc. This programme served as the basis for the founding of a new party, called the National Union (Nationalverein), at a congress in Frankfurt on September 15-16, 1859. The nucleus of the Union was the Gotha party (see Note 87).

It was in St. Paul’s Church that the German National Assembly held its sessions in 1848 and 1849.
NAME INDEX

A

Abdul Mejid (Abd Ul-Medjid) (1823-1861)—Sultan of Turkey (1839-61).—82

Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, Earl of (1784-1860)—British statesman, Tory, leader of the Peelites from 1850; Foreign Secretary (1828-30, 1841-46) and Prime Minister of the Coalition Ministry (1852-55).—513, 606

Ahmet Kiamil Bey—see Türr, István

Aesop (6th cent. B.C.)—semi-legendary Greek fabulist.—268, 499

Agénais—French worker, republican.—44

Albrecht Friedrich Rudolf (1817-1895)—Archduke of Austria, general; took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; civil and military Governor of Hungary (1851-60); was sent on a diplomatic mission to Berlin in 1859.—450, 458

Alexander I (1777-1825)—Emperor of Russia (1801-25).—52, 73, 145, 387

Alexander II (1818-1881)—Emperor of Russia (1855-81).—51-53, 60, 72, 139, 141, 144-47, 150, 254, 273, 289, 304, 343, 354, 357, 607

Alexander Ludwig Georg, Prince of Hesse (1823-1888)—Austrian general; in the Italian war of 1859 commanded at first a brigade and later a division.—349, 375

Alexei (Alexis) Michaelowitch (1629-1676)—Tsar of Russia (1645-76).—50

Ala-Kuly—Khan of Khiva (1825-42).—61

Allemandi, Michele Napoleone (1807-1858)—Italian general, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Italy, led the Lombard, Swiss and Genoese volunteers.—352

Anselme, Jacques Bernard Modeste d' (1740-1812)—French general, commander of an army during the 1792 war of revolutionary France against Austria.—596

Anstey, Thomas Chisholm (1816-1873)—British lawyer and politician, radical M.P. (1847-52), Attorney General for Hong Kong (1854-59).—511

Arminius (Hermann) the Cheruscan (17 B.C.-A.D. 21)—leader of the resistance of Germanic tribes against Roman rule, annihilated a Roman army in the Teutoburg Woods in A.D. 9.—625, 626

Armstrong, William George, Baron of Cragside (1810-1900)—English inventor of rifled cannon.—220

Arndt, Ernst Moritz (1769-1860)—German writer, historian and
philologist; took part in the German people's war of liberation against Napoleon.—217
Arnstein, Fanny, Baroness von (1758-1818)—wife of the banker Nathan Adam Arnstein.—325
Arnstein, Nathan Adam, Baron von (1743-1838)—Austrian banker, Consul-General of Sweden in Vienna.—325
d'Aspre, Constantin, Baron (1789-1850)—Austrian general, took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49.—229
Assurbanipal (Sardanapalus)—King of Assyria (668-c. 626 B.C.).—502
Attila (d. 453)—King of the Huns (433-53).—448
Auckland, George Eden, Earl of (1784-1849)—British statesman, Whig, held several ministerial posts, Governor-General of India (1835-42).—515
Auerswald, Rudolf von (1795-1866)—Prussian statesman, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (June-September 1848), Minister without portfolio (1858-62).—97, 101-03, 450
Augereau, Pierre François Charles, duc de Castiglione (1757-1816)—French general, marshal from 1804; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—597
Augusta Marie Luise Katharina (1811-1890)—wife of William, Prince of Prussia.—57, 67, 96, 97, 98, 117-19
Azeglio, Massimo Taparelli, marchese d' (1798-1866)—Italian statesman, moderate liberal, President of the Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Piedmont (1849-52), Sardinian plenipotentiary in Romagna in 1859.—484

B

Bach, Alexander, Baron von (1813-1893)—Austrian statesman, Minister of Justice (1848-49); from July 1849 to August 1859 held the post of Minister of the Interior and in fact directed the entire policy of Austria.—422
Baker, Robert, Esquire—inspector of factories in Ireland.—196, 209
Balabine (Balabin), Viktor Petrovich—Russian diplomat, ambassador to Vienna (1858-64).—290, 292, 304
Balfour, George (1809-1894)—British Consul in Shanghai (1843-66), member of the Military Finance Commission (1859-60).—14
Bangya, János (Mehemed Bey) (1817-1868)—Hungarian journalist and army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; Kossuth's emissary abroad after the defeat of the revolution and at the same time an agent-provocateur; later served in the Turkish army under the name of Mehemed Bey and was a Turkish agent in the Caucasus (1855-58) during the Circassians' war against Russia.—21-26, 497
Baraguay d'Hilliers, Achille, comte (1795-1878)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; commanded the Paris garrison in 1851 and a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—301, 330, 332, 338, 339, 349, 350, 362, 363, 368, 373, 376, 385, 398, 401, 422
Baraguay d'Hilliers, Louis (1764-1812)—French general, participant in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns; father of the above. —223
Baring, Sir Francis Thornhill (1796-1866)—British statesman, Whig, M.P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1839-41), First Lord of the Admiralty (1849-52).—4
Baring, Thomas (1799-1873)—financier, head of a banking house in London, Conservative M.P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852 and 1858).—304
Barni, Jules Romain (1818-1878)—
French politician and philosopher.—613

Barnum, Phineas Taylor (1810-1891)—American showman; circus producer.—446

Barrot, Camille Hyacinthe Odilon (1791-1873)—French lawyer and politician; leader of the liberal dynastic opposition until February 1848; headed the monarchist coalitions ministry (December 1848-October 1849); withdrew from political activities after the dismissal of the ministry in November 1849.—123, 613

Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, Jules (1805-1895)—French philosopher and politician, moderate republican.—613

Baudet, Jean Jacques, baron (1792-1862)—French politician; gave up political activities in the 1840s; contributed to the Revue des deux Mondes.—402

Bazaine, François Achille (1811-1888)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—350

Beaucharnais, Eugène de (1781-1824)—French general, stepson of Napoleon I; participant in Napoleon's campaigns including that of 1812 in Russia; Viceroy of Italy (1805-14).—220

Beaucharnais, Eugénie Hortense de (1783-1837)—mother of Napoleon III, wife of Louis Bonaparte, King of Holland.—67, 446

Beaumelle—see La Beaumelle, Laurent Angliviel de

Belisarius (Bélisaire or Belisar) (c. 504-565)—Byzantine general, associate of Emperor Justinian I.—42

Bem, Józef (1795-1850)—Polish general, prominent in the national liberation movement, participant in the Polish insurrection of 1830-31 and in the revolutionary events in Vienna in 1848; a leader of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49); emigrated to Turkey after the defeat of the revolution.—26

Bender, H.—a London bookseller, distributor of the newspaper Hermann.—626

Benedek, Ludwig von (1804-1881)—Austrian general, took part in the suppression of the peasant uprising in Galicia in 1846 and of the national liberation movement in Italy and Hungary in 1848 and 1849; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—329, 335, 336, 368, 385, 397-99, 401, 429, 430

Bennigsen, Rudolf von (1824-1902)—German politician, advocate of Germany's unification, under Prussia's supremacy; President of the National Union (1859-67).—638

Béranger, Pierre Jean de (1780-1857)—French poet, wrote many songs on satirical subjects; democrat.—42, 44, 316

Berger—Austrian general, commander of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—427

Bernstorff, Albrecht, Count von (1799-1873)—Prussian diplomat, envoy to London (1854-61), Foreign Minister (1861-62), ambassador to London (1862-73).—462

Berry, Marie Caroline de Bourbon, duchesse de (1798-1870)—mother of Count Chambord, Legitimist pretender to the French throne; in 1832 attempted to start an uprising in Vendée with the aim of overthrowing Louis Philippe.—42

Berreyer, Pierre Antoine (1790-1868)—French lawyer and politician, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Legitimist.—123, 613

Beta, Johann Heinrich (pen-name of Bettische) (1813-1876)—German journalist, democrat; a refugee in London, follower of Gottfried Kinkel.—629

Bethlen, Gergely, Count (1818-1867)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503

Bethmann-Hollweg, Moritz August von (1795-1877)—Prussian lawyer and
### Name Index

**politician, a leader of the Conservative Party; deputy to the first and the second Chambers of the Prussian Diet (1849-55), Minister of Religious Worship, Education and Medicine (1858-62).**—96, 104, 106

**Beuret, Georges (1803-1859)—**French general, participant in the Spanish expedition of 1823, the Algerian war and the intervention against the Roman Republic in 1849; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—339

**Bismarck-Schönhausen, Otto, Prince von (1815-1898) —**statesman of Prussia and Germany, diplomat; Prussian representative in the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main (1851-59); ambassador to St. Petersburg (1859-62) and Paris (1862); Prime Minister of Prussia (1862-71) and Chancellor of the German Empire (1871-90).—75, 268, 462

**Bixio, Jacques Alexandre (1808-1865) —**French journalist and politician, moderate republican; an editor of *Le National*: Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly (1848), Minister of Agriculture and Trade (from December 20 to 29, 1848), deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849).—170

**Blakeley—**British army officer and journalist; the *Times* correspondent in the Austrian army in the Italian war of 1859.—574, 575

**Blanchard, Georges Eugène (1805-1876)—**French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—339

**Bloomfield, John Arthur Douglas, Baron (1802-1876)—**British diplomat, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at St. Petersburg (1844-51) and Berlin (1851-60).—72, 463, 464

**Blücher, Gebhard Leberecht von, Prince of Wahlstadt (1742-1819)—**Prussian field marshal-general; took part in wars against Napoleon I;—252, 411

**Boër, Imre (1808-1859)—**Hungarian-born Austrian general; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—385, 427

**Bonaparte—**imperial dynasty in France (1804-14, 1815 and 1852-70).—99, 130, 152, 168, 170, 176, 240, 259, 261, 357, 417, 419, 500, 502

**Bonaparte, Jérôme (1784-1860)—**youngest brother of Napoleon I; King of Westphalia (1807-13), Marshal of France from 1850.—577

**Bonaparte, Joseph (1768-1844)—**eldest brother of Napoleon I, King of Naples (1806-08) and Spain (1808-13).—379

**Bonaparte, Prince Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul (1822-1891)—**son of Jérôme Bonaparte, cousin of Napoleon III; assumed the name of Jérôme after his elder brother's death (1847); deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; commander of a division in the Crimea in 1854; Minister for the Colonies and Algeria (June 1858-March 1859); commander of a corps in the Italian war of 1859; known under the nicknames of Plon-Plon and the Red Prince.—168-70, 256, 331, 348, 356, 388, 397, 400, 402, 433, 500-02, 577, 622

**Boncompagni di Mombello, Carlo (1804-1880)—**Italian statesman, moderate liberal, Sardinian plenipotentiary in Florence in 1859.—484

**Bonham, Sir Samuel George (1803-1863)—**British colonial official, Governor of Hong Kong and Superintendent of Trade in China (1847-52).—537

**Boniface, Louis (b. 1796) —**French journalist, Bonapartist.—171, 296, 303

**Bonin, Eduard von (1793-1865) —**Prussian general and statesman, War Minister (1852-54, 1858-59).—96, 104, 450

**Borgia (Borja), Cesare, Duke of Valentinois and Romagna (c. 1475-1507)—**member of an influential Italian feudal family, son of Pope Alexander VI, tried to establish a powerful absolutist state, famous for his unscrupulousness.—157

**Bouat, Marie Joseph Guillaume (1802-1859)—**French general, commander
of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—317

**Bourbaki, Charles Denis Sauter** (1816-1897)—French general, Greek by birth; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commander of a division in the Italian war of 1859.—275, 401

**Bourbons**—royal dynasty in France (1589-1792, 1814-15, 1815-30), in Spain (1700-1808, 1814-68, 1874-1931 and since 1975), in the Kingdom of Naples (1735-1806, 1815-60), and in Parma (1748-1859).—91, 483

**Bourboulon, A. de**—French plenipotentiary in China from 1852, minister to Peking (1859).—508, 509, 518

**Boustrapa**—see Napoleon III

**Brandenburg, Friedrich Wilhelm, Count von** (1792-1850)—Prussian general and statesman, head of the counter-revolutionary Ministry (November 1848-November 1850).—72

**Brennus**—legendary leader of the Gauls, who in 390 B.C. invaded Italy and captured Rome.—451

**Bright, John** (1811-1889)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; M.P. (from 1843); leader of the Left wing of the Liberal Party from the early 1860s; held several ministerial posts.—87-90, 135, 202-05, 410, 526, 545

**Broglie, Achille Charles Léonce Victor, duc de** (1785-1870)—French statesman, Prime Minister (1835-36), deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849-51), Orleanist; father of Albert Broglie.—92, 123

**Broglie, Jacques Victor Albert, duc de** (1821-1901)—French politician, writer and historian; contributed to the Catholic journal *Le Correspondant*: subsequently held several ministerial posts.—92

**Brougham and Vaux, Henry Peter, Baron** (1778-1868)—British statesman, lawyer and writer, Whig; Lord Chancellor (1830-34); from the 1850s was not very active in politics.—464, 531

**Bruce, Sir Frederick William Adolphus** (1814-1867)—British colonial administrator and diplomat, envoy to China (1858-65).—508-10, 513, 518, 520, 522

**Brunnow, Filipp Ivanovich, Baron** (1797-1875)—Russian diplomat, envoy (1840-54, 1858-60) and ambassador (1860-70, 1870-74) to London, member of the Russian delegation at the Paris Congress of 1856.—446

**Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus)** (c. 85-42 B.C.)—Roman politician, republican, an organiser of the conspiracy against Julius Caesar.—42

**Büchner, Ludwig Friedrich Karl Christian** (1824-1899)—German physiologist and philosopher, representative of vulgar materialism.—473

**Bülow, Dietrich Adam Heinrich, Baron von** (1757-1807)—Prussian military writer, author of the well-known book *Geist des neuer Kriegssystems*.—231-32, 315, 422, 426

**Bulwer, William Henry Lytton Earle** (Baron Dalling and Bulwer) (1801-1872)—British diplomat, ambassador to Madrid (1843-48).—513

**Bulwer-Lytton**—see Lytton, Edward George Earle Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton

**Buol-Schauenstein, Karl Ferdinand, Count von** (1797-1865)—Austrian statesman and diplomat, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1852-59).—288, 290-92, 297, 421

**Burdett-Coutts, Angela Georgina, Baroness** (1814-1906)—favourite of Napoleon III.—448

**Buridan, Jean** (1300-1358)—French philosopher.—159

**Burnes, Sir Alexander** (1805-1841)—British colonel; was sent on a mission to Kabul (1836-38), political officer with the army at Kabul (1839-41).—514-16

**Burnes, James** (1801-1862)—English physician, brother of the above.—515

**Caligula** (Gaius Julius Caesar Germanicus) (12-41)—Roman Emperor (37-41).—157

**Camou, Jacques** (1792-1868)—French
Name Index

general, Senator; participant in the Crimean war of 1853-56; commanded a guard division in the Italian war of 1859.—375

**Campbell**—sub-inspector of factories in Scotland.—195

**Camphausen, Ludolf** (1803-1890)—German banker, a leader of the Rhenish liberal bourgeoisie, Prime Minister of Prussia from March to June 1848.—54, 68, 76, 101, 102, 104

**Canning, Charles John, Earl** (1812-1862)—British statesman, Tory, then Peelite; Governor-General of India (1856-62), organised the suppression of the Indian national liberation uprising of 1857-59.—279-82

**Canning, George** (1770-1827)—British statesman and diplomat, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1807-09, 1822-27), Prime Minister (1827).—30

**Canrobert, François Certain** (1809-1895)—Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; an active participant in the coup d’état of December 2, 1851; commander-in-chief of the French army (September 1854-May 1855) during the Crimean war; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—301-02, 330, 360, 362, 363, 365, 369, 373, 374, 376, 379, 399, 401

**Capo d'Istria (Capodistrias), Giovanni Antonio (Joannes), Count** (1776-1851)—Greek statesman; from 1809 to 1822 was in the Russian service, Second Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Russia (1815-22), President of Greece (1827-31).—132

**Carden, Sir Robert Walter** (b. 1801)—British official, Tory M.P.—526-29

**Cardwell, Edward Cardwell, Viscount** (1813-1886)—British statesman, Peelite, later liberal; Secretary for Ireland (1859-61).—4

** Carlyle, Thomas** (1795-1881)—British writer, historian and philosopher, Tory; preached views bordering on feudal socialism up to 1848; later a relentless opponent of the working-class movement.—191

**Carrel, Armand** (1800-1836)—French journalist, liberal; one of the founders and editor of Le National.—44

**Cass, Lewis** (1782-1866)—American statesman, general and diplomat, member of the Democratic Party; minister to France (1836-42), Secretary of State (1857-60).—621

**Castelborgo**—Italian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—362, 363

**Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Marquis of Londonderry, Viscount Castlereagh** (1769-1822)—British statesman, Tory; Secretary for War and for the Colonies (1805-06, 1807-09), Foreign Secretary (1812-22).—135, 608

**Catherine II** (1729-1796)—Empress of Russia (1762-96).—73, 139

**Cavour, Camillo Benso, conte di** (1810-1861)—Italian statesman, head of the Sardinian Government (1852-59, 1860-61), pursued a policy of unifying Italy under the supremacy of the Savoy dynasty relying on the support of Napoleon III; headed the first government of united Italy in 1861.—149, 150, 288, 297, 354, 356-58, 413, 417, 421, 615

**Chambord, Henri Charles, duc de Bordeaux, comte de** (1820-1883)—last representative of the elder line of the Bourbons, grandson of Charles X, pretender to the French throne under the name of Henry V.—42

**Chandos**—see Grenville, Richard, Duke of Buckingham and Chandos

**Charles I** (1600-1649)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1625-49), beheaded during the English revolution.—75

**Charles II** (1630-1685)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1660-85).—75

**Charles V** (1500-1558)—Holy Roman Emperor (1519-56), King of Spain (1516-56) as Charles (Carlos) I.—357

**Charles Albert** (Carlo Alberto) (1798-1849)—King of Sardinia (1831-49).—151, 418

**Charlemagne** (Charles the Great) (c. 742-814)—King of the Franks (768-814) and Holy Roman Emperor (800-814).—272

**Charlesworth, John C. Dodson**—British
Conservative, M.P. from Wakefield (1857).—530

Charlotte Louise (Alexandra Fyodorovna) (1798-1860)—wife of the Russian Emperor Nicholas I, eldest daughter of Frederick William III of Prussia. —72

Charlotte (or Carlotta), Marie Amélie Augustine Victoire Clémentine Léopoldine, Princess (1840-1927)—Archduchess of Austria, wife of Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph. —149

Chateaubriand, François René, vicomte de (1768-1848)—French writer, statesman and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1822-24).—608

Chatelain, Amable Pierre Eugène (1829-1902)—French poet, participant in the 1848 revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871.—44

Cialdini, Enrico, duca di Caeta (1811-1892)—Italian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—360-62

Cid, the (Campeador the Cid) (real name—Rodrigo Diaz de Bivar) (c. 1043-1099)—Spanish national hero, famous for his exploits in the wars against the Moors; hero of a number of literary works.—549

Clam-Gallas, Eduard, Count (1805-1891)—Hungarian-born Austrian general; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—372, 397

Clausewitz, Karl von (1780-1831)—Prussian general and military theoretician.—435, 445, 599

Clement VII (Giulio de Medici) (1478-1534)—Pope (1523-34).—357

Clothilde, princesse de Savoie (1843-1911)—daughter of Victor Emmanuel II of Sardinia; wife of Prince Jérôme Napoleon from 1859.—168-70

Cobden, Richard (1804-1865)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; M.P. —410

Coburgs—a family of German dukes, belonging to or connected with the royal dynasties of Belgium, Portugal, Britain and other European countries.—99

Colloredo-Melz und Wallsee, Wenzel Joseph, Count (1758-1822)—Austrian general, field marshal from 1808, participant in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic and Napoleon I.—597

Coningham, William (b. 1815)—English radical M.P.—410

Conolly, Arthur (1807-1842)—British army officer, envoy to Khiva in 1840, arrested and killed in Bukhara.—61

Constantine (Konstantin Nikolayevich) (1827-1892)—Grand Duke of Russia, second son of Nicholas I; Admiral-General, head of the Sea Department (1853-81) and the Navy (1855-81); as a member of the Chief Peasant Question Committee in 1858-61 took part in preparing and effecting the 1861 Peasant Reform. —51, 304, 357, 603

Cooke, George Wingrove (1814-1865)—English liberal historian and journalist, the Times correspondent in China in 1857.—29, 31, 84

Coppack, James (1798-1857)—English lawyer, an agent for the elections to Parliament.—526, 528

Cordon, Franz, Baron (1796-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—373, 376, 377

Costa de Beauregard, Louis Marie Pantaléon, Marchese (1806-1864)—Italian aristocrat, deputy to the Sardinian Parliament from Savoy (1848-49).—581

Courier, Paul Louis (1772-1825)—French philologist and writer, democrat; opposed the aristocratic and clerical reactionaries in France.—44

Cousin, Victor (1792-1867)—French philosopher.—42

Coutts, Miss—see Burdett-Coutts, Angela Georgina, Baroness

Cowley, Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, Baron of (1804-1884)—British diplomat, ambassador to Paris (1852-67).—304, 307, 615

Crawford, Robert Wygram—member of the House of Commons (1857-59).—286

Cucchiari, Domenico (1806-1900)—
Italian general, commanded a Piedmontese division in the Italian war of 1859.—362, 363

Cuza, Alexandru (1820-1873)—Romanian politician; from 1859 to 1866 hospodar (under the name of Alexandru Ioan Cuza I) of the Danubian Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia which in 1862 formed a united Romanian state.—447

Czeck (Czetz), János (1822-1904)—Hungarian general; during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary Chief of the General Staff of the revolutionary army in Transylvania; emigrated after the defeat of the revolution.—503

Dahlmann, Friedrich Christoph (1785-1860)—German historian and politician, liberal, deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right centre) in 1848.—71

Dalhousie, James Andrew Broun-Ramsay, Earl and Marquis of (1812-1860)—British statesman, Peelite, Governor-General of India (1847-56), pursued a policy of colonial conquests.—284

Danilo I Petrović Njegoš (1826-1860)—Prince of Montenegro (1852-60).—446

Delescluze, Louis Charles (1809-1871)—participant in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848 in France, sentenced to four-year imprisonment in 1851, after which he was exiled to penal servitude in Cayenne; member of the Paris Commune.—43

Denman, Thomas, Baron (1779-1854)—British lawyer and statesman, Whig, member of the House of Lords, Lord Chief Justice (1832-50).—278


Dessolle, Jean Joseph Paul Augustin, marquis (1767-1828)—French general, participant in Napoleon I’s wars, later Legitimist.—221

Diogenes Laertius (3rd cent.)—Greek historian of philosophy, compiled a large work on the ancient philosophers.—629

Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881)—British statesman and writer, a Tory leader; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Prime Minister (1868, 1874-80).—4, 202-04, 520, 521

Dixon, Joshua—American banker; left for England in 1852, a manager of the Board of the Liverpool Borough Bank and from August 1857 its Managing Director.—35

Dormus—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—375

Dost Mohammed Khan (1793-1863)—Afghan Emir (1826-39, 1842-63).—514-16

Dréolle, Jean Baptiste Ernest (1829-1887)—French journalist, contributed to several newspapers.—169

Duncker, Franz (1822-1888)—German politician and publisher, founder and editor of the Volks-Zeitung (1853-59).—465

Dupin, André Marie Jean Jacques (1783-1865)—French lawyer and politician, Orleanist, deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848-19) and President of the Legislative Assembly (1849-51); subsequently Bonapartist.—91

Dupoty, Michel Auguste (1797-1864)—French journalist, took part in publishing several republican-democratic newspapers.—44

Durando, Giovanni (1804-1869)—general of the Piedmontese army, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—228, 362, 363, 401

Dürfeld—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

Duvergier de Hauranne, Prosper (1798-1881)—French liberal politician and writer.—613
**Duvernoy, Heinrich Gustav** (1802-1890)—Württemberg statesman, Minister of the Interior in the Liberal Ministry (1848-49), deputy to the Provincial Diet (1851-68), advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy, one of the founders of the National Union.—405

**Echagüe, Rafael, conde del Serrallo** (1815-1887)—Spanish general, participant in the 1854-56 revolution, belonged to the Moderado Party; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—548, 549, 553, 554

**Eglinton and Winton, Archibald William** Montgomerie, Earl of (1812-1861)—British statesman. Tory, Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland (1852, 1858-59).—134, 135, 137

**Elgin, James Bruce, Earl of Elgin and Kincardine** (1811-1863)—British diplomat, plenipotentiary extraordinary to China (1857-58, 1860-61), Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1862-63).—84, 509-11, 519, 520-23, 536-38

**Elisabeth** (1801-1873)—Queen of Prussia, wife of Frederick William IV.—55-57, 67, 70, 97, 118, 126-27, 320

**Ellenborough, Edward Law, Earl of** (1790-1871)—British statesman. Tory, member of the House of Lords, Governor-General of India (1842-44), First Lord of the Admiralty (1846), President of the Board of Control for India (1858).—203, 285, 286, 440, 523

**Elphinstone, John, Baron** (1807-1860)—British official in India, Governor of Madras (1837-42) and Bombay (1853-59).—283

**Elsner, Karl Friedrich Moritz** (1809-1894)—Silesian radical journalist and politician, deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left wing) in 1848; an editor of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* in the 1850s.—115

**Emmet, Anthony** (1790-1872)—British military engineer, major-general from 1855, commanding royal engineer at St. Helena (1815-21).—251

**Engels, Frederick** (1820-1895).—572, 616, 624

**Eskeles, Bernhard, Baron von** (1753-1839)—Austrian banker, one of the founders of Arnstein & Eskeles firm.—325

**Eskeles, Denis, Baron von** (1804-1876)—Austrian banker, Consul-General of Denmark in Vienna.—325

**Espinasse, Charles Marie Esprit** (1815-1859)—French general, Bonapartist; an active participant in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—375

**Esquiroz, Henri François Alphonse** (1812-1876)—French writer; in 1840 was sentenced to imprisonment for his book *L'Evangile du peuple*; after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 was expelled from France.—44

**Eugène, Prince**—see Beauharnais, Eugène de

**Eugénie Marie Ignace Augustine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba** (1826-1920)—Empress of France, wife of Napoleon III.—167, 379, 448

**Euripides** (c. 480-406 B.C.)—Greek dramatist.—451

**Faliero (Falter), Marino** (1274-1355)—Doge of Venice (1354-55), executed for conspiring against the rule of the nobility.—271

**Falloux, Frédéric Alfred Pierre, comte de** (1811-1886)—French politician and writer, Legitimist and clerical; in 1848 initiated the closure of the national workshops and inspired the suppression of the June uprising of the Paris workers; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Minister of Education (1849).—122
Fanti, Manfredo (1808-1865)—Italian general and statesman, participant in the national liberation and revolutionary movements in Italy in 1848-49; commanded a Piedmontese division in the Italian war of 1859.—361-63, 401

Farini, Luigi Carlo (1812-1866)—Italian statesman and historian, Sardinian plenipotentiary in Modena in 1859.—485

Ferdinand II (1810-1859)—King of the Two Sicilies (1830-59), nicknamed King Bomba for the bombardment of Messina in 1848.—151, 153, 154, 289

Ferdinand IV—see Lorena, Ferdinando di

Ferdinand Maximilian Joseph (1832-1867)—Archduke of Austria, Governor-General of the Lombardo-Venetian Kingdom (1857-59), Emperor of Mexico under the name of Maximilian (1864-67).—149, 154

Ferrier, François Louis Auguste (1777-1861)—French economist, government official, advocate of mercantilism.—446

Festetics, Tassilo (Tasziló), Count (1813-1883)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—334-35

Feuerbach, Ludwig Andreas (1804-1872)—German philosopher.—472, 473

Filangieri, Carlo, principe di Satriano e duca di Taormina (1784-1867)—Neapolitan general and statesman, Prime Minister and War Minister (1859-60).—289

Fleury, Émile Félix, comte (1815-1884)—French army officer and diplomat, Bonapartist, active participant in the coup d’État of December 2, 1851.—170

Flottwell, Eduard Heinrich von (1786-1865)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Finance (1844-46). Oberpräsident of Posen and later of Westphalia: deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848-49; Minister of the Interior (1858-59).—70, 96, 116, 117, 125

Forey, Élie Frédéric (1804-1872)—French general, later marshal, Senator, Bonapartist; participant in the coup d’État of December 2, 1851; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—332, 336, 338, 339, 347, 349

Francis I (1494-1547)—King of France (1515-47).—627

Francis II (1836-1894)—King of the Two Sicilies (1859-60).—409, 412

Francis V (1819-1875)—Archduke of Austria, Duke of Modena (1846-59).—151, 273, 412, 535


Frederick I (1657-1713)—Elector of Brandenburg under the name of Frederick III (from 1688); King of Prussia (1701-13).—71

Frederick II (the Great) (1712-1786)—King of Prussia (1740-86).—73, 77, 159, 252, 446

Frederick William I (1688-1740)—King of Prussia (1713-40).—71, 73

Frederick William I (1802-1875)—Elector of Hesse-Cassel (1847-66); Regent (1831-47).—540, 542-44

Frederick William II (1744-1797)—King of Prussia (1786-97).—71, 73

Frederick William III (1770-1840)—King of Prussia (1797-1840).—71-73, 97, 102, 104, 446

Frederick William IV (1795-1861)—King of Prussia (1840-61).—54-57, 65-68, 70-72, 75, 97, 99, 104, 105, 107, 117, 118, 121, 126, 159-61, 320, 638

Freiligrath, Ferdinand (1810-1876)—German romantic and later revolutionary poet; member of the Communist League; one of the editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung (1848-49).—624

Fréron, Élie Catherine (1719-1776)—French critic and writer, literary opponent of Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists.—380

Friedrich Wilhelm Ludwig (1794-1863)—Prince of Prussia, general, nephew of Frederick William III.—99
**Friedrich Wilhelm Nikolaus Karl** (1831-1888)—Crown Prince of Prussia and the German Empire; general; son of William I; King of Prussia and Emperor of Germany under the name of Frederick III (1888).—68, 117

**Gerlach, Ludwig Friedrich Leopold von** (1790-1861)—Prussian politician, general, headed the reactionary camarilla in the 1840s; adjutant general of Frederick William IV in 1850. —72, 97

**Germyny, Charles Gabriel Le Bègue, comte de** (1789-1871)—French statesman and financier, Bonapartist; Minister of Finance (January-April 1851), Governor of the Crédit Foncier (1854-56) and of the Bank of France (1857-63).—168

**Gibson, Thomas Milner** (1806-1884)—British politician and statesman, Free Trader, later liberal, President of the Board of Trade (1859-65, 1865-66).—511, 512, 520

**Ginain, Louis Eugène** (1818-1886)—French battle-painter. —495

**Girardin, Émile de** (1806-1881)—French journalist and politician; editor of La Presse in the 1830s-1860s (with intervals); moderate republican during the 1848-49 revolution; deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1850-51); later Bonapartist; notorious for his lack of principles in politics. —170

**Gladstone, William Ewart** (1809-1898)—British statesman, Tory, then Peelite, leader of the Liberal Party in the second half of the nineteenth century; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66), Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-85, 1886, 1892-94).—4, 129, 130, 511

**Godunov, Boris** (c. 1552-1605)—Tsar of Russia (1598-1605). —139

**Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von** (1749-1832)—German poet. —67, 98, 99, 405, 452

**Gorchakov, Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince** (1798-1883)—Russian statesman and diplomat, ambassador to Vienna (1854-56), Foreign Minister (1856-82), State Chancellor (1867-82).—455, 462, 571, 602, 606-09

**Gordon, Anton, Baron** (1767-1832)—Austrian general, took part in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic. —584

**Granier de Cassagnac, Bernard Adolphe** (1806-1880)—French journalist, lack-
ed principles in politics; Orleanist prior to the 1848 revolution, later Bonapartist; deputy to the Corps législatif during the Second Empire; contributed to the newspaper Le Constitutionnel.—485

Great Moguls—dynasty of Indian padishahs (1526-1858).—284


Grey, Charles, Earl of, Viscount Howick, Baron Grey (1764-1845)—British statesman, a Whig leader; First Lord of the Admiralty (1806), Prime Minister (1830-34).—545

Grey, Sir Henry George, Earl (1802-1894)—British statesman, Whig, Secretary at War (1835-39), Colonial Secretary (1846-52); son of Charles Grey.—132

Gruber—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

Grünne, Karl Ludwig, Count von Pinchard (1808-1884)—Austrian general, belonged to the Court camarilla, adjutant general of Emperor Francis Joseph (1850-59).—393, 397, 422

Guernsey, William Hudson, alias Guernsey, Wellington (born c. 1819)—British official.—129, 131, 133

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume (1787-1874)—French historian and statesman: virtually directed France's home and foreign policy from 1840 to the February 1848 revolution.—42, 204

Guylay, Franz (or Gyulai, Ferenc), Count von Maros-Németh und Nadaska (1798-1868)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth: took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; War Minister (1849-50); during the Italian war of 1859 commanded an Austrian army until the defeat at Magenta (April-June 1859).—154, 297, 316-19, 321, 322, 328, 338, 349, 365-67, 368-70, 372, 373-75, 376-79, 387, 389, 422-27, 433, 574, 575

H

Habsburgs (or Hapsburgs)—dynasty of emperors of the Holy Roman Empire from 1273 to 1806 (with intervals), of Spanish kings (1516-1700), of emperors of Austria (1804-67) and of Austria-Hungary (1867-1918).—149, 344, 382, 392, 417, 419, 629

Hadfield, George (1787-1879)—British politician, radical, M.P. (1852-74).—515

Hadji (Haji) Abd Saleem—commander of the Moroccan troops at Tétouan during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—549

Hailbronner, Karl von (1789-1864)—Bavarian military writer and traveller.—216, 238, 240, 246

Hampden, John (c. 1595-1643)—prominent figure in the English revolution, a leader of the Parliamentary opposition to the absolutist regime.—448

Handel, George Frederick (1685-1759)—German composer.—545

Hansemann, David Justus Ludwig (1790-1864)—German capitalist, a leader of the Rhine liberal bourgeoisie: Finance Minister of Prussia (from March to September 1848).—102, 103

Hartmann—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

Hartung, Ernst (1808-1879)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

Hassenpflug, Hans Daniel Ludwig Friedrict (1794-1862)—German statesman, advocate of absolutism, Minister of Justice and the Interior of Hesse-Cassel (1832-37), head of the Hesse-Cassel Ministry (1850-55).—543

Hauff, Wilhelm (1802-1827)—German poet and novelist.—54

Haugwitz, Christian August Heinrich Kurt, Count von (1752-1832)—Prussian statesman, Foreign Minister (1792-1804, 1805-06).—269

Hauréau, Jean Barthélemy (1812-1896)—French historian and writer, moderate republican.—613
Haussonville, Joseph Othenin Bernard de Cléron, comte d’ (1809-1884) — French writer and politician. — 613
Havas, Charles (1785-1858) — French journalist, founder of the French information agency Agence Havas. — 23
Haxthausen, August Franz Ludwig Maria, Baron von (1792-1866) — Prussian official and writer; author of works on the agrarian system and the peasant commune in Russia. — 608
Haynau, Julius Jakob, Baron von (1786-1853) — Austrian general; took part in suppressing the 1848-19 revolution in Italy; commanded the Austrian troops in Hungary (1849-50); initiated brutal repressions against Hungarian revolutionaries. — 154
Head, Sir Francis Bond (1793-1875) — British colonial administrator, traveller and writer. — 258-60
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831) — German philosopher. — 159, 456, 466, 472-75
Heine, Heinrich (1797-1856) — German revolutionary poet. — 215, 217, 406
Heise, Heinrich (d. 1860) — German journalist, democrat, participant in the 1848-49 revolution, emigrated to England. — 624
Heliogabalus (Elagabalus) (204-222) — Roman Emperor (218-22); his name became the symbol of extravagance, despotism and debauchery. — 500
Hengstenberg, Ernst Wilhelm (1802-1869) — German theologian, professor of Berlin University. — 160
Henley, Joseph Warner (1793-1884) — British statesman, Tory, President of the Board of Trade (1852, 1858-59). — 84, 205
Henry V — see Chambord, Henri Charles
Henszlmann, Imre (1813-1888) — Hungarian archaeologist; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after its defeat. — 503
Hermann — see Arminius
Herwegh, Georg Friedrich (1817-1875) — German democratic poet. — 635
Hess, Heinrich Hermann Josef, Baron von (1788-1870) — Austrian general, later field marshal, took part in suppressing the 1848-19 revolution in Italy; commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops in Hungary, Galicia and the Danubian Principalities (1854-55); during the Italian war of 1859 commanded the Austrian army after the defeat at Magenta (June-July 1859). — 185, 319, 321, 328, 371, 387, 393, 402, 403, 422, 425, 428, 429, 432, 435-37, 574
Hesse, Prince of — see Alexander Ludwig Georg, Prince of Hesse
Heu Naetse (Hsü Nai-tsi) — Chinese statesman, judge in the province of Kwangtung (1834), Vice President of the Sacrificial Court at Peking (1836). — 18
Heydt, August, Baron von der (1801-1874) — Prussian conservative statesman, Elberfeld banker; Minister of Trade, Industry and Public Works (from December 1848 to 1862); deputy to the Second Chamber (1848). — 97, 104, 105
Hien-Fung (Hsien Feng) (c. 1831-1861) — Chinese Emperor (1850-61). — 17, 18, 83, 84, 509, 513
Hohenstaufen — dynasty of emperors of the Holy Roman Empire (1138-1254). — 225
Hohenzollern — dynasty of Brandenburg electors (1415-1701), Prussian kings (1701-1918) and German emperors (1871-1918). — 67, 71, 72, 77, 98, 118, 269, 312, 344, 419
Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, Karl Anton, Prince von (1811-1885) — Prussian general, Prime Minister (1858-62). — 96, 97, 98, 99, 106
Homer — semi-legendary Greek epic poet, author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. — 42, 129
Hope, Sir James (1808-1881) — British admiral, commanded a military expedition in China (1859-60). — 508-09, 517
Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) (65-8 B.C.) — Roman poet. — 89, 634
Horner, Leonard (1785-1864) — English geologist and public figure, commissioner to inquire into employment of children in factories and a chief inspector under Factories Act (1833-
56), took the side of the workers.—191-93

Hortense—see Beauharnais, Eugénie Hortense de

Hübner, Joseph Alexander, Count von (1811-1892)—Austrian diplomat, envoy (1849-56) and ambassador (1856-59) to Paris.—149, 155, 256, 272, 273

Hudson, George (1800-1871)—English capitalist, big railway owner, Tory M.P. (1845-59).—102

Hugo, Victor Marie (1802-1885)—French writer; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; opposed Louis Bonaparte.—448

Humboldt, Alexander von (1769-1859)—German naturalist and traveller.—312, 627, 629

Hunt, Freeman (1804-1858)—American journalist, publisher of The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review (1839-58).—14

Hütten, Ulrich von (1488-1523)—German poet, advocate of the Reformation, ideologist of and participant in the knights' uprising in 1522-23.—160

I

Ihász, Dániel (1813-1882)—Hungarian army officer; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary, later emigrated; friend of Kossuth.—503

Ingram, Herbert (1811-1860)—English radical M.P.—410

Irányi, Dániel (1822-1892)—Hungarian politician and journalist; participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary, deputy to Parliament, then commissar of the revolutionary government, after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503

Ivan III (1440-1505)—Grand Duke of Muscovy (1462-1505).—500

J

Jacobi, Karl Wigand Maximilian (1775-1858)—German psychiatrist.—54

Jacoby, Johann (1805-1877)—German radical writer and politician; in 1848 one of the leaders of the Left wing in the Prussian National Assembly; in the 1870s was close to the Social-Democrats.—74, 115

James I (1566-1625)—King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1603-25).—75

James II (1633-1701)—King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1685-88).—75

Jannin—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

Jomini, Henri, Baron (1779-1869)—general serving in the French and later in the Russian army, Swiss by birth; military theoretician, author of several works on strategy and military history.—226

Jones, Ernest Charles (1819-1869)—prominent figure in the English working-class movement, proletarian poet and journalist, a leader of the Left Chartist; friend of Marx and Engels; in 1858 came to an agreement with bourgeois radicals, which was the cause of Marx's and Engels' temporary break with him.—410, 411

Joseph Karl Ludwig (1833-1905)—Archduke of Austria, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

Josephine Friederike Luise, Princess of Baden (1813-1900)—daughter of the Duchess of Baden Stéphanie and wife of Karl Anton Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—98

Joubert, Barthélemy Catherine (1769-1799)—French general, took part in Bonaparte's Italian campaign in 1796-99; commander-in-chief of the army in Italy (1798-99).—223

Juch, Hermann—German journalist, petty-bourgeois democrat, refugee in London, Kinkel's supporter, editor of the newspaper Hermann (from July 1859).—630, 631

Juvenal (Decimus Junius Juvenalis) (born c. 60-d. after 127)—Roman satirical poet.—102, 293, 483
Kabat—Pole by birth, captain of the Turkish army.—25
Kalmár, Józef—Hungarian émigré in Turkey.—23, 26
Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804)—German philosopher.—103, 473
Kaye, Sir John William (1814-1876)—British military historian and colonial official, Secretary of the Political and Secret Department of the India Office (1858-74), author of History of the War in Afghanistan (1851).—515
Kellermann, François Christophe, duc de Valmy (1735-1820)—French general, from 1804 marshal, took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I’s campaigns, later Legitimist.—584
Khudayar Khan (born c. 1829)—Khan of Kokand, ruled from 1845 to 1875 (with intervals).—62, 63
Killin, Ann—owner of a factory school in Glasgow.—195
Kincaid, John (1787-1862)—inspector of factories and jails in Scotland in the 1850s.—195, 196
King, Peter John Locke (1811-1885)—British politician, radical M.P.—202
Kinkel, Johann Gottfried (1815-1882)—German poet and journalist, democrat; took part in the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849; sentenced to life imprisonment by a Prussian court; in 1850 escaped and emigrated to London; a leader of the petty-bourgeois emigrants; editor of the Hermann (1859); opposed Marx and Engels.—625-29, 633, 634
Kirchmann, Julius Hermann von (1802-1884)—German lawyer, journalist and philosopher, radical; in 1848 deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left Centre), in 1849 deputy to the Second Chamber; later member of the Progressist Party.—75
Kiss, Miklós (1820-1902)—Hungarian army officer, democrat, refugee, Kossuth’s agent in France and Italy; maintained contact with the Bonapartist circles.—500, 503
Klapka, György (1820-1892)—general of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49), emigrated in 1849; maintained contact with the Bonapartist circles in the 1850s; after the amnesty returned to Hungary in 1867.—380, 381, 500, 503
Kleist, Ewald Christian von (1715-1759)—German poet and officer.—632
Kleist-Retzow, Hans Hugo von (1814-1892)—Prussian politician, one of the founders of the Neue Preussische Zeitung, Oberpräsident of the Rhine Province (1851-58); headed the conservative faction of the Prussian Upper Chamber (extreme Right wing).—117
Kolb, Gustav Eduard (1798-1865)—German journalist, editor-in-chief of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung (1837-65).—252
Koller, August, Baron von (b. 1805)—Austrian diplomat, ambassador in Berlin (1857-60).—457
Kossuth, Lajos (Louis) (1802-1894)—leader of the Hungarian national liberation movement, headed the bourgeois-democratic elements in the 1848-49 revolution, head of the Hungarian revolutionary government; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated first to Turkey and later to England and the USA; sought for support in the Bonapartist circles in the 1850s.—22, 26, 380, 381, 390, 413, 498-503, 626
Krassow, Karl Reinhold, Count von (1812-1892)—Prussian Landrat, deputy to the Provincial Diet from 1849 to 1852 (Right wing). Regierungspräsident of Stralsund (1852-68).—108
Kray von Krajob, Pál (Paul), Baron von (1735-1804)—Austrian general, Hungarian by birth; took an active part in the wars of European coalitions against the French Republic and Napoleon I.—232
Kuhn, Franz, Baron von Kuhnenfeld (1817-1896)—Austrian army officer, Chief of the General Staff during the Italian war of 1859.—321
La Beaumelle, Laurent Angliviel de (1726-1773)—French writer, literary opponent of Voltaire.—380
Labouchere, Henry, Baron Taunton (1798-1869)—British statesman, Whig; President of the Board of Trade (1839-41, 1847-52), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1855-58).—129
Ladmirault, Louis René Paul de (1808-1898)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859; took part in suppressing the Paris Commune.—376
Ladreitt de la Charrière, Jules Marie (1806-1870)—French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—376
La Guéronnière, Louis Étienne Arthur Dubreuil Hé lion, vicomte de (1816-1875)—French journalist and politician, Bonapartist in the 1850s.—253
Lamartine, Alphonse Marie Louis de (1790-1869)—French poet, historian and politician, a leader of the moderate republicans in the 1840s, Foreign Minister and effective head of the Provisional Government in 1848.—42
Lamennais, Félicité Robert de (1782-1854)—French abbot, writer, one of the ideologists of Christian socialism.—42-44
La Motterouge (La Motte Rouge), Joseph Édouard de (1804-1883)—French general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—375
Langley, J. Baxter—English radical, journalist.—410
Lanskoi, Sergei Stepanovich, Count (1787-1862)—Russian statesman, conservative, Minister of the Interior (1855-61); took part in effecting the 1861 Peasant Reform.—145
Łapiński, Teofil (1827-1886)—Polish colonel, participant in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; under the name of Tewfik Bey served in the Turkish army; fought against Russia in Circassia (1857-58).—22-27
Las Cases, Émanuel Augustin Dieudonné, comte de (1766-1842)—French historian, accompanied Napoleon I to St. Helena (1815-16); published Mémorial de Sainte Hélène (1822-23).—502
Leatham, William Henry (1815-1889)—English poet and politician, radical M.P.—526, 527, 530
Lecourbe, Claude Joseph, comte (1759-1815)—French general; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—221-22, 587
Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste (1807-1874)—French journalist and politician, a leader of the petty-bourgeois democrats, editor of La Réforme: Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government (February-May 1848), deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies, where he headed the Montagne party; emigrated to England after the demonstration of June 13, 1849.—498
Leopold II (1797-1870)—Grand Duke of Tuscany (1824-59).—151, 273, 486, 535, 615
Leslie, Charles Robert (1794-1859)—English painter.—633
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim (1729-1781)—German writer.—103
Lewis, Sir George Cornewall (1806-1863)—British statesman, Whig, Secretary to the Treasury (1850-52), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1855-58), Home Secretary (1859-61).—8, 4, 286
Liechtenstein, Eduard Franz Ludwig, Prince (1809-1864)—Austrian general; took an active part in suppressing the Prague uprising of June 1848; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 372
Lilla—Austrian general; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—374, 375, 577
Lin Tse-sü (1785-1850)—Chinese statesman, appointed in 1839 the Imperial High Commissioner at Kwang-
tung and Kwangsi and authorised agent in the struggle against opium trade.—19
Lind, Jenny (1820-1887)—Swedish opera singer.—26
List, Friedrich (1789-1846)—German economist, adherent of protectionism.—466
Lloyd, Edward (late 17th-early 18th cent.)—keeper of a coffee house in Tower Street, London, and later (1692) of "Lloyd's Coffee House" in Lombard Street. His coffee house became the centre of ship brokerage and marine insurance. From him the association and the corporation now known as Lloyd's were named.—325
Loftus, Lord Augustus William Frederick Spencer (1817-1904)—British diplomat, envoy to Austria (1858-60).—290, 293, 421
Logue, William—owner of a factory school in Glasgow.—195
Loison, Louis Henri, comte (1771-1816)—French general, took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I's campaigns.—221
Lorena, Ferdinando di (1835-1908)—son of the Grand Duke of Tuscany Leopold II in July 1859, after his father's abdication, assumed the title of Grand Duke Ferdinand (Ferdinando) IV.—186
Louis XIII (1601-1643)—King of France (1610-43).—71
Louis XIV (1638-1715)—King of France (1643-1715).—107
Louis XV (1710-1774)—King of France (1715-74).—164
Louis XVI (1754-1793)—King of France (1774-92), guillotined during the French Revolution.—461
Louis XVIII (Louis le Désiré) (1755-1824)—King of France (1814-15, 1815-24).—68
Louis Bonaparte—see Napoleon III
Louis Napoleon—see Napoleon III
Louis Philippe I (1773-1850)—Duke of Orleans, King of the French (1830-48).—40, 44, 80, 91, 174, 264, 445, 446, 448
Louise de Bourbon, Marie Thérèse, duchesse de Parme (1819-1864)—Regent of the Duchy of Parma (1854-59).—122, 151, 273, 535, 615
Ludvigh, János (1812-1870)—Hungarian journalist and politician, took part in the 1848-49 revolution; emigrated after the revolution.—503
Ludwig (Louis) I (1786-1868)—King of Bavaria (1825-48).—382
Lyndhurst, John Singleton Copley, Baron (1772-1863)—British statesman and lawyer, Tory; Lord Chancellor (1827-30, 1834-35, 1841-46), M.P.—440
Lyttelton, Edward George Earle Lytton, Bulwer-Lytton (1803-1873)—British writer and politician; at the beginning of his career a Whig and from 1852 a Tory M.P.; Secretary for the Colonies (1858-59).—129

M

Macdonald, Jacques Étienne Joseph Alexandre, duc de Tarente (1765-1840)—Marshal of France, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns, in 1799 commander-in-chief of the French troops during the Italian and Swiss campaigns; after Napoleon I's abdication entered the service of the Bourbons; from 1816 to 1830 held high posts at the Court.—220, 222, 252
MacGregor, John (1797-1857)—British economist, statistician and historian, Free Trader; Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1840-47), M.P. from 1847: founder and one of the governors of the Royal British Bank (1849-56).—48
Machiavelli, Niccolò (1469-1527)—Italian politician, historian and writer.—130, 419, 447, 517
MacMahon, Marie Édémé Patrice Maurice, comte de, duc de Magenta (1808-1893)—French military figure and politician, marshal, Bonapartist; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859; a butcher of the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Third Republic (1873-79).—301, 330, 362, 363, 365, 369, 373-75, 376, 379, 385, 398, 401, 575
Magalon, Jean Denis (1794-c. 1840)—French writer of liberal trend.—44

Maitland, Sir Thomas (c. 1759-1824)—British lieutenant-general, Governor of Malta (1813-24), Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands and commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean (1815-24).—132

Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of (1807-1889)—British statesman, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1852, 1858-59), Lord Privy Seal (1866-68, 1874-76).—288, 292, 293, 421, 521-23

Malthus, Thomas Robert (1766-1834)—English clergyman and economist, author of a theory of population.—493

Mameli, Goffredo (1827-1849)—Italian poet and patriot, perished in 1849 while defending the Roman Republic.—355

Manteuffel, Otto Theodor, Baron von (1805-1882)—Prussian conservative statesman, Minister of the Interior (November 1848-November 1850), deputy to the First and Second Chambers (1849), Prime Minister (1850-58).—55, 70, 71, 79, 97, 104, 118, 269, 415, 542

Marie Louise (1791-1847)—daughter of Francis I of Austria; was married to Napoleon I in 1810.—169

Martens, Armand (1801-1852)—French journalist and politician, a leader of moderate republicans, editor of Le National; in 1848 member of the Provisional Government and Mayor of Paris, President of the Constituent Assembly (1848-49).—44

Martinspré, Ange Auguste de (1809-1875)—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—376

Martin, James (1815-1886)—English lawyer, Attorney-General (1856 and 1857); presided in the Central Criminal Court in 1858.—129

Martin, Robert Montgomery (c. 1803-1868)—English historian and statistician, well-known traveller in the East.—13, 14


Masséna, André, duc de Rivoli, prince d’Essling (1756-1817)—French general, from 1804 marshal, participant in Napoleon I’s campaigns; in 1814 went over to the side of the Bourbons.—232, 597

Maximilian II (1811-1864)—King of Bavaria (1818-64).—289

Maxwell, John Hall (1812-1866)—English agronomist and statistician, Secretary to the Highland Agricultural Society.—210

Mazarin, Jules (Mazarini, Giulio) (1602-1661)—Italian-born French cardinal and statesman; Prime Minister from 1643; virtual ruler of France during Louis XIV’s minority.—71

Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805-1872)—Italian revolutionary, democrat, a leader of the national liberation movement in Italy; head of the Provisional Government of the Roman Republic in 1849; an organiser of the Central Committee of European democracy in London in 1850; sought support among the Bonapartists in the early 1850s, but later opposed Bonapartism.—37, 139, 354, 355, 420, 498, 499, 503, 533

Mecklenburg—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429

Mednyánszky, Sándor (1816-1875)—Hungarian army officer, took part in the 1848-49 revolution, after the revolution emigrated.—503

Mehemed Bey—see Bangya, János

Melas, Michael Friedrich Benedikt, Baron von (1729-1806)—Austrian general, participant in the Seven Years’ War (1756-63), commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Italy (1799-1800).—188

Meszleny, Zsuzsánna (née Kossuth) (d. 1854)—sister of Lajos Kossuth, government inspector of hospitals during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary.—501

Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince von (1773-1859)—
Austrian statesman and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1809-21) and Chancellor (1821-48); an organiser of the Holy Alliance.—627

Mevissen, Gustav von (1815-1899)—German banker and politician, a leader of the Rhineland liberal bourgeoisie, founder of a number of big joint-stock and credit banks and industrial joint-stock companies.—161

Mill, John Stuart (1806-1873)—English economist and philosopher.—5

Millaud, Moïse (1813-1871)—French banker, founder of a number of newspapers and banks.—43

Miné, Claude Étienne (1804-1879)—French army officer, inventor of a new type of rifle adopted by the French army in 1852.—165, 178, 180

Mirès, Jules Isaac (1809-1871)—French banker, owner of several newspapers.—43

Mitchell—British agent in Canton.—537, 558

Mohammed-Amin—Naib in the western part of the North Caucasus (the abadzekh tribe) (1848-59), directed the struggle of the mountaineers against Russia.—27

Mohammed-Emin—Khan of Khiva (1845-55).—62

Moleschott, Jakob (1822-1893)—Dutch physiologist and philosopher; taught in Germany, Switzerland and Italy.—473

Molière (real name Jean Baptiste Poquelin) (1622-1673)—French dramatist.—127

Mollard—Piedmontese general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—401

Mon, Alejandro (1801-1882)—Spanish politician, liberal, ambassador to France (1858-62).—483

Montalembert, Charles Forbes René de Tryon, comte de (1810-1870)—French politician and writer, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic, Orleanist; leader of the Catholic circles; supported Louis Bonaparte during the coup d'état of December 2, 1851 but soon afterwards joined the opposition.—91-94, 122, 448

Montesquieu-Fenziac, Anne Pierre, marquis de (1759-1798)—French general, politician, Legitimist, took part in conquering Savoy in 1792.—584

Montez, Lola (1818-1861)—well-known adventuress, dancer, favourite of the Bavarian King Ludwig I in 1846-48; upon his abdication emigrated to London and in 1851 to the USA.—26

Montijo—see Eugénie Marie Ignacine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba

Moreau, Jean Victor Marie (1763-1813)—French general; took part in the wars waged by the French Republic against European coalitions.—232

Morny, Charles Auguste Louis Joseph, duc de (1811-1865)—French politician, Bonapartist; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; Minister of the Interior (December 1851-January 1852); President of the Corps législatif (1854-56, 1857-65); half brother of Napoleon III.—162, 170

Möser, Justus (1720-1794)—German historian and politician, one of the founders of the conservative-romantic trend in historiography.—217

Mouravieff (Murrayev-Amursky), Nikolai Nikolayevich, Count (1809-1881)—Russian general, statesman and diplomat; Governor-General of the Eastern Siberia in 1847-61.—514, 525

Muley el Abbas (Muley-Abbas) (d. 1885)—Prince of Morocco, commander-in-chief of the Moroccan army during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—550

Murat, Antonio Maria, Princess von (1793-1847)—mother of Prince Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.—98

Murat, Joachim (1767-1815)—Marshal of France; participated in Napoleon I's campaigns; commander-in-chief of the French troops in Spain in 1808; King of Naples (1808-15).—98

Murat, Napoléon Lucien Charles, prince (1803-1878)—French politician,
Bonapartist, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; son of Joachim Murat and cousin of Napoleon III. — 151, 152, 289, 356

Muravyev, N. N. — see Mouravieff, Nikolai Nikolayevich

Mustoxidis, Andreas (1785-1860) — Greek scientist and politician; studied the history of the Ionian Islands. — 132

N

Naas, Richard Southwell Bourke, Earl of Mayo, Lord (1822-1872) — Irish statesman, Conservative, Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68), Viceroy and Governor-General of India (1869-72). — 134, 135


Napoleon, Prince — see Bonaparte, Napoleon Joseph Charles Paul

Nasrulla Khan (d. 1860) — Emir of the Khanate of Bukhara (1826-60). — 63, 64

Nesselrode, Karl Vasilyevich, Count (1780-1862) — Russian statesman and diplomat, Foreign Minister (1816-56); State Chancellor from 1845. — 608

Nessler — French army officer, inventor of a new rifle projectile (1857). — 165

Newmarch, William (1820-1882) — English economist and statistician. — 202, 203

Ney, Michel, duc d'Elchingen (1769-1815) — Marshal of France, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns; fought in the war in Spain from 1808 to 1811. — 223

Nicholas I (1796-1855) — Emperor of Russia (1825-55). — 50, 51, 60, 61, 72, 96, 121, 131, 145, 146, 431, 515, 516, 605, 606, 609, 610

Niebuhr, Barthold Georg (1776-1831) — German historian of antiquity. — 72

Niebuhr, Markus Carsten Nikolaus von (1817-1860) — Prussian official, Frederick William IV's retainer, secretary of the King's Cabinet (1851-57); son of Barthold Georg Niebuhr. — 72

Nie, Adolphe (1802-1869) — French general and later marshal; commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859. — 170, 302, 330, 361, 362, 364, 365, 369, 373, 374, 399, 401

Nonnotte, Claude François (1711-1793) — French writer, Jesuit, literary opponent of Voltaire. — 380

Nugent, Laval, Count of Westmeath (1777-1862) — Austrian field marshal (from November 1849); took part in the suppression of the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848 and in the war against revolutionary Hungary in 1848 and 1849; fought in the Italian war of 1859. — 185, 228, 321, 574

O

O'Donnell y Jorris, Leopoldo, conde de Lucena y duque de Tetuán (1809-1867) — Spanish general and politician, a leader of the Moderado Party; made attempts to use revolutionary
crisis in the country to establish military dictatorship in 1854; as War Minister directed the suppression of the 1854-56 revolution: head of government (1856-57, 1858-63, 1865-66); commander-in-chief of the Spanish expeditionary army during the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—548, 549, 550-54, 556, 561-65

Orger, Hermann von (1821-1874)—German journalist, an editor of the Augsburg Allgemeine Zeitung from 1854 to 1864.—571, 576

Orléans, Hélène Louise Elisabeth, duchesse d' (1814-1858)—Princess of Mecklenburg, widow of Ferdinand, Louis Philippe’s elder son.—42

Orlov, Alexei Fyodorovich, Prince (1786-1861)—Russian general and statesman, diplomat: headed the Russian delegation at the Paris Congress (1856): President of the State Council and the Committee of Ministers (from 1856); President of the Secret (from 1856) and (from 1858) of the Chief Peasant Question Committee, opposed the abolition of serfdom.—446

Orsini, Félicé (1819-1858)—Italian revolutionary, democrat and republican, prominent in the struggle for Italy’s national liberation and unification: executed for an attempt on Napoleon III’s life.—163, 167, 262, 263, 265, 380, 381, 448

Overstone, Samuel Jones Loyd, Baron (from 1860) (1796-1883)—English banker, Whig, inspirer of Robert Peel’s financial policy and, in particular, of his English Bank Act of 1844.—3, 4

P

Palmer, William (1824-1856)—English physician: so as to receive insurance money he poisoned his wife, brother and friend, for which he was sentenced to death by hanging.—15

Palmerston, Henry John Temple, Viscount (1784-1865)—British statesman, Tory, Whig from 1830: Foreign Secretary (1830-34, 1835-41, 1846-51), Home Secretary (1852-55) and Prime Minister (1855-58, 1859-65).—3, 46, 47, 49, 60, 87, 89, 120, 129, 263, 265, 410, 418, 421, 447, 448, 455, 464, 482, 484, 498, 509-16, 520-23, 525, 546, 606, 637

Parma, Duchess of—see Louise de Bourbon, Marie Thérèse

Parry, John Humffreys (1816-1880)—English serjeant-at-law.—133

Patou, Erasmus Robert, Baron von (1804-1890)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Trade, Industry and Public Works (from April to June 1848), Finance Minister (1858-62).—97, 104, 106

Peel, Sir Robert (1788-1850)—British statesman, moderate Tory, Home Secretary (1822-27, 1828-30), Prime Minister (1834-35, 1841-46); repealed the Corn Laws in 1846.—3-6, 33, 35, 137, 511, 513

Pélissier, Aimable Jean Jacques (1794-1864)—Marshal of France, took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s-early 1850s; ambassador to Britain (1858-59): commander of the army of observation at Nancy in 1859.—312, 438, 448

Perceval, Spencer (1762-1812)—British statesman, Tory, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1807-09), Prime Minister (1809-12).—71

Peretzl, Mór (1811-1899)—Hungarian general: took part in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to Turkey and in 1851 to England; returned to Hungary in 1867.—503

Pérée, Isaac (1806-1880)—French banker, Bonapartist, deputy to the Corps législatif; in 1852, together with his brother Émile Péreire, founded the joint-stock bank Crédit Mobilier; author of works on credit.—160, 161, 288

Périer, Casimir (1777-1832)—French statesman, banker; Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior under Louis Philippe (1831-32).—44

Perovsky, Vasily Alexeyevich, Count (1795-1857)—Russian general, Military Governor of Orenburg (1833-42),
Governor-General of Orenburg and Samara gubernias (1851-57): commanded a military expedition to Khiva in 1839-40.—60, 62

Persigny, Jean Gilbert Victor Fialin, comte (1808-1872)—French statesman, Bonapartist, deputy to the Legislative Assembly (1849-51); an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851, Minister of the Interior (1852-54, 1860-63), ambassador to Britain (1855-58, 1859-60).—170

Peter I (the Great) (1672-1725)—Russian Tsar from 1682, Emperor of Russia from 1721.—60, 61, 139, 140, 147, 415, 605, 608, 610

Pfeil, Count von—Prussian Junker, member of the Prussian Provincial Diet.—104

Philipson, Grigory Ivanovich (1809-1883)—Russian general; took part in conquering the Caucasus.—23

Pianori, Giovanni (1827-1855)—Italian revolutionary: took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Italy and in the defence of the Roman Republic against the French invaders; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to Piedmont and then to France; executed for an attempt on Napoleon III's life in May 1855.—163

Picard—French general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

Pitt, William (1759-1806)—British statesman, Tory, Prime Minister (1783-1801, 1804-06).—545

Pius IX (Giovanai Maria Mastai-Ferretti) (1792-1878)—Pope (1846-78).—141, 151, 153, 228, 267, 271, 273, 356, 408, 412, 418-19, 483, 577, 601.

Plato (c. 427-c. 347 B.C.)—Greek philosopher.—167, 168

Platonoff (Platonov), Alexander Platonovich—Russian major, District Marshal of Nobility, in 1858 Vice-President of the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee for Preparing the Peasant Reform of 1861.—144

Plon-Plon—see Bonaparte, Prince Napoléon Joseph Charles Paul

Poèrio, Carlo (1803-1867)—Italian politician, liberal, participant in the national liberation movement; in 1848 Prefect of Police and Minister of Education in Naples; in 1849-59 was imprisoned in Italy.—154

Polignac, Jules Auguste Armand Marie, prince de (1780-1847)—French statesman of the Restoration, Legitimist and clerical; Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister (1829-30).—604, 608

Pölitz, Karl Heinrich Ludwig (1772-1838)—German historian.—629

Pompignan, Jean Jacques Lefranc, marquis de (1709-1874)—French poet, literary opponent of Voltaire.—380

Porcia, Alphonse Séraphin, comte d'Ortenbourg, Mitterbourg, Porcia et Brugniera (1801-c. 1878)—Italian aristocrat.—149

Pottinger, Sir Henry (1789-1856)—British diplomat and military figure, ambassador to China (1841-42); in 1842 commanded British troops in the first Opium war with China, Governor of Hong Kong (1843-44), the Cape of Good Hope (1846-57) and Madras (1847-54).—28, 537

Prim y Prats, Juan, conde de Reus, marquis de los Castillejos (1814-1870)—Spanish general and politician; in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60 commanded a division and then a corps.—549, 552-54, 556

Prince of Prussia—see William I

Princess of Weimar, Princess of Prussia—see Augusta Marie Luise Katharina

Proudhon, Pierre Joseph (1809-1865)—French writer, economist and sociologist, a founder of anarchism; deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848).—355, 448

Pückler, Erdmann, Count von (1792-1869)—Prussian Minister of Agriculture (1858-62).—104

Pückler-Muskau, Hermann Ludwig Heinrich, Prince von (1785-1871)—German writer.—104

Puky, Miklós (1806-1887)—Hungarian politician, deputy to the Hungarian Parliament and commissar of the revolutionary government during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary: emigrated after the defeat of the
revolution; returned to Hungary after the 1867 amnesty.—503
Pulszky, Ferenc (1814-1897) — Hungarian politician, writer and archaelogist, a Pole by birth; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after the defeat of the revolution, contributed to the New-York Daily Tribune in the 1850s; returned to Hungary after the 1867 amnesty; deputy to the Diet (1867-76 and 1884-97).—328, 503
Pyat, Félix (1810-1889) — French journalist, dramatist and politician; petty-bourgeois democrat, took part in the 1848 revolution; was against an independent working-class movement; member of the Paris Commune (1871); conducted a slander campaign against Marx and the International.—41, 42, 44, 45
Racine, Jean Baptiste (1639-1699) — French dramatist.—627
Radetzky, Joseph, Count of Radetz (1766-1858) — Austrian field marshal; commanded the Austrian forces in Northern Italy from 1831; suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; Governor-General of the Kingdom of Lombardy and Venice (1850-56).—154, 178, 185, 186, 228-30, 276, 322, 362, 378, 423, 574
Radovitz, Joseph Maria von (1797-1853) — Prussian general and statesman; a Right-wing leader in the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848-49.—216, 235, 236, 238, 240, 246, 270, 405
Ramming, Wilhelm, Baron von Riedkirchen (1815-1876) — Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374
Raspail, François Vincent (1794-1878) — French naturalist and writer, socialist close to the revolutionary proletariat; took part in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848; deputy to the Constituent Assembly.—44
Rau, Karl Heinrich (1792-1870) — German economist.—446
Raumer, Friedrich Ludwig Georg von (1781-1873) — German historian and politician.—313
Rea, John (1822-1881) — Irish politician, member of the “Young Ireland” society.—136
Rechberg und Rothenlöwen, Johann Bernhard, Count von (1806-1899) — Austrian statesman and diplomat; conservative; Prime Minister (1859-60) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1859-64).—312, 454-59
Redgrave, Alexander, Esquire — inspector of factories in England.—206-08
Reed, William Bradford (1806-1876) — American lawyer, diplomat and author; United States Minister to China (1857-58).—85
Reichensperger, August (1808-1895) — German lawyer and politician; deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848-49; from 1852 leader of the Catholic deputies in the Prussian Provincial Diet.—118
Reimer, Georg Ernst (1804-1885) — German book publisher, conservative, deputy to the Prussian Provincial Diet.—115
Reischach, Sigmund, Baron von (1809-1878) — Austrian general, commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—372-76
Reiset, Gustave Armand Henri, comte de (1821-1905) — French diplomat; in 1859, while ambassador at Darmstadt, was sent with a special mission to Victor Emmanuel II for concluding the Peace Treaty of Zurich.—485
Renault, Pierre Hippolyte Paulius (1807-1870) — French general, took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—275, 374, 376, 399
Reynolds, George William MacArthur (1814-1879) — British politician and journalist, founder of Reynolds’s Newspaper.—411
Reyscher, August Ludwig (1802-1880) — Württemberg politician, lawyer, advocate of Germany’s unification under
Prussia's supremacy, one of the founders of the National Union.—405
Richardson, Jonathan—manager of the Northumberland and Durham District Bank.—36
Richelieu, Armand Jean Du Plessis, duc de (1585-1642)—French statesman in the period of absolutism, Cardinal.—532
Richmond, Charles Lennox, Duke of (1735-1806)—British politician, Tory M.P.—545
Riehl, Wilhelm Heinrich von (1823-1897)—German historian of literature and writer, professor in Munich.—466
Rios, Diego de los—Spanish general; in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60 commanded a division and later a corps.—554, 561, 563
Ristori, Adelaide (1822-1906)—famous Italian actress.—122
Robespierre, Augustin Bon Joseph de (1763-1794)—prominent figure in the French Revolution, Jacobin; brother of Maximilien Robespierre.—597
Rodbertus-Jagetzow, Johann Karl (1805-1875)—German economist, head of the Left Centre in the Prussian National Assembly in 1848; subsequently, theoretician of “state socialism”.—74, 115
Roden (d. 1859)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—385, 427
Roebuck, John Arthur (1801-1879)—British politician and journalist, radical M.P.—202, 204
Rolland—Italian colonel, commanded the Brigade of Savoy.—122, 165
Romanoffs (Romanovs)—dynasty of Russian tsars and emperors (1613-1917).—131
Rónay, Jácint (Jánoš) (1814-1889)—Hungarian scientist and writer; took part in the 1848-49 revolution, emigrated after its defeat; in 1866 returned to Hungary, member of the Hungarian Diet.—503
Ros de Olano, Antonio (1808-1886)—Spanish general and politician, belonged to the Moderado Party, participant in the 1854-56 revolution; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—553
Rosbach—Austrian army officer, commanded a regiment in the Italian war of 1859.—429
Rössler, Constantin (1820-1896)—German writer, professor of Jena University.—269
Rothschild, Anselm, Baron von (1803-1874)—Austrian banker, head of the Rothschild banking house in Vienna from 1855.—325
Rothschild, James, baron de (1792-1868)—head of the Rothschild banking house in Paris.—288
Rothschild, Lionel Nathan, Baron (1808-1879)—head of the Rothschild banking house in London; Whig M.P. from 1858.—304
Rothschilds—dynasty of bankers with banks in many European countries.—67, 273
Rouher, Eugène (1814-1884)—French lawyer and statesman, Minister of Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works (1855-63).—112, 113
Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712-1778)—French philosopher and writer of the Enlightenment.—267
Russell, John, Earl (1792-1878)—British statesman, a Whig leader; Prime Minister (1846-52, 1865-66), Foreign Secretary (1852-53, 1859-65), President of the Council (1854-55).—202-04, 462-64, 482, 483, 511, 557, 616

S
Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de (1801-1854)—Marshall of France, Bonapartist; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; War Minister (1851-54); commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea (1854).—170
Saint Mon—see Mon, Alejandro
Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de (1760-1825)—French utopian socialist.—43
Sardanapalus—see Assurbanipal

Savoy—Italian ruling dynasty.—418, 484

Schaffgotsch, Johann Franz, Count (1792-1866)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—397

Schérer, Barthélemy Louis Joseph (1747-1804)—French general and statesman, took part in France’s wars in Italy in 1795-96 and 1799: War Minister (1797-99).—597

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von (1759-1805)—German poet, dramatist, historian and philosopher.—98, 572, 627

Schleinitz, Alexander, Baron von (1807-1885)—Prussian statesman, Minister of Foreign Affairs (June 1848, 1849-50, 1858-61).—96, 103, 268, 312, 405, 450-64

Schlick, zu Bassano und Weisskirchen, Franz Heinrich, Count (1789-1862)—Austrian general, commanded the 2nd Army in the Italian war of 1859.—387, 489

Schönhals, Karl, Baron von (1788-1857)—Austrian general and military writer; took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy.—185

Schott, Sigmund (1818-1895)—Württemberg writer and politician, advocate of Germany’s unification under Prussia’s supremacy, a founder of the National Union.—405

Schulze-Delitzsch, Franz Hermann (1808-1883)—German economist and liberal politician, deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left Centre) in 1848 and member of the Second Chamber in 1849; advocate of Germany’s unification under Prussia’s supremacy: a founder of the National Union, a leader of the Progressist Party in the 1860s; tried to detract workers from the revolutionary struggle by organising cooperative societies.—638

Schurz, Karl (1829-1906)—German democrat, participant in the Baden-Palatinate uprising of 1849; emigrated to Switzerland and in 1852 to the USA, took part in the American Civil War; later US ambassador to Spain, Senator and Home Minister.—625

Schwarzenberg, Edmund Leopold Friedrich, Prince zu (1803-1873)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 397

Schwarzenberg, Felix, Prince of (1800-1852)—Austrian conservative statesman and diplomat; Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (from November 1848 to 1852).—96, 404, 543

Scott, Sir Walter (1771-1832)—Scottish poet and novelist.—74

Seebach, Albin Leo, Baron von (1811-1884)—Saxon diplomat, envoy to Paris (1852-70); in 1858 was in St. Petersburg with a diplomatic mission.—150, 446

Sepher Pasha (Sepher Bey)—Circassian prince; being in the Turkish service, took part in the Russo-Turkish war (1826-28); directed the Circassians’ military operations against Russia in 1855-59.—22-24, 25, 27

Sérurier, Jean Matthieu Philibert, comte (1742-1819)—French general, from 1804 marshal; took part in the wars of the French Republic against European coalitions and in Napoleon I’s campaigns.—597

Servius Tullius (578-534 B.C.)—sixth Roman Tsar.—81

Seymour, George Hamilton (1797-1880)—British diplomat; envoy to St. Petersburg (1851-54), envoy extraordinary to Austria (1855-58).—606, 609

Seymour, Sir Michael (1802-1887)—British admiral; rear admiral of the Baltic Fleet in 1854-56; commanded the navy in the second Opium war with China (1856-58).—522

Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—English dramatist and poet.—69, 102, 137, 259, 344, 373, 450, 457, 463, 489, 523, 544, 629

Shuvalov, Pavel Andreyevich, Count (1830-1908)—Russian military figure and diplomat; took part in the Crimean war of 1853-56; adjutant general of Alexander II; Russia’s military representative in Napoleon III’s army.
during the Italian war of 1859.—607

Shuwaloff (Shuvalov), Pyotr Pavlovich, Count (b. 1824)—St. Petersburg Gubernia Marshal of the Nobility; President of the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee for Preparing the Peasant Reform of 1861.—145

Sidi Mohammed (1803-1873)—Emperor of Morocco (1859-73).—565

Siegel, Franz Ludwig (1812-1877)—German journalist and lawyer, editor of the Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung; advocate of Germany’s unification under Prussia’s supremacy; a founder of the National Union.—638

Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph (1748-1836)—French abbot; prominent figure in the French Revolution of 1789; deputy to the Convention, moderate constitutionalist (Feuillant).—102, 461

Simon, Jules François Simon Suisse (1814-1896)—French statesman and idealist philosopher; moderate republican, deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848-49), member of the Corps législatif.—613

Simonich, Ivan Stepanovich, Count (1799-1868)—Russian general, a Serb by birth: envoy to Teheran (1832-39).—516

Simons, Ludwig (1803-1870)—German lawyer; deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Right wing) in 1848; Minister of Justice (1849-60).—101

Simonyi, Ernő (1821-1882)—Hungarian politician, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after its defeat emigrated; deputy to the Hungarian Diet in 1861.—503

Simpson—the Times financial observer.—304

Slater—partner of a big London firm, Morrison, Dillon & Co.—10

Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—Scottish economist.—476

Sobieski, John (Jan) (1624-1696)—King of Poland (1674-96); in 1683 commanded the combined Polish and Austro-German forces and defeated the Turkish army at Vienna. —38

Socrates (c. 469-c. 399 B.C.)—Greek philosopher.—455

Sonnaz—see Gerbaix de Sonnac, Maurizio

Sophia (Sophie) (1805-1872)—Archduchess of Austria; mother of Emperor Francis Joseph I.—57, 501

Stadion, Philipp, Count (1799-1868)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—332, 333, 335, 338, 339, 347, 349, 397

Stahl, Friedrich Julius (1802-1861)—German lawyer and politician; from 1840 professor of Berlin University.—160

Stanley, Edward Henry, Earl of Derby (1826-1893)—British statesman, Tory, Conservative in the 1860s and 1870s, then Liberal; Colonial Secretary (1858, 1882-85) and Secretary of State for India (1858-59), Foreign Secretary (1866-68, 1874-78); son of Edward Derby.—279, 280

Stein, Julius (1813-1889)—Silesian teacher and journalist; in 1848 deputy to the Prussian National Assembly (Left wing), deputy to the Second Chamber (extreme Left wing) (1849).—115

Stein, Lorenz von (1815-1890)—German lawyer, historian and economist; author of works on the socialist movement, advocate of “social monar-
the Cologne Communist trial (1852); later chief of the Prussian political police.—461

Stock, Franciszek—Polish refugee, officer of the Turkish army.—21, 24, 27

Stoddart, Charles (1806-1842)—British diplomat and army officer; in 1838 was appointed envoy to Bukhara, where he was arrested and killed.—61

Straubenzee—see Van Straubenzee, Sir Charles Thomas

Strauss, Johann (1825-1899)—Austrian composer and conductor.—322

Stuart, Lord Dudley Coutts (1803-1854)—British politician, Whig M.P.; was connected with Polish and Hungarian emigrants.—498

Suetonius (Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus) (c. 70-c. 160)—Roman historian and writer, author of The Twelve Caesars.—157, 344

Suvorov, Alexander Vasilyevich, Count Suvorov Rimniksky, Prince Italisky (c. 1729-1800)—Russian general.—221, 222

Szabó, Imre (1820-1865)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; War Minister (1848); after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to London; took part in the Italian war of 1859.—503

Szabó, István (1825-1862)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—503

Szemere, Bertalan (1812-1869)—Hungarian politician and journalist; Minister of the Interior (1848) and head of the revolutionary government (1849); fled from Hungary after the defeat of the revolution.—503

Tacitus, Cornelius (c. 55-c. 120)—Roman historian and orator.—42

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice, prince de (1754-1838)—French diplomat; Foreign Minister (1797-90, 1799-1807, 1814-15); represented France at the Vienna Congress (1814-15).—604

Tao Kuang (1782-1850)—Chinese Emperor (1820-50).—16, 17, 19

Teleki, László, Count (1811-1861)—Hungarian politician and writer; represented the Hungarian Republic in France during the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; after the defeat of the revolution remained in France.—503

Teleki, Sándor, Count (1821-1892)—Hungarian army officer, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the defeat of the revolution emigrated.—500, 503

Thalnayer (Emin Agha)—Hungarian refugee in Turkey.—23

Thiers, Louis Adolphe (1797-1877)—French historian and statesman, Prime Minister (1836, 1840), deputy to the Constituent (1848) and Legislative (1849-51) Assemblies; head of the Orleanists after 1848; suppressed the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Republic (1871-73).—42, 169

Thoré, Etienne Joseph Théophile (1807-1869)—French politician, lawyer and journalist, democrat; took an active part in the 1848 revolution; emigrated to England; returned to France after the 1859 amnesty.—44

Thouvenel, Édouard Antoine (1818-1866)—French diplomat, ambassador to Turkey (1855-60), Foreign Minister (1860-62).—26

Thun-Hohenstein, Leo, Count von (1811-1888)—Austrian statesman of Czech descent; one of the closest counselors of Francis Joseph I; Minister of Religious Worship and Education (1849-60).—422

Thusnelda—wife of Arminius the Cheruscan.—625

Titus—German politician, lawyer, advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy; founder of the National Union.—638

Trocch, Louis Jules (1815-1896)—French general and politician, Orleanist; took part in conquering Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; commanded a division in the Italian
war of 1859.—360, 362, 363, 374, 376, 399
Trollope—English industrialist, head of a building firm.—636
Tüköry, Lajos (Selim Agha) (1828-1860)—Hungarian refugee in Turkey.—23, 26
Türr, István (Ahmet Kiamil Bey) (1825-1908)—Hungarian army officer, refugee in Turkey; participant in the Italian national liberation movement and in the 1848-49 revolution in Germany; fought in the Crimean war on the side of the Allies and in the Circassians' war against Russia.—22, 23, 25-27
Tyrtaeus (7th-6th cent. B.C.)—Greek poet.—631, 632
Unruh, Hans Victor von (1806-1886)—Prussian engineer and politician; in 1848 a leader of the Left Centre in the Prussian National Assembly; President of this Assembly from October 1848; deputy to the Second Chamber (Left wing) in 1849; subsequently a founder of the Progressist Party, then a national-liberal.—75, 115
Urban, Karl, Baron von (1802-1877)—Romanian colonel, later general for the Austrians; Right-wing leader of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania (1848-49); took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859.—351, 352
Urquhart, David (1805-1877)—British diplomat, writer and politician, Turkophile; went on diplomatic missions to Turkey in the 1830s; Tory M.P. (1847-1852); opposed Palmerston's policy.—410, 415, 498, 603
Usedom, Karl Georg Ludwig Guido, Count von (1805-1884)—Prussian diplomat, Plenipotentiary in the Frankfurt National Assembly (1848) and in the Federal Diet in Frankfurt am Main (1858-59).—343-44
Vaillant, Jean Baptiste Philibert, comte (1790-1872)—Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; War Minister (1854-59); Chief of General Staff during the Italian war of 1859.—430
Van Straubenzee, Sir Charles Thomas (1812-1892)—British general, in 1855-56 commanded a British brigade in the Crimea and in 1857-60 the British troops in the second Opium war with China.—48
Vauban, Sébastien Le Prêtre (Prestre) de (1633-1707)—Marshal of France, military engineer; author of a number of books on fortification and siege-works.—242, 243, 247, 251
Veit, Moritz (1808-1864)—German book publisher, liberal, deputy to the Prussian Provincial Diet.—115
Venedey, Jakob (1805-1871)—German radical journalist and politician; in 1848 deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Left wing); liberal after the 1848-49 revolution.—404, 405, 447
Veress, Sándor (1828-1884)—Hungarian historian and journalist, participant in the 1848-49 revolution; after the revolution emigrated.—26, 505
Very, marquis de—Sardinian diplomat.—382
Vespasian (Titus Flavius Vespasianus) (9-70)—Roman Emperor (69-79).—417
Vetter, Antal (Doggenfeldi) (1803-1882)—Hungarian lieutenant-general, Chief of General Staff of the Hungarian revolutionary army (1848-49) and commander-in-chief (March 1849); emigrated after the defeat of the 1848-49 revolution; returned to Hungary in 1867.—503
Veuillot, Louis François (1813-1883)—French journalist, editor-in-chief of the Catholic newspaper L'Univers (1848-60).—42
VICTOR EMANUEL (Vittorio Emanuele) II (1820-1878)—King of Piedmont (Sardinia) (1849-61), King of Italy
Victoria (1819-1901)—Queen of Great Britain and Ireland (1837-1901).—50, 206, 271, 273, 522, 637
Villemain, Abel François (1790-1870)—French politician and writer, liberal, Minister of Public Education (1839-40, 1840-44).—123
Vinoy, Joseph (1800-1880)—French general, Bonapartist; commanded a division in the Italian war of 1859; took part in the suppression of the Paris Commune (1871).—339, 348, 350, 374, 376
Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro) (70-19 B.C.)—Roman poet.—102, 134, 452, 592
Vischer, Friedrich Theodor (1807-1887)—Württemberg politician and poet; member of the Frankfurt National Assembly (1848); advocate of Germany's unification under Prussia's supremacy, took part in founding the National Union.—405
Vukavic, Ivan Viktorovich (c. 1810-1839)—Russian army officer, diplomatic representative in Afghanistan (1837-38).—515
Vogt, Karl (1817-1895)—German natural scientist, materialist, petty-bourgeois democrat; deputy to the Frankfurt National Assembly (Left wing) in 1848-49; one of the five imperial regents in June 1849; emigrated in 1849; was exposed by Marx as an agent of Louis Bonaparte in his work Herr Vogt (1860).—317, 380, 381, 384, 473, 590, 627
Voltaire, François Marie Arouet (1694-1778)—French philosopher, writer and historian of the Enlightenment.—267, 380
Vukovics, Sebő (1811-1872)—Hungarian politician, Minister of Justice of the revolutionary government (1849); after the defeat of the revolution emigrated to London, maintained contacts with Kossuth.—503
W
Waldeck, Benedikt Franz Leo (1802-1870)—German lawyer and radical politician; in 1848 Vice-President of the Prussian National Assembly and one of the leaders of its Left wing; subsequently a leader of the Progessist Party.—74, 115
Walewski, Alexandre Florian Joseph Colonna, comte (1810-1868)—French diplomat and statesman, son of Napoleon I and the Polish Countess Marie Walewska; participant in the Polish uprising of 1830-31; emigrated to France after its defeat; French Foreign Minister (1855-60); chairman of the Paris Congress (1856).—307, 441, 460, 483, 557, 633
Walpole, Horatio (Horace), Earl of Orford (1717-1797)—British aristocrat, writer and art historian.—382
Walpole, Spencer Horatio (Horace) (1806-1898)—British statesman, Tory, Home Secretary (1852, 1858-59, 1866-67).—205
Ward, Sir Henry George (1797-1860)—British colonial official, Whig; Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1849-55), Governor of Ceylon (1855-60) and Madras (1860).—131, 132
Watson, Henry (1737-1786)—British engineer, colonel; from 1764 was in the service of the East India Company; chief engineer of Bengal.—15
Weguelin, Thomas Matthias—British businessman, liberal M.P., a Governor of the Bank of England in 1857.—7, 9
Welden, Franz Ludwig, Baron von (1782-1853)—Austrian Master of Ordinance; took part in the campaign against the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848; commandant of Vienna after the suppression of the October 1848 uprising; commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops fighting against the Hungarian revolution (April and May 1849).—229
Wellington; Arthur Wellesley, Duke of (1769-1852)—British general and
statesman, Tory; Prime Minister (1828-30) and Foreign Secretary (December 1834-April 1835).—248

Wenzel, August (1799-1860)—Prussian judiciary official, deputy to the Provincial Diet (Left wing) in 1849-59.—118

Wernhardt, Stephan Wilhelm, Baron von (1806-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—429

Wether, Karl, Baron von (1809-1894)—Prussian diplomat, ambassador to Austria (1859-66, 1866-69).—382, 453-58

Westphalen, Ferdinand Otto Wilhelm Henning von (1799-1876)—Prussian statesman, Minister of the Interior (1850-58); stepbrother of Jenny Marx, Karl Marx's wife.—70, 77, 103

Wetslar, Gustav (1813-1881)—Austrian general, commanded a brigade in the Italian war of 1859.—374

Wheeler—Vice-President of the East India Company (1773-80).—15

Whiteside, James (1804-1876)—Irish lawyer and politician, Tory M.P.; Attorney-General (1858-59, 1866).—134

Whitworth, Charles, Earl (1752-1825)—British diplomat, ambassador to Paris (1802-May 1803).—263

William I (1797-1888)—Prince of Prussia, Prince Regent (1858-61), King of Prussia (1861-88) and Emperor of Germany (1871-88).—57, 65-67, 70-72, 74, 75, 78-79, 97, 107, 117-19, 121, 126-28, 287, 289, 344, 381, 394, 405, 452-54, 458, 460

William II (1777-1847)—Elector of Hesse-Cassel (1821-47).—540-42

Williams, Sir William Fenwick, Baronet “of Kars” (1800-1883)—British general; in 1855, during the Crimean war, directed the defence of Kars, M.P. (1856-59).—447

Willisem, Friedrich Adolf, Baron von (1798-1864)—Prussian general, took part in suppressing the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; Prussian ambassador to Italy (1862-64).—320, 454-55, 458, 461

Willisen, Karl Wilhelm, Baron von (1790-1879)—Prussian general and military theorist, royal commissioner in Posen in 1848; was in the Austrian army that suppressed the revolutionary and national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; in 1850 commander-in-chief of the Schleswig-Holstein army in the war against Denmark.—216, 234, 238, 244, 246, 320

Wilson, James (1805-1860)—Scottish economist and politician, Free Trader, founder and editor of the journal The Economist, M.P., Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1853-58), Chancellor of the Indian Exchequer (1859-60); opposed the quantitative theory of money.—4, 28, 284, 518

Wimffsen, Franz Emil Lorenz, Count (1797-1870)—Austrian general, commanded the 1st army in the Italian war of 1859.—331, 387, 429

Wittelsbachers—dynasty of Bavarian dukes (1180-1806) and kings (1806-1918).—344

Wolff, Christian, Baron von (1679-1754)—German philosopher and mathematician.—473

Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond Charles (1830-1908)—British politician and diplomat, Private Secretary to the Secretary for the Colonies (1858), Secretary to Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1859-64).—131

Wolff, Wilhelm (Lupus) (1809-1864)—German teacher, proletarian revolutionary, leading figure in the Communist League, an editor of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 1848 and 1849; friend and associate of Marx and Engels.—624

Wood, Sir Charles, Viscount Halifax (1800-1885)—British statesman, Whig; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1846-52), President of the Board of Control for India (1852-55), First Lord of the Admiralty (1855-58), Secretary of State for India (1859-66).—4
Y

Yeh Ming-chin (1807-1859)—Chinese statesman, Imperial Commissioner, Governor-General of Kwangtung and Kwangsi (1852-57).—83

York, Frederick Augustus, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster (1763-1827)—second son of George III of Great Britain; field marshal from 1795; commander-in-chief of the British army (1798-1809, 1811-27).—71

Young, Sir John, Baron Lisgar (1807-1876)—British statesman, Tory; Chief Secretary for Ireland (1852-55), Lord High Commissioner of the Ionian Islands (1855-59).—129, 131

Z

Zabala y de la Puente, Juan de (1804-1879)—Spanish general, belonged to the Moderado Party, participant in the 1854-56 revolution; commanded a corps in the Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60.—549, 553

Zabel, Friedrich (1802-1875)—German journalist, editor of the Berlin National-Zeitung (1848-75).—79, 450, 638

Zais—German liberal politician and physician, advocate of Germany’s unification under Prussia’s supremacy; took part in founding the National Union.—404-05

Ziegler, Franz Wilhelm (1803-1876)—Württemberg politician; in 1848 member of the Prussian National Assembly and then of the Second Chamber; advocate of Germany’s unification under Prussia’s supremacy; took part in founding the National Union.—405

Zobel, Thomas Friedrich, Baron (1799-1869)—Austrian general, commanded a corps in the Italian war of 1859.—335, 372, 397, 423

INDEX OF LITERARY AND MYTHOLOGICAL NAMES

Aaron—the first high priest mentioned in the Bible.—272

Argus (Gr. Myth.)—a giant with a hundred eyes whom Goddess Hera made guardian of Io, Zeus’ lover, turned into a cow.—118

Augeas, Augeias or Augias (Gr. Myth)—King of Elis, at whose order Heracles performed one of his exploits—cleaned Augean stables.—44

Baal—chief deity of the Phoenicians.—155

Briareus—one of the hundred-handed and fifty-headed giants, sons of Uranus and Ge, the embodiment of forces destined to guard the nether world.—118

Christ, Jesus (Bib.).—271, 451

Damocles—according to Greek legend, a courtier of the Syracusean tyrant Dionysius (4th cent. B.C.).—163

Dionysus (Bacchus) (Gr. and Rom. Myth.)—god of wine and mirth.—55

Dogberry—a character in Shakespeare’s comedy Much Ado about Nothing.—523, 526

Don Quixote—the title character in Cervantes’ novel.—134

Elvire—a lyrical character in A. de Lamartine’s collection of poems Premières méditations poétiques.—12
Falstaff, Sir John—a character in Shakespeare’s tragedy King Henry IV and his comedy The Merry Wives of Windsor; a sly fat braggart and jester.—373, 450

Faust—hero of a medieval German legend, the title character in Goethe’s tragedy and Marlowe’s play The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus.—42

Grasiella—a character in A. de Lamartine’s Les Confidences.—42

Hudibras—the title character in Samuel Butler’s satirical poem, a man inclined to meaningless arguments and debates and capable of proving the most absurd propositions with the help of syllogisms.—102

Iphigenia (Gr. Myth.)—daughter of King Agamemnon who sacrificed her before the Trojan war.—571

Ixion (Gr. Myth.)—King of the Lapithae whom Zeus punished for his crimes by having him bound to a perpetually revolving wheel in Hades.—42

Janus (Rom. Myth.)—god represented with a double-faced head.—517

Jehovah (Bib.)—451

John Bull—the title character in John Arbuthnot’s The History of John Bull (18th cent.); his name is used to personify England.—32, 47, 48, 50, 54, 84, 93, 133, 259, 279, 280, 286, 290, 447

Judith—a biblical character; also the heroine of P. Giacometti’s play Giuditta.—422

Laocoon (Gr. Myth.)—a Trojan priest of god Apollo.—613

Leviathan (Bib.)—sea monster.—125

Lysander—a character in Shakespeare’s comedy A Midsummer Night’s Dream.—463

Macbeth—the title character in Shakespeare’s tragedy.—273

Mammon—the idol of wealth among some ancient peoples.—191

Manu—the semi-legendary law-giver of Ancient India.—74

Margaret (Gretchen)—a character in Goethe’s Faust.—42

Mars (Rom. Myth.)—god of war.—170

Matthew (Bib.)—one of the four evangelists.—528

Medea (Gr. Myth.)—a sorceress, daughter of Aeëtes, King of Colchis.—314

Mittler—a character in Goethe’s Die Wehloverandtschaften; Mittler (meaning in English “mediator”) was a clergyman who was constantly busy with settling quarrels arising among his parishioners.—452

Moloch—the Son-God in Carthage and Phoenicia, whose worship was accompanied by human sacrifices.—14

Narcissus (Gr. Myth.)—a handsome youth who fell in love with his own reflection in the water.—43

Orlando Furioso—the title character in Lodovico Ariosto’s epic poem.—509

Orpheus (Gr. Myth.)—Thracian poet and musician able to charm stones and tame wild beasts with his lyre.—322

Pandora (Gr. Myth.)—a woman, who, out of curiosity, opened a box which contained all human evils and let them out.—115

Paul (Bib.)—one of Christ’s twelve apostles.—527

Peter (Bib.)—one of Christ’s twelve apostles.—451

Poseidon (Gr. Myth.)—god of the sea.—452

Quasimodo—a character in Hugo’s Notre Dame de Paris; his name came to personify ugliness.—264, 386, 387, 448, 499

Sexton—a character in Shakespeare’s comedy Much Ado about Nothing.—523

Sisyphus (Gr. Myth.)—King of Corinth; for cheating the gods he was condemned to push a rock to the top of
a hill from which it rolled down again.—261
Sly, Christopher—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *The Taming of the Shrew*; a tinker.—457
Snug—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*; a joiner.—463

Tell, William—hero in folk tales about the liberation war of Switzerland against the Habsburgs at the end of the 13th and the beginning of the 14th century; the title character in a drama by Schiller.—447
Teut—the name of an ancient German god invented by the Klopstock school at the end of the 18th century.—158
Theseus—a character in Shakespeare's comedy *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—463
Titus (Bib.)—a convert from paganism and companion of the Apostle Paul.—527
INDEX OF QUOTED
AND MENTIONED LITERATURE

WORKS BY KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

Marx, Karl

*Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 74-77). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5471, November 3, 1858.—115, 122, 158

*Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 78-81). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5475, November 8, 1858.—122, 158

*Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 106-09). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5497, December 3, 1858.—122, 158

*Affairs in Prussia* (this volume, pp. 115-19). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5505, December 13, 1858.—122, 125, 158


*Another Strange Chapter of Modern History* (this volume, pp. 21-27). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5436, September 23, 1858.—497


*[Commercial Crises and Currency in Britain]* (this volume, pp. 8-12). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5414, August 28, 1858.—494


*The King of Russia's Insanity* (this volume, pp. 65-69). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5465, October 27, 1858.—76, 122


*The New Ministry* (this volume, pp. 101-05). In: *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 5492, November 27, 1858.—122

The Prussian Regency (this volume, pp. 70-73). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5465, October 27, 1858.—122


Vorrede Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie (present edition, Vol. 30). In: Das Volk, No. 5, June 4, 1859.—469, 477


Engels, Frederick


The Austrian Hold on Italy (this volume, pp. 183-89). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5575, March 4, 1859.—197


The Battle at Solferino (this volume, pp. 392-95) — Die Schlacht bei Solferino. In: Das Volk, No. 9, July 2, 1859.—400

The Battle of Solferino (this volume, pp. 400-03) — Die Schlacht bei Solferino. In: Das Volk, No. 10, July 9, 1859.—428


Fighting at Last (this volume, pp. 332-37). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5655, June 6, 1859.—437


Po and Rhine (this volume, pp. 211-55)
— Po und Rhein, Berlin, 1859.—572

Progress of the War (this volume, pp. 360-63). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5665, June 17, 1859.—437

Russian Progress in Central Asia (this volume, pp. 59-64). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5471, November 3, 1858.—85

[Russia's Successes in the Far East] (this volume, pp. 82-86). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5484, November 18, 1858.—508


Marx K. and Engels F.

The Great Men of the Exile (present edition, Vol. 11).—471

WORKS BY DIFFERENT AUTHORS

Aesop. The Fox and Grapes.—499
— The Fox and the Lion.—268
— The Shepherd Boy and the Wolf.—148

Allen, N. An Essay on the Opium Trade, Boston, 1850.—18


Bangya, J. [Letter to the Editor of the Presse d'Orient, April 25, 1858.] In: The Free Press, No. 18, June 30, 1858.—24

Baude, J.-J. L'Autriche et sa puissance militaire en Italie. In: Revue des deux Mondes, April 1, 1859.—402

Béranger, P. J. de. Le Roi d'Ivetot.—316

Bible
The Old Testament
Exodus.—272
Psalms.—161, 629

The New Testament
Luke.—144
The Epistle of Paul to Titus.—546

Bonaparte, N.-L. Fragments historiques 1688 et 1830, Paris, 1841.—440
— Des idées napoléoniennes, Paris, 1839.—417, 533
— [Speech in Bordeaux on October 9, 1852.]—157

Boniface, L. [Refutation of the rumours about the treaty between France and Russia.] In: Le Constitutionnel, No. 119, April 29, 1859.—303

Bright, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]
— March 31, 1854. In: The Times, No. 21704, April 1, 1854.—88
— March 26, 1858. In: The Times, No. 22952, March 27, 1858.—88
— February 28, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—202, 205
— [Speech at a meeting of Birmingham constituents on October 27, 1858.] In: The Times, No. 23136, October 28, 1858.—88
— [Speech at a banquet in Birmingham.] In: The Times, No. 23138, October 30, 1858.—88

Brougham, H. [Speech at the Third Congress of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science, Bradford, October 10, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—531

Buchanan, G. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester. October 10, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23434, October 11, 1859.—528

Buelow, A. H. D. Der Feldzug von 1800, militärisch-politisch betrachtet von dem Verfasser des Geistes des neunern Kriegssystems, Berlin, 1801.—231
— Histoire de la campagne de 1800, en Allemagne et en Italie, Paris, s. a.—231, 232

Burat, L. [On the consumption of grain in France.] In: Le Constitutionnel, No. 315, November 11, 1858.—111

Burnes, J. [Statements about the forgery of the dispatches of Sir A. Burnes.] In: The Free Press, No. 5, February 3, 1858.—515
Burtenshaw, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 7, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—530


Carden, R. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 12, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23436, October 13, 1859.—526

Canning, Ch. J. [Report of February 21, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23268, March 31, 1859.—280-82

Carlyle, Th. Past and Present, London, 1843.—191


Clark, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530


— Vom Kriege, Bd. 1-2, Berlin, 1832-1833.—435, 600

Clutterbuck, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—529

Cooke, G. W. China: being "The Times" Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58. London, 1858.—84

Costa de Beauregard. [Statement concerning Savoy's incorporation in France.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 39, February 8, 1860.—581

Crawford, R. [Speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—286

Dahlmann, F. Ch. [Speech in the Frankfurt National Assembly on December 14, 1848.] In: Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main, Bd. 6, Frankfurt a. M., 1849.—71

Derby, E. [Speeches in the House of Lords:]
— March 25, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23264, March 26, 1859.—279
— April 7, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—285
— April 18, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23284, April 19, 1859.—295-96
— [Speech at a dinner at the Mansion-House on April 25, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23290, April 26, 1859.—305-06, 421

Dickinson, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 8, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530

Diogenes Laertius. De vitis philosophorum.—629

Disraeli, B. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]
— February 28, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—202, 204

Dréolle, E. On se préoccupe beaucoup de la guerre... In: Le Constitutionnel, No. 25, January 25, 1859.—169

Edda.—98

Ellenborough, E. [Speech in the House of Lords on April 7, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23275, April 8, 1859.—285
Ferrier, F. L. *Du gouvernement considéré dans ses rapports avec le commerce*, Paris, 1805.—466


Gladstone, W. E. *Studies on Homer and the Homeric Age*, Oxford, 1858.—129


— *Die Wahlverwandtschaften.*—452


Hansemann, D. *Preussen und Frankreich. Staatswirtschaftlich und politisch, unter vorzüglicher Berücksichtigung der Rheinprovinz*, Leipzig, 1833.—102

— [Speech in the first United Diet on June 8, 1847.] In: *Der Erste Vereinigte Landtag in Berlin 1847*, Th. 3, Berlin, 1847.—102

Hauff, W. *Der Affe als Mensch.*—54

Head, F. *Bubbles from the Brunnen of Nassau*, Paris, 1834.—258

— *To the Editor of “The Times”,* January 24, 1852. In: *The Times*, No. 21022, January 27, 1852.—258

Hegel, G. *Phänomenologie des Geistes.*—456, 474

— *Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik.*—474

— *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie.*—474

— *Wissenschaft der Logik.*—474

Heine, H. *Die Bäder von Lucca.*—406

— *Bei des Nachtwächters Ankunft zu Paris.*—215

— *Deutschland. Ein Wintermärchen.*—217

Herwegh, G. [On the occasion of the Federal Marksmen’s Festival in Zurich.] In: *Das Volk*, No. 12, July 23, 1859.—635

Homer. *Iliad.*—98

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). *Ars poetica.*—89

— *Epistula ad Pisones.*—634

Hugo, V. *Napoléon le petit*, Londres, 1852.—264, 439, 448


Ingham, B. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield on October 8, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—530


Juvenalis. D. *Junius. Satirae.*—102, 483

Kinkel, G. *Die Ausstellung der Kunst-Akademie auf Trafalgar Square.* In: *Hermann*, No. 27, July 9, 1859.—633

Kossuth, L. *In the Name of the Hungarian Nation. To the soldiers quartered in Italy, February 1853.* In: *The Times*, No. 21348, February 10, 1853.—498

— *L’Europe, l’Autriche et la Hongrie*, Bruxelles, 1859.—499


— [Speech made on landing in Southampton, on October 23, 1851.] In: *Authentic Life of ... Louis Kossuth*, London, 1851.—498
Die Krähwinkler Landwehr (folk song).—427


Lamartine, A. de. Les confidences.—42
— Histoire des Girondins.—42
— Premières méditations poétiques...—42


Leatham, W. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Wakefield, October 11, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23435, October 12, 1859.—527

Lessing, G. E. Nathan der Weise.—103

Lewis, G. [Speech in the House of Commons on April 4, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23272, April 5, 1859.—286

List, F. Das nationale System der politischen Oekonomie, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1841.—466

Macgowan, D. To the Editor of "The Times". In: The Times, No. 23410, September 13, 1859.—509


Machiaveli, N. Istorie fiorentine.—419


Maysev, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 8, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23433, October 10, 1859.—529

Mazzini, G. A Vittorio Emanuele lettera [Firenze, 16 September 1859].—533
— [Manifesto.] In: Pensiero ed Azione, September 1858.—37-40

Molière, J.-B. Le malade imaginaire.—127
— Le médecin malgré lui.—127

Montalembert, Ch. [Speeches in the French Legislative Assembly:]
— June 22, 1852. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 176, June 24, 1852.—92
— June 26, 1852. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 180, June 28, 1852.—92
— Un débat sur l'Inde au parlement anglais. In: Le Correspondant, nouvelle serie, V. IX. Octobre 1858.—92-93, 122

Möser, J. Patriotische Phantasien.—217

[Moolla Reshid.] Copy of a Letter from Moolla Reshid, the Counsellor of Kohin Dil Khan Sirdar, to the Address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, received at Cabool on the 19th of December 1837. In: Papers. East India (Cabul and Afghanistan). Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be Printed, 8 June 1859, London, 1859.—515-16

Palmerston, H. J. T. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]
— February 3, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23221, February 4, 1859.—263
— August 8, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23380, August 8, 1859.—484

Plato, Respublica.—629
Proudhon, P.-J. *De la justice dans la révolution, et dans l'église*, T. 1-3, Paris, 1858.—448

Pückler-Muskau, H. *Briefe eines Verstorbenen*, Stuttgart, 1831.—104

Pyat, F. *Lettre aux mandarins de la France*, London, 1858.—41-45

Racine, J. *Les Plaideurs*.—627

Rau, K. H. *Grundriss der Kamerawlsciusschaft*, Heidelberg, 1823.—466

— *Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie*, Bd. 1-3, Heidelberg, 1826.—466

— *Über die Kamerawlsciusschaft*, Heidelberg, 1825.—466


Riehl, W. H. *Kulturstudien aus drei Jahrhunderten*, Bd. 1-2, Stuttgart, 1859.—466

Roebuck, J. A. [Speech in the House of Commons on February 28, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—204

[Rössler, C.] *Preussen und die italienische Frage*, Berlin, 1859.—269

Rouher, E. *Extension des réserves de la boulangerie*. In: *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112, 113

Russell, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons:]

— February 9, 1852. In: *The Times*, No. 21034, February 10, 1852.—203

— February 13, 1854. In: *The Times*, No. 21664, February 14, 1854.—203

— February 28, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23242, March 1, 1859.—204

— July 22, 1859. In: *The Times*, No. 23366, July 23, 1859.—482, 483

— [Speech in the House of Lords, February 2, 1860.] In: *The Times*, No. 23533, February 3, 1860.—557

Schiller, F. *Die Braut von Messina*.—627

— *Das Lied von der Glocke*.—98

— *Wilhelm Tell*.—447


Shakespeare, W. *Hamlet*.—489

— *Julius Caesar*.—629

— *King Henry IV*.—259, 373

— *Macbeth*.—273

— *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—69, 137, 463

— *Much Ado About Nothing*.—523

— *Romeo and Juliet*.—544

— *The Taming of the Shrew*.—457

— *Twelfth Night; or What You Will*.—101

Sieyès, E.-J. *Qu'est-ce que le tiers-état?* [Paris], 1789.—102

Stanley, E. [Speech in the House of Commons on February 14, 1859.] In: *The Times*, No. 23230, February 15, 1859.—279

Stein, L. *Lehrbuch der Volkswirtschaft*, Wien, 1858.—466

— *System der Staatswissenschaft*, Bd. 1-2, Stuttgart, 1852-1856.—466

Suetonius. *Vitae XII Caesarum*.—157

*A Thousand and One Nights*.—57

Urquhart, D. [Reply to L. Kossuth of February 14, 1852. London.] In: The Free Press, No. 16, May 12, 1858.—498

Usedom, K. [Statement of the Prussian Plenipotentiary at the Federal Diet of May 19, 1859.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 118, May 22, 1859.—343-44

Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro). Aeneid.—452, 592
— Bucolicon.—134
— Georgicon.—102

Ward, J. [Testimony at a sitting of the commission of enquiry into the elections in Gloucester, October 7, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23432, October 8, 1859.—529


Willisen, W. Der italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848, Berlin, 1849.—216, 234, 244, 246, 320
— Theorie des grossen Krieges angewendet auf den russisch-polnischen Feldzug von 1831, Berlin, 1840.—320

Wilson, J. [Speech in the House of Commons on March 7, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23218, March 8, 1859.—284

Wolff, H. D. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 23153, November 17, 1858.—131

DOCUMENTS

Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1859. In: The Economist, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—478

An Act for the Better Prevention of Crime and Outrage in Certain Parts of Ireland until the First Day of December One Thousand Eight Hundred and Forty-Nine and to the End of the Then Next Session of Parliament (1848).—464

An Act for the More Effectual Suppression of Local Disturbances and Dangerous Associations in Ireland (1833).—134, 464

An Act to Amend the Laws Relating to Labour in Factories. 7 Victoria, Cap. 15 [1844].—206

An Act to Amend the Representation of the People in England and Wales, 7 June 1832.—202

An Act to Indemnify the Governor and Company of the Bank of England in Respect of Certain Issues of Their Notes, and to Confirm Such Issues, and to Authorise Further Issues for a Time to be Limited [December 12, 1857].—3

An Act to Regulate the Issue of Bank Notes, and for Giving to the Governor and Company of the Bank of England Certain Privileges for a Limited Period, July 19, 1844.—3-7, 9, 33

An Act to Regulate the Labour of Children and Young Persons in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom (1833).—190, 207

Acte final du Congrès de Vienne, 9 juin 1815.—131

[Address of the Commercy Municipal Council to Napoleon III.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 196, July 15, 1849.—114

Алекса́ндър I. Объ́ отпустъ́ помышля́емъ крестья́нъ своихъ на волю по заключении условий на обходномъ согласии основанныхъ. 20 февраля 1803 года.—145

Alexander II. [Speech addressed to the Tver nobility on August 11, 1858.] In: Le Nord, No. 277, October 4, 1858. “Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Pétersbourg”.—144
— [Speech addressed to the Kostroma nobility on August 16, 1858.] In: Le Nord, No. 277, October 4, 1858. “Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Pétersbourg”.—144

[Announcement in the Wiener Zeitung of May 7, 1859 about the immobilisation of a silver coin of six kreuzers.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—324

The Austrian Account. In: The Times, No. 23325, June 6, 1859.—371

The Austrian Account. In: The Times, No. 23326, June 7, 1859.—371


The Board of Trade Returns for the Half-Year Ending June 30, 1859. In: The Economist, No. 831, July 30, 1859.—479, 480

[The British Government’s proposal to the governments of France, Prussia and Russia on a general disarmament of April 18, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23287, April 22, 1859.—293

[Buol-Schauenstein, K.] Copie d’une lettre de M. le Comte Buol-Schauenstein à M. le Comte de Cavour en date de Vienne le 19 avril 1859. In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 116 (supplement), April 26, 1859.—297, 421

— [Note to the Russian Ambassador in Vienna Balabin of March 23, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—290, 292

— [Note to the British Ambassador in Vienna A. Loftus of March 31, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23280, April 14, 1859.—290, 292-93

Circular dispatch to the Prussian Ambassadors at the German Courts, early March 1859. In: Neue Preussische Zeitung. No. 56, March 8, 1859.—265

[Circular-Erlass des Ministers des Inneren von Westphalen vom 24. September 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung von Staats und gelehrten Sachen, No. 231, October 3, 1858.—77


Code Napoléon.—386, 532

Commerce of the British Empire. The Result of Recent Commercial Legislation. II. Declared Value of British and Irish Produce Exported from the United Kingdom to Various Foreign Countries and British Possessions. III. Summary of the Import and Export Trade of the United Kingdom. In: The Economist, No. 803 (supplement), January 15, 1859.—492, 493

[Constitution of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, 1803.]—132

[Constitution of the Republic of the Ionian Islands, 1817.1]—132

Convention entre les cours de Vienne, de St. Pétersbourg, de Londres et de Berlin, pour fixer le sort des sept îles Ionniennes: signée à Paris le 5 novembre 1815.—130, 132

Corps Législatif Sommaire de la séance du mardi 26 avril 1859. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 117, April 27, 1859.—305

Correspondence Relating to Persia and Affghanistan, London, [1839].—514, 515

Correspondence Relative to the Affairs of Hungary 1847-1849. Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty, August 15, 1850, London, 1850.—498
Correspondence Relative to the Earl of Elgin's Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857-1859. Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty in Pursuance of Their Address dated July 15, 1859. [London, 1859.]—509-11, 522-24, 536, 537-39


The Customs Report. The Trade of 1857 and 1858. In: The Economist, No. 833, August 13, 1859.—492, 493

Déclaration des Puissances rassemblées au Congrès de Vienne au sujet de la Suisse. Annexe N 11 de l'acte du Congrès de Vienne.—560

[Decree on temporarily relieving the National Bank from the obligation of redeeming notes for cash.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 101, May 1859.—324

Décret impérial qui institue une caisse de service pour la boulangerie de Paris, le 27 décembre, 1853. In: Collection complète des lois décrets, règlements et avis du Conseil d'Etat..., T. 54, Paris, 1854.—111

Dixon, Y. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on April 27, 1858.] In: Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., London, 1858.—34-35

Denman, Th. [Speech at a trial in September 1844.]—278

Erklärung nassauischer Staatsbürger. In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 176, June 25, 1859.—405

First Report from the Secret Committee on Commercial Distress; with the Minutes of Evidence, Vol. VII, Part I. Session 18 November 1847-5 September 1848. Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, London, 1848.—34


— [Circular of November 17, 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 271, November 19, 1858.—116, 125

[Forey, E. F.] Rapport officiel de M. le général Forey, transmis par S. Exc. le maréchal Baragaery d'Hilliers à l'Empereur. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 114, May 24, 1859.—338

Francis Joseph [Manifesto of July 15, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23364, July 21, 1859 ("Austria").—436, 437

Friedrich II. Aus der Instruction für die Generalmajors von der Cavallerie (14. August 1748).—252

Friedrich Wilhelm IV. Der 11. April 1847. Thron-Rede... zur Eröffnung des Vereinigten Landtages. Berlin, 1847.—65-66, 68, 75

— Allerhöchster Erlass vom 7. Oktober 1858, betreffend die Aufforderung an Seine Königliche Hoheit den Prinzen von Preussen zur Uebernahme der Regentschaft. In: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten, Berlin, 1858.—65-67, 70


— [Speech at the sitting of both Prussian Chambers on February 6, 1850.]—69

— [Speech delivered on the occasion of laying the foundation stones of a new bridge over the Rhine, about October 3, 1855.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 280, October 7, 1855.—55
Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature

— Verordnung, betreffend die Auflösung der zur Vereinbarung der Verfassung berufenen Versammlung vom 5. Dezember 1848. In: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten, 1848, Berlin, s. a.—97


Government communication on the observance of military secrets, published in the Wiener Zeitung on May 9, 1859.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 133, May 13, 1859.—310

Government of India Bill, 1858.—203

Gyulay, F. [War bulletin of May 3, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23298, May 5, 1859.—316
— Report of Count Gyulay, Commander of the Second Army, to His Majesty the Emperor, June 7, 1859. In: The Times, No. 23331, June 13, 1859.—372, 376

[Horner, L.] Report of Leonard Horner, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ending the 31st October 1858. In: Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858, London, 1858.—191-94

[Kincaid, J.] Report of Sir John Kincaid, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year ending the 31st October 1858. In: Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858, London, 1858.—194, 196

Krassow, K. R. [Circular addressed to the primary electors on October 26, 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 267, November 14, 1858.—108

Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 5ten Januar 1831.—540-14

Kurhessische Verfassungs-Urkunde vom 13ten April 1852.—543, 544

Lloyd, S. S. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on April 16, 1858.] In: Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., London, 1858.—4

Loi relatif à des mesures de sûreté générale [19 février 1858].—579

Mill, J. S. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on June 12, 1857.] In: Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts..., P. 1, London, 1857.—6

Mouvement de la population en France pendant l'année 1855. In: Annuaire de l'économie politique et de la statistique pour 1858, Paris, 1858.—113

Mustoxidis. Pro Memoria. Printed by the House of Commons, June 22, 1840.—132

Naas, R. S. By the Lord Lieutenant-General and General Governor of Ireland. Proclamation. Eglinton and Winton. In: The Times, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 ("The Irish Government and the Riband Conspiracy").—135
Napoleon III. [Address to the Austrian Ambassador von Hübner at a reception for the Diplomatic Corps in the Tuileries, January 1, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23196, January 6, 1859.—615
— [Decree of December 2, 1852 on the restoration of the Empire in France.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 337, December 2, 1852.—445
— [Decree on grain reserves of November 16, 1858.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112, 113
— [Decree of May 9, 1859 on the erection of a statue of Humboldt in Paris.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 130, May 10, 1859.—312
— [Decree of August 16, 1859 on the amnesty of those condemned for criminal and political offences.] In: Le Moniteur universel, Nos. 228 and 229, August 16 and 17, 1859.—546, 638
— [Decree of August 16, 1859 revoking administrative warnings to the press.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 230, August 18, 1859.—638
— Proclamation [Milan, le 8 juin 1859]. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 163, June 12, 1859.—431
— [Speech to the Corps législatif on March 2, 1854.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 62, March 3, 1854.—110
— [Speech at a reception for members of the State Council, the Senate and the Corps législatif in the Palace of Saint-Cloud on July 19, 1859.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 201, July 20, 1859.—432, 436, 437
— [Letter to F. Head of March 1, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23246, May 5, 1859.—258-60
— [Telegram to the Empress Eugénie, June 5, 1859.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 157, June 6, 1859.—364, 384, 426

Nesselrode, K. V. [Circular of the Russian Foreign Minister to the Russian representatives in German states, July 6, 1848.] In: Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung, No. 210 (second supplement), July 28, 1848.—608

Николай I. О крепостных людях, проданных лицами, неимущими во владении своем населенных ими земли. 16 декабря 1846 года.—145
— О правах состояния помещичьих крестьян, назначенных в рекрут и внезапно за себя в казну деньги. 20 декабря 1854 года.—146
— О предоставлении крестьянам имений, продавящихся с публичных торгов за долги, права пыкать себя с землею. 8 ноября 1847 года.—146
— О предоставлении крестьянам помещичьих и крепостных людей покупать и приобретать в собственность земли, дома, лавки и недвижимых имущества. 3 (15) марта 1848 года.—146
— О предоставлении помещикам заключать с крестьянами договоры на отдачу их участков земли в пользование за условиями повинности, с принятием крестьянами, заключившими договоры, названия обязанности крестьян. 2 апреля 1842 года.—145
— О предоставлении помещикам отпускать дворовых людей на волю без земли, по обоюдным договорам в платеж последовыми за себя условленных сумм. 12 июня 1844 года.—145
— Положение о морском ополчении. 2 апреля 1854 года.—146
[Note of the Government of Austria to the Government of Prussia of February 22, 1859.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 56, March 8, 1859.—292

[Official announcement concerning the appointment of a new Prussian Cabinet.] In: Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger, November 6, 1858 (evening issue).—97

Overstone, S. J. L. [Testimony before the House of Commons Committee on July 14, 1857.] In: Report from the Select Committee on Bank Acts..., London, 1857.—3


Papers. East India (Cabul and Affghanistan). Ordered by the House of Commons, to be Printed 8 June 1859. [London, 1859.]—514-16

Pius IX. [The Encyclical Letter of June 18 to the Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops and Bishops in Communion with the Holy See.] In: The Times, No. 23352, July 7, 1859.—412

[Regulations on Governing the Landowners’ Peasants of the St. Petersburg Gubernia Drawn up by the St. Petersburg Nobility Committee, about December 5, 1857.].—144

The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers, and Other Documents and Correspondence, Historical, Diplomatic, and Commercial, Vol. III, London, 1836.—603

Protocole signé à Aix-la-Chapelle le 15 novembre 1818 par les plénipotentiaires des cours d’Autriche, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de Prusse et de Russie.—291


[The programme of action for Gubernia Nobility Committees for improving the life of the landlords’ peasants, April 21, 1858.] In: Le Nord, No. 354, December 20, 1858, “Russie (Correspondance particulière du Nord). Saint-Pétersbourg, le 27 novembre/9 décembre.”—139-43

[Prussian circular letter to the governments of the states of the German Confederation of April 29, 1859.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 108, May 10, 1859.—312

[Prussian Factory Law of 1853.]—208


Real Value of the Principal Articles Imported. An Account of the Computed Real Value of the Principal Articles of Foreign and Colonial Merchandise Imported in the Five Months Ended 31st May 1859. In: The Economist, No. 831 (supplement), July 30, 1859.—478


Recueil des documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle, Paris, 1854.—603

[Redgrave, A.] Report of Alexander Redgrave, Inspector of Factories, for the Half Year
ended the 30th of October 1858. In: Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year ending 31st October 1858, London, 1858.—206, 208


Report from the Select Committee on the Bank Acts. Together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Index, London, 1858.—3-7, 9-11, 34, 35


[Resolution proposed in the name of Hanover to the Federal Diet in Frankfurt on May 13, 1859.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 141, May 21, 1859.—343


The Russian Despatch from China. In: The Times, No. 23085, August 30, 1858.—13

Schleinitz, A. [Dispatch of May 26, 1859 to General F. A. Willisen, in Vienna on mediation in the Italian war.]—454
— [Dispatch of June 14, 1859 to Karl Werther, Prussian ambassador in Vienna.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454-57
— [Dispatch of June 24, 1859 to Albrecht Bernstorff, Prussian ambassador in London, and Otto Bismarck, Prussian ambassador in St. Petersbourg, on mediation in the Italian war.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 170, July 24, 1859.—462

Statistical Abstract for the United Kingdom in Each of the Last Fifteen Years, from 1844 to 1858. London, 1859.—487-91

Tableau des villes dans lesquelles la boulangerie est réglementée par des décrets ou ordonnances, et dans lesquelles l’approvisionnement de réserve des boulangers sera porté à trois mois de leur vente journalière. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 322, November 18, 1858.—112

[Table of the official quotations of the Paris Stock Exchange.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 84, March 25, 1859; No. 98, April 8, 1859; No. 119, April 29, 1859.—305

Traité additionnel entre la Russie, la Prusse, et l’Autriche, relatif à Cracovie, signé à Vienne. le 3 mai 1815.—131

Traité d’alliance de Vienne entre la Grande-Bretagne, l’Autriche, la Prusse et la Russie conclu le 25 mars 1815.—39, 130, 170, 535

Traité d’amitié, de commerce et de navigation, conclu entre la France et la Chine à Tien-Tsin, le 27 juin 1858.—83

Traité d’amitié entre la Russie et la Chine signé à Tien-Tsin, le 13 juin 1858.—88, 508, 510, 512

Traité de paix entre l’Autriche et la France, signé à Zurich, le 10 novembre 1859.—532

Traité de paix entre S. M. l’empereur des Français roi d’Italie et S. M. l’empereur de toutes les Russies; signé à Tilsit, le 7 juillet 1807.—499, 603

Traité entre le roi du Pays-Bas et les quatre Puissances alliées, signé à Vienne, le 13 mai 1815.—130

Traité entre S. M. la reine de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande, et S. M. impériale
l’Empereur de Chine, signé à Nanking, le 29 août 1842.—19, 28, 46, 47, 49, 83, 85, 537
Traité général de paix entre l’Autriche, la France, la Grande-Bretagne, la Prusse, la Russie, la Sardaigne et la Porte Ottomane, signé à Paris, le 30 mars 1856.—163
Traité supplémentaire entre S. M. la reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d’Irlande et l’empereur de Chine, signé à Houmon-Schai, le 8 octobre 1843.—13, 46, 47

[The Treaty between Great Britain and China, signed at Tientsin, June 26, 1858.] In: The Times, No. 23109, September 27, 1858, “The Treaty with China”.—13, 46, 47-49, 83-85, 508, 513, 522

The Treaty between Russia and France on Neutrality and Co-operation, Paris, February 19-March 3, 1859.—320

Trial of Mr. Guernsey for Stealing the Ionian Despatches. In: The Times, No. 23178, December 16, 1858.—133

Verfassungs-Gesetz für den Preussischen Staat, Vom 20. Mai 1848. In: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten, 1850, Berlin, s. a.—68, 76, 77
Verfassungs-Urkunde für den Preussischen Staat vom 5. Dezember 1848. In: Gesetz-Sammlung für die Königlichen Preussischen Staaten, Berlin, 1848.—77

Victoria, R. [Speech in the House of Lords on August 13, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23385, August 15, 1859.—637

Victor Emmanuel II. [Address to Colonel Rolland after the review of the Savoy brigade, November 1858.] In: The Times, No. 23168, December 4, 1858 (“Piedmont”).—122, 165
— [Throne speech at the opening of the Sardinian Chambers on January 10, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23200, January 11, 1859.—154, 165

— [Circular to the French diplomatic representatives abroad of April 27, 1859.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 121, May 1, 1859.—307-08
Werther, K. [Dispatch of May 27, 1859 to A. Schleinitz.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454
— [Dispatch of May 30, 1859 to A. Schleinitz.] In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 211, July 30, 1859.—454

Wilhelm, Prinz von Preussen, Regent. [Declaration at the reception of the Breslau notabilities on September 13, 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 216, September 16, 1858.—107
— Allerhöchster Erlass vom 6. November 1858 betreffend die Zusammensetzung des neu zu bildenden Ministeriums. In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 261, November 7, 1858.—97
— [Speech in the State Council on November 8, 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 276, November 25, 1858.—117, 127
— [Address to the Treubund on November 11, 1858.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 270, November 18, 1858.—117
— [Speech at the closing session of the two Chambers of the Prussian Diet on May 14, 1859.] In: Königlich privilegirte Berlinische Zeitung, No. 113, May 15, 1859.—344

Young, J. [Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to the Right Hon. Sir E. L. Bulwer Lytton, Corfu, July 14, 1858.] In: The Times, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—129
— [Copy of a Despatch from Sir J. Young to Mr. Secretary Labouchere, Corfu, June 10, 1857.] In: The Times, No. 23150, November 13, 1858.—129
— [Despatch.] In: The Daily News, November 12, 1858.—129

OFFICIAL BULLETINS
FROM THE THEATRES OF THE ITALIAN WAR OF 1859

Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 2, Turin, 30 avril au matin. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 124, May 4, 1859.—335
Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 18, Turin, 8 mai au matin. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 131, May 11, 1859.—371
[French report from Alexandrie, 21 mai 1859.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 142, May 22, 1859.—332
[French report from Alexandrie, 29 mai 1859.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 150, May 30, 1859.—364
Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 60, Turin, 31 mai au matin. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 154, June 3, 1859.—361
Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 61, Turin, 31 mai au soir. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—360
Bulletin officiel de la guerre: N° 62, Turin, 1-er juin au matin. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 155, June 4, 1859.—360
Passage du Tessin et Bataille de Magenta. Quartier général de San Martino, le 5 juin 1859. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 161, June 10, 1859.—372, 376
Bulletin de la bataille de Solferino [28 juin 1859]. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 183, July 2, 1859.—428
[Report from Turin of April 30, 1859.] In: The Times, No. 23295, May 2, 1859.—335
Official Bulletin. Turin, May 7, 8. In: The Times, No. 23301, May 9, 1859.—327
Official Bulletin. Turin, May 9, 10. In: The Times, No. 23303, May 11, 1859.—327
Official Bulletin Published To-day. Turin, May 31. In: The Times, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—350, 360


The Austrian Army in Piedmont (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters, Mortara, May 10. In: The Times, No. 23309, May 18, 1859.—336

The Austrian Army in Piedmont (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters, Mortara, May 15. In: The Times, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—333

[Official report from Vienna of May 22.] In: The Times, No. 23313, May 23, 1859.—332


Von der österreichischen Armee in Italien, Garlasco, 22. Mai. In: Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 147, May 27, 1859.—349-50

The Battles of Palestro. In: The Times, No. 23322, June 2, 1859.—361

The Battle of Solferino (From our special correspondent). Austrian headquarters. Verona, June 25. In: The Times, No. 23348, July 2, 1859.—396, 571

[Official report of the Austrian command on the battle at Solferino, early July 1859.] In: Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 155, July 7, 1859.—428

ANONYMOUS ARTICLES AND REPORTS PUBLISHED IN PERIODIC EDITIONS

Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 148, May 28, 1859.—350
— No. 149, May 29, 1859.—350
— No. 223, August 11, 1859: [Report from the Wiener Zeitung, August 8, 1859. Abendblatt.]—483
— No. 223, August 11, 1859.—484
— No. 242, August 30, 1859: “Eisenach (die Kundgebung für preussische Hegemonie).”—638
— No. 34, February 3, 1860: [French newspapers on the plans for the annexation of Savoy to France.]—581
— No. 56, February 25, 1860. “Beilage: Die Lage der italienischen Frage und die Interessen Deutschlands (Schluss).”—571
— No. 58, February 27, 1860: “Das Wachsen der Opposition.”—600
— No. 58, February 27, 1860: [Exposition of an article from Le Courrier du dimanche.]—602

The Economist, No. 209, August 28, 1847. Supplement.—14
— No. 785, September 11, 1858: "What Commercial Treaties May Really Effect."—50
— No. 838, September 17, 1859: "The Disaster in China."—518-19
— No. 838, September 17, 1859: "The Trade of China. Its Importance, Direct and Indirect."—518-20

*The Free Press*, No. 16, May 12, 1858: "Recent Treachery in Circassia."—23, 24, 25
— No. 18, June 30, 1858: "Charge of Hungarian Treachery."—23, 24, 25
— No. 20, August 25, 1858: "The Russian Agent in Circassia."—22, 26-27
— No. 21, September 22, 1858: "Treaties with China."—48
— No. 23, November 24, 1858: "The Ionian Islands."—131-32
— No. 23, November 24, 1858: "Russian State Papers Respecting Her Recent Advance to Our Indian Frontiers."—59-64

*The Friend of China*, July 28, 1849.—14

*Hermann*, No. 21, May 28, 1859: "Der europäische Krieg. Karl Schurz in Boston."—625
— No. 21, May 28, 1859: "Furor Teutonicus."—625, 626
— No. 21, May 28, 1859: [The Hermann's editorial note to the article "Die Society of Arts, und die elfte Ausstellung neuer Erfindungen in ihrem Gebäude: John Street, Adelfi. Schluss"].—626
— No. 21, May 28, 1859: *Deutsche Naturwissenschaft, für das praktische Verständniss und Leben*.—626
— No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Der Germanismus in Böhmen."—626
— No. 24, June 18, 1859: [Editorial note to the article "Der Germanismus in Böhmen"].—627
— No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Unsere Politik."—627
— No. 24, June 18, 1859: "Die Vacanz an der Savoy-Kirche in London."—627
— No. 26, July 2, 1859: "Ueber die Verunreinigungen der Luft."—628
— No. 27, July 9, 1859: "Solferino."—632
— No. 27, July 9, 1859: "Die Stellung Preussens."—630-31

*L'Indépendance belge*, No. 22, January 22, 1859: "Bruxelles, 21 janvier 1859."—169
— No. 104, April 14, 1859: [Account of an article from *La Patrie* of April 12, 1859].—288
— No. 105, April 15, 1859: [Account of an article from *La Patrie* of April 13, 1859].—294
— No. 202, July 21, 1859.—438
— No. 221, August 9, 1859: "Nouvelles d'Italie. (Correspondance particulière de *L'Indépendance belge*) Turin, 5 août."—485
— No. 320, November 16, 1859.—549
— No. 324, November 20, 1859.—549
— No. 334, December 1, 1859: [Report on O'Donnell's order.] "Nouvelles d'Espagna."—549
— No. 338, December 5, 1859: [Report of the correspondent of *L'Indépendance belge* from Madrid of November 29].—549
— No. 10, January 10, 1860: [Telegraphic message from Madrid of January 7].—553, 554

*The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review*, January 1850.—14

*Le Moniteur universel*, No. 64, March 5, 1859.—256, 264, 441, 442, 540
— No. 81, March 22, 1859.—274
— No. 84, March 25, 1859.—291
— No. 109, April 19, 1859.—296, 304
— No. 111, April 21, 1859.—295
— No. 127, May 7, 1859.—312
— No. 207, July 26, 1859: “Paris, le 25 juillet.”.—440
— No. 252, September 9, 1859.—504
— No. 258, September 15, 1859: “Chine. Aux embouchures du Pei-Ho, 1er juillet 1859.”.—512, 520

Le National, January 24, 1832.—44

Neue Preussische Zeitung, No. 264, November 11, 1858: “Der Ministerwechsel.”—106
— No. 34, February 10, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage I.”.—269
— No. 35, February 11, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage II.”.—269
— No. 36, February 12, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage III.”.—269
— No. 40, February 17, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage IV.”.—269
— No. 41, February 18, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage V.”.—269
— No. 42, February 19, 1859: “Preussen und die Italienische Frage VI.”.—269
— No. 101, May 1, 1859.—324
— No. 107, May 8, 1859.—335
— No. 108, May 10, 1859.—312
— No. 110, May 12, 1859.—320
— No. 171, July 26, 1859.—451

New-York Daily Tribune, No. 5647, May 27, 1859: [Report from London of May 14, 1859].—328

La Patrie, July 28, 1859.—440

The Times, No. 21963, March 20, 1854: “England, Turkey and Russià.”.—72
— No. 22930, March 2, 1858 (leader).—523
— No. 23085, August 30, 1858: “The Russian Despatch from China.”.—13, 50
— No. 23129, October 20, 1858 (leader).—85
— No. 23137, October 29, 1858 (leader).—89
— No. 23152, November 16, 1858 (leader).—130
— No. 23167, December 3, 1858: “Prussia (From Our Own Correspondent. Berlin, November 30).”—125
— No. 23174, December 11, 1858: “Ireland. Illegal Societies.”.—136
— No. 23176, December 14, 1858 (leader).—135
— No. 23183, December 22, 1858: “Ireland. The Arrests.”.—136
— No. 23194, January 4, 1859: “France (From Our Own Correspondent. January 2).”—162
— No. 23247, March 7, 1859 (leader).—257
— No. 23274, April 7, 1859: [Report from Bombay of March 12, 1859].—283
— No. 23284, April 19, 1859: [Telegram from Turin of April 18, 1859].—296
— No. 23293, April 29, 1859.—304-05
— No. 23295, May 2, 1859: [Report from Turin of April 30, 1859].—335
— No. 23329, June 10, 1859: [Letter from Novara of June 4, 1859].—575
— No. 23330, June 11, 1859: [Commentaries on the Austrian and French reports on the Battle of Magenta].—575
— No. 23370, July 28, 1859 (leader).—441
— No. 23375, August 3, 1859 (leader).—481
— No. 23387, August 17, 1859: "Meeting of Trades' Delegates."—636
— No. 23387, August 17, 1859: "The Nine Hours Movement."—636
— No. 23409, September 12, 1859 (leader).—517
— No. 23411, September 14, 1859: "The Disaster in China (From Our Own Correspondent). Hong Kong, July 22."—512
— No. 23413, September 16, 1859: "The Disaster in China."—525
— No. 23413, September 16, 1859 (leader).—512, 517
— No. 23415, September 19, 1859 (leader).—518
— No. 23473, November 25, 1859 (leader).—546
— No. 23487, December 12, 1859: "Spain."—548
— No. 23488, December 13, 1859: "Spain and Morocco."—548
— No. 23530, January 31, 1860: "The Annexation of Savoy."—557
— No. 23531, February 1, 1860: [Report of the Times correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561
— No. 23535, February 6, 1860: [Report of the Times correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561
— No. 23548, February 21, 1860: [Report of the Times correspondent from Camp of Guad el Jelu.]—561
INDEX OF PERIODICALS

Allgemeine Militär-Zeitung—a newspaper, organ of the German Officers' and Soldiers' Society, published from 1826 to 1902, first in Darmstadt and then in Leipzig; Engels contributed to it from 1860 to 1864.—575

Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung—a government daily published in Berlin from 1853 to 1859.—117


Berliner politisches Wochenblatt—a conservative weekly published from 1831 to 1841 with the participation of some members of the Historical School of Law; it was supported and patronised by the Crown Prince Frederick William (King Frederick William IV from 1840).—159

Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrt en Sachen—a semi-official government newspaper of a constitutional-monarchist trend; it appeared in Berlin from 1740 to 1874 six times a week; also called Spener sche Zeitung after its publisher.—313

Le Constitutionnel—a daily published in Paris from 1815 to 1817 and from 1819 to 1870; during the 1848 revolution it voiced the views of the monarchist bourgeoisie (Thiers' party) and after the coup d'état of 1851 became a Bonapartist newspaper.—44, 111, 113, 169, 171-76, 277, 296, 303, 485

Le Correspondant—a Catholic monthly published in Paris from 1829; mouthpiece of the Orleanists in the 1850s.—91, 95, 122

Le Courrier des États-Unis—a French-language daily published in New York from 1828 to 1938; it spoke for the French Government.—171

Courrier du Dimanche—an anti-Bonapartist weekly published in Paris from 1858 to 1866.—613

The Daily Express—a British government daily published in Dublin from 1851.—136

The Daily News—a liberal newspaper of the industrial bourgeoisie published in London from 1846 to 1930.—129, 363
The Daily Telegraph—a liberal, and, from the 1880s, conservative daily published in London from 1855 to 1937.—49, 509, 520, 525
Dio e Papola (Genoa).—37

The Evening Post—a daily published in New York from 1801 to 1934; organ of the Republican Party from 1856.—372

France Centrale—a French provincial newspaper.—167
Frankfurter Oberpostamts-Zeitung—a newspaper published in Frankfurt am Main from 1619 to 1866; organ of the Imperial Regent and Government during the 1848-49 revolution.—608

The Free Press. Journal of the Foreign Affairs Committees—a journal on questions of foreign policy, opposed to the Palmerston government; it was published by David Urquhart and his supporters in London from 1855 to 1865 (weekly until April 1858 and then monthly); in 1866 it was renamed Diplomatic Review; it printed several works by Marx.—22-27, 48, 59, 61, 131, 132, 415, 498, 503, 525
The Friend of China—see The Overland Friend of China

Die Gartenlaube. Illustriertes Familienblatt—a literary weekly published in Leipzig from 1855 to 1903 and in Berlin from 1903 to 1943.—629, 633
The Globe and Traveller—a daily published in London from 1803 to 1921; mouthpiece of the Whigs up to 1866, and afterwards a Conservative newspaper.—130

Hermann. Deutsches Wochenblatt aus London—a German-language weekly organ of the German petty-bourgeois democratic refugees published in London from 1859; Gottfried Kinkel was its publisher and editor from January to July 1859.—625-30, 632, 633

The Illustrated London News—a weekly published since 1842.—431
L’Illustration—an illustrated literary journal published in Paris since 1843.—430
L’Indépendance belge. Journal mondial d’informations politiques et littéraires—a daily of the liberals founded in Brussels in 1831.—162, 169, 288, 294, 438, 485, 549, 553, 554

Journal de Constantinople—a French-language Turkish newspaper published from 1846; it was subsidised by the Turkish Government but was actually the vehicle of French influence; it appeared six times a month.—24
Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1944; organ of the moderate Orleanist opposition after the coup d’état of 1851.—42

Kölische Zeitung—a daily published in Cologne from 1802 to 1945; it took an anti-revolutionary stand and attacked the Neue Rheinische Zeitung in 1848-49; it expressed the interests of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie in the 1850s.—313
Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger—a daily newspaper, official organ of the Prussian Government, published in Berlin from 1851 to 1871.—97, 126, 128, 269, 343, 455


Kreuz-Zeitung—see Neue Preussische Zeitung

The London Gazette—the British Government's biweekly published since 1666.—205

The London News—a Chartist weekly published in 1858.—410

The Merchant's Magazine and Commercial Review—an American journal founded by Freeman Hunt and published from 1839 to 1850.—14


The Morning Chronicle—a daily published in London from 1770 to 1862; organ of the Whigs in the 1840s, of the Peelites in the early 1850s and later of the Conservatives.—89, 132

The Morning Post—a Conservative daily published in London from 1772 to 1937; organ of the Right-wing Whigs grouped around Palmerston in the mid-nineteenth century.—89

The Morning Star—a daily of the English Free Traders published in London from 1856 to 1869.—49, 129, 511

Le National—a daily published in Paris from 1830 to 1851; organ of the moderate republicans in the 1840s.—44, 602

National-Zeitung—a daily published in Berlin from 1848 to 1915; it voiced liberal views in the 1850s.—78, 79, 381

Neue Preussische Zeitung—a conservative daily published in Berlin from June 1848 to 1939; organ of the Prussian Junkers and Court circles; it was also known as the Kreuz-Zeitung because the heading contained a cross bearing the device “Forward with God for King and Fatherland!”—106, 125, 161, 265, 269, 312, 320, 324, 335, 344, 428, 451, 452, 462


New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune—a special edition of the New-York Daily Tribune reprinting its most important articles; it came out on Tuesdays and Fridays.—20, 50, 58, 64, 69, 73, 77, 86, 90, 114, 124, 147, 153, 157, 161, 166, 182, 196,

Le Nord. Journal international—a monarchist daily published in Paris and Brussels from 1855 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1899.—139, 141, 144

The Observer—a conservative weekly published in London since 1791.—130

Ost-Deutsche Post—a moderate liberal daily published in Vienna from 1848 to 1866.—572

The Overland Friend of China—an English official newspaper published in Victoria (Hong Kong) from 1842 to 1859.—14

La Patrie. Journal du commerce, de l'agriculture, de l'industrie, de la littérature, des sciences et des arts—a daily published in Paris from 1841; it spoke for the Party of Order (the monarchist bourgeoisie) in 1850 and later took a Bonapartist stand.—44, 288, 294, 440

Le Pays. Journal de l'Empire—a daily founded in Paris in 1849; semi-official organ of Napoleon III's Government from 1852 to 1870.—44

Peking Gazette—the name given to King Pao, the official organ of the Chinese Government, published from 1844 to 1911.—509

Pensiero ed Azione—a bimonthly organ of the Italian democrats edited by Giuseppe Mazzini; it was published in London in 1858 and 1859, and in Lugano and Genoa in 1860.—503

The People's Paper—a Chartist weekly published by Ernest Jones in London from 1852 to 1858; Marx and Engels contributed to it from October 1852 to December 1856 and helped with its editing; in June 1858 it fell into the hands of bourgeois dealers.—410, 411

Politisches Wochenblatt—see Berliner politisches Wochenblatt

Post—see The Morning Post

La Presse—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1866; mouthpiece of the opposition to the regime of the Second Empire in the 1850s and later a Bonapartist newspaper.—170

La Presse d'Orient (Constantinople).—22-25

Preussische Zeitung—see Allgemeine Preussische Zeitung

Revue des deux Mondes—a literary and political fortnightly published in Paris since 1829.—402


Sächsische Konstitutionelle Zeitung—a liberal newspaper published in Dresden, from 1850 to 1859 under this title and from April 1859 to 1874 as the Konstitutionelle Zeitung.—638

Le Siècle—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1939; it was moderate republican in the 1850s and 1860s.—42

Staats-Anzeiger—see Königlich Preussischer Staats-Anzeiger

Tribune—see New-York Daily Tribune

Das Volk—a German-language weekly published in London from May 7 to August 20, 1859; it was founded as the official organ of the German Workers' Educational Society in London; Marx took part in its publications beginning with issue No. 2 and in early July he virtually became its editor and manager.—348, 367, 372, 373, 374, 375, 377, 379, 383, 387, 395, 400, 403, 406, 410, 411, 415, 428, 434, 441, 464, 469, 477, 624, 634, 635, 638

Volks-Zeitung—a liberal daily published in Berlin from 1853.—78

Wiener Zeitung—a daily organ of the Austrian Government published in Vienna from 1780 to 1931.—310, 324, 436, 482, 483
SUBJECT INDEX

A
Abstraction, abstract and concrete—435, 446, 473-77
Algeria—448, 555, 565
Alsace—216, 252
Ancient Greece—270
Armament, weapons—178, 179-80, 407
Armed uprising
— national, popular—151, 152-53
See also Indian uprising of 1857-59; Taiping uprising in China
See also Army (of different countries); War, wars
Army of German states—179-82, 252, 253, 297-98, 540, 573
See also Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany
Army, Prussian—127, 155, 178-81, 252-53, 298, 390
Army, Sardinian (Piedmontese)—151, 152-53, 200, 276-77
Asia—6, 63, 86
Australia—30, 488, 491, 494-96, 519-20

Austria
— general characteristic—448, 607
— in Middle Ages—225
— and Napoleonic wars—573, 604
— in 1815-47—448, 604
— in 1850-67—122, 342, 394, 404, 407, 422, 447-49, 607
— finances—156, 162, 261-62, 323-26, 448, 607
— political system—289, 393, 407, 607
— bureaucracy—394
— home policy—337, 394
— national question—337, 604-05, 607
— and Hungary, its oppression—270, 288, 498, 604, 607
— and Poland—288, 604, 608
— and the Slavs, their oppression—217, 269-70, 277, 325, 607
— foreign policy and diplomacy—128, 448, 604
— and England—150, 448
— and Germany—216, 230, 233, 238-39, 267-70, 308-09, 343, 573
— and Prussia—71-73, 99, 103, 107, 128, 150, 239, 254-55, 265, 268,
Austro-Italian war of 1848-49
— general characteristic—152-53, 179, 216, 238-39, 361, 400, 418
— progress of the war—183-88, 197, 198, 200-01, 228-31, 276-77, 321, 346, 351, 352, 362, 394, 423
See also Revolution of 1848-49 in Austria; Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states

Austro-Italian-French war of 1859 (Italian war of 1859)
— general characteristic—153, 341, 370-71, 381-82, 407, 416-20, 431, 432, 448, 451, 482, 534, 572, 615-16
— forces of belligerents—150, 166, 171-79, 276-77, 300-02
— battle of Magenta, June 4, 1859—364, 366-67, 368, 370, 384, 393, 396, 397, 424-26, 431, 455, 557, 616
— actions by Garibaldi's detachments—348, 351-55, 360, 417, 533
— Villafranca preliminary peace treaty of 1859—407, 412, 413, 416-19, 438, 449, 483-84, 504-06, 532-33, 576, 577, 607, 616, 629

Zurich peace treaty of 1859—482, 484, 532-34
— Mazzini's attitude—170, 354-59, 420, 499, 533
— and Britain—150, 156, 157, 263, 276, 287-90, 292, 293, 295-97, 303-07, 421, 422, 448, 451, 455, 464, 482, 484, 637
— and diplomacy of European
— and European Stock Exchange—154-63, 268, 303-05, 325, 326
— and revolutionary movement in Europe—341, 381, 413, 419
— and European democracy—387, 413, 499, 500, 573

B

Bank of England—3-12, 33, 34-35, 156, 303
Belgium
— its neutrality—247
— strategic position—241-42, 243, 246-47, 251, 252, 599
— and France—242, 243, 246-47, 251, 253, 579, 581
— and Germany—251
— and Holland—130, 251, 252
Berlin—158, 160, 342
Bonapartism
— general characteristic, its essence—91, 271-72, 309, 404, 443, 546
— manoeuvring between contending classes—114, 164
— and army—91, 95, 164, 168, 271, 443, 606
— and bourgeoisie—94-95, 114
— and working class—114
— and lumpenproletariat—596
— and national liberation movements—167-70, 253-54, 309, 404, 497-503, 573
— critique of Bonapartist principle of nationalities—381, 417
See also France. Second Empire
Bosnia—82, 289
Bourgeoisie
— general characteristic—94-95, 114, 123, 160, 191, 637
— English—190-91, 502, 536
— French—92, 94-95, 114, 122, 272
— German—102, 345, 466
— Hungarian—525
— Prussian—80, 116, 159-61
Brandenburg—109

Bulgaria—289
Bureaucracy, bureaucratism—76-77, 80, 102, 123, 161, 394, 466

C

California
— California gold—488, 495-96
Cameralistics—466
Canada—491
Carbonari—163, 167, 168, 265
Carthage—32
Child labour—193-95, 206-08
China
— general characteristic—16, 83, 86
— economy, finances—31-32, 536, 538-39
— foreign trade—13-16, 18, 28-32, 47-49, 83-84, 519, 520, 536-38
— silver as means of circulation—18
— social and political system—16, 17, 83
— as object of colonial expansion by capitalist states and their market—28-32, 523-24, 536
— opium trade—13-20, 30-31, 32, 46-47, 286, 519, 524, 536, 537
See also Opium wars; Taiping uprising in China
Chinese revolution, Chinese war—see Taiping uprising in China
Civilisation—19, 147, 153, 439, 517, 577
Civil war (general characteristic)—465, 544
See also Revolution
Class, classes—52, 125, 160, 191, 391, 476, 531, 581
See also Bourgeoisie
Colombia—30
Colonial wars (general features)—13, 488, 565
See also Indian uprising of 1857-59; Opium wars; Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60; Taiping uprising in China
Commerce, trade—218, 477, 488-89
See also Foreign trade; Opium trade
Commodity—476-77
Communist League—469, 470
Community—140, 141, 146, 147, 476, 539
Confederation of the Rhine—233, 390, 577
Constitution—76, 77, 80, 526, 541-42
Corruption—526, 531, 637
Courts, judiciary system—193, 489, 541
Cracow, Cracow Republic—193, 261, 288, 448
Crime—487-91, 530
Customs Union (Germany, 1834-71)—269, 466
Dalmatia—270
Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50—104, 320
Danubian Principalities—256, 268, 447
See also Moldavia; Wallachia
Democracy, vulgar—470, 573
Denmark—608
See also Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Schleswig-Holstein question
Despotism, tyranny
— as reactionary political power of exploiting minority—262-63, 288, 406, 409, 485, 571, 580
See also Bonapartism; Tsarism, autocracy in Russia
Dialect, dialects
— French—557, 558, 594, 595
— Italian—558, 593-95
— Limousin—557
— Lombard—558, 594
— Norman—579
— Piedmontese—558, 593-95
— Walloon—579
See also Language
Dialectics—472-77
Diplomacy—152, 262, 292-93, 295, 297, 343, 604
Disarmament—288-89, 293, 296
Division of labour—617-18

E
East India Company (British)—15-18
Economic crises—34, 209, 263, 272, 342, 479, 493
Economic relations—32, 476, 536
Egypt—606
Emigration
— as social phenomenon—488, 490-91
— political—21, 37, 470
— from different countries—21-27, 37, 145, 354-59, 488, 490-91, 497-503, 573
England (Great Britain)
— general characteristic—19, 254, 487-89, 493
— in the 1850s (from 1849)—120-21, 134, 511, 512, 520, 545, 546
— political parties—87-89
— suffrage—87-89
— press, the—89
— and Italian question in 1859-60—150-51, 276, 287-93, 295-96, 303, 305-06, 421, 422, 462-64, 637-38
See also Bank of England; Bourgeoisie (English); East India Company; Liberal Party; Parliament, British
Europe
— economic and political characteristic in 19th cent.—52, 120-24, 128
— prospects of revolution in the 1850s—120, 124, 127-28, 341-42, 381
— prospects of revolution and threat of war—127-28, 152-53, 341, 391, 413, 448
See also Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe
Export of capital—493-94

F
Famine—489
Fenians, Fenianism—136
Feuerbach, Feuerbachianism—472-73
Foreign trade
— and colonies—478-81, 519-20, 539
— foreign trade balances—478-81, 492-96, 519-20, 536-39
— export and import of precious metals—494-96
Fortification
— permanent—243, 251, 346
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Index</th>
<th>759</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>— Italian quadrilateral of fortresses in Lombardy—183-88, 346, 534</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— entrenched camp—230, 247-48, 252, 586, 600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— siege and defence of fortresses—248, 343, 356, 556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— general characteristic—112, 169, 248, 263, 416, 465</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— before French Revolution (18th cent.)—71, 165</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— during Consulate and First Empire—29, 532, 580</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— July 1830 revolution and July monarchy—80, 91, 94, 168, 170, 259, 579</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— foreign policy and diplomacy, colonial policy (general characteristic)—130, 152, 264, 446, 532-33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also Alsace; Army, French; Bourgeoisie (French); French Revolution; Napoleonic wars; Paris</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>France. Second Empire</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— general characteristic—91-92, 94-95, 120, 124, 130, 262, 309, 404, 446, 546</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— coup d'état of December 2, 1851—91-95, 168, 170, 257, 263, 271, 309, 440, 445</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— industry, railways, agriculture—169, 245, 271, 347, 583-84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— finances—156, 162, 164, 169, 268, 271, 305, 546</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Crédit Mobilier—102, 114, 123, 155, 164, 271, 313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Stock Exchange, stock-exchange speculation—123, 155, 162, 169, 257, 273, 443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— government's economic and financial policy—110-14, 164, 268</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— domestic situation, home policy—133, 152-53, 442-43, 446, 448, 533, 546-47, 613-14, 638</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— corruption of ruling circles—93, 162, 164, 297, 347</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— character of political power—91-92, 120, 123-24, 309</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— army as bulwark and ruling force of Bonapartist regime—91, 95, 164, 168, 271, 443, 445, 546, 606</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— counter-revolutionary terrorism—288, 309, 448, 547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— manoeuvring between contending classes—114, 164</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— the press, literature—41-44, 93, 116, 162, 294, 305, 309, 547, 578</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Corps législatif—91, 92, 305</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— courts, judiciary system—44-45, 613</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— monarchical groups, the clergy, bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie—92, 94-95, 114, 122, 123, 156-64, 263, 264, 546-47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— working masses, peasantry—95, 114, 164, 264, 444</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— growth of opposition—94, 95, 122, 123, 156, 215, 263-65, 267-68, 380-81, 416</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— growth of opposition in army—92, 268, 448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— republican movement—92, 120, 287, 448</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— Bonapartist regime and wars—128, 152, 156, 164, 166, 215, 416, 442, 443, 446, 546-47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— impending revolution—95, 128, 166</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Austria—264, 604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Belgium—218, 242, 247, 251, 253, 447, 599</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Denmark—303</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and England—259, 260, 263, 264</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Germany—251, 540, 603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Greece—447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Holland—251</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Hungary—502</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Italy—218, 253-54, 504-07, 597-98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Portugal—262, 447, 621-22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Prussia—264, 605</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Russia—263, 272, 603, 604</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Spain—272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Switzerland—447, 484, 560, 591-92</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and USA—416, 447</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— its colonial expansion—150-51, 169, 170, 264, 447, 448, 603</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
See also Bonapartism; Society of December 10

French Revolution (18th cent.)—141, 142, 147, 225, 502, 545, 580, 596-97, 604
See also Jacobin dictatorship, Jacobins

Frontiers, borders (state)
— general characteristic—225, 254, 572
— critique of "natural frontiers" theory—188, 225, 238, 243-51, 571-72, 578, 582, 583, 600, 602

G

Galicia—246, 250, 270, 337
Geographical environment—239-40, 588
Geography—590

German Confederation (1815-66)
— general characteristic—165, 251, 268, 287, 312, 320, 394, 404, 418-19, 456, 462, 542, 608, 638
— Federal Diet—161, 268, 419, 542-44, 608, 638

German philosophy—158-61, 473
See also Feuerbach, Feuerbachianism; Hegel, Hegelianism

Germany
— Germans—159, 465
— in Middle Ages—224-25, 465
— and French Revolution (18th cent.) and Napoleonic wars—181, 225, 239, 245-46, 268, 269, 602, 603, 608
— survivals of feudalism and process of their liquidation—465-66
— in 19th century—103, 104, 122, 473, 540
— fragmentation of country and task of its unification—103-04, 150, 216-17, 239-40, 254-55, 288-89, 312, 344, 394-95, 404-06, 452-53, 465, 573, 600, 638
— economy—31, 103, 325, 342, 465-66
— bourgeois liberalism in 1840s—106, 159, 160
— bourgeois liberalism in 1850s—74, 78, 81, 95, 103, 106-08, 115, 116, 121-22, 125-26, 454, 573
— democrats, democratic movement—313, 454, 470, 573, 638
— science—77, 104, 465-66
— prospects of revolution in 1850s—119, 128, 181-82, 341-43, 381, 382, 394-95, 544
— foreign policy—240, 251, 607-08
— and Belgium—218, 247, 251, 253
— and Britain—72, 540
— and Hungary—254
— and Netherlands—465
— and Russia—104, 239, 246, 391, 406, 419, 455, 543, 603, 605, 607-08
— and the Slavs, their oppression—216-17, 254
— and Switzerland—588-89
— and USA—540
See also Army of German states; Berlin; Bourgeoisie (German); Brandenburg; Confederation of the Rhine; Customs Union; German Confederation; German philosophy; Gotha party; Hesse-Cassel; Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation; Pan-Germanism; Pomerania; Prussia; Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany; Rhine Province; Saxony; Silesia

Gotha party (Germany, 1849)—103, 312, 313, 405, 572, 573, 638

Greece—82, 132
See also Ancient Greece

H

Hegel, Hegelianism—159, 472-75
Hesse-Cassel—540-44

Historical materialism, materialist conception of history—466-70

History, historicism—72-73, 163, 474, 475, 477
See also Historical materialism, materialist conception of history

Holy Alliance—253, 291, 296

Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation—216, 225, 465

Hong Kong—46

Humanism
— pseudo-humanism of bourgeoisie, private owners—52, 131-32

Hungary—178, 254, 270, 288, 289, 390, 413, 497-503, 603-05, 607, 608

See also Bourgeoisie (Hungarian); National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary; Revolution of 1848-49 in Hungary

I

Idealism
— as aspiration for ideal goals—159
— its opposition to materialism—469-70, 473-75
— and religion—159
— idealist method—473-75
— idealist conception of history—469, 470, 474

See also German philosophy; Plato (Plato's philosophy)

India
— general characteristic—86, 488
— industry, social system—539
— colonial subjugation by Britain, its conversion into market—133, 479-81, 519, 539
— trade—519-20, 537
— money system, finances, accumulation of treasures under British rule—279-86

See also Indian uprising of 1857-59

Indian uprising of 1857-59—88, 254, 279, 281, 284-85, 481

Industry, large-scale—208, 536-39

Ionian Islands—129-33, 254

Iran—514

Ireland—133, 134-37, 209, 489-90

See also Fenians, Fenianism; Orangism

Italian war of 1859—see Austro-Italian war of 1859

Italian wars of 1494-1559—183

Italy
— general characteristic—218
— geographical position—183-84, 218-20, 226, 228, 559, 560, 584
— Italian nation, national character—217, 238, 240, 417
— economy, social and political system—162, 218, 559, 583
— towns—337

— history—183-84, 218, 236, 253
— question of Italy's unification—148-53, 238-40, 409, 601
— national movement—95, 238, 354, 418, 498, 559, 580, 601
— Savoy and Nice—557-60, 577, 578, 595, 598-602
— duchies of Tuscany, Parma and Modena—122, 154, 165-66, 273, 291, 408, 533
— foreign policy—296, 297
— and Vienna Congress of 1815—291, 417
— and Britain—150, 484
— and Russia—149, 150, 154, 156, 221
— and Switzerland—148

See also Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italian-French war of 1859; Carbonari; Italian wars of 1494-1559; Kingdom of Sardinia; Kingdom of the Two Sicilies; Lombardy; Mazzini, Mazzinists; Papal States; Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states; Venice
J

Jacobin dictatorship, Jacobins—142, 147, 181
Junkers, Prussian—108, 159-60

K

See also Army, Sardinian; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italian-French war of 1859; Crimean war of 1853-56; Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies (Naples)—122, 148, 154, 218, 289, 601

L

Language—222, 254, 557, 558, 579, 593-95
See also Dialect, dialects
Liberal Party (England)—530, 637
Liberty—66, 77, 133, 160
Lombardy—122, 149, 151, 165-66, 216, 225-27, 238-40, 288, 337, 408, 418, 534, 558
Lorraine—216, 252

M

Manchuria (Mantchooria)—83, 86
Marxism
— as a new scientific world outlook—466-70
Marxist political economy—465-77
Materialism—469-70, 473-75
Mazzini, Mazzinists—37, 170, 354, 420, 498-99
Method—472-75
Militarism—439
Military art
See also Fortification
Military science—216, 231-32, 319, 435
See also Military art
Military training—351-52, 407, 551
Mode of production—469
Moldavia—289, 603
Monarchy—79-80, 119, 286
Money circulation—155, 156, 494-96
Montenegro—82, 265
Moorish war—see Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60
Moores—548-56
Moravia—270
Morocco—551, 555, 565
See also Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60

N

Napoleonic wars
— general characteristic—200-01, 217, 222-23, 225, 232, 253, 327, 346, 426
— war with third European coalition (1805)—154, 181, 236, 269, 387, 389, 448, 573
— Pressburg Peace Treaty of 1805 between France and Austria—233
— war with fourth European coalition (1806-07)—128, 181, 238, 243, 573
— Tilsit peace treaties of 1807—603, 605, 606
— war with fifth European coalition
(1809)—181, 201, 220, 223, 426
— war with sixth European coalition
(1813-14)—225, 227, 242, 244-48,
252-53, 269, 365, 369, 587, 599-
600, 606
— war with seventh European coalition—150, 241-44, 245, 248, 606
— war on Iberian Peninsula (1808-
14)—232, 272
— and Austria—604
— and Britain—502, 545
— and Germany—225, 245-46, 269,
297, 532
— and Italy—253
— and Prussia—103, 128, 268, 269,
533, 573, 603
— and Russia—246
See also Patriotic war of 1812 in
Russia; Vienna Congress of 1814-15
and Vienna treaties of 1815; Wars of
First French Republic
Nation—238, 254, 595
See also Nationality; National question
Nationality—152-53, 238
National liberation war of 1848-49 in
Hungary—322, 346, 608
National movement—152-53, 238, 572
See also National question
National question—152-53, 238-39, 240,
380, 417
See also National movement
Neutrality (in international relations)
— general features—247, 287, 560
— Belgian—247
— Swiss—200, 223, 224, 247, 558,
560, 588
New Zealand—491
Nice—557-60, 577-78, 593-600, 602

O

Opium trade—13-20, 32, 46-47, 283
Opium wars
— their colonial, predatory character—13, 30-32, 49, 87
— Anglo-Chinese war of 1840-42—
13, 19, 28, 46, 48, 49, 50, 514,
524
— Nanking treaties of 1842 and
1843—13, 19, 28, 29-32, 46-49,
83, 537
— Anglo-Franco-Chinese war of
1856-60—13, 19, 28, 31-32, 46-
49, 50, 83, 84, 447, 508-14, 516-
20, 521-24, 546
— Tientsin treaties of 1858—13, 46-
50, 508-11, 513, 517, 518
Orangism (in Ireland)—134-37
Ottoman Empire—see Turkey

P

Pan-Germanism—216-17
Pan-Slavism—156, 277
Papacy—267, 271, 273, 419, 483, 601
Papal States (Roman State)—122, 148-
49, 151, 153, 166, 218, 273, 293, 408,
419, 482-84, 534, 601, 615
See also Papacy
Paris—241, 248, 249
Parliament, British—80, 134, 526, 637
Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia—145,
448, 603
Pauperism—488, 490
Peasantry, Russian, peasant movements in
Russia
— serf—52, 121, 139-41, 142-43,
145-47
— peasant uprisings on eve of abolition
of serfdom in 1861—52-53,
147, 607, 609-10
Piedmont—see Kingdom of Sardinia
Pietism, pietists—160
Plato (Plato's philosophy)—167-68
Poland—73, 109, 131, 246, 250, 603-05,
608
See also Cracow, Cracow Republic; Posen
Political economy (as science, its
method)—465-66, 469-77
Politics—95, 469, 470
Pomerania—73, 109
Portugal—621-22
Posen—99, 109
Power, legislative and executive—541-42
See also Bureaucracy, bureaucracy
Press, the—95, 160, 453
Productive forces, production relations, production—469
Prussia
— general characteristic—78, 96,
103, 107-09, 160
— feudalism, its survivals—52, 77,
160
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Index</th>
<th>Page references</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>— and French Revolution (18th cent.) and Napoleonic wars</td>
<td>52, 103, 128, 243, 268, 269, 573, 603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in 1815-early 1848</td>
<td>77, 102, 159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in 1848-49</td>
<td>see Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in 1850-early 1860</td>
<td>54-58, 65-81, 96-100, 106-9, 115-19, 122, 125-28, 155, 158-61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— economy</td>
<td>67, 103, 160, 161, 208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— social and political system</td>
<td>67, 77, 80-81, 96, 99-104, 108, 125, 128, 147, 159-61, 289, 449, 452-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— prospects of revolution</td>
<td>128, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— foreign policy and diplomacy (general features)</td>
<td>71-73, 103, 128, 156, 157, 268-69, 298, 445, 450, 456-64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Austria</td>
<td>72-73, 99, 103, 107, 128, 150, 239, 254, 265, 268, 269, 311-13, 320, 382, 419, 420, 448, 452-59, 462-63, 540-44, 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Britain</td>
<td>452, 462, 464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and France</td>
<td>102, 107, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Germany</td>
<td>73, 103, 312, 394, 404, 405, 452-56, 459-62, 638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Poland</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— and Russia</td>
<td>72-73, 107, 269, 344, 415, 452, 462, 608, 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also Army, Prussian; Bourgeoisie (Prussian), Confederation of the Rhine; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Germany; Junkers, Prussian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion</td>
<td>— and state policy and legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punishment</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also Crime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution (general characteristic)</td>
<td>52, 381, 469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also French Revolution; Revolution of 1848-49 (in different countries); Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe; Revolution, proletarian, socialist; Revolution, social</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1848-49 in Austria</td>
<td>52, 107, 178, 288, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1848-49 in Europe (general characteristic)</td>
<td>37, 120, 123, 146, 268, 404, 488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1848-49 in Germany</td>
<td>— prerequisites and causes of the revolution, its development and character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— classes, estates, parties, social groups</td>
<td>52-53, 66, 99-103, 106-07, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— state apparatus, government institutions, representative assemblies</td>
<td>55, 67-68, 75-76, 97, 100-03, 104, 270, 406, 542, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— ways of Germany's unification</td>
<td>404, 542-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— national question and foreign policy</td>
<td>98, 107, 181, 270, 604, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— results and assessment of</td>
<td>78, 101, 160, 181, 343, 394, 404, 406, 470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1848-49 in Hungary</td>
<td>52, 288, 501, 604, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution of 1848-49 in Italian states</td>
<td>37, 95, 106, 149, 150, 153, 165, 178-79, 183-84, 238, 273, 277, 351, 352, 361, 418, 482, 604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also Austro-Italian war of 1848-49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution, proletarian, socialist</td>
<td>469, 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolution, social</td>
<td>469, 637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhine Province</td>
<td>99, 109, 160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right, law</td>
<td>76, 130, 140, 418, 469, 489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman State</td>
<td>see Papal States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (Russian Empire)</td>
<td>— before 19th century</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— in first half of 19th century</td>
<td>121, 139, 144-47, 607, 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— economic situation before 1861</td>
<td>Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— industry, agriculture, foreign trade</td>
<td>31, 52, 83-84, 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— finances</td>
<td>53, 156, 288, 303, 304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— social and political system</td>
<td>52, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— serfdom</td>
<td>51-52, 139-40, 142-43, 146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>— question of abolition of serfdom (position of ruling circles, prep-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aration of Reform</td>
<td>51-53, 121, 139-47, 307-08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>revolutionary movement in 19th cent.</td>
<td>53-54, 147, 607, 609-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy (general characteristic)</td>
<td>83, 86, 157, 406, 609-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foreign policy before mid-19th cent.</td>
<td>60, 603, 605, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Central Asia</td>
<td>59-63, 86, 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Far East</td>
<td>50, 83-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tsarist policy in Poland in 19th cent.</td>
<td>131, 246, 250, 605, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Afghanistan</td>
<td>515-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Austria</td>
<td>150, 261, 265, 277, 288, 293, 297, 448, 542-43, 604, 607-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Britain</td>
<td>59, 515-16, 525, 545, 605-06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and China</td>
<td>19, 31, 83, 84-86, 512-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Denmark</td>
<td>128, 303, 608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and France</td>
<td>82, 163, 165, 263, 269, 273, 303-04, 320, 408, 571, 602-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Germany</td>
<td>104, 246, 391, 406, 419, 455, 608-09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Italy</td>
<td>149, 154, 288, 571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Prussia</td>
<td>72, 269, 344, 415, 452, 457, 462, 609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Turkey</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See also Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia; Peasantry, Russian; Tsarism, autocracy in Russia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**S**

Saxony | 109

Schleswig-Holstein question, the | 72, 128, 250, 268, 543, 604, 608, 638

See also Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50

Scotland | 103, 195-96, 210

Serbia, Serbs | 82, 265, 277

Seven Years' War (1756-63) | 225, 253

Silesia | 73, 99, 109, 325

Slavs | 82, 277, 607

Society | 469, 476-77

Society, bourgeois | 36, 191, 469, 488-89

Society of December 10 (France, from 1849) | 445, 596


Speculation (money, Stock Exchange) | 123, 155, 161, 162, 443

State, the | 51-52, 160, 217, 254-55, 476

See also Despotism, tyranny; Monarchy; Power, legislative and executive

Stock Exchange | 8, 123, 155, 161, 162, 313

Switzerland | 148, 200-01, 223, 224, 247, 557, 558, 560, 581, 582, 588-92, 627

**T**

Taiping uprising in China (1850-64) | 18, 31, 49, 83, 84

See also Opium wars

Terror | 147, 448

Theory and practice

— general features | 159, 247, 465, 469, 473, 475-77

— various theories and practice | 216, 230, 231, 233, 243, 247-48, 465, 475-77, 563, 577, 599, 600, 602

— miscellaneous | 33, 147, 159, 191, 253, 465-66, 469-71, 473, 582, 601

Thirty Years' War (1618-48) | 104, 465, 532

Tsarism, autocracy in Russia | 142, 156, 157, 406

Turkey | 82, 85, 150, 277, 289, 603, 605

**U**

United States of America, the

— economy | 31-32, 49, 478-79, 488-89, 519-20

— emigration, its role | 491

— foreign policy | 31-32, 83, 264, 447, 513, 545

See also California
Venice—149, 225, 227, 418, 505, 506, 601
Vienna—225, 314
See also Holy Alliance

Wallachia—289
War, wars
— general characteristic—188, 216, 435, 439
— in feudal society—327
— in capitalist society—439
— their influence on economic and social development—52, 443, 488-89, 547
— method of conducting war—346-47
— and revolutionary movement—128, 341
— revolutionary—413
— national liberation—152-53, 175
— guerrilla—352
— defensive—175, 179-80
— local—341, 446
— character of military operations in land warfare—188, 252, 352, 555, 556
— mountain warfare—220-23, 224, 232, 583-85, 587-88
— threat of war in 1850-60s—127, 128, 148, 156, 163-64, 443, 547
See also Armament, weapons; Army; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Austro-Italo-French war of 1859; Civil war; Colonial wars; Crimean war of 1853-56; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Italian wars of 1494-1559; Military art; Military science; Military training; Napoleonic wars; National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary; Opium wars; Patriotic War of 1812 in Russia; Seven Years' War; Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859-60; Thirty Years' War; War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48; Wars of First French Republic; War of Spanish Succession, 1701-14
War of Austrian Succession, 1740-48—252
Wars of First French Republic (late 18th-early 19th cent.)
— general characteristic—502
— and development of military technique and military art—184, 200-01, 220-23, 225, 232, 445, 596
— war with second European coalition (1798-1801)—183, 188, 220-23, 230-32, 263, 432, 586
War of Spanish Succession, 1701-14—183, 243
Westphalia—99, 109, 160
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aix-la-Chapelle ..........</th>
<th>Aachen ..........</th>
<th>Elberfeld ..........</th>
<th>Wuppertal ..........</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Akmetchet ...............</td>
<td>Kzyl-Orda ........</td>
<td>Elbing ..........</td>
<td>Elblag ............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amoy ..................</td>
<td>Szeming ..........</td>
<td>Fiume ..........</td>
<td>Rijeka ............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arquata .................</td>
<td>Arquata Scrivia ....</td>
<td>Fu-chow ..........</td>
<td>Foochow (Fu-chau, Minhow) ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austerlitz .............</td>
<td>Slavkov ..........</td>
<td>Gravellona ..........</td>
<td>Gravellona Toce ............</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barmen .................</td>
<td>Wuppertal ..........</td>
<td>Groppello ..........</td>
<td>Groppello Cairoli ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgioioso .............</td>
<td>Belgioioso ..........</td>
<td>Hong Kong ..........</td>
<td>Hsiang-Kiang ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blindah ...............</td>
<td>Bilda ..........</td>
<td>Ivangorod ..........</td>
<td>Děblín ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boffalora .............</td>
<td>Boffalora sopra Ticino ..........</td>
<td>Jaxartes ..........</td>
<td>Syr Darya ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breslau ...............</td>
<td>Wroclaw ..........</td>
<td>Kalisch ..........</td>
<td>Kalisz ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruneck ...............</td>
<td>Brunico ..........</td>
<td>Karabulak ..........</td>
<td>Karabutak ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brünn .................</td>
<td>Brno ..........</td>
<td>Khojend ..........</td>
<td>Leninabad ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candia ................</td>
<td>Crete ..........</td>
<td>Khokan ..........</td>
<td>Kokand (Khokand) ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton .................</td>
<td>Kwangchow ..........</td>
<td>Komorn ..........</td>
<td>Komárno (Komárom) ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canton River ..........</td>
<td>Chu-Kiang (Pearl River) ..........</td>
<td>Königsberg ..........</td>
<td>Kaliningrad ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casale .................</td>
<td>Casale Monferrato ..........</td>
<td>Kutaya ..........</td>
<td>Kütahya ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castiglione ...........</td>
<td>Castiglione delle Stiviere ..........</td>
<td>Laibach ..........</td>
<td>Ljubljana ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Castiglione ..........</td>
<td>Castiglione delle Stiviere ..........</td>
<td>Lanslebourg ..........</td>
<td>Lanslebourg-Mont-Cenis ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Châlons-sur-Marne ......</td>
<td>Lemberg ..........</td>
<td>Lvov or Lwow ..........</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantinople ..........</td>
<td>Istanbul ..........</td>
<td>Lüttich ..........</td>
<td>Liège ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cracow .................</td>
<td>Krakow ..........</td>
<td>Macao ..........</td>
<td>Aomen ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danzig .................</td>
<td>Gdansk ..........</td>
<td>Malborgheth ..........</td>
<td>Malborghetto-Valbruna ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desenzano .............</td>
<td>Desenzano del Garda ..........</td>
<td>Marignano ..........</td>
<td>Melegnano ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunkirk ............</td>
<td>Dunkerque ..........</td>
<td>Mequinez ..........</td>
<td>Meknès (Meknez) ..........</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eckmühl ...............</td>
<td>Eggmühl ..........</td>
<td>Nankin ..........</td>
<td>Nanking ..........</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This glossary includes geographical names occurring in Marx’s and Engels’ articles in the form customary in European and American press of the time but differing from the national names or from those given on modern maps. The left column gives geographical names as used in the original (when they differ from the national names of the time, the latter are given in brackets); the right column gives corresponding names as used on modern maps and in modern literature.— Ed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neuenburg</td>
<td>Neuchâtel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuss</td>
<td>Nyon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novaraese</td>
<td>Fara Novarese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olmütz</td>
<td>Olomouc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oxus</td>
<td>Amu Darva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pe-chi-li</td>
<td>Po Hai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peiho</td>
<td>Hai-ho</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekin</td>
<td>Peking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peschiera</td>
<td>Peschiera del Garda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peshawur</td>
<td>Peshawar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peterlingen</td>
<td>Payerne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plombières</td>
<td>Plombières-les-Bains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pola</td>
<td>Pula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pomerania</td>
<td>Pomorze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posen</td>
<td>Poznań</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prague</td>
<td>Praha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pralongnan</td>
<td>Pralongnan-la-Vanoise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjaub</td>
<td>Punjab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raab</td>
<td>Győr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratibor</td>
<td>Racibórz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reichenberg</td>
<td>Liberec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivoli</td>
<td>Rivoli Veronese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Petersburg</td>
<td>Leningrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saorgio</td>
<td>Saorge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stettin</td>
<td>Szczecin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stura</td>
<td>Stura di Demonte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thonon</td>
<td>Thonon-les-Bains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilsit</td>
<td>Sovetsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toblach</td>
<td>Dobiaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troppau</td>
<td>Opava</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turan</td>
<td>Turkistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valeggio</td>
<td>Valéggio sul Mincio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villafranca</td>
<td>Villafranca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>di Verona</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whampoa</td>
<td>Huang-pu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worms</td>
<td>Bormio</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>