The war raging on the shores of the Black Sea for the last two years, has called particular attention to the two millions of armed men kept in pay by Europe, even in the midst of peace, and destined, perhaps, to be very soon increased to twice that number; and if, as is all but certain, the war should continue, we may expect to see these four millions engaged in active operations, on a theater of war occupying, from sea to sea, the whole breadth of the European Continent.

For this reason, an account not only of the armies hitherto engaged in the Eastern conflict, but of the more important remaining armies of Europe as well, cannot be uninteresting to our readers, especially as, on this side of the Atlantic, nothing has fortunately ever been seen approaching, in any degree, the magnitude of even the second-rate armies of Europe; wherefore the organization of such bodies is but vaguely known to the non-professional public among us.

The jealousy which formerly surrounded the army of every power with mysterious secrecy, no longer exists.—Strange to say, even in countries the most adverse to publicity, where all departments of the civil administration remain, to the present day, enveloped in the darkness required by absolutism, the organization of the army is perfectly known to the public. Army lists are published, stating, not only the subdivision of the armed force in corps, divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and squadrons, but also the dislocations of these bodies, with the numbers and the names of the officers commanding them. Whenever great reviews take place, the presence of foreign officers is not only tolerated, but even courted, criticism is solicited, observations are exchanged,
the distinctive institutions and contrivances of each army are sagely discussed, and a publicity is established, which but too strangely contrasts with many other features in the same government. The actual secrets which a European war-ministry can contrive to keep to itself, are a few recipes for chemical compositions, such as rockets or fuses; and even these are found out very soon, or are superseded by the progress of invention; as, for instance, the British congreve-rocket composition, by Mr. Hale’s war-rockets, adopted in the U.S. army, and now in the British army also.

This publicity causes, in time of peace, the various war-ministries of the civilized world to form, as it were, one large military committee, for the purpose of discussing the merit of all proposed innovations, and allowing each member to profit by the experience of all the remainder. Thus it has been brought about that the arrangements, organization and general economy of almost all European armies are nearly the same, and in this sense it may be said that one army is about as good as any other. But national character, historical tradition, and, above all things, different degrees of civilization, create as many diversities, and give to each army its peculiar points of excellence and weakness. The Frenchman and the Hungarian, the Englishman and the Italian, the Russian and the German, under certain circumstances, may be equally good and efficient soldiers; but, in spite of a uniform system of drill, which appears to level all distinctions, every one will be good in his own way, by virtue of qualities different from those possessed by his rivals.

This brings us to a question but too often mooted between the military patriots of different nationalities: Which are the best soldiers? Of course, every people is jealous of its own fame; and, in the opinion of the general public, fed by narratives which, whatever they may lack in critical exactness, are amply adorned with high patriotic coloring,—one regiment of its own can “lick” any two or three of any other nation. Military history, as a science in which a correct appreciation of facts is the only paramount consideration, is but of very recent date, and boasts as yet of a very limited literature. It is, however, an established branch of science, and more and more every day scatters to the winds, like chaff, the unblushing and stupid bluster which too long has characterized works calling themselves historical because they made a trade of distorting every fact they recounted. The time is past when, in writing the history of a war, people can continue that war, so to say, on their own account, and safely cannonade
the late enemy with dirt, after the conclusion of peace forbids
them from cannonading him with iron.\textsuperscript{296} And although many a
minor point in military history remains still to be settled, yet thus
much is certain, that there are none of the civilized nations which
cannot boast of having, at some time or other, produced the best
soldiers of their time. The German \textit{Landsknechte} of the later
middle ages, the Swiss soldiers of the sixteenth century, were for a
period as invincible as the splendid Spanish soldiers, who
succeeded them to the rank of "the first infantry of the world;"
the French of Louis the Fourteenth, and the Austrians of Eugene
disputed, for a while, with each other this post of honor, until the
Prussians of Frederick the Great settled the question by defeating
both of them; these, again, were hurled down into utter disrepute
by a single blow at Jena,\textsuperscript{297} and once more the French were
universally acknowledged the first soldiers of Europe; at the same
time, however, they could not prevent the English, in Spain, from
proving themselves their superiors under certain circumstances
and in certain moments of a battle.\textsuperscript{298} No doubt, the legions which
Napoleon led, in 1805, from the camp of Boulogne to Auster-
litz,\textsuperscript{299} were the finest troops of their time; no doubt Wellington
knew what he said, when he called his soldiers at the conclusion of
the Peninsular war "an army with which he could go any where,
and do any thing;" and yet the flower of this Peninsular British
army was defeated at New Orleans, by mere militia men and
volunteers, without either drill or organization.\textsuperscript{300}

The experience of all past campaigns, then, leads us to the same
result; and every sensible old soldier, unbiased by prejudice, will
confirm it: that military qualities, both as regards bravery and
aptitude for the work, are, upon the whole, pretty impartially
distributed among the different nations of the world; that it is not
so much the degree, as the special nature of the qualification,
which distinguishes the soldiers of different nationalities; and that
with the publicity established now-a-days in military matters, it is
the assiduous application of thought, improvement, invention, to
the military institutions and resources of a State, and the
development of the military qualities specially distinguishing a
nation, by which alone an army can be made, for a time, to rank
foremost among its rivals. Thus we see, at once, what an
advantage, in a military sense, a higher development of civilization
gives to a country over its less advanced neighbors. As an example,
we may mention that the Russian army, though distinguished by
many soldier-like qualities of the first order, has never been able
to establish a superiority over any army of civilized Europe. At
even chances, the Russians would fight desperately; but up to the present war, at least, they were sure to be beat, whether their opponents were French, Prussians, Poles, or English.

Before we consider the different armies separately, a few general remarks respecting them all are requisite.

An army, especially a large one of from three hundred thousand to five hundred thousand and more men, with all its necessary subdivisions, its different arms, and its requirements in men, material, and organization, is itself so complicated a body that the highest possible simplification becomes indispensable. There are so many inevitable varieties, that it might be expected they would not be increased by factitious and unmeaning variegations. Nevertheless, habit and that spirit of show and parade which is the bane of old armies, has complicated matters in almost every European army to an incredible degree.

The differences in size, strength, and temperament which are found, both in men and horses, in every country, necessitate a separation of light infantry and cavalry from heavy infantry and cavalry. To attempt to completely obliterate this separation, would be to mix up in one body individuals whose military qualifications are opposite by nature, and would, therefore, to a certain degree neutralize each other; thereby lessening the efficiency of the whole. Thus, either arm is naturally divided into two separate bodies—the one comprising the heavier and clumsier men (and horses respectively), destined principally for the great decisive charges, and the fight in closed ranks; the other forming the lighter, more active men, specially adapted for skirmishing, outpost and advanced guard duty, rapid maneuvers, and the like. So far, the subdivision is perfectly legitimate. But, in addition to this natural distribution, in almost every army, each subdivision is again subdivided into branches distinguished by nothing but fanciful distinctions of dress and by theoretical quibbles which are constantly contradicted by practice and experience.

Thus, in every European army there exists a corps called Guards, pretending to be the élite of the army, but which in reality merely consists of the biggest monsters of men that can be got hold of. The Russian and the English Guards are most distinguished in this respect; though no proof exists that they exceed in bravery and effectiveness the other regiments in either service. Napoleon's Old Guard was a far different institution; it was the actual élite of the army; and bodily size had nothing to do with its formation. But even this guard weakened the rest of the army, by absorbing its best elements, and consideration for such an
unrivaled corps led Napoleon, sometimes, into mistakes—as at Borodino, where he did not bring the Guards forward at the decisive moment, and thereby missed the chance of preventing the Russian force from effecting their retreat in good order. The French have, beside their Imperial Guard, a sort of élite in every battalion, forming two companies—one of grenadiers, and the other of voltigeurs; thereby complicating the tactical evolutions of the battalion to an unnecessary degree. Other nations have similar corps. All these choice troops, beside their distinctive formation and dress, receive higher pay. It is said that such a system spurs the ambition of the private soldier, especially amongst excitable nations like the French and Italians; but the same object would be obtained, and perhaps more perfectly, if the men who had earned such distinctive marks should remain in the ranks of their respective companies, and were not made use of as a pretext for disturbing the tactical unity and symmetry of the battalion.

A still more striking humbug is practiced with regard to the cavalry. Here the distinction between light and heavy horse forms a pretext for subdivisions of all sorts—cuirassiers, dragoons, carabineers, lancers, chasseurs, hussars, and so on. All such subdivisions are not only useless, they are actually preposterous by the complications they cause. Hussars and lancers are imitated from the Hungarians and Poles; but in Hungary and Poland these arms have their sense—they were the national arms, and the dress of the troops carrying them was the national dress of the country. To imitate such peculiarities in other countries, where the national spirit is wanting that gave them life, is, to say the least of it, ridiculous; and well might, in 1814, the Hungarian hussar, when greeted with the title of "comrade" by a Russian hussar, reply, "No comrade—I hussar, you harlequin!" (Nix camerad—ich husar, du hanswurst!) Another such ridiculous institution, in almost all armies, is formed by the cuirassiers—men actually disabled, and disabling their horses, too, by the weight of their breast-plates (a French cuirass weighs twenty-two pounds), and, for all that, not protected by them from the effects of a rifle-ball fired at a hundred and fifty yards distance! The cuirass had been got rid of in almost all European armies, when Napoleon's love of show and of monarchical tradition re-introduced it among the French, and his example was soon followed by all the nations of Europe.

Beside our own little army, the Sardinian is the only one, among civilized nations, in which cavalry consists of plain light and heavy horse, without any further subdivision, and where the cuirass is completely done away with.
In the field artillery, a great complication of different calibers is found in every army. The English have the greatest diversity in theory, carrying eight calibers and twelve different models of guns; but in practice their enormous material allows them to reduce their artillery to great simplicity. In the Crimea, for instance, the nine-pounder and the twenty-four pound howitzer are almost the only calibers in use. The French have introduced, during the last few years, the greatest possible simplicity, by replacing their four different calibers by one, the light twelve-pound howitzer-gun, of which we shall speak in its place. In most other armies, from three to four calibers are still in existence, not counting the varieties of carriages, tumbrils, wheels, and the like.

The technical corps of the different armies, the engineers, and so on, to which we may add the staff, are organized in all armies upon a pretty similar footing, except that with the British, and to their great detriment, the staff does not form a separate corps at all. Other minor differences will be mentioned in their respective places.

We begin with that army which, from the organization it received during the revolution and under Napoleon, has served as a sort of model to all European armies since the beginning of this century.

I. THE FRENCH ARMY

France had, when the present war broke out, one hundred regiments of infantry of the line (the 76th to 100th were, up to a recent date, called "light infantry," but their drill and organization was in no way distinguished from the line regiments). Each regiment counts three battalions, two field-battalions, and the third as a reserve. In time of war, however, the third battalion can be very soon organized for field duty, and a fourth battalion, formed by the extra dépôt company of each of the three battalions, undertakes the duties of the dépôt. This was done during the wars of Napoleon, who even formed fifth, and, in some instances, sixth battalions. For the present, however, we can only count three battalions per regiment. Each battalion has eight service-companies (one of grenadiers, one of voltigeurs, and six center-companies); and each company, on the war footing, counts three officers and one hundred and fifteen non-commissioned officers and soldiers. A French battalion of the line, therefore, amounts, on the war footing, to about nine hundred and sixty men, one-eighth of whom (the voltigeur company) are especially set apart for light infantry duty.
The special corps destined for light infantry service consist of the *chasseurs-à-pied* and of the African corps. The chasseurs, before the war, only ten battalions, were, in 1853, raised to twenty battalions, so that nearly every infantry division of the army (four regiments) can, on its formation, receive one chasseur battalion. These battalions count ten companies, or nearly 1,300 men. The troops specially destined for African service consist of: three regiments, containing nine battalions of Zouaves; two regiments, or six battalions, of the Foreign Legion; six battalions of light infantry (of which, three battalions native chasseurs), together twenty-one battalions, or about 22,000 men.

The cavalry is divided into four distinct portions:

1. Heavy or Reserve Cavalry, 12 regiments—2 of carabineers (cuirassier rifles), 10 of cuirassiers=72 squadrons.
2. Cavalry of the line, 20 regiments—12 of dragoons, 8 of lancers=120 squadrons.
3. Light Cavalry, 21 regiments—12 chasseurs-à-cheval, 9 hussars=126 squadrons.

The squadrons are of 190 men for the reserve and line cavalry, and 200 men for the light cavalry—on the war footing. In time of peace, there are scarcely four squadrons of 120 men fully equipped, so that, on every mobilization of the army, a great number of men on furlough have to be called in, and the horses for them to be found, which, in a country as poor in horses as France, can never be done without a large importation from abroad.

The artillery, as recently reorganized, is formed in seventeen regiments: five of foot-artillery, for garrison and siege duty; seven of the line (for service with the infantry divisions); four of horse-artillery, and one of pontoniers. The foot-artillery appear to be destined to act in the field on emergencies only. The artillery of the line have their gun-carriages and limbers constructed so that the gunners can ride on them during quick movements. The horse-artillery is organized as in other services. The line and horse-artillery count one hundred and thirty-seven batteries, of six guns each, to which sixty batteries of the foot-artillery may be added as a reserve, altogether, 1,182 guns.

Beside the above, the artillery comprises thirteen companies of workmen.
The special services of the army comprise:—A general staff of 560 officers; staffs for the fortresses, the artillery, and the engineers, of about 1,200 officers; three regiments of sappers and miners; five pack squadrons; five train squadrons; 1,187 medical officers, and so on. The total numbers are as follows:

**Infantry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry Line, 300 bat’s and 300 dépôt comp’s</td>
<td>335,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chasseurs, 20 battalions</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African troops, 21 battalions</td>
<td>22,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>383,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Cavalry**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve, 72 sq. and 12 dépôts</td>
<td>16,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line, 120 ” 20 “</td>
<td>28,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light, 126 ” 21 ”</td>
<td>31,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African, 42 ”</td>
<td>10,000 86,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200 guns and 70,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Artil’y and special corps**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1,200 guns and</td>
<td>70,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,200 guns and 539,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To these are to be added the newly formed Guard in the strength of one division of infantry (two regiments of grenadiers, two of voltigeurs), one brigade of cavalry (one regiment of cuirassiers, one of guides), one battalion of chasseurs, and four or five batteries of artillery; as well as 25,000 men of the gendarmerie, 14,000 of whom are horse gendarmes. Two more regiments of infantry, the 101st and 102d, have recently been formed, and a new brigade of the foreign legion (Swiss) is in course of formation. Altogether, therefore, the French army, in its present organization, contains the cadres for about 600,000 men, and this will be a pretty correct estimate of its present strength.

The army is recruited by ballot, among all young men who have reached their twentieth year. It is presumed that about 140,000 men are annually available, of which number, however, in time of peace, from 60,000 to 80,000 only are taken for service. The remainder may be called in at any time during the eight years following their ballot. A great number of soldiers, besides, are dismissed on long furloughs during peace, so that the actual time of service, even of those called in, does not exceed from four to
five years. This system, while it gives the troops actually serving a high degree of efficiency, does not prepare any drilled reserves for a case of emergency. A great continental war, in which France would have to act with two or three large armies, would force her, even in the second campaign, to bring into the field many raw levies, and would show, in the third campaign, a very sensible deterioration of the army. The French are, indeed, very handy at learning the trade of a soldier, but, in that case, why keep up the long period of service, which excludes the greater portion of the available young men from the benefit of a school of military instruction?

Wherever military service is both compulsory and of long duration, the necessity of European society has introduced the privilege, for the wealthier classes, of buying off by a money-payment, in some shape or other, the obligation to serve personally. Thus, in France, the system of finding substitutes is legally recognized, and about eighty thousand of these are constantly serving in the French army. They are mostly recruited from what are called the “dangerous classes;” they are rather difficult to handle, but, when once broken in, form capital soldiers. They require a very strict discipline to keep them in good behavior; and their notions of order and subordination are sometimes rather extravagant. Wherever there are large numbers of them in a regiment, they are sure to cause difficulties in a garrison. For this reason, it is thought that the best place for them is before the enemy, and, thus, the light troops of Africa are especially recruited from them; for instance, the Zouaves, who almost all entered the army as “remplaçants.” The Crimean campaign has fully shown that the Zouaves carry their African habits everywhere—their love of plunder, as well as their unruly conduct in adversity, and it is, perhaps, in this sense that a kindred genius, the late Marshal St. Arnaud, said, in his bulletin on the battle of the Alma, “The Zouaves are, indeed, the first soldiers of the world!”

The equipment of the French army is, upon the whole, first-rate. The arms are well constructed, and, especially the cavalry saber, of a very good model, though, perhaps, it is a little too long. The infantry are accoutred according to the new system which was introduced, at the same time, in France and Prussia; by

---

*a* A. de Saint-Arnaud, “Au quartier général à Alma. Champ de bataille d’Alma, le 21 septembre 1854”, _Le Moniteur universel_, No. 280, October 7, 1854.— _Ed._
it, the cross-belts, for pouch and sword, or bayonet, are done away with; both are worn on a belt round the waist, supported by two leather braces over the shoulders, while the knapsack is loosely worn over the shoulders by two straps, without the old-fashioned connecting strap across the chest. Thus, the chest is left entirely free, and the soldier becomes a different man altogether from the unfortunate being strapped and buckled up in the sort of leather cuirass in which the old system confined him. The dress is plain, but tasteful; it must, indeed, be admitted that, in military, as well as in civilian fashions, the French have showed more taste than any other nation. A blue tunic, or frock-coat, covering the thighs to the knees, with a low standing collar cut out in front, scarlet trowsers, moderately wide, a light képi, the most soldier-like headgear yet invented, shoes and gaiters, and a comfortable gray capote, form an outfit as simple and efficient as any known in European armies. In Africa, the head is protected from the rays of the sun by a white flannel capote, and flannel under-clothing is also served out to the troops. In the Crimea, heavy cloth capotes were worn during the last winter, covering the head, neck and shoulders. The chasseurs-à-pied are clothed all in gray, with green facings; the Zouaves have a sort of Turkish fancy costume, which appears well adapted to the climate and the duty they have to do. The Chasseurs, and some other African battalions, are armed with the Minié rifle, the remainder of the infantry, with plain percussion muskets. There appears to be, however, an intention to increase the proportion of the troops armed with rifled muskets.

The cavalry are a fine-looking class of men, lighter in weight than in many other armies, but none the worse for that. In the peace establishment, they are, upon the whole, passably well horsed by animals procured abroad, or from the horse-breeding establishments of the government, and the districts where they have succeeded in improving the native breed, which, until lately, was very poor. But, in case of war, when the number of horses has to be suddenly doubled, the resources of the country are altogether insufficient, and thousands of horses have to be bought abroad, many of which are scarcely fit for cavalry service. Thus, in any long war, the French cavalry will soon be deteriorated, unless the government can lay its hands on the resources of countries rich in horses, as it did in 1805, '6, and '7.

The artillery are now armed exclusively with the new light twelve-pound gun, the so-called invention of Louis Napoleon. But, as the light twelve pounder, adapted for a charge one quarter the
weight of the ball, already existed in the English and Dutch armies, as the Belgians had already done away with the chamber in their howitzers, and as both Prussians and Austrians are in the habit, in certain cases, of firing shells from common twelve and twenty-four-pound guns, the pretended invention reduces itself to the adaptation of this light twelve pounder to the common French eight pounder carriage. However, the French artillery has evidently gained in simplicity and efficiency by the change; whether its mobility has not suffered, remains to be seen; as also, whether the twelve pounder will be found efficient enough for hollow shot. We have, at least, seen it stated that it has already been found necessary to forward howitzers of a heavier caliber to the army in the East.

The tactical regulations of the French army are a strange compound of soldierly sense and old-fashioned traditions. There is, perhaps, no language better adapted for the short, distinct, dictatorial military word of command, than the French; yet the command is generally given with an excessive prolixity of words—where two or three words would be sufficient, the officer has to shout out a whole sentence, or even two. The maneuvers are complicated, and the drill contains a good deal of old-fashioned nonsense, quite inapplicable to the present state of tactics. In skirmishing, that very function which appears innate to the Frenchman, the men are drilled with a pedantry hardly surpassed in Russia. The same is true in some of the cavalry and artillery maneuvers. But whenever the French have to go to war, the necessity of the case very soon dispenses with these antiquated and pedantic maneuvers; and new tactical methods, suited to new situations, are arranged and introduced by nobody so quickly as by the French.

Upon the whole, light troop duty is the forte of the French. They are literally the lightest troops in Europe. Nowhere is the average bodily size of the army so low as in France. In 1836, of about 80,000 men in the French army, only 743 were five feet eight inches or above; and only seven measured six feet; while full 38,000 measured from four feet ten and a half inches to five feet two inches! And yet these little men not only fight exceedingly well, but they also stand the heaviest fatigues, and beat, in agility, almost every other army. General Napier maintains that the British soldier is the heaviest laden fighting animal in the world; but he had never seen these French African campaigners carry, beside their arms and personal baggage, tents, firewood, provi-

sions, heaped up on their backs to a height far overshadowing their
shakos, and thus march thirty or forty miles in a day, under a tropical sun. And then compare the big, clumsy British soldier, who, in time of peace, measures five feet six inches, at least, with the puny, short-legged, tailor-like Frenchman, of four feet ten! And still, the little Frenchman, under all his load, remains a capital light-infantry-man; skirmishes, trots, gallops, lies down, jumps up, all the while loading, firing, advancing, retiring, dispersing, rallying, re-forming, and displays not only twice as much agility, but also twice as much intelligence as his bony competitor from the island of "rosbif." This light-infantry service has been brought to perfection in the twenty battalions of chasseurs-à-pied. These incomparable troops, incomparable for their peculiar service, are drilled to make every movement, when within range of the enemy, in a sort of easy trot, called pas gymnastique, in which they make between one hundred and sixty and one hundred and eighty paces per minute. But not only can they run, with short intervals, for half an hour and more, but creeping, jumping, climbing, swimming, every movement that can possibly be required, are equally familiar to them, while they are first-rate riflemen. Who, at even odds, can hold out, in skirmishing fights, against these dead shots, finding shelter behind the least inequality of ground?

As to the action of the French infantry in masses, their passionate character gives them great advantages with great disadvantages. Generally, their first charge will be business-like, rapid, determined, if not furious. If successful, nothing can resist them. If defeated, they will soon rally, and be in a position to be again brought forward; but, in an unfortunate or even chequered campaign, French infantry will soon lose its solidity. Success is a necessary element to all armies, but especially to those of the Romano-Celtic race. The Teutonic race has, in this respect, a decided superiority over them. The French, when Napoleon had once put them on the track, could, for fifteen years, overthrow everything before them, until reverses broke them down; but a seven years' war, such as Frederick the Great carried through, a war where often enough he was on the brink of ruin, often defeated, and yet finally victorious—such a war could never be won with French troops. The war in Spain, 1809-14, affords a conclusive example on this head.

Under Napoleon, the French cavalry were, in contrast to the infantry, far more renowned for their action in masses than for their duty as light troops. They were deemed irresistible, and even Napier admits their superiority over the English cavalry of that
day. Wellington, to a certain degree, did the same. And strange to say, this irresistible cavalry consisted of such inferior horsemen, that all their charges were made in a trot, or, at the very outside, an easy canter! But they rode close together, and they were never launched except when the artillery, by a heavy fire, had prepared the way for them; and then in large masses only. Bravery and the flush of victory did the rest. The present French cavalry, especially the Algerian regiments, are very fine troops, good riders in general, and still better fencers; though, in horsemanship, they are still inferior to the British, Prussians, and, especially, the Austrians. But as the army, when placed on a war-footing, must double its cavalry, there is no doubt the quality will be deteriorated; it is, however, a fact, that the French possess, in a high degree, that essential quality of a horse-soldier which we call dash, and which makes up for a great many deficiencies. On the other hand, no soldiers are so careless of their horses as the French.

The French artillery has always ranked very high. Almost all improvements made in gunnery, during the last three or four centuries, have originated with the French. During the Napoleonic wars, the French artillery were especially formidable by their great skill in selecting positions for their guns, an art then but imperfectly understood in other armies. All testimony agrees that none equaled the French in placing their guns so that the ground in front, while covering them from the enemy's fire, was favorable to the effect of their own. The theoretical branch of artillery has also been constantly a favorite science with the French; their mathematical turn of mind favors this; and the precision of language, the scientific method, the soundness of views, which characterize their artilleristic literature, show how much this branch of science is adapted to the national genius.

Of the special corps, the engineers, staff, sanitary and transport corps, we can merely say that they are highly efficient. The military schools are models of their kind. The French officer is not required to have that general education which is expected in Prussia; but the schools he has to pass through furnish him with a first rate professional training, including a thorough knowledge of the auxiliary sciences, and a certain proficiency in at least one living language. There is, however, another class of officers in the French army, viz., that selected from old non-commissioned officers. These latter seldom advance higher than to a captaincy,

---

so that the French often have young generals and old captains; and this system answers exceedingly well.

Upon the whole, the French army shows, in all its features, that it belongs to a warlike and spirited nation, that feels a pride in its defenders. That the discipline and the efficiency of this army have overcome the seductions laid out for it by Louis Bonaparte, and that the Pretorians of December, 1851, a could so soon be turned into the heroes of the Crimea, certainly speaks highly to their credit. Never was an army more flattered, more courted by a government, more openly solicited to all sorts of excesses than the French in the autumn of 1851; never were they allowed such license as during the civil war of December; yet they have returned to discipline and do their duty very well. The Pretorian element, it is true, has, several times, risen to the surface in the Crimea, but Canrobert always succeeded in quelling it.

II. THE ENGLISH ARMY 306

The British army forms a complete contrast to the French. There are not two points of similarity between them. Where the French are strong, there the British are weak, and vice versa. Like old England herself, a mass of rampant abuses, the organization of the English army is rotten to the core. Everything seems to be arranged so as to prevent all possibility of the end aimed at ever being attained. By an inexplicable haphazard, the boldest improvements—though few, indeed—take their stand in the midst of a heap of superannuated imbecility; and yet, whenever the clumsy, creaking machine is set to work, it somehow or other manages to do its duty.

The organization of the British army is soon described. Of infantry there are three regiments of guards, eighty-five regiments of the line, thirteen regiments of light infantry, two regiments of rifles. During the present war, the guards, the rifles, and a few other regiments have three battalions, the remainder have two—a dépôt being formed by one company in each. The recruiting, however, is hardly sufficient to fill up the vacancies caused by the war, and so the second battalions can scarcely be said to be in existence. The present effective total of the infantry does certainly not exceed 120,000 men.

---

a I.e., the troops that took part in the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—Ed.
Beside the regular troops, the militia form part of the infantry as a sort of reserve or nursery for the army. Their number, according to act of Parliament, may come up to 80,000, but they cannot now number more than 60,000, although, in Lancashire alone, there are six battalions called out. As the law stands at present, the militia may volunteer to serve in the Colonies, but cannot be conducted to foreign theaters of war. They can, therefore, only serve to set free the line-soldiers who garrison Corfu, Malta and Gibraltar, or, perhaps, hereafter, some of the more distant settlements.

Of cavalry there are three regiments of guards (cuirassiers), six of dragoon guards (heavies), four of heavy dragoons, four of light dragoons, five of hussars, and four of lancers. Each regiment is to be raised, on the war-footing, to 1,000 sabers (four squadrons of two hundred and fifty men, beside a dépôt). Some regiments did go out with this strength, but the disasters of the Crimea in winter, the senseless charge at Balaklava, and the dearth of recruits have re-established, on the whole, the old peace-footing. We do not think that the whole of the twenty-six regiments amount, at this moment, to 10,000 sabers, or 400 sabers per regiment, on an average.

The artillery consists of the regiment of foot-artillery (twelve battalions, with ninety-six batteries), and the brigade of horse artillery (seven batteries and one rocket-battery). Each battery has five guns and one howitzer; the calibers of the guns are three, six, nine, twelve, and eighteen pounders, those of the howitzers four and two-fifth inches, four and a half inches, five and a half inches, and eight inches. Each battery, also, has two models of guns, of almost every caliber, heavy and light ones. In reality, however, the light nine pounder and twelve pounder, with four and a half inch and five and a half inch howitzer, form the field-calibers, and, upon the whole, the nine pounder may now be said to be the universally adopted gun of the British artillery, with the four and a half inch (twelve pounder) howitzer as an auxiliary. Beside these, six pounder and twelve pounder rockets are in use.

As the English army, on its peace establishment, forms but a cadre for the war-footing, and as it is recruited entirely by voluntary enlistment, its real force, at a given moment, can never be precisely stated. We believe, however, we may estimate its present strength at about 120,000 infantry, 10,000 cavalry, and 12,000 artillery, with about 600 guns (of which, not one-fifth part

---

a The 1852 act of Parliament on the militia.—Ed.
are horsed). Of these 142,000 men, about 32,000 are in the Crimea, about 50,000 in India and the Colonies, and the remaining 60,000 (of whom one-half are raw recruits, the other half drilling them) at home. To these are to be added about 60,000 militia men. The pensioners, yeomanry cavalry, and other useless corps, not available for service abroad, we do not count at all.

The system of recruiting by voluntary enlistment, makes it very difficult, in time of war, to keep up the efficiency of the army, and this the English are now, again, experiencing. We see again, as under Wellington, that 30,000 or 40,000 men is the very outside of what they can concentrate and keep up on a given theater of war; and as, now, they have not Spaniards for their allies but French, the “heroic little band” of Britishers almost disappears in the midst of the allied army.

There is one institution in the British army which is perfectly sufficient to characterize the class from which the British soldier is recruited. It is the punishment of flogging. Corporal punishment does not exist in the French, the Prussian, and several of the minor armies. Even in Austria, where the greater part of the recruits consist of semi-barbarians, there is an evident desire to do away with it; thus the punishment of running the gauntlet has recently been struck out from the Austrian military code. In England, on the contrary, the cat-o'-nine-tails is maintained in its full efficiency—an instrument of torture fully equal to the Russian knout in its most palmy time. Strange to say, whenever a reform of the military code has been mooted in Parliament, the old martinets have stuck up for the cat, and nobody more zealously than old Wellington himself. To them, an unflogged soldier was a monstrously misplaced being. Bravery, discipline, and invincibility, in their eyes, were the exclusive qualities of men bearing the scars of at least fifty lashes on their backs.

The cat-o'-nine-tails, it must not be forgotten, is not only an instrument calculated to inflict pain; it leaves indelible scars, it marks a man for life, it brands him. Now, even in the British army, such corporal punishment, such branding, really amounts to an everlasting disgrace. The flogged man loses caste with his fellow soldiers. But, according to the British military code, punishment, before the enemy, consists almost exclusively in flogging; and thus, the very punishment which is said, by its advocates, to be the only means of keeping up discipline in cases of great urgency, is the means of ruining discipline by destroying the morale and the point d'honneur of the soldier.
This explains two very curious facts: first, the great number of English deserters before Sebastopol. In winter, when the British soldiers had to make superhuman exertions to guard the trenches, those who could not keep awake for forty-eight or sixty hours together, were flogged! The idea of flogging such heroes as the British soldiers had proved themselves in the trenches before Sebastopol, and in winning the day of Inkermann in spite of their generals! But the articles of war left no choice. The best men in the army, when overpowered by fatigue, got flogged, and, dishonored as they were, they deserted to the Russians. Surely there can be no more powerful condemnation of the flogging system than this. In no former war have troops of any nation deserted in numbers to the Russians; they knew that they would be treated worse than at home. It was reserved to the British army to furnish the first strong contingent of such deserters, and, according to the testimony of the English themselves, it was flogging that made the men desert. The other fact is, the signal failure of the attempt to raise a foreign legion under the British military code. The Continentals are rather particular about their backs. The prospect of getting flogged has overcome the temptation of the high bounty, and good pay. Up to the end of June, not more than one thousand men had enlisted, where fifteen thousand were wanted; and this much is certain, if the authorities attempt to introduce flogging even among these one thousand reprobates, they will have to encounter a storm which will force them either to give way, or to dissolve the foreign legion at once.

The dress and equipments of the British soldiers are a model of what they should not be. Up to the present time, the dress in common wear is the same as armies used to wear as long ago as 1815. No improvement has been admitted. The old swallow-tail coatee, disfigured by ugly facings, still distinguishes the British from every other soldier. The trowsers are tight, and uncomfortable. The old cross-belt system for fixing bayonet-scabbard, pouch and knapsack, reigns supreme in almost all regiments. The cavalry wear a better fitting dress than the infantry, and far superior; but, for all that, it is much too tight and inconvenient. Besides, the English are the only nation who have maintained in their army the red coat, the “proud red coat” as Napier calls it. This coat, which makes their soldiers look like dressed-up monkeys, is supposed by its brilliancy to strike terror into the enemy. But alas, whoever has seen any of the brick-colored British infantry must confess that their coats, after four weeks’ wear, inspire every looker-on with an
incontrovertible idea, not of frightfulness, but of shabbiness, and that any other color would be far more terror-inspiring, if it only could stand dust, dirt, and wet. The Danes and Hanoverians used to wear the red coat, but they dropped it very soon. The first campaign in Schleswig proved to the Danes what a capital mark to the enemy is offered by a red coat and white cross-belts.

The new dress-regulation has brought forward a red coat of the cut of the Prussian coat. The infantry wear the Austrian shako, or the képi; the cavalry the Prussian helmet. The cross-belt accoutrements, the red color, the tight trousers, are more or less maintained. Thus, the improvement amounts to nothing; and the British soldier will only look as strange as ever in the midst of the other European armies, dressed and accoutred, as they are, a little more in accordance with common sense.

Nevertheless, one improvement has been carried out in the British army, which far surpasses anything that has been done in other countries. This is, the arming of the whole of the infantry with the Minié rifle, as improved by Pritchett. How the old men, at the head of the army, men generally so obstinate in their prejudices, could come to so bold a resolution, it is difficult to imagine; but they did it, and thus doubled the efficiency of their infantry. At Inkermann, there is no doubt that the Minié rifle, by its deadly certainty of aim and great power, decided the day in favor of the English. Whenever an English line of infantry delivers its fire, the effect must be overpowering to any enemy armed with the common musket, for the English Minié rifle loads as quickly as any smoothbored gun.

The cavalry are fine men, well horsed, armed with swords of a very good model; and what they can do, they have shown at Balaklava. But, on the whole, the men are too heavy for their horses, and, therefore, a few months of active campaigning must reduce the British cavalry to nothing. The Crimea has given us a fresh example of this. If the standard for heavy cavalry was reduced to five feet six inches, and for light cavalry to five feet four or, even, two inches, as, we believe, it is now for the infantry, a body of men might be formed far more suitable for their actual field duties. But, as it is, the horses are too heavily loaded, and must break down before they can be used, with effect, against the enemy.

The artillery, too, is composed of taller men than it should be. The natural standard of size for an artilleryman is, that he should be big enough to unlimber a twelve pound gun, and five feet two to five feet six inches are ample for this purpose, as we know from
abundant personal experience and observation. In fact, men of about five feet five, or six, inches, if stoutly made, are, generally, the best handlers of guns. But the British want a crack corps, and their men, therefore, though tall and elegant to look at, lack that compactness of body which is so necessary to a really useful artilleryman. Their artillery material is first-rate. The guns are the best in Europe, the powder is acknowledged to be the strongest in the world, the shot and shell are of a smoothness of surface unknown anywhere else. But, for all that, no guns in the world have as much windage, and this shows by what sort of men they are commanded. There is hardly an artillery in Europe officered by men of so deficient professional education as the British. Their information very seldom goes beyond the mere elements of the science of artillery, and, in practice, the handling of field-guns is as much as they understand, and that but imperfectly. Two qualities, in both officers and men, distinguish the British artillery: uncommonly good eye-sight, and great calmness in action.

a In the German version of this section, published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* of September 1, 1855 under the title “Dress and Equipments of the British Soldier”, the text of the last five paragraphs is given in a condensed and altered form: “The dress and equipments of the British soldiers are a model of what they should not be. Up to the present time, the dress in common wear is the same as the army used to wear up to 1815, altered but superficially by a new dress-regulation which gave the red coat a Prussian cut, the infantry the Austrian shako, or the képi, and the cavalry the Prussian helmet. Britain alone has maintained in her army the red coat, the ‘proud red coat’ as Napier calls it. The Danes and Hanoverians used to wear the red coat. The first campaign in Schleswig proved to the Danes what a capital mark it offered to the enemy.

“Nevertheless, one improvement has been carried out in the British army, which far surpasses anything that has been done in other countries. This is, the arming of the whole of the infantry with the Minié rifle, as improved by Pritchett. There is no doubt that at Inkerman the Minié rifle, by its deadly certainty of aim, decided the day in favour of the English.

“The cavalry are fine men, well horsed, armed with swords of a very good model; and what they can do, they have shown at Balaklava. But, on the whole, the men are too heavy for their horses, and, therefore, a few months of active campaigning must reduce the British cavalry to nothing. As the horses are too heavily loaded, they must break down before they can be used, with effect, against the enemy. The Crimea has given us a fresh example of this.

“The artillery, too, is composed of taller men than it should be. The artillery material is first-rate. The guns are the best in Europe, the powder is acknowledged to be the strongest in the world, the shot and shell are of a smoothness of surface not to be found anywhere else. The artillery material is the product of modern, industrial England, whereas the artillery officers are the product of old England. The former, therefore, is just as much above the level of the European armies as the latter are below it. Their education in most cases does not go beyond the mere elements of the science of artillery, and, in practice, the handling of field-guns is as
Upon the whole, the efficiency of the British army is sorely impaired, by the ignorance, both theoretical and practical, of the officers. The examination which they are now expected to undergo, is actually ridiculous—a captain examined on the first three books of Euclid! But the British army is mainly instituted for the stowing away, in respectable situations, of the younger sons of the aristocracy and gentry, and the standard of education for its officers must, therefore, be regulated, not by the requirements of the service, but by what little information is commonly expected in an English “gentleman.” As to the practical military knowledge of the officer, it is equally insufficient. The British officer believes he has only one duty to perform: to lead his men, on the day of battle, straight against the enemy, and to give them an example of bravery. Skill in handling troops, seizing favorable opportunities, and the like, is not expected from him; and as to looking after his men and their wants, why, such a thing hardly ever enters his head. One half of the disasters of the British in the Crimea arose from this universal incapacity of the officers. They have, however, one quality which fits them for their functions: being, most of them, passionate huntsmen, they possess that instinctive and rapid appreciation of advantages of ground, which the practice of hunting is sure to impart.

The incompetence of the officers nowhere creates greater mischief than on the staff. As no regularly educated staff-corps exists, every general forms his own staff from regimental officers, ignorant of every part of their duty.\textsuperscript{b} Such a staff is worse than none. Reconnoitring, especially, is always done in a slovenly manner, as it must be, when done by men who know little of what is expected from them.

The education of the other special corps is rather better, but far below the standard in other nations; and, in general, an English officer would pass as an ignoramus amongst men of his class in any other country. Witness the military literature of the British. Not a work hardly, but is full of blunders which would not be

\textsuperscript{a} The reference is to Euclid’s Elements, a work in 13 books which sets forth the fundamentals of ancient mathematics.\textemdash Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} The \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: “...every general forms his own staff from his relations and protégés among the regimental officers without the least regard for special knowledge.”\textemdash Ed.
forgiven anywhere else, to a candidate for a lieutenancy. Every statement of facts is given in a slovenly, unbusiness-like, and unsoldier-like manner, leaving out the most important points, and showing, at once, that the writer does not know his business.\textsuperscript{a} The consequence is, that the most ridiculous statements of foreign books are credited at once.* We must, however, not forget to state that there are some honorable exceptions, amongst which W. Napier’s “Peninsular War,” and Howard Douglas’s “Naval Gunnery,” rank foremost.\textsuperscript{c}

The administrative, medical, commissariat, transport, and other accessory departments are in a deplorable state, and have experienced a thorough breakdown when put to the test in the Crimea.\textsuperscript{d} Efforts are made to improve them, as, also, to centralize the administration, but little good can be expected while the civil administration, and, in fact, the entire governing power, remains altogether the same.

With all these enormous drawbacks, the British army manages to hobble through every campaign, if not with success, yet without disgrace. There is a loss of life, a deal of mismanagement, a compound of blunders which astonish us when compared with the state of other armies under the same circumstances; yet there is no loss of military honor, there is seldom a repulse, almost never a complete defeat. It is the great personal bravery and tenacity of the troops, their discipline and implicit obedience, which bring this about. Clumsy, unintelligent, and helpless as the British soldier is when thrown upon his own resources, or when called upon to do the duty of light troops, nobody surpasses him in a pitched battle where he acts in masses. His \textit{forte} is the action in line. An English line of battle will do what has scarcely ever been done by other infantry: receive cavalry \textit{in line}, keep their muskets charged to the last moment, and fire a volley when the enemy is at thirty yards.

* As an instance, we refer to the work on fire-arms by Col. Chesney,\textsuperscript{b} who is considered one of the best artillery officers in Great Britain.

\textsuperscript{a} This sentence does not occur in the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} F. R. Chesney, \textit{Observations on the Past and Present State of Fire-Arms...}. In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the words “now General” are added in brackets after “Col.”—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{c} W. F. P. Napier, \textit{History of the War in the Peninsula...}; H. Douglas, \textit{A Treatise on Naval Gunnery...}.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{d} Instead of this sentence the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: “Earlier we repeatedly pointed to the lamentable state of the commissariat, transport and other accessory departments. They experienced a thorough breakdown during the Crimean campaign.”—\textit{Ed.}
and in almost every instance with perfect success. The fire of British infantry is delivered with such a coolness, even in the most critical position, that it surpasses, in effect, that of any other troops. Thus, the Highlanders, in line, repulsed the Russian cavalry at Balaklava. The indomitable tenacity of this infantry was never shown to greater advantage than at Inkermann, where the French, under the same circumstances, would certainly have been overwhelmed; but, on the other hand, the French would never have allowed themselves to be surprised, unguarded, in such a position. This solidity and tenacity in attack and defense, form the great redeeming quality of the British army, and have alone saved it from many a defeat, well-merited and all but intentionally prepared by the incapacity of its officers, the absurdity of its administration, and the clumsiness of its movements.

III. THE AUSTRIAN ARMY

Austria profited by the first moments of repose after her severe trials in 1848 and 1849, to reorganize her army upon a modern footing. Almost every department has been completely reformed, and the army is now far more efficient than ever.

First comes the infantry. The line consists of sixty-two regiments, beside which there are one regiment and twenty-five battalions of rifles, and fourteen regiments and one battalion of frontier-infantry. The latter, with the rifles, make up the light infantry.

An infantry regiment of the line consists of five field and one dépôt battalion—together thirty-two companies—of which the field companies count 220 men, and the dépôt companies 130 men. Thus, the field battalion numbers about 1,300 men, and the whole regiment nearly 6,000 men, or as many as a British division. The whole line, therefore, on the war-footing, is about 370,000 strong.

The frontier infantry have per regiment, two field and one dépôt battalion, together sixteen companies; in all, 3,850 men: the whole frontier infantry comprises 55,000 men.

The chasseurs, or rifles, count in all thirty-two battalions, of about 1,000 men each: total, 32,000 men.

In cavalry, the army has, of heavies: eight regiments of cuirassiers, and eight of dragoons; of light horse: twelve of hussars, and twelve of lancers (seven of which were formerly light dragoons, or chevau-légers, but have been, latterly, turned into lancers).
The heavy regiments count six squadrons, beside one dépôt—the light ones eight squadrons, and one dépôt squadron. The heavy regiments have 1,200 men, the light ones 1,600 men. The whole cavalry numbers about 67,000 men, on the war-footing.

Of artillery, there are twelve field regiments, each consisting of four six pounders, three twelve pounder foot batteries, six cavalry batteries, and one howitzer battery, on the war-footing; total, 1,344 guns; one coast regiment, and one rocket regiment, of twenty batteries, with one hundred and sixty tubes. Total, 1,500 guns and rocket tubes, and 53,000 men.

This gives a total effective number, on the war-footing, of 522,000 fighting men.

To these are to be added about 16,000 sappers, miners and pontoniers, 20,000 gens d'armes, the transport corps, and the like, raising the total to about 590,000 men.

By calling in the reserve, the army can be increased by from 100,000 to 120,000 men; and by draining the resources of the military frontier to their utmost limit, another 100,000 to 120,000 men may be made available. But, as these forces could not be collected at a given moment, they would drop in gradually, and thus serve mainly to fill up the vacancies in the ranks. More than 650,000 men Austria could hardly bring together, at a time, under arms.

The army is divided into two quite distinct corps, the regular army and the frontier troops. For the first, the time of service is of eight years' duration—after which the men remain two more years in the reserve. Long furloughs, however, are granted—as in France—and five years may be nearer the actual time the men are kept with the colors.

The frontier troops are got together upon a quite different principle. They are the descendants of South-Slavonian (Croat or Serbian), Wallachian, and partly of German, settlers who hold their lands by military tenure under the crown, and were formerly employed to protect the frontier, from Dalmatia to Transylvania, against the inroads of the Turks. This service is now reduced to a mere formality, but the Austrian government, nevertheless, has shown no inclination to sacrifice this capital nursery of soldiers. It was the existence of the frontier organization, which in 1848 saved Radetzky's army in Italy, and which in 1849 made possible the first invasion of Hungary under Windischgrätz. Next to Russia, it is to the South-Slavonian frontier regiments that Francis Joseph owes his throne. In the long stretch of country occupied by them, every crown-tenant (that is almost every inhabitant), is obliged to
serve from his twentieth to his fiftieth year, when called upon. The younger men, of course, make up the strength of the regiments; the older men, generally, only take their turns at the frontier guard-houses, until called upon to serve in time of war. This explains how a population of about 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 can furnish a contingent, in case of need, of 150,000 to 170,000 men, or from ten to twelve per cent, of the whole number.

The Austrian army has many points of resemblance to the British army. In both there are many nationalities mixed together, though each regiment, generally, belongs to one nation only. The Highland Gael, the Welshman, the Irishman, and the Englishman, scarcely vary more than the German, the Italian, the Croat, and the Magyar. In either, officers of all races, and even a great many foreigners, are to be found. In either, the theoretical instruction of the officers is extremely defective. In either, the tactical forms have retained a deal of the ancient line-formations, and adopted, in a limited degree only, the use of columns and skirmishing. In either, the dress is of an unusual color: with the English, red, with the Austrians, white. But in the efficiency of their arrangements, in the practical experience and competence of the officers, and in tactical mobility, the Austrians by far surpass the British.

The dress of the soldier, leaving apart the absurd white color of the infantry coat, has been adapted in its cut to the modern system. A short tunic, like the Prussians’ sky-blue trowsers, a gray capote, a light képi, similar to the French, make a very good and serviceable dress, excepting, always, the tight trowsers of the Hungarian and Croat regiments, which form part of the national dress, but are, for all that, very inconvenient. The accoutrements are not what they should be; the cross-belt system has been maintained. The frontier troops and artillery are dressed in brown coats; the cavalry, either white, brown or blue. The muskets are rather clumsy, and the rifles, with which both the chasseurs and a certain portion of each company are armed, are of a rather antiquated model, and far inferior to the Minié rifle. The common musket is the old flint gun changed, in an imperfect manner, into a percussion musket, and very often misses fire.

The infantry, and in this respect it is similar to the English, is more distinguished by its action in masses, than by its agility in light infantry service. We must, however, except the frontier troops and the chasseurs. The first are, for the most part, very efficient in skirmishing, especially the Serbians, whose favorite warfare is one of ambuscades. The chasseurs are mainly Tyrolians, and first-rate marksmen. But the German and Hungarian infantry
generally impose by their solidi ty, and, during Napoleon's wars, they often showed that in this respect they deserve to be placed along with the British. They, too, have more than once received cavalry, in line, without deigning to form square, and wherever they have formed squares, the enemy's cavalry could seldom break them up—witness Aspern.311

The cavalry is excellent. The heavy or "German" cavalry, consisting of Germans and Bohemians, is well horsed, well armed, and always efficient. The light cavalry has, perhaps, lost by mixing up the German chevau-légers with the Polish lancers, but its Hungarian hussars will always remain the models of all light cavalry.

The artillery, recruited mostly from the German provinces, has always stood high; not so much by early and judicious adoption of improvements, as by the practical efficiency of the men. The non-commissioned officers, especially, are educated with great care, and are superior to those of any other army. With the officers, theoretical proficiency is left too much an optional matter, but yet Austria has produced some of the best writers on the subject. In Austria, study is the rule, at least with subalterns, while in England, an officer who studies his profession is considered a disgrace to his regiment. The special corps, staff, and engineers, are excellent, as is proved by the beautiful maps they have made from their surveys, especially of Lombardy. The British ordnance map, though good, is nothing in comparison.

The great confusion of nationalities is a serious evil. In the British army, every man can at least speak English, but with the Austrians, even the non-commissioned officers of the non-German regiments can scarcely speak German. This creates, of course, a deal of confusion, difficulty, and interpreting, even between the officer and the soldier. It is partly remedied by the necessity in which frequent change of quarters places the officers of learning at least something of every language spoken in Austria. But yet, the inconvenience is not obviated.

The severity of the discipline, which is whacked into the men by frequent applications of a hazel stick to their posteriors, and the long time of service, prevent the outbreak of serious quarrels between the various nationalities of the army, at least in time of peace. But 1848 showed how little internal consistency this body of troops possesses. At Vienna, the German troops refused to fight the revolution. In Italy and Hungary, the national troops passed

---

a Czechs.—Ed.
over to the side of the insurgents, without as much as a struggle. Here it is that the weak point of this army lies. Nobody can tell how far or how long it will hold together, or how many regiments will leave it in any peculiar case, to fight their former comrades. There are six different nations, and two or three different creeds, represented in this one army; and, as to the sympathies pervading it, they must necessarily clash in a time like the present, when nations are panting for the free use of their forces. In a war with Russia, would the Greek Catholic Serbian, influenced by Panslavist agitation, fight the Russians, his cousins by race, and holding the same creed as he? In a revolutionary war, would the Italian and Hungarian forsake his country, to battle for an emperor foreign to him in language and nationality? It is not to be expected; and therefore, whatever the strength of the Austrian army may be, very particular circumstances are required to bring its full power into play.
The Prussian army deserves special notice, on account of its peculiar organization. While, in every other army, the peace-footing is the groundwork of the entire establishment, and no cadres are provided for the new formations which a great war at once necessitates, in Prussia, we are told, everything, to the minutest detail, is prepared for the war-footing. Thus, the peace establishment simply forms a school, in which the population are instructed in arms and maneuvers. This system, including, as it professes to do, the whole able-bodied male population in the ranks of the army on the war-footing, would appear to render the country which adopts it safe from every attack; yet this is by no means the case. What is attained is, that the country is stronger by about 50 per cent. than under the French or Austrian system of recruiting; by which means it is possible for an agricultural state of some seventeen millions of inhabitants, on a small territory, without a fleet or direct maritime commerce, and with comparatively little manufacturing industry, to maintain, in some respects, the position of a great European power.

The Prussian army consists of two great divisions: of those soldiers who are still being trained—the line; and of those trained men who may be said to have been sent home on indefinite furlough—the landwehr.

The service in the line lasts five years, from the twentieth to the twenty-fifth year of each man's age; but three years of active service are thought sufficient; after which, the soldier is dismissed to his home, and placed for the remaining two years in what is called the war-reserve. During this time he continues to figure on
the reserve-lists of his battalion or squadron, and is liable to be called in at any time.

After having been, for two years, in the war-reserve, he passes into the first levy of the landwehr (erstes Aufgebot der Landwehr), where he remains up to his thirty-second year. During this period he is liable to be called in, every other year, for the exercises of this corps, which generally take place upon a pretty extensive scale, and in connection with those of the line. The maneuvers generally last a month, and very often from 50,000 to 60,000 troops are concentrated for this purpose. The landwehr of the first levy are destined to act in the field along with the line. They form separate regiments, battalions, and squadrons, the same as the line, and carry the same regimental numbers. The artillery, however, remain attached to the respective regiments of the line.

From the thirty-second to the thirty-ninth year, inclusive, the soldier remains in the second levy (zweites Aufgebot) of the landwehr, during which time he is no longer called upon for active duty, unless a war breaks out, in which case the second levy has to do garrison duty in the fortresses, thus leaving available the whole of the line and first levy for field operations. After the fortieth year, he is free from all liability to be called out, unless, indeed, that mysterious body called the Landsturm, or levy en masse, be required to arm itself. The landsturm includes every man not comprised in the former categories, with all those too small or too weakly, or otherwise liberated from service, between the sixteenth and sixtieth year of age. But this landsturm cannot even be said to exist on paper, for there is not any organization prepared for it, no arms or accoutrements provided; and if it should ever have to assemble, it would not be found fit for anything but police duty at home, and for a tremendous consumption of strong drink.

As in Prussia every citizen is, according to law, a soldier, from his twentieth to his fortieth year, a population of seventeen millions might be expected to furnish a total contingent of at least a million and a half of men. But, in reality, not one half of this number can be got together. The fact is, that the training of such a mass of men would presuppose, at three years’ service with the regiments, a peace establishment of at least 300,000 men, while Prussia merely maintains something like 130,000. Thus various devices are employed to liberate a number of men otherwise liable to serve: men fit enough for duty are declared too weak, the medical inspection either selecting the best candidates only, or allowing itself to be moved by bribes in the selection of those
considered fit for duty, and so on. Formerly, the reduction of the time of actual service, for the infantry, to two years only, was the means of bringing down the peace establishment to some 100,000 or 110,000 men; but since the revolution, the government, having found out how much an additional year of service will do in making the men obedient to their officers, and reliable in case of insurrection, the three years’ service has been generally introduced again.

The standing army, or the line, is composed of nine army-corps—one of guards and eight of the line. Their peculiar organization will be explained presently. They comprise, in all, thirty-six regiments of infantry (guards and line), of three battalions each; eight regiments of reserve, of two battalions each; eight combined reserve battalions, and ten battalions of chasseurs (fâger); in all, 144 battalions of infantry, or 150,000 men.

The cavalry is composed of ten cuirassier, five dragoon, ten lancer, and thirteen hussar regiments, of four squadrons, or 800 men each; in all, 30,000 men.

The artillery consists of nine regiments, each composed, when on the war-footing, of four six-pounder, three twelve-pounder, and one howitzer, foot batteries, and three batteries of horse artillery, with one reserve company to be turned into a twelfth battery; beside four garrison companies, and one company of workmen. But as the whole of the war reserve and landwehr of the first levy (of the artillery) are required to man these guns, and to complete the companies, the line-artillery may be described as consisting of nine regiments, of about 2,500 men each, with about thirty guns in each regiment, fully horsed and equipped.

Thus, the grand total of the Prussian line would amount to about 200,000 men; but from 60,000 to 70,000 men may safely be deducted for the war reserves, dismissed to their homes after three years’ service.

The first levy of the landwehr counts, for every regiment of the guards and line, one of landwehr, except for the eight reserve regiments; beside, it has eight reserve battalions, forming a total of 116 battalions, and about 100,000 men. The cavalry has two regiments of guards, and thirty-two of the line, with eight reserve squadrons; in all, 136 squadrons, or about 20,000 men. The artillery is attached to the line regiments, as before stated.

---

a The revolution of 1848-49.—Ed.
b Not all regiments in the guards corps consisted of three battalions.—Ed.
The second levy also counts 116 battalions, 167 squadrons (comprising sundry reserve and dépôt squadrons, whose duties are assimilated to those of the second levy), and some garrison artillery; altogether, about 150,000 men.

With the nine battalions of sappers, several minor corps, about 30,000 pensioners, and an army train amounting, on the war-footing, to no less than 45,000 men, the whole of the Prussian force is stated to amount to 580,000 men; of which, 300,000 are for the field, 54,000 for the dépôts, 170,000 for the garrisons and as a reserve, with about 60,000 non-combatants. The number of field-guns attached to this army should be between 800 and 850, divided into batteries of eight guns (six cannon and two howitzers) each.

For all these troops, not only the complete organization of the cadres, but also the arms and equipments, are provided; so that, in case of a mobilization of the army, nothing has to be found but the horses; and as Prussia is rich in horses, and as animals as well as men are liable to instant requisition, no great difficulty is presented by this necessity. So says the regulation; but how the matter stands, in point of fact, was shown when, in 1850, the army was mobilized. The first levy of the landwehr was equipped, though not without great difficulty; but the second levy found nothing provided, neither clothing, nor shoes, nor arms, and thus it offered the most ridiculous spectacle imaginable. Long before this occurred, competent judges, who had themselves served in the Prussian army, had predicted that such would be the case; and that, in point of fact, Prussia could, on an emergency, count upon nothing but the line and a portion of the first levy. Their opinion was fully borne out by the event. No doubt, the equipments for the second levy have since been provided; and this body, if called out now, would, in a month or six weeks, form a very respectable corps for garrison, and even field duty. But then, in time of war, three months' drill is considered quite sufficient to prepare a recruit for the field; and thus, the cumbrous organization adopted by Prussia does not at all insure such enormous advantages as is generally believed. Beside, in a couple of years, the material reserved for the second levy will again have disappeared in the same way as that which had certainly once existed, but was not to be found when needed in 1850.

Prussia, when adopting the principle that each citizen was to be a soldier, stopped half-way, and falsified that principle, thereby falsifying all her military organization. Once the system of conscription abandoned for that of universal compulsory service,
the standing army, as such, ought to have been abolished. Mere cadres of officers and non-commissioned officers should have been maintained, through whose hands the young men should have passed for instruction, and the period of instruction should not have lasted longer than was necessary for the purpose. If such had been the case, the time of service, during peace, must have been brought down to a year, for all the infantry, at least. But that would not suit either the government or the military martinet of the old school. The government wanted a disposable and reliable army, to be used, in case of need, against disturbances at home; the martinet wanted an army which, in precision of drill, in general appearance, and in solidly, could rival the remaining armies of Europe, composed of comparatively older soldiers. A body of young troops, serving no more than a single year, would not do for either purpose. Consequently, the middle course of three years' service was adopted, and hence arise all the faults and weaknesses of the Prussian army.

As we have seen, at least one half of the available men are excluded from the army. They are at once inscribed on the rolls of the second levy, which body, swelled thereby nominally to enormous numbers, is completely swamped, in whatever efficiency it might possess, by a mass of men who never handled a musket, and are no better than raw recruits. This reduction of the actual military strength of the country by at least one half, is the first bad effect produced by the protracted time of service.

But the line itself, and the first levy of the landwehr, suffer under this system. Of every regiment, one third has served less than three, one third less than two years, and the remaining third less than one year. Now it is not to be expected that an army composed like this can have those military qualities, that strict subordination, that steadiness in the ranks, that esprit de corps, which distinguish the old soldiers of the English, Austrian, Russian, and even the French armies. The English, who are competent judges in this matter, from the long period their soldiers serve, consider that it takes three years completely to break in a recruit.* Now, as, in time of peace, the Prussian army is composed of men none of whom have ever served three years, the natural consequence is that these military qualities of the old soldier, or at least the semblance of them, have to be drummed into the young Prussian recruit by an intolerable martinetism. The Prussian subaltern and sergeant, from the impossibility of the task

* See Sir W. Napier's *Peninsular War.*
imposed upon them, come to treat their subordinates with a roughness and brutality doubly repulsive from the spirit of pedantry with which it is coupled; and this pedantry is the more ridiculous because it is in complete contrast with the plain and sensible system of drill prescribed, and because it constantly appeals to the traditions of Frederick the Great, who had to drill a quite different set of men in a quite different system of tactics. Thus, real efficiency in the field is sacrificed to precision on the parade-ground, and the Prussian line, upon the whole, may be considered inferior to the old battalions and squadrons which, in the first onset, any of the great European powers can bring forward against it.

This is the case, in spite of advantages of which no other army is possessed. The Prussian, as well as the German in general, makes capital stuff for a soldier. A country, composed of extensive plains varied by large groups of mountains, furnishes material in abundance for every different arm. The general bodily aptitude for both light infantry and line infantry duty, possessed equally by the majority of the Germans, is scarcely equaled by other nations. The country, possessing horses in plenty, furnishes numerous men for the cavalry, who, from their childhood, have been at home in the saddle. The deliberate steadiness of the Germans adapts them especially for the artillery service. They are, withal, among the most pugnacious people in the world, enjoying war for its own sake, and often enough going to look for it abroad, when they cannot have it at home. From the Landsknechte of the middle age to the present foreign legions of France and England, the Germans have always furnished the great mass of those mercenaries who fight for the sake of fighting. If the French excel them in agility and vivacity of onslaught, if the English are their superiors in toughness of resistance, the Germans certainly excel all other European nations in that general fitness for military duty which makes them good soldiers under all circumstances.

The Prussian officers form by far the best educated body of their class in the world. The general educational tests to which they are subjected are of a far higher standard than those of any other army. Brigade and divisional schools are maintained to complete their theoretical education; higher or more special military knowledge is provided for by numerous establishments. Prussian military literature holds a very high rank; the works it has furnished for the last twenty-five years sufficiently prove that their authors not only perfectly understood their own business, but could challenge, for general scientific information, the officers
of any army. In fact, there is almost too much of a smattering of metaphysics in some of them, and this is explained by the fact that, in Berlin, Breslau, or Königsberg, you may see officers taking their seats amongst the students at the university lectures. Clausewitz is as much a standard author in his line, all over the world, as Jomini; and the works of the engineer Aster mark a new epoch in the science of fortification. Yet, the name of a "Prussian lieutenant" is a by-word all over Germany, and, indeed, the caricatured esprit de corps, pedantry and impertinent manners inculcated by the general tone of the army, fully justify the fact; while nowhere are there so many old, stiff-necked martinets among the field-officers and generals as in Prussia—most of them, however, relics of 1813 and '15. After all, it must be acknowledged that the absurd attempt to force the Prussian line into what it can never be made to be—an army of old soldiers—deteriorates the quality of the officer as much as it does that of the soldier, and even more.

The drill-regulations in the Prussian army are, undoubtedly, much the best in the world. Simple, consistent, based upon a few common sense principles, they leave very little to be desired. They are owing to the genius of Scharnhorst, who was, perhaps, the greatest military organizer since Maurice of Nassau. The regulations for handling large bodies of troops are equally good. The scientific manuals, however, for the artillery service, which are officially recommended to the officers, are old-fashioned and by no means up to the requirements of the present time; but this blame is confined to works bearing a more or less official stamp, and does not at all bear upon Prussian artilleristic literature in general.

The engineering body enjoy, and deservedly, a very high character. From them proceeded Aster, the first military engineer since Montalembert. They have constructed a series of fortresses, from Königsberg and Posen to Cologne and Coblenz, which has obtained the admiration of Europe.

The equipment of the Prussian army, since the changes effected in 1843 and '44, is not very handsome, but very convenient for the soldiers. The helmet is a very efficient protection against sun and rain, the clothing is loose and comfortable, the adjustment of the accoutrements still better than that adopted in France. The guards and light battalions (one to each regiment) are armed with the rifled needle-gun; the remainder of the line are having their

---

[a] [G. J. D. von Scharnhorst,] Kriegs-Artikel für das Preussische Heer.—Ed.
muskets transformed, by a very simple process, into good Minié rifles; as to the landwehr, they, too, will, in two or three years, receive the Minié gun, but as yet they carry percussion muskets. The saber of the cavalry is too broad and crooked—most of the cuts fall flat. The material of the artillery, both in cannon, carriages, and harness, leave much to be desired.

On the whole, the Prussian army, that is, the line and first levy, forms a respectable body of men, but nothing like what Prussian patriotic authors boast. The line, once in the field, will very soon throw off the fetters of the parade-ground, and, after a few engagements, be equal to their opponents. The landwehr of the first levy, as soon as the old soldier-like spirit has been re-awakened, and if the war be popular, will equal the best old troops in Europe. What Prussia has to fear, is an active enemy during the first period of a war, when troops of superior organization, and of older standing, are brought against her; but in a protracted struggle she will have a greater proportion of old soldiers in her armies than any other European state. In the beginning of a campaign, the line will form the nucleus of the army, but the first levy will very soon push it into the shade, by the greater bodily strength and the higher military qualities of its men. They are the real old soldiers of Prussia—not the beardless youths of the line. Of the second levy we do not speak; it has yet to show what it is.

II. THE RUSSIAN ARMY

In Russia, too, a certain provision has been made for establishing cadres for the war-footing, by a scheme of reserves, similar, in some points, to the Prussian landwehr system. But, on the whole, the Russian reserve comprises such a limited number of men, and the difficulty of bringing them together from all the points of that vast empire is so great, that, as early as six months after the Anglo-French declaration of war,a and before a single shot had been fired in the Crimea, the abolition of the system and the formation of new bodies, followed up since by other new formations, at once became necessary. Thus, in Russia, we must distinguish between the army as it was on the breaking out of the war, and the army as it is now.

---

a Britain and France officially declared war on Russia on March 27 and 28, 1854, respectively.—Ed.
The Russian army, in time of peace, is divided as follows:—1. The active army—six corps of the line, Nos. 1 to 6; 2. The reserve army—one corps of guards, one corps of grenadiers, two corps of cavalry of the reserve; 3. The special corps—that of the Caucasus, that of Finland, that of Orenburg, that of Siberia; 4. The troops for inland duty—veterans, inland guards, invalids, and so forth; 5. The irregular troops. To these must be added the reserves, consisting of soldiers dismissed on furlough.

The composition of each of the six corps of the line is as follows:—it includes three divisions of infantry, consisting each of a brigade of the line and one of light infantry, each brigade consisting of two regiments, each regiment of four service-battalions; in all, six brigades or twelve regiments, comprising forty-eight battalions, with one battalion of rifles, and one of sappers; total, fifty battalions. There is also one division of light cavalry, containing one brigade of lancers, and one brigade of hussars, each of two regiments, or sixteen squadrons; total, thirty-two squadrons. The artillery consists of one division [of artillery] of three foot brigades, and one horse brigade; total, fourteen batteries or 112 guns; total, per corps, fifty battalions, thirty-two squadrons, 112 guns; grand total, 300 battalions, 192 squadrons, 672 guns.

The guards contain three divisions, or six brigades, comprising twelve regiments (nine of grenadiers, and three of carabineers, or light infantry); in all, thirty-six battalions, for the regiments of guards and grenadiers count three service-battalions only. There is also one battalion of rifles and one of sappers and miners, beside three divisions of cavalry (one cuirassiers, one lancers, one hussars), comprising six brigades or twelve regiments, and making in all seventy-two squadrons of cavalry. There is one division of five brigades and fifteen batteries (nine foot, five horse, one rockets); in all, 135 guns. The grenadier corps consists of three divisions or six brigades, comprising twelve regiments or thirty-six battalions of infantry, one battalion of rifles, and one of sappers and miners. This corps also counts one division of cavalry, including two brigades (lancers and hussars), made up of four regiments or thirty-two squadrons. The artillery consists of three foot and one horse brigade, with fourteen batteries; in all, 112 guns.

The reserve cavalry is organized as follows:—1st corps: three divisions (two of cuirassiers, one of lancers), comprising six brigades or twelve regiments; in all, eighty squadrons (forty-eight of cuirassiers, thirty-two of lancers). There is also one division of
horse artillery, containing three brigades, with six batteries; in all, forty-eight guns.—2d corps: three divisions (one lancers, two dragoons) or six brigades; including twelve regiments or 112 squadrons (thirty-two of lancers, eighty of dragoons). There are also two squadrons of mounted sappers and pontoniers, and six batteries of horse artillery, comprising forty-eight guns.

The Caucasian corps is composed of one reserve grenadier brigade, containing two regiments or six battalions; three divisions of infantry, containing twelve regiments or forty-eight battalions; one battalion of rifles, one of sappers; forty-seven battalions of the Caucasian line (militia); total, 103 battalions. The cavalry consists of one regiment of dragoons, of ten squadrons. Of artillery there is one division, with ten common and six mountain batteries, of 180 guns in all.

The Finland corps consists of one division, comprising two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry; that of Orenburg, of one division, likewise of two brigades, but of only ten battalions; that of Siberia, of one division, comprising three brigades; making fifteen battalions. Finally, the grand total of the regular troops, actually under arms in time of peace, may be stated as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Squad</th>
<th>Guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 corps of the line</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guards</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenadiers</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve cavalry</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caucasian corps</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland corps</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orenburg do.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siberia do.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The troops for inland service consist of fifty-two battalions of inland guards, 800 companies of veterans and invalids, eleven and a half squadrons of gens d’armes, and ninety-eight companies of artillery. These troops can hardly be counted in an estimate of the available force of the country.

The irregular troops, mostly cavalry, form the following divisions:—

1. The Don Cossacks: — fifty-six regiments, each of six sotnias; in all, 336 sotnias, thirteen batteries.
2. The Tshornomor (Black Sea Cossacks):—seventy-two sotnias, nine battalions, three batteries.
3. The Caucasian line Cossacks (on the Kuban and Terek):—120 sotnias and three batteries.
4. The Astrachan Cossacks:—eighteen sotnias, one battery.
5. The Orenburg Cossacks:—sixty sotnias, three batteries.
6. The Ural Cossacks:—sixty sotnias.
7. The Bashkir levy:—eighty-five sotnias, almost all Bashkirs and Kalmyks.
8. The Siberian Cossacks:—twenty-four battalions, eighty-four sotnias, three batteries, composed partly of Tungusians, Buriates, &c.
10. The Danubian Cossacks in Bessarabia: twelve sotnias.
11. The Baikal Lake Cossacks, but recently formed, of unknown organization and strength.

The total would amount to 847 sotnias (squadrons of 100 men each, from sto, hundred), thirty-three battalions, twenty-six batteries. This would make about 90,000 men of cavalry, and 30,000 infantry. But, for actual war purposes on the western frontier, perhaps 40,000 to 50,000 cavalry, a few batteries, and none of the infantry are available.

Thus, in time of peace, the Russian army (exclusive of the inland service troops) should consist of 360,000 infantry, 70,000 cavalry, and 90,000 artillery; in all, 500,000 men; beside a number of Cossacks, varying according to circumstances. But of these 500,000 men, the local corps of the Caucasus, of Orenburg, and Siberia cannot be made available for any war on the western frontier of the empire; so that, against western Europe, not more than 260,000 infantry, 70,000 cavalry, and 50,000 artillery, with about 1,000 guns, can be used, beside some 30,000 Cossacks.

So far for the peace establishment. For the event of a war, the following provisions were made: the full time of service was twenty, twenty-two, or twenty-five years, according to circumstances. But after either ten or fifteen years, according to circumstances, the soldiers were dismissed on furlough, after which they belonged to the reserve. The organization of this reserve has varied very much, but it appears, now, that the men on furlough belonged, during the first five years, to a reserve battalion (the fourth of each regiment in the guards and grenadiers, the fifth in the line), a reserve squadron, or a reserve battery, according to their respective arms. After the lapse of five years they passed to the dépôt (fifth or respectively sixth) battalion of their regiment, or to the dépôt squadron or battery. Thus, the calling-in of the reserve would raise the effective strength of the infantry and artillery about fifty per cent., of the cavalry about
twenty per cent. These reserves were to be commanded by retired officers, and their cadres, if not in full organization, were nevertheless, to a certain degree, prepared.

But when the war broke out, all this was altered. The active army had to send two divisions to the Caucasus, though it was destined to fight on the western frontier. Before the Anglo-French troops embarked for the east, three corps of the active army (the third, fourth, and fifth) were engaged in the campaign against the Turks. At that period, indeed, the reserves were concentrating, but it took an enormous length of time before the men could be brought up to their respective headquarters from all points of the empire. The allied armies and fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas, as well as the wavering policy of Austria, necessitated more vigorous measures; the levies were doubled and tripled, and the motley mass of recruits, thus got together, were formed, along with the reserves, into fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth battalions for all the infantry regiments, while a similar increase was made in the cavalry. Thus, the eight corps of guards, grenadiers, and line, instead of 376 battalions, now muster about 800, while, for every two squadrions or batteries of the peace establishment, at least one of reserve has been added. All these figures, however, look more formidable on paper than in reality; for, what with the corruption of the Russian officials, the mal-administration of the army, and the enormous length of the marches from the homes of the men to the dépôts, from the dépôts to the points of concentration of the corps, and from thence to the seat of war, a great proportion of the men are lost or invalided before they come to meet the enemy. Besides, the ravages of disease, and the losses in battle, during the two last campaigns, have been very serious, and, altogether, we do not think that the 1,000 battalions, 800 squadrions, and 200 batteries of the Russian army, can much exceed, at present, 600,000 men.

But the government was not satisfied with this. With a promptitude which shows how fully it is aware of the difficulty of bringing together large masses of men from the various portions of this vast empire, it decreed the levy of the militia as soon as the organization of the seventh and eighth battalions was completed. The militia, or opoltshenie, was to be organized in druginas (battalions) of 1,000 each, in proportion to the population of each province; twenty-three men out of every 1,000 males, or nearly one-quarter per cent. of the population were to serve. For the time being, the opoltshenie was called out in the western provinces only. This levy, made upon a population of 18,000,000, compris-
ing about 9,000,000 males, must have produced about 120,000 men, and this agrees with what the reports from Russia state. There is no doubt that the militia will prove, in every respect, inferior even to the newly formed reserve, but, at all events, it is a valuable addition to the forces of Russia, and, if employed to do garrison duty in Poland, it can set free a good many regiments of the line.

On the other hand, not only many Cossacks, but even considerable numbers of Bashkirs, Kalmyks, Kirghiz, Tungusians, and other Mongol levies have arrived on the western frontier. This shows how early they were ordered westwards, for many of them had above a twelve-month's march to make before they could arrive at St. Petersburg, or on the Vistula.

Thus, Russia has taxed her military resources almost to the utmost; and, after two years' campaigning, during which time she has lost no decisive battle, she cannot muster more than 600,000 to 650,000 regular troops, with 100,000 militia, and perhaps 50,000 irregular cavalry. We do not mean to say that she is exhausted; but, there is no doubt, that now, after two years' war, she could not do what France did after twenty years' war, and after the total loss of her finest army in 1812: pour forth a fresh body of 300,000 men and arrest, for a time, at least, the onslaught of the enemy. So enormous is the difference, in military strength, between a densely and a thinly populated country. If France bordered on Russia, the 66,000,000 inhabitants of Russia would be weaker than the 38,000,000 French. That the 44,000,000 Germans are more than a match for the 66,000,000 subjects of the orthodox Czar, there is not the slightest doubt.

The Russian army is recruited in various ways. The great body of the men is raised by the regular levy, which takes place one year in the western, and the next in the eastern provinces of Russia in Europe. The general percentage is four or five men levied out of every 1,000 (male) "souls;" for in the Russian census the males only are counted, as, according to the orthodox belief of the east, the women do not constitute "souls." Those from the western half of the empire serve twenty, those from the eastern half twenty-five years. The guards serve twenty-two years; young men from the military colonies twenty years. Beside these levies, the soldiers' sons are a fertile source of recruits. Every son born to a soldier while in service is obliged to serve; and this principle is carried so far that children borne by soldiers' wives are claimed by the state, though the husband may have been at the other end of the empire for five or ten years. These soldiers' children are called
cantonists, and most of them are educated at the expense of the
government; from them most of the non-commissioned officers
are taken. Finally, criminals, vagabonds, and other good-for-
nothing individuals, are sentenced, by the courts of law, to serve in
the army. A nobleman has the right of sending a serf, if otherwise
able-bodied, into the army; and every father, when dissatisfied
with his son, can do the same. "S'bogom idi pod Krasnuyu shapkoo."
Begone, then, with God, and put the red cap on—that is to say,
go into the army—is a common saying of the Russian peasant to a
disobedient son.

The non-commissioned officers, as we have said, are mostly
recruited from the soldiers' sons, educated in government
establishments. From early boyhood subject to military discipline,
these lads have nothing whatever in common with the men whom
they are, subsequently, to instruct and direct. They form a class
separate from the people. They belong to the state—they cannot
exist without it: once thrown upon their own resources, they are
fit for nothing. To get on, then, under the government, is their
only object. What the lower class of employés, recruited from the
sons of employés, are in the Russian civil service, these men are in
the army: a set of cunning, low-minded, narrowly-egotistical
subordinates, endowed with a smattering of elementary education,
which almost renders them more despicable; ambitious from
vanity and love of gain; sold, life and soul, to the state, and yet
trying, daily and hourly, to sell the state, in detail, whenever they
can make a profit by it. A fine specimen of this class is the
feldjäger or courier who accompanied M. de Custine during his
travels in Russia, and who is admirably portrayed in that
gentleman's account of Russia.† It is this class of men, both in the
civil and military branches, which principally foments the immense
corruption pervading all branches of the public service in that
country. But as it is, there is no doubt that, if this system of total
appropriation of the children, by the state, were done away
with, Russia would not be able to find a sufficient number of
civil subaltern employés and military non-commissioned
officers.

With the class of officers it is, perhaps, still worse. The
education given to a future corporal or sergeant-major is a
comparatively cheap article; but to educate officers for an army of
one million (and that is the number for which the Russian cadres,
officially speaking, should be prepared) is a costly affair. Private

† A. de Custine, La Russie en 1839, T. IV, pp. 283-85.—Ed.
establishments do nothing or little for the purpose. The state, again, must do everything. But it evidently cannot educate such a mass of young men as are required for this use. Consequently, the sons of the nobility are, by a direct moral compulsion, induced to serve for at least five or ten years in the army or the civil service; for every family in which three consecutive generations have not "served," loses its privilege of nobility, and especially the right to own serfs—a right without which, in Russia, extensive landed property is worse than valueless. Thus, vast numbers of young men are brought into the army with the rank of ensign or lieutenant, whose entire education consists, at the best, in a certain fluency in French conversation on the most ordinary topics, and some little smattering of elementary mathematics, geography and history—the whole drummed into them for mere show. To them, to serve is an ugly necessity, to be gone through, like a prolonged medical treatment, with unfeigned disgust; and as soon as the prescribed time of service has elapsed, or the grade of major is attained, they retire, and are inscribed on the rolls of the dépôt battalions. As to the pupils of the military schools, they, too, have almost all been crammed so as to pass the examinations; and they are, even in mere professional knowledge, far behind the young men from the Austrian, the Prussian, or French military schools. On the other hand, young men of talent, application, and passion for their special branch, are so rare in Russia that they are seized upon wherever they show themselves, be they foreigners or natives. With the greatest liberality, the state provides them with all the means for completing their studies, and gives them rapid promotion. Such men are used to show off Russian civilization before Europe. If they are inclined to literary pursuits, they meet with every encouragement so long as they do not overstep the bounds of Russian government requirements, and it is they who, have furnished what little there is of value in Russian military literature. But up to the present time, the Russians of all classes are too fundamentally barbarous to find any enjoyment in scientific pursuits or head-work of any kind (except intrigues), and, therefore, almost all their distinguished men in the military service are either foreigners, or, what nearly amounts to the same, "ostzeñski," Germans from the Baltic provinces. So was the last and most distinguished specimen of this class, General Todtleben, the chief engineer at Sebastopol, who died in July from the effects of a wound. He was certainly the cleverest man at his trade in the whole siege, either in the Russian or the Allied camp; but he was a Baltic German, of Prussian extraction.
In this manner the Russian army has among its officers the very best and the very worst men, only that the former are present in an infinitesimally small proportion. What the Russian government thinks of its officers it has plainly and unmistakably shown in its own tactical regulations. These regulations do not merely prescribe a general mode of placing a brigade, division, or army-corps in action, a so-called "normal disposition," which the commander is expected to vary according to the ground and other circumstances, but they prescribe different normal dispositions for all the different cases possible, leaving the general no choice whatever, and tying him down in a manner which, as much as possible, takes all responsibility from his shoulders. An army-corps, for instance, can be arranged, in battle, in five different ways, according to the regulations; and, at the Alma, the Russians were actually arrayed according to one of them—the third disposition—and, of course, they were beaten. This mania of prescribing abstract rules for all possible cases, leaves so little liberty of action to the commander, and even forbids him to use advantages of ground to such an extent, that a Prussian general in criticising it says:

"Such a system of regulations can be tolerated in an army, only, the majority of whose generals are so imbecile, that the government cannot safely intrust them with an unconditional command, or leave them to their own judgment."

The Russian soldier is one of the bravest men in Europe. His tenacity almost equals that of the English and of certain Austrian battalions. As John Bull boasts of himself, he does not know when he is beaten. Russian squares of infantry have resisted, and fought hand to hand, a long while after the cavalry had broken them; and it has always been found easier to shoot them down than to drive them back. Sir George Cathcart, who saw them in 1813 and '14, as allies, and in 1854 in the Crimea, as enemies, gives them the honorable testimonial that they are "incapable of panic." Beside this, the Russian soldier is well made, healthy, a good marcher, a man of few wants, who can eat and drink almost anything, and more obedient to his officers than any other soldier in the world. And yet the Russian army is not much to boast of. Never, since Russia was Russia, have the Russians won a single battle against either Germans, French, Poles, or English, without being vastly superior in numbers. At even odds, they have always been beaten by any army, except Turks or Prussians; and at Citate

---

a G. Cathcart, *Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813.*—Ed.
and Silistria, the Turks, though inferior in numbers, defeated them.

The Russians are, above all things, the clumsiest soldiers in the world. They are not fit either for light infantry or for light cavalry duty. The Cossacks, capital light cavalry as they are in some respects, are so unreliable generally, that before the enemy a second line of out-posts is always placed in the rear of the line of Cossack out-posts. Beside, the Cossacks are totally unfit for a charge. As to the regular troops, infantry and cavalry, they are not fit to act in skirmishing order. The Russian, imitator as he is in everything, will do anything if ordered or compelled, but will do nothing if he has to act upon his own responsibility; in fact, this term can hardly be applied to a being who never knew what responsibility was, and who will go to be shot at with the same passive obedience as if he were ordered to pump water, or to whip a comrade. To expect from the Russian soldier, when acting on out-post duty or in skirmishing order, the rapid glance of the Frenchman, or the plain common sense of the German, would be an insult to him. What he requires is command—clear, distinct command—and if he does not get it, he will perhaps not go backwards, but he will certainly not go forwards, nor use his own senses.

The cavalry, though a deal of expense and care has been bestowed upon it, has never been excellent. Neither in the wars against the French, nor in that against Poland, did the cavalry distinguish itself. The passive, patient, enduring obedience of the Russians is not what is wanted in cavalry. The first quality of the horseman is just what the Russian lacks most: "dash." Thus, when the 600 English dragoons, with all the daring and pluck of real horsemen, dashed at the numerically far superior Russians at Balaklava, they rode down before them Russian artillery, Cossacks, hussars, lancers, until they came to the solid columns of the infantry; then they had to turn back; yet, in that cavalry action, it is still doubtful who deserves to be called the victor. If such a senseless charge had been made against any other army, not a man would have returned; the enemy would have taken them in flank and rear, and cut them down singly. But the Russian horsemen actually awaited them standing, and were ridden down before they thought of moving their horses! Surely, if anything should condemn the Russian regular cavalry, it is such a fact as this.

The artillery is provided with a material of unequal quality, but where it has good guns, it will do its duty well. It will display great
bravery in the field, but it will always be found wanting in intelligence. A Russian battery which has lost its officers is good for nothing; and while the officers live, it can only take the positions, often absurd, prescribed by the regulations. When besieged in a fortress where patient endurance and constant exposure to danger are required, the Russian artillery will distinguish itself, not so much by precision of aim, as by devotion to duty and steadiness under fire. The whole of the siege of Sebastopol proves this.

In the artillery and engineers, however, are to be found those well-educated officers whom Russia shows off before Europe, and who are really encouraged to use their talents freely. While in Prussia, for instance, the best men, when subalterns, have usually been so thwarted by their superiors, and while all their proposed improvements have been snubbed as presumptuous attempts at innovation, so that many of them have had to seek employment in Turkey, where they have made the regular artillery one of the best in Europe—in Russia, all such men are encouraged, and, if they distinguish themselves, make a rapid and brilliant career. Diebitsch and Paskiewitsch were generals at twenty-nine and thirty years of age, and Todtleben, at Sebastopol, in less than eight months was advanced from a captain to a major-general.

The great boast of the Russians is their infantry. It is of very great solidity, and, used in line or column, or behind breastworks, will always be awkward to deal with. But here its good qualities end. Almost totally unfit for light infantry duty (the so-called chasseurs are light infantry in name only, and the eight battalions of rifles attached to the line corps are the only real light infantry in the service), usually bad marksmen, good but slow marchers, their columns are generally so badly placed that it will always be possible to pound them well with artillery before they are charged. The "normal dispositions," from which the generals dare not deviate, contribute a great deal toward this. At the Alma, for instance, the British artillery made terrible havoc amongst the Russian columns long before the equally clumsy British line had formed, defiled across the river and re-formed for the charge. But even the boast of solid tenacity must be taken with a considerable grain of salt, since at Inkermann 8,000 British infantry, surprised in a position but incompletely and slovenly occupied, resisted, in hand to hand fight, the 15,000 Russians brought against them for more than four hours, and actually repelled every renewed attack. This battle must have shown the Russians that, upon their own favorite ground, they had found their masters. It was the bravery
of the British soldiers and the intelligence and presence of mind of both non-commissioned officers and soldiers which defeated all the attempts of the Russians; and from this battle we must consider as justified, the claim of the British to the title of the first infantry of the line in the world.

The clothing of the Russian army is a pretty close imitation of that of the Prussians. Their accoutrements are very badly adjusted; not only the belts for bayonets and cartridge pouch are crossed over the chest, but also the straps which hold the knapsack. There are, however, some alterations being made just now, but whether they affect this point, we do not know. The small arms are very clumsy, and have only been lately provided with percussion caps; a Russian musket is the heaviest and most unwieldy thing of its kind. The cavalry swords are of a bad model and badly tempered. Of the guns, the new ones taken in the Crimea, are described as very good and of excellent workmanship; but whether that is uniformly the case is very doubtful.

Finally, the Russian army still bears the stamp of an institution in advance of the general state of civilization of the country, and has all the disadvantages and drawbacks of such hot-house creations. In petty warfare, the Cossacks are the only troops to be feared, from their activity and indefatigability; but their love of drink and plunder makes them very unreliable for their commander. In grand war, the slowness with which the Russians move will make their strategic maneuvers little to be feared, unless they have to deal with such negligent opponents as the English were last autumn. In a pitched battle, they will be obstinate opponents to the soldiers, but not very troublesome to the generals who attack them. Their dispositions are generally very simple, founded upon their prescribed normal rules, and easy to be guessed at; while the want of intelligence in both general and field officers, and the clumsiness of the troops, make it a matter of great risk for them to undertake important maneuvers on a battle field.

III. THE SMALLER ARMIES OF GERMANY

Bavaria has two army-corps, of two divisions each. Each division contains two brigades of infantry (four regiments of infantry and one battalion of rifles), one brigade of cavalry, containing two regiments, and three foot and one horse batteries. Each army-corps has, beside, a general reserve of artillery, of six foot batteries, and a detachment of sappers and miners. Thus, the
whole army forms sixteen regiments of three battalions each, with six battalions of rifles, in all, fifty-four battalions; two regiments of cuirassiers, and six, of light dragoons, in all, forty-eight squadrons; two regiments of foot artillery (of six six-pounder and six twelve-pounder batteries each), and one of horse artillery (four six-pounder batteries), in all, twenty-eight batteries of eight guns each, making 224 guns, beside six companies of garrison artillery, and twelve train companies; there are also one regiment of engineers, of eight companies, and two sanitary companies. The whole strength, on the war-footing, is 72,000 men, beside a reserve and landwehr, the cadres of which, however, do not exist.

Of the army of the Germanic Confederation, Austria furnishes the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps; Prussia the 4th, 5th, and 6th; Bavaria the 7th. The 8th corps is furnished by Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt.

Württemberg has eight regiments (sixteen battalions) of infantry, four of cavalry (sixteen squadrons), one regiment of artillery (four foot and three horse-batteries, with forty-eight guns). Total, about 19,000 men on the war-footing.

Baden keeps four regiments (eight battalions), two fusilier battalions, one rifle battalion; in all, ten battalions of infantry, with three regiments, or twelve squadrons of cavalry, and four foot and five horse-batteries, containing together forty guns. Total, on the war-footing, 15,000 men.

Hesse-Darmstadt has four regiments or eight battalions of infantry, one regiment or six squadrons of light horse, and three batteries of artillery (one mounted) of eighteen guns. Total, 10,000 men.

The only peculiarity of the 7th and 8th army-corps is, that they have adopted the French gun-carriage for the artillery. The 9th federal army corps is formed by the kingdom of Saxony, which furnishes one division, and Electoral Hesse and Nassau, which furnish the second.

The quota of Saxony is four brigades of infantry, of four battalions each, and one of rifles, of four battalions; beside four battalions of the line, and one battalion of rifles as a reserve, still unorganized; four regiments of light horse, of five squadrons each; one artillery regiment, six foot and two horse-batteries. Total, twenty battalions of infantry, twenty squadrons and fifty guns; or 24,500 men on the war-footing. In Electoral Hesse there are four regiments or eight battalions, with one battalion of fusileers and one of rifles; two squadrons of cuirassiers, seven
squadrons of hussars; three batteries, of which one of horse artillery. Total, ten battalions, nine squadrons, nineteen guns, and 12,000 men on the war-footing. Nassau affords seven battalions, 2 batteries, or 7,000 men, and twelve guns, on the war-footing.

The 10th army-corps consists of Hanover and Brunswick, which maintain the first division; and of Mecklenburg, Holstein, Oldenburg, and the Hanse towns, which furnish the second division. Hanover furnishes eight regiments or sixteen battalions, and four battalions of light infantry; six regiments or twenty-four squadrons of cavalry, and four foot and two horse-batteries. Total, 22,000 men, and thirty-six guns. The artillery is on the English model. Brunswick furnishes five battalions, four squadrons, and twelve guns, in all, 5,300 men. The small States of the second division are not worth mentioning.

Finally, the smallest of the small fry of German States form a reserve division, with which the entire army of the German Confederation, on the war-footing, may be summed up in a table, as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. CONTINGENTS.</th>
<th>II. RESERVE CONTINGENTS.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria, .......</td>
<td>73,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia, .......</td>
<td>61,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria, .......</td>
<td>27,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighth Corps, ...</td>
<td>23,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ninth Corps, ....</td>
<td>19,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenth Corps, .....</td>
<td>22,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Division,</td>
<td>11,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, ...........</td>
<td>238,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This of course does not represent the real armed force of the Confederation, as, in case of need, Prussia, Austria, and Bavaria would furnish far more than the above contingents. The troops of the 10th corps and reserve division, perhaps, also, those of the 9th corps, would form the garrisons, so as not to interfere, by their

---

*The free cities of Bremen, Hamburg and Lübeck.—Ed.*
multifarious organizations and peculiarities, with the rapidity of field operations. The military qualities of these armies are more or less the same as those of the Austrian and Prussian soldiers; but, of course, these small bodies furnish no occasion for developing military talents, and many old-fashioned arrangements exist among them.

In a third and concluding article, we shall consider the Spanish, Sardinian, Turkish and other armies of Europe.
I. THE TURKISH ARMY

The Turkish army, at the beginning of the present war, was in a higher state of efficiency than it had ever reached before. The various attempts at reorganization and reform made since the accession of Mahmud, since the massacre of the Janissaries, and especially since the peace of Adrianople, had been consolidated and systematized. The first and greatest obstacle—the independent position of the pashas in command of distant provinces—had been removed, to a great extent, and, upon the whole, the pashas were reduced to a discipline somewhat approaching that of European district commanders. But their ignorance, insolence, and rapacity remained in as full vigor as in the best days of Asiatic satrap rule; and if, for the last twenty years, we had heard little of revolts of pashas, we have heard enough of provinces in revolt against their greedy governors, who, originally the lowest domestic slaves and "men of all work," profited by their new position to heap up fortunes by exactions, bribes, and wholesale embezzlement of the public money. That, under such a state of things, the organization of the army must, to a great extent, exist on paper only, is evident.

The Turkish army consists of the regular active army (Nizam), the reserve (Redif), the irregular troops, and the auxiliary corps of the vassal states.

The Nizam is composed of six corps (Orders), each of which is raised in the district it occupies, similar to the army-corps in Prussia, each of which is located in the province from which it recruits itself. Altogether the organization of the Turkish Nizam
and Redif is, as we shall see, copied from the Prussian model. The six Orders have their head-quarters in Constantinople, Shumla, Toli-Monatzip, Erzeroum, Bagdad, and Aleppo. Each of them should be commanded by a Mushir (field marshal), and should consist of two divisions or six brigades, formed by six regiments of infantry, four of cavalry, and one of artillery.

The infantry and cavalry are organized upon the French, the artillery upon the Prussian system.

A regiment of infantry is composed of four battalions of eight companies each, and should count, when on its full complement, 3,250 men, inclusive of officers and staff, or 800 men per battalion; the general strength, however, before the war, seldom exceeded 700 men, and in Asia was almost always much less.

A cavalry regiment consists of four squadrons of lancers, and two squadrons of chasseurs, each squadron to contain 151 men; in general, the effective strength was here even more below the standard than in the infantry.

Each artillery regiment consists of six horse and nine foot batteries, of four guns each, thus representing a total of sixty guns.

Every order was thus expected to number 19,500 infantry, 3,700 cavalry, and sixty guns. In reality, however, from 20,000 to 21,000 men in all is the utmost ever reached.

Beside the six Orders, there are four artillery regiments (one of reserve, and three of garrison artillery), two regiments of sappers and miners, and three special detachments of infantry sent to Candia, to Tunis, and Tripoli, of a total strength of 16,000 men.

The total strength of the Nizam, or regular standing army, before the war, should, therefore, have been as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36 reg. of infan. averaging</td>
<td>2,500—90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 &quot; cavalry &quot;</td>
<td>660-670—16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 &quot; field artillery</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot; garrison &quot;</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot; sappers and miners</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detached corps</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The soldiers, after having served five years in the Nizam, are dismissed to their homes, and form, for the seven following years,
part of the Redif or reserve. This reserve counts as many orders, divisions, brigades, regiments, etc., as the standing army; in fact, it is to the Nizam what in Prussia the first levy of the landwehr is to the line, with the sole exception, that in Prussia, in larger masses than brigades, line and landwehr are always mixed, while in the Turkish organization they are to be kept separate. The officers and non-commissioned officers of the Redif are constantly assembled at the dépôts, and once a year the Redif are called in for exercise, during which time, they receive the same pay and rations as the line. But such an organization, presupposing a well-regulated civil administration, and a civilized state of society, far from having been reached in Turkey, must in a great degree exist on paper only, and if we count, therefore, the Redif as equal in numbers to the Nizam, we shall certainly put it down at its highest possible figure.

The auxiliary contingents consist of troops from:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troops</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Danubian Principalities</td>
<td>6,000 men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Servia</td>
<td>20,000 ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>30,000 ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Upper Albania</td>
<td>10,000 ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Egypt</td>
<td>40,000 ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Tunis and Tripoli</td>
<td>10,000 ”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total, about</strong></td>
<td><strong>116,000 ”</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To these troops must be added the volunteer Bashi Bazouks, whom Asia Minor, Kurdistan, and Syria can furnish in great numbers. They are the last remnant of that host of irregular troops which, in past centuries, flooded Hungary, and twice appeared before Vienna. Most cavalry, their inferiority, even to the worst-equipped European horseman, has been proved by two centuries of all but constant defeats. Their self-confidence has disappeared, and now they serve no other purpose than to swarm around the army, eating up and wasting the resources upon which the regular body should subsist. Their love of plunder and unreliable temper make them even unfit for that active outpost duty which the Russians expect from their Cossacks; for the Bashi Bazouks, when most wanted, are least to be found. In this present war, it has, therefore, been found desirable to keep their numbers
down, and we do not think that there were ever collected more than 50,000 of them.

Thus the numerical strength of the Turkish army, at the beginning of the war, may be estimated as follows:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nizam</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redif</td>
<td>136,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliaries, regulars from Egypt and Tunis</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do. irregulars, Bosnia and Albania</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bashi Bazouks</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>412,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

But again, from this sum total several deductions have to be made. That the Orders stationed in Europe were in pretty good condition, and as near their full complement as can be expected in Turkey, seems pretty certain; but in Asia, in the distant provinces where the Mussulman population predominates, the men might be ready, while neither arms, nor equipments, nor stores of ammunition were forthcoming. The Danubian army was formed from the three European Orders principally. They were the nucleus around which the European Redifs, the Order of Syria, or, at least, a good part of it, and a number of Arnauts, Bosnians, and Bashi Bazouks were collected. Yet the excessive caution of Omer Pasha—his constant unwillingness up to the present time to expose his troops in the field—is the best proof that he has but a limited confidence in the capabilities of this, the only good regular army Turkey ever possessed. But in Asia, where the old Turkish system of embezzlement and laziness was still in full blossom, the two Orders of the Nizam, the whole of the Redifs, and the mass of the irregulars were unable to withstand a Russian army vastly inferior in numbers; in every battle they were beaten, and, at the end of the campaign of 1854, the Asiatic army of Turkey had all but ceased to exist. There, then, it is clear that not only the details of the organization, but a great proportion of the troops themselves had no real existence. The want of arms, equipments, ammunition, and provisions, was the constant complaint of the foreign officers and newspaper correspondents in Kars and Erzeroum; and they plainly stated that nothing but the indolence, incapacity, and rapacity of the Pashas was the cause of it. The money was duly sent to them, but they always appropriated it to their own uses.

---

a Turkish name for Albanians.—*Ed.*
The equipment of the Turkish regular soldier is on the whole imitated from the western armies, the only distinction being the red fez or skull-cap, which is about the worst head-gear possible in that climate, where, during the heats of summer, it causes frequent sun-strokes. The quality of the articles furnished is bad, and the clothing has to stand longer than can be expected, in consequence of the officers generally pocketing the money destined for its renewal. The arms are of an inferior description, both for the infantry and cavalry; the artillery alone has very good field-guns, cast at Constantinople, under the direction of European officers and civil engineers.

The Turk, in himself, is not a bad soldier. He is naturally brave, extremely hardy and patient, and, under certain circumstances, docile. European officers who have once gained his confidence, can rely upon him, as witness Grach and Butler at Silistria, and Iskender Bey (Ilinski) in Wallachia. But these are exceptions. On the whole, the innate hatred of the Turk for the "Giaour" is so indelible, and his habits and ideas are so different from those of a European, that, so long as he remains the ruling race in the country, he will not submit to men whom he inwardly despises as incommensurably his inferiors. This repugnance is extended to the very organization of the army, ever since it has been put upon a European footing. The common Turk hates Giaour institutions as much as the Giaours themselves. Then the strict discipline, the regulated activity, the constant attention required in a modern army are things utterly hateful to the lazy, contemplative, fatalist Turk. The officers, even, will rather allow the army to be beaten than exert themselves, and use their own senses. This is one of the worst features in the Turkish army, and alone would suffice to make it unfit for any offensive campaign.

The private and non-commissioned soldiers are recruited by volunteers and the ballot; the lower grades of officers are sometimes filled by men promoted from the ranks, but generally by the camp-followers and domestic servants, the tshibukdjis and kafeidjis of the higher officers. The military schools at Constantinople not very good in themselves, cannot furnish young men enough for the vacancies. As to the higher ranks, a system of favoritism exists, of which the western nations have no idea. Most of the generals were originally Circassian slaves, the mignons of some great man in the days of their youth. Utter ignorance, incapacity, and self-sufficiency rule supreme, and court-intrigue is the principal means of advancement. Even the few European generals (renegades) in the service would not have been accepted,
if they had not been absolutely necessary to prevent the whole machine from falling to pieces. As it is, they have been indiscriminately taken, both from men of real merit and mere adventurers.

At present, after three campaigns, no Turkish army can be said to exist, except the 80,000 men of Omer Pasha's original army, part of which is stationed on the Danube, and part in the Crimea. The Asiatic army consists of about 25,000 rabble, unfit for the field, and demoralized by defeat. The remainder of the 400,000 men are gone nobody knows where; killed in the field or by sickness, invalided, disbanded, or turned into robbers. Very likely this will be the last Turkish army of all; for, to recover from the shock received by her alliance with England and France, is more than can be expected from Turkey.

The time is gone by when the contests of Oltenitza and Citate created an exaggerated enthusiasm for Turkish bravery. The stubborn inactivity of Omer Pasha sufficed to raise doubts as to their other military qualifications, which not even the brilliant defense of Silistria could entirely dispel; the defeats in Asia, the flight of Balaklava, the strictly defensive attitude of the Turks in Eupatoria, and their complete inactivity in the camp before Sebastopol have reduced the general estimate of their military capabilities to a proper level. The Turkish army was so constituted that a judgment on its general value was hitherto completely impossible. There were, no doubt, some very brave and well-managed regiments, capable of any duty, but they were greatly in the minority. The great mass of the infantry lacked cohesion, and was, therefore, unfit for field-duty, though good behind intrenchments. The regular cavalry was decidedly inferior to that of any European power. The artillery was by far the best portion of the service, and the field-regiments in a high state of efficiency; the men were as if born for their work, though no doubt the officers left much to desire. The Redifs appear to have suffered from a general want of organization, though the men no doubt were willing to do their best. Of the irregulars, the Arnauts and Bosnians were capital guerrillas, but nothing more, best used in defending fortifications; while the Bashi Bazouks were all but worthless, and even worse than that. The Egyptian contingent appears to have been about on a level with the Turkish Nizam, the Tunisian nearly unfit for anything. With such a motley army, so badly officered and subject to such maladministration, no wonder it is all but ruined in three campaigns.
II. THE SARDINIAN ARMY

This army is composed of ten brigades of infantry, ten battalions of rifles, four brigades of cavalry, three regiments of artillery, one regiment of sappers and miners, a corps of carabineers (police troops), and the light horse in the island of Sardinia.

The ten brigades of infantry consist of one brigade of guards, four battalions of grenadiers, two battalions of chasseurs, and nine brigades of the line, equal to eighteen regiments of three battalions each. To these are added ten battalions of rifles (bersaglieri), one for every brigade, thus constituting a proportion of light infantry, actually trained, far stronger than in any other army.

There is, besides, a dépôt battalion for every regiment.

Since 1849, the strength of the battalions has been very much reduced, from financial motives. On the war-footing, a battalion should number about 1,000, but on the peace-footing there are no more than about 400 men. The remainder have been dismissed on indefinite furlough.

The cavalry counts four regiments of heavy, and five of light cavalry. Every regiment has four field and one dépôt-squadron. On the war-footing, a regiment should count about 800 men in the four field-squadrons, but on the peace-footing there are scarcely 600.

The three regiments of artillery consist of one regiment of workmen and artificers, one of garrison artillery (twelve companies), and one of field-artillery (six foot, two horse, two heavy batteries of eight guns each). The light batteries have eight lb. guns and twenty-four lb. howitzers, the heavy batteries sixteen lb. guns; in all eighty guns.

The regiment of sappers and miners has ten companies, or about 1,100 men. The carabineers (horse and foot) are very numerous for such a small kingdom, and number about 3,200 men. The light horse, doing duty as police troops in the island of Sardinia, figure about 1,100 strong.

The Sardinian army, in the first campaign against Austria, in 1848, certainly reached the strength of 70,000 men. In 1849, it was very near 130,000. Afterwards it was reduced to about 45,000 men. What it is now it is impossible to say, but there is no doubt that, since the conclusion of the treaty with England and France, it has been again increased.

This great elasticity of the Piedmontese army, which allows it to
increase or diminish the numbers present under arms at any time, arises from a system of recruiting very nearly akin to that of Prussia; and, indeed, Sardinia may be called, in many respects, the Prussia of Italy. There is in the Sardinian states a similar obligation for every citizen to serve in the army, though, unlike Prussia, substitutes are allowed; and the time over which this obligation extends, consists, as in Prussia, of a period of actual service and another period, during which the soldier dismissed from the ranks remains in the reserve, and is liable to be called in again in time of war. The system is something between the Prussian method and that of Belgium and the minor German states. Thus, by calling in the reserves, the infantry, from about 30,000 men, may be raised to 80,000, and even more. The cavalry and field artillery would undergo but a small augmentation, as in these arms the soldiers generally have to remain with the regiments during the whole period of their service.

The Piedmontese army is as fine and soldier-like a body of men as any in Europe. Like the French, they are small in size, especially the infantry; their guards do not average even five feet four inches; but what with their tasteful dress, military bearing, well-knit but agile frames, and fine Italian features, they look better than many a body of bigger men. The dress and equipments are, with the infantry of the line and guards, upon the French principle, with a few details adopted from the Austrians. The bersaglieri have a costume of their own, a little sailor's hat with a long hanging plume of cock-feathers and a brown tunic. The cavalry wear short brown jackets, just covering the hip-bone. The percussion-musket is the general arm of the infantry; the bersaglieri have short Tyrolese rifles, good and useful weapons, but inferior to the Minié in every respect. The first rank of the cavalry used to be armed with lances; whether this is still the case with the light-horse we cannot say. The eight lb. calibre for the horse and light-foot batteries gave them the same advantage over the other continental armies which the French had while they preserved this calibre; but their heavy batteries, carrying sixteen pounders, rendered them the heaviest field artillery of the continent. That these guns, when once in position, can do excellent service, they have shown on the Chernaya, where their accurate firing contributed a great deal to the success of the Allies, and was universally admired.

Of all the Italian states, Piedmont is the best situated for creating a good army. The plains of the Po and its tributaries produce capital horses, and a fine, tall race of men, the tallest of
all Italians, exceedingly well-adapted for cavalry and heavy artillery service. The mountains, which surround these plains on three sides, north, west, and south, are inhabited by a hardy people, less in size, but strong and active, industrious and sharp-witted, like all mountaineers. It is these that form the staple of the infantry, and especially of the bersaglieri, a body of troops nearly equaling the Chasseurs de Vincennes in training, but certainly surpassing them in bodily strength and endurance.

The military institutions of Piedmont are, upon the whole, very good, and, in consequence, the officers bear a high character. So late as 1846, however, the influence of the aristocracy and the clergy had a great deal to do with their appointment. Up to that period, Charles Albert knew but two means of governing—the clergy and the army; in fact, it was a general saying in other parts of Italy, that in Piedmont, out of three men you met in the street, one was a soldier, the second a monk, and only every third man a civilian. At present, of course, this has been done away with; the priests have less than no influence, and, though the nobility preserve many officers' commissions, the wars of 1848 and '49 have stamped a certain democratic character upon the army which it will not be easy to destroy. Some British Crimean newspaper correspondents have stated that the Piedmontese officers were almost all "gentlemen by birth," but so far from this being the case, we know, personally, more than one Piedmontese officer who rose from the ranks, and can safely assert that the mass of the captains and lieutenants are now composed of men who either gained their epaulettes by bravery against the Austrians, or who at least are not connected with the aristocracy.

We think that the greatest compliment that can be paid to the Piedmontese army is contained in the opinion expressed by one of its late opponents, General Schönhals, quarter-master-general of the Austrian army in 1848 and '49. In his "Recollections of the Italian Campaigns", this general, one of the best officers of the Austrian army, and a man violently opposed in every way to anything smacking of Italian independence, treats the Piedmontese army throughout with the highest respect.

"Their artillery [...]" he says, "consists of picked men, under good and well-informed officers; the matériel is good, and the calibre is superior to ours [...]" "The cavalry is no contemptible arm; the first rank carry lances, but as a very adroit rider only can well manage this arm, we should not like to say that this innovation was exactly an improvement. Their school of equitation, however, [...] is very good." "At Santa Lucia, both parties fought with astonishing bravery. The Piedmontese attacked with great vivacity and impetuosity—both Piedmontese and Austrians performed
many feats of great personal valor." "The Piedmontese army [...] has a right to mention the day of Novara without a blush,"—and so on.a

In the same way, the Prussian General Willisen, who assisted in part in the campaign of 1848, and who is no friend of Italian independence, speaks highly of the Piedmontese army.b

Ever since 1848, a certain party in Italy has looked upon the king of Sardinia as the future chief of the whole peninsula. Though far from participating in that opinion, we still believe that whenever Italy shall reconquer her freedom, the Piedmontese forces will be the principal military instrument in attaining that object, and will, at the same time, form the nucleus of the future Italian army. It may undergo, before that happens, more than one revolution in its own bosom, but the excellent military elements it contains will survive all this and will even gain by being merged in a really national army.

III. THE SMALLER ITALIAN ARMIES

The papal army hardly exists except on paper. The battalions and squadrons are never complete, and form but a weak division. There is, besides, a regiment of Swiss guards, the only body on which the government can place any reliance. The Tuscan, Parmesan and Modenese armies are too insignificant to be mentioned here; suffice it to say that they are organized, upon the whole, on the Austrian model. There is, besides, the Neapolitan army, of which, too, the least said the sooner mended. It has never shone conspicuously before the enemy, and, whether fighting for the king, as in 1799, or for a constitution, as in 1821, it always distinguished itself by running away.321 Even in 1848 and '49, the native Neapolitan army was everywhere beaten by the insurgents, and, had it not been for the Swiss, King Bomba c would not now be on his throne. During the siege of Rome, Garibaldi advanced with a handful of men against the Neapolitan division and beat it twice.322 The army of Naples, on the peace- footing, is estimated at 26,000 or 27,000 men, but in 1848 it is stated to have numbered nearly 49,000 men, and the full footing should raise it to 64,000. Of all these troops, the Swiss are alone worth mentioning.

a Engels is quoting from the anonymously published book by C. Schönhals, 
Erinnerungen eines österreichischen Veteranen aus dem italienischen Kriege der Jahre 1848 und 1849, Bd. I, S. 166, 167 and 223; Bd. II, S. 299.—Ed.

b A reference to W. Willisen's book Der Italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848.—Ed.

c Ferdinand II. He was nicknamed King Bomba after the bombardment of Messina by Neapolitan troops in 1848.—Ed.
They consist of four regiments, of two battalions each, and should number, when complete, 600 men per battalion, or 4,800 men. But the cadres are now overfilled, so that each battalion is about 1,000 strong (the fourth, or Bernese regiment, alone mustering 2,150), and the whole number may be estimated at nearly 9,000. These are really first-rate troops, commanded by officers of their own country, and independent, in their internal organization and administration, from the government of Naples. They were first taken into pay in 1824 or '25, when the king, a no longer trusting the army that so shortly before had revolted, found it necessary to surround himself with a strong body-guard. The treaties or "capitulations," as they were called, were concluded with the different cantons for thirty years; the Swiss articles of war and the Swiss military organization were secured to the troops; the pay was three-fold that of the native Neapolitan soldiers; the troops were recruited by volunteers from each canton, where recruiting offices were established. Pensions were secured to retiring officers, veterans, and the wounded. If, at the expiration of the thirty years, the capitulation was not renewed, the regiments were to be broken up. The present Swiss constitution forbids recruiting for foreign service, and the capitulations, therefore, were canceled after 1848; recruiting was stopped, at least ostensibly, in Switzerland, but at Chiasso and other points of Lombardy, dépôts were established, and many a recruiting agent secretly continued his business on Swiss soil. So eager was the Neapolitan government for recruits, that it did not refuse to accept the refuse of the political refugees then in Switzerland. The King of Naples, under these circumstances, confirmed the privileges granted to the Swiss soldiers by the capitulations, and in August last, when the thirty years had elapsed, by a special decree again prolonged these privileges for so long a time as the Swiss should remain in his service.

IV. THE SWISS ARMY

In Switzerland no national standing army exists. Every Swiss is compelled to serve in the militia, if able-bodied; and this mass is divided into three levies (Auszug, erstes and zweites Aufgebot), according to age. The young men, during the first years of service, are called out separately for drill, and collected from time

---

a Ferdinand I. — Ed.
b Men under arms, first levy and second levy. — Ed.
to time in camps; but whoever has seen the awkward gait and uncomfortable appearance of a Swiss squad, or heard the jokes they crack with the drill-sergeant while under drill, must at once see that the military qualities of the men are but very poorly developed. Of the soldierly capabilities of this militia we can only judge by the one example of the Sonderbund war, in 1847, which campaign is distinguished by the extremely small number of casualties in proportion to the forces engaged. The organization of the militia is almost entirely in the hands of the various cantonal governments; and, though its general form is fixed by federal laws, and a federal staff is at the head of the whole, this system cannot fail to create confusion and want of uniformity, while it must almost necessarily prevent a proper accumulation of stores, the introduction of improvements, and the permanent fortification of important points, especially on the side where Switzerland is weak, toward Germany.

The Swiss, like all mountaineers, make capital soldiers when drilled; and, wherever they have served as regular troops under foreign banners, they have fought exceedingly well. But being rather slow-headed, they need drilling much more, indeed, than either French or North Germans, to give them confidence in themselves, and cohesion. It is possible that national feeling might possibly replace this in the case of a foreign attack upon Switzerland, but even this is very doubtful. An army of 80,000 regular troops, and less, would certainly be a match for all the 160,000 and more men which the Swiss say they can congregate. In 1798, the French finished the business with a few regiments.

The Swiss boast a great deal of the rifles of their sharp-shooters. There are, certainly, in Switzerland, comparatively more good shots than in any other European country, the Austrian Alpine possessions excepted. But when one sees how these dead shots, when called in, are almost all armed with clumsy common percussion muskets, the respect for the Swiss sharp-shooters is considerably lessened. The few battalions of rifles may be good shots, but their short, heavy pieces (Stutzen) are antiquated and worthless compared with the Minié, and their awkward, slow method of loading, with loose powder from a horn, would give them but a poor chance when opposed to troops armed with less superannuated weapons.

Altogether, arms, accoutrements, organization, drill, everything is old-fashioned with the Swiss, and very likely will remain so as long as the cantonal governments have anything to say on the subject.
The Swedish and Norwegian armies, though united under one crown, are as separate as the two countries to which they belong. In contrast to Switzerland, both give us the example of an Alpine country with a standing army; but the Scandinavian peninsula is altogether, by the nature of the soil, and the consequent poverty, and thin population of the country, so much akin to Switzerland, that even in the military organization of both, one system, and that the militia system, predominates.

Sweden has three sorts of troops,—regiments raised by voluntary enlistment (Värfvade trupper), provincial regiments (Indelta trupper), and Reserve troops. The Värfvade consist of three regiments of infantry, containing six battalions, two of cavalry and three of artillery, with thirteen foot and four horse batteries, altogether 96 six lb., 24 twelve lb., and 16 twenty-four lb. guns. This makes a total of 7,700 men, and 136 guns. These troops contain all the artillery for the whole army.

The Indelta form twenty provincial regiments of two battalions, with five separate battalions of infantry, and six regiments of a strength varying from one to eight squadrons. They are estimated at 33,000 men.

The Reserve troops form the mass of the army. When called in they are expected to reach 95,000 men.

There is, besides, in the province of Götaland, a sort of militia constantly under arms, numbering 7,850 men, in twenty-one companies and sixteen guns. Altogether, therefore, the Swedish army comprises about 140,000 men with 150 field guns.

The volunteers for the enlisted regiments are generally engaged for fourteen years, but the law allows engagements of three years. The Indelta are a sort of militia, living, when once trained, in farms apportioned to them and their families, and called in only once a year for four weeks' drill. They have the revenues of their farms for pay, but when assembled they receive a special compensation. The officers also receive crown-lands on tenure in their respective districts. The Reserve consists of all able-bodied Swedes from twenty to twenty-five years of age; they are drilled a short time, and afterwards called in a fortnight in every year. Thus, with the exception of the few Värfvade and the Gotland troops, the great body of the army—Indelta and Reserve—are, to all intents and purposes, militia.

The Swedes play a part in military history which is beyond all proportion to the scanty population which furnished their
renowned armies. Gustavus Adolphus, in the thirty years' war, marked a new era in tactics by his improvements; and Charles XII, with his adventurous foolhardiness which spoiled his great military talent, actually made them do wonders—such as to take entrenchments with cavalry. In the later wars against Russia, they behaved very well; in 1813, Bernadotte kept them as much as possible out of harm's way, and they were scarcely under fire, unless by mistake, except at Leipsic, where they formed but an infinitesimal part of the allies. The Värfvade, and even the Indelta, will, no doubt, always sustain the character of the Swedish name; but the Reserve, unless assembled and drilled a long time before brought into action, can only figure as an army of recruits.

Norway has five brigades of infantry containing twenty-two battalions and 12,000 men; one brigade of cavalry, of three divisions of chasseurs, containing 1,070 men; and one regiment of artillery of about 1,300 men; beside a reserve of militia, of 9,000 men; altogether about 24,000 men. The character of this army does not vary much from that of Sweden; its only distinguishing feature is a few companies of chasseurs, provided with flat snow-shoes, on which, with the assistance of a long pole, they run, Lapland fashion, very rapidly over the snow.

The Danish army is composed of twenty-three battalions of infantry (one of guards, twelve line, five light, five chasseurs) in four brigades, each battalion numbering about 700 men on the peace-footing; three brigades of cavalry (three squadrons of guards, six regiments of dragoons, of four squadrons each, the squadron containing 140 men in time of peace), and one brigade of artillery (two regiments and twelve batteries with 80 six lb. and 16 twelve lb. guns), and three companies of sappers. Total, 16,630 infantry, 2,900 cavalry, 2,906 artillery and sappers with ninety-six guns.

For the war-footing, each company is raised to 200, or the battalion to 800 men, and each squadron to 180 men, raising the line in all to 25,500 men. Besides, thirty-two battalions, twenty-four squadrons, and six batteries of the reserve can be called in, representing a force of 31,500 men and raising the total of the force to about 56,000 or 57,000 men. Even these, however, can be increased in case of need, as during the late war Denmark proper alone, without either Holstein or Schleswig, could muster from 50,000 to 60,000 men, and the Duchies are now again subject to the Danish conscription.

The army is recruited by ballot, out of the young men of from twenty-two years and upwards. The time of service is eight years,
but actually the artillery remain six years, the line four years only with the regiments, while for the remainder of the time they belong to the reserve. From the thirtieth to the thirty-eighth year the men remain in the first, and then up to the forty-fifth year in the second levy of the militia. This is all very nicely arranged, but, in any war against Germany, nearly one-half of the troops—those from the Duchies—would disband and take up arms against their present comrades. It is this strong admixture of Schleswig-Holsteiners which forms the great weakness of the Danish army, and, in reality, almost nullifies it in any complications with its most powerful neighbor.

The Danish army, since its reorganization in 1848-49, has been well equipped, well armed, and brought altogether to a very respectable footing. The Dane, from Denmark proper, is a good soldier and behaved very well in almost every action of the three years' war; but the Schleswig-Holsteiner proved himself decidedly his superior. The corps of officers is good upon the whole, but there is too much aristocracy and too little scientific education in it. Their reports are slovenly made, and similar to those of the British, to which army the Danish troops likewise appear related in their want of mobility; but they have not shown of late that they possess such immovable steadiness as the victors of Inkermann. The Schleswig-Holsteiners are, without any dispute, among the best soldiers in Europe. They are excellent artillery men, and as cool in action as the English, their cousins. Though inhabitants of a level country, they make very good light infantry; their first rifle-battalion in 1850 might have vied with any troop of its class.

VI. THE ARMY OF HOLLAND

The Dutch army numbers thirty-six battalions of infantry in nine regiments, containing 44,000 men in all; four regiments of dragoons composed of twenty squadrons; two squadrons of mounted chasseurs; and two squadrons of gens d'armes; in all, twenty-four squadrons, comprising 4,400 cavalry, with two regiments of field artillery (five six lb. and six twelve lb. foot, two six lb. and two twelve lb. horse batteries, of 120 guns in all), and one battalion of sappers, making a total of 58,000 men, beside several regiments in the colonies. But this army does not always exist in time of peace. There is a nucleus remaining under arms, consisting of officers, subalterns, and a few voluntarily enlisted men. The great mass, though obliged to serve for five years, are drilled during a couple of months, and then dismissed so as to be
called in for a few weeks in each year only. Besides, there is a sort of reserve in three levies, comprising all the able-bodied men from twenty to thirty-five years of age. The first levy forms about fifty-three, and the second twenty-nine battalions of infantry and artillery. But this body is not at all organized, and can hardly be accounted even as militia.

VII. THE BELGIAN ARMY

The Belgian army has sixteen regiments of infantry, containing forty-nine battalions, beside a reserve battalion for each regiment; comprising in all 46,000 men. The cavalry consists of two regiments of chasseurs, two of lancers, one of guides, two of cuirassiers, making thirty-eight squadrons, beside seven reserve squadrons, in all 5,800 men. There are four regiments of artillery (four horse, fifteen foot batteries, four dépôt batteries, twenty-four garrison companies), with 152 guns, six and twelve pounders; and one regiment of sappers and miners, numbering 1,700 men. The total, without the reserve, is 62,000 men; with the reserve, according to a late levy, it may be raised to 100,000. The army is recruited by ballot, and the term of service is eight years, but about one half of that time is passed on furlough. On the peace-establishment, therefore, the actual force will scarcely reach 30,000 men.

VIII. THE PORTUGUESE ARMY

The Portuguese army consisted, in 1850, of the following troops:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Peace footing.</th>
<th>War footing.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry, ......</td>
<td>18,738</td>
<td>40,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry, ......</td>
<td>3,508</td>
<td>4,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery, .....</td>
<td>2,707</td>
<td>4,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers and Staff</td>
<td>495</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>25,681</strong></td>
<td><strong>49,670</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The artillery consists of one field-regiment, of one horse and seven foot batteries; three regiments of position and garrison artillery, and three detached battalions in the islands. The calibre is six and twelve pounds.
Of all European armies, that of Spain is, from peculiar circumstances, most a matter of interest to the United States. We give, therefore, in concluding this survey of the military establishments of Europe, a more detailed account of this army than its importance, compared with that of its neighbors on the other side of the Atlantic, might seem to warrant.

The Spanish military force consists of the army of the interior, and of the colonial armies.

That of the interior counts one regiment of grenadiers, forty-five regiments of the line, of three battalions each, two regiments of two battalions each in Ceuta, and eighteen battalions of cazadores or rifles. The whole of these 160 battalions formed, in 1852, an effective force of 72,670 men, costing the state 82,692,651 reals, or $10,336,581, a year. The cavalry comprises sixteen regiments of carabineers, or dragoons and lancers, of four squadrons each, with eleven squadrons of cazadores, or light horse, in 1851; in all 12,000 men, costing 17,549,562 reals, or $2,193,695.

The artillery numbers five regiments of foot artillery, of three brigades each, one for each division of the monarchy; beside five brigades of heavy, three of horse, and three of mountain artillery, making a total of twenty-six brigades, or, as they are now called, battalions. The battalion has in the horse artillery two, in the mountain and foot artillery four batteries; in all ninety-two foot and six horse batteries, or 588 field guns.

The sappers and miners form one regiment of 1,240 men.

The reserve consists of one battalion (No. 4) for every infantry regiment, and a dépôt-squadron for each cavalry regiment.

The total force—on paper—in 1851 was 103,000 men; in 1843, when Espartero was upset, it amounted to 50,000 only; but at one time Narváez raised it to above 100,000. On an average 90,000 men under arms will be the utmost.

The colonial armies are as follows:

1. The army of Cuba; sixteen regiments of veteran infantry, four companies of volunteers, two regiments of cavalry, two battalions of four batteries foot, and one battalion of four batteries of mountain artillery, one battalion of horse artillery with two batteries, and one battalion of sappers and miners. Beside these troops of the line, there is a milicia disciplinada of four battalions and four squadrons, and a milicia urbana of eight squadrons,

\[a\] Disciplined militia.—*Ed.*
making a total of thirty-seven battalions, twenty squadrons and eighty-four guns. During the last few years this standing Cuban army has been reinforced by numerous troops from Spain; and if we take its original strength at 16,000 or 18,000 men, there will now be, perhaps, 25,000 or 28,000 men in Cuba. But this is a mere approximation.

2. The army of Porto Rico; three battalions of veteran infantry, seven battalions of disciplined militia, two battalions of native volunteers, one squadron of the same, and four batteries of foot artillery. The neglected state of most of the Spanish colonies does not allow any estimate of the strength of this corps.

3. The Philippine Islands have five regiments of infantry, of eight companies each; one regiment of chasseurs of Luzon; nine foot, one horse, one mountain battery. Nine corps of five battalions of native infantry, and other provincial corps, previously existing, were dissolved in 1851.

The army is recruited by ballot, and substitutes are allowed. Every year a contingent of 25,000 men is levied; but, in 1848, three contingents, or 75,000 men, were called out.

The Spanish army owes its present organization principally to Narváez, though the regulations of Charles III, of 1768, still form the groundwork of it. Narváez had actually to take away from the regiments their old provincial colors, different in each, and to introduce the Spanish flag into the army! In the same manner he had to destroy the old provincial organization, and to centralize and restore unity. Too well aware, by experience, that money was the principal moving lever in an army which had almost never been paid and seldom even clad or fed, he also tried to introduce a greater regularity in the payments and the financial administration of the army. Whether he succeeded to the full extent of his wishes, is unknown; but any amelioration introduced by him, in this respect, speedily disappeared during the administration of Sartorius and his successors. The normal state of "no pay, no food, no clothing," was reestablished in its full glory; and while the superior and general officers strut about in coats resplendent with gold and silver lace, or even don fancy uniforms, unknown to any regulations, the soldiers are ragged and without shoes. What the state of this army was ten or twelve years ago, an English author thus describes:—

"The appearance of the Spanish troops is, to the last degree, unsoldierly. The sentry strolls to and fro [...] on his beat, his shako almost falling off the back of his

---

\[a\] Ordenanzas de S. M. para el regimen, disciplina, subordinacion, y servicio de sus ejercitos, T. 1-II.—Ed.
head, his gun slouched on his shoulders, singing outright [...] a lively seguidilla with the most sans façon air in the world. He is, not unfrequently, destitute of portions of his uniform; or his regimental coat and lower continuations are in such hopeless rags, that, even in the sultry summer, the slate-colored great-coat is worn as a slut-cover [...]; the shoes [...], in one case out of three, are broken to pieces, disclosing the naked toes of the men—such in Spain are the glories of the vida militar."

A regulation, issued by Serrano, on Sept. 9, 1843, prescribes that:

"All officers and chiefs of the army have in future to present themselves in public in the uniform of their regiment, and with the regulation sword, whenever they do not appear in plain clothes; and all officers are also to wear the exact distinctive marks of their rank, and no other, as prescribed, without displaying any more of those arbitrary ornaments and ridiculous trimmings by which some of them have thought proper to distinguish themselves."

So much for the officers. Now for the soldiers:

"Brigadier General Cordoba has opened a subscription in Cadiz, heading it with his name, in order to procure funds for presenting one pair of cloth trousers to each of the valiant soldiers of the regiment of Asturias!"

This financial disorder explains how it has been possible for the Spanish army to continue, ever since 1808, in a state of almost uninterrupted rebellion. But the real causes lie deeper. The long continued war with Napoleon, in which the different armies and their chiefs gained real political influence, first gave it a pretorian turn. Many energetic men, from the revolutionary times, remained in the army; the incorporation of the guerrillas in the regular force even increased this element. Thus, while the chiefs retained their pretorian pretensions, the soldiers and lower ranks altogether remained inspired with revolutionary traditions. In this way the insurrection of 1819-23 was regularly prepared, and later on, in 1833-43, the civil war again thrust the army and its chiefs into the foreground. Having been used by all parties as an instrument, no wonder that the Spanish army should, for a time, take the government into its own hands.

"The Spaniards are a warlike but not a soldier-like people," said the Abbé de Pradt. They certainly have, of all European nations, the greatest antipathy to military discipline. Nevertheless, it is possible that the nation, which for more than a hundred years was celebrated for its infantry, may yet again have an army of which it can be proud. But, to attain this end, not only the military system, but civil life, still more, requires to be reformed.

---

b Dominique de Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 189.—Ed.
London, August 3. The day before yesterday The Morning Post, in obviously embarrassed phraseology, informed the British public that General Simpson will soon resign his command under the pretext of weakened health and will have no successor." In other words: the English army is to be placed under French general command. In this way the Government would shift the responsibility for the conduct of the war from itself onto "our great and glorious ally". Parliament forfeits the last semblance of control. At the same time an infallible means for transforming the alliance between England and France into the most acrimonious dissension between the two nations has been discovered. We see the same master hand at work in whose all too robust grasp the Entente Cordiale\(^3\) broke into pieces in 1839.

Parliament concludes its present session in a fitting manner—with scandals.\(^b\) First scandal: the withdrawal of the Bill for limited liability in private (not joint-stock) commercial companies at the bidding of the big capitalists before whose frowns even the Olympian Palmerston trembles. Second scandal: the adjournment in infinitum of the Bills regulating lease-hold tenure in Ireland, which have been moving to and fro in both Houses of Parliament for 4 years—a cowardly compromise in which the House of Commons has consented to take back its own work, the Cabinet to break its word and the Irish Brigade\(^3\) to hold the question open

---

\(^{a}\) "The Command of the Army in the East", The Morning Post, No. 25455, August 2, 1855.—Ed.

\(^{b}\) The reference is to the sittings of the House of Commons of July 24, July 30 and August 2. The Times, No. 22115, July 25; No. 22120, July 31 and No. 22123, August 3, 1855.—Ed.
for exploitation on the hustings. Final scandal: Major Reed's motion obliging the Cabinet to recall Parliament in the event of peace being concluded during the recess. Reed is a buffoon, notoriously in Palmerston’s pay. His aim was to deceive the House into passing a vote of confidence as a result of his “distrustful motion”. But the House laughed his motion down, laughed Palmerston down and laughed itself down. It has reached the stage where “laughter” remains the last recourse for depravity to repudiate itself.

Written on August 3, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 361, August 6, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
London, August 8. The financial report on the British Empire in Asia presented by Vernon Smith (at present Great Mogul and Manu in one person) and Bright’s motion to bring this important subject before the Commons at a “debatable” time in the future prompted yesterday’s Commons debate on India, which we shall leave to one side for the time being since we intend to provide a detailed sketch of conditions in India during the parliamentary recess.

Lord John Russell will hardly allow the impending conclusion of this Parliamentary session to pass off without an attempt to make political capital out of his awkward situation. He is no longer in the Government, and not yet a member of the opposition—this constitutes his awkward situation. The position of leader in the Tory opposition is already occupied, and Russell has nothing to gain from this side. In the liberal opposition Gladstone is pressing to the fore. In his latest and, from his point of view, exemplary speech—on the occasion of the Turkish loan—Gladstone skilfully advocated peace with Russia, by showing the war to be a war at the expense of Turkey and the fighting nationalities, especially Italy. Russell senses that dreadful misfortunes will occur during

---

a The speeches of Smith, Bright, Russell and Palmerston in the House of Commons on August 7, 1855, were published in The Times, No. 22127, August 8, 1855.—Ed.

b Gladstone’s speech in the House of Commons on July 20, 1855. The Times, No. 22112, July 21, 1855.—Ed.
the recess, implying a great clamour for peace when Parliament reassembles. He senses that this peace must be demanded on liberal pretexts, all the more so since the Tories have run themselves into the position of the war party *par excellence.*

Italy—the pretext for making peace with Russia! Russell envies Gladstone this brainwave and since he is unable to *anticipate* him with this plausible position, he has decided to *absorb* him by translating Gladstone’s speech from the sublime style into the trivial. The circumstance that he is no longer in the Government as Palmerston is, and not yet, like Gladstone, in the opposition, promises to make the plagiarism profitable. Thus Russell rose yesterday evening and began by assuring the House that he did “not wish either to diminish or to aggravate the responsibility [...] of the Government”. This responsibility was great, however. This year alone £49,000,000 had been voted for war expenses, and it would soon be time to account for this enormous sum. In the Baltic the fleet had done nothing and would probably do still less. The prospects in the Black Sea were no more promising. Austria’s change of policy permitted Russia to send its armies from Poland, etc., to the Crimea. On the Asiatic coast catastrophes were impending for the Turkish army. The prospect of sending a foreign legion of twenty to thirty thousand men there as a replacement had disappeared. He regretted that his Viennese despatches had not been laid before Parliament. The Turkish ambassador* had completely agreed with him concerning the acceptability of a peace on the basis of the latest Austrian proposals. Should the war be pursued any further against the will of Turkey then in future it would no longer be a question of underwriting loans but of subsidies. Piedmont had joined the Western Powers, but for this it was demanding, and rightly so, a change in the conditions of Italy. Rome was occupied by the French, the Papal States by the Austrians, an occupation which maintained despotism there and in the two Sicilies and prevented the people of Italy from following the example of Spain. Russia’s occupation of the Danubian principalities was the excuse for the present war. How to square with this the Franco-Austrian occupation of Italy? The independence of the Pope* and thus the balance of Europe was endangered. Could an understanding not be reached with Austria and France concerning changes in the Papal form of government which would permit the evacuation of

---

*a Arif Bey.—* Ed.  
*b Pius IX.—* Ed.
the Papal States? Finally the hackneyed advice: the Ministers should not conclude a dishonourable peace, but should also let no opportunity for peace negotiations slip through their hands.

Palmerston replied that "he was not like other people who took upon themselves the responsibility of declaring a war and then shrank back before the responsibility of conducting it. He was not such a man as that". (He indeed knows what "responsibility" involves.) Conditions for peace depended upon the results of war, and the results of war depended upon all sorts of circumstances, i.e., upon chance. (Thus chance is responsible for the results of war and the results of war are responsible for the conditions of peace.) As far as he (Palmerston) knew, Turkey was in complete agreement with the views of France and England. Even if this were not so, Turkey was merely a means, not an end in the struggle against Russia. The "enlightened" Western Powers must know better what was advantageous than the decaying Eastern Power. (This is a splendid commentary on the declaration of war against Russia, in which the war is described as a purely "defensive war" on Turkey's behalf; on the notorious Vienna Note which the "enlightened" Western Powers wished to force upon Turkey, etc.) As for Italy, that was a ticklish question. A dreadful state of affairs reigned in Naples, but why? Because it was the ally of Russia, a despotic state. As for the condition of Italy occupied by Austria and France (not despotic states?), "the governments there are not, to be sure, in accordance with the feelings of the people", but the occupation was necessary to maintain "order". Besides, France had reduced the number of troops in Rome and Austria had evacuated Tuscany completely. Finally Palmerston congratulated England upon the alliance with France, which was now so intimate that actually only "one Cabinet" was governing on both sides of the Channel. And he had just been denouncing Naples for its alliance with a despotic state! And now he congratulated England on the same thing! The point of Palmerston's speech was that he used military tirades to conclude a session he had been able to keep so free of military deeds.

Using Italy as a false pretext for peace, in the same way as he had used Poland and Hungary as a false pretext for war after his return from Vienna, was naturally a matter of no consequence to Russell. It did not embarrass him to forget that as premier in 1847-1852 he had allowed Palmerston, first to help stir up Italy with false promises, only to abandon it later on to Bonaparte and King Ferdinand, to the Pope and the Emperor.

---

33 Francis Joseph I. — Ed.
matter to him. What mattered to him was snatching the "Italian pretext" from Gladstone and making it his own.

Written on August 8, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*,
No. 371, August 11, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, August 11. At the moment the armies mustered by the allies against Russia are limited, apart from their own troops, to:

1. a small Piedmontese auxiliary corps of 15,000 men—a corps extorted from Piedmont by the concerted threats of England, France and Austria. This bloodletting of Piedmont was one of the conditions Austria made for selling its adhesion to the “Treaty of 2 December” 335;

2. the Foreign Legion, amounting to a few thousand troops—an olla podrida a of occidental mercenaries enticed bit by bit surreptitiously and illegally away from their respective countries;

3. an Italian Legion of 4,000 to 5,000 men, still in the process of formation;

4. a Polish Legion, existing in the form of a project;

5. finally, in the distant future, a Spanish auxiliary corps, to represent “dire financial necessity”.

This motley sample card of volunteer corps and diminutive armies provides a map of the Europe England and France have in their retinue at this moment. Can one conceive of a more consummate caricature of the army of nations which the first Napoleon rolled into motion against Russia?

Written on August 11, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 375, August 14, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

a Hotchpotch (literally: rotten stew).—Ed.
London, August 13. The repeated angry sallies of the Government newspapers against the great Poland meeting which took place last Wednesday in St. Martin's Hall necessitate some marginal notes. The initiative for the meeting evidently originated with the Government itself. The "Literary Association of the Friends of Poland", an association composed of Czartoryski's supporters on the one hand and English aristocrats with a friendly disposition towards Poland on the other, was pushed forward as a front. From its inception this association has been a blind tool in the hands of Palmerston, who manipulated and controlled it through the mediation of the recently deceased Lord Dudley Stuart. The addresses concerning Poland and deputations which it sent to Palmerston each year were one of the most significant aids he had in keeping his "anti-Russian" reputation alive. For their part Czartoryski's supporters gained important advantages from this connection: they figured as the only respectable, so to say "official" representatives of the Polish emigration, they could keep down the democratic party among the emigrants and they had the association's significant material means of relief at their disposal as recruiting funds for their own party. The controversy between the Literary Association and the "Centralisation" of the Democratic Polish Association has been fierce and long-lived. In 1839 the latter held a great public meeting in London, exposing the intrigues of the "Literary" Association, unfurling the past history of the Czartoryskis (this was done by Ostrowski, the author of a

---

\(^a\) The meeting was held on August 8, 1855. Reports on it were published in *The Times*, No. 22128, August 9, 1855, and in *The People's Paper*, No. 70, August 11, 1855.— *Ed.*
history of Poland written in English\textsuperscript{3}) and openly declaring its opposition to the diplomatic-aristocratic "restorers" of Poland. From this moment the position which the "Literary" Association had usurped was undermined. In passing, it should be noted that the events of 1846 and of 1848-49\textsuperscript{339} added a third element to the Polish emigration, a socialist group, but this, together with the democrats, opposes the Czartoryski party.

The purpose of the meeting held at the instigation of the Government was threefold: to form a Polish legion and thus get rid of part of the "Polish foreigners" by sending them to the Crimea; to refurbish Palmerston's popularity; and finally to deliver any potential Polish movement into his own hands and those of Bonaparte. The government press claims that a deeply laid conspiracy inspired by Russian agents thwarted the purpose of the meeting. Nothing could be more ridiculous than this assertion. The majority of the audience in St. Martin's Hall was made up of London Chartists. The anti-Government amendment\textsuperscript{*} was moved by an Urquhartist and seconded by an Urquhartist—Collet and Hart. Leaflets distributed in the hall said that

"the meeting had been called by English aristocrats simply trying to maintain the old British system of government, etc.". "Poland, which condemned every alliance with the present rulers of Europe, did not wish to be restored by any of the existing governments, nor sink to being a tool of diplomatic intrigue, etc."

These leaflets were signed by the president and the secretary of the "Polish Democratic Committee". Now considering that in London all three factions, Chartists, Urquhartists and the really "democratic" Polish emigration are on anything but friendly terms with one another, every suspicion of a "conspiracy" vanishes. The noisy interruptions of the meeting were provoked exclusively by the unparliamentary refusal by the chairman, Lord Harrington, to read out Collet's amendment and put it to the vote. They were aggravated by the secretary of the "Literary

\textsuperscript{*} The following is the wording of Collet's amendment, which was adopted by the meeting: "That this meeting, cordially desiring the restoration of Polish nationality, cannot forget that the destruction of that nationality was mainly owing to the perfidious conduct of Lord Palmerston from 1830 to 1846; that so long as Lord Palmerston is a servant of the Crown, no proposal for the restoration of Poland can be anything but a sham and a delusion, and that the truth of this proposition is shown by the fact that Lord Palmerston has carried on the war in such a way as to avoid, as far as possible, injuring Russia, while he has proposed terms of peace which utterly destroy the integrity and independence of Turkey."

\textsuperscript{a} J. B. Ostrowski, \textit{The History of Poland}, Vols. I-II.—\textit{Ed.}
Association of the Friends of Poland" Colonel Szulzewski's notion
of shouting for a constable to have Collet arrested. The tumult
naturally reached its climax when Lord Harrington, Sir Robert
Peel and their friends fled the platform and quit the premises.
With the appointment of George Thompson as president in place
of Harrington tranquillity was instantly restored.

The specimens of England's ruling class prominent at this
Poland meeting were by no means calculated to instil any special
respect for the patriciate. The Earl of Harrington may perhaps be
a very good man, but he is indubitably a very bad speaker. It
would be impossible to witness a more embarrassing performance.
Only by means of supreme exertion could his lordship stammer
forth two connected words. To this moment he failed to
conclude a single sentence of his speech. In the meantime this
was done for him—by the stenographers. His lordship is a
military man and undoubtedly brave, but judging from the way he
conducted the Poland meeting, he is better fitted for any other
vocation than for that of being a leader. As a speaker Lord
Ebrington, the midwife of the Sunday Bill, is only a little better
than the Earl of Harrington. His physiognomy betrays obstinacy,
his skull has the form of a battering ram. He has one undeniable
merit. Arguments cannot defeat him. Napoleon once declared that
Englishmen did not know when they were beaten. In this respect
Ebrington is a model Englishman.

After the lords came the baronets. Lord Ebrington proposed the
government motion on the restoration of Poland; Sir Robert Peel
followed him and spoke as his seconder. In many respects no
greater contrast can be imagined than exists between the "Member
for Tamworth" (Peel) and the "Member for Marylebone"
(Ebrington). The former is a roguish and natural humbug, the
latter an affected and puritanical chicken heart. The one amuses,
the other disgusts. Sir Robert Peel gives the impression of a
traveller in wines who has been raised to the nobility, Lord
Ebrington of an inquisitor converted to Protestantism. Tony
Lumpkin and Beau Brummell rolled into one would, more or less,
produce the incongruity exhibiting itself in Peel's person, dress
and manner. An extraordinary mixture of clown and dandy.
Palmerston is extremely partial to this oddity from Tamworth. He
finds it serviceable. Whenever he wants to know which way the
popular wind is blowing, he hoists aloft Sir Robert Peel to act as
his weather-vane. When he desired to know if public opinion in
England would sanction the expulsion of Victor Hugo, etc., he let
Sir Robert Peel deliver a denunciation of the refugees and an
apology for Bonaparte. So once again in relation to Poland. He exploits him as a "feeler". Peel is extraordinarily fitted for this not particularly dignified role. He is what the English call "a chartered libertine", a dashing madcap, a privileged eccentric, for whose impulses and outbursts, erratic manoeuvrings, words and deeds no Government is held responsible, nor any party. Sir Robert came to the Poland meeting padded out and, it is said, made up in the artistic fashion. He appeared to be girdled, wore a crimson rose in his buttonhole, was as perfumed as a milliner and in his right hand he flourished a huge umbrella with which he beat time as he spoke. By a highly ironic coincidence the ex-vicepresident of the Association for Administrative Reform, Mr. Tite, followed hard on the heels of the lords and the baronets. Since the influence of this association gained him the designation of the Solon of Bath he has begun his parliamentary career, as is well known, by voting against Scully's motion for a piece of administrative reform and for Palmerston's Turkish loan, while abstaining, with great moderation, from voting on Roebuck's motion. The lords and the baronets seemed to be pointing at him and snickering: There you have our substitute! It is unnecessary to describe Mr. Tite in detail. Shakespeare did so when he invented the immortal Shallow, compared by Falstaff to one of the little men made out of cheese-parings after supper.

In contrast to all these gentlemen the very first words of an unknown young plebeian named Hart gave the impression that he was a man able to inspire and to govern great masses. Now we can understand the Government's vexation at the Poland meeting. It was not only a defeat for Palmerston, but even more so for the class he represents.

Written on August 13, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 379, August 16, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

a Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act I, Scene 1, quoted by Marx in English.— Ed.
b Scully submitted his motion to the Commons on July 10, 1855; Palmerston's motion on the Turkish loan was submitted on July 20; for Roebuck's motion, submitted on July 17, see this volume, pp. 337-38, 355-57 and 363.— Ed.
Karl Marx

ON THE CRITIQUE OF AUSTRIAN POLICY IN THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN

London, August 15. Bratiano recently addressed a letter to The Daily News in which he depicts the suffering of the inhabitants of the Danubian principalities under the Austrian army of occupation, alludes to the equivocal attitude of the French and English consuls and then puts this question:

"Is Austria acting as an ally or even as a neutral party when she maintains an army of 80,000 in the principalities thereby, as the official despatches prove, preventing the Turks entering Bessarabia and also the formation of a Romanian army which could have taken an active part in the war, while withdrawing 200,000 men from Galicia thus enabling Russia to send a similar number to the Crimea?"

Austria's ambiguous position arose the moment when neither neutral nor an ally, she set herself up as a mediator. The following extract from a despatch of Lord Clarendon to the Viennese Cabinet, dated June 14, 1853, seems to prove that England in part forced her into this role:

"If the Russian army proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of Turkey were invaded, a general rising of the Christian population would ensue, not in favour of Russia, nor in support of the Sultan, but for their own independence; and it would be needless to add that such a revolt would not be long in extending itself to the Danubian Provinces of Austria but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge of the effect it might produce in Hungary and in Italy, and the encouragement it must give to the promoters of disorder throughout Europe whom Austria has reason to fear, and who even now would appear to think that the moment is at hand for the realisation of their projects. It was these considerations, I said, that rendered Her Majesty's Government most anxious to unite with Austria for an object so essential to the best interests of society, and to endeavour with her to discover some mode by which the just claims of Russia may be reconciled with the sovereign rights of the Sultan."

a Abdul Mejid.—Ed.
b Queen Victoria's.—Ed.
Another question concerning Austrian policy remains as unanswered at the conclusion of the parliamentary session as at the start. What was Austria's position with regard to the Crimean expedition? On July 23 this year Disraeli asked Lord John Russell on what authority he had declared that "one of the principal causes of the Crimean expedition was the refusal of Austria to cross the river Pruth".

Lord John Russell could not remember—i.e., he said "his authority was a vague recollection, a general recollection". Disraeli then addressed the same question to Palmerston, who said

"he would not answer questions taken piecemeal from a long course of negotiations between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of one of the Sovereigns who was to a certain degree in alliance with Her Majesty."

With this apparently evasive answer Palmerston was evidently only indirectly confirming Russell's claim, pleading delicacy with regard to the "ally to a certain degree". Let us now move from the House of Commons to the House of Lords. On June 26 this year Lord Lyndhurst delivered his philippic against Austria:

"Early in June" (1854) "Austria resolved on making a demand upon Russia to evacuate the principalities. That demand was made in very strong terms with something like an intimation that if it were not complied with Austria would resort to forcible means to secure this object."

After some historical remarks Lyndhurst continues:

"Well, did Austria then immediately carry into effect any attack upon Russia? Did she attempt to enter the principalities? Far from it. She abstained from doing anything for a period of several weeks, and it was only when the siege of Silistria had been raised and the Russian army was in retreat, and when Russia herself had served a notice that she would within a certain time leave the principalities and retire behind the Pruth [...]—that Austria again remembered her engagements." c

In reply to this speech Lord Clarendon declared:

"When Austria entered into these successive engagements with England and France and when she made those extensive and costly preparations for war, when, moreover she urgently proposed that military commissioners should be sent by France and England to the head-quarters of General Hess, I have no doubt she intended and expected war. But she also expected that long before the season for military operations began the allied armies would have obtained decisive victories in the Crimea, that they would be free, and would be able to undertake other

---

a Disraeli's questions and the replies by Russell and Palmerston were published in The Times, No. 22114, July 24, 1855. Disraeli quotes from Russell's speech in the House of Commons on July 19, 1855.—Ed.
b Presumably Francis Joseph.—Ed.
c The speeches of Lyndhurst and others who took part in the debate in the House of Lords on June 26, 1855, were published in The Times, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—Ed.
operations in concert with her own forces. That, unfortunately, was not the case; and if Austria had at our invitation declared war, she would in all probability have had to wage that war single-handed.”

Still more astonishing is Ellenborough’s later statement in the House of Lords, which to this moment has not been challenged by any minister:

“Before the expedition to the Crimea was despatched, Austria proposed to communicate with the allied Powers on the subject of future military operations; acting, however, upon preconceived opinions, the allies sent that expedition, and then Austria at once said that she could not meet the Russians single-handed, and that the expedition to the Crimea rendered it necessary for her to adopt a different course of action. At a subsequent period, just at the commencement of the conference at Vienna, when it was of the greatest possible importance that Austria should act with us—at that time, still looking to nothing but the success of your operations in the Crimea, you withdrew from the immediate vicinity of Austria 50,000 good Turkish troops, thus depriving Austria of the only assistance on which she could rely in the event of a military expedition against Russia. It is clear, therefore, my lords, and also from the recent statements of the noble earl, Clarendon, that it is our ill-advised expedition to the Crimea which has paralysed the policy of Austria, and which has reduced her to her present difficult position. Before that expedition sailed to the Crimea I warned the Government. [...] I warned them of the effect which that expedition would produce upon the policy of Austria.”

Here then we have a direct contradiction between the statement of Clarendon, the Foreign Secretary, between his statement and the statement of Lord John Russell and the statement of Lord Ellenborough. Russell says: the Crimean expedition sailed because Austria refused to cross the Pruth, i.e., to take sides against Russia with arms in hand. No, says Clarendon. Austria could not take sides against Russia because the Crimean expedition did not have the desired result. Finally, Lord Ellenborough: the Crimean expedition was undertaken against the will of Austria, and forced her to abstain from the war with Russia. These contradictions—however one may interpret them—prove in any case that the ambiguity was not merely to be found on the side of the Austrians.

Written on August 15, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 383, August 18, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
An enlarged English version was published as a leading article in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4493, September 13, 1855 and reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1075, September 14, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
This version is published in English for the first time
London, August 17. The Anglo-French war against Russia will undoubtedly always figure in military history as "the incomprehensible war". Big talk combined with minimal action, vast preparations and insignificant results, caution bordering on timidity, followed by the foolhardiness that is born of ignorance, generals who are more than mediocre coupled with troops who are more than brave, almost deliberate reverses on the heels of victories won through mistakes, armies ruined by negligence, then saved by the strangest of accidents—a grand ensemble of contradictions and inconsistencies. And this is nearly as much the distinguishing mark of the Russians as of their enemies. If the British have destroyed an exemplary army through the maladministration of the civil servants and the slothful incompetence of the officers; if the French have had to run useless risks and suffer enormous losses simply because Louis Napoleon affected to run the war from Paris, the Russians for their part have suffered similar losses as a result of maladministration and foolish but peremptory orders from Petersburg. Ever since the Turkish wars of 1828-29 Tsar Nicholas's military talents have been "passed over in silence" even by his most servile eulogists. If the Russians have Todtleben, who is not a Russian, they have on the other hand Gorchakov and [other]... ovs who in no respect yield to the S[ain]t-Arnauds and Raglans in the matter of incompetence.

One would have supposed that now, at any rate, when so many minds are occupied in drawing up plausible plans for attack and defence, and given this ever increasing mass of men and material, some breath-taking idea must needs be born. Not a bit of it, however. The war drags on and its prolongation serves only to
enlarge the area over which it is being fought. The greater the proliferation of new theatres of war, the less the activity in each of them. We now have six: the White Sea, the Baltic, the Danube, the Crimea, the Caucasus and Armenia. What has been happening throughout this stupendous area can be told in the space of one column.

Of the White Sea, the Anglo-French wisely say nothing at all. Here they have only two practicable military aims: to prevent the coastal and other trade of the Russians in these waters and, if possible, to capture Archangel. The former has been attempted, but only up to a point; this year as well as last the Allied squadrons always arrived too late and sailed away too soon. The second object, the seizure of Archangel, has never been embarked upon. Instead of carrying out this, its real task, the blockading squadron has scattered to carry out slovenly attacks on Russian and Lapp villages and the destruction of what little the needy fishermen possess. The excuse proffered by English correspondents for these ignominious goings-on is the morose irritability of a squadron that feels itself incapable of getting down to serious work! Some defence!

On the Danube nothing is happening. The delta of this river is not even being cleared of the brigands who infest it. Austria holds the key to the door that leads into Russia from this side and seems determined to hang on to it.

In the Caucasus all is quiet. The formidable Circassians, like all barbarian and independent mountain-dwellers, seem to be perfectly content with the withdrawal of the Russian mobile column from their valleys and to have no desire to descend into the plain save on looting forays. They know how to fight only on their own territory and seem, furthermore, far from delighted at the prospect of annexation by Turkey.

In Asia Turkey may be seen as she really is—her army there fully reflects the decayed state of the empire. It was deemed necessary to call on the Frankish giaour for assistance; but the Franks\(^a\) could do nothing there save throw up field-works. All their attempts at making the troops adopt civilised methods of warfare failed utterly. The Russians have invested Kars and are apparently prepared to attack it systematically. It is difficult to see how the town can be relieved, unless Omer Pasha lands at Batum with 20,000 men and attacks the Russians in the flank. It is incomprehensible, and by no means a feather in the Russians' cap,

---

\(^a\) A name frequently applied to West Europeans in the Middle East.—Ed.
that they should have acted so cautiously and hesitantly in the face of such an ill-disciplined adversary, when they had 20,000-30,000 good troops at their disposal. Whatever successes they may score in this theatre of war, the most they can achieve is the capture of Kars and Erzerum, for a march on Constantinople through Asia Minor is quite out of the question. For the time being, therefore, the war in Asia is of no more than local interest and, since it is hardly possible, given the inaccuracy of existing maps, to express from afar an accurate tactical and strategical opinion, we shall not pursue the matter further. There remain the two principal theatres of war, the Crimea and the Baltic.

[Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 387, August 21, 1855]

London, August 18. In the Crimea the siege drags on lethargically.\(^a\) The French and British were at work throughout the whole month of July on the new approaches to the Redan and the Malakhov and, though we were repeatedly given to understand that they had moved "quite close" to the Russians, we now learn that on August 4 the head of the sap was no closer than 115 metres to the Russian main ditch, and perhaps not even as close as that. It is certainly satisfactory to see Hotspur Pélissier\(^b\) brought down to the acknowledgement that his "system of assault" has failed, and that regular siege works must pave the way for his columns; but for all that, to leave 200,000 men quiet in their tents to wait for the completion of these trenches, and to die in the

\(^a\) Instead of this sentence the New-York Daily Tribune has: "Our files of English, French and German journals, received yesterday morning by the mail of the Canada, shed no additional light on the battle of August 16, on the Chernaya, where Liprandi was repulsed by the Allied forces and a number of Russian prisoners taken. With regard to this affair, we must wait for the next steamer before we can receive any satisfactory details. It is rather suspicious, however, that so little was known about it at Paris and London previous to the sailing of the Canada. Had it been really as decisive as the English journals represent, something more than the very incomplete statements now in our possession would naturally have been made public.

"It appears that the assault on the Malakoff, which was expected to have taken place on the 15th, had to be postponed, and that the preliminary bombardment did not commence till the 17th. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that the siege works are not in so forward a state as the journals of Paris and London have reported." — Ed.

\(^b\) Pélissier is ironically compared to Sir Henry Percy (1364-1403) called Hotspur, the eldest son of the first earl of Northumberland, as portrayed in Shakespeare's Henry IV, Part 1.— Ed.
meantime of cholera and fever, is singular management. If—as the Paris papers maintain—the Chernaya cannot be crossed in view of the impregnable Russian position on the far side, something useful might at least be achieved by a sea-borne expedition to Eupatoria and an attempt to force the Russians on this side into the open field and to find out their real strength and the state of their resources. As matters now stand the Turkish, Sardinian and half the French and British armies have been reduced to the role of passive onlookers. Hence a large part of them could be used for diversions. But the only diversions we have heard of are those created every evening at Astley's Amphitheatre, in Surrey Gardens and Cremorne Gardens where, amidst a storm of applause from the patriotic cockneys, a the Russians suffer frightful defeats.

The Russians must by now have received all their reinforcements and will be at maximum strength during the period that lies immediately ahead. The British are sending out a few more regiments, the French have despatched 10,000-15,000 men with more to follow and all in all 50,000-60,000 fresh troops are to be added to the allied forces in the Crimea. On top of that the French Government has registered or bought a large number of river steamers (variously put at between 50 and 100), all of which are to be used for an expedition in the Black Sea. Whether they are intended for the Sea of Azov or the entry to the Dnieper and the Bug, where Ochakov, Kinburn, Kherson and Nikolayev would constitute objects of attack, remains to be seen. We mentioned on a previous occasion that some bloody affrays might be expected towards the middle of August, for at that time the Russians, after receiving reinforcements, would again seize the initiative. Under General Liprandi they have in fact carried out a sortie directed against the French and Sardinians on the Chernaya and been beaten off with heavy loss. Allied losses have not been stated and must therefore have been very considerable. Something more than telegraphic reports will be needed if this affair is to be discussed in greater detail.

---

a Marx uses the English word.—Ed.
b See this volume, pp. 363-64.—Ed.
c Instead of this paragraph and the greater part of the preceding one, beginning with the words “If—as the Paris papers maintain—the Chernaya cannot be crossed”, the New-York Daily Tribune has: “It must be confessed that from first to last, this has been a war of incapacities on both sides. Todtleben is the only man in either camp who has shown a spark of genius.”—Ed.
Finally, in the Baltic, "a great blow has been struck"a! Vide the English press. Bombardment of Sweaborgb! Destruction of Sweaborg! Earthworks and all other installations lie in ruins! Sweaborg has actually ceased to exist! Glorious triumph for the Allies! The Navy is in an indescribable state of enthusiasm! And now let us consider the facts as they are. The Allied fleets, six liners, four or five large frigates (blockshipsc), and about thirty mortar-vessels and gunboats, crossed over from the Revel to Sweaborg on August 7. On the 8th they took up their positions. The vessels of light draft passed through the shoals and rocks west of the fortress, where no large ship can pass, and apparently drew up at long range from the islands on which Sweaborg is situated. The large vessels remained outside, and as far as we can judge out of range of the forts. Then the gunboats and mortar-vessels opened fire. No direct firing appears to have been attempted. It was all shelling from mortars or shell guns at the highest elevation practicable. The bombardment lasted forty-five hours. As to the amount of damage inflicted it is not possible to estimate without detailed accounts from both parties. The arsenal and various magazines of powder (apparently small ones) were destroyed. The "town" of Sweaborg (so far as we know, only a few houses inhabited by people connected with the fleet or the works) was burnt. As to the fortifications themselves, the damage done to them cannot but be insignificant, for the fleets, as both Admirals state, had not a man killed, only a few wounded, and no loss whatever in matérield. No better proof could be given that they kept out of harm's way. In that case they might bombard, but could not act by direct fire, by which alone fortifications can be destroyed. Dundas, who is far more honest and collected in his report than the French Admiral, according to the Moniteur's rendering of the text which may have been coloured in Paris, avers that the damage inflicted was confined to the three islands (out of the seven constituting Sweaborg) which are situated west of the main entrance to the bay of Helsingfors. An attack on the

---

a The words in quotation marks are given both in German and in English in the original.—Ed.
b Instead of the preceding part of this paragraph the New-York Daily Tribune has: "With regard to the attack on Sweaborg, we are also still without full official reports or newspaper correspondence. The facts, however, appear on a careful examination of all the information at hand to be as follows."—Ed.
c Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
d The reference is to the report of Admiral Dundas, which was published in The Times, No. 22134, August 16, 1855, and that of the French Admiral Penaud, published in Le Moniteur universel, No. 227, August 15, 1855.—Ed.
main entrance does not even seem to have been attempted. It seems that the large vessels looked on and did nothing, and the decisive act in such an attack—the landing of troops to possess themselves of the works and destroy them—was entirely out of the question. Thus the damage inflicted falls upon stores and storehouses exclusively—that is, upon matters easily replaced; and if the Russians avail themselves of their time and means, Sweaborg may in three weeks be in as good a condition as ever. Militarily speaking, it has not suffered at all; the material results of the whole affair are hardly worth its cost; and it seems to have been undertaken merely because the Baltic fleet must do something before it comes home for the season, partly because Palmerston wanted to conclude the parliamentary session with a firework. Unfortunately the event occurred 24 hours too late for this purpose. Such was the glorious destruction of Sweaborg by the Allied fleets. We shall revert to the matter as soon as detailed reports are to hand.¹

Written on August 17 and 18, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, Nos. 385 and 387, August 20 and 21, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

An abridged English version of the second part of the article was published as a leading article in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4483, September 1, 1855, and reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1072, September 4, 1855

¹ The end of this paragraph from the words “partly because Palmerston wanted...” is omitted in the *New-York Daily Tribune.*—*Ed.*
London, August 22. The reports of Admirals Penaud and Dundas⁴ confirm the assessment which we have made of the "glorious destruction of Sweaborg, the Gibraltar of the North" (Times terminology). Thus we read today in one of the London newspapers:

"The great bombardment of Sweaborg was such that one can only say that it has perhaps inflicted considerable damage on the enemy owing to the spread of fire. We do not, however, seem to have gained much by it. The success was neither brilliant nor substantial. As much remains undone in the Baltic as before."⁵

Of course The Times, needing fair weather and good tidings during the Queen's trip to France,³⁴⁶ having painted nothing but couleur de rose for the last few days and pretending to be suffering from a fit of optimism— The Times stubbornly insists on dreaming of the destruction of the "town" of Sweaborg.

As far as the Chernaya affair³⁴⁷ is concerned, further reports, above all, are required for its proper evaluation. For everything depends on how far the battle was centred on the narrow passes of the Chernaya and to what extent the depth of the water made the river a real obstacle. If the battle took place in front of the French lines without such an obstacle then this would cast great discredit on the Russians. If, on the other hand, it was a case of forcing narrow passes which could not be circumvented, this would explain the large Russian losses, and both sides may have

---

⁴ The report of Penaud was published in Le Moniteur universel, No. 230, August 18, 1855, and that of Dundas in The Times, No. 22138, August 21, 1855.— Ed.

⁵ In a report from Paris of August 15 published in The Times, No. 22135, August 17, 1855.— Ed.
acquitted themselves honourably. But in any case it is not clear why the Russians failed to attempt a detour through the Baidar Valley. It is, however, certain that if the allies do not voluntarily move out, the Russians have now proved their inability to expel them from the plateau and the Chernaya line. And so the old dilemma has cropped up again.

The storming of Malakhov may be expected any day now. If it fails, the Allies are in a difficult position. If it succeeds, which is after all possible, though only with tremendous losses, this still does not mean that the south side is lost, unless evacuation should be necessary due to lack of provisions. But at any rate the Allies would have achieved the prospect of driving out the Russians before winter. The reports about the state of health of the English army in the Crimea are contradictory. According to one account every month 1,000 English soldiers in the trenches become unfit for duty. It is certain that out of a single regiment, the 10th Hussars, with a force of 676 men, 161 are sick. Dr. Sutherland, head of the health commission despatched to the Crimea by the government, writes in a letter to Lord Shaftesbury inter alia:

“Week ending July 7. Strength of the British army 41,593, total deaths 150, deaths from cholera 71, deaths from fever 17, deaths from diarrhoea 19, deaths from dysentery 2. Week ending July 14. Strength of the army 42,513, total deaths 123, deaths from cholera 55, deaths from fever 18, deaths from diarrhoea 10, deaths from dysentery 5. The deaths from wounds for these two weeks were 44 and 30, making a total of 74.”

The ratio of deaths due to disease to deaths due to injuries during the first two weeks of July is thus almost 4:1. Dr. Sutherland makes the following contrast between the Army’s state of health last winter and this summer:

“The winter mortality was a far different thing from the summer mortality. Hardly any of the causes—namely, bad food, want of rest, overwork, want of clothing and shelter, and exposure to the elements, which caused scorbutsis over the whole army—exist now. [...] All the cases then were scorbatic, and hence the awful mortality in the hospitals at Scutari; it was exactly like the Irish famine fever” (1847): “now we have [...] fever and cholera, the intensity of which in our camp has been, no doubt, most materially lessened by the great care bestowed on the men.”

The besieged army’s state of health is at present indisputably worse than that of the besiegers. Dr. Sutherland’s letter can, however, by no means command full confidence since, as a recent

---

a The letter was printed in The Times, No. 22139, August 22, 1855.—Ed.
incident has shown, criticism within the English camp is punished. Approximately six weeks ago The Times published an anonymous letter denouncing the unforgivable treatment of the wounded after the bloody carnage of June 18. The War Office demanded the name of the correspondent from The Times. The demand was rejected, unless Mr. Frederick Peel expressly promised that the correspondent would not suffer any reprisals because of his revelations. Peel would not accept this condition but denounced the refusal of The Times in Parliament. Mr. Bakewell (assistant surgeon), the author of the letter in question, had in the meantime been sent on sick-leave to Scutari. This occurred in the middle of July. The authorities in the camp discovered somehow or other that he had written the letter. Behind his back, and during his absence, a court of inquiry was set up consisting of superior medical officials, for the most part personally compromised by Bakewell's letter. This court condemned him, without giving him the chance to defend himself or submit evidence to substantiate his charges. On August 3 his dismissal was announced in the general ordre du jour of the army. One should gauge the credibility of the official or semi-official English reports on the state of health of the army, care of the injured, etc., with this incident in mind.

Written on August 22, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 395, August 25, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

[a] [R. H. Bakewell.] "The Wounded before Sebastopol. To the Editor of The Times", The Times, No. 22098, July 5, 1855.—Ed.
[b] Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
[c] The Times, No. 22139, August 22, 1855.—Ed.
London, August 24. Today's newspapers have published a letter from Sir Charles Napier, in which our view of the Sweaborg affair is substantially confirmed. We give the following excerpt from it.

"It will be seen by what I have written and by Admiral Dundas's despatch, had my plan been followed up to the letter, Sweaborg would have been annihilated. It appears that the allies had only 43 gun and mortar boats, and many mortars have been disabled; they ought at least to have had 100—Sir James Graham in a letter to me" (1854) "said 200. Had that number been there the bombardment would have been continued by means of reliefs, as men are relieved in the trenches. The mortars would have had time to cool, and the bombardment continued till not one stone was left on another, and an opening made for the ships to go in and finish the work. Instead of that, the Admiralty do not seem to have foreseen that mortars could not stand for ever, though they must have had reports from Sebastopol; and thus an operation which appears to have been managed with great judgment has only met with partial success, for Admiral Dundas, in his report, admits the sea defences were little injured. [...] Had Admiral Dundas's means been greater he might have continued the bombardment as long as the weather remained fine, and the fleets, instead of returning to Nargen, might have been at anchor in Sweaborg.

"The first year there might have been some excuse for the Admiralty not having means, but none the second. [...] Instead of building gun and mortar boats they built a parcel of iron floating batteries which could hardly swim and, if they could, they would have been useless, for, had they been placed within 400 yards of Sweaborg they would have been annihilated, and at 400 yards they would have done no harm.

"The first experiment on iron cost the country a million, and where are they? The second experiment not much less than half a million, and they have not yet left our ports, and probably never will. This is because incapable men are at the head.

---

a See this volume, pp. 485-87. Napier's letter was published in The Times, No. 22141, August 24, 1855. — Ed.
b Published in The Times, No. 22138, August 21, 1855. — Ed.
c In The Times: "at 800 yards". — Ed.
The Ministers have been driven to reform the War Department—when will they think of reforming the Admiralty? Till they do the people’s money will be thrown away. The Admiralty do not seem to have contemplated the effect of a bombardment, though I told them upwards of a year ago what would happen and if they had read history they would have known that Martinique was taken by mortars; there were not casemates for all the garrison, nor were there at Sweaborg. Admiral Dundas says it formed no part of his plan to attempt a general attack by the ships on the defences, and his operations were confined to such destruction of the fortress and arsenals as could be accomplished by mortars.

"Had Admiral Dundas been furnished with sufficient means he would have contemplated an attack on the defences, and assembled the whole of his fleet, ready to take advantage of the terror and confusion occasioned by the gun and mortar boats. The heat of the conflagration alone would have kept the garrison from the guns, and the fleet would have been in Sweaborg, and the whole of the fortifications, islands, and all blown to the Devil; instead of that, the wooden buildings and magazines are destroyed, and the work will have to be begun again next year."

Napier concludes his letter thus:

"Sir James Graham was one of the Ministers who sent a British army to Sebastopol in the middle of last September, without means of moving, without food, proper tents, or clothing, and without hospitals, to pass a dreary winter and perish; and he was the Minister who wanted me to take a British fleet, in the end of October, to perish among the rocks of Sweaborg, and, to their shame, got two naval officers to put their names to the insulting letter he wrote me; and these men still remain in the Admiralty, and that is the way the navy of this country is managed. The two summers in the Baltic will be a lesson to them. They are in possession of my plans of attacking Kronstadt, and I dare say are in possession of Admiral Dundas’s; and Sir James Graham and his two coadjutors had better go next summer and carry them into execution."

Written on August 24, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.
No. 397, August 27, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time.
We communicate to our readers on another page an account by an Austrian officer of a tour of inspection of the Galician Army recently made by the Emperor Francis Joseph. The writer, in narrating the events of this tour, and in stating the dislocation of the Imperial forces, confirms the opinion we have on former occasions taken care to explain, that in the preparations she last year made for war Austria was by no means engaged in a comedy for the delusion of the Western Powers. Certainly she could never have made such sacrifices merely to throw dust in the eyes of the world.

It is true that the utmost necessity alone induced her to arm against Russia; and indeed, as long as it was possible to procrastinate, Austria clung to the cobweb thread of a prospective peace which Russian diplomacy held out for a bait. At last, however, her patience was exhausted, and St. Petersburg learned with surprise, not unmingled with terror, that the Austrian columns were drawn up along the Galician frontier. This was before the bare possibility of such an armament had been admitted; and to concentrate an army of equal strength on the Russian side, within an equally short time, was altogether out of the question. The arts of diplomacy had therefore again to be resorted to. In what manner, and with what success this was done, need not be repeated. The whole of the immense army lately gathered on the Galician frontiers was dissolved at once, and the apprehensions of Russia in that quarter were partly allayed. We say partly, because two important elements have risen with that
army which are not dissolved along with it. These are the fortifications and railways erected, renewed, or completed, during the stay of the army in Galicia.

While in all other parts of the Empire the Government was guided by the principle of abandoning railway enterprise to private speculators, while the Western Railway, intended to connect Vienna with Munich, was even strikingly neglected, Baron Hess, the commander-in-chief in Galicia, was employing thousands of soldiers in the construction of a line of which however great the strategical value the commercial advantages are questionable, at least for the present—a line, too, which otherwise might have remained in the desks of private engineers for thirty years to come. To Russia nothing could have been more disagreeable than the construction of these railways, by which Austria is now able to reconcentrate the army just dissolved within less than a fifth part of the time required by Russia to bring up a similar army. Whoever will take the pains to inquire into the statistics of Austrian railway enterprise, and compare what has been done in the east to meet purely political views with the little attention paid to the interests of commerce in the west, he cannot fail to disbelieve that these Galician railways were thus hurried into premature existence for the mere deception of the world. Indeed, it is plain that such a purpose would have been much better answered by the speedy completion of the western lines connecting Austria with Bavaria.

Our opinion is also confirmed in a still higher degree by the recent extensive improvements and additions in the fortifications of the eastern provinces of Austria. If railways may or may not be constructed from strategical considerations, the erection and completion of a system of fortifications, and the unproductive outlay occasioned by such works, certainly admit of no explanation beyond the immediate necessities of the case. What we have said about the comparative extent of railway-works in the east and west of Austria applies with much greater force to these fortifications. Of the thirty-six fortresses of the Austrian Empire seven belong directly, and nine indirectly, to the eastern line of defense, most of them having only recently been raised to a high perfection—as for instance Cracow, Przemysl and Zaleszcyki. The two former, together with Lemberg, which on account of its situation cannot be made of great strength, command the road to Warsaw; the latter is at the easternmost extremity of Galicia, opposite the important Russian fortress of Chotin. Cracow has been made a fortress of the first order, and all the works of this, as well as of the other
Galician fortifications, have been put in complete readiness for war. It was once the custom in the Austrian army to give the command of fortresses to old worn-out generals, as a sort of honorable retirement; and such places were looked upon as a sort of exile for officers in disgrace at the Court; but we now find in the whole east and north-east really efficient men, generals of merit and distinguished staff-officers in command of fortresses. Cracow is commanded by Field-Marshal Wolter; Przemysl by Major-General Ebner; Zaleszczyki by Major-General Gläser; Carlsburg, in Transylvania, by Field-Marshal Sedlmayer; and Olmütz, on the north-western flank, by General von Böhm. At the same time the state of things in the west is the very reverse—men and things all but ruins tranquilly made over to further decay. How different would be the aspect there if the Western Powers could even pretend to call Austria's policy ambiguous! How the Austrian authorities would hasten to restore Linz with its forty Maximilian towers, now scarcely treated as a fortress—and Salzburg, once a stronghold of the first order! Instead of this, what do we behold?—dead quiet and perfect absence of all military preparations. The very soldiers returning from the East, where they expected to reap their laurels, are invalided as fast as they approach the Bavarian frontier.

These being facts which speak for themselves, there remains only one question to be settled: namely, through whose fault was the policy of Austria baffled and that country saddled with an enormous additional debt, without any immediate advantage either to itself or to its ostensible allies? We know it to be an opinion current at Vienna and reechoed throughout Germany, that Austria shrank back for fear of creating a second adversary in Prussia, and because a war undertaken without the aid of Germany, offered no guaranty of as speedy a termination as the exceptional position of the empire requires. We must however insist upon the contrary view. It is our judgment that if Austria had boldly attacked the Russian army, Prussia and the rest of Germany would have been compelled to follow, more or less slowly and reluctantly, in her track.

Who, then, is to be held responsible for the present Austrian policy?—England, under the guidance of that brilliant boggler and loquacious humbug, Lord Palmerston. To prove this proposition it is necessary to leave the military camp and to enter the diplomatic labyrinth. On the 23d of July Mr. Disraeli asked Lord John Russell the authority for his statement that "one of the principal causes of the expedition to the Crimea was the refusal of
Austria to cross the River Pruth."\textsuperscript{a} Lord John could not recollect—that is he said his "authority was his general recollection." Mr. Disraeli then put the question to Lord Palmerston, who

"would not answer questions like these, picked out piecemeal from a long course of negotiations between her Majesty's Government and the Government of one of the Sovereigns\textsuperscript{b} in alliance to a certain degree with her Majesty. All he could say with regard to himself was, that he had always thought the Crimea was the place where the most effective blow could be struck at the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea; and if there had been no other reason [...] that would, in his mind, be amply sufficient for the expedition." "My opinion," he declared, "was that the expedition to the Crimea was the best step to take."

Thus we learn from Lord Palmerston that the Crimean campaign originated not with Austria, not with Bonaparte, but with himself. On June 26 Lord Lyndhurst, making a fierce onslaught on Austria, stated that

"early in June [1854] she resolved on making a demand upon Russia to evacuate the Principalities. That demand was made in very strong terms, with something like an intimation that if it were not complied with Austria would resort to forcible means to secure this object."

After some historical observations, the learned lord went on to say:

"Did Austria then immediately carry into effect any attack upon Russia? Did she attempt to enter the Principalities?—Far from it. She abstained from doing anything for a period of several weeks, till the moment when the siege of Silistria had been raised and the Russian army was in retreat, and when Russia herself had served a notice that she would within a certain time leave the Principalities and retire behind the Pruth."\textsuperscript{c}

Lord Lyndhurst thus reproaches Austria for saying one thing and doing another. He was followed in the debate by Lord Clarendon, and from him we may get some idea of the genius which transformed the Austria of May and June into the Austria of July and August. He says that

"when Austria entered into those successive engagements with England and France, and when she made those extensive and costly preparations for

\textsuperscript{a} The House of Commons debate (Disraeli's questions and the replies by Russell and Palmerston) was reported in The Times, No. 22114, July 24, 1855. Russell's statement quoted by Disraeli is from the former's speech in the House of Commons on July 19, 1855.—Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} Presumably Francis Joseph.—Ed.

\textsuperscript{c} The House of Lords debate of June 26, 1855 was reported in The Times, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—Ed.
war—when, moreover, she urgently proposed that military commissions should be sent by France and England to the headquarters of Gen. Hess, I have no doubt she intended and expected war. But she also expected that long before the season for military operations began the allied armies would have obtained decisive victories in the Crimea—that they would be free, and would be able to undertake other operations in concert with her own forces. That unfortunately was not the case; and if Austria had at our invitation declared war, she would in all probability have had to wage that war single-handed."

The explanation of Lord John Russell is thus in direct opposition to the statement of Lord Clarendon. Lord John stated that the Crimean expedition sailed because Austria refused to cross the Pruth—that is, to take part against Russia. Lord Clarendon tells us that Austria could not take part against Russia because of the expedition to the Crimea.

Next, we may consult with profit an uncontradicted statement of Lord Ellenborough:

"Before the expedition to the Crimea was dispatched, Austria proposed to communicate with the allied Powers on the subject of future military operations; acting, however, upon preconceived opinions, the Allies sent that expedition, and then Austria at once said that she could not meet the Russians single-handed, and that the expedition to the Crimea rendered it necessary for her to adopt a different course of action. At a subsequent period, just at the commencement of the Conferences at Vienna, when it was of the greatest possible importance that Austria should act with us—at that time, still looking to nothing but the success of your operations in the Crimea, you withdrew from the immediate vicinity of Austria 50,000 good Turkish troops, thus depriving Austria of the only assistance on which she could rely in the event of a military expedition against Russia. It is clear, therefore, my lords, and also from the statements of the noble earl [Clarendon], that it is our ill-advised expedition to the Crimea which has paralyzed the policy of Austria, and which has reduced her to a position of such difficulty as to prevent her at once adopting a course which is essential for her honor, her dignity, and her interest. Before that expedition sailed to the Crimea I ventured to counsel the Government as to what the necessary consequences of it would be. I counseled them as to the effect which that expedition would produce upon the policy of Austria."

The advice of Lord Ellenborough was not heeded. Palmerston sent off the Sevastopol expedition at the very moment when its sailing was best calculated to prevent and avert Austrian hostilities against Russia. It almost looks as if he had meant to render aid to the great enemy of England, and as if he had purposely entrapped Austria into her present ambiguous position in the Principalities, delivered her over to Russian diplomacy, and crowded her still nearer to the brink of that abyss into which she must ultimately sink. In this matter, as in so many others during his long and inglorious career, Palmerston has brilliantly suc-
ceeded, whatever may have been his real purpose, in serving the interest of Russia alone.

Written in the second half of August 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4493, September 13, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 4502, September 14, 1855 as a leading article; the German version of the second half of this article was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 383, August 18, 1855, marked with the sign ×
London, August 28. A single institution of the British army is sufficient to characterise the class the British soldier is recruited from. We refer to the punishment of flogging. Corporal punishment no longer exists in the French, the Prussian or several smaller armies. Even in Austria, where the recruits for the most part are semi-barbarians, its abolition is evidently being striven for; for instance, the punishment of running the gauntlet was recently expunged from the military law of Austria. In England, on the other hand, the "cat-o'-nine-tails" has remained in full operation—an instrument of torture quite on a par with the Russian knout. Whenever a reform of military legislation has been mooted in Parliament all the old plumed hats have waxed passionate on behalf of the "cat", and none more zealously than old Wellington. For these men an unflogged soldier was an incomprehensible creature. In their eyes bravery, discipline and invincibility were the exclusive attributes of men bearing the scars of at least 50 lashes on their backsides like liegemen of old bearing a coat of arms.

The only reform has been the limitation of the number of strokes of the lash to 50. The efficacy of this reform may be judged from the fact that in Aldershot about a week ago a private expired shortly after receiving 30 strokes of the lash. On this occasion the favourite method of soaking the "cat-o'-nine-tails" in urine was employed. The application of urine on raw and bleeding flesh is an infallible recipe for tormenting the patient beyond the bounds of sanity. The nine-tailed cat is not only an instrument of torture, it leaves behind ineradicable scars, it brands

---

Here and below Marx and Engels use the English term.—Ed.
a man for life. Even in the English army such a branding entails a constant oppressive burden of shame. The flogged soldier falls below the level of his comrades! But under the British military code punishment before the enemy consists almost exclusively of flogging, and thus the punishment lauded by its defenders as the only means of maintaining discipline in decisive moments becomes the surest means of destroying discipline, by breaking the moral composure and the point d'honneur of the soldier. This explains two strange facts. Firstly: the great number of British deserters before Sevastopol. During the winter when the British soldiers had to make superhuman efforts in guarding the trenches, those unable to keep awake for 48-60 hours at a stretch were flogged. Just imagine it! Floggings for heroes like the British soldiers, who had proved themselves in the trenches before Sevastopol and in the open before Inkerman! But the articles of war left no choice. Floggings were meted out to the best men in the army if they were overcome by fatigue, and dishonoured as they were they deserted to the Russians. It is impossible to conceive of a better motivated condemnation of this system than is provided by these facts. In no previous war have the troops of any nation deserted to the Russians in any numbers worth mentioning. They knew they would receive worse treatment than in their own national ranks. It was left to the British army to provide the first strong contingent of such deserters, and according to the evidence of the Englishmen themselves it was the “cat-o'-nine-tails” which recruited these deserters to Russia.

The second fact is the difficulty England encounters in all its attempts at forming foreign legions. As early as the anti-Jacobin war, even though the British articles of war nominally apply to the foreign corps, corporal punishment had to be abandoned in fact. At the beginning of this century some heterodox British generals, Sir Robert Wilson among others, published pamphlets criticising the corporal punishment of soldiers. For more than ten years Sir Francis Burdett thundered against the “cat-o'-nine-tails” in Parliament and called the British “a flogged nation”. In the Commons he found energetic seconds in Lord Folkestone and the famous Lord Cochrane (now Admiral Earl of Dundonald). In the press Cobbett conducted a strenuous campaign against the “cat”, atoning for it with two years' imprisonment. At one point, during the last years of war against Napoleon, exasperation in the nation

---

a The English phrase is used in the original and the German translation is given in brackets.—Ed.
and in the army reached such heights that the Duke of York, equally notorious for his bigoted attachment to square-bashing, his bolting from the French and his amours with Madame Clarke, was forced to issue an order of the day in which all officers received notice that were flogging a frequent occurrence in their respective commands it would hinder their promotion.

How then can we explain the fact that the "cat-o'-nine-tails" has victoriously survived all these storms of half-a-century? Very simply. It is the instrument by which the aristocratic character of the British army is preserved, by which all higher positions, starting with ensign, remain secure as the anage of the younger sons of the aristocracy and the gentry. With the disappearance of the "cat-o'-nine-tails" the extraordinary distance between the soldiers and the officers, which splits the army into two virtually separate races, would also disappear. At the same time the army's ranks would be opened to sections of the population higher than those from which they have hitherto been recruited. And that would seal the fate of the old constitution of the British army. It would be revolutionised through and through. The nine-tailed cat is the Cerberus guarding the treasure of the aristocracy.

Written on August 28, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 405, August 31, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
This version is published in English for the first time
Contrary to our expectation the mail of the Africa, which we received late on Wednesday night, failed to bring the report of Prince Gorchakoff concerning the battle of the Chernaya, fought on the 16th ult. However, the French and English accounts which we printed yesterday afford sufficient information for a tolerably correct judgment of the affair.\(^a\) In the French report one is struck by the absence of that tendency to bluster which but too often is innate in a French sabreur, and which was so prominent in Pélissier’s first Bulletins. The old General is now uncommonly clear, business-like, and to the point\(^b\); he even gives the Russians full credit for the bravery they displayed on that occasion; and his report very favorably contrasts with General Simpson’s amusing calculations as to the numbers engaged, by which it would appear that without any great effort some 15,000 French and Sardinians defeated 60,000 Russians. The facts of the case appear to have been as follows:

On the morning of Aug. 16, before daybreak, the Russians descended from the Mackenzie heights and took up a position on

\(^a\) Instead of these two sentences the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune and New-York Weekly Tribune have: “At last we have received the reports of the several commanding Generals in the Crimea concerning the battle of the Chernaya, fought on the 16th ult.”—Ed.

\(^b\) In the Neue Oder-Zeitung of September 3, 1855 the beginning of the article reads as follows: “Although we still have no detailed Russian report on the battle of the Chernaya (fought on August 16), the French and English reports this time allow a fairly accurate judgment of the affair. The defeat of June 18 seems to a certain degree to have held in check the tendency to bluster which was so prominent in Pélissier’s first Bulletins. His report on the Chernaya affair is uncommonly clear, business-like, and to the point.”—Ed.
Chart of the Battle of the Chernaya
(August 16, 1855) made by Engels
The Battle of the Chernaya

The edge of the hills descending toward the Chernaya. They were commanded by Prince Gorchakoff in person, under whom Gen. Read commanded the right wing (7th and 12th divisions), while Liprandi with the 5th division appears to have occupied the center, while the 17th division formed the Russian left. Portions of the 4th and 6th divisions were also present, and seem to have acted as reserves. The 5th division, along with the troops belonging to the 4th and 6th, form part of the second (Paniutin's) corps, which had but just arrived in the Crimea; the remainder were old Crimean troops, and must have figured with effective numbers very much reduced.

The ground on the opposite side of the Chernaya is mostly level, a continuation of the plain of Balaklava toward the river; but close to its banks this plain is interrupted by two groups of hillocks, rising gradually from the Balaklava side, but falling off toward the Chernaya, thus offering a good defensible position against an enemy crossing the river. Between these two groups of hillocks lies the valley into which the British Light Cavalry charged in the battle of Balaklava. The eastern group of hillocks, forming the right wing of the position, was occupied by La Marmora with his two Sardinian divisions; the other, toward the northwest, by three French divisions, which thus formed the center and left of the position. The French were commanded by General d'Herbillon, who had disposed Camou's division to the left, his own in the center, and Faucheux's division to the right, where it joined the Sardinian division of Trotti. The position gained additional strength from the two obstacles in its immediate front: first, the Chernaya, which river at the time was certainly fordable, but still obliged the Russians to cross at certain places only, and with a small front; and secondly, the aqueduct, cut in most places into the rock, and thus offering, even after its passage, a steep wall of scarped rock to be climbed. On the brink of the hills the French and Piedmontese had thrown up some light breast-works just sufficient to shelter their cannon. The two groups of hillocks formed, so to speak, several bastions flanking each other with their artillery. Beyond the Chernaya, which was crossed by bridges at Chorgun, on the Sardinian extreme right, and at an inn (in Russian Traktir) in front of the French center, the Piedmontese had two companies as outposts, while the bridge of Traktir was covered by a slight bridge-head occupied by the French. The French outposts were still beyond this.

On the morning of the 16th the Russians having got their artillery in position on the heights east of the Chernaya, sent their
advanced troops down into the valley. Day had not yet broken and a dense fog facilitated a surprise, as at Inkerman. The allied outposts were driven in in a moment, and by daybreak the bridge-head and the whole eastern side of the river were in their hands, while they were fighting for the passage of the bridges with two French regiments. Then the 7th and 12th Russian divisions, placed exactly opposite the French divisions of Camou and d'Herbillon, descended in two close columns into the valley; and here they formed their columns of attack and advanced in two distinct masses—the 7th division, passing river and aqueduct, partly by fords, partly by flying-bridges constructed in all haste, against Camou; while the 12th division, part of which remained in reserve, advanced against d'Herbillon by the bridge of Traktir, the defenders of which were in an instant thrown back by the overwhelming masses of the Russians. They advanced with greater rapidity and spirit than were ever shown by Russians through the aqueduct and up the hill-side. The 7th Russian division came up nearly to the brink of the hill, when Camou's troops, deployed in line, gave them a volley and charged them in flank and rear with such vehemence that the Russians instantly turned, recrossed the river under a murderous fire, and, if we may believe Pélissier, that 7th division never showed itself again during the battle. In the center, the 12th division succeeded in scaling the heights and driving in several French regiments. The fate of the battle appeared uncertain for a moment, when d'Herbillon ordered a brigade from Faucheux's division to attack the left flank of the Russian columns, and after a short struggle, the Russians were driven down the declivity, followed by the French, who for a moment retook the bridge.

Gorchakoff, however, had prepared a fresh attack. The remainder of the 12th division and the 5th division had descended into the valley, where they sheltered the fugitives who re-formed; and now the whole of the 12th and 5th divisions moved forward for a second charge. They passed by the bridge, and close to the right and left of it, and advanced with great vivacity against the allied center (d'Herbillon's and Faucheux's divisions). But by this time the French had got all their artillery into position; it fired in front against the Russian columns, while the Sardinian artillery took them in flank. In spite of this murderous fire they advanced steadily and rapidly, and again reached the heights. There they found the French collected, deployed in line a little behind the edge of the hill. As soon as the heads of the columns were fairly on the edge, the French gave them a volley, and charged them
with the bayonet in front and flank. The struggle was as short as before. The Russians gave way and fled in disorder across the river, pursued by the musketry and artillery-fire of the Allies. This second defeat of the Russians virtually decided the battle. They had three-fifths of their infantry engaged, and could not hope to see any fresh reenforcements arrive on the field; the Allies, too, had three divisions out of five engaged, but fresh troops were hurrying to support them from the camp before Sevastopol. Pélissier had sent for two more divisions of the line and one of the Guards, and they were coming up. It was now about 8 o'clock in the morning.

Gorchakoff, in spite of these odds, resolved upon another attack. The 17th division now had to come forward and to form a nucleus for such part of the beaten troops as were still fit to be brought against the enemy. The line of attack was again shifted to the left; it was Faucheux's division upon which the Russians fell this time. But in vain. The cross-fire of the French and Sardinian artillery decimated them before they could reach the summit of the hills, and again the French lines broke their columns and drove them back to the other side of the river, while the Piedmontese (Trotti's division) took them in flank and completed the victory. There remained but the troops of the 4th and 6th divisions intact, amounting to the effective strength of about one division. To launch these would have served no purpose whatever. The defeat was unmistakable; and accordingly the Russians, bringing forward their artillery, commenced the retreat. Their own position was so strong that Pélissier deemed an attack upon it out of the question; and therefore they were molested by the artillery and rifles only. The loss of the Russians in this affair was enormous in comparison with that of the Allies. The former lost about 5,000 in killed, wounded and prisoners; the latter about 1,500 only. The reason of this was, that the Russians had to make all their charges under the most effective fire of the allied artillery, especially the Piedmontese, whose 16-pounders, though slow to move, are of the highest effect when once in position.

The Russian attack was here made exclusively in front. To turn the French left by Inkerman, appeared impossible from the command exercised by the French batteries on the spur of the

---

\*\* Instead of the last two sentences the Neue Oder-Zeitung of September 4, 1855, where the end of this article is published, has: "Yesterday we described the mere progress of the battle of the Chernaya. For an accurate assessment of the number of troops engaged on both sides we shall have to wait for the Russian reports." — Ed.\*
ridge opposite that place. To turn the Allies by their right would have necessitated that the main body of the Russians should descend into the valley of Baidar, where the ground is evidently too intricate for such clumsy troops. Thus the front attack was chosen, and very properly a surprise attempted. The surprise partially succeeded, but was not carried out with the necessary energy. When the Russians were once masters of the passages of the Chernaya, they should have pushed forward their masses just as they happened to be at hand, in order to follow up their advantage before the French could recover from the first blow. Instead of that, they allowed their opponents the time necessary to bring their troops and artillery into position, and the effect of the surprise which might have brought into their hands the heights occupied by the French ceased almost as soon as the Russians had reached the Chernaya. This is another proof of the difficulty of moving Russian troops under circumstances where they should be expected to act rapidly and where inferior commanders must use their own judgment.

The French have always been notorious for a certain contempt of outpost duty. Even in their best estate an active enemy could any night surprise their outposts and alarm their camps without any great risk. On this occasion they showed that even the slowly-moving Russians might do it. Their main position was so close on the Chernaya that their advanced troops should have been either pushed much further forward, or, if the ground did not allow this, that they should have been reenforced so strongly as to be able to hold out until the camp could be got under arms. As it was, the French were encamped without any proportionate advanced guard, and in consequence the Russians were able to advance on their main position before they had time to bring their full powers of resistance into play. More active opponents than the Russians would have brought forward superior numbers so rapidly that the heights occupied by the French must have been carried before any regular and systematic resistance could have been made. But the Russians themselves were afraid of risking a

---

a This sentence does not occur in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*.—*Ed.*

b Instead of the passage beginning with the words “On this occasion they showed...” the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: “That omission was all the more striking this time as Pélissier had repeatedly been informed of the plans of the Russians, even on the eve of the battle, by Russian deserters. As it was, the French were encamped on the hills without any proportionate advanced guard, so that the enemy could have advanced before they had had time to bring their full powers of resistance into play. This could have decided the outcome had the French been confronted by an active opponent.”—*Ed.*
division or two of their troops in twilight-fighting, and thus they lost every advantage the surprise had gained for them.

The decisive and easily-bought successes of the French in repelling the Russian columns when they had already scaled the heights, were due to a system of tactics hitherto not often followed by them. They have evidently learnt this mode of fighting from the English, who are masters in it. In defending a range of hills, the great advantage consists in concealing your troops just behind the crest, where they are fully sheltered, deploying them in line, and awaiting the appearance of the hostile columns. As soon as the heads of the columns appear on the crest, your line pours a volley into them, to which but a few muskets can reply, and then you rush upon them, in front and flank, with the bayonet. The English fought thus at Busaco, Pampeluna, Waterloo, and other battles, with constant success. Yet the continental troops of Europe appear to have lost all trace of this all but infallible mode of defending a range of heights. In the manuals of tactics it figured, but in practice it had almost disappeared before the universal predilection for columns covered by skirmishers. The French deserve great credit for having adopted from their old opponents this plain and effective maneuver. Had they been disposed in columns there is little doubt the Russians would have had greater advantages over them and perhaps even carried the day. But as it was, the fire of a deployed line of infantry, acting upon an enemy disorganized by a telling artillery fire and the fatigue of mounting a steep hill, proved overwhelming; and a hearty advance with the bayonet was quite sufficient to hurl back the masses that had already spent their spirits before the glittering steel was close upon them.3

This is the third pitched battle of this war, fought in the open field, and like Alma and Inkerman, it is distinguished by its comparatively short duration. In Napoleon's wars a great deal of preliminary skirmishing characterized a battle; each party sought to feel the enemy before engaging him on decisive points and with decisive masses; and it was after each party had engaged the greater number of its troops only that the decisive blow was attempted. Here we see, on the contrary, no time lost, no fencing to tire out the enemy; the blow is struck at once, and upon the result of one or two attacks the fate of the battle depends. This looks a great deal braver than Napoleon's mode of fighting; yet, if

---

3 The concluding part of this paragraph beginning with the words "but in practice it had almost disappeared" does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
a superiority of two to one, as the Allies possessed on the Alma, or if the known clumsiness of the Russians in maneuvering may seem to justify such straightforward action, the fact is that it shows in both parties a great want of generalship; and whenever the sabreurs who act upon this principle happen to be opposed to a general who properly understands how to occupy their troops, how to lay snares for them and invite them to run into them, they will very soon find themselves in a very unenviable position.

Finally, we repeat what we have often said; bravery in the soldiers and mediocrity in the generals are the chief characteristics, on both sides, of the present war.\(^a\)

Written about August 31, 1855

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4494, September 14, 1855, reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1076, September 18, 1855 and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 732, September 22, 1855 as a leading article; the German version was published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, Nos. 409 and 411, September 3 and 4, 1855, marked with the sign \(\times\)

\(^a\) Instead of the last two paragraphs the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* has: “The battle of the Chernaya is the third ‘great’ battle of the Crimean campaign alongside the battles of the Alma and Inkerman. Characteristic of all these battles is their extraordinary simplicity, we would almost say primitiveness. No long manoeuvring, several strong blows, rapid decision. In Napoleon’s battles we find, on the contrary, a great deal of skirmishing, all sorts of manoeuvres, and the decisive blow dealt unexpectedly only after the greater part of the troops has temporarily been engaged. The Crimean mode of procedure looks braver but in fact only shows the mediocrity of the generals on both sides and bears out our view that in modern times the art of war has been developing in reverse proportion to war material. If the battle of the Chernaya by no means provides as strong evidence of the Russians’ inability as the battle of Inkerman, it undoubtedly proves anew the superiority of the Western armies. It shows to those prophets who on the pretext of having discovered a ‘new’ element in history are merely giving modern colour and shape to their school recollections of the decline of the Roman Empire that the substitutes for the Goths should be looked for not among the Muscovites but elsewhere.

“In *The Morning Advertiser* Sir Charles Napier is publishing his correspondence with Sir James Graham, something he has threatened to do for a long time.”—*Ed.*
Karl Marx

ANOTHER BRITISH REVELATION

With the single exception of the posthumous papers of Sir A. Burnes, published by his father in order to clear his memory from the false imputation, cast upon him by Lord Palmerston, of having initiated the infamous and unfortunate Afghan war, and proving to evidence that the so-called dispatches of Sir A. Burnes, as laid before Parliament by Lord Palmerston, were not only mutilated to the entire perversion of their original sense, but actually falsified and interpolated with passages forged for the express purpose of misleading public opinion — with this single exception, there has, perhaps, never appeared a series of documents more damaging to the reputation of the British Government and of the caste which enjoys a hereditary tenure of office in that country, than the correspondence between Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Napier, just published by the old Admiral with a view to vindicate his own character.

In this controversy Sir James Graham possesses one great advantage over his adversary — no revelation whatever is likely to lower his character in the world's judgment. The man who loudly boasted of having been an accomplice in the murder of the Bandieras; who stands convicted of having regularly opened, and tampered with, private letters at the London Post-Office for the mere benefit of the Holy Alliance; who spaniel-like licked the hands of the Emperor Nicholas, when he landed on the English shore; who even exaggerated the atrocious cruelty of the new English Poor Laws by his peculiar method of administering them;

\[a\] The Times, Nos. 22149, 22150, 22152 and 22154, September 3, 4, 6 and 8, 1855.— Ed.
and who, but a few months ago, vainly attempted in a full House to throw upon Mr. Layard the odium of the injuries he had himself inflicted upon poor Captain Christie—a such a man may be fairly considered character-proof. There is something mysterious in his public career. Possessed neither of the uncommon talents which allow Lord Palmerston to belong to no party, nor of the hereditary party influence which enables Lord John Russell to dispense with uncommon talents, he has nevertheless succeeded in acting a prominent part among British statesmen. The clue to this riddle is to be found, not in the annals of the history of the world, but in the annals of Punch. In that instructive periodical there occurs, year after year, a picture drawn from the life, and adorned with the laconic inscription: "Sir Robert Peel’s Dirty Boy.” Sir Robert Peel was an honest man, though no great man; but above all, he was a British statesman, a party leader, forced by the very exigencies of his position to do much dirty work, which he was rather averse to doing. Thus, Sir James proved a true godsend to him, and thus Sir James happened to become an inevitable man, and a great man too.

Sir Charles Napier belongs to a family alike distinguished by their gifts and their eccentricities. The Napiers, amid the present tame race of men, impress one with the notion of some primitive tribe, enabled by their natural genius to acquire the arts of civilization; but not to bow before its conventionalities, to respect its etiquette, or to submit to its discipline. If the Napiers have always done good service to the English people, they have always quarreled with and revolted against their government. If they possess the value of Homeric heroes, they are also somewhat given to their swaggering mood. There was the late General Sir Charles Napier—undoubtedly the most ingenious soldier England has possessed since the times of Marlborough, but not more noted for his conquest of Scinde than for his quarrels with the East India Company, which were prolonged beyond the grave on the part of his family. There is General Sir W. Napier, the first writer in the military literature of England, but not less famous for his eternal feuds with the British War-Office—whose regard for the narrow prejudices of his countrymen is so small that, at first, his celebrated history of the Peninsular War was unanimously denounced by the British reviews as “the best French account ever given of that War.” There is also the antagonist of Sir James

---

*a This refers to Graham's speech in the House of Commons on May 18, 1855. The Times, No. 22058, May 19, 1855.—Ed.
Graham, old Admiral Napier, who made his renown by unmaking the orders of his superiors. As for this last burly scion of the Napiers, Sir James fancied he had wrapped him in boa-constrictor folds, but they finally prove to be mere conventional cobwebs.

Sir James Graham, as First Lord of the Admiralty, deprived Sir Charles Napier, on his return to England, of his command; in the House of Commons he pointed to him as the responsible author of the Baltic failure, in proof of which he quoted some passages from his private letters; he accused him of having shrunk from the execution of the bold orders he had received from the Admiralty Board; he expressed a hope that no other Lord of the Admiralty would at any future time be inconsiderate enough to hoist Sir Charles Napier's flag; and he ridiculed him in the papers at his disposal as “Fighting Charley,” who, like the mythological King of France, “marched up the hill with twenty thousand men, and then marched down again.” Sir Charles, to use his own words,

“demanded inquiry on his conduct, which was refused; he appealed to the Cabinet, but received no reply, and finally to the House of Commons. The papers were refused, under the plea that it would be injurious to her Majesty's service.”

After the bombardment of Sweaborg that plea was of course at an end.

Sir James thought his game the more sure, as he had taken the precaution of marking all his letters “private” which were likely to expose himself and to vindicate his intended victim. As to the meaning of that sacramental word “private,” Sir James himself, when giving his evidence before the Sevastopol Committee, stated that a British First Lord of the Admiralty is wont to mark public instructions “private” whenever he has good reason to withhold them not only from the public, but even from Parliament.

With a man like Sir James, who thinks himself entitled to turn private letters into public ones, it is quite natural to convert public documents into private property. But this time he reckoned without his host. Sir Charles Napier, by boldly breaking through the shackles of “private instructions,” is perhaps exposed to the chance of being struck from the British Navy list, and has probably disabled himself from ever again hoisting his flag; but, at

---

a Graham’s speech in the House of Commons on March 8, 1855. The Times, No. 21997, March 9, 1855.—Ed.

b "Sir Charles Napier on the Bombardment of Sweaborg. To the Editor of The Times", The Times, No. 22141, August 24, 1855.—Ed.

c “State of the Army before Sebastopol”, The Times, No. 22054, May 15, 1855.—Ed.
the same time, he has not only barred the entrance of the Admiralty Board to Sir James, but also shown to the English people that their navy is as rotten as their army. When the Crimean campaign stripped from the British army its time-honored reputation, the defenders of the ancient régime pleaded not guilty on the plausible ground that England had never pretended to be a first-rate military power. However, they will not dare to assert that Great Britain has laid no claim to be the first naval power of the world. Such is the redeeming feature of war; it puts a nation to the test. As exposure to the atmosphere reduces all mummies to instant dissolution, so war passes supreme judgment upon social organizations that have outlived their vitality.

This correspondence between Sir James Graham and Admiral Napier, extending from the 24th of February to the 6th of November, 1854, and denied a place in full in our columns only from its great length, may be summed up very briefly. Up to the end of August, when the Baltic season, as is generally known, has reached its close, all went very smoothly—although Sir Charles Napier, on the very outset of the expedition, had told Sir James his opinion that

"the means which the Admiralty had provided for fitting out and manning the North Sea fleet [...] were insufficient for the occasion and unequal to an encounter with the Russians on fair terms."

During all this time Sir James in his letters does nothing but smile upon his "Dear Sir Charles." On March 12 he "congratulates" him on the "order" in which the fleet had left the English shores; on April 5 he is "satisfied with his movements;" on April 10 he is "entirely satisfied with his proceedings;" on June 20 he calls him "a consummate Commander-in-Chief;" on July 4 he is "sure that whatever man can do will be done by Sir Charles;" on August 22 he "congratulates him sincerely on the success of his operations before Bomarsund;" and on August 25, seized with a sort of poetical rapture, he breaks forth:

"I am more than satisfied with your proceedings; I am delighted with the prudence and sound judgment you have evinced."

During the whole time Sir James feels only anxious lest Sir Charles,

"in the eager desire to achieve a great exploit and to satisfy the wild wishes of an impatient multitude, should yield to some rash impulse, and fail in the discharge of one of the noblest of duties—which is the moral courage to do what you know to be right, at the risk of being accused of having done wrong."
As early as May 1, 1854, he tells Sir Charles:

"I believe both Sweaborg and Kronstadt to be all but impregnable from the sea—Sweaborg more especially—and none but a very large army could operate by land efficiently in the presence of such a force as Russia could readily concentrate for the immediate approaches to her capital."

If Sir Charles tells him on June 12 that

"the only successful manner of attacking Sweaborg that he could see after the most mature consideration, assisted by Admiral Chads [...] was by fitting out a great number of gun-boats [...]" —

Sir James answers him on July 11:

"With 50,000 troops and 200 gun-boats you might still do something great and decisive before the end of September."

But hardly had the Winter set in, the French army and navy sailed away, and the heavy equinoxial gales begun to furrow the Baltic waves—hardly had Sir Charles reported

"that our ships have already been parting their cables; the Dragon was reduced to one anchor, and the Impérieuse and Basilisk lost one each the other night; and the Magicienne was obliged to anchor in a fog, and when she weighed in the night from off Narren found herself obliged to anchor off Renskar Lighthouse, having drifted among the rocks; and that the Euryalus had been ashore on the rocks, and that it was a mercy she was not lost" —

when Sir James all at once discovered that "war is not conducted without risks and dangers," and Sweaborg, therefore, must be taken without a single soldier or a single gun or mortar-boat! Indeed, we can only repeat with the old Admiral: "Had the Emperor of Russia been First Lord of the Admiralty he would have written just such letters."

At the Admiralty Board, as is clearly shown by this correspondence, anarchy reigned as supreme as at the War-Office. Sir James approved of Napier's movement inside the Belt, while the Board disapproved of it. In August, Sir James writes him to prepare for an early retreat from the Baltic, while the Board sends dispatches in a contrary sense. Sir James takes one view of Gen. Niel's report, and the Board an opposite one. But the most interesting point presented by the correspondence is, perhaps, the new light it throws upon the Anglo-French Alliance. The French admiral showed Sir Charles his orders of recall on the 30th of August. The

---

*a* "Sir Charles Napier on the Bombardment of Sweaborg. To the Editor of The Times", The Times, No. 22141, August 24, 1855.—*Ed.*

*b* A. F. Parseval-Deschênes.—*Ed.*
French army sailed on the 4th of September, and the rest of the French fleet left on the 19th; while Sir James Graham informs Sir Charles that he only knew of their withdrawal on the 25th September. Sir James, therefore, erroneously supposed "the decisions to have been taken on the spot, with Napier's consent," but, as he emphatically adds: "without any reference to the English Government." On the other hand, it seems that Niel, the French General of Engineers, and Louis Bonaparte's intimate friend, gave the advice to "destroy Sweaborg in two hours, by sail-of-the-line." This would seem to show clearly that he intended goading the English fleet into a desperate attack, in which they would uselessly knock their heads on the forts and sunken rocks of the Russian defenses.

Written about September 8, 1855
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4502, September 24, 1855 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
After a year of varying fortunes and terrible suffering, the Crimean campaign has at last reached its turning-point. From the 1st inst. to the 8th the Russian telegraphic dispatches admit that considerable damage had been done to the lines of Sevastopol by the allied fire, and that the damage had been repaired "as much as possible," and no more. Finally, on the 8th about noon the Allies stormed four of the bastions—were defeated at one, carried two, but were again compelled to leave them, though they finally maintained themselves in the fourth, and what was most important, on the Malakoff Hill. The loss of this point forced the Russians on the 9th to march their troops from the southern to the northern side, and thus to abandon the town of Sevastopol, after having exploded their magazines, blown up the buildings, ruined the defensive works by springing mines under them, and converted, to use Gen. Pélissier's words, the whole place into an immense blazing furnace; they also burnt their steamers, sunk their last ships-of-war, and finally broke up the bridge near Fort Paul.

\[a\] In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the article begins as follows: "London, September 11. At 9 o'clock last night the guns of James's Park and the Tower announced the fall of the southern side of Sevastopol. At the Lyceum, Haymarket and Adelphi theatres the managers at last had the satisfaction of soliciting the hurrahs, the 'God save the Queen' and the 'Partant pour la Syrie' on the strength of official dispatches rather than, as hitherto, of false rumours.

"The Crimean campaign has at last reached its turning-point."—Ed.

\[b\] A. Pélissier, "Crimée, 9 septembre, huit heures du soir", Le Moniteur universel, No. 254, September 11, 1855.—Ed.

\[c\] Instead of the last sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "the loss of which forced the Russians to lay waste to and abandon the southern side".—Ed.
The arrival of considerable reinforcements after the battle of the Chernaya, must have relieved the allied Generals from any apprehension on the score of the Russian army at Inkerman; for, though even the remainder of the 4th and 6th Russian divisions, beside the two divisions of grenadiers, had joined that army, the Allies were now in a position to oppose successfully any number of men the Russians could throw across the Chernaya; while enough of allied troops would remain to carry on the siege, and even to attempt an assault. It must be confessed that the French Government has now been exceedingly prompt in sending to the Crimea a number of troops fully adequate to the Russian reinforcements already there, or on the march from Poland and Volhynia; for the number of the French forces dispatched to the East since the beginning of July, must amount to at least 50,000.

Under these circumstances, the English and French advanced mortar batteries being in good working condition, the trenches were pushed up to the ditch, under the protection of a vigorous fire. How near the advanced trenches were established, and whether a complete crowning of the glacis, *secundum artem*, was accomplished, we do not yet know. The firing more and more assumed the character of a regular bombardment and vertical fire was successfully made use of to render the place untenable for large bodies of troops, till finally the assault was ordered.

On the Mamelon, the Russians had last Spring constructed a number of fireproof and shellproof compartments with the aid of traverses and blindages. These contrivances gave capital protection against the enemy's fire, but when the assault was made, it was found that no room had been left for concentrating a sufficient number of troops for the defense of the work. Compartment after compartment, defended by a few men only, was carried by the French, and at once formed a ready-made lodgement for them. The same mistake appears to have been made in the completion of the defenses of the Malakoff. The thing was overdone, and when the French once got hold of the commanding point of the hill, the Russian works themselves must have afforded them protection against the Russian fire.

The Redan (Bastion No. 3) and the Redan of the Careening Bay (Bastion No. 1 of the Russians) being situated on more level ground, did not admit of the terraced batteries and complicated defenses applicable to the Malakoff. Here, therefore, a simple coupure appears to have been made in the interior of the bastion,

---

a According to the rules of art.—Ed.
cutting off the salient angle and exposing its interior to an overwhelming fire. The troops for its defense could thus be placed further to the rear, and the interior of the work protected by sallies from the coupure. In consequence of this arrangement, which was of the kind generally adopted in such cases, the English lines and the French columns ordered to the assault of these positions could indeed penetrate beyond the all but abandoned outer wall; but when there, face to face with the coupure, they were crushed by its grape and musketry, and had to give up the assault.

As soon as the Malakoff was carried, Gen. de Salles, on the French left attack, made an attempt to establish himself in the Central bastion (No. 5, between the Flagstaff and Quarantine bastions). He was repulsed. We are not informed whether this assault was undertaken on his own responsibility or whether it formed part of the original plan. Nor do we know how far the proximity of the French trenches to the bastion justified such a detached and hazardous attempt.

The fact of the Malakoff hill being taken, at once formed the turning point of the struggle. From all the preceding events of this remarkable siege, it was to be anticipated that the French, if properly alive to their business, were not in the remotest danger of being driven out of their new position. The Malakoff completely commands the Karabelnaya and the eastern slope of the hill on which the town of Sevastopol was built. Taking in the rear the sea forts on the southern side of the harbor, it made the whole of the inner harbor and the greater part of the outer harbor untenable to the Russian ships of war. By the fall of the Malakoff the continuity of the defensive lines of Sevastopol became interrupted at that very point upon which the security of the whole was dependant. The possession of the Malakoff, therefore, meant the possession of Karabelnaya, the destruction of the town by bombardment, the taking in flank and rear of the Flagstaff bastion, and the disappearance of the last chance of the town's holding out. Sevastopol had hitherto been a fortified camp for a large army, as indeed are all modern fortresses. By the capture of the Malakoff it had sunk to the rank of a mere bridge-head to the Russian garrison of the north side, and more than this, of a bridge-head without a bridge. It was therefore wise to abandon it. It is true we had heard a good deal of new works constructed on the inner slope of the Malakoff, with a view to maintain the

---

a In the Neue Oder-Zeitung this sentence does not occur.—Ed.
defense of the Karabelnaya, after the loss of that fortification; but they do not seem to have been of value enough to induce Prince Gorchakoff to continue the defense. However, we shall now soon know what was their real nature.\footnote{The passage beginning with the words “It was therefore wise to abandon it” does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.}

Some Russian ships had already been burned in the harbor by shells from the allied batteries. The Malakoff once armed with French guns would have made it difficult for the remaining Russian vessels to find a safe anchorage, except just at the foot of Forts Nicholas and Alexander, and there is not room for a great many; hence the burning and sinking of the remainder of the fleet.

The Karabelnaya side being completely in the hands of the Allies, they are in a position to undertake operations in the field. Though they will not be able to establish many batteries or many troops in that suburb, on account of the fire from the northern shore of the harbor, they have succeeded in reducing the Russian portion of Sevastopol to less than one-half its extent before the 8th inst., and to a fortress capable of holding but a limited number of defenders. Not only is the offensive power of the garrison completely crushed, but its defensive strength is greatly reduced. A far smaller number of men will suffice to carry on the siege, and the troops thus set free, with the reinforcements now on the road or at the camp of Maslak, will be available for an expedition to Eupatoria. The more we examine the relative position of both Russians and Allies on the Chernaya, the more evident it becomes that neither party can drive the other away hence without great superiority and enormous sacrifices. The opinion in the allied camp would seem to be that from 60,000 to 70,000 men should be sent to Eupatoria, in order to march upon the communications of the Russians at Sympheropol. Suppose the Russians to have 200,000 men in the Crimea (which they certainly have not), 80,000 men would be required for the defense of the North Forts, 60,000 for the position on the Chernaya, and 60,000 to meet the allied army of Eupatoria. In the present spirit of the allied forces, it is certain that with equal numbers and in an equally divided field, they will beat the Russians; and as by taking up a position on the Russian line of communications they can force them to give battle, there does not seem to be any risk in such an undertaking. On the contrary, it is probable that the Russians would be able to oppose this expeditionary army with but 60,000 men at the very outside.
The sooner, however, such a movement is undertaken the better for the Allies, and if they act vigorously they may expect great results. They now have both moral and numerical superiority, and we doubt not they will profit by it before another winter on the plateau has reduced their numbers and damped their spirits. Indeed the latest report is that by the 13th 25,000 men had already sailed for Eupatoria, and we shall doubtless hear of a still greater force following.

Of these important events we have as yet only the meagre information conveyed by telegraphic dispatches. When more complete details reach us we shall return to the subject again.¹

Written about September 11, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4506, September 28, 1855 and the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1079, September 28, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 734, October 6, 1855 as a leading article; the German version was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 429, September 14, 1855, marked with the sign ×

¹ Instead of the passage beginning with the words "Suppose the Russians to have 200,000 men" the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "This would force the Russians to fight a battle in the open field in which, under the present circumstances, success would seem to be guaranteed to the Allies. But everything depends on the latter's taking advantage of the present situation with dispatch and energy." — Ed.
London, September 11. Yesterday afternoon the funeral of O'Connor, the late Chartist leader, took place. A procession of 20,000 people, practically all of them from the working class, moved from Finsbury Square and Smithfield to Notting Hill, from where the coffin was taken to Kensal Green Cemetery (one of the most magnificent burial-grounds in London).

Four-horse hearse, decorated with enormous plumes in the English fashion, took their place at the head of the procession. Hard on their heels followed flag-bearers and standard-bearers. In letters of white the black flags bore the inscription “He lived and died for us”. A gigantic red flag magnificently displayed the inscription “Alliance des peuples”. A red liberty cap was swaying at the top of the main standard. When the service in the beautiful, cloistered cemetery chapel was over, William Jones made a funeral oration at the grave of the deceased. The singing of a hymn concluded the ceremony. All the requirements for a great demonstration were at hand, but the finishing touch was missing because Ernest Jones was prevented from appearing and speaking by the fatal illness of his wife. As the procession moved back into the city at about half past five in the afternoon it had the ironic satisfaction of meeting five detachments of constables marching out, and greeted them each in turn with a “too late”. Since O'Connor died as a pauper in the true sense of the word, the burial expenses were met by the working class of London.
Beyond an imperfect list of the British officers killed and wounded, the journals brought by the steamer America—and we have examined them with care—add scarcely anything to our previous knowledge of the circumstances attending the capture of the southern side of Sevastopol. It is true that there is a plenty of speculation as to both the causes and the consequences of Gorchakoff's sudden abandonment of a place so long and so desperately defended; and among such speculations those of our correspondents at London and Paris are eminently worthy of attention. But there are some points of view and some considerations which neither of these writers, opposite as are their views, seems to have dwelt upon with the necessary care, or to have given the due amount of importance.

Precisely what turn matters now will take in the Crimea depends to a great extent on the causes which induced the Russians to give up the south side. That purely tactical and strategical motives were completely foreign to this sudden resolution, is evident. Had Gorchakoff considered the south side, and even the Karabelnaya, untenable as soon as the Malakoff should have fallen, he would not have thrown up so many internal defenses in that suburb. Though the ultimate success of the siege might be considered assured by the taking of that commanding point, yet from four to six weeks breathing time might have been gained by a stubborn defense, first of the inner rocks of the suburb, and then of the town proper. To judge from the best maps, plans and models,
there was no necessity whatever in a mere tactical or strategical light to abandon so hastily what had been fended with such tenacity. Military science alone cannot account for a step which can yet scarcely be attributed to the confusion and fright caused by an unexpected and decisive defeat. Necessities of a different nature must have been active to force Gorchakoff to a step which compromises his military position and career so seriously as this.

There are two possibilities only. Either the *morale* of the Russian soldiers was so completely broken up that it would have been impossible to rally them in anything like order behind the inner lines of defense, so as to continue the struggle, or else they had begun to run short of provisions, not only within Sevastopol but in the camp without. The all but uninterrupted series of defeats to which the Russian army had been exposed, from Oltenitza and Chetatea to the Chernaya, and the assault of Sept. 8, must certainly have completely destroyed the spirit of the defenders of Sevastopol; and all the more, as they consisted principally of the same troops who were beaten on the Danube and later at Inkerman. The Russians have rather dull moral feelings, and can stand defeats longer than most troops; but no army in the world can hold together forever when it is beaten by every enemy it meets, and when to a long list of defeats it can oppose nothing except the negative satisfaction of its tenacious and lengthened resistance, and a solitary example of successful, active defense, like that of the 18th June. But such a resistance in a besieged place is of itself demoralizing in the long run. It implies hardships, want of rest, sickness, and the presence, not of that acute danger which braces, but of that chronic danger which must ultimately relax the mind. The rapidly succeeding defeats on the Chernaya and at the Malakoff must have completed the demoralization, and it is more than likely that Gorchakoff's troops in the town were no longer fit to be led against the enemy. And as the Malakoff commanded the bridge to the other side, and the French guns might any day have destroyed it, relief became impossible, while retreat might at least save the troops. It is not astonishing that this demoralization should at last seize the garrison; it is astonishing that it had not done so long before.

There are also some very strong symptoms that want of provisions for the army generally had a great deal to do with Prince Gorchakoff's sudden retreat. The interruption of Russian navigation in the Sea of Azoff, though it had not that immediate effect which the British and French Press, then so much in want
of some success, expected it to have, must nevertheless in the long
run prove troublesome to the Russians, as it confined them to one
single line of operations, and thereby limited their supplies. The
immense difficulty of transporting victualing stores, ammunition
and forage from Kherson through a thinly-populated steppe
country must have been greatly increased when this road became
the only one by which the army could be provided. The means of
transport, brought together by requisition from the Ukraine and
Don Provinces, must finally have been used up; horses and
draft-oxen must have been sacrificed in great numbers, both by
overwork and scantiness of provender; and the nearest provinces
once being exhausted, it became more and more difficult to
replace the necessary stock. This shortness of supplies would show
itself at first, not so much in Sevastopol (where reserve stores must
have been kept up for the event of the place being invested on the
north side too), as in the camp above Inkerman, at Bakshiserai,
and on the line of march of the reenforcements. The reports of
the allied commanders had more than once adverted to this being
the case; but other circumstances too indicate that such must have
been the fact. By this impossibility of feeding even the troops now
in the Crimea, we can alone explain why the two divisions of
grenadiers so long on the march, and now said to be about
Perekop, were not allowed to advance and to partake in the battle
on the Chernaya, and why, notwithstanding the better half of the
troops advancing to relieve Sevastopol was thus kept back, that
battle was yet ventured, though with a force ridiculously small in
proportion to the task expected from it.

Thus all indications point to this, that both demoralization of
the greater portion of the Russian troops, and want of supplies for
the army in the field, induced Gorchakoff not to stake too much
on delaying, for a few days, the fall of a fortress which had
become untenable. He profited by the last chance of saving
the garrison, and he would seem to have done right; for accor-
ding to all appearances he would have had to leave it to its
fate, to collect his field-army, and to retire into the interior of
the Crimea, if not to Perekop. In this case, the garrison of the
south side would soon have been compelled either to cross steal-
uthily to the north side or to capitulate; and the north side, too,
once cut off from all chance of ever being relieved, and gar-
risoned by demoralized troops, would have been starved into
submission.

So long as the Russians had a chance not only of keeping their
army in the Crimea up to something like a force equaling that of
the Allies but were even expecting reenforcements which would make it far outnumber its opponents, the north side of Sevastopol was a position of immense importance.  

To hold the north side by a garrison while the field army stood where it did up to the latest news we have received, was to bring the allied army on the plateau of the Heracleatic Chersonese. It was to exclude their ships from Sevastopol Bay, and to deprive them of a proper naval base of operations nearer than the Bosphorus, for neither Kamiesh nor Balaklava can pass for such a thing. So long as the Russians were able to keep the field in the Crimea the north side was as much the key to the whole of the Crimea and to what gives the whole country any military and naval importance as the Malakoff was to the south side. But from the moment the Russians are unable to hold the field, the north side has no longer any great importance. It is a fortified position of a certain strength, but which if regularly besieged by sufficient forces is doomed to fall, for relief there can then be none.

This may seem astonishing after the great importance ascribed, and rightly too, to the north side. And yet it is quite correct. The whole of this war has been, in appearance, a war of fortifications and sieges, and has in the eyes of superficial observers completely annihilated the progress made by Napoleon's rapid maneuver, thus carrying back the art of warfare to the days of the Seven Years' War.  

But in reality nothing is more contrary to fact. Fortresses and groups of fortresses have no other importance now-a-days than as the fixed points on which an army in the field supports itself in its movements. Thus the camp at Kalafat was a bridge-head allowing Omer Pasha to menace the Russians in flank; thus Silistria, Rustchuk, Varna, Shumla, were the four salient angles, so to say, of a large fortified camp into which he could always retreat, and where he could not be followed unless two at least of those salient angles were taken or neutralized. Thus Sevastopol formed the pivot of the Russian army in the Crimea, and whenever that army was outnumbered or otherwise checked, Sevastopol allowed it breathing time until fresh reenforcements had come up. To the Allies Sevastopol was a Russian naval center to be destroyed, a naval base of operations to be gained; to the Russians it was the possession of the Crimea, because it was the only position to be held against far superior numbers until relieved. Thus the ultimate decision always rested with the armies in the field, and the importance of fortresses depended, not on their natural or artificial strength or intrinsic value, but on the protection and support (appui) they could give to the field army.
Their value has become relative. They are no longer independent factors in the game of war, but merely valuable positions which it may or may not be expedient to defend by every means and to the last extremity. This the Sevastopol affair proves more than any previous occurrence. Sevastopol, like all really modern fortresses, takes the place of a permanently-fortified camp. As long as the disposable force is sufficient to defend that camp, as long as supplies are plentiful, the communications with the main base of operations secure, especially as long as that camp held by a strong army prevents the enemy from going past it without exposing his own safety—so long that camp is of first-rate importance and may baffle the enemy for a whole campaign. But if such is no longer the case; if the defending force suffers check after check, runs short of provisions, risks having its communications cut off and being reduced to the fate of the Austrians at Ulm in 1805 367—then it is high time to prefer the safety of the army to the abstract value of the position and to retreat at once to another place offering greater advantages.

This seems to be now the situation of the Russians. The greater part of their original active army—fourteen divisions out of twenty-four—is engaged, and has been partly destroyed in the Crimea, and what they have of reserves and militia, or other new formations, can stand no comparison with the troops they have lost. They will certainly do well not to send any more men to that dangerous peninsula, and indeed to abandon it as soon as they can. The Allies are far superior to them in numbers and especially in spirit. With Gorchakoff's present army to risk a battle in the field would be to solicit defeat. He may be turned either by the south coast and the valley of the Salghir, or by Eupatoria. Either operation would force him to give up his communication with the north side, never to regain it, for the numerical superiority of the Allies is increasing every day. It would seem that the best he can do is to make as bold a front as possible, while he prepares everything for blowing up the northern forts, and to steal a march or two on his opponents. The sooner he gets to Perekop the better. This is especially the case if the report we have from Paris be true that the Allies began sending an army to Eupatoria immediately after getting possession of Sevastopol. If they act with vigor, either in that direction or along the south coast and the passes of the Chatyr Dagh, the campaign must speedily close, leaving them in possession of the Crimea. So far as we can see the only mistakes now in their power are a serious front attack on the Russian position above Inkerman, or a week's inaction. The next
steamer, due here to-morrow night, can hardly fail to settle the question as to what they mean to do.

Written about September 14, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4508, October 1, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1080, October 2, 1855 as a leading article; an abridged German version was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 435, September 18, 1855, marked with the sign ×

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, September 14. "The ringing of bells and the thunder of cannon" is the slogan of the day in England at the moment. The world seems full of happiness and every building of the slightest importance, public or private, is full of Anglo-French flags. The same scene in Manchester as in London, despite the "Manchester School"; in Edinburgh as in Manchester, despite the Scottish philosophy. At the moment, nothing is able to dampen the general enthusiasm, not even the extraordinary list of fatalities flashed to London by the telegraph. The defeat of the British before the Redan bastion and the capture of the decisive point, fort Malakhov, by the French—this contrast alone muffles the clamour of victory and sets some bounds to the boastfulness. Anyone sharing the old prejudice—one owed like so many others to the uncritical confusion of modern and ancient conditions of society—the prejudice that industry and commerce destroy the martial character of a people may now inform himself of the contrary in England, and even in Manchester, its industrial metropolis. It is a very simple matter. In modern society the wealth of a nation, though not the wealth of the individual, increases with increased labour; in ancient society it increased with the increased laziness of the nation. Steuart, the Scottish economist, who published his important work ten years before Adam Smith, had already discovered and developed this point.\(^3\)

---

\(^3\) The reference is to Sir James Steuart's *An Inquiry into the Principles of Political Economy*, published in London in 1767 (the point in question is discussed in Volume I, Book I, Chapter VII) and Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, published in London in 1776.—*Ed.*
But public enthusiasm is vainly seeking nourishment in the latest telegraphic despatches. They are as meagre as the first was rich. Pélissier writes that a "matériel immense" has fallen into the hands of the Allies at Sevastopol.\(^3\) We suspect—a heap of old iron whose price is bound to fall.

The turn that will be taken by events now depends mainly on the motives which induced the Russians to abandon the South Side so suddenly. This much is clear. Purely tactical and strategic reasons played no part in this decision. If Gorchakov had considered the surrender of Karabelnaya and the town to be inseparable from the fall of fort Malakhov, then why the huge mass of defence works within the suburb? In spite of the commanding position of the Malakhov 5-6 weeks could have been won by a stubborn defence, first of the inner defence works of the suburb and then of the town itself. Judging from the best maps, plans and models there are no purely strategic or tactical reasons for the sudden surrender of what has so far been held so tenaciously. There remain only two feasible explanations: the moral self-confidence of the Russian army was broken to a point which made it inadvisable to take a new stand behind the inner defence works of the town. Or the lack of provisions was beginning to make itself felt, not only in the town but also in the camp, or, finally, both these reasons.

The almost unbroken series of defeats suffered by the Russian army from Oltenitza and Chetatea to the battle on the Chernaya and the assault of September 8 can only have had a demoralising effect on the besieged troops, all the more so as a great number of them had witnessed the defeats on the Danube and at Inkerman.\(^369\) Certainly, the Russians possess an obtuse sense of morale and as a result they can endure defeats better than other troops. However, even this is bound to have its limits. Resistance stretched over an unusually long period of time in a besieged location has in itself a demoralising effect. It comprises suffering, exertion, lack of rest, disease and the constant presence, not of acute danger, which steels, but of that chronic danger which breaks men down. The defeat on the Chernaya, where half the reserve army was engaged, precisely those reinforcements which were to rescue the South Side, and the seizure of the Malakhov, the key to the whole position, these two defeats must have consummated the demoralisation. Since the Malakhov commanded the bridge to the

---

\(^3\) Pélissier’s report of September 10, 1855, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 256, September 13, 1855.—Ed.
other side and the French could destroy it at any moment, all access became problematic and retreat became the last resort of the troops. As for the lack of provisions, there are signs that it was beginning to make itself felt. The interruption of Russian shipping in the Sea of Azov restricted the Russians to a single line of operations and thus shortened their supplies. The enormous difficulty of transporting food, munitions, etc., over a thinly-populated steppe naturally grew as soon as the road from Kherson alone remained open. The means of transport requisitioned and collected from the Ukraine and the Don provinces had to become used up sooner or later, and for the adjacent provinces, since they were exhausted, it became more and more difficult to replace them. This lack of supplies must first of all have revealed itself, not in Sevastopol, where great stocks were heaped up, but in the camp at Inkerman, at Bakhchisarai and along the reinforcements' line of march. This is the only possible explanation why the two infantry divisions which have been on the march for so long and are now said to be at Perekop, did not advance and take part in the battle on the Chernaya, and also, on the other hand, why in spite of the absence of this, the better, half of the replacement troops the battle was risked with a fighting force which was entirely disproportionate to its task. If these points of view are correct then Gorchakov had indeed no alternative but to use the capture of fort Malakhov as a respectable pretext for saving his garrison.

Written on September 14, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 435, September 18, 1855
Marked with the sign X

The English version was published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4508, October 1, 1855, and reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1080, October 2, 1855 as a leading article

Printed according to the Neue Oder-Zeitung
Published in English for the first time
London, September 24. Public opinion at the moment is occupied almost as much with the commercial and financial situation, not only in Great Britain but especially in France, as with the war in the Crimea. As we know, the Bank of France has raised its discount on government bonds and similar securities to 5 per cent, while it discounts commercial bills of exchange at 4 per cent. The directors of the French bank, worried by the flow of precious metal from its vaults, had already decided to increase the discount for commercial bills of exchange to 5 per cent as well when the Minister of Finance\(^a\) intervened directly and forbade them to carry out this operation. The concern of the government is naturally to maintain the appearance of an easy money market and overflowing credit for as long as possible and to keep the shopkeeping world in a good mood.

The *Manchester Examiner* has stated that

"The drain during the last two years on the wealth of France has been enormous. [...] But, in two years, the Government of Louis Napoleon has spent £200,000,000—the municipality of Paris has lavished vast sums of borrowed money on the adornment of his capital—projects requiring great wealth have been formed, at the instigation and under the patronage of the Government—the *Crédit Mobilier*\(^{570}\) alone has been the parent of no less than half a dozen great companies, each of which has had its shares puffed up to an enormous premium—the capital of these companies has yet to be paid up, and an immense mass of every sort of share paper is passing from hand to hand without any reference to the reckoning day. The financial state of the Government, the purely speculative character of much of that enterprise, the present position of the French money market, and the burden of another indifferent harvest both on the people and

\(^a\) P. Magne.— *Ed.*
the Bourse, all points to chances of disaster which may prove as embarrassing to the war in the East[^a] as to the internal peace and prosperity of France herself.[^b]

With regard to the grain market the above-quoted newspaper comments in particular:

"There can be no doubt that both France and England will be large importers of grain; and the orders which have already been sent out to the Danube from this country will [...] cause extensive shipments of grain to be made from the United States in place of gold to Europe. Last year’s was the best harvest ever known in this country, and yet we imported, from August, 1854, to August, 1855, 2,335,000 quarters of wheat, and 1,588,892 cwt.s. of flour, and the average price, nevertheless, of the whole year was above 70s. [...] During the coming year [...] we shall require much larger imports [...] to prevent prices rising very considerably. Where supplies are to be obtained if not from North America? [...] The crops in Northern Germany also are a failure, [...] and the United States even are shipping flour to the Baltic, whence we have been accustomed to import no inconsiderable portion of wheat in times of need. Austria, it has been announced by the Government, has average crops, but it is doubtful whether she will have any surplus for export, and throughout Southern Italy a serious scarcity is felt, which cannot, as heretofore, be relieved by imports from the [...] ports in the Black Sea."

Thus in demand for grain France will not only have to compete with England but also with a large part of the European continent. Nothing shows how distasteful this situation is for its Government better than the half consolatory, half didactic article in the Moniteur.[^c]

As for the numerous new joint-stock companies in France which are mentioned by the Manchester Examiner, a work recently published in Paris, Opérations de Bourse[^d], shows that in one branch alone—that of the joint-stock banks—their numbers have increased six-fold in Paris alone since the February Revolution. Before 1848 only two were in existence; now there are twelve of these banks in Paris, namely the Banque de France, the Caisse Commerciale, the Comptoir d’Escompte, a commandite bank under the firm of Lediheur and Co., the Crédit Foncier de France, the Martinique Bank, the Banque de Guadeloupe, the Banque de l’île de la Réunion, the Bank of Algiers, the Crédit mobilier, the Société Générale du crédit maritime, the Caisse et journal des chemins de fer, the Comptoir central,

[^a]: The Manchester Daily Examiner and Times has “our policy in the East”.—Ed.
[^b]: “The condition of the money market...”, Manchester Daily Examiner and Times, No. 193, September 24, 1855.—Ed.
[^c]: The article, dated September 19, was published in Le Moniteur universel, No. 263, September 20, 1855.—Ed.
[^d]: A. Courtois fils; Des opérations de Bourse ou Manuel des fonds publics français et étrangers et des actions et obligations de sociétés françaises et étrangères négociés à Paris, Paris, 1855.—Ed.
the Crédit industriel and the Banque de Sénégal. The paid-up capital of these banks amounts only to 151,230,000 francs and their total bank capital only to 252,480,000 francs, or about £10,000,000, which does not equal the capital of the Bank of England alone.

"...The large superstructure which is built by the credit system on this small foundation", writes the London Economist, a journal which supports the Government, "is anything but satisfactory. Against the capital of the Bank of France, 91,250,000f, are issued notes to the amount of 542,589,300f, or six times the amount. [...] The Crédit mobilier [...] is empowered to issue bonds to ten times the amount of its capital. The Crédit Foncier de France [...] whose nominal capital is 30,000,000f has issued bonds to the amount of 200,000,000f. We may anticipate, therefore, that a panic, or a depreciation of this mass of obligations, would cause in Paris and France very considerable distress...."\(^a\)

Written on September 24, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 453, September 28, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) "Paris Banks", The Economist, No. 630, September 22, 1855.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE STATE OF THE WAR

It is plain from the advices of the last Liverpool steamer that the Czar\textsuperscript{a} has no intention of making peace under the circumstances now existing. His sudden departure for Odessa instead of going to Warsaw, where he had arranged to meet the King of Prussia\textsuperscript{b}; the transfer of the residence of the Empress\textsuperscript{c} from St. Petersburg to Moscow,\textsuperscript{d} the heart and center of Holy Russia; the leaving the administration of affairs in the hands of the Grand Duke Constantine, the most warlike of his brothers; and the taking of the other brothers with him to the seat of war—all this indicates a determination to prosecute the contest to some other end than can now be realized. At the same time extensive preparations are making for the defense of South Russia.\textsuperscript{c} Nikolaieff and Kherson, the two most important fortified points, form the centers for an army of reserve now collecting in the government of Kherson, and that portion of Taurida situated north of Perekop. Beside a number of army reserves (Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth battalions of the line-regiments), whose number it is impossible to fix even approximately, forty thousand men of the militia are reported to be collected at Nikolaieff. About twenty-five thousand men are said to be at Odessa. Whether these rumors are exact or not, the fact of the Emperor’s departure shows that a considerable force must be concentrating there.

\textsuperscript{a} Alexander II.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} Frederick William IV.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{c} Maria Alexandrovna.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{d} In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} the article begins as follows: “The Emperor’s departure from Russia to Odessa; the transfer of the residence of the Empress from St. Petersbourg to Moscow....”—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{e} In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} this sentence does not occur.—\textit{Ed.}
The plan of operations of the Russians seems to be elaborated with the same foresight for which all their grand strategic schemes are generally distinguished. Not only is the complete loss of the Crimea taken into account as a possible event, but even a campaign in South Russia. For this purpose the line of the Dnieper is chosen, very naturally, as the main line of defense; and Kherson and Nikolaieff as the first, and Ekaterinoslav as the ulterior base of operations. Nikolaieff is within reach of an attack by water; therefore, against an enemy in possession of the Black Sea, an inland base is absolutely necessary. Now, Ekaterinoslav is a position of great strategical importance. Situated on the very point where, by a bend in its course, the Dnieper forms an angle of about seventy-five degrees, it is a capital center for an army which, in its retreat toward the interior, intends to cover itself first behind the southern course (N. E. to S. W.) and later on behind the middle course (N. W. to S. E.) of that river. An army advancing from Perekop into the interior of Russia would first have to force the passage of the Dnieper somewhere about Kherson, and then, advancing toward Ekaterinoslav, to pass the same river again at that place. Any detachments advancing on the left bank of the Dnieper could easily be stopped a few leagues south of Ekaterinoslav, on the line of the Voltschya, a river which there empties into the main stream. Beside these advantages, the whole country to the south of Ekaterinoslav is one vast steppe, two hundred miles in width, through which it is extremely difficult to convey and to feed an army; while that town itself, situated on the northern range of the steppe, and in close proximity to the rich and comparatively densely populated provinces of Kieff and Poltava, can receive any amount of provisions without difficulty. And lastly, Ekaterinoslav maintains the communication with the army of the center at Kieff and covers the road to Moscow.

Ekaterinoslav, as we learn from trustworthy sources, is now being fortified and provided with the reserve magazines for the southern army. Stores of food, equipments, ammunition are

---

\textsuperscript{a} Instead of the last two sentences the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: “As Kherson and Nikolayev lie within the range of operation not only of gun-boats but even of sloops of war, an inland base is needed. This is provided by Ekaterinoslav.” — \textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Instead of the text following this sentence the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: “If on the one hand this testifies to the Russians’ strategic foresight—and it is certainly not in vain that the old general and deserter Jomini has schooled them for such a long time—it just as much shows, on the other hand, that they expect no successes for a considerable time to come. If the Allies ventured to advance into Russia’s interior (via
collected there; and if ever the Allies should venture to advance into the interior, they would have to force this point before they could proceed any further. But even under circumstances very unfavorable to the Russians, the chances are that the forces of either party would be at least pretty equally matched at Ekaterinoslav. Such an advance, however, is out of the question in this campaign, and nearly so in that of 1856. Indeed, any movement of the Allies into the interior of Russia would be a blunder, unless the Crimea and all the countries south of the Caucasus, nay, even of the Kuban and Terek, were freed from Russian dominion, all the Russian coasts devastated, Ismail taken, the mouths of the Danube up to Galatz opened to trade, and, in short, everything done which could be attempted against the extremities of Russia on that side. Then even it would be a mistake to advance into the interior of the steppe, until the passive resistance of Russia, successfully maintained, left no other choice. It is evident that the probability of such an event occurring is not very great; but if the Russians are already preparing against it, we have another proof of that comprehensive foresight which has of late distinguished the chief strategical management of their forces, and which is apparently due to the commanding influence of General Jomini.

For the present, the conquest of the Crimea is still the great task...
of the Allies. On that head our latest intelligence\textsuperscript{a} was that they had sent a strong column of infantry and cavalry into the valley of the upper Chernaya, threatening to turn, by Aitodor or the upper Belbek, the Russian extreme right. Gorchakoff had telegraphed, besides, that the Allies were daily concentrating additional troops on the Chernaya. Now, this movement of the Allies toward the Russian right has evidently been made with such a degree of show, the Russians themselves having noticed it at once, that it cannot prelude a serious attempt at turning the Russians on that side. It may serve either to draw away from the camp at Mackenzie's farm a portion of the troops defending that intrenched position, or else to mask a great expedition to Eupatoria. The first supposition hardly seems likely, from the concentration of the allied troops on the Chernaya, noticed at the same time by Gorchakoff; the second supposition is more likely; and though, as we have before stated, a flank movement by the south coast would seem preferable,\textsuperscript{b} such an expedition, suddenly transporting a large force on the flank and rear of the Russians, cannot but be of great effect, and must decide the campaign.

As to the actual position of the Russians in the Crimea we have no clear information. They are doing their best to maintain a bold front, and if the state of their stores allows, it is certainly the best they can do. Still we remain of opinion that they must soon leave the Crimea unless the Allies make great mistakes and they, themselves, receive provisions more plentifully than they have a right to expect. The great object of the Allies is to drive them away from the position of Mackenzie's hights, for that position once lost, the north side of Sevastopol, defended by a small garrison, must be abandoned to its fate, and the Crimea must be evacuated; because between Mackenzie's farm and Sympheropol there is not a single tolerable position which cannot be turned with the greatest ease, and beyond Sympheropol the steppe, being untenable for large armies, offers no positions whatever.

One thing however is certain, namely, that there can be little delay in the decision of this question. The Atlantic, due here to-day, will most probably bring us intelligence of a battle in the field, which, if

\textsuperscript{a} As can be seen from the version published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, the reference is to Pélissier's dispatch of September 11, published in Le Moniteur universel, No. 268, September 25, 1855, and Gorchakov's dispatch of September 17, published in The Times, No. 22169, September 26, 1855.—Ed.

\textsuperscript{b} See this volume, p. 529.—Ed.
The State of the War

unfavorable to the Russians, must be followed by their prompt retreat from the peninsula.

Written on September 26, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4522, October 17, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1085, October 19, 1855 as a leading article; an abridged German version was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 455, September 29, 1855, marked with the sign X

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, September 27. The reports of Generals Simpson, Pélissier and Niel, and especially the despatches from British newspaper correspondents in the Crimea, form a vast and complex documentary material, and it is a time-consuming process to sift it judiciously. For this reason we shall be able to examine the events of September 7 and 8 in detail only in our next report. We may note, however, that the British press is almost unanimous, and rightly so, in its condemnation of General Simpson and the higher English commanders acting under him. The joke making the rounds of the Russian army, that "L'armée anglaise est une armée des lions, commandée par des ânes" (The English army is an army of lions led by asses) has been thoroughly vindicated by the assault on the Redan. A London newspaper is demanding a new Sevastopol committee, forgetting that the miserable leadership of the British army is the inevitable result of rule by an antiquated oligarchy. All preparations miscarried from the very start. The English trenches were still so far (250 yards) from the Redan ditch that the troops had to run the gauntlet of enemy fire without cover for a quarter of an hour and were out of breath when they arrived. French engineers had drawn attention to this defect

---

a Simpson's report of September 9 (The Times, No. 22166, September 22, 1855), Pélissier's of September 11 and 14 and Niel's of September 11 (The Times, No. 22170, September 27, 1855).—Ed.

b The assault on the southern side of Sevastopol was analysed by Engels in the article promised here. There are two versions of this article, one was published in the New-York Daily Tribune (see this volume, pp. 546-52) and another in the Neue Oder-Zeitung (wherever the latter differs from the English version this is pointed out in footnotes to the English text).—Ed.
The Reports of Generals Simpson, Pélissier and Niel

beforehand; however, the answer they received from the English was:

“If we were to advance another couple of yards then we should come to an angle which would expose us to enfilading fire by the Flagstaff bastion and thus great losses.”

In the first place this risk of losses was undeniably smaller than that incurred by the exposure of the troops during the assault. Furthermore the enfilading fire could have been countered partly by traverses and bends in the trenches and partly by setting up counter-batteries. All the remonstrations of the French foundered against Simpson’s thick-skinned obstinacy, however. What is more, whereas the French trenches were broad, spacious and capable not only of absorbing vast military forces but also of concealing them, the British trenches were narrow and so constructed that every Briton with a touch of corpulence immediately attracted the attention of the Russian commanders to himself. The wide stretch of ground the British troops had to run across meant that, instead of directly throwing themselves upon the enemy after reaching the object of their attack, they first of all sought cover and engaged in musket fire, which gave the Russians time to rally. The miserable inadequacy of the British preparations is also revealed by the fact that once their troops had gained control of the rampart, no one thought of spiking the Russian cannon positioned there. They had with them neither workers with the necessary instruments nor artillery troops who could have done the job with no extra instruments. General Simpson’s tactical arrangements before and during the assault take the cake, however. (During the assault, as we learn from the [report] of a Daily News correspondent, Simpson, who suffered from a cold in the head, sat wrapped in a wide cape, in an easy chair in the Greenhill battery.) He had detailed an assault party of 200 men, a covering party of 320 men and a total operational force of not more than 1,000 men against the fearsome Redan, against which the English attacks had broken for six months. When the English had broken through the salient of the Redan they were exposed to murderous fire from the redoubt, which had been transformed into a stronghold, and from the casemates positioned behind it on the flanks. With sufficient numbers they could have by-passed the redoubt, which would have put a speedy end to the battle. No reinforcements arrived on the scene, however, even though Colonel Windham sent for them urgently three times and eventually had to go

---

*The reference is to the Mamelon.—Ed.*
himself to search for them. Thus the troops remained on the parapet for three fatal hours, twice forcing their way inside only to be slaughtered uselessly one by one, and finally had to retreat in great disorder. The inadequate number of troops with which Simpson, disposing of masses which would have sufficed twenty-fold, originally undertook the assault, the holding back of the necessary reserves during the action, the useless and wanton sacrifice of the brave assault troops—all this amounts to one of the greatest scandals known to modern military history. Simpson would inevitably have faced a court martial under the first Napoleon.

On the Continent the evil of *patrimonial jurisdiction* has been attacked, and rightly. However, the *unpaid English magistracy* is nothing but a modernised, constitutionally flavoured version of patrimonial jurisdiction. Read the following literal extract from an English provincial newspaper:

"Last Tuesday" Nathaniel Williams, an elderly labourer, [...] was brought before a bench of magistrates, at Worcester and fined 5s., with 13s. costs, for cutting a small amount of wheat, belonging to himself, on Sunday, the 26th of August. He pleaded that it was a work of necessity—that the wheat would have been spoilt if he had not cut it—that he was employed from morning till night in farm labour. Nothing helped. The magistrates liberally interlarded with Reverends were inexorable".

Just as here the priests judge their own case, so do the factory-owners, the squires and the other privileged estates which compose the unpaid magistracy.

We have taken the following extract from the private letter of an Englishman (a Whig) at present in Paris:

"Today's warlike article (dated September 24) in the *Constitutionnel* seems to have discouraged the Paris bourgeoisie a great deal; and in three different districts, all of great commercial importance, however, I heard the same comments, almost in the same words: There you have it! For almost a year they told us that once Sevastopol were taken it would be possible to open peace negotiations. Now that Sevastopol has been taken we are told that this is a purely military matter and that peace cannot be contemplated before the whole Crimea has fallen. Things will carry on in this way and heaven knows when peace will come. All this is expressed

---

a September 18, 1855.—Ed.
b Marx and Engels use the English word and give the German translation in brackets.—Ed.
c This quotation coincides almost word for word with a passage in a letter to the editor from Worcester, signed "No Bitter Observer" (published in *The Times*, No. 22165, September 21, 1855). The letter was probably also published in a local newspaper.—Ed.
d The English word is used in the original.—Ed.
e Signed by the editor A. de Céséna.—Ed.
in the most dejected manner. To be just, one has to admit that apart from the question of national glory, the present war has come at an inopportune time for France for many reasons. Every week the autumn reports turn out to be worse than was assumed the preceding week. At the moment for instance the price of bread in Rouen is 26 sous the four-pound loaf, which is the same as 3 francs or 60 sous in Paris. In Bordeaux the municipal council has already been forced to approve a large sum for subsidies should the price of a four-pound loaf rise to 1 franc, considered a famine price in the Gironde. This situation is gradually spreading over the whole area of the country. The internal situation in France is thus extremely delicate, the partisans of the revolution are scattered over the country in terrifying numbers, and if the emergency becomes unbearable they may well gather thousands around their banners. The new organisation of the departmental and municipal councils was an enormous blunder. The system has fatal effects. In many departments at this moment no departmental council exists; and the mayors appointed by the Government are now constantly forced to dissolve their municipal councils. Almost every day you can read an official announcement that the mayor of this or that town has dissolved the municipal council; or that Prefect N.N. has dissolved the general council. The reasons are not made public; but, although all comments in public are prohibited, the fact itself nevertheless agitates the department in which it takes place. In many respects this would make the presence of older and more experienced soldiers desirable.”

Written on September 27, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 457, October 1, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

*a Retranslated from the German.— Ed.
The details of the successful general assault at Sevastopol, on the 8th ult., are now fully known to us, through the official reports of the allied commanders, and the correspondence of the European journals, the most important of which have already occupied a place in our paper. Of course these interesting statements have been read quite universally, and it is not necessary that we should recapitulate the facts they contain. What we desire to do is to give our readers a clear idea of the conditions under which the assault took place, and to explain why, on that occasion, the Allies met with such opposite results at different points of the attack.\textsuperscript{a}

According to Gen. Niel,\textsuperscript{b} the French had pushed their trenches at all points quite close to the Russian works. Opposite the Little Redan of the Careening bay (Bastion No. 1), and the Malakoff (Bastion No. 2), the head of the sap was no more than twenty-five yards distant from the Russian ditch. At the Flagstaff (Bastion No. 4), the distance was thirty; at the Central (Bastion No. 5), forty yards. On all these points, therefore, the storming columns were close to the works to be stormed. The English, on the other hand, had given up sapping as soon as they had arrived at 240 yards from the Great Redan (Bastion No. 3).\textsuperscript{c} This was due to the spirit

---

\textsuperscript{a} Instead of this paragraph the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung} has: "Five French divisions and units of two English divisions were engaged on September 8. According to their own admission, the Allies lost 10,000 men out of about 45,000, i.e. almost one man in four. The Russian losses cannot be estimated." — \textit{Ed}.

\textsuperscript{b} General Niel's report of September 11, 1855, published in \textit{The Times}, No. 22170, September 27, 1855.— \textit{Ed}.

\textsuperscript{c} In the \textit{Neue Oder-Zeitung}: "Despite remonstrations by French engineers, the English had given up sapping 240 yards from the Great Redan (Bastion No. 3). The stupidity of this has already been discussed." — \textit{Ed}.
of routine still predominant in the English army. As soon as they had pushed their trenches to that distance, they found that on going any further they would be enfiladed from the Flagstaff bastion, which projects a good deal beyond the other Russian works. Now, there is a general rule in the theory of sieges not to trace any portion of the trenches so that its prolongation will meet any point occupied by the enemy, as this would lay it open to enfilading fire.

This is of course right enough when one can do without such faulty tracing. But here, where this enfilading fire could not be avoided (the general plan of the siege and the nature of the ground precluding the idea of taking the Flagstaff bastion separately beforehand), it was evidently better to make faulty trenches than none at all. The theoretical rules in fact provide plenty of remedies for such an unavoidable evil. Traverses and the compound sorts of sap are prescribed in such a case. The French engineer officers, it seems, remonstrated with their English comrades, telling them that, although they might lose many men in pushing their trenches under such adverse circumstances, yet it was better to lose them now in completing a work which would all but secure the success of an assault, than to lose them during an assault, the result of which might be very doubtful from the want of covered approaches. But the British engineers knew better. The result shows them to have been grossly in the wrong.

The French general distributed his forces as follows: Against the key of the whole position, the Malakoff, M’Mahon’s division; to its right, against the curtain connecting it with Bastion No. 1, the division of La Motterouge; on the extreme right, against Bastion No. 1 itself, Dulac’s division. The Malakoff being the only point which, in case of serious resistance, it was necessary to force at all risks, M’Mahon had for his reserve a division of Guards under Mellinet. So much for the French attack on the Karabelnaya side. On the town-side, the Flagstaff bastion forming a sort of advanced citadel on very strong ground, and having interior works of considerable strength, was not to be immediately attacked in front; but the Central bastion was to be assaulted by Levailant’s division, which, in case of success, was to be followed up by d’Autemarre’s division, ordered to turn the gorge of the Flagstaff

---

*a* This paragraph and part of the preceding one beginning with the words "This was due to the spirit of routine" do not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—*Ed.*

*b* The beginning of this sentence up to and including the words “at all risks” does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—*Ed.*
bastion, to assail which in front, at that moment, Cialdini's Piedmontese brigade was concentrated in the trenches. The position between the Malakoff and the Flagstaff bastion was held by the English. They were to attack the Redan.

The Malakoff was to be assailed first, and after its capture, the remaining columns were to advance on their respective objects of attack. The Malakoff was a large redoubt on the top of the commanding hill of that name, closed on all sides, but having wide apertures to the rear for admitting reinforcements. It was connected by a curtain with the Great and Little Redans to its right and left; they, too, were closed redoubts, containing smaller works, intended for reduits; while the rear faces, the embrasures of which looked into the interior of the redoubts, formed a coupure. The gorges of these coupures were again connected with the Malakoff by a second or interior curtain, forming a second line of defense. The interior of the Great and Little Redans was pretty free from obstructions, and therefore completely commanded by the artillery of the coupures and reduits. But the Malakoff redoubt, on which the fire of the enemy had been concentrated ever since the Mamelon was taken, was crammed, alongside the ramparts, with hollow traverses. affording bomb-proof shelter to the gunners and troops on duty, while the interior was filled with large blockhouses, roofed bomb-proof, serving as barracks, and completely unfit for defense. When first the news of the taking of the Malakoff arrived, we stated that undoubtedly the Russians had committed the same error as in the construction of the Kamtchatka redoubt on the Mamelon, viz.: that in order to save themselves from the enemy's fire, they evidently had made the interior of the fort unfit for defense against an assault, by cutting it up into small compartments. Our opinion is now fully borne out. The labyrinth of the Malakoff, like that of the Mamelon, proved quite indefensible; in ten minutes it was taken, never to be recaptured.

The arrangements of the French for this assault on the Malakoff were admirable. Everything was foreseen and provided for. A new sort of bridges, the description of which is not forthcoming, was used to cross the ditch; they were laid down in less than a minute. No sooner had the assault commenced than the sappers constructed a flying sap from the trenches to the ditch, cut large passages through the Russian breastworks, filled

---

a See this volume, pp. 519-23.—Ed.
b In the Neue Oder-Zeitung: "This view has now been fully borne out by General Niel's report."—Ed.
up the ditch opposite, and formed a practicable road into the interior of the Malakoff redoubt by which supports, reserves and even field-guns could move up. As soon as the whole of the redoubt was taken, the passages in the gorge were rapidly closed, embrasures cut, field-guns brought up, and in a couple of hours, before the Russians could seriously attempt to reconquer the work, it was completely turned against them, and they came too late. Gunners were ready to spike the guns if necessary, and the detachments of infantry carried short-handled trenching-tools in their waist-belts.

This attack was under the immediate superintendence of Marshal Pélissier and Gen. Niel. Whether the other attacks were equally well organized we are not told; but they were generally unsuccessful, and that of the Central bastion especially. This assault seems to have been undertaken by Gen. de Salles with quite insufficient forces, for as soon as the French arrived at the Russian parapet they were compelled to seek shelter behind it; the assault degenerated into a skirmishing fire, and was necessarily repulsed. What this means Gen. Simpson has taken good care to show us in his assault on the Redan. The attack on the Little Redan was most bloody, and the position well defended by the Russians, who here alone defeated five French brigades.

We have on former occasions noticed the absurd system prevalent in the British army, of forming their storming columns so weak that they can but count as forlorn hopes in case they meet with anything like serious resistance. That blunder was conspicuous in Lord Raglan’s plan of attack on the 18th of June; and it seems Gen. Simpson was determined even to outdo his late chief. The salient angle of the Redan had suffered from the English fire, and it was determined to direct the assault against this portion as soon as the Malakoff should be fully secured by the French. Accordingly, Gen. Simpson had storming parties told off from the second and light divisions, amounting, all in all, to about 1,800

---

a This sentence does not occur in the Neue Oder-Zeitung.—Ed.
b See this volume, pp. 313-19 and 328-32.—Ed.
c Instead of this sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “That method of procedure stems from the fact that most of the fortresses the English had to deal with, including Wellington in Spain, were built according to the Italo-Spanish system and therefore could seldom accommodate more than 500 men. Everything is traditional with the English and so is their method of assault, even though the conditions for it disappeared long ago. Thus Lord Raglan emulated the old Wellington method on June 18, we know with what success. Instead of drawing a lesson from his misfortune Simpson deemed it his duty not only to emulate Raglan but even to outdo him.”—Ed.
men—or the half of two brigades! The other two brigades of these divisions were to act as supports, and the third and fourth divisions were to form the reserves; and beside these, the Guards and Highland divisions were on the spot—altogether a force of 25,000 men; and out of these the actual assault was confided to about 1,800, supported later on by about 2,000 more! Now, these 1,800 men, unlike the French, who could jump out of their trenches into the Russian ditch, had to perform a journey of 250 yards across open ground, exposed to the flanking fire from the curtains of the Redan. They fell in heaps, but they advanced, passed the ditch by escalade, penetrated into the salient angle, and here they found themselves at once opposed to a tremendous fire of grape and musketry from the coupure and réduits in the rear of the Redan. The consequence was that they dispersed, seeking shelter behind the traverses, and commenced firing on the Russians exactly as the French did at the Central bastion. This would not have done any harm, had the supports and reserves only advanced and followed up, in close attack, the advantages already gained. But hardly a man came, and those who came, came in driblets and irregularly. Three times Brigadier Windham, who commanded, sent officers to ask for the advance of troops in regular formation, but none were brought. All the three officers were wounded in crossing the plain. At last he went himself, and prevailed upon Gen. Codrington to send another regiment; when all at once the British troops gave way, and abandoned the Redan. The Russian supports had come up, and swept the place clean out. Then Father Simpson, who still had 20,000 men intact, resolved to attempt another assault next morning!

This feeble attack of the English on the Redan stamps their Crimean generals with the indelible mark of incapacity. They appear to have an innate tendency to surpass each other in blundering. Balaklava and Inkerman were great feats in that respect; but the 18th of June and the 8th of September, outstrip them by far. So carelessly was the assault arranged that while the English held the salient of the Redan, not even the guns found in it were spiked, and therefore these very guns plied the English on their retreat as lustily with grape and case-shot as they had done during their advance. As to attempts at forcing a proper lodgment, neither Simpson nor the newspaper correspondents mention any such thing. In fact the first precautions appear to have been neglected.\(^a\)

\(^a\) Instead of the passage beginning with the words “The salient angle of the Redan had suffered from the English fire” (third sentence of the preceding
The attacks on the Redan, Central bastion and Little Redan were, it is true, mere demonstrations to a certain degree. But the attack on the Redan still had an importance of its own. That was a position by which the conquest of the Malakoff became immediately decisive, because if the Malakoff commands the Redan by its height, the Redan commands the access to the Malakoff, and when once taken, would have taken in flank all Russian columns marching to recapture that hill. The conquest of the Malakoff induced the Russians to quit the whole of the south side; the conquest of the Redan would have obliged them to evacuate at least the Karabelnaya in haste, and before they could organize that well-arranged system of destruction by fire and explosion under shelter of which they made good their retreat. The English, then, have actually failed to do what their allies had a right to expect from them, and on a very important point, too. And not only have the generals failed, but the soldiers, too, were not what they had formerly been. Mostly young lads recently arrived in the Crimea, they were too eager to look out for shelter, and to fire instead of attacking with the bayonet. They lacked discipline and order; the different regiments got mixed, the officers lost all control, and thus the machine was out of train in a few minutes. Yet it must be acknowledged that, for all that, they held out in the Redan for nearly two hours in dogged, passive resistance while no support was coming up; but then we are not accustomed to see the British infantry sink down to the level of the Russians, and seek their only glory in passive bravery.

The palm of the day belongs to Generals Bosquet and M'Mahon. Bosquet commanded the whole of the French assault on the right, and M'Mahon had the division which took and held the Malakoff. This was one of those rare days in which the French really out-did the English in the point of bravery. In every other point they had shown their superiority over them long before. Are we, then, to conclude that the English army has degenerated, and that its infantry cannot boast any longer of being, in close order, the first infantry of the world? It would be premature to say so; but certainly, of all men in the world, the British generals in the Crimea are the best fitted to ruin the physical and moral character

paragraph) the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “On September 8, Simpson had 25,000 men on the spot. Out of these he confided the actual assault to 1,800.”—Ed.

a Instead of this sentence the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: “Through the blunders of its general the English army made a full victory impossible.” The rest of this paragraph is omitted.—Ed.
of the army; and on the other hand, the raw material for soldiers which has now been for some time introduced into the ranks, is far inferior to what it used to be. The British people had better look to this; two defeats in three months form a novel feature in British military history.

Of the Russians we can only say that they fought with their accustomed passive bravery, and in the assault made to retake the Malakoff even displayed great active courage. What their tactical arrangements were, we have no means of judging until their report is published. One thing is certain, namely, that the Malakoff was completely taken by surprise. The garrison were enjoying their dinner, and not any portion of them, except the artillery at the guns, appear to have been under arms and ready to meet an attack.

If we now look at what has been done since the taking of the south side, we find from Gorchakoff's reports that 20,000 allied troops (of what nation is not said) have gone to Eupatoria, and that at the same time strong reconnoitering parties are pushed against the Russian left in the valley of Baidar, where the Russian advanced troops were compelled to retire towards Urkost, in the direction of the valley of the upper Chulin, another tributary to the Chernaya. The corps of 30,000 men, now at Eupatoria, are rather weak, and could not venture to any great distance from the place. But others may follow. At all events, field operations have commenced, and another fortnight must decide whether the Russians can hold their ground, or whether they must leave the whole of the Crimea a prey to the Allies.

Written on September 28, 1855

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4519, October 13, 1855, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1084, October 16, 1855 as a leading article: the German version was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 463, October 4, 1855, marked with the sign X

---

a Report of September 11, 1855 in Russky Invalid, No. 211, September 16, 1855.—Ed.

b Instead of the last three paragraphs the Neue Oder-Zeitung has: "The palm of the day belongs to generals Bosquet and Mac-Mahon. Bosquet commanded the whole of the French assault on the right, and Mac-Mahon was in charge of the division that held the Malakhov.—The Russians fought with their usual passive bravery. The Malakhov was obviously taken by surprise. The garrison were having dinner, and only the artillery were at their guns, ready to meet an attack."—Ed.
London, October 2. Considerable surprise has been caused here by a speech of Sir Alexander Malet, the British envoy accredited to the German Federal Diet. For in the speech, which was made at a dinner in Homburg given on the occasion of the capture of Sevastopol, he launched into a strong attack on the King of Prussia and his Ministers. The British envoy said bluntly that the British people were entitled to expect a different policy from Prussia, especially since the majority of the Prussian people had never concealed their sympathies for the Western Powers. Sir Alexander is of the opinion that if Prussia had sided with the Western Powers, Austria would have acted energetically and it would have been impossible for Russia to oppose the Prussian coalition. Prussia is thus, as it were, made directly responsible for the war. As the King of Prussia is a member of the German Confederation, at which Sir Alexander is accredited as British envoy, it is widely believed that this attack will in any case give rise to serious representations. If he is defended by his government, it will be a pointer to Britain's future policy; if the contrary is the case one can certainly expect the recall of the envoy.

Written on October 2, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 465, October 5, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

a An account of it was published in The Times, No. 22172, September 29, 1855.—Ed.
b Frederick William IV.—Ed.
London, October 2. We now have before us the official report on the national revenues for the past year, half-year and quarter (according to Gladstone's innovations the English financial year ends for both expenditure and revenue on September 30). On the one hand it demonstrates the elasticity of English resources, on the other that the probabilities calculus is not the forte of English financiers. With regard to the past financial year the net surplus amounts to £8,344,781, with regard to the past half-year to £2,929,699, and to the past quarter £1,924,124. The significance of these figures is transformed at once if one takes into consideration on the one hand the increase in taxation which has taken place under Gladstone and Lewis and on the other the disproportion between the tax increases as calculated and as realised. This is incontrovertibly revealed as soon as we look into details. In the customs we find an increase of £1,290,787 for the year, of £608,444 for the half-year, and of £364,423 for the quarter. This is due entirely to the new taxes on tea, sugar and coffee. It needs the bourgeois optimism of The Daily News to use this statistical premise to deduce that prosperity within the working classes has increased. As we know, Gladstone suspended the tax reductions on tea and sugar which the House of Commons had decreed at his suggestion in 1854. His successor Lewis added 3 shillings per cwt. on sugar, which according to his estimate was to bring in £1,200,000 in taxes; 3d. per pound of tea, which according to his calculations was to add £750,000 to the customs; and finally 1d. per pound of coffee, which should be equivalent to

---

*The report was published in* The Times, No. 22173, October 1, 1855.—*Ed.*
a financial surplus of £150,000. The total surplus revenue from the customs for the last quarter, however, only amounts to £364,423, that is far less than even half of the additional return expected from the increased tax on sugar alone. From the taxation lists we see that the consumption of coffee has fallen by almost 2 per cent as against 1853. The customs revenue from wine and tobacco has fallen significantly.

In England the excise is regarded as the barometer of the "comforts" of the lower classes of the people enjoy. Here we find a reduction of £266,006 in the best quarter, although Sir George Cornewall Lewis' new tax on distilled liquors was in full operation in Scotland and Ireland. He counted on receiving an increase of £1,000,000 from his additional tax. Instead of this he has lost £266,006 over the quarter. As for the stamp-duty, there is an increase over the year of £100,472 but a loss over the half-year of £48,402 and for the last quarter a loss of £103,344. This is all the more striking when one considers that Gladstone's newly introduced inheritance tax is in full operation. In the postal revenue, which belongs to this category (of stamp revenues), we find a deficit of £206,819 over the year, of £175,976 over the half-year and of £81,243 for the last quarter. The landed property tax shows an increase of £6,484,147 for the year, £2,195,124 for the half-year and £1,993,590 for the quarter. But we must not forget that Gladstone doubled the former rate of taxation and expected this to yield an increase of £6½ million, while Sir George Cornewall Lewis moreover passed a new additional tax of twopence in the pound, from which he anticipated another tax increase of £4,000,000. Thus with regard to the revenue from landed property the increase in revenue has in no way corresponded to the increase in taxation, either.

The swindles and the probable future of the Crédit Foncier and the Crédit mobilier and other Bonapartist creations in banking and in bankruptcy constantly occupy the public here. In this connection one may recall that Émile Péreire and other directors of these institutions were originally Saint Simonists. These gentlemen always expected the salvation of the world from the banks, perhaps also from bankruptcy. In any case they have found their own salvation therein. In so far as one abstracts from the great general ideas of the master, St. Simonism has been realised under Bonaparte in the only form in which it was possible. What more could one want! Péreire is Bonaparte's chief financial humbug and

---

Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
M. Michel Chevalier is one of his editors-in-chief, he is the principal economist of the *Journal des Débats*. *Habent sua fata libelli*. But great ideas too have their "fata".

Written on October 2, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 467, October 6, 1855
Marked with the sign X

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

---

Books have their fate—a saying by the Roman grammarian and poet Terence, from his work *De litteris, syllabis et metris* (*Carmen heroicum*, verse 258).— *Ed.*
London, October 4. The Bank of England has once again raised the rate of interest, from 5 per cent to $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. In the first instance this measure is directed against the Banque de France, which—by way of bills of exchange drawn on London and discounted there—has shipped gold to the value of £4,600,000 from England to France in the course of the last six weeks. The most disturbing rumours are circulating on the stock exchange here concerning the financial state of the Banque de France. According to some of them a suspension of cash payments is imminent, according to others the notes of the Banque de France will receive a guarantee of increase “for additional security”. This latter measure would then infallibly lead to a “run” on the bank and to the immediate depreciation of its paper currency. Finally, it is claimed that the Banque de France will attempt to increase its capital to double the present amount by means of a subscription. However, these rumours may appear as far as their details are concerned, they all indicate that the Banque de France is heading towards a crisis and that this institution, which has always been regarded as unshakeably solid since its foundation during the reign of Napoleon I, has become under Napoleon III just one more of the inverted credit pyramids which must be regarded as the most characteristic monuments of his reign. That section of French society which demanded more than anything else the appearance of abundant credit and of a “prospérité toujours croissante” cannot complain when it is time to pay the price for

---

a Marx uses the English word.— Ed.
b Constantly growing prosperity.— Ed.
this pleasant deception. In any case the financial operations, stock exchange manoeuvres and bank speculations which caused such a tremendous sensation in the last years of Louis Philippe's reign and gave rise to a whole polemical literature of the type of *Juifs rois de l'époque*, *La dynastie Rothschild*, etc., appear as mere child's play when they are compared with what has been achieved in this line from 1852 to the present time.

At this moment there are approximately 6,000 men under orders for shipment to the Crimea, among them 800 artillerymen, 900 cavalrymen and the rest infantry. In addition to these about 4,000 infantrymen are supposed to be despatched from Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands and Piraeus to the theatre of war. These reinforcements—even taking the Foreign Legion into account—are far from sufficient to restore the active English army even to its original strength. This brought the following comment from Bright at a meeting in Rochdale yesterday:

"Were I an advocate of the war I should adopt a quite different policy with regard to our internal military establishment. I should introduce a proper system of conscription, such as exists in Russia, Austria and France, and thus compel people from all classes to play their due part in what is called the task of the nation."0

The appointment of the superannuated lords and earls Combermere, Strafford and Hardinge as field marshals as a reward for General Simpson's defeat before the Redan bastion (he is to be recalled, incidentally) is one of the many poor jokes and frivolous jests with which Palmerston is wont to brighten the evening of his life. The first two generals may fittingly be considered *deceased*, so their promotion has rather the character of a retroactive canonisation. Their earthly career long since finished, they have been raised to military sainthood. Lord Hardinge holds the antediluvian rank of *Commander in Chief* of the English army and has amply earned his field marshal's baton for his determined and indefatigable sycophancy and fawning upon field marshal Prince Albert. What makes the business still more piquant is the circumstance that a victory gained with the French over the Russians is celebrated by the promotion of forgotten officers who

---

a Written by Alphonse Toussenel.— Ed.

b A reference to Georges-Marie Dairnvaell's pamphlets *Grand procès entre Rothschild Ier, Roi des Juifs, et Satan Dernier, Roi des Imposteurs, Histoire édifiante et curieuse de Rothschild I-er, Roi des Juifs...* and *Rothschild I-er, ses valets et son peuple*, all published in Paris in 1846 (the first one anonymously).— Ed.

c Marx gives a free rendering of Bright's speech made on October 3, 1855. Cf. the report published in *The Times*, No. 22177, October 5, 1855.— Ed.
have fought against the French with the Russians. Thus for instance Lord Strafford's merit consists in having led a brigade of Guards at Waterloo, commanded the first army corps in the march on Paris and taken possession of Paris by occupying the heights of Belleville and Montmartre.

Written about October 4, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 469, October 8, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, October 6. The Committee set up at Newcastle-upon-Tyne for the purpose of investigating the "Action of Diplomacy", has just published a very remarkable report. We quote the most important passages from it and for the present we shall merely mention that Mr. Porter, who is a prominent figure in the following documents, was Vice-President of the British Board of Trade and has a place in English literature as the author of The Progress of the Nation.

No. 1. Report of the Committee at Newcastle-upon-Tyne. The committee [...] have to report—1. That Mr. Porter, whilst in office at the Board of Trade, during the administration of Lord Melbourne, and whilst Lord Palmerston was Foreign Minister, formed and expressed the conviction, as the result of his own observation, and of facts within his own knowledge, that Lord Palmerston systematically sacrificed the interests of England to those of Russia, in matters relating to commercial treaties. 2. That Mr. Porter did not conceal this conviction from his official chief, the President of the Board of Trade, Lord Palmerston's colleague; but that, on the contrary, when, in 1840, he was offered a mission to Paris, for the purpose of negotiating a commercial treaty with France, he declined to accept that mission, except on the express condition that he should have no communication to make to the Foreign Office; assigning as a reason for this demand, his conviction that his endeavours to conclude such a treaty would be treacherously thwarted by the chief of that department. 3. That this condition was submitted to; and Mr. Porter, in consequence, [...] undertook the mission to Paris. 4. That whilst in office, under Mr. Gladstone, during Sir R. Peel's administration, Mr. Porter adhered to his former convictions, and in addition charged Lord Palmerston with having received Russian money; alleging that the agent in this transaction was a Jew, by name Jacob James Hart, who formerly kept a gambling-house, in St. James's street, and who was

---

a Here and below Marx uses the English term.—Ed.
b Labouchere.—Ed.
subsequently appointed British Consul at Leipsic, by Lord Palmerston; and that he had ascertained this in consequence of enquiries made by the government, with a view of getting rid of Hart. 5. That, independently of Mr. Porter's evidence, it is an indubitable fact, to be ascertained by any who will take the trouble to enquire, as we have done, that Jacob James Hart did keep a gambling-house, and was appointed by Lord Palmerston to be British Consul at Leipsic, where he was universally shunned as a most disreputable character.

The committee subjoin evidence which they have taken.

Newcastle, September 20th, 1855

We publish the following extracts from that evidence:

No. 2. Mr. Porter heard of the transaction concerning the gambling-house only later, under Sir Robert Peel's Administration.

The circumstances, as related by Mr. Porter to me, are as follows:

There was a Jew, a British Consul at Leipsic, who was considered, both by natives and British merchants, as a most discreditable representative of England, particularly as it was ascertained that he had been the keeper of a gambling-house somewhere about St. James's street. An attempt was made to get him removed, and the matter was brought before Sir R. Peel's government. But that government experienced such fierce and violent opposition from Lord Palmerston, who had made the appointment originally, that they gave way. The secret of Lord Palmerston's adherence to such a disreputable character came then to be inquired into, and it was found that Lord Palmerston, at a time when he was in great pecuniary embarrassment, I think about 1825, was told by Princess Lieven to go to the gambling-house kept by this Jew, where a foreigner was [...] to lose to him £20,000 in two nights.

Mr. Porter spoke of this openly to many persons, amongst others to Mr. Bright.

April 7th, 1855

No. 3. Hart's appointment was made in 1841, when Palmerston was just about to leave the Cabinet. A letter of Palmerston's which expressed regret that at the moment he did not have a more advantageous post for Hart at his disposal was flaunted by Hart before several people in Leipsic.

Worthling, April 28, 1855

No. 4. It would be as impossible for me, as it is unnecessary, to recall all private conversations with Mr. Porter. I shall confine myself to one incident. An important treaty had been concluded with a European state (Naples) under which, if it had been ratified, this country would in an amicable way have obtained considerable commercial advantages. Those in official positions who knew about the Russian action in the Cabinet and opposed it, feared that the treaty would be wrecked, if there remained any pretexts for discussion, formalities or preliminaries. Accordingly to avoid this danger, the treaty was entirely completed and only presented to the Government after having been approved of and signed by Naples. It was received in silence in Britain. No government organ was permitted to welcome this event. The Foreign Office ignored it completely. Those who had brought about the treaty induced a Member of Parliament to ask whether Naples had given its approval to such a treaty. Palmerston replied that this was a complete misunderstanding, no such treaty existed, there existed merely a few
rough notes for a treaty. I recollect that Porter, after referring to this reply of the Minister, opened a depository of public documents in my presence, laid hold of one, handed it to me and exclaimed, "Here is the treaty". It is probably still where it was. This treaty had been negotiated by MacGregor, now M.P. for Glasgow. Even more astonishing was Porter's assertion about the sacrifice of a commercial treaty which he had himself negotiated with France, and whose conclusion was baulked by Palmerston.

May 4, 1855

R. Monteith

No. 5. I remember having heard of the appointment of Mitchely (or some similar name), a Jew or a former Jew, who was joint owner and also joint editor of *The Morning Post*. Palmerston secured him the consulate at St. Petersburg, a position which he retained until the outbreak of the war, and which yielded £4,000 to £5,000 per annum. It was just after the general election, in 1847, that *The Morning Post*, then strictly Derbyite and Conservative, published an article about the Ministry, which with regard to Palmerston said that Urquhart could make charges against Palmerston which made one's hair stand on end. Shortly afterwards Mitchely received this appointment. It is true that the management of the newspaper passed into different hands, but from that moment Palmerston was not included in its general attacks on the Government but was on the contrary praised and assisted by the newspaper, even while it continued to support Derby and the Corn Laws. During the last twelve months it openly deserted the Conservative camp and became not only a Palmerstonian paper but also a pro-Government one.

Charles Attwood

Written on October 6, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 475, October 11, 1855
Marked with the sign ×

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
The news from the war is abundant. In addition to the report of Gorchakoff, on which we comment elsewhere, we have by the steamer of Saturday, the official accounts of the cavalry action at Kurulu near Eupatoria, before reported; the intelligence of an unsuccessful assault of the Russians on Kars, of the destruction by the Allies of Taman and Phanagoria, and of the landing of a body of allied troops in the peninsula of Kinburn.

The cavalry action near Eupatoria was fought by twelve French squadrons (fourth hussars, sixth and seventh dragoons). According to Gen. d'Allonville's report, which is plain and intelligible, the French and Turks made an extensive reconnoissance toward the interior on three different roads—one to the south and two to the north of Lake Sasik. The two latter columns met at a village called Dolshak, where they discovered the approach of the Russian cavalry. Here the reports begin to disagree. Gen. d'Allonville maintains that eighteen squadrons of Russians—while the French were dismounted, baiting their horses—tried to turn them by the south and cut off their retreat to Eupatoria; that he then ordered his men to mount, fell upon the flank of the Russians, routed and pursued them for two leagues. Gorchakoff says that the Russians were only one regiment (eighteenth lancers) or eight squadrons; that they were surprised by the French after having dismounted in

---

a A. Pélissier, "Grand quartier général, à Sébastopol, le 1er octobre 1855", Le Moniteur universel, No. 289, October 16, 1855.—Ed.
order to unlimber a battery of artillery, and that under these circumstances they had to run for their lives. He makes Gen. Korff responsible for this mistake. Now what business a whole regiment of lancers had to dismount and assist in unlimbering a battery of eight guns, and how it was that the gunners, whose business it was to do this work, were not at hand, we are left to guess for ourselves. The whole report of Gorchakoff is so confused, so unmilitary, so impregnated with the desire to palliate this first cavalry disaster, that it is impossible to treat it as a serious statement of facts. At the same time we see Gen. Korff made responsible for this defeat, as Selvan was made responsible for Silistria, Soimonoff for Inkerman, Read for the Chernaya. Gorchakoff, though defeated in every action, is still invincible. It is not he who is beaten, far from it; it is some unlucky subaltern who upsets the general’s wise plans by some clumsy mistake, and who generally gets killed in action in punishment for this crime. In this instance, however, the blunderer is unfortunate enough to preserve his life. Perhaps he may, later on, have something to say to Gorchakoff’s dispatch. In the mean time he has the satisfaction that his opponent represents him in a far better light than his infallible commander-in-chief does. Since then, the British light cavalry division has been sent to Eupatoria to reenforce the French.

Two other expeditions have been undertaken on the extreme flanks of the Crimean theater of war. One of these was from Kerch and Yenikale to the opposite side of the straits. The small fortresses of Taman and Phanagoria have been destroyed, about one hundred guns captured, and thus the entrance to the Sea of Azoff has been completely secured by the Allies. This operation was merely one of precaution; its immediate results are of no great consequence.

The second expedition is of greater importance. The allied fleets, with about ten thousand troops, first made a demonstration off Odessa, where, however, not a shot was fired, and then sailed to Kinburn. This place is situated near the extremity of a tongue of land which on the south encloses the estuary of the Dnieper and Bug. At this point, the estuary is about three miles wide; a bar with fifteen feet of water (according to the best charts) closes its entrance. On the north side of this entrance is situated Otshakoff, on the south side Kinburn. Both these places first came into notoriety during the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1787, when the Bug formed the frontier of the two empires, and consequently Otshakoff belonged to the Turks and Kinburn to the Russians.
At that time, Suvaroff commanded the left wing of the Russian army (under Potemkin), and was stationed at Kinburn. The Turks, then masters of the Black Sea, crossed over from Otshakoff. They first made a diversion by landing behind the town of Kinburn, to the south-east; but when they saw that Suvaroff was not to be led astray by this false maneuver, they landed with their main body at the north-western extremity of the spit, exactly opposite Otshakoff. Here they entrenched themselves, and attacked the fortress; but Suvaroff sallied forth with a far inferior number of men, engaged them, and, with the help of reenforcements coming up, drove them into the sea. Their loss was enormous. Suvaroff himself, however, was wounded during this action, which was followed up in the following year, 1788, by the storming of Otshakoff.

This time the Allies landed, not below, but about four miles above the town of Kinburn, so as to intercept its communications by land with Kherson and the interior of Russia. Their gun-boats will very likely soon intercept the communications by water also. The spit of Kinburn, for six miles above the town, is extremely narrow, like that of Arabat, and so low and sandy that on digging a few feet below the surface water is found. Thus, strong fortifications with deep ditches cannot be constructed there in a hurry; and the works thrown up by the Turks in 1787 were either stockades or sand-bag batteries. The fortifications of Kinburn themselves cannot, for the same reason, be very formidable, no good foundation for masonry scarps being possible, though since that time broad wet ditches have no doubt been constructed. Nevertheless, we think that Kinburn cannot long hold out against the Allies if energetically attacked; and once in their hands, it opens to them a perspective of important operations in the direction of Cherson and Nikolaieff—that is, the direction of the base of operations of the Russian army in the Crimea. This descent, then, may prove very important if properly followed up. But up to the departure of the steamer no news of anything decisive had arrived, and thus we are led to conclude that this expedition is also to be conducted in the habitual, easy, jog-trot style of the Allies.

The defeat of the Russians before Kars will very probably prove to be the crowning event of the campaign in Armenia. The Turks, badly organized and short of every requisite for war, had played but a poor part in this portion of the seat of war. Unable to hold the field, they confined themselves to the occupation of Kars, Erzeroum and the country immediately under the command of
these fortresses. Gen. Williams, who had entered the Turkish service, commanded at Kars and superintended the construction of proper defensive works. For the greater part of the Summer the whole campaign on either side was confined to skirmishes, forays and foraging expeditions in the hill country; the general and first result of which was that the Russians, gradually gaining ground, succeeded in blockading Kars and even in cutting off its communications with Erzeroum. Kars is situated in a lateral valley of the Upper Araxes; Erzeroum at the sources of the Euphrates; Batoum, on the mouth of the Churuk Su (Bathys), the upper course of which passes near, both to Kars and to Erzeroum, so that one of the roads between these two places follows the basin of the Churuk Su as far as Olti, whence it strikes off across the hills toward Kars. Olti was, therefore, the central point for the Turks, as a road from Batoum there joins the one mentioned above, and Batoum was the place from which the nearest and strongest reenforcements were to be expected. Had the Russians succeeded in taking Kars, their first step would have been to establish themselves at Olti thereby cutting off Erzeroum from its nearest and best communication with the Black Sea and Constantinople. The Turks, however, were so dispirited that they retired as far as Erzeroum, merely occupying the mountain pass between the Upper Euphrates and the sources of the Araxes, while Olti was all but completely neglected.

At last, when Kars was more closely hemmed in, they attempted to form a convoy of provisions at Olti, and with a strong escort to force an entrance into Kars. Part of the cavalry from Kars having been sent away, as it was useless there, actually fought its way through the Russians as far as Olti, and the convoy started shortly afterward; but this time the Russians were better on the alert—the Turks were completely defeated, and the convoy was captured by the Russians. Kars, in the mean time, began to run short of provisions; Omer Pasha was, indeed, sent to take the command in Asia and to organize at Batoum an army fit to act in the field; but this creation of a new army takes a deal of time, and a march direct to the relief of Kars by Olti would not have been the best course he could take, as Kars might any day be compelled to surrender from want of provisions before relief could arrive.

In this difficult position the Turks stood at the end of September; Kars was considered as good as lost, and the Russians were sure, by merely blockading the town, to starve it out. But the Russians themselves appear not to have been willing to wait until
the last flour was baked and the last horse cooked in Kars. Whether from the fear of approaching Winter, the state of the roads, shortness of provisions, superior orders, or the fear of Omer Pasha's relieving corps, they at once made up their minds to act vigorously. Siege-guns arrived from Alexandropol, a fortress on the frontier but a few leagues from Kars, and after a few days of open trenches and cannonading, Kars was assaulted by the concentrated main body of the Russian army under Muravieff. The combat was desperate, and lasted eight hours. The Bashi-Bazouks and foot irregulars, who had so often run before the Russians in the field, here fought on more congenial ground. Though the attacking forces must have been from four to six times more numerous than the garrison, yet all attempts to get into the place were in vain. The Turks had here at last recovered their courage and intelligence. Though the Russians, more than once, succeeded in entering the Turkish batteries (very likely lunettes open at the gorge, so as to be commanded by the fire of the second line of defense), they could nowhere establish themselves. Their loss is said to have been immense; four thousand killed are stated to have been buried by the Turks; but before crediting this, we must have more detailed and precise information.

As to Omer Pasha's operations, he had a double choice. Either to march up the Churuk Su, by Olti, to the relief of Kars, where he would run the risk of arriving too late for this object, while he would have led his army to the Armenian plateau, where the Russians are secure from effective front attack by a strong line of fortresses, and where Omer Pasha could have no opportunity to fall on their flanks; or he would have to march up the Rion to Kutais, and thence across the hills into the valley of the Kura toward Tiflis. There he would meet with no fortified posts of any consequence, and menace at once the center of Russian power in the South Caucasian country. A more effective means for recalling Muravieff from Armenia could not be found, and our readers may recollect that we have over and over again referred to this line of operations as the only one fit to deal a great blow at the strength of the Russians in Asia. The proper basis of operations for this march would be Redout Kaleh; but as there is no safe harbor, Omer Pasha has chosen Sukum Kaleh, where there is a good harbor and a better road along the coast. Whether the

---

a See this volume, p. 269. — Ed.
season is not too far advanced for any serious operations there we shall soon learn.²

Written about October 19, 1855


² For a description of the further fighting in the Kars area after the abortive Russian assault of September 29, 1855, and of the fall of Kars see this volume, pp. 588-94 and 595-98.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

ASPECTS OF THE WAR

"Of what use are allies to thee, O Russian?
Stride forth, and thine is the whole world!"\(^a\)

Times appear to be changed since Derjavin, the poet-laureate of Catherine II, could venture this proud appeal to his people. At that period, indeed, the Russians had made giant strides. The whole of South, or New Russia, from the Don to the Dniester, and the whole of West Russia, from the Dniester to the Niemen, were added to the Empire. Odessa, Cherson, Kharkov, Ekaterinoslav, and Sevastopol were founded; and indeed so long as the "great nation" of the East had no more dangerous opponents to fight than Turkish janissaries and Polish volunteers, every march appeared to imply a conquest and every declaration of war to be a sure guarantee of a speedy and glorious treaty of peace. It is true the Russian legions, on venturing beyond their favorite and favorable ground received a terrible lesson at Zorndorf, and were saved from even a severer one at Kunersdorf by the intervention of the Austrian Loudon only.\(^386\) It is true that in 1798-99 even Suvaroff found his match in Masséna, and had to pay dearly for his Italian victories with the defeat of Zurich and the disastrous retreat across the Saint Gothard.\(^387\) But for all that, the time of Catherine and Suvaroff was the great and glorious epoch of the Russian arms, and never since then has a similar splendor surrounded them. At Austerlitz, at Friedland, the inferiority of the Russian army, as compared with the French, was signally manifested; and if at Eylau they were saved from similar disgrace, it was because Lestocq, with the remnants of the Prussian army, rendered them the same service Loudon had done at Kunersdorf.\(^388\) At Borodino an inferior number of Frenchmen defeated

\(^a\) G. R. Derzhavin, On the Capture of Warsaw.—Ed.
them, and had not Napoleon kept his guards in reserve, the defeat would have been decisive. The battles fought by the Russians during the French retreat from Moscow were far more glorious to the latter than to the former. And in the campaigns of 1813 and 1814, it was the Germans who had not only to supply the numerical force, and to bear the brunt of every battle, but to find the generals who could plan them.

Of the campaigns against Napoleon, however, it might be said that there was no disgrace in being beaten by a man who was in himself a host; but when the campaign of 1828-29, against the Turks, and of 1831, against the Poles, showed again what superiority of numbers and what great efforts and waste of time it cost the Russians to overcome opponents far less formidable than Napoleon and his well-seasoned troops, the decline of Russian military glory was evident. It cannot be denied that at the very time when Russian influence in European politics was stronger than ever, the actual feats of the Russian army justified anything but such a political position. And though Russia, in consequence of the events of 1848-50, was actually raised to the position of arbiter and protector of all Europe east of the Rhine, the campaign which seemingly elevated her to such omnipotence, the Hungarian campaign, was positively disgraceful to Russian generalship, and did not add a single laurel leaf to the crown of victory of the "invincible" Russian army.

This "young, powerful, irresistible nation," this "people of the future," as the Russians modestly called themselves, in a military sense at least culminated long ago, and was even declining when the present war began. The Russian army was ranked as a respectable force from the tenacity and solidity of its infantry, though with many shortcomings which more than made up for these advantages. It appeared imposing by its numbers, professionally ready for war at any moment, and by the implicit obedience which held this vast machine together. But alas! what has become of this mighty army, this "stern fact" which so frightened Western Europe! Three of its eight corps, on the Danube, were checked by what Turkey could find to oppose to them; and when the Crimean campaign began, division after division, corps after corps was drawn into the insatiable whirlpool, never to disentangle themselves again. Indeed the army was drained to its very reserves and elite troops. The innate bravery as well as the innate clumsiness of the Russian soldiers was aided by the engineering skill of a truly gifted man, Todtleben; it was favored by the sins of omission and commission of the allied generals; it achieved a
Aspects of the War

passive defense, glorious and even unparalleled of its kind, kept up full eleven months; but with all that, there was not a single actual success, not a single victory, and, indeed, invariable and inglorious defeat wherever the Russians attempted to take the initiative, no matter against what sort of enemies.

Except the truly incredible bravery displayed by the French and English soldiers, and in some instances by the Turks, also, the whole of this war does not afford to the Allies much matter for bragging; from the Alma to the present day, their generalship has been worse than indifferent, and in no single instance have they ever seized time by the forelock. But such days as Inkerman and the Chernaya prove irretrievably the superiority of western armies over the Russians, while the repelled assaults on Silistria and Kars prove that under certain circumstances even the Turks are more than a match for them. This war has been distinguished by more hand to hand encounters than all the wars of Napoleon together. Not an action but the troops have actually closed, even in the open field. Everywhere the bayonet has decided in the last instance. Now the bayonet—Russki styk—always was the great boast of the Russians. And precisely with the bayonet have the Russians been beaten in every instance, and by inferior numbers too. Russki styk belongs to bygone days, and the men who had to shrink back at Silistria, Kars, and even from the small bridge-head of Oltenitza, are no longer the same as those who took Akaltzik, Erzeroum and Warsaw, much less the same whom Suvaroff made to storm Ismail and Praga. "Stride forth a Russian" is bitter irony when applied to the step of the soldiers retiring over the bridge from South to North Sevastopol.

That the position of the Russians in the Crimea is not very enviable is proved by the Emperor Alexander's return to the north without having gone to see the army before the enemy. Had there been any improvement in its position, any possibility of encouraging it by prospects of speedy reenforcements, of increased supplies, and of changes in the fortune of war, surely Alexander would not have lost the opportunity to visit that army which at all events has exhibited more patience and more passive resisting force than any previous army, even in Russia. As he has not done so, there is an increased probability that the rumors are true according to which the Russians are resolved to retire by small detachments from Sympheropol toward Perekop, leaving a rear-guard only to make a bold front against the enemy as long as may be necessary. There are, indeed, other circumstances tending to confirm these rumors. The fire of the north forts against
Sevastopol, though not very effective, is on the increase, as if they intended to expend all their ammunition before leaving. The troops about Inkerman are daily diminishing; and at the same time, as if to make up for this, fresh batteries are daily erected on the north shore. The camp about Mackenzie's even is reported to be peopled by diminished numbers. On the other hand, it is true, stronger columns have appeared on the Upper Belbek as soon as the French showed themselves there, and no progress of any note has been made by the Allies on that side.

It is, however, not to be forgotten that the road through the steppe from Sympheropol by Perekop to Cherson, offers no means of subsistence whatever to a marching army, and very often not even water. Thus small detachments only can pass at a time, as everything for their consumption has to be brought from a distance; consequently the slower Gorchakoff effects his retreat, the more regularly supplied will be his columns and the fewer men will he lose on the long march. On the other hand, the allied generals will commit an unpardonable military sin if they allow this gradual retreat of the Russians, without even ascertaining, by strong reconnaissances, whether it is actually taking place or not. As far as we can judge, Pélissier is noways satisfied on this point, but it is his own fault exclusively. Should he go on with his offensive movements at the present slow rate, he may have finished his preliminary operations for an attack upon the Russian position by the time the last Russian passes the lines of Perekop. But the "conqueror of Sevastopol" has now a reputation to lose, and this has made him even more cautious than the defeat of the 18th of June did.394 Napoleon finished his campaign of 1796 in the maritime Alps, in six days and four battles, and that was ground far more difficult than the Crimean chalk-hills; but then he was not an understrapper to his own nephew.3 One attempt has, indeed, been made on the part of the Allies which displays a little more energy. The corps at Eupatoria, reenforced by Gen. de Failly's French division, consisting of nine battalions, and Paget's British light dragoon brigade, which counts four regiments, has now extended its feelers as far as half way to Sympheropol, but very soon retreated again. Gorchakoff, who sends this piece of news,3b states the strength of the Allies at from thirty thousand to forty thousand men. We shall be nearer the mark if we take the first number. But with thirty thousand men disposable in the field,

---

3 Napoleon III.—Ed.
3b "Paris, Wednesday Evening", The Times, No. 22200, November 1, 1855.—Ed.
the Eupatoria corps might attempt far bolder movements, especially as its line of retreat to Eupatoria, either north or south of Lake Sasik, cannot be cut off. Thus, after all, we find the same languor at Eupatoria as on the Chernaya; and that this languor, instead of being lashed up into action, will rather become more languid, there can be no doubt, if it be certain, as the whole British press asserts, that Gen. Codrington is to succeed old Father Simpson in the command of the British forces. Codrington distinguished himself at the Redan on the 8th of September, where he commanded the assaulting divisions, by his magnificent imperturbability. So imperturbable was he that he could afford to look with the marble placidity of Horace’s honest man—*si fractus illabatur orbis*—on the defeat of his vanguard, without so much as even suspecting that it might not be amiss to send the reserves to their support! Codrington, no doubt, is the man for the moment—the great general who has been looked for so long in vain—and if he gets the command the British are safe from defeat, as he never would allow more than his outpost troops to be beaten in a single day.

That the Russians are actually retreating from the Crimea is also indicated by another fact. When Alexander was at Nikolaieff, he inspected the 31st, 32d, 33d, 34th, 35th and 36th marine equipages recently arrived from Sevastopol. These marine equipages are battalions of sailors and marines, each of which serves at sea to man a ship-of-the-line, and one or more smaller vessels. That these troops left the Crimea when they could neither be missed nor replaced if any lengthened resistance was intended, clearly shows what is to be expected. The mission of Generals Benkendorf and Stackelberg to headquarters in the Crimea, in order to inquire into and report on the state of the army there is also significant, and from what we know of the doings of the allied generals, it may be expected that the Russian retreat, on the whole, will be effected unmolested and without any great loss.

The London *Times* of course knows better than this.\(^b\) If Pélissier does not act now, it is merely to induce the Russians to *stop* in the Crimea. If they were to retreat now, while the season is tolerable, what could he do to prevent them? what great injury could he inflict on them? No; Pélissier’s plan is far deeper.

---

\(^a\) Part of Horace’s dictum “*si fractus illabatur orbis, impavidum ferient ruinae*” (if the world were to crumble into atoms, the ruins would strike him undismayed). Horatius Flaccus Quintus, *Carmina*, Lib. III, III.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) This refers to the leading article in *The Times*, No. 22195, October 26, 1855.—*Ed.*
Pélissier not only intends to conquer the Crimea, but also to make the Russians perform a counterpart to the French retreat from Moscow. He is waiting for Winter to set in, and then he will pounce upon them, expel them from their position, drive them in heedless flight across the frozen steppe, or, as the Russians say of 1812, turn against them "His Excellency Gen. Hunger, and his Excellency Gen. Frost;" and then have them stopped in their march by the flanking corps falling upon them from Eupatoria, from Kertch, from Kinburn, so that what cold and hunger have left, will have to surrender at discretion, and not a man escape to tell the tale of the Crimean catastrophe to his countrymen.

Such is the strategy of the London Times.

Written in late October 1855 Reproduced from the newspaper
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4543, November 10, 1855 as a leading article
At the time the war between the Western Powers and Russia was declared, the Anglo-French press was of opinion that Russia would have no lack of men to fight, but that she would soon be short of money. Financial difficulties were counted on to counteract the strength and to impede the movements of those millions of soldiers which Russia could, it was said, send forth at any time against her enemies. But what has been the actual fact? Russia, though ostensibly banished from all the great European Stock exchanges, has found no difficulty in contracting a loan; her paper money, in spite of repeated fresh issues, maintains its credit; and her troops on their marches are fed, and the means of transport are furnished by the population in a manner impossible in any other less exclusively agricultural country. Blockaded as her ports are, she has managed hitherto to weather all those financial shoals upon which the London wiseacres were sure she would founder. As to the inexhaustible supply of men, however, matters look far different. While England with voluntary enlistment at home and abroad has managed gradually to increase her Crimean army to some forty thousand men, while France has only called in for the present year one hundred and forty thousand men instead of eighty thousand, and yet could send to the East an army numerous enough for more work than Pélissier could cut out for it, what has Russia had to do? Two general levies have been ordered on the whole extent of territory subject to the conscription, each averaging ten men to every one thousand male souls; then a general levy for the militia of twenty-three men to each one thousand souls, and now a fresh general levy for the line of ten men to each one thousand souls is again decreed. The average
levy, in time of peace, is about five per one thousand for one-half of the empire, the other half furnishing recruits the year following. Thus two-and-a-half per one thousand male souls on the whole empire (except, of course, in the provinces not subject to conscription) is the yearly average. The two years of war, however, have now already caused levies to be made amounting in the whole to fifty-three to each one thousand souls, or about two-and-a-half per cent of the entire population, male and female—that is, in each of the two years, ten times the amount of the regular peace recruiting. If we suppose France to have, during the two years of the war, recruited for her army altogether three hundred thousand men, which is certainly beyond the mark, that would make, for a population of thirty-six millions, five-sixth per cent in two years, or five-twelfths per cent per annum—that is, just one-sixth of the numbers which Russia has had to incorporate in her army. It is true that in Russia about one-ninth per cent, and in France two-ninths per cent, of the entire population are taken annually in time of peace, for military service; but then, as the time of actual service in Russia is more than twice as long as in France, that circumstance is more than balanced.

That this continuous drain upon the able-bodied male population begins to tell in Russia, while its counterpart is hardly felt in France, we learn from all quarters. In Poland particularly we are informed that hands are wanted for the tillage of the soil; and the great discontent of the nobles at the general abstraction of their most valuable serf-property is another proof of the fact. The appointment of an out-and-out aristocrat, Lanskoy, to the ministry of the Interior, and his circular to the nobility, stating that the Emperor Alexander, by a ukase, has guaranteed to them all their rights and privileges, shows how seriously alarmed the Court is at these symptoms of discontent among the owners of serfs.

The most remarkable feature, however, in these quickly-renewed recruitings, is the insignificance of the actual numerical increase gained, through them, for the army. Reckoning the total number of male souls subject to conscription at twenty-two millions, which is certainly low, in two years no less than six hundred and sixty thousand men have been enrolled in the ranks of the line, and five hundred and six thousand in those of the militia. Of the latter, indeed, a portion only have been mobilized, amounting perhaps to two hundred thousand men; so that the actual drain on the able-bodied male population has been about

---

a Issued on August 28, 1855.—Ed.
eight hundred and sixty thousand men. Beside these should be counted the soldiers of the reserve, dismissed on furlough for the last five or ten years of their term of service, and called in before the war broke out; but as most of these were called in as far back as 1853, we will not take them into account here.

In spite of these reserves, forming the fifth and sixth battalions of each infantry regiment—in spite of the six hundred and sixty thousand recruits incorporated partly in the first four line-battalions of each regiment, partly in the newly-formed second reserve (seventh and eighth) battalions of these regiments, the various bodies of the line are still far short of their full complement of men. The most curious proof of this is afforded by a proclamation issued at Nikolaieff, by the commander of the army of the south, Gen. Lüders.\footnote{Lüders’ proclamation was reported in \textit{The Times}, No. 22200, November 1, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}} He declares that by imperial order, twenty-three \textit{druginas} of the militia (twenty-three thousand men) attached to the army of the south, are to be incorporated with the line, and that they are to join the third and fourth battalions of each regiment. Now this measure cannot possibly have any other signification than that the regiments forming the army of the south are so reduced in numbers, that the mass of the soldiers of the third and fourth battalions are to be transferred to the first and second battalions while their places are to be filled by the militia. In other words, before the incorporation of the militia with them, the four battalions of these regiments were scarcely as strong as two battalions of the full complement. If such losses have taken place in an army the greater portion of which has never been before the enemy, and no portion of which has been engaged since Silistria, what must have been the losses in the Crimea and in Asia! We gain at once an insight into the actual state of the Russian army, and the conjecture which this insight allows us to make as to its wear and tear, explains the possibility of two-thirds of a million of men being absorbed into it without visibly increasing its numbers.

But how is this immense and disproportionate wear and tear brought about? First, by the enormous marches the recruits have to make from their respective homes to the chief towns of the provinces, thence to their depots, and finally to their regiments—not to count the marches these regiments have to make afterward. It is no trifle for a recruit to march from Perm to Moscow, from

\footnote{See this volume, p. 440.—\textit{Ed.}}
Moscow to Wilna, and finally from Wilna to Odessa or Nikolaieff. And if such interminable marches are hurried on by the supreme will of a man like Nicholas, who fixes the hour of arrival as well as the hour of departure, and punishes every deviation from his order; if brigades, divisions, army-corps, are precipitated in hot haste from one end of the empire to the other, regardless of the numbers left behind on account of sickness and fatigue; if a march from Moscow to Perekop has to be made at the rate of an ordinary forced march, which elsewhere is never continued beyond two days—a great deal of this wear and tear is explained. But to this overstraining of the physical powers of the soldier must be added the confusion necessarily arising from the notorious mal-administration of every department in the Russian service, especially in the army commissariat. Then comes the method of having the soldiers fed on the march as far as possible by the inhabitants of the country on the line of march—a method quite practicable if well managed, in an exclusively agricultural country, but illusory and open to the greatest inconvenience wherever, as in Russia, the commissariat and the commanding officers make good their embezzlements out of the stores stolen from the peasantry. And finally come the formidable miscalculations which necessarily must occur wherever armies disseminated over such a vast extent of ground are made to move by orders from one center, and are expected to execute them with the regularity of clockwork, while all the premises upon which these orders are based are false and unreliable. It is not the sword and the shot of the enemy, it is not the sickness inevitable in many parts of Southern Russia, it is not even the necessity of long marches which so decimates the Russian army; it is the special circumstances under which the Russian soldier is enlisted, drilled, marched, treated, fed, clad, lodged, commanded and fought, which can account for the terrible fact that very nearly the whole of the Russian army, as it existed in 1853, has already disappeared from the face of the earth without having made its opponents suffer more than one third of such a loss.

The order of the day of General Lüders is remarkable for another circumstance. It confesses openly that the militiamen are anything but fit to be led against the enemy. It implores the old soldiers not to laugh at or despise these young troops for their awkwardness under arms; it admits that they hardly know anything about drill, and introduces an alteration in the drill-regulations which must have been expressly sanctioned by the Emperor. The men are not to be “disgusted” by useless
parade-drill; the most indispensable movements only are to be practiced with them; handling, loading, firing their muskets, firing at the target, movements in column, and skirmishing—everything else is declared to be useless parade-drill. Thus a Russian general, under the express sanction of the Emperor, condemns two-thirds of the whole Russian drill-regulations as useless stuff, fit for nothing but to disgust the soldier with his duties; and these regulations were the very work of which the late Emperor Nicholas was most proud!

The "young soldiers", whose very gesture and step are thus described as provoking the laughter of their comrades, would not in any other country be called recruits. They have been under arms from six to ten months, and yet they are as clumsy as if they came straight from the plow. It cannot be said that the long marches they have had to make have left them no time for drill. Napoleon in his latter campaigns incorporated his recruits in their respective battalions after a fortnight's drill, and then dispatched them to Spain, to Italy, to Poland; they were drilled during the march, both while marching and when arrived in quarters; and when they joined the army, after six or eight weeks' marching, they were expected to be fit for active service. Never did Napoleon allow his recruits more than three months' drill to become soldiers; and even in 1813, when he had to create a fresh army, fresh cadres, and everything, he brought his conscripts down to the battlefields of Saxony in three months from the time they had joined their depots; and his opponents soon learned what he could do with these "raw recruits." What a difference between this quickness of adaptation with the French and this clown-like clumsiness of the Russian! What a certificate of incapacity in the officers of this Russian militia! And yet, Lüders says, these officers have nearly all served in the line, and many of them have smelt powder.

The restriction of the drill to the most indispensable movements, too, shows what Lüders expects from his new reinforcements. Skirmishing and movements in column alone are to be practiced; no deployments into line, no formations of columns out of the line. The Russian soldier, indeed, is of all the least fit for line movements, but he is quite as unfit for skirmishing. Close column-fighting is his forte, that formation in which blunders of commanding officers are followed by the least possible disorder and derangement of the general order of battle, and where the cohesive instinct of the brave but inanimate mass may make up for these blunders. The Russian soldiers, like the wild horses of the
steppe when persecuted by wolves, throng together in a shapeless mass, immovable, unmanageable, but which will hold its ground until a supreme effort of the enemy forces it asunder. But, anyhow, line formations are necessary in many circumstances, and even the Russians have recourse to them, though in a moderate degree. What then is to become of an army which cannot form in line at all, or which when got into line with a deal of trouble, cannot reform in column without throwing everything into confusion?

Written about November 2, 1855


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, November 13. An exceptionally well attended meeting was held in St. Martin's Hall last night. The notices announcing the meeting spoke of “a joint demonstration against the recent expulsions from Jersey, the proposed Alien Bill and the present war policy”. The last point, however, was dropped to ensure concord on the other two points. The chairman, Mr. Edward Miall, M.P., gave a survey of the events which led to the expulsion and then continued:

“The simple object of this meeting is to protest both against the past and against the future. We claim on behalf of political exiles here the right of asylum (cheers) on the simple ground that they are political exiles (cheers), whose misfortunes suffice to secure our sympathy and protection (cheers). We do not ask what politics they profess or what might be the party in their own country to which they belong. We make no distinction between prince and plebian in this respect. (Cheers.) We want the right of sanctuary to be accorded equally to all who come to these shores. Hitherto we have done this impartially. We have extended our hand to Prince Louis Napoleon, just as we sheltered a forgotten monarch under the name of John Smith. (Cheers and laughter.) We have granted the protection of our laws to Orleanists, Fusionists, Royalists and Republicans not according to the policy of the rulers of the country from which they fled, but according to the laws of this country. (Cheers.) Our national hospitality has bid them all a cordial welcome. Among others we have held in high esteem Kossuth (prolonged applause) whom The Times recently called the noble Magyar, we have likewise afforded Mazzini the protection he sought. (Loud applause.) We had not thought it necessary to inquire whether the political views of these men were in accordance with our own; it sufficed that they were exiles from their own country for political causes, and their misfortunes were a sufficient passport

---

a Below follows a summary of a report of this meeting published in The Times, No. 22210, November 13, 1855.— Ed.
b Louis Philippe.— Ed.
to our sympathies. (Cheers.) This is what we claim for the Jersey [...] refugees. (Hear, hear!) This is what we claim for all who come to these shores and we will not bat e one jot of our national hospitality at the bidding of any one. (Loud and prolonged cheers.) It is therefore fitting that those who come here should be welcomed to the full enjoyment of British liberty and not merely to a prison. (Hear, hear!) There must be no registration of political refugees, no police surveillance. (Hear, hear!) The freedom of these persons, just as our own, must not be placed in the hands of any minister or the Crown”, etc.

After Miall's fairly long speech, which was greeted with tremendous applause and did not pass off without fierce attacks on Louis Napoleon and Austria, Mr. Washington Wilks read the following letter from Cobden:

"My dear Sir,—I cannot, I am sorry to say, take a part in your demonstration against the arbitrary treatment of M. Victor Hugo and his brethren in exile. But although distance from town and other engagements prevent me from being present, I sympathize very cordially with the promoters of the meeting. Surely such proceedings as those which you are meeting to protest against ought to open the eyes, of at least that part of the public which is supporting the war (cries of oh, oh) from a sympathy with liberalism abroad, as to the gross delusion that has been practised on their credulity (cries of oh, oh) by those who have told them that in the hands of our present Government the war in which we are engaged is a struggle for liberty. (Hisses and cheers.) Depend on it, the tendency, both at home and abroad, ever since the peace of Europe was broken, has been the very reverse; and give us but a few years more of war, and we shall find ourselves retrograding to the dark political doings of Sidmouth's evil days.  

R. Cobden

The meeting then passed the following resolution:

"That this meeting utters its indignant protest against the recent expulsion of refugees from Jersey, and affirms that foreigners landing in the dominion of the British Crown become at once entitled to the natural and legal right of Englishmen—a public examination and trial by jury before exposure to any penal consequences. That this meeting pledges itself and calls upon the country to resist by all lawful means the apprehended attempt to carry through Parliament an act invalidating or restricting the right of sanctuary."

This demonstration will be followed by quite a number of similar ones. Incidentally I cannot refrain from observing that the whole refugee question consists of much smoke and little fire. Public opinion has definitely turned against the government, but I also believe that this uproar was allowed for in the government's calculations. The government responded to Louis Napoleon's first demands so clumsily, tragi-comically and blusteringly merely to demonstrate the fact to him that further concessions were beyond the power of a British government. Had it been in earnest, the government would have proceeded more skilfully and would not
have struck in such a grotesque way and so long before the opening of Parliament. Palmerston does not love the refugees, but he regards them as a means which he must keep at hand so as to be able to threaten the Continent with them when the occasion arises. I am convinced that just now the refugees have less reason for anxiety than ever before.

Written on November 13, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 537, November 16, 1855
Marked with the sign ×
Concerning the foreign policy of English Whigs a most erroneous impression prevails; it is supposed that they have been ever the sworn foes of Russia. History clearly establishes the contrary. In the diary and correspondence of James Harris, first Earl of Malmesbury—for several years, under both Whig and Tory administrations, English Minister at the Court of St. Petersburg—and in the Memoirs and Correspondence of Charles James Fox, edited by Lord John Russell, we find astounding revelations of Whig policy as inspired and inaugurated by Fox, who is still the political hierophant of the Whigs, being in fact as much revered by them as Mohammed is by the Osmanlis. To understand, therefore, how England has been ever a subservient to Russia, we will revert for a moment to facts antecedent to the accession of Fox to the Cabinet.

In the diary of the Earl of Malmesbury we perceive the anxious, impatient haste with which England pressed her diplomacy on Russia during our War of Independence. Her Embassador was instructed to conclude by any means an alliance offensive and defensive. The reply of the Czarina in the first instance was evasive: the very word "offensive" was odious to Catherine; and it was necessary first to wait the course of events. Finally the English diplomat discerned that the obstacle was Russia's desire of English support for her Turkish policy; and Harris advised his Government of the necessity of nourishing the Russian appetite, if her aid against the American Colonies was to be secured.

---

\[ \text{a The New-York Daily Tribune has "even".— Ed.} \]
The following year the proposition of Sir James Harris assumes a milder form; he does not ask for an alliance. A Russian protest to hold France and Spain in check, if backed by a naval armament, will be acceptable to England. The Empress replies that she can perceive no occasion for such a measure. The Ambassador, with servile flattery, remonstrates that

“A Russian Sovereign of the seventeenth century [...] might well have spoken so, but since that epoch Russia has become a leading power in Europe, [...] and the concerns of Europe are hers also. [...] If Peter the Great could behold the Russian navy [...] allied to that of England [...] he would confess himself no longer the first of Russian rulers”

—and so on in the same strain.

The Empress accepted this flattery, but rejected the Embassador’s proposals. Two months later, on November 5, 1779, King George wrote to his “lady sister,” the Czarina, an autograph letter in old-fashioned French. He no longer insisted on a formal protest, but would be satisfied with a simple demonstration.

“The apparition merely”—such were his royal words—“of a portion of the Imperial fleet will suffice to restore and confirm the peace of Europe, and the league joined against England will at once vanish.”

Has ever another power of the first order so abjectly supplicated?

But all this wheedling on the part of England failed of its object, and in 1780 the armed neutrality was proclaimed.402 England patiently swallowed the pill. To sweeten the dose her Government had previously proclaimed that the merchant-vessels of Russia should not be stopped or hindered by English cruisers. Thus, without compulsion England at that time surrendered the right of search. Soon afterward the English diplomat assured the Cabinet at St. Petersburg that British vessels of war should not molest the subjects of the Empress in their commercial pursuits; and in 1781 Sir James Harris claimed as a merit for the English Board of Admiralty that it overlooked the frequent case of Russian vessels conveying naval stores to the enemies of England, and that wherever such vessels had been by mistake arrested or hindered, liberal indemnity for the detention had been awarded by the Board. Every inducement was employed by the English Cabinet to detach Russia from the neutrality. Thus, Lord Stormont writes to the Ambassador at St. Petersburg:

“Is there no dear object with which to tempt the ambition of the Empress—no concession advantageous to her navy and her commerce, which may move her to help us against our rebellious colonies?”
Harris replies that the cession of Minorca will be such a bait. In 1781 Minorca was proffered to Catherine—but not accepted.

In March, 1782, Fox entered the Cabinet, and immediately the Russian Minister at London\(^a\) was advised that England was ready to treat with Holland, with whom the previous Ministry had declared war on the strength of the treaty of 1674\(^403\)—wherein it was conceded that Free ships make Free goods—and would at once conclude an armistice. Harris is instructed by Fox to represent these advances as an evidence of the deference which the King desires to pay to the wishes and opinions of the Empress. But Fox does not stop here. A Cabinet Council advises the King to make known to the Russian Minister residing near his Court that his Majesty is desirous of sharing the views of the Empress, and of forming the most intimate relations with the Court of St. Petersburg, making the declaration of neutrality the basis of stipulations between the two countries.

Soon after this Fox resigned. His successor, Lord Grantham, certified that the rather favorable disposition of St. Petersburg toward London was the fruit of Fox’s policy; and when Fox reentered the Cabinet, the idea was proclaimed by him that an alliance with the Northern Powers was the policy for an enlightened Englishman, and should continue to be so forever. In one of his letters to Harris he admonishes him to regard the Court of St. Petersburg as the one whose friendship is of the first importance to Great Britain, and avers that the proudest aim of his first brief administration was to make plain to the Empress how sincerely the English Ministry desired to follow her counsels and win her confidence. The partiality of Fox to a Russian alliance was extreme. He advised the King to write to the Empress and invite her to lend her condescending attention to the affairs of England.

In 1791, Fox, being then in the Opposition, said in Parliament\(^b\) that

"it was something new for a British house to hear the growing greatness of Russia presented as matter for anxiety. [...] Twenty years before, England had introduced Russian vessels into the Mediterranean. He (Fox) had advised the King not to impede the annexation of the Crimea to Russia. England had confirmed Russia in her scheme to found her own aggrandizement on the ruin of Turkey. It were madness to betray jealousy of Russia’s increased power in the Black Sea."

\(^a\) I. M. Simolin.—\textit{Ed.}
\(^b\) Fox’s speech in the House of Commons on March 29, 1791.—\textit{Ed.}
In the course of the same debate, Burke, then a Whig, observed:

"It is something new to consider the Turkish Empire as a part of the European equilibrium;"

and these views were urged in still stronger language, again and again by Burke—who is held by every party in England as the paragon of British statesmen—down to the close of his political life; and they were caught up by the great leader of the Whigs,\(^a\) who succeeded in command of that party.

During Lord Grey's administration in 1831 and 1832, he took occasion in a discussion on foreign policy to state his conviction that it would be for the advantage of Turkey herself and the happiness of Europe if that Power were merged in the Russian Empire. Was Russia less barbarous then than she is pictured now? Was she less then that hideous despotism which modern Whigs in such terrible color portray her? And yet not alone was her alliance coveted with fawning servility, but she was encouraged by English liberal statesmen to that very design for which she is now so vehemently denounced.

Written about December 28, 1855

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4597, January 12, 1856 as a leading article

\(^a\) Fox.—*Ed.*
Little by little we are getting at the details of the fall of Kars\textsuperscript{a}, and so far they fully confirm what we have habitually asserted to be the case with respect to the Turkish army in Asia Minor.\textsuperscript{a} It is now beyond the possibility of denial that that army has been systematically ruined by the neglect of the Turkish Government, and by the unchecked sway of Turkish indolence, fatalism and stupidity. Indeed, the facts now disclosed go a great way to prove that even direct treason, as is commonly the case in Turkey, has had much to do with the fall of Kars.

As far back as the beginning of last year’s campaign, we had occasion to show to our readers the wretched condition of the Turkish army at Erzeroum and Kars, and the flagrant peculation from which that state of things proceeded.\textsuperscript{b} There were concentrated for the defense of the Armenian highlands the two army-corps of Asia Minor and Mesopotamia, beside part of the corps of Syria. These corps had been reenforced by their redifs or reserve battalions, and formed the nucleus of a numerous host of Kurdish and Bedouin irregulars. But the four or five unfortunate battles of 1853 and 1854, from Akaltzik to Bayazid, had destroyed the cohesion and spirit of this army, while the want of clothing and provisions during the Winter completely ruined it. A motley assemblage of Hungarian and Polish refugees, adventurers as well as men of decided merit, had been collected at its headquarters,

\textsuperscript{a} See this volume, pp. 484-89.—\textit{Ed.}
\textsuperscript{b} See the section “The Turkish Army” in Engels’ series of articles \textit{The Armies of Europe} (this volume, pp. 451-56).—\textit{Ed.}
without any officially-recognized position. Before the ignorant, jealous and intriguing Pashas the adventurers could pass themselves off as first-rate men, while the really useful men among these refugees were treated as adventurers; in the end it was a race of vanity and intrigue, discreditable to the refugees as a mass, and destroying almost every vestige of their influence. Then came the British officers, who were received with great respect, backed as they were by the consideration due to an allied Government, and by the utter helplessness of the Turkish commanders. But they, too, failed in their attempts to infuse anything like military spirit into the Armenian army. Their efforts might now and then rouse a Pasha from his solid apathy for a moment, secure the construction of the most indispensable defensive works at Kars, and prevent, from time to time, some of the grossest instances of peculation and even connivance with the enemy; but this was all. When Gen. Williams, last Spring, strained every nerve to procure the most indispensable stores of provisions at Kars, he was constantly checked. The Turkish commissariat thought a siege out of the question; it had no horses to move stores with. When asses were found to be abundant, they thought it derogatory to the Sultan's\(^a\) stores to be transported by asses, and so forth; so that in the end Kars, the bulwark of Armenia, at only two marches from the Russian stronghold of Gumri, was, in fact, left without any provisions at all, and had to forage for itself in the environs. It was the same with regard to ammunition. After the Russian attack of Sept. 29, there remained but three days' ammunition for the artillery, though it is to be remembered that no actual siege took place—the 29th September being the only real fighting-day during the blockade. The medicine-chests sent to the army contained all sorts of rubbish, and the surgeons were provided from Constantinople with obstetrical instruments to probe wounds and amputate limbs with!

This was the state of things in Kars. That with such scanty resources a garrison composed of the demoralized troops of Anatolia should have made such a desperate resistance on the 29th of September, and held out so long afterward against hunger, is one of those redeeming facts in Turkish history which abound in the present war. The same fatalism which leads to apathetic indolence in the superiors produces this stubborn resistance in the masses. It is the last remnant of the spirit that bore the banner of Islam from Mecca to Spain and was only

\(^a\) Abdul Mejid.—Ed.
checked at Poitiers. Its offensive strength is gone, but a trace of its defensive power has remained. This stubbornness of resistance behind walls and ramparts is essentially Turkish; it would be a great mistake to attribute the credit of it to the presence of European officers. If such were present at Kars and Silistria in 1855 and 1854, they were not so at Varna, at Braila, at Silistria in 1829, when the same feats of heroism were exhibited. What European officers could do in such instances was to correct mistakes, to strengthen redoubts, to give unity to the system of defense, and to prevent direct treachery. But the individual bravery of the soldiers has always been the same, whether they were present or not; nor was it wanting at Kars, even among the disorganized troops of the all but destroyed army of Anatolia.

This leads us to the merits of the British officers who played a conspicuous part in the defense of Kars, and who are now prisoners of war at Tiflis. That they did a great deal toward preparing the means of resistance, that to them is due all the credit for having fortified the place, provisioned it as well as possible, lashed the Turkish Pashas out of their dreamy indolence, and conducted the defense on the 29th of September, cannot be doubted. But it is preposterous to ascribe to them, as the British press now does, all the credit of the 29th September, and of the defense generally, and to set them down as a parcel of heroes, abandoned in the hour of danger by the cowardly Turks, for whose sake they sacrificed themselves. That during the assault they were foremost in the ranks of the defenders, we do not intend to deny; the Englishman is of so pugnacious a nature that the greatest and most common fault of the British officer, in a battle, is to forget his duty as an officer and to fight as a private soldier. Indeed, when he does this he is sure of the applause of his countrymen, although in any other army he would risk being cashiered for loss of presence of mind. But on the other hand, the Turkish soldier is so accustomed to see his own officers run away that when once his spirit is up, he cares nothing at all for officers or command, but fights where he happens to stand, and is not at all the man to notice or much less to be inspired by the fact of half a dozen Englishmen beside him, attempting to display their bravery. That the fortifications of Kars were planned in an exceedingly faulty manner we fully demonstrated immediately after the assault of September 29 was known here, and the

---

^a See this volume, pp. 563-68, 694-702.—Ed.
judgment we then passed upon them has since been completely confirmed by the official map of these fortifications published by the British Government. Finally, then, the merits of these British officers at Kars must be measured by the French proverb: "In the kingdom of the blind, the one-eyed is a king." Many a man who cannot muster the knowledge necessary to pass the examination for Sub-Lieutenant in France, would make a great General among the Cochin-Chinese; and if British officers are notorious in their own country for professional incompetence, it must not be expected that they will be illuminated by sudden floods of knowledge or genius on taking service in Turkey. For our part, we believe that Kmetty deserves as much credit as any man who partook in the defense of Kars.

While this was the state of things at Kars, what was going on at Erzeroum? A dozen old Pashas passed their days in smoking their chibouks, quite unconscious that any responsibility rested upon them, that Kars was hard pressed, or that the enemy was within a few marches, on the other side of the Dewe Boyun hills. A few thousand regular troops, accompanied by some irregulars, marched to and fro, never risking an attack on the enemy, and returning as soon as they had descried his outposts. There was neither the force nor the spirit to relieve Kars, and consequently Kars was starved out while the army of Erzeroum scarcely dared to demonstrate in its favor. General Williams must have known that he could not expect any assistance from that quarter. But what reports, what promises he received respecting the effect of Omer Pasha's movements, we have no means of guessing. It has been said that Williams intended, at the last extremity, to force his way with the garrison through the Russian army; but we doubt whether such a plan was seriously entertained. The hilly ground, offering but very few passes by which Erzeroum could be gained, was all in favor of the Russians; if a few defiles were well occupied by them, this plan was not feasible. On the other hand, movements of troops become almost impossible toward the latter end of October in a country elevated from 5,000 to 8,000 feet above the sea, where Winter sets in very early and lasts from six to nine months. If Kars could hold out till Winter, the loss of a garrison of 6,000 regular troops would be nothing in comparison to the time gained by the prolonged defense. Erzeroum, the great center of all the Turkish stores in Armenia, was almost without fortifications, and would thereby be made safe till May, 1856; while the actual advantage gained by the Russians would be confined to the virtual possession of the villages of the Kars Chai
and the Upper Araxes, neither of which could have been disputed to them, even if the garrison of Kars had succeeded in reaching Erzeroum. This town was scarcely fortified at all; if the garrison of Kars had actually found its way thither toward the middle of October, there would not have been a sufficient force to defend it. As an open town only can Dewe Boyun be defended, by a battle in front of it, in the Pass. Thus the patience of the garrison of Kars saved Erzeroum.

Again, the question is asked, whether Omer Pasha could not have saved Kars, and almost every European correspondent in the East has an answer of his own to it. It is even now attempted to lay all the blame of the fall of Kars on Omer Pasha, and that by the very parties who formerly were full of his praise. The fact is, that in the first instance, Omer Pasha was retained in the Crimea, against his own will, until it was almost too late to undertake anything on a grand scale before Winter. When finally he went to Constantinople to settle his plan of operations, he had to spend his time in counteracting intrigues of all kinds. When at last everything was ready, the promised British transports were not forthcoming; and when the army was concentrated near Batoum, and later on at Sukum Kaleh, no stores, ammunition and means of transport were provided. How, under such circumstances, Omer Pasha was expected to march to the direct relief of Kars, it is not easy to make out. We find that during his Mingrelian expedition, he could never venture to go more than two or three days' march from the coast, and yet there he had good Russian military roads to march on. But in going to Kars, either by Erzeroum or Ardahan, he would have had to march either twenty or twelve days from the coast, using for his roads the beds of rivers and paths across the hills, where nothing more clumsy than a pack-horse can pass. The caravans from Trebizond to Erzeroum have no other roads to travel over, and the fact that they never use vehicles is the best proof of what ground they have to traverse. And this is the only track which is at all beaten; as to the so-called roads from Batoum into the interior, their existence is still more problematical, as no great traffic passes over them. The wise military critics who reproach Omer Pasha with not having marched straight upon Kars should first study the accounts of men who have traveled over the ground—such as Curzon and

---

\(^a\) The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and *New-York Weekly Tribune* have: "As an open town only can be defended by a battle in front of it, in the Dewe Boyun Pass." — *Ed.*
Bodenstedt. As to the allegation of the London Times, that Gen. Williams had pointed out to Omer Pasha Batoum as a starting point for a direct march on Kars, we can only say that Williams knows Armenia, where he has lived many years, far too well to propose such a thing.

All things considered, Omer Pasha could not do better than menace the communications of the Russians before Kars. How far he might be enabled to do this effectively depended upon the mobility of his own army and on the Russian forces opposed to him. Leaving out of the question the first consideration, as a matter to be judged of after the fact, we concluded from the beginning, that in all probability the Russians would prove too strong for the invading army. Our very first statement of the forces at the disposal of Bebutoff, and which has turned out quite exact, showed that even at Kutais, the Russians, with a little management, might oppose a superior force to the Turks. And so they did. Had Omer Pasha been ever so free in his movements, he could not have forced, with the army at his command, the passage of the Rioni. But beside this, the slowness and uncertainty with which his supplies were brought up, hampered his operations from the start. After every two or three marches he had to halt nearly a week in order to form the most indispensable depositories of provisions; and when at last he had advanced three days’ march from Redout Kaleh into the interior, he was completely paralyzed. Finding at the same time a superior army before him, he could but retreat to the coast, where the Russians followed him, harassing his rear very severely. The Turkish army now bivouacs on the coast and is being transported to Batoum, Trebizond, and other places, having suffered severely both from the enemy and from sickness. Mingrelia, with the exception of the coast forts, is again in the hands of the Russians.

This concludes the third lucky campaign of the Russians in Asia: Kars and its Pashalik conquered; Mingrelia freed from invasion; and the last body of Turkish troops remaining in the field, Omer Pasha’s army, considerably weakened numerically and morally—these results are not to be despised in a country like that south-west of the Caucasus, where all operations are necessarily slow in consequence of the ground and of the want of roads. And

---

a The reference is to F. Bodenstedt’s book *Die Völker des Kaukasus und ihre Freiheitskämpfe gegen die Russen*, published in Frankfurt am Main in 1848, and R. Curzon’s book *Armenia: A Year at Erzeroon, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey and Persia.—Ed.*

b *The Times*, No. 22254, January 3, 1856.— *Ed.*
if these successes and positive conquests are placed as a set-off against the occupation of the south side of Sevastopol, of Kertch, Kinburn, Eupatoria, and a few Caucasian forts by the Allies, it will be seen that the advantages actually gained by the latter are not so overwhelming as to justify the rhodomontade of the British press. It is a very significant fact that the Paris Constitutionnel, in an article inspired by the French Court, directly charges Lord Redcliffe with being the principal cause of the Asiatic disasters, by his not only withholding from the Porte the subsidies granted to it on the part of the Allies, but also inducing it to keep back, as long as possible, the reinforcements intended for the theater of war.\footnote{L. Boniface, “D’après les nouvelles qui viennent de Constantinople...”, Le Constitutionnel, No. 8, January 8, 1856.—\textit{Ed.}}
Frederick Engels

THE EUROPEAN WAR

The system of warfare carried on hitherto by the Western Powers against Russia, has completely broken down. It will not do to carry on this year's campaign, if campaign there is to be, upon the plan which has, so far, been followed up. To concentrate the whole forces of France, England, Turkey and Sardinia, against one particular point in the Crimea, a point which, by using indirect means, might have been gained as an accessory; to fight for that point eleven long months, and then to obtain only one half of it; to neglect all other opportunities for dealing effective blows at the enemy to such an extent that Russia could obtain by the conquest of Kars, a counterpart to the loss of the south side of Sevastopol—all that might do for a campaign or two, in a war where the most vulnerable points of the opposing parties were covered by the neutrality of Central Europe. But it will do no longer. The Council of War which has just been sitting in Paris, is the best proof that now we shall have something like war in earnest if the war is to continue at all.\(^{407}\)

The war, as hitherto carried on, has been a state of official hostilities, mitigated by extreme politeness. We do not here allude to civilities marking the unavoidable intercourse of flags of truce, but to the civilities which the very councils of war of the contending parties displayed to their opponents. That the war arose at all, is the fault of a miscalculation on the part of the Emperor Nicholas. He never expected that France and England would join to oppose his designs upon Turkey; he looked out for a quiet little war of his own with the Sultan,\(^a\) which might lead his troops for a second time to the walls of Constantinople,\(^{408}\) arouse European diplomacy when it would be too late, and finally give his

\(^a\) Abdul Mejid.— Ed.
own diplomatists a chance of gaining, as usual, twice as much in conferences and congresses as his troops could have gained by the sword. Unfortunately, unexpectedly, unwillingly, Russia and the Western Powers were entangled into war over this business before they were aware of it, and to war they had to go, though none of them liked it. Now, either party had a last means of warfare in perspective which it thought would frighten the other from resorting to extremities. It was expected to be a war of principles, and of a more or less revolutionary character in which Germany and her dependencies, Hungary, Poland, Italy would have to partake. The *ultima ratio* of the West was to be the setting loose of the oppressed nationalities of Hungary, Poland, Italy, and more or less of Germany also. The *ultima ratio* of Russia, on the other hand, was the appeal to Panslavism, the realization of the dreams fostered by enthusiasts for the last fifty years, among the Slavonic population of Europe.

But neither the Russian Government, nor that of Louis Bonaparte (not to speak of Palmerston) chose to appeal to such means of action before the last extremity had arrived; and in consequence the war has been carried on with a mutual forbearance and urbanity scarcely habitual between legitimate monarchs of ancient lineage, much less between such upstarts and usurpers as the Romanoffs, the Hanoverians, and the Pseudo-Bonapartes. The Baltic coast of Russia was scarcely touched; no attempts at permanent lodgment were made there. There, as in the White Sea, private property was much more assailed than Government property; and on the coast of Finland, especially, the British fleets seemed to have no other end in view than to reconcile the Fins to the Russian rule. In the Black Sea similar principles were acted upon. The Allied troops sent there appeared to have come for the purpose of making the Turks long for a Russian invasion; for that is the only conclusion to be drawn from their conduct, ever since 1854 till now. The most innocent portion of the time they spent in Turkey was during their stay at Varna, when, incapable of doing good, they did at least no considerable harm except to themselves. When at last they started for the Crimea. They managed to carry on the war in such a way that the Russian Government had every reason to be highly satisfied with them. The Duke of Cambridge has been, lately, distributing plenty of medals to the French troops returned from the Crimea; but no medals, crosses, grand-crosses, stars and ribbons the Russian

---

*a Final argument or last resort.— Ed.*
Government can bestow will adequately express the gratitude it owes to the directors of the campaign of 1854 and '55. Indeed, when the south side of Sevastopol was abandoned by its Russian garrison, it had cost the Allies in dead and invalid 250,000 men, beside millions on millions of money. The Russians, always worsted in battle, had regularly defeated their enemies in resolution, activity, and the skill of their commanding engineer. If Inkermann was an indelible disgrace to the Russians, the building up of the redoubts on Sapun and the Mamelon by the Russians, under the very nose of their opponents, was an indelible disgrace to both English and French. And, after all, it appears that Sevastopol did not so much exhaust the forces of Russia as those of the Allies, for it did not prevent the Russians from taking Kars.

This taking of Kars is, in fact, the most disgraceful thing which could have happened to the Allies. With the enormous naval armaments at their disposal, with a number of troops superior, ever since June, 1855, to the Russians in the field, they never attacked the weakest points of Russia, the Transcaucasian provinces. Nay, they even allowed the Russians to organize in that part an independent base of operations, a sort of vice-royalty, capable of holding out some time against a superior attack, though the communications with the mother country might be interrupted. Not satisfied with that, not forewarned by the continuous defeats the Asiatic-Turkish army had suffered in 1853 and '54, they prevented the Turkish army of Omer Pasha from doing any good in Asia, by keeping it in the Crimea, and in the Crimea they gave it nothing to do except hewing wood and drawing water for its Allies. Thus, after the whole coast from the straits of Kertch to Batoum had been carefully cleared of all Russian settlements, after thereby a line had been gained on which ten or fifteen points could be chosen as capital bases for any operations against Caucasia or Transcaucasia—the weakest part of Russia as we have often shown —nothing was done, until at last Kars being hard pushed, and the army at Erzeroum being fit for nothing, Omer Pasha was allowed to undertake his unfortunate expedition to Mingrelia—too late to do any good.

This obstinacy in concentrating the pith of the war in a Peninsula about the size of Long Island, has certainly served to keep aside all unpleasant questions. No nationalities, no Panslav-

---

a Todtleben.— Ed.

ism, no trouble with Central Europe, no necessities for conquest, no great decisive results which might embarrass ulterior negotiations by implying the necessity of imposing real sacrifices on any party, have appeared upon the scene. But to the men engaged in the actual campaign this is not agreeable. To them, at least from the Sergeant-Major downward, the war has been a matter of stern, stubborn fact. Never, as long as there have been wars, has such brilliant bravery been thrown away for such inadequate results as in this Crimean campaign. Never have such numbers of first-rate soldiers been sacrificed, and in such a short time, too, to produce such indecisive successes. It is evident that such sufferings cannot be imposed again upon the armies. There must be some more palpable gain than barren "glory." You cannot go on fighting at the rate of two great battles and four or five general assaults per annum, and yet remain always on the same spot. No army stands that in the long run. No fleet will stand a third campaign of the modest nature of the two last, in the Baltic and Black Seas. If the war is to continue, we hear, accordingly, of the invasion of Finland, of Esthonia, of Bessarabia; we are promised Swedish auxiliaries, and Austrian demonstrations. But at the same time we are informed that Russia has accepted the Austrian proposals as a basis for negotiation, and while this is far from settling the question of peace, it opens a possibility of that consummation.

There is, then, a chance that there may not be another campaign; but if one does come, we may presume that it must be much more extensive and fruitful than those that have preceded it.

Written about January 18, 1856 Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4616, February 4, 1856 as a leading article
London, Friday, Feb. 8, 1856

Except the venal gentry of the Ministerial press, nobody in England seems to believe much in our Anglo-American difficulty.\(^{411}\) Some people consider it a trick to withdraw attention from the peace negotiations. Others pretend that Palmerston will push on to a mutual recall of \(\text{embassadors,}\) when he will go out, as Pitt did before the peace of Amiens,\(^{412}\) to return when a truly English Minister is again wanted. From the manner in which the dispute is maintained very clever people look upon the whole as a simple election dodge of the President.\(^{a}\) The Democratic press beholds Bonaparte behind the scenes, delighted in fanning internecine war between the Anglo-Saxons on either side of the Atlantic. Everybody else is quietly convinced that there is not the least chance of hostilities, however high official language may run. This view, we observed, is entertained also by the French Government paper, the *Constitutionnel*, which offers its master as pacificator for the New as well as for the Old World.\(^{b}\).

The principal circumstance not to be lost sight of in estimating this affair is the almost virtual extinction of the *entente cordiale* between England and France,\(^{413}\) more or less openly confessed by the English press. Take, for instance, the London *Times*, the paper which not long ago proclaimed this Bonaparte a much greater man than the real Napoleon, and proposed to expel all the vicious people who would not bow to that creed. In a leading article it now suggests that the only obstacle to peace is Bonaparte's

\(^{a}\) Pierce.—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) L. Boniface, "Une question intéressante...", *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 37, February 6, 1856.—*Ed.*
over-eagerness for it. This is followed up by another article hinting that the “chosen instrument of Providence” is, after all, a mere *pis-aller* of French society, accepted “because there was not to be found one single man in whom the nation could place its confidence and esteem.” In a third article it denounces his whole staff of generals, ministers, functionaries, &c., as a motley band of stockjobbing desperadoes. The language of the provincial press of England is even less reserved. Observe, on the other hand, the altered tone of the French journals—theyir fulsome adulation and flattery to Russia; so singularly contrasting with their moderate antipathy for England. Further, observe the very confident menaces of a general Continental coalition held out by the Austrian, Belgian and Prussian papers. Lastly, take the Russian press which in its peace homilies ostentatiously addresses itself to France alone, without as much as mentioning England.

“A rainbow of peace,” says the *Nordische Biene*, “has appeared in the horizon, and has been joyfully hailed by all friends of civilization.... In these two years of war with Four Powers, the Russian people has given a striking proof of its great and noble character, and has earned the respect of its enemies. [...] As regards France, it may be positively affirmed that the French nation loves and respects the Russians, admires their courage and self-denial, and takes every opportunity of expressing its sympathy, as it did when there was a short suspension of hostilities in the Crimea, as also when Russian prisoners passed through France. The French prisoners, on their part, have been treated by the Russians like brothers.”

*Le Nord* of Brussels bluntly intimates that Bonaparte cultivated the Austrian mediation from the beginning with the view to throw off the English alliance at the first opportunity. The alliance with France then being about to be supplanted by a rupture with that country, England, still at war with Russia, evidently cannot mean to embark in a war with America, and it is plain that no importance, beyond what has been pointed out, can attach to the present difficulty between the two Governments. Peace in Europe itself is by no means certain. With regard to the conditions presented by the Allies to Russia: the fact is there is hardly the appearance of a concession in their acceptance. The cession of a problematic strip of land in Bessarabia, marked out by a mysterious chain of mountains not to be discovered on any map, is more than counterbalanced by the obdurate silence on the Russian acquisition of Kars, suspiciously mentioned since in a

---

*a* The articles in question were published in *The Times*, Nos. 22277, 22278 and 22275, January 30, 31 and 28, 1856. *Pis-aller* means “last resort”.—*Ed.*

*b* *Severnaya Pchela*, No. 11, January 14, 1856.—*Ed.*

*c* *Le Nord*, No. 19, January 19, 1856.—*Ed.*
Petersburg paper as a Russian province. Meanwhile, the advantages of an armistice, together with the other opportunities in the course of turning up, do not make it improbable that Russia, having had the time to concentrate her forces on all the decisive points, may wish to continue the war. The great pledge of peace, however, is the absolute necessity for Bonaparte to conclude it at any price. On the one hand the means for carrying on the war are failing him; on the other hand there is growing up a necessity of repeating the Crimean expedition, as Montalembert said of the expedition against Rome, in the interior of France.415

Shortly before the acceptance of the preliminaries of peace by Russia, it was generally current at Paris that Bonaparte contemplated a forced loan, to be borne proportionately to the amount of direct taxes. The *vacuum* in his exchequer is forcibly demonstrated by the condition of his army in the Crimea. For some time past the lamentable state of the troops under Pélissier has been alluded to by correspondents. The plain statement which follows is given by a British non-commissioned officer writing to *The Birmingham Journal*, under date of Sevastopol, January 5:

"To-day was very fine. About 3 o'clock a strong north wind blew, and it froze very hard, which soon made us button up. Our men do not feel the cold; but you would pity the poor French. They are eternally dragging fuel from Sevastopol. They are miserably clad and, I think, are worse fed. Every hour of the day there are some of them looking for biscuit. Our men pity them, and are very kind. Our sentries have orders not to allow them in the camp, because some were in the habit of selling *cognac*, which caused some of our men to get drunk. But the poor French manage to elude the sentries occasionally, and introduce themselves with *bono Inglis*. Of course, our men know what they want, and never send them away empty-handed. The poor fellows have not so much as a glove to put on their hands. The only article 1 see they have got more than they had in Summer is a hood to their great-coat, and a pair of common, coarse cloth gaiters, which reach the knee, and are buckled round the knee with a few straps. They do not wear socks, and they generally have had boots. The fact is, they are the picture of misery, and indeed they feel it when they see the British soldier with his fine seal-skin cap, tweed coat, lined with fur, a fine, large comforter round his neck and one round his waist, and a fine, strong pair of ox-hide boots which come to the knee."

The state of Napoleon's finances must be wretched enough, when he leaves his army, his one and all, in the condition just described; at the same time, an inference as to their administration may be drawn from the fact that these two years of war have cost already more than all his uncle's\(^a\) campaigns, from 1800 to 1815, together. Even Bonapartist generals, returned from the Crimea, are said to have commented indignantly on the impudent robberies of Morny & Co., at the expense of the army. These

\(^a\) Napoleon I.—*Ed.*
remonstrances have found publicity in a semi-official paper, which has the following:

"If peace be concluded, the emperor will turn his whole attention to the finances, and especially to certain abuses too inherent to great movements of speculation, such as certain accumulations of incompatible offices, and certain fortunes a little too rapidly acquired."

Meanwhile revolutionary symptoms manifest themselves in the youth of the universities, in the working-classes, in a portion of the middle class, and what is the worst for Bonaparte, in the army. On the affair of the Ecole Polytechnique, we are informed that Bonaparte, although sufficiently exasperated at their taciturn attitude on the 29th of December when he played the Roman Senate with this army (as he likes to play the Roman Imperator with his Senate), at first meditated a compromise with the Ecole. The students were given to understand that the Emperor was inclined to maintain that institution, if they consented, as an opportunity would be given them to manifest sympathy for the dynasty. To this the Ecole replied by their delegates that not only they would not cry vive l'Empereur, but would drive any of their comrades from school who should utter that cry. It was upon this reply that the dissolution of the anarchical establishment was determined. One-half, composed of the pupils destined for military service, will be transferred to Vincennes, there to form a simple school of artillery. The other half, destined to the civil service, will be in the Ecole Normale. The building itself is to be converted into barracks. Such is the end of the pet institute of Napoleon the Great.

The prison of Mazas is filled with pupils of the University of Paris, and with other young men who, at the funeral of David, the sculptor, had raised the cry of Vive la liberté. There was a circumstance connected with the demonstration against Nisard peculiarly annoying to Bonaparte. The police having made their razzia among the students for having hissed Nisard's apotheosis of Tiberius as the savior of Roman society, the rest formed in a body, and, traversing all Paris, went to Nisard's residence, Rue Courcelles, and summoned him to put their comrades at liberty. A detachment of soldiers of the line dispatched after them arrived there almost at the same time. Received with cries of Vive la ligne, they immediately stood at ease, and refused to act. To prevent a further fraternization, they were at once withdrawn, and sup-

---

\[a\] Pedagogical higher school in Paris.—Ed.

\[b\] Long live the Army!—Ed.
planted by *sergents de ville.* The students removed in a body to the Odéon, where they invaded the pit, and kept singing the "*Sire de Franc Boissy*," shouting the more offensive verses right into the ears of Bonapartete and Eugénie, who were present in their box.

The Bonapartist press confess that the number of arrests effected in the departments amount to 5,000; the figure given elsewhere of 15,000 is therefore probably the whole truth. This conspiracy of the laborers, it now appears, had its ramifications in the midst of the army. It became necessary to break up the whole school for non-commissioned officers at La Flèche, and to change all the garrisons of the center of France. In order to suppress this dangerous spirit in the army, Bonaparte is having recourse to that most dangerous experiment of the Restoration, setting up a complete system of espionage through all ranks of the army. This new legion of honor has led to some very lively altercations between Marshal Magnan and certain superior officers who do not think it much to the taste of the troops.

The movement of the working classes of Paris, as in all times preceding a crisis, is betokened by *quod libets,* the greatest favorite of which is the

"Voilà qu'il part, voilà qu'il part,
Le petit marchand de moutarde,
Voilà qu'il part pour son pays
Avec tous ses outils," etc.

To leave no doubt as to who is meant by the little mustard-vendor, the police has prohibited the song.

The esteem in which Bonapartist institutions are held, is illustrated by an anecdote related in the *Nord.* Some Senators did not hesitate to approve of the act of M. Drouyn de Lhuy in resigning his senatorship, but took good care not to imitate him. Morny being asked if any of them were likely to follow the example, replied that he had excellent reasons to believe the contrary. "But what reasons have you?" asked his interlocutor. "I have thirty thousand very good reasons, *one franc* a piece," coolly answered Morny.

---

*a* Police.—*Ed.*  
*b* Medleys.—*Ed.*  
*c* "He is leaving, he is leaving,  
The little mustard-vendor.  
He is leaving for his country  
With all his belongings," etc.—*Ed.*  
*d* *Le Nord,* No. 37, February 6, 1856.—*Ed.*
One more circumstance may be mentioned of immense meaning in the present condition of the French people. I don’t revert to the stock-jobbers, for whom peace and war are equally convenient. The first time in their history the mass of the French people have shown themselves indifferent to their old hobby “la gloire.” This ominous fruit of the revolution of 1848 proves in a manner not to be mistaken, that the epoch of Bonapartism has passed its climax.

Written on February 8, 1856

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The papers relating to the fall of Kars, as laid before the British House of Commons, have been described by our London correspondent as arranged with a view to conceal, rather than disclose the truth; and a careful examination of the Blue Book in which they are contained\(^a\) evinces the correctness of that judgment. Hardly less remarkable and significant than the papers themselves, are the comments they have elicited from the leading press of London. *The Times*, for instance, has devoted three consecutive articles to the subject,\(^b\) selecting, however, as the special marks of its flourishes, invectives and arguments, the dispatches covering the interval from August 2, 1854, the day of General Williams’s appointment as British Commissioner at the head-quarters of the Turkish army in Asia, to the latter part of January, 1855, when his personal quarrels with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe had, at last, died away. The real aim of *The Times*, in giving this exaggerated importance to that portion of the documents which do not even touch on the epoch of actual warfare, is transparent. On the one hand, public attention was to be diverted from the darkest pages in this most melancholy Blue Book; and on the other, Lord Redcliffe is to be made the scapegoat of the Government at home. The rest of the daily

\(^a\) Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars. London, 1856. Below Marx quotes documents included in this collection.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) This refers to the series of articles published under the heading “The Capitulation of Kars” in *The Times*, Nos. 22320, 22322 and 22323 on March 20, 22 and 24, 1856. The last, fourth, instalment in this series appeared in *The Times*, No. 22325 on March 26, after Marx had written this article.—*Ed.*
London press, with the exception of *The Morning Herald*, are but too happy to follow in the track beaten by *The Times*

To become initiated in the mysteries of that disastrous Asiatic campaign, we must start from a quite different point, and commence by inquiring into the action of the Allied Governments during the decisive epoch, beginning with the first advance of the Russians from Gumri, in May, and ending with the capitulation of Kars, on November 24, 1855.\(^{420}\) Carefully concocted as it is, mutilated by omissions, falsified by extracts, beautified by patches and plasters, even this Government publication, if put to the critical rack, may be forced to speak truth.

Toward the end of May, 1855, Gen. Williams reports to Lord Redcliffe, who reports to Lord Clarendon, that a large Russian force, consisting of 28,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 64 pieces of artillery was assembled around Gumri; that the Mushir\(^{a}\) had received information of their intention to attack Kars, and that their own (Turkish) force concentrated in the intrenched camp consisted of 13,900 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 1,500 artillerymen, and 42 field-pieces. When Redcliffe received this letter from Williams, and Clarendon from Redcliffe, both already held in their hands another letter from Williams, in which he makes the following statement:

> "I left Erzeroum yesterday (2d June) en route for Kars, which place the enemy has announced, in an order of the day, his intention to attack.... I have now *four months' provision in that garrison* (viz.: at Kars), "and [...] trust the central Government and the Allies will soon prove to this remnant of an army that it is not absolutely forgotten by them."

The English Government, then, was informed that if Kars should be cut off from Erzeroum, and a blockade be established by the Russians, the fortress could not hold out much longer than Oct. 3, 1855. If it did fall rather more than a month after, it was because the garrison were Turks, and not beef-eaters.

On the receipt of the dispatches from General Williams, Redcliffe makes urgent recommendations to the Porte that reenforcements with fresh supplies and money should be sent forthwith to the army of Kars. He even invites the Seraskier,\(^{b}\) now that Circassia is cleared of the Russians, to unite the army of Batoum with that of Kars. Why the Porte objected to this proposal, the following dispatch from Gen. Williams explains:

---

\(^{a}\) Vassif Pasha.— *Ed.*

\(^{b}\) The Turkish War Minister, Rushdi Pasha (Mchemet).— *Ed.*
Fragment of the first page of Marx’s notes for his articles on the fall of Kars
"Kars, June 28, 1855.—Mustapha Pasha of Batoum has [...] recently written to me to say that he had only 3,772 regular troops, and was pressed by the enemy."

On June 28, Lord Redcliffe reports to Lord Clarendon that:

"It is some consolation to him [...] that even at this eleventh hour the Porte has recognized the necessity of listening to his advice, and sending out reenforcements without further delay."

The only difficulty avowed by Redcliffe himself was to decide where those reenforcements were to come from.

"How are they to be provided with the necessary supplies? [...] Nothing can with prudence or consistency be detached from the army under Omer Pasha in the Crimea. At Batoum, Sukum Kaleh, and other neighboring stations on the coast, it would be extremely difficult to muster more than 11,000 men. [...] The other parts of the Empire afford no additional reserves, with the exception of Bosnia, where it is still possible that a few thousand men might be detached. I speak of regulars. Bashi-Bazouks may be procured, but your lordship knows what little dependence is to be placed on such undisciplined hordes. There remains the half-formed corps of Gen. Vivian, and the irregular cavalry collected by Gen. Beatson and his officers. [...] In Bulgaria I question the existence of more than 50,000 men, including garrisons.... Austria, it is true, has declared her intention of considering the passage of the Danube by Russia a casus belli, and she also stands pledged to the exclusion of that power from the Danubian Principalities; but the resolution which in such an emergency would enable the Porte to take its line upon those assurances, and to overlook the awkwardness of leaving an important position inadequately defended, is more fit to be admired than to be embraced."

According, then, to the avowal of Redcliffe himself, he urges the Porte to send to Kars "reenforcements of every description," while he is quite aware that there exist none of any description whatever.

On June 30 there took place at the Grand-Vizier's house, on the Bosphorus, a meeting between the Grand-Vizier, the Seraskier, and Fuad Pasha on the one side, and Redcliffe, attended by Brigadier Mansfield, on the other. The Turkish Ministers proposed, as they had done before, to collect an army at Redout KALEH, which was to advance to Kutais, and to make from there an excursion into Georgia. They proposed that the expeditionary force should be composed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vivian's Contingent</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatson's</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batoum Garrison</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be drawn from Bulgaria: 5,000

Egyptian Cavalry: 800

Tunis Horse: 600

---

* Ali Mehemet Pasha.—Ed.
The Turkish Ministers expressed their readiness to intrust the direction of the expedition to a British commander, and to accept General Vivian in that capacity. Gen. Vivian at once raised difficulties as to the means disposable for this plan, and considered the employment of his contingent as premature and interfering with the arrangements for its organization. Two weeks later Redcliffe communicated to his Government that—

"Preparations for the said expedition are in progress, and that it might save much valuable time if he was informed at once by telegraph whether Government was prepared to sanction a powerful diversion, by Redout Kaleh and Kutais into Georgia."

On July 13th, 1855, Lord Clarendon sends a dispatch wherein he first repeats the objections raised by General Vivian, and then adds his own:

"Her Majesty's government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to send reenforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reenforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine.

"If the army of Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it should fall back upon Erzeroum, and the whole Turkish force should be concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated" (are they?), "it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected than by divided portions of that force: and a defeat would be the more decisive the further it took place within the Turkish frontier."

On the following day, July 14, Clarendon also addresses the following telegraphic answer to Lord Redcliffe's telegraphic question:

"The plan for reenforcing the army at Kars, contained in your dispatches of the 30th June and 1st inst., is disapproved. The reasons will be sent by the messenger to-day against employing the Turkish contingent until it is fit for service. Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back on Trebizond, where it would easily be reenforced."

It is very curious that this telegraphic dispatch, dated London, July 14, had not arrived at Constantinople on July 19, on which day we find Redcliffe writing again to Clarendon:

"An appeal has [...] been made by means of the electric telegraph to her Majesty's Government, who were entreated to lose no time in making known their pleasure as to the proposed diversion."
In fact, this answer from London only reached Constantinople on the 30th of July, six days after the arrival there of the London mail of the 14th of July. On July 15 the Seraskier informs Lord Redcliffe, through Gen. Mansfield, that:

"The 15,000 men in Bulgaria destined to form part of the expedition were in readiness to march to the coast with sufficient means of transport, and that, in general, his preparations were so advanced as only to require the assent of Her Majesty's Government to carry them into effect."

Meanwhile, appeals from Gen. Williams for assistance followed upon appeals. On June 23 he announces that—

"The enemy [...] has pushed forward large bodies of cavalry, [...] and urgently recommends the immediate landing of troops at Trebizond, and if the season admit of it, strong demonstrations from Redout Kalch."

On June 26, he writes that the Turkish army in Kars was surrounded by the Russians, who had established themselves on the high road between that fortress and Erzeroum, and cut off a portion of the provisions collected for the army. On June 27, he states that the Russian army was master of the surrounding country. On June 28, that the enemy was master of all beyond the reach of their guns, and that the troops at Kars were twenty-three, twenty-seven and twenty-eight months respectively in arrear of their pay; and on July 7, that the united forces of the Russians were ready either to assault or to more closely invest Kars, by cutting off their only remaining communication with Erzeroum via Olti. It is true that these latter dispatches did not arrive in London till July 26; still the use of the telegraph occurred to the British Government only on August 9—not indeed to advise what should be done in consequence of this news, but only to raise fresh difficulties against what the Porte was preparing to do. On the same day on which Lord Clarendon addressed Lord Redcliffe by telegraph, Lord Panmure addressed General Vivian as follows:

"War Department, July 14, 1855.

"Sir: I transmit herewith, for your information, a copy of a dispatch which the Earl of Clarendon has addressed to her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, on the subject of the plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, and I have to acquaint you that I entirely concur in all that is said in that dispatch as to the objectionable character of the plan proposed by the Porte. I place such full reliance on your professional ability that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and indigested as that contemplated by the Porte. While it is your duty to give every aid in your power, not simply as commanding the Contingent, but as a British officer enjoying the confidence of her Majesty's Government, to our allies, the Turks, it is at the same time necessary that you should be cautious in not risking the honor of the British
name and your own reputation by undertaking military operations for which proper bases have not been laid down, communications opened, supplies arranged, and transport provided. A *coup de main* by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack an enemy's stronghold, is one thing; but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory to make war against him, is quite another. In the first case something may be hazarded; but in the other every preparation must precede action. Moreover, from all the information which has reached me, I have every reason to believe the army of Batoum to be in a deplorable state. I know the Contingent to be scarcely organized; of the Bulgarian troops you can have no knowledge; and I presume that Beaton's troops are as little reduced to control and discipline as your own troops. In short, I am assured that it would be madness to attempt to succor Brigadier-General Williams in this way. It is too late to regret the policy which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits; but it would only be opening the way to fresh failure to follow out such schemes as have been proposed for the purpose of relieving him. You must, as I have no doubt you feel, lose no time in getting your force into order for service, which will be sure to await you somewhere as soon as you are ready for it; but organization is as necessary for an army as endurance and valor, and without the former the latter qualities are utterly unavailing.

"Panmure."

The plan proposed by the Porte was, in its general conception, bold and strategically correct; it amounted, in fact, to the adoption of an eccentric position with respect to the invading army, menacing Tiflis, the center of the Russian power in Asia, and thus, by threatening to cut off Muravieff's basis and line of operations, forcing him to retreat from before Kars. A Mingrelian expedition held out fair prospects not only of relieving Kars, but of affording ample opportunity to gain the great point in all warfare, viz.: throwing the enemy on the defensive. But, the urgency of the danger being admitted, such an expedition could hardly be undertaken save on the condition of its being pushed on with rapidity, with a numerically sufficient force, and with an abundance of supplies and means of transport. Now, the army proposed by the Porte for this service, apart from its motley composition and the unfinished drill of certain portions, was to muster 43,000, or, as Redcliffe computes them, only 36,000 men. It was with about the same force that Omer Pasha afterward undertook the expedition; still, when he arrived at the Rioni (Phasis), his army had dwindled down to 18,000 or 20,000 men. Muravieff had, in his immediate rear, Gumri, as his nearest support, a fortress expressly calculated for the offensive against the Turkish territory; he was therefore enabled to keep his position till informed of the advance on Tiflis being near its accomplishment. However, for the expedition to assume this dangerous turn, there was required the descent of at least 55,000
to 60,000 men on the Circassian coast, the capture of Kutais, and the forcing of the pass of Gori. The Turks not having that force at their disposition, there remained but the alternative of marching via Trebizond on Erzeroum, thence to relieve, reenforce and provision Kars and limit themselves to the defensive. An army of 20,000 men was, at all events, more useful at Erzeroum than one of only 40,000 in Mingrelia. There were also difficulties in the way of that operation; the roads being extremely bad, a considerable force with its artillery and ammunition could hardly reach Erzeroum in less than three months, and thus the crisis might have been over long before the army could arrive on the scene of action. If, on the other hand, a small force were sent, it might succeed in reestablishing the communication between Erzeroum and Kars, but would be insufficient to guard Erzeroum if Kars had fallen. It is clear, then, that the Turks had hit on the best plan for the relief of Kars; but that the Allies, by locking up in the Crimea the only Turkish army capable of carrying it out, prevented its execution.

Let us now come to the objections raised by the British Government. Lord Clarendon commences his attack, not upon the weak points, but on the strategically correct points of the Turkish plan. He thinks it wiser for an army to strengthen its defensive basis in its own rear than to undertake offensive operations in the rear of the enemy. We will leave him to settle this point with old Napoleon or Jomini, while we can quite understand his anxiety for a safe retreat. He thinks it better for an army to march through a friendly country than through a hostile one, if march it must. In his first dispatch he says that if the Turkish army could not maintain its position at Kars, it should fall back on Erzeroum. Did he not know Kars was the key of Erzeroum, and that but for the prolonged defense of Kars, Erzeroum in its then state of defense would have fallen in the same year? But, as his Lordship entertains peculiar views as to the offensive and the marching of armies, so he holds opinions of his own with regard to defensive warfare. A defeat of the Russians, he says, would be the more decisive, the nearer it took place to the gates of Constantinople. In his telegraphic dispatch of July 14, he goes a step further, and coolly recommends the Porte to withdraw its army not only from Kars, but also from Erzeroum, falling back on Trebizond, "where it could easily be reenforced." He would have the Turkish army come to its reenforcements, if the reenforcements would not come to it. Not choosing to recollect, before the fall of Kars, the importance of Erzeroum as the center not only of the commercial
but also of the military resources of Anatolia, he discovers, after the fall of Kars (when writing to Lord Cowley in December, 1855), that that alone was sufficient

"to bring about the worst consequences, if prompt and decisive measures are not taken. Masters of that strong fortress, threatening Erzeroum, and commanding all the mountain passes, the Russians might be able to force the whole of Kurdistan and the Armenian population to assist them against the Sultan; and the Allies might in a few months learn that far greater dangers threatened the Ottoman Empire on the side of Asia than on that of Europe."

From the same telegraphic dispatch (14th July) we also see that the Turkish contingent was formed for no other purpose than to remove from the control of the Porte the only reenforcements of its armies.

This much would seem to result from the dispatches of Clarendon, namely: that it was a settled point with the British Government as early as July, 1855, that Kars and Erzeroum should fall into the hands of the Russians. This strange and indeed almost impossible view of the case is further confirmed by the dispatch of Lord Panmure to General Vivian. Nothing could be more curious than the distinction drawn by this English Minister between his own Crimean expedition and the Mingrelian expedition intended by the Porte. Because the civilized Governments of the West had ventured upon a headlong coup de main against Sevastopol, the barbarians of the East must not undertake a "deliberate" expedition against Georgia. The forces enumerated in the Turkish plan he scatters to the winds, and laughs at the notion that Turkey possessed any army fit for operations, except the one pent up in the Crimea. What, then, after all, was the meaning of the hectoring and bullying instructions as to reenforcements with which the British Government worried the poor Porte? Was it to read well in a Blue Book on "The fall of Kars?"

Written about March 25, 1856

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4671, April 8, 1856 as a leading article

---

\(^{a}\) Abdul Mejid.— Ed.
Karl Marx

THE FRANCE OF BONAPARTE THE LITTLE

The France of Bonaparte the Little, revelling at the birth of a son\(^a\) of a Montijo, lavishing the treasures of a nation on a ludicrous pageantry, “all cinquant, all in gold, like heathen gods,”\(^b\) that France is terribly contrasting with the France tortured at Cayenne, smarting at Lambessa, lingering at Belle-Île,\(^c\) and rotting in the Bagne—with the France starving in the Crimea and the France in France reeling on the brink of bankruptcy.

In the letter of Citizen Tassilier, literally translated from the original,\(^d\) the reader will find the genuine and soul-stirring story of the French citizens transported to Cayenne. The press of true-born British flunkeyism, it is true, trumpets into the ears of the drowsy world in most hyperbolical flourish the great news of the boundless magnanimity and rather superhuman clemency of the sausage-hero of the camp of Satory\(^e\) proclaiming a general amnesty\(^d\) and deafening the first screams of his testy baby by the shouts of thousands of Frenchmen given back to their families and to liberty.

But turning away from the paid exaltation of the sycophant, let us harken to the un bribed language of facts. Boustrapa\(^e\) offers the men he has tortured during four years, to tear asunder their chains, on the condition of their consenting to brand themselves

\(^a\) Prince Eugène, titled King of Algeria (born March 16, 1856).—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) Shakespeare, \textit{Henry VIII}, Act I, Scene 1.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^c\) \textit{The People's Paper} has the following editorial note here: “M. Tassilier’s letter we are forced to postpone till next week, from want of space. We direct the particular attention of all our readers to it.” Marx’s translation of the letter was published in \textit{The People's Paper}, No. 206, April 12, 1856.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^d\) The \textit{New-York Daily Tribune} has: “superhuman clemency of Louis Bonaparte, proclaiming a general amnesty.”—\textit{Ed.}

\(^e\) A nickname of Louis Bonaparte, formed of the first syllables of Boulogne, Strasbourg and Paris, the cities where Bonapartist coups were staged in August 1840, October 1836 and December 1851, respectively. The \textit{New-York Daily Tribune} everywhere has “Bonaparte” instead of “Boustrapa.”—\textit{Ed.}
with indelible infamy, and to pass through the *furcae Caudinae* of the lower empire. If they will declare *loyal submission* to the empire, that is, sanctify the *coup d'état*, and abnegate the Republic—if they will sell their souls, Boustrapa is ready to sell them their lives.

"Already," says the *Moniteur*, "at the inauguration of the empire, this generous appeal has been made."

Thus, the *Moniteur* itself avows that the general amnesty, now puffed as a stupendous novelty, is but a repetition of a stale farce played off four years ago. The genius of corruption flatters himself that his victims are now brought down to his own level, that they are sufficiently broken in to accept as a grace in 1856 what they indignantly resented as an affront in 1852.

The *Moniteur* decks its "generous appeal" to meanness with wisely calculated forgeries and falsifications. It pretends that after the events of June 1848, 11,000 persons having been condemned to transportation to Algiers, the clemency of the President left only 306 in Africa. Now, with the same *Moniteur* in our hand, we assert that from the 11,000 prisoners made in June 1848, there remained in November 1848, at the time when the Assemblée Constituante discussed the execution of the decree of transportation, only 1,700; that 1,500 of them were sent to Belle-Île, and on the 8th March, 1849, under the ministry of O. Barrot, 700 out of these 1,500 were directed to Bona, in Africa. It is then this last figure of 700 that the grace of Boustrapa has reduced to 306, and not as his lying *Moniteur* has it, the enormous number of 11,000, and that small grace itself was only a trick played off against the assembly. However, we are obliged to thank the *Moniteur* for having reminded France of the atrocious infamies committed by Cavaignac and the Bourgeois Republic.

As to the transported and exiled of December, the same *Moniteur* computes their number at 11,201, and affirms that this is now reduced to 1,058. Now, the *coup d'état* made more than 11,000 victims in the sole departments of the Lower Alps, Hérault, Var and Nièvre, and at this very moment there remain at least 12,000 victims doomed to exile or deportation. It is notorious that the *coup d'état* has affected more than 50,000 persons. It should be further remarked that the "generous appeal" of the *Moniteur* is exclusively addressed to those deported to Algiers and other

---

*a* *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 80, March 20, 1856.—*Ed.*

*b* The *New-York Daily Tribune* has: "the official journal itself".—*Ed.*

*c* The *New-York Daily Tribune* has: "to humbly accept".—*Ed.*

*d* This sentence does not occur in the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—*Ed.*
foreign possessions, the slightest allusion being avoided to the condemned of Angers, the incarcerated for participation in secret societies, to those thrown into the Bagne by the ambulant war councils of 1851, to the prisoners of Belle-Île, to the students locked up for hissing the paid white-washers of Boustrapa, etc. By way of compensation, the Moniteur announces an unsophisticated and unconditional amnesty for poachers, smugglers, forgers, thieves, deserters, convicts, and id genus omne. It is quite in keeping with the character of the Lower Empire and the precedents of the Brummagem Bonaparte, that the birth of a son should prove a holiday for all the lower relations of the father.

From the victims of the coup d'état we pass now to its tools, from the men who opposed it to the slaves that executed it, from the soldiers of liberty to the army of the Crimea. If it is a great historical sign that Bonaparte, in midst of the fresh delusions of a new fangled dynasty, and the supreme triumph of his admittance into the embalmed air of rancid legitimacy, still wants to be acknowledged by his wretched victims, and, therefore, hypocritically bids for their adhesion to the empire, it is a trait of historical irony, not less notable that at the very time the head and the members of the society of the 10th December are feasting the success of the coup d'état in pompous profusion at Paris, the army that imposed this disgusting rule upon France is expiating its crime in the Crimea by denudation, starvation, agony and death in their most dismal and hideous forms.

In the first period of the Oriental campaign, from November 1854, to March 1855, the upstart of December was extolled as a second providence and in every tune was sung the admirable military administration of the empire of all the glories, in contrast to the scandalous sufferings that befell the English army from intentional treason at home and the natural working of a superannuated system. But, as in every other feat of the Lower Empire, what was taken for a substance, was but a theatrical phantasmagoria calculated for immediate stage effect. During two years Bonaparte had been exclusively bent on preparing for war. He had strained every nerve of the immense power of centralised

---

\[a\] Le Moniteur universel, No. 81, March 21, 1856. Id genus omne means "all persons of that sort".—Ed.

\[b\] This word does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.

\[c\] Instead of the words "for their adhesion to the empire" the New-York Daily Tribune has "the acknowledgement".—Ed.

\[d\] The words "intentional treason at home and" do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
France to provide for the first movement of his army. Indeed, it is not to be wondered at, that even the wretched adventurer of Strassburg and Boulogne should not succeed, during the first two years of his misrule, in breaking down the admirable organisation of the French army, bequeathed by the first revolution. It is a miracle that he has contrived that point in the first two years of actual warfare. Having lavished more wealth on a Batrachomyomachia of his own, than the Great Napoleon in fifteen years of his Iliad, he finds at the beginning of the third year the resources of France drained, her military administration broken up, and her very army dwindling away from misery. The cancer that eats up the French army is the organic principle of the Lower Empire—theft and embezzlement; and but two years were needed to make its work appear on the surface.

The wretched state of the French army was for a long time carefully concealed not only in the French but also in the English press. Now-a-days it has become a secret running the streets and encumbering the thoroughfares. It has become a truth no longer controverted after Bonaparte's own Moniteur has given it the lie direct. For the present purpose it will suffice to quote from the last letter of the Times' Sebastopol correspondent:

"The French army, however, numerous as they may show it to be on paper, is dwindling sadly; scurvy and fever are playing havoc in its ranks: I recently stated its daily loss at 170 men ... now the French admit the daily mortality in their army to be 120 men, and in some days considerably more. The right wing of the army, in the Baidar valley, suffers the most.... When the mild weather sets in, a great increase of disease is to be anticipated.... The sick returns of the French will be terrible.... The French army is being expended at least as rapidly as it was by shell and shot during the severest part of the siege."

Insufficiency of shelter, want of covering, and the scarcity of food are pointed at as the principal causes of their trials. Having described the rigour of the weather, "tubs of water in the huts having frozen to a depth of 3 inches," and the prevalence of

---

\(^a\) The New-York Daily Tribune has: "He had strained every nerve of the centralized power of France to provide for the first movements of his army—then the main prop of his usurpation and which had not yet served his turn." — Ed.

\(^b\) The New-York Daily Tribune has: "Having lavished more wealth in that short struggle than the great Napoleon in the fifteen years of his warfare...." — Ed.

\(^c\) This refers to reports published in Le Moniteur universel, Nos. 84 and 85, March 24 and 25, 1856. In the New-York Daily Tribune this sentence does not occur.— Ed.

\(^d\) Here and below Marx quotes from a report by W. H. Russell published in The Times, No. 22324, March 25, 1856. — Ed.

\(^e\) In the New-York Daily Tribune the words "principally of wine and vegetables" are added here.— Ed.
snow-storms which "allowed few huts to remain in which the snow did not make its appearance in great quantities," the correspond-
ent puts the question what the French army must have suffered in tents not huts carefully fitted out, not double tents well dug out, but single and unprotected tents. He concludes by stating that "it is really painful to meet the French convoys of sick," and that Marshal Pélissier is more anxious to hide them from the English army than to mitigate their sufferings.

We add another quotation from The Morning Advertiser, the very paper that shared with The Morning Post the infamous privilege of hailing Bonaparte’s advent in 1851 and of still trumpeting Lord Palmerston as the truly English minister:—

"There are 3,000 sick in the French camp of the Chernaya—the ambulances are choked and the medical staff decimated by disease and exhaustion—the commissariat has broken down, and is unable to feed the troops—the men are actually begging biscuits from the soldiers at the outposts—scurvy from the want of vegetables, and typhus from the want of meat, rage with indomitable virulence—and the contrast between the two armies is the source of open discontent on the part of the French soldiery. The transports are insufficient to convey the sick to Constantinople—the hospitals there have more than 12,000 patients in them—the epidemic is a positive pestilence—and the mortality frightful—the troop-ships arriving from the east at Marseilles are loaded with the dregs of fever, and the vessels and the typhoid patients are consigned to the lazaretto at Frioul." a

What is to be done with this withering army? b are they to be soothed by recitals of the Arabian tale of the King of Algiers’ "nativity"? or by the description of the embroidered and gold-laced uniforms of the cautious hero’s pampered guards? It should be recollected that French soldiers have no stomach for undergoing injuries like English privates. Proof, if proof be wanted, the several attempts made in the French army to shoot General Pélissier, a fact recorded by the Gazette de Milan, c Radetzky’s Moniteur. Nor must it be imagined that the army of the line in France remains a dull spectator of the Crimean tragedy. The razzias of the Paris police are beginning to affect the barracks. d The Zouaves ordered to Paris to chafe public en-

---

a The quotation from The Morning Advertiser and the preceding paragraph do not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune.—Ed.
b Instead of this sentence the New-York Daily Tribune and New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune have: "What is to be done with these discontented legions, dying from a wretched commissariat, scandalous neglect, and notoriously organized plunder?"—Ed.
c Gazzetta Ufficiale di Milano.—Ed.
d Instead of this sentence the New-York Daily Tribune has: "The razzias of the Paris police have lately been directed at two barracks situated on the right bank of the Seine."—Ed.
thusiasm by their exhibition are already removed from the capital, they having become suspicious. Two other regiments returned from the Crimea have also been banished into the provinces. The antagonism between the guard and the line is daily growing more embittered, Bonaparte being about to create at this very moment new guard regiments in sufficient numbers to enable this privileged corps to keep the garrison of Paris, exclusive of the regiments of the line. Having bribed the army into antagonism to the country, he is now trying to bribe an army within the army—a rather dangerous experiment this.

The Finances—we would not call them the heels of this strange Achilles, he being rather tall at his heels—require a separate article for a full exposition. For the present it may suffice to state that the funds falling somewhat hence, it was consequently expected the announced conclusion of peace, and the birth of another Bonaparte could not fail to send them up. Such an issue was not quite left to chance. Not only the Government gave orders to freely use the public chests at its disposal for the purchase of public funds, but the crédit mobilier, and similar mushrooms of Bonapartist credit were, during two consecutive days, largely employed in buying stock. All these manoeuvres notwithstanding, on the very news of the “nativity,” instead of rising, the funds went down, and continue to go down. Bonaparte, in great rage now, prohibited the sale on Change of any but governmental quoted papers, and had then the principal stockjobber summoned to the Préfecture de Police.

When the statuary of Pallas Athene tumbled down in the Parthenon, such an accident told fatal tidings to the Republic of Athens. Bonaparte's bust, tottering on its pedestal in the Synagogue, where the marketable value of governments is settled, and the peoples' history discounted, presages the downfall of the Empire of Agio.

Written about April 1, 1856
First published in The People's Paper, No. 205, April 5, 1856 (signed: K. M.) and simultaneously in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4676, April 14, 1856, reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1136, April 15, 1856 as a leading article

---
a The preceding sentence does not occur in the New-York Daily Tribune. The paragraph begins as follows: “As for the finances of France, it may suffice to state...”—Ed.

b The New-York Daily Tribune has: “in the temple”—Ed.
Karl Marx

THE FALL OF KARS
Written in late March and April 1856

First published in *The People's Paper*, Nos. 205, 206, 207 and 208, April 5, 12, 19 and 26, 1856

Signed: *Karl Marx*
The fall of Kars is the turning-point in the history of the sham-war against Russia. Without the fall of Kars no Five Points, no Conferences, no treaty of Paris, in one word: no sham peace. Then if we can prove from the Government's own Blue Book—a carefully cooked, as it is mutilated by extracts, deformed by omissions, plastered and patched up by falsifications—that Lord Palmerston's cabinet has planned from the beginning, and systematically carried out to the end, the fall of Kars, the veil is lifted and the drama of the Oriental War with all its startling incidents emerges from the mist diplomatically wrapt around it.

Towards the end of May, 1855, General Williams reports to Lord Redcliffe, who reports to Lord Clarendon, that

"a large force, consisting of 28,000 infantry, 7,500 cavalry, and 64 pieces of artillery, was assembled round Gumri, and that the Mushir had received information of the intention of the enemy to attack Kars. We have in that entrenched camp 13,900 infantry, 1,500 cavalry, 1,500 artillerymen and 42 field pieces."

Seven days later, on June 3rd, Williams informed Clarendon:

"I have now four months provisions in the garrison of Kars, and I trust the central government, and the allies, will soon prove to this remnant of an army that it is not absolutely forgotten by them."

This despatch (see Kars papers, No. 231) was received in Downing-street, on June 25th. On that day, consequently, the

---

\[a\] Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars, London, 1856. Documents from this book are quoted below.—Ed.

\[b\] Vassif Pasha.—Ed.

\[c\] 10 Downing Street is the official residence of the British Prime Minister.—Ed.
British government knew that on Oct. 3rd, Kars must fall if not relieved; and this knowledge became the basis of its operations.

On July 11th, Lord Clarendon receives three despatches from General Williams, dated June 15th, 17th, and 19th, stating severally that a skirmish of the advanced posts had taken place; that on the 16th of June a regular attack of the entrenched camp by the Russians had been gallantly repulsed by the Turks, and lastly that the enemy had made a flank march upon the entrenched camp, and established himself in force (30,000) within an hour’s march of the weakest point of the Turkish position. Williams concludes the last of these despatches with the following words:

"Unfortunately we have no irregular cavalry. ... The enemy has already partially interrupted our communications with Erzeroum."

When the same news reached Constantinople, Lord Redcliffe was invited to a Conference at the Grand Vizier’s house on the Bosphorus. It was proposed by the Turkish ministers to relieve Kars by an expedition from Redout Kaleb by Kutais into Georgia, the force to consist of—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contingent</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vivian’s Contingent</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beatson’s</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batoum Garrison</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanians</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Bulgaria</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Regular Cavalry</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunis Horse</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** ........................................ 43,400

The Porte expressed its readiness to entrust the direction of this expedition to a British commander, and to accept General Vivian in that capacity. This proposition reached Lord Clarendon on July 11th. On July 12th, Lord Redcliffe further informed him by telegraph that

"Preparations for an eventual expedition [...] are in progress. It might save much valuable time if you would inform me at once by telegraph whether government is prepared to sanction a powerful diversion by Redout Kaleb and Kutais into Georgia."

From June 25th to July 12th the British government, apprised of the danger of Kars, moved not a finger to come to the rescue,

---

a Ali Mehemet Pasha.—*Ed.*
not once was the telegraph set in motion; from the very day, however, when there is some Turkish plan for the relief of Kars to be thwarted, they suddenly are all activity. On July 13th (see No. 248 of Kars papers) Clarendon addresses a despatch to Redcliffe to this effect:

"Her Majesty's government are of opinion that the wiser course would be to send reinforcements to the rear of the Turkish army, instead of sending an expedition to the rear of the Russian army. The reinforcements might go to Trebizond, and be directed from thence upon Erzeroum. The distance from Trebizond to Erzeroum is less than from Redout Kaleh to Tiflis, and the march is through a friendly instead of through a hostile country; and at Erzeroum the army would meet supporting friends instead of opposing enemies, and supplies instead of famine. If the army at Kars cannot maintain that position against the Russians, it should fall back upon Erzeroum, and the whole Turkish force should be concentrated there. If the Russians are to be defeated, it will be easier to defeat them by the whole force collected than by divided portions of that force; and a defeat would be the more decisive, the further it took place within the Turkish frontier."

On the day following the receipt of Redcliffe's telegraphic despatch, Clarendon becomes still more liberal, adding Erzeroum also to the list of places to be fallen back from.

(Telegraphic.)

"The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe,
Foreign Office, July 14th, 1855.

"The plan for reinforcing the army at Kars contained in your despatches of 30th June, and 1st instant (should be the 12th inst.) is disapproved. The reasons will be sent by the messenger to-day against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for service. Trebizond ought to be the base of operations, and if the Turkish army of Kars and Erzeroum cannot hold out at the latter place against the Russians, it might fall back upon Trebizond where it would easily be reinforced."

If Kars is the key to Erzeroum, Erzeroum is the key to Constantinople, and the central point of the strategical and commercial lines of Anatolia. Kars and Erzeroum once in the hands of Russia, the British land-trade, via Trebizond to Persia, is cut off. The British Government, aware of all these circumstances, coolly advises the Porte to surrender the keys of its house in Asia, when scarcely one of the two was in danger, and invites the besieged army of Kars to come to the reinforcements forbidden to come to the besieged army. "If," says his lordship, "the Russians are to be defeated" (where is the necessity? he seems to ask) he thinks a defeat would be the more decisive and easy the further it took place within the Turkish frontier, i.e., the more strong places and territory are surrendered to the Russians, and, in fact, the nearer behind Constantinople.
These despatches of Lord Clarendon are worthily backed by the following despatch from my lord "Take care of Dowb" Pam-mure, the English Carnot, to Lieutenant-General Vivian:—

"Lord Panmure, to Lieut.-General Vivian,
"War-Department, July 14, 1855.

"Sir,—I transmit, herewith, for your information, a copy of a despatch which the Earl of Clarendon has addressed by the present opportunity to her Majesty's embassy at Constantinople, on the subject of the plan proposed by the Porte for the relief of the Turkish army at Kars, and I have to acquaint you that I entirely concur in all that is said in that despatch as to the objectionable character of the plan proposed by the Porte. I place such full reliance on your professional ability, that I feel no anxiety lest you should undertake any expedition of a nature so wild and undigested as that contemplated by the Porte. Whilst it is your duty to give every aid in your power, not simply as commanding the Contingent, but, as a British officer enjoying the confidence of her Majesty's Government, to our allies the Turks, it is at the same time necessary that you should be cautious in not risking the honour of the British name and your own reputation, by undertaking military operations for which proper basis has not been laid down, communications opened, supplies arranged, and transportation provided. A coup de main by means of suddenly throwing an army on the coast to threaten, or even to attack, an enemy's stronghold is one thing; but a deliberate expedition to invade an enemy's country, and on his own territory, to make war upon him, is quite another. In the first case something may be hazarded; but in the other every preparation must precede action. Moreover, from all the information which has reached me, I have every reason to believe the army of Batoum to be in a deplorable state. I know the Contingent to be scarcely organised; of the Bulgarian troops you have no knowledge, and I presume that Beatson horse are as little reduced to control and discipline as your own troops. In short I am assured that it would be madness to attempt to succour Brigadier-General Williams in this way. It is too late to regret the policy which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits: but it would only be opening the way to fresh failures to follow out such schemes as have been proposed for the purpose of relieving him. You must, as I have no doubt you feel, lose no time in getting your force into order for service which will be sure to await you somewhere, as soon as you are ready for it; but organisation is as necessary for an army as endurance and valour, and without the former, the latter qualities are utterly availing."

This despatch puts down Lord Palmerston's war minister a regular clown, useful only for the amusement of his master. To threaten, "or even" to attack, the stronghold of Sebastopol, where Russia had accumulated the defensive labour of twenty years, appears to him one thing very sensible, because it was a needless coup de main on the part of the allies; but a "deliberate invasion" on the part of the Porte, of an enemy's country with the purpose of beating him—"Dowb" never heard of such a thing. He entirely concurs with Clarendon in opinion that, to strengthen the rear of one's own army, instead of acting in the rear of the enemy, is the true essence of strategy—a point we may leave him to settle with
Napoleon I, Jomini, and all other great strategists. He also concurs with his friend in thinking, that in warfare an army must never march through hostile, but always through friendly countries—"with supplies instead of famine"—the true philosophy of the trencher-knife. But through the complacent silliness of the clown we catch a glimpse of the mind that moves him! or could it be given to poor Dowb, to make the discovery that Georgia was a hostile, instead of a friendly country—Georgia, Russia's Poland in the Caucasus.

The Turkish proposal which Dowb styles wild and ill-digested, was, in its general conception, bold, correct, we may say the only strategical idea given birth to in the whole war. It reduced itself to taking up an eccentric position with respect to the besieging army, to menace Tiflis, the centre of the Russian power in Asia, and to force Muravieff to retreat from Kars by the threat of becoming cut off from his basis of operations and line of communications. Such a Mingrelian expedition bade fair not only to relieve Kars, but to afford the opportunity of advancing offensively on all parts, and thus to gain the greatest point in all warfare—viz., to throw the enemy on the defensive. But the danger being urgent, such a plan, to result in success, required to be pushed on vigorously, with a sufficient force, and abundant means of supply and transport. Having in his immediate rear Gumri, as his first base of operations, a fortress directly calculated for the defensive against the Turkish territory, Muravieff was enabled to keep his position, till convinced of an advance upon Tiflis really becoming dangerous. To assume that character there was required a descent on the Circassian Coast of at least 55,000, the capture of Kutais, and the forcing of the pass of Gori. Omer Pasha, who, at a later period, undertook the same expedition at the head of 36,000 men, mustered on the Rioni hardly 18,000 to 20,000.

There can exist no doubt that an army of 20,000 men at Erzeroum would have been more useful than one of only 40,000 in Mingrelia. On the other hand it should not be forgotten that at the time when the Porte made its proposal, the Russians at Tiflis, according to the Blue Book itself, amounted to only 15,000 men, and Bebutoff with his reinforcements had not yet arrived. Besides, the movement of an army sufficiently large for its purposes from Trebizond to Erzeroum, and thence to Kars, with supplies, ammunition, and guns, would have cost, on Omer Pasha's assurance, exactly four months. Lastly, if the Porte proposed a right plan, with insufficient means, it was the part of
its ally to provide the right means, and not to suggest a false plan. Sixty-thousand Turks were at that time pent up in the Crimea, in inactivity—and those the only effective troops of Turkey.

"At Batoum, Sukum Kaleh, and other neighbouring stations on the coast," writes Lord Redcliffe, under date 28th June, "it would be extremely difficult to muster more than 11,000 men.... The other parts of the empire (Bulgaria excepted), afford no additional reserves, with the exception of Bosnia, where it is still possible that a few thousand men might be detached; I speak of regulars, Bashi-bazouks may be procured, but your lordship knows what little dependency is to be placed on such undisciplined hordes.... In Bulgaria I question the existence of more than 50,000 men, including garrisons.[...] Austria, it is true, has declared her intention of considering the passage of the Danube by Russia a *casus belli*—and she also stands pledged to the exclusion of that power from the Danubian Principalities; but the resolution which in such an emergency would enable the Porte to take its line upon those assurances, and to overlook the awkwardness of leaving an important position inadequately defended is more fit to be admired than likely to be embraced."

What troops, then, remained at the disposal of the Porte, save the Anglo-Turkish Contingent? and this, as results from the despatches of Clarendon and Panmure, was only a contrivance to withhold from the Porte its last available force.

But did the British Government oppose any plan of theirs to the Turkish one? Was it in any way bent on sending the Anglo-Turkish Contingent to Trebizond, and thence to Erzeroum or Kars? In his despatch dated July 14th, Clarendon declares himself "against employing the Turkish Contingent until it is fit for service." If unfit for service, it was as unfit for the Erzeroum expedition as for the Mingrelian one. Clown Panmure, in his despatch of the same day, writes to Vivian, the commander of the Contingent:—"You must lose no time in getting your force into order for service, which will be sure to await you *somewhere*, as soon as you are ready for it"—thus summoning him to be ready not for an immediate service, not for Erzeroum, but *somewhere*—that is, *nowhere*. Still, on Sept. 7th (see No. 302 of Papers), Clarendon considers the Anglo-Turkish Contingent so little organised as to be unfit to encamp in the entrenched lines before Sebastopol. It is thus evident that the British Government brings forth the Erzeroum plan, not to execute it, but to thwart the Mingrelian expedition of the Porte. It was not opposed to a certain plan for the relief of Kars, but to any plan. "It would be madness to attempt to succour the army of Brigadier-General Williams.... It is too late to regret the policy"(Palmerston's policy) "which has left that gallant officer and his army exposed to such straits," said Panmure to Vivian. It is too late to do anything but
surrender Kars to Russia, and Erzeroum into the bargain, says Clarendon to Redcliffe. Not only was this plan settled by the Palmerstonian Government as early as July 13th, but it is confessed in the Blue Book, and not a moment shall we see them swerving from it.

From No. 254 to 277 of the Kars Papers every despatch of Redcliffe during July exhibits the Porte busily engaged in the preparations for Vivian's Mingrelian expedition. How came this to pass?

On the 12th July, 1855, as will be remembered, Lord Redcliffe telegraphed to the Earl of Clarendon that the preparations for the Mingrelian expedition, under General Vivian were in progress, and "to save much valuable time," he applied for Government instructions to be sent by telegraph. Consequently, by telegraph, Clarendon despatches his protest against the Turkish plan, but, although this message bears the inscription of July 14th on its front, it does not reach Constantinople till July 30th, when we find Lord Redcliffe writing again to Clarendon:

The unfavourable judgment passed by Her Majesty's Government on the plans which have lately been under discussion, with a view to the relief of the Sultan's army at Kars, has naturally increased the Porte's embarrassment. It was my duty to make it known to the Turkish Ministers, not only as an opinion, but, with respect to General Vivian's Contingent, as a veto. A most serious dilemma is the immediate result. Her Majesty's Government not only withheld the Contingent, but express a decided preference for the alternative of sending reinforcements to Erzeroum by way of Trebizond. This opinion is not adopted by the Porte, or indeed by any official or personal authority here. The Seraskier, Omer Pasha, General Guyon, and our own officers[,] agree with the Porte, and the French Embassy, in preferring a diversion on the side of Redout Kaleh, as offering better chances of success, supposing, of course, the necessary means of transport, supply, and other indispensable wants, can be sufficiently provided.... Meanwhile, the advices from Kars are not encouraging, and time of precious value is unnecessarily wasted in doubt and uncertainty.

The way from Constantinople to London being not a whit longer than the way from London to Constantinople, it is a very curious fact indeed that Redcliffe's telegraphic despatch, leaving Constantinople on July 12th, should reach London on the 14th of that month, while Lord Clarendon's despatch, leaving London on July 14th, should reach Constantinople only on the 30th, or about that date. Redcliffe, in his despatch of July 19th, complains of the silence of the Government whom he had entreated "to lose no time in making known its pleasure." From a later despatch, dated

---

a Abdül Mejid.— Ed.
b Rushdi Pasha. "Seraskier" means "War Minister".— Ed.
July 23rd, we learn that he had received no answer even then. In fact, the receipt of the answer is not acknowledged, as we have said, before the 30th. There can exist, then, no doubt that the London date of the Clarendon despatch is false, and that it was not sent until weeks after the date given in the Blue Book. This falsification betrays the aim of the delay. Time of precious value was to be wasted, doubt and uncertainty were to be engendered, and above all, the Porte was to kill the whole of the month of July with preparations for Vivian's expedition, which the British Government was determined should not take place.
The strategic scruples of the British Government not allowing it to settle, during the interval of three months, its views of the great operations to be undertaken by the Porte, nothing would seem more fair and urgent than that it should have sent in the meantime, on its own responsibility, a small detachment via Erzeroum, to re-open the communications between that town and Kars. The allies were masters of the Black Sea, and the British Government had at its uncontrolled disposition General Beatson’s 4,000 Bashi-bazouks, the only effective corps of Turkish irregular horse. Once landed at Trebizond they might have reached Erzeroum in ten days, escorting provisions to Kars, and thus enabling that fortress to prolong its resistance to from four to six weeks, when the severe Armenian winter setting in, all offensive movements on the part of the besiegers would have been stopped. General Beatson wrote to Redcliffe on the 7th July, applying to be sent on active service.

No notice was taken of his memorial. On the 14th of August petitions were presented by the troops themselves, praying that they might not be inactive, but be despatched to Asia. They received no answer whatever. Beatson ventured upon a third remonstrance on September 12. The forbearance of the British Government being now exhausted by the harassing importunities of the indiscreet petitioner, some diplomatic-military intrigues were set on foot, crowned by Beatson’s dismissal from the service. As Beatson himself was dismissed from the service, so all his communications with the Government are dismissed from the Blue Book.
We have seen how stubbornly the British Government was bent on an expedition to Erzeroum via Trebizond. On the news of the Russians having established themselves on the high-road between Erzeroum and Kars, and cut off a portion of the provisions collected for the Kars army, some spontaneous efforts at immediate relief were risked from Trebizond, behind the back of the British Embassy. In Redcliffe’s despatch, dated July 16th, 1855, is enclosed a report from Vice-Consul Stevens, to this effect:

“Trebizond, July 9, 1855. My Lord,—I have the honour to report that [...] Hafiz Pasha left for Erzeroum yesterday with 300 artillermen and 20 field-pieces. A large force of irregulars, which may reach the number of 10,000, is now assembling, and will march to-day for the same place. (signed, Stevens.)”

Redcliffe, as in duty bound, forthwith asks for explanations, on the Seraskier’s silence with regard to the collection of 10,000 irregulars at Trebizond, and the advance of Hafiz Pasha for Erzeroum.

“All that I had heard on the subject from his Excellency,” he complains, “is that Toussoum Pasha was directed to go to Trebizond, and thence perhaps to Sivas, where he would assemble 4,000 irregulars, and proceed with them to the theatre of war.”

By drawing lines between Trebizond, Sivas and Erzeroum, it will be seen that they form an isosceles triangle—the basis of which, viz., the line from Trebizond to Erzeroum, is about one-third shorter than either of the sides. To send, then, reinforcements direct from Trebizond to Erzeroum instead of sending Toussoum Pasha from Constantinople to Trebizond, from Trebizond, “perhaps,” to Sivas, there to waste time in collecting an irregular force, with the view of advancing perhaps upon Erzeroum, was too rash a course not to be rebuked by the British Ambassador. Not daring to tell the Seraskier that the relief of a besieged town depends on a well calculated dilatoriness, he puts him the question:

“May it not be doubtful whether so large a body of Bashi-bazouks suddenly and loosely brought together, may be of any use to any party but the enemy?”

The Seraskier very properly replying,

“that he had insisted on having the necessary funds wherewith to pay them, which was the main instrument of control, and that he had threatened to retire from office, if his demand was not complied with.”

Lord Redcliffe turns at once hard of hearing.

In entering upon the second plan of operations proposed by the Porte, and baffled by its Allies, we tread a maze, where all is meander and no forth-right.
From a despatch of Lieut.-Colonel Simmons's, the British commissioner in Omer Pasha's camp, dated July 15th, addressed to Lord Clarendon, and from Omer's memoranda enclosed in it, the following facts may be collected. On June 23rd Omer Pasha received a letter from General Williams, stating that the communication with Erzeroum was cut off, and requiring in the most pressing terms that reinforcements might be sent to Kars with the least possible delay, or that a powerful diversion might be made on the side of Redout Kaleh. Under date of July 7, Omer Pasha addressed a memorandum to the allied commanders—Simpson and Pélissier—requesting them to assemble a council of the allied generals and admirals commanding-in-chief, in order to come to an immediate resolution. In his memorandum he proposes that,

"he should throw himself, with the part of his army which is here" (at Balaklava) "and at Kertch—25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria, and a proportional artillery—upon some point of the Coast of Circassia, and by menacing from thence the communications of the Russians, oblige them to abandon the siege of Kars."

In support of this proposal, Omer argues that the Ottoman army in Asia, to the number of 10,000 men blockaded in the entrenched camp of Kars by a superior Russian force, is in a position in which it is probable that from want of food it may be obliged to capitulate; that the garrison in Kars is in fact the Ottoman army in Asia; that if the garrison of Kars should yield, Erzeroum, a town, from its situation, difficult to fortify, will fall into the hands of the enemy, by which means he would become master of the communications with Persia, and of a great part of Asia Minor; that by accepting his proposal the Allies will make use of the chief advantages which they possess, viz., the facility of sea transport, and of the only Turkish army that is effective and capable of marching, viz., his own. In answer to that memorandum, Marshal Pélissier and General Simpson write that, "in absence of further information, they consider a conference would be premature." Omer Pasha, however, on July 12th, addresses them again, to inform them that,

"in the meanwhile he had received from his Government a despatch, according to which, the whole of Turkey in Asia, up to the gates of Constantinople itself, is undefended, and entreating him, as every hour is of the greatest value, immediately to find the means, and put in execution the resources necessary to avert the great danger in which the Government of Turkey, and in consequence the cause of the Allies, are placed." "Under these circumstances," he adds, "since I have in the Crimea 60,000 Turks, of whom the greater part are Asians, and whose families and property are exposed to the ravage of the enemy, and since I find that that army is inactive in the Crimea, without prospects of any immediate service that
I can discover, I consider it my duty to my sovereign and the common cause to repeat my former proposal."

Accordingly he invites them to a conference at the English head-quarters. Simultaneously with this common note to the allied generals he caused [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons to address a confidential letter to General Simpson and Admiral Lyons, of which we give the following extract:—

The Porte have proposed to General Vivian to take the Turkish Contingent to Redout Kaleh.... Omer Pasha, however, thinks there will be great risk in sending them there, as the men are not yet acquainted with their officers, the officers do not speak their language, and consequently cannot command them in the field, and the Contingent, although it might form a garrison, cannot yet be in a condition to march into the interior. The force of the Contingent also is small to make the contemplated operation. Omer Pasha also thinks that possessing, as he does, the confidence of the Turks, and being well-known in Asia, where he has had several campaigns, he is more likely to gain the sympathies and assistance of the inhabitants in provisioning and gaining information, [...] than strangers who do not know the language or country.

On July 14th the Conference took place, attended by Omer Pasha, [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, Generals Simpson, Pélissier, and Martimprey, and Admirals Lyons, Bruat, and Stewart. Omer Pasha went into a detailed statement of the Russian forces in Asia, and their operations in the vicinity of Kars. He amply developed the arguments above quoted, and forcibly stuck to the opinion that

"no time was to be lost in preparing a movement to check the progress of the Russians in Asia."

However, as [Lieut.-]Col. Simmons reports to Clarendon,

"the generals and admirals having received no information from their respective ambassadors at Constantinople, which should lead them to believe that the affairs of Asia were in that precarious state in which Omer Pasha, from the information received from his Government, believed them to be," decided that "in the absence of such information they would give no opinion on the subject."

In this instance, then, the allied generals declined giving any opinion on the subject, because they had received no information from their respective Governments. Afterwards, the allied Governments declined giving their orders because their generals had not given their opinion. Rather startled at the cool behaviour of the allied commanders, at their curious tactics of making their incredulity in facts a reason for giving no opinion on them, and at the incivility of giving the lie to his Government, the only one immediately interested in the matter, Omer Pasha, rose at once, and peremptorily declared that,
"under the circumstances, he felt it his duty to proceed to Constantinople for a few days to confer with his Government."

Accordingly, two days later, July 16th, he proceeded to Constantinople, taking with him [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, but being accompanied also by one [Lieut.-]Colonel Suleau, "ostensibly travelling for the purpose of restoring his health" (see enclosure 1 in No. 270 of the Kars papers), but really charged by Pélissier and Simpson with the mission of thwarting Omer Pasha's project. This Suleau, attached to the staff of Simpson, conveyed a letter to Redcliffe from poor General Simpson—the most unlucky warrior ever heard of, as General Evans has it—a—in which that general tells his ambassador not that he and his colleagues did not believe in Omer Pasha's statements, but that "they entertained the strongest objection to the withdrawal of any troops from the Crimea at this moment"—not that they had thought fit to withhold their opinion from Omer Pasha, but that he

"earnestly begs his Excellency to use his powerful influence with the Porte to cause their opinion to prevail over that of his Highness," for "great public interests were at stake," and "serious consequences might result from his success."

Success indeed! It was Omer Pasha's success that troubled Pélissier's sleep, who, up to that period, had nothing to boast of but the disgraceful battle of the 18th of June. Poor Simpson, the unlucky warrior, naturally obtuse, as General Evans affirms his mind to be, was clever enough to catch the uneasiness of his co-commander, and to manage an intrigue in the rear of Omer Pasha, the only manoeuvre he can be said to have executed during the whole Crimean campaign.

In a despatch, dated July 19th, Redcliffe writes to Clarendon that

"the night before last (July 17th) he was surprised to hear that Omer Pasha had arrived suddenly from the Crimea [...] and went straight to the Seraskier."

He chuckles at the rumour reported by the fanariot Pisani, that

"the generalissimo's arrival without the orders of his Government had created some feelings of dissatisfaction," and is under "a strong impression that Omer will best consult the interests of the alliance by returning without unnecessary delay to the command of his forces in the Crimea."

---

a Evans' speech in the House of Commons on February 29, 1856. The Times, No. 22304, March 1, 1856.—Ed.
b Omer Pasha.—Ed.
Notwithstanding Redcliffe's strong impression, Omer Pasha's stay at Constantinople was prolonged from the 17th of July to the beginning of September. It will be seen, by and by, how this waste of time was occasioned.

On July the 23rd, Redcliffe informs Clarendon that

"Omer Pasha [...] had proposed [...] to the Porte to make himself an incursion towards Georgia, starting from Redout Kaleh, and turning Kutais to good account."

This idea had been debated the night before (July 22) in a council at the Grand Vizier's,\(^a\) and the result of the deliberations had been

"that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned manner, under the command of Omer, should be taken from Eupatoria, to the amount of 20,000, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5,000, and that the Contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant space at Eupatoria. By way of alternative, it is proposed, that if the above-mentioned plan be objectionable, it might be so far modified as to take only 10,000 men from the Crimea, and 15,000 from Bulgaria, including those destined to form part of the Contingent."

Now, this despatch, which Clarendon is said to have received on August 1st, on the arrival of which he immediately took occasion to address a despatch to Lord Cowley, the British Ambassador at Paris, is evidently and wilfully misconstrued in its main passage—viz., the passage in which the Porte is stated to have proposed the withdrawal from Eupatoria of 20,000 men, to be placed under the command of Omer Pasha, and their replacement at Eupatoria by the Turkish Contingent. It is this very passage to which Clarendon points in his despatch to Lord Cowley, stating "Her Majesty's Government to be favourably disposed to it," and expressing "his hope that the Government of the Emperor will concur in it." In this passage Eupatoria is interpolated for Balaklava. From the despatch of [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, dated 15th July, received by Clarendon on the 30th July, it will have been seen that Omer Pasha, in his memoranda to the allied generals, and in the war council, insisted upon taking with him that part of his army which is here (Balaklava), which he had brought from Eupatoria, and which he declared the only one fit for the Asiatic campaign. Did Omer Pasha alter his opinion, after arriving at Constantinople? The contrary is shown from a despatch dated August 2nd, in which Simmons states:

"His Highness Omer Pasha informed me that he should be happy to give over to complete the contingent any of the Turkish troops under his command, except

\(^a\) Ali Mehemet Pasha.— Ed.
the division which is now at the camp before Sebastopol, which being composed of his best troops, he is naturally desirous to have with him, if he make the proposed movement to Asia."

Will it be asserted that the Porte in the council of the night of July 22nd, arrived at a resolution contrary to Omer's proposal? In the very despatch of 23rd July in which Redcliff reports the Porte's resolution, he tells Clarendon that,

"Omer Pasha has been most graciously received and most generously rewarded by the Sultan," and adds, "I need not add that he is on excellent terms with his Majesty's ministers, and particularly with the Seraskier Pasha."

Any discrepancy, therefore, between the Porte and its commander-in-chief, is out of the question; both of them appear equally startled on receiving from London the injunction of placing the troops at Eupatoria under Omer's command, and withdrawing from it the troops at Sebastopol and Kertch. What, then, was the intention of the British Government in forging the above passage? To conceal from the public that while exhibiting themselves as the patrons of Omer's project before the French Government, by a mere shuffling of words they substituted for the Porte's own proposal, one directly hostile to it. Thus a new subject of dispute was provided. Matters were embroiled still further, and the occasion was afforded to waste August and September with orders and counter-orders. The false play of the British Government is apparent even in the arrangement of the Blue Book. To confound the reader, Clarendon's despatch to Cowley figures on page 248, followed up from page 248 to 252 by an extract from Redcliffe's despatch of July 19th, Simpson's letter to Redcliffe of July 16th, Omer Pasha's letters and memoranda, and only in the last place by Redcliffe's despatch of July 23rd, of which Clarendon's instruction to Cowley pretends to be the sequel.

We must now stay for a moment in the Foreign-office, Downing-street, there beholding the Earl of Clarendon busily engaged in acting the head clerk of great Palmerston. Two days after the despatch of his message to Redcliffe on July the 16th, he is forwarding to Redcliffe another despatch concluding with the following words:

"Her Majesty's Government would still recommend that whatever force is sent for the relief of the army of Kars should proceed to Trebizond. If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who, we understand, is about to proceed to Constantinople, should determine to take any part of his own army with Tunisians and Albanians, to Redout Kaleh, her Majesty's Government would have nothing to say to that proceeding."
Redcliffe's despatch dated Constantinople, 23rd July, having reached London on August 1st, in exactly nine days, the despatch of Clarendon dated 16th July, again wants more than half a month to reach Constantinople. It had not arrived on July 30th, when Redcliffe wrote that

"her Majesty's Government insisting upon having the reinforcements sent via Trebizond placed the Porte in the most serious dilemma."

Redcliffe, then, was not in possession of Clarendon's despatch, according to which her Majesty's Government have nothing to say to the Redout Kaleh expedition, if undertaken by Omer Pasha himself. It is a feature peculiar to the chronology of this strange diplomatic-military drama that all despatches sure to create delay arrive with the most admirable speed, while all those pretending to recommend speed arrive with the most inexplicable delay. But there is another point quite as startling in Clarendon's last-quoted despatch. While Lord Redcliffe writes from Constantinople, dated July 19th, that he was surprised to learn of Omer Pasha's sudden arrival at Constantinople, on the 16th of July, on the very day Omer Pasha left the Crimea, Clarendon informs Redcliffe, from London, that "he understands Omer to be about to proceed to Constantinople." Omer Pasha himself, we know, adopted this resolution only on July 14th, after the breaking up of the war-council. In the interval from July 14th to the 16th no vessel left Sebastopol for Constantinople, so that Omer was obliged to request Admiral Lyons to place at his disposition her Majesty's ship Valorous. Are we then to understand that while the despatches, the Foreign-office telegraph, from London, require seventeen days to arrive at Constantinople, the despatches it receives from the Crimea convey intelligence of events even before they do happen? Not quite so. There was the submarine telegraph from Sebastopol to Varna, and the telegraph from Varna to London; so that Clarendon may have had direct intelligence the very day of the war-council's sitting. But where is this telegraphic despatch dated Sebastopol? Certainly not in the Blue Book. It is simply suppressed. And why? The same electric wire which informed Clarendon of Omer Pasha's intended departure must have informed him of the resistance he met with on the part of Pélissier, that is on the part of the French Government. Thus the question would naturally arise why Clarendon quietly waited from 16th July to the 1st of August to break the matter to the French Government, and to commence negotiations with it on the point on which the whole campaign depended? To prevent this question
the telegraphic despatch has disappeared. But having suppressed that despatch from the Crimea, why did he insert his own despatch, from London, dated the 16th July? As no trace can be discovered of the latter ever having reached Constantinople, its omission would have caused no palpable blank in the Blue Book. A double-edged end was aimed at. On the one hand the readiness of the English Government to relieve Kars was to be paraded in contrast to the difficulties raised by Bonaparte, and the whole odium of the delay to be shifted to his shoulders. On the other hand, Clarendon’s belief in the spurious despatch of the 23rd July, was to be proved by his willingness to leave to Omer Pasha any part of his army, before he was aware of the resolution of the Porte to clog him with the Eupatoria army; having once become aware of this resolution, Clarendon, it is true, did stand upon it, Omer Pasha’s and the Porte’s protests notwithstanding. All the proceedings of Clarendon, his encouraging the Porte to occupy July with Vivian’s expedition, his deferring the negotiations with Bonaparte to August, his substitution in the despatch to Paris a spurious proposition of the Porte, the very acceptance of which by Bonaparte was sure to become a source of further imbroglio in this comedy of errors—all these proceedings tended to the same end—to kill time.
On August 2nd, 1855, Lord Cowley telegraphs from Paris that "Count Walewski foresees objections to the proposal" made by Clarendon in the name of the Porte. Thus the occasion is afforded to the clever Earl of displaying, in a despatch dated August 3rd, his patriotic zeal, and of pressing on the French Government the enormous consequences likely to arise from Kars and Erzeroum falling into the hands of Russia. The following day, Aug. 4th, he receives a despatch from Paris to this effect:


"Paris, August 4, 1855.—The French Government will not oppose the projected expedition to Asia Minor under Omer Pasha, provided that the numbers of the Turkish contingent before Sebastopol are not diminished."

Notwithstanding its conditional form this is the unconditional acceptance of the proposal made by Clarendon on August 1st in the name of the Porte according to which the troops stationed at Eupatoria were to be given over to Omer Pasha, and General Vivian's contingent to replace them there. On the same day Clarendon despatched the following to Redcliffe:

"August 4th.—Omer Pasha can go to relieve Kars, provided he does not diminish his Turkish troops before Sebastopol or disturb the garrison at Yenikale."

The French government had only protested against the diminution of the Turkish troops before Sebastopol. The English government add another clog by sequestrating the Turkish troops at Yenikale too. On August 8th, Clarendon received a letter from General Williams dated Kars, July 14th, stating that General
Muravieff had made close reconnaissances on the 11th and 12th July, and that on the 13th

"he appeared with his whole army on the southern heights above Kars which form the key of our defences, and by the crowning of which Kars was taken in 1828." 433

The letter concludes with the words,

"I have just heard that the Russian general expects reinforcements from Bayazid via Gumri, and that those troops recently expelled from the garrisons of the coast of Circassia are also marching into the interior of Georgia, and may take part in the future operations of Asia Minor." (No. 276)

Having become aware of the reinforcement of the Russians, the zeal of Clarendon for the diminution of the Turkish forces receives a fresh impulse. He immediately sits down to complete his index militum prohibitorum:

"Telegraphic—The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Redcliffe.

"Foreign-office, Aug. 9, 1855.—General Vivian’s contingent to go immediately to Eupatoria. The Turkish troops there 10,000 or 12,000 to go with Omer Pasha to Redout Kaleh. The Turkish troops at Balaklava and Kertch not to be diminished in number. The Turkish force to go to Redout Kaleh under Omer Pasha, to be completed to its proper number by troops from Bulgaria or elsewhere, not from the Crimea."

Here, then, we behold Clarendon again extending the circle of interdiction. Recollecting, from [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons’s despatch of July 15th, that Omer Pasha intended taking with him "the part of his army which is here (Balaklava) and at Kertch—25,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry from Eupatoria and artillery," he now forbids the Porte to touch the garrison at Kertch, and extends Bonaparte’s objection to the removal of Turkish troops from Sebastopol to the whole Crimea—save Eupatoria; and even the number of troops at the latter place dwindles down to 10,000 or 12,000, instead of the 20,000 mentioned in his despatch to the French Government, dated August 1. With a sort of clownish humour he leaves the Porte at liberty to look out for troops "elsewhere." Having filled the bomb at London, he may now quietly await its bursting at Constantinople.

In Clarendon’s despatch to Redcliffe of July 16th, we were struck by this passage: “If, indeed, Omer Pasha, who, we understand, is about to proceed to Constantinople, should

---

433

List of withheld troops.—Ed.
determine to take any part of his own army to Redout Kaleh. Her Majesty's Government have nothing to say to that proceeding.”

Now, from a letter of Fuad Effendi to Redcliffe, dated July 31, from Redcliffe’s answer of August 4, and from Redcliffe’s letter of August 8 (see No. 282 and enclosures), it results that Clarendon's despatch, dated July 16th, had not yet reached Constantinople on August 8. Fuad Pasha states in his letter that what has been begun of the measures (relating to the Mingrelian expedition) had been suspended, in consequence of “the official and categorical answer expected (from London) having not yet been received,” and defends the Turkish plan of a Mingrelian expedition against “the substance of the English despatches,” according to which “the succours must be sent through Erzeroum by way of Trebizond.” Redcliffe, in his answer, dated Aug. 4, tells us that

> "when latterly called upon to declare the opinions of his Government, he performed that duty with a painful sense of the embarrassments which surrounded the Porte,"

increased as they would be by the opinion “he was called upon to declare,” and adds:

> “Though Her Majesty's Government have declared their decided preference for a more direct operation by Trebizond and Erzeroum, their objections to a diversion on the side of Circassia would in all likelihood be modified if the force employed were of a compact or reliable character.”

In his despatch to Clarendon, dated August 8, he complains that the Government

> “still leans with all its weight on Trebizond as the only true chance of relief.... The military authorities are decidedly in favour of it"(the Mingrelian expedition).... “Amidst so many motives to vigorous support of the only practicable scheme of relief, [...] I made no reserve in communicating the adverse opinions of Her Majesty's Government to the Porte.”

Clarendon's answer to this latter despatch of Redcliffe’s (August 20) must be considered from a double point of view—with respect to Redcliffe’s assertion that in his opinion the English Government had resisted the Mingrelian expedition up to August 8, and with respect to the plan which Clarendon forwarded to Paris on August 1 as the Porte's own plan. As to the first point, Clarendon declares (see No. 283):—

> “My various messages by telegraph, and my despatch of the 4th inst., which you will have received since the date of your despatch, will have shown you that Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French, were willing that Omer Pasha should proceed to Asia to effect a diversion for the relief of Kars, and Her Majesty's Government in that case no longer insists upon
the view they had entertained at first, that the relief should be given by way of Trebizond."

With the exception of the despatch of July 14, in which Clarendon protested against the Mingrelian expedition, and summoned the Turks to fall back from Erzeroum and Kars, and his despatch, dated August 9, which Redcliffe, of course, could not have received on August 8, Clarendon had, according to the Blue Book, sent no telegraphic despatch at all. It is therefore a palpable falsehood when he speaks of his "various messages by telegraph" withdrawing the veto of the British Government against the Mingrelian expedition. Why does he not refer to his despatch dated July 16? Because it figures only in the Blue Book, was written only for the Blue Book, and has never left the Foreign-office at Downing-street. Redcliffe, as if aware of the trap laid for him, writes to Clarendon, dated August 13 (No. 286):—

"I have just learnt the contents of your lordship's telegraphic message dated the 9th inst. The sanction given by Her Majesty's Government to the experiment of a diversion on the side of Redout Kaleh will, I doubt not, afford the highest satisfaction as well to the Turkish Ministry as to Omer Pasha. The disappointment occasioned by the terms of the preceding message, which appeared to favour exclusively an advance upon Kars by Trebizond, was evident [...]."

Redcliffe knows nothing of Clarendon's various "despatches by telegraph;" he knows only of the preceding message being "exclusively" in favour of a Trebizond expedition. He means the message of the 13th, backed by the telegraphic message of the 14th of July. He ignores altogether the existence of the message of the 16th of July. We insist upon this point for a simple reason. One glance at the Kars papers will satisfy everybody as to the constant efforts made by the British Government to thwart the projects of the Porte. But the falsifications, forgeries, and lies which we reveal, prove the British Government to have been conscious of foul play, and betray on its part a preconcerted plan, which it dares not openly confess.

Let us now consider Clarendon's despatch of Aug. 20, from another point of view:—

"Omer Pasha," he says, "as commander of the Sultan's troops, will be free to direct his movements in a manner most beneficial to the common cause; and the only limitation placed by the two governments on his proceedings is the condition that the movement in Asia shall not lead to any diminution of the Turkish force employed before Sebastopol and Yenikale, while the Turkish Contingent, under General Vivian, may be made available for filling up the room of the Turkish troops whom Omer Pasha may take with him from Eupatoria."
According to Clarendon's despatch to Paris, dated August 1, the Porte had proposed to place the Eupatoria troops under Omer Pasha while not meddling with the Turkish army before Sebastopol. How can he call the simple acceptance of the Porte's own proposal, "putting a limitation on Omer Pasha's proceedings?" But, on the other hand, could he do otherwise? Since the very despatch of Redcliffe he is answering, reminds him that the Pasha reckons on "17,000 men from Balaklava," 3,000 from Kertch, etc. Thus, what figured in his despatch to Paris as the Porte's own proposal, is now enjoined to the Porte, as the advice of its Western allies.

Up to the 13th of August—just a month after Omer Pasha had proposed to the Allied commanders his Mingrelian expedition—the Porte was labouring under the painful conviction that the British Government objected to it, and all its preparations for the relief of Kars were consequently kept in deadly suspense. On the 13th, at last, it is delivered from that nightmare, and has the satisfaction to understand that its Western allies have accepted the resolution it had come to on July 22nd. It would now, at last, be free to turn its energies against Muravieff, instead of against Clarendon. On the 15th of August, the Ottoman Council was assembled for deliberation as to the most effectual means of succouring Kars. The result of their deliberations is quite as startling as it is unexpected.

"Omer Pasha," Redcliffe says in his despatch to Clarendon, dated August 16th (No. 294), "objects most positively to the plan transmitted from London by telegraph, of stationing the contingent at Eupatoria, and he is not prepared to assume the responsibility of commanding the expedition, unless the Turkish troops before Sebastopol be allowed to form part of it."

Thus we see the Eupatoria plan, pretended to have been sent on the 23rd July to London, is now asserted to have been transmitted on August 9 from London to Constantinople.

On the 16th of August, [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons also addressed a despatch to Clarendon (No. 297):

"I have to inform your Lordship that the Seraskier having received [...] a communication from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to the effect that her Majesty's Government had ordered the Turkish contingent to Eupatoria, placed the communication into the hands of his Highness Omer Pasha, who conceiving that this movement would not enable the Porte to provide the necessary force to make any operation in Asia to save the army of Kars, has drawn up a report for the Seraskier... Omer Pasha, while insisting upon taking with him his troops [...] from Sebastopol, will hand over part of them and the Turkish troops at Kertch to the Anglo-Turkish contingent, such as are required to complete its full complement.... The proposal of the Pasha appears to me the only one which holds out any hope of
saving the army of Kars, subject to the condition which His Highness understands has been imposed by the English and French Governments—that there is to be no material reduction of force in the Crimea, and therefore that the first proposal made by Omer to the Generals, reported in my despatch of July 15th, cannot be put in execution. [...] The Pasha doubts if the expedition will now be in time to save the garrison of Kars, but if not, it will at any rate prevent the enemy from establishing himself in the government of Erzeroum, and there organizing measures for another advance into the interior in the next campaign.”

Omer Pasha’s memorandum to the Seraskier, alluded to in the above despatch of [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, is enclosed in Redcliffe’s letter to Clarendon, dated August 16th. We extract from it the following considerations made by Omer Pasha:

"The troops now at Eupatoria, are composed of different materials, Tunisians and Egyptians, and are deficient of the means of land transport.... They are not capable of taking the field or of manoeuvring.... If the Egyptians were to go to Asia, as it will be necessary to keep the field during the commencement of the winter, coming as they do from a hot climate [...], they could not perform the necessary manoeuvres, and the army being composed of different materials there would be but little chance of success. By the execution of this project the unity of the Ottoman as well as of the English army will be destroyed, and it is to be observed that much of the energy, if not the existence, of an army in warfare depends upon its unity.... The Pasha observes, that every general in warfare ought to consider beforehand the most difficult circumstances in which he may be placed by the events of war, and to provide as far as possible against misfortune. He supposes the case, that the army of Kars is destroyed before his arrival in Asia, and that the Russians had advanced beyond that place, and states that in such a case, being with an army composed of different materials, in which he could not place entire confidence, he would find himself in similar difficulties in which the army of Asia is now placed.

"Every general to whom an operation is confided, ought to consent to the operation, and its mode of execution, in order that he may be made responsible for its conduct [...]. The Anglo-Turkish contingent, if supplied with its full complement from the detachments about to be drafted from Bulgaria and from Kertch, will be almost equal in numbers to the divisions under his command. [...] As far as the numbers of the Allied armies are concerned, there need be no diminution, if his views were acceded to. On the contrary, if the plan, sent from London, were acted upon, the permanent arrangements made by the Seraskier for the supply of the garrison of Eupatoria [...] would be broken up, unavoidable delay must ensue, absolutely new establishments would have to be organized.”

The destruction of the last effective Turkish army, the loss of the unity of the English as well as the Ottoman army, the wilful sacrifice of the Egyptians and Tunisians, the breaking up of the permanent arrangements made for the supply of the Turkish troops at Eupatoria, the creation of unavoidable delay, the ruin of his own military representation, the exposure of the Mingrelian

---

*In Kars Papers: “Turks and Egyptians”.—* *Ed.*
army to the fate of the garrison of Kars—these are, according to Omer Pasha, the natural consequences of the plan sent from London. While communicating to Clarendon this strong protest, Lord Redcliffe evinces not the least suspicion of having himself been the channel through which the Porte is made to have transmitted the identical project to Lord Clarendon.

We have, thus, new and irrefutable proof that the proposal of the Porte, as figuring in the despatch dated July 23rd, is a London forgery, and that Clarendon in submitting it to the acceptance of the French Government in his despatch of August 1st was fully aware of committing an atrocious fraud.

His scheme worked exactly up to his intention, the Porte, at last informed that the British Government consents to the Turkish expedition in general, learns simultaneously, that it objects to all the details required for carrying it out. Having been compelled to waste one month with struggling against Clarendon's Erzeroum plan, it has now to waste the still more precious month of August with resisting his Eupatoria scheme.

In a despatch dated August 20, addressed by Redcliffe to Clarendon, he encloses another memorandum of Omer Pasha, similar in substance to the former one, but with the addition (see No. 296):

"any general undertaking such an operation against all military rules, would sacrifice his military reputation, and he would, moreover, imperil the general alliance. I intend doing neither.

"If I were even to accept this service, it would not serve the object in view."

He represents the troops at Eupatoria "as undisciplined, mixed, and inexperienced soldiers."

On the 26th of August (see No. 298, Simmons to Clarendon) Omer Pasha informs Simmons of the state of things at Kars as reported by an aide-de-camp of the Seraskier, who left Kars on the 5th, and arrived at Constantinople on August 19th,

"At the time of his departure the stores within the town of Kars did not contain more than sufficient provisions for the garrison for one month or five weeks at the outside, and they were not well provided with ammunition. This, however, does not appear of much consequence, as General Muravieff had proclaimed to his army, which, by the reinforcement it has received, is stated now to number about 50,000 men, to reduce the town of Kars by starvation, and to capture the town without firing a shot. The Russians have caused the inhabitants to remove everything in the shape of provisions throughout a district within a radius of 8 hours (28 miles) round Kars as a centre. The forts at Erzeroum consist of 6,000 regular troops, and 12,000 irregulars; but many of the latter are leaving and dispersing. "From Omer Pasha's conversations [...]", says Simmons, "it is evident that the Porte is deeply impressed with the deplorable state of affairs in Asia, and
is almost in despair at the apparent certainty of losing, towards the end of this month or early in September, the garrison of Kars, sixteen thousand men with nearly two hundred pieces of artillery, of which about seventy are field guns.... They are very much grieved and disappointed at the time which has been lost [...]—and that the cabinets of Paris and London, as well as the military authorities in the Crimea, have not considered the subject in that serious aspect in which it presents itself to the Porte, but have objected to the propositions which have hitherto been made with a view to retrieving their position and their preventing the disaster."

On August 21st, at a meeting of the Porte's council (No. 299—Simmons to Clarendon, dated August 23),

"a decision was arrived at to proceed with the utmost vigour and all the means at the disposal of the Porte to carry into execution the plan proposed by Omer Pasha.... A note was agreed upon, to be addressed to the ambassadors of France and England, informing them of the decision of the Porte, and inviting them to obtain the assistance of the fleets of their respective Government to transport the Ottoman troops, with their artillery, baggage, and means of land-transport, to the coast of Asia.... Having done all in their power to effect a movement for the relief of the army of Kars, to recover their position in Asia, they" (the Porte) "considered themselves relieved from the responsibility of any disaster which might happen from the non-execution of any of the plans proposed with that view. The Turkish Government, in order to commence the movement, are now sending their ships to Sizopolis, to begin the embarkation of the troops, etc., but they evidently have entertained some doubt as to taking this decided course, in consequence of the Anglo-Turkish Contingent having received orders from London to proceed to Eupatoria."

Thus the end of August was approaching, the Porte still finds itself clogged in its movements by Clarendon's Eupatoria plan, and its anxiety waxing with the dismal news from Kars, it extorts at last from Redcliffe, who in the meantime had made a trip to Sebastopol, the following telegraphic despatch (No. 290):—

"Lord Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.

"Before Sebastopol, Aug. 26.—I request to be informed definitively and immediately here, whether Omer Pasha may take Turkish troops in whole or in part from Balaklava, provided they be replaced by others of the same numerical force, and whether General Vivian's Contingent is in that case at liberty to take position before Sebastopol, instead of going to Eupatoria. Omer Pasha is expected from day to day. He makes his expedition conditional on the power of acting as above. He has stated plausible reasons for this. If transport can be spared by us the troops may land, it would seem, at Redout Kaleh in about a month. The Russians who threatened Erzeroum have retired by the road to Kars; the Turkish army there is stated to have nearly two months provisions early in August."

---

a É. A. Thouvenel and Stratford de Redcliffe.— Ed.
Clarendon had now succeeded in thwarting, by his Eupatoria plan, all action on the part of the Porte during the whole month of August. Redcliffe’s despatch confirmed the statement of General Williams, that “the provisions of Kars will hardly last to the beginning of September.” By what extraordinary devotion the Turkish garrison at Kars contrived to prolong its existence beyond the term assigned by Williams, will be seen from the following memorandum:—

(Enclosure in No. 315.)

Kars, September 1st, 1855.—“The most is made of our provisions; the soldiers are reduced to half-allowances of bread and meat, or rice-butter. Sometimes 100 drachmas of biscuit instead of bread; nothing besides. No money. Mussulman population, 3,000 rifles, will soon be reduced to starvation. Armenians are ordered to quit the town to-morrow. No barley, scarcely any forage. Cavalry reduced to walking skeletons, and sent out of garrison; artillery horses soon the same. How will the field pieces be moved after that?... What is being done for the relief of this army?

(Signed) Williams.

Clarendon having made sure that the provisions of Kars could not last beyond the first days of October, and being on the other hand assured by Redcliffe that even with the succour of the allied transports Omer Pasha’s troops would not arrive at Redout Kaleh before the first days of October, thinks it no longer dangerous to press on the French Government the acceptance of the Turkish plan. He was informed besides that at the very moment he addressed that Government the assault of Sebastopol was imminent, and Pélissier, therefore, had good reasons not to allow any
change in the composition of the troops before Sebastopol. To hide this knowledge, the despatch of Redcliffe is given in the mutilated shape of an extract. The following is Clarendon's despatch to Lord Cowley:

Foreign Office, Aug. 28, 1855.—"Her Majesty's Government trusts that the Government of the Emperor will agree to the following answer to the despatch from Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, dated Balaklava, Aug. 26th, in which case your excellency will send it on immediately from Lord Panmure to General Simpson, who will inform Viscount de Redcliffe, if he is still at Balaklava:

"Omer Pasha is to be at liberty to take such of his own troops as he pleases, from Balaklava to Asia. They must be replaced in equal numbers by General Vivian's Contingent, or by troops from Eupatoria, as the allied generals may decide; and instructions accordingly must be given in conjunction with the admirals as to transporting them."

(Signed Clarendon.)

Even in this despatch, Clarendon cannot abstain from playing a trick on the Porte. Informed as he was by Omer Pasha's various memoranda that the replacement of his troops before Sebastopol by troops from Eupatoria, would go a great length to spoil his whole plan, he proposes to the French Government, quite en passant, to replace the troops before Sebastopol by Vivian's contingent, or by troops from Eupatoria. The answer from Paris was this:

"Telegraphic.—Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.

"Paris, Aug. 29, 1855.—The Emperor has no objection to the removal of the Turkish troops from Balaklava, and to their being replaced by others, provided that the allied commanders-in-chief have no objection; but he will not take the responsibility upon himself of saying more under these circumstances. I send the telegraphic despatch to General Simpson, inserting, after the word 'Asia,' 'provided that General Pélissier and you have no objection'."

Lord Clarendon's sincere anxiety to hasten the Mingrelian expedition at this supreme moment, shines in overpowering brightness in his despatch of September 7th, sent by ordinary mail to [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, so that it did not arrive till September 23rd. On September 5th he had received the following despatch from [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons. (No. 301.)

"I have to inform your lordship that Omer Pasha has stated to me that he will not be able to leave Constantinople for five or six days, as he is occupied in making the necessary arrangements for the expedition to Asia, and his presence here is absolutely required to complete them." According to the arrangements accepted by the Porte "Omer Pasha hoped to land 50,000 men" and 3,400 horses in Asia, in

a In Kars Papers: "15,000 men".—Ed.
two trips of the Turkish fleet alone, the operation occupying from three weeks to
one month, or for each voyage from ten days to a fortnight.... Omer Pasha is most
desirous that assistance should be given by the allies in conveying the troops and
their material from before Sebastopol, and baggage-horses from Sizopolis, and he
considers the most practicable way in which this could be done, would be by
allowing the English fleet to convey the troops from before Sebastopol to Asia,
after having conveyed the Contingent to Balaklava to replace them."

To this despatch, Clarendon answers in the following strain:—

"The Earl of Clarendon to Lieutenant-Colonel
Simmons.

"The Earl of Clarendon to Lieutenant-Colonel
Simmons.

"Foreign Office, Sept. 7, 1855.

"Sir,—The account of the arrangements proposed by Omer Pasha for the relief
of the army in Asia, which is contained in your despatch of the 26th ult., is
inconsistent with subsequent statements which have reached Her Majesty's
Government. In your despatch you report that Omer Pasha reckons upon taking a
portion of the Turkish troops from before Sebastopol, and replacing them by
General Vivian's Contingent. But it appears, by a despatch of a later date from
General Simpson, that Omer Pasha has given it as his opinion that General Vivian's
Contingent would not be fit to take up a position before Sebastopol until next
spring; and, in consequence of that opinion, and by reason of General Simpson's
protest against having the Contingent sent to him, which protest was founded upon
that opinion, Her Majesty's Government have determined that the Contingent shall
not go to join the army before Sebastopol."

Clarendon.

Let it be remarked that Simpson's, the poor warrior's despatch,
is omitted from the Blue Book, that Omer Pasha's "opinion" is a
changeling, and that the "later date" when Omer expressed his
new opinion contradicting his opinion of the 26th of August,
注定 to be the beginning of July—as will be seen from the
following extract from [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons's despatch,
dated, camp of Kamara, Sep. 23rd, 1855:—

"On this subject I beg to inform your lordship that this opinion was given by
Omer Pasha in a letter to General Simpson early in the month of July ... and
before he was aware of the critical position of the army in Asia. He then stated that
he was strongly of opinion that General Simpson could not contemplate making
use of the Contingent in the open field (en rase campagne) in front of the
enemy.... Lord Raglan had, on several occasions, asked whether I thought it would
be possible to make use of the Contingent to hold the lines of Balaklava, and upon
consulting Omer Pasha upon the subject, he told me that he saw no objection to it,
if his lordship considered it absolutely necessary."

In excavating an opinion of Omer Pasha, given before the
Mingrelian expedition was mooted, in falsifying that opinion and
in foundering upon this falsification a protest, Simpson's "obtuse
mind" followed, of course, the secret instructions received from
London. Poor Simpson was an invention of Palmerston, one of his
golems. Golems, as the German poet Arnim has it, are earth clods, shaped in the human form and infused with a factitious life by the spell of capricious wizards. Supposing Simpson to have written exactly as he is represented to have done in Clarendon’s despatch—a point that becomes questionable from the suppression of his despatch in the Blue Book, Clarendon could not be for a moment in doubt either as to the date or as to the substance of Omer Pasha’s opinion. As early as July 15, Simmons had informed him that in Omer’s opinion “the Contingent, although it might form a garrison, cannot yet be in a condition to march into the interior;” and in a later despatch that “in Balaklava and Kertch the troops of the Contingent will be within fortified lines” and, therefore, not “in the open field.”

The history of Omer Pasha’s Mingrelian campaign is not given in the Blue Book, but enough transpires to denounce the obstacles thrown in its way by the allied governments even at the too late epoch, when they had reluctantly given their consent and captured the south side of Sebastopol.

Simmons writes to Clarendon from the camp at Kamara on Sept. 21, 1855.

“On the 18th inst. General Pélissier consented to the departure of three battalions of Turkish chasseurs hence for Asia. [...] They will be embarked in a day or two for Batoum. Up to the present time General Pélissier has not signified his assent to the departure for Asia of any more of the Ottoman troops now stationed here.”

“In answer to my inquiries at the Porte,” says Redcliffe on Sept. 26th, “I am assured [...] that the passage of troops and the conveyance of provisions are in progress, though slowly, in consequence of the limited command of transport for those purposes. It is impossible not to apprehend that the many changes of plan, the exigencies of our operations at Sebastopol, and heavy demands on the transport-service, concur to diminish the hope of relieving Kars.”

Now the many changes of plan were the work of the British ministry; the exigencies of the operations before Sebastopol a mere pretext, as the allies, after the capture of the town, confined themselves to guarding its ruins; and lastly the want of sufficient transport was produced by the orders issued from Downing-street for the useless transmissions of the Contingent from Varna to Yenikale, Kertch, Eupatoria, and back to the Bosphorus.

The gloom of these forebodings was dispelled for a moment by the meteorlike flash of the victory gained by the Turks over the Russian assaulting columns before Kars on September 29th. In
his despatch of the same date General Williams calls it "a day glorious for the Turkish arms." In his despatch of October 3rd (No. 342), he tells Clarendon,

"During the combat, which lasted nearly seven hours, the Turkish infantry, as well as artillery, fought with the most determined courage; and when it is recollected that they had worked on their entrenchments, and guarded them by night, throughout a period extending to nearly four months—when it is borne in mind that they were ill-clothed and received less than half a ration of bread—that they have remained without pay for 29 months, I think your lordship will admit that they have proved themselves worthy of the admiration of Europe, and established an undoubted claim to be placed among the most distinguished of its troops."

On the receipt of these glad tidings the Porte issued an address to the defenders of Kars (No. 345), in which the following words occur:

"We were conscious of the zeal and intrepidity which animated your excellency, and of the infinite mercy of God, and found consolation in this reflection. On the other hand, we worked day and night in devising means to oblige the enemy to raise the siege, and the joyful tidings of this victory have infused new life into us."

And what an exuberance of life will they not infuse into Clarendon's breast? He who worked day and night in devising means to thwart the means devised by the Porte, how will he not at least profusely scatter the cheap flowers of his rhetorical sympathy! Nothing of the sort. Rather disappointed in his calculations he vents his spleen upon the Porte, in the following short and provokingly ironical despatch (see No. 346):

"...The neglected garrison of Kars will at least have the satisfaction of knowing that their sufferings troubled the ... repose of the Turkish ministers, who, in default of all ordinary means of relief, never ceased to pray for their safety and success."

Clarendon, formerly the silent friend of Aberdeen, figures here as Palmerston's twanging mouthpiece. From the repulse of the Russians before Kars, on September 29th, to the day of its capitulation, on November 24th, there elapsed again nearly two months. How was this time improved by the British Government? First, by withholding from Omer Pasha the necessary transports. On October 6th Mr. Oliphant, the correspondent of the Times, writes from Omer Pasha's camp:

"The Turkish army is gradually assuming a more imposing aspect, and the assent which the allied generals have at length reluctantly given to the despatch of

---

\(^{a}\) The quotation that follows is from Clarendon’s dispatch to Stratford de Redcliffe of November 21, 1855.—*Ed.*
10,000 Turks from Balaklava, will swell it to about 50,000 strong. The principal delay is caused by the slackness of our authorities in the Crimea, who do not provide transport for the conveyance of the troops here, nor seem to care in the least whether they ever get here or not. It is certainly unfortunate that the only serious cause of annoyance which Omer Pasha has felt with respect to this expedition [...], is to be attributed to the same source which has already been so fruitful of disaster.”

But this was not all. As early as July, Lord Palmerston had stated in the Parliamentary debates on the Turkish loan, that the Porte was lamentably deficient in money, and that all its operations depended upon receiving a supply of it at once. The Parliament having consented to the loan, the British Government advertised it in August, 1855, but from a paper laid before Parliament it appears that out of the five millions sterling granted something short of two millions was but paid to the Porte on January 29th, 1856, and that even this sum had been sent in dribblets of one hundred thousand pounds. Still, on Nov. 24, 1855, the Porte declares (see No. 353, inclosure 4):

“In conclusion, his Excellency (the Seraskier) turned round to me, and said that I was as well aware as he of the continuous exertion, made by him to help the garrison of Kars[...]. That Omer Pasha had been delayed by causes over which he, unfortunately, could not exercise any control. It was an affair of the alliance. It had all along been understood that such measures as it was in their power to take without the army which had been retained in the Crimea, would not suffice for the object in view... His Excellency then proceeded to tell me with much force that the Turks were absolutely debarred from executing what was necessary for the prosecution of the campaign by the delay in giving them the advantage of the loan. The grain to the amount of one million of kilos bought by them for the service of the army, was not forwarded, because they could not pay for it... He had written to the Grand Vizier, that if money was not forthcoming from that source (the loan) in a week from this date, he would resign his office.” (Letter of General Mansfield to Lord de Redcliffe.)

It is a rather curious coincidence that on the very day on which Kars surrendered, the Seraskier was forcibly stating to the British military commissioner the true reasons of that disaster—the delay of Omer Pasha’s expedition by the Allies retaining from the Porte its own troops, and then the stoppage of all operations during October and November by the British Government retaining from the Porte its own money.

---

a Report from Sukum Kaleh published in The Times, No. 22195, October 26, 1855.—Ed.

b Rushdi Pasha (Mehemet).—Ed.

c Ali Mehemet Pasha.—Ed.
When the capitulation was resolved upon at Kars, on Nov. 24th,

"the soldiers were dying by hundreds a day, of famine. They were mere skeletons, and were incapable of fighting or flying. The women brought their children to the general's\textsuperscript{a} house for food, and there they left them, and the city was strewed with dead and dying." (No. 366.)\textsuperscript{b}

During the whole epoch that Clarendon systematically thwarts the plans of the Porte, paralyses its forces, and retains its own money, we behold him dinning the ears of the manacled man with the counsel to move on vigorously, and abusing him for his slackness. History exhibits, perhaps, no parallel more bitterly ludicrous than that between the British Government making England the laughing-stock of Europe by its adventures in the Crimea, the Baltic, and the Pacific, and the rewards lavished on the tools of its miscarriages—and the same Government upbraiding the Porte in the severest tones of antique Catonism for the blunders of its military officers and administrators. The Government of Sadleirism, morally indignant at pasha-corruption; the patrons of a Codrington and an Elliot, insisting on the punishment of a Selim Pasha and a Tahir Pasha; the \textit{improvisatori} of a Simpson sullenly frowning on the promoters of an Omer Pasha; "Take-care-of-Dowb" Panmure doctoring the Seraskier; Downing-street with its doctors Smiths, its Filders, its Aireys, and its Gordons, during the very sittings of the Sebastopol Committee, censuring a pasha at Trebizond for a load of sponges and rammers not having been packed in bundles and covered with matting:—this is the true picture of the Oriental war. And, above all, the brave Clarendon's soul-stirring complaints of the Porte's apathy!—think of an official Thersites tasking the Danaides for not filling the sieve.

\textsuperscript{a} W. F. Williams.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} Message of J. Brant, British Consul in Erzeroum, to Clarendon of November 27, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
Karl Marx

SPEECH AT THE ANNIVERSARY
OF THE PEOPLE'S PAPER

DELIVERED IN LONDON, APRIL 14, 1856

The so-called revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents—small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. However, they denounced the abyss. Beneath the apparently solid surface, they betrayed oceans of liquid matter, only needing expansion to rend into fragments continents of hard rock. Noisily and confusedly they proclaimed the emancipation of the Proletarian, i.e. the secret of the 19th century, and of the revolution of that century. That social revolution, it is true, was no novelty invented in 1848. Steam, electricity, and the self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous character than even citizens Barbès, Raspail and Blanqui. But, although the atmosphere in which we live, weighs upon every one with a 20,000 lb. force, do you feel it? No more than European society before 1848 felt the revolutionary atmosphere enveloping and pressing it from all sides. There is one great fact, characteristic of this our 19th century, a fact which no party dares deny. On the one hand, there have started into life industrial and scientific forces, which no epoch of the former human history had ever suspected. On the other hand, there exist symptoms of decay, far surpassing the horrors recorded of the latter times of the Roman Empire. In our days, everything seems pregnant with its contrary. Machinery, gifted with the wonderful power of shortening and fructifying human labour, we behold starving and overworking it. The new-fangled sources of wealth, by some strange weird spell, are turned into sources of want. The victories of art seem bought by the loss of character. At the same pace that mankind masters nature, man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy. Even the pure light of science seems unable to
shine but on the dark background of ignorance. All our invention and progress seem to result in endowing material forces with intellectual life, and in stultifying human life into a material force. This antagonism between modern industry and science on the one hand, modern misery and dissolution on the other hand; this antagonism between the productive powers and the social relations of our epoch is a fact, palpable, overwhelming, and not to be controverted. Some parties may wail over it; others may wish to get rid of modern arts, in order to get rid of modern conflicts. Or they may imagine that so signal a progress in industry wants to be completed by as signal a regress in politics. On our part, we do not mistake the shape of the shrewd spirit that continues to mark all these contradictions. We know that to work well the new-fangled forces of society, they only want to be mastered by new-fangled men—and such are the working men. They are as much the invention of modern time as machinery itself. In the signs that bewilder the middle class, the aristocracy and the poor prophets of regression, we do recognise our brave friend, Robin Goodfellow, the old mole that can work in the earth so fast, that worthy pioneer—the Revolution. The English working men are the first-born sons of modern industry. They will then, certainly, not be the last in aiding the social revolution produced by that industry, a revolution, which means the emancipation of their own class all over the world, which is as universal as capital-rule and wages-slavery. I know the heroic struggles the English working class have gone through since the middle of the last century—struggles less glorious, because they are shrouded in obscurity, and burked by the middle-class historian. To revenge the misdeeds of the ruling class, there existed in the middle ages, in Germany, a secret tribunal, called the "Vehmgericht." If a red cross was seen marked on a house, people knew that its owner was doomed by the "Vehm." All the houses of Europe are now marked with the mysterious red cross. History is the judge—its executioner, the proletarian.

First published in *The People's Paper*, Reproduced from the newspaper No. 207, April 19, 1856

---

a A character in Shakespeare's *A Midsummer Night's Dream*.—Ed.

b The *Vehmgericht*, derived from *Vehme* (judgment, punishment) and *Gericht* (court), was a secret tribunal which exercised great power in Westphalia from the end of the twelfth to the middle of the sixteenth century.—Ed.
The strange frenzy which has converted France into a gambling-house, and identified the Napoleonic Empire with the Bourse, has by no means been confined within Gallic boundaries. That plague, unrestrained by political frontiers, has crossed the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine, and, wonderful to say, has seized upon solid Germany, where speculation in ideas has given way to speculation in stocks, the \textit{summum bonum} to the bonus, the mysterious jargon of dialectics to the no less mysterious jargon of the Exchange, and the aspiration for unity to the passion for dividends. Rhenish Prussia, from its proximity to France, as well as from the high development of its industry and commerce, was the first to catch the disease. Not only did the Cologne bankers enter into a formal alliance with the great swindlers at Paris, by purchasing with them the \textit{Indépendance belge} as their common organ, and establishing an international bank at Luxemburg; not only did they drag into the whirlpool of the Crédit Mobilier all South-Western Germany, but in the limits of Rhenish Prussia and in the Duchy of Westphalia they succeeded so well that at this moment every layer of society, except that formed by the working classes and smaller peasantry, is permeated by the gold mania, so that even the capital of the small middle class, diverted from its customary channels, seeks for wild adventure, and every shopkeeper is turned into an alchemist. That the rest of Prussia has not escaped the contagion will be seen by the following extract from the \textit{Preussische Correspondenz}, a ministerial paper.

\footnote{Supreme good.—\textit{Ed.}}
"Observations recently made on the money market justify the assumption that there is again approaching one of those frightful commercial crises which return periodically. The feverish movement of an immoderate spirit of speculation, first prompted abroad, has, since last year, pervaded Germany to a great extent, and not only the Berlin Bourse and the Prussian capitalists have been dragged into this whirlpool, but also whole classes of society, which, at every former time, endeavored to shun any immediate participation in the hazards of the stock market."

On this apprehension of an imminent financial crisis, the Prussian Government grounded its refusal to allow the establishment of a Crédit Mobilier, the dazzling colors of which were suspected to conceal a swindling purpose. But what is not permitted under one form may be allowed in another; and what is not permitted at Berlin will be tolerated at Leipsic and Hanover. The latest phase of the speculative mania has set in at the close of the war, which, apart from the commercial excitement inseparable from any conclusion of peace—as witnessed in 1802 and 1815—is this time marked by the peculiar feature that Prussia has formally expressed her wish to throw open her markets to the importation of western capital and speculation. We shall, accordingly, soon hear of the grand Irkutsk trunk-line with branches to Pekin, and other not less monstrous schemes, the question being not what is really designed for execution, but what fresh material may be offered for the spirit of speculation to feed upon. There was nothing wanting but the peace to hurry the great crash apprehended by the Prussian Government.

This uncommon participation by Prussia in the speculative movement of Europe would have been impossible but for the great strides made by its industry of late years. The capital invested in railways alone has been increased from 19,000,000 to 154,000,000 Prussian thalers, in the interval from 1840 to 1854-55. Other railroads at an estimated cost of 54,000,000, are in progress; and the Government have further authorized the construction of new lines at a cost of 57,000,000. Eighty-seven joint-stock companies, with a capital of 83,000,000, have sprung into life since 1849. From 1854-56, nine insurance companies, with a capital of 22,000,000, have been registered. In these last two years, likewise, six joint-stock companies, with a capital of 10,500,000, have commenced to run spinning-mills. From the Cotton Report it will be seen that the quantity of cotton received by the different ports of Europe, has, from 1853-56, varied in the

---

a The Crimean war (1853-56).—Ed.
following proportions, according to the return of the first seven months of the year the export of bales being as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1853</th>
<th>1854</th>
<th>1855</th>
<th>1856</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To England</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>840,000</td>
<td>963,000</td>
<td>1,131,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>255,000</td>
<td>229,000</td>
<td>249,000</td>
<td>354,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European ports</td>
<td>204,000</td>
<td>179,000</td>
<td>167,000</td>
<td>346,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hence it follows that the Continent, which in 1853 received only about one third of the cotton exported to England, received in 1856 as much as five eighths of it. To this must be added the cotton reshipped by England to the Continent. The great export to France is only so in appearance, considerable quantities being transported from Havre to Switzerland, Baden, Frankfort and Antwerp. The development of Continental industry as exhibited by the above figures denotes therefore, above all, the increase of German, and chiefly of Prussian industry. The wealth accumulated by the industrial middle classes of late years, is nearly rivaled by the appreciation of land-owners' profits during the war period of dearth and high price. Horses, cattle, live-stock in general, and not least corn, have kept so high in Germany itself, that the influence of foreign markets has hardly been needed to enable the great landholders to roll in gold. It is wealth—the rapid increase of wealth never before experienced by these two classes—which has furnished the basis for the present speculative murrain in Prussia.

The bursting of the bubble will put the Prussian State to a severe test. The different counter-revolutions it has undergone since 1849 have ended in placing the Government in the power of the narrow class of noble landowners, with respect to whom the King, who has done everything to create their supremacy, now finds himself in the same situation as did Louis XVIII toward the Chambre introuvable. Frederick William had never the sense to put up with the dry bureaucratic machinery of Government bequeathed him by his father. He has all his life been dreaming of beautifying the Prussian State edifice by some romantico-gothic decoration. The short experience which he has had of his Herrenhaus, however, must have satisfied him that in reality the landocracy or Krautjunkers, as they are called in Prussia, so far from deeming themselves happy in serving as a mediaeval ornament to the bureaucracy, are striving with all their might to degrade the bureaucracy and make it the simple executor of their class-interests. Hence the split between the Junkers and the

---

*a The First Chamber of the Prussian Diet.—Ed.*
Administration; between the King and the Prince of Prussia. To show the Government how much they are in earnest, they have just refused to renew the grant of an additional tax which had been levied during the war—a thing unheard of in constitutional Prussia. They have coolly and deliberately proclaimed the doctrine that they are as much kings over their little estates as the King himself is over the country at large. They insist that the Constitution, while it is to remain a sham for all other classes, must be a reality for themselves. Emancipating themselves from all control of the bureaucracy, they wish to see it weigh with double force on the classes below.

The middle class, who betrayed the revolution of 1848, have now the satisfaction, even while they are accomplishing their social triumph by the unrestrained accumulation of capital, of seeing themselves politically annihilated. Moreover, the Krautjunkers delight in every day finding fresh occasions to make them feel their humiliation, even setting aside the common laws of etiquette. When the middle-class spokesmen get up in the House of Deputies, the Junkers leave their benches en masse, and when requested at least to listen to opinions contrary to their own, they laugh in the faces of the gentlemen of the Left. When the latter complain of the obstructions put in the way of elections, they are informed that it is simply the duty of the Government to protect the masses from seduction. When they contrast the licentiousness of the aristocratic, with the shackled condition of the liberal press, they are reminded that liberty in a Christian State is not to do as one pleases, but as pleases God and the authorities. One day they are given to understand that “honor” is the monopoly of an aristocracy; the next day they are stung to the quick by a practical illustration of the exploded theories of a Haller, a de Bonald and a de Maistre. Proud of his philosophical enlightenment, the Prussian citizen has the mortification of seeing the first scientific men driven from the universities, education handed over to a gang of obscurants, ecclesiastical courts meddling with his family concerns, and the police taking him to church on a Sunday. Not content with exempting themselves from taxes so far as they could, the Junkers have packed the middle class in guilds and corporations, adulterated their municipal institutions, abolished the independence and immovability of their Judges, cancelled the religious equality of the different sects, and so forth. If at times their choking anger breaks through their fears, if they occasionally muster enough

---

*William.—Ed.*
courage to threaten, from their seats in the Chamber, the Junkers with a coming revolution, they are sneeringly answered that the revolution has as heavy an account to settle with them as with the nobility.

Indeed, the higher middle class is not likely to find itself again, as in 1848, at the head of a Prussian revolution. The peasantry in Eastern Prussia have lost not only all that the revolution of 1848 had brought them in the shape of emancipation, but have been reduced once more, both administratively and judicially, under the direct yoke of the nobility. In Rhenish Prussia, by the attraction of capital toward industrial enterprise, they have sunk deeper into the bondage of the mortgagee, at the same rate at which the interest on loans has risen. While in Austria something, at least, has been done to conciliate the peasantry, in Prussia nothing has been left undone to exasperate them. As to the working classes, the Government has prevented them from participating in the profits of their masters by punishing them for strikes, and has systematically excluded them from taking part in political affairs. A disunited dynasty, a Government broken up into hostile camps, the bureaucracy quarreling with the aristocracy, the aristocracy with the middle class—a general commercial crisis, and the disinherited classes brooding in the spirit of rebellion against all the upper layers of society: such is the aspect of Prussia at this hour.

Written on April 15, 1856

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4694, May 5, 1856 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
At the very time that Lord John Russell

"The minimus of hind'ring knot-grass made,"\(^a\)

amused the House of Commons with one of his dwarfish mock-schemes for the education of that giant called the people, his fellows in the House of Lords were exhibiting a practical specimen of the education enjoyed by the heaven-born rulers of Great Britain. The subject of their debates was a report of the Committee of the House of Commons, recommending for local purposes, the removal of the Duke of York's monument from Waterloo Place.\(^b\) On that occasion the Marquis of Clanricarde said,

"The Duke of York was not only eminent from his illustrious birth, but he had performed great professional services to the Crown and the country.... The regret for his death was not confined merely to the circle of his friends, but was universally felt. All parties concurred in bearing testimony to the zeal which he had displayed in the discharge of the duties committed to him."\(^c\)

According to the Marquis of Lansdowne

"a memorial erected some years ago to the memory of an illustrious individual whom they all respected, should not be lightly disposed of or set away."

Aberdeen, the travelled Thane, called the monument "in a certain manner sanctified." The Earl of Malmesbury

"concurred entirely in what had fallen from the noble earl with respect to what might be called the sentimental view of the case."

---


\(^b\) A road was to be built across St. James's Park.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) The speeches of Clanricarde, Lansdowne, Aberdeen and Malmesbury in the House of Lords on April 10, 1856 were reported in *The Times*, No. 22339, April 11, 1856.—*Ed.*
Let us cast a retrospective view at the life of the royal hero thus canonized by the Lords.

The most memorable event in the Duke of York's lifetime—his birth—happened to occur in 1763. Twenty-six years later he contrived to draw the attention of the world to his person by renouncing the state of single blessedness, and getting a married man. The Anti-Jacobin war afforded the royal prince an opportunity of becoming a royal captain. If, during his ever-famed campaign of Flanders, and his no less famed campaign of the Helder, the English army was regularly beaten, it had the constant satisfaction of beholding its royal commander returning to his home again in a whole skin. It is known how cleverly he ran away before Houchard at Hondscho, and how his siege of Dunkirk in some sort outjested the siege of Troy. Such was the distinguished celebrity he won in his Flanders campaigning that Pitt, growing jealous of his renown, caused the war-minister Dundas, to send despatches to his Royal Highness with the urgent intimation to come home, to reserve the display of his personal bravery to times of greater hazard, and to remember the old Fabian maxim: *jamae etiam jactura facienda est pro patria.* An officer of the name of Cochrane Johnstone, to whom by and by we shall return, was the person selected to be the bearer of these despatches and—says an author of those bygone times—

"Johnstone performed this service with a degree of celerity and resolution that entitled him to the admiration of the army." 

Greater still than the Duke's military exploits during this same campaign, turned out his financial ones, a convenient fire at every depot, settling for ever the accounts of all his commissaries, contractors, and in-supers. These successes notwithstanding, we find his Royal Highness again in 1799 at the head of the Helder expedition which, in the British papers under Pitt's avowed patronage, was represented as a mere holiday march, it being thought a rather preposterous idea that an army of 45,000 men, with the squadron commanding the Zuyder Zee at its back, with an offspring of the royal house of Brunswick at its head, was not by its mere appearance to scatter to the winds a rabble of about 20,000 Frenchmen,

"commanded by a printer's boy of Limousin, one Brune, who had received his military and political education in the Tennis Courts of the French Revolution."

---

*Even glory should be sacrificed for the Fatherland.—Ed.*

However, with that blunt cynicism peculiar to those Jacobin generals, the printer's boy of Limousin had the impudence to beat his Royal Highness hollow, whenever he happened to board him, and when his Royal Highness, considering it still more meritorious to live for one's country than to die for it, strove to get back to the Helder, Brune was so discourteous as not to let him before he had signed the famous capitulation of Alkmaar, stipulating the surrender of eight thousand French and Dutch seamen then prisoners of war in England.

The Duke of York had now had enough in the shape of campaigns, and wisely condescended for a while to shroud his name in the obscurity naturally enveloping the commander-in-chief at the Horse-Guards. Yet in that position he found himself placed over a department costing the nation £23,000,000 a year, and entrusting to him, under the King's sole control, the absolute power of promoting or cashing any number of about 12,000 commissioned and staff officers.

His Royal Highness did not fail to engross a very large portion of public gratitude by his enlightened general orders regarding the cashing the queues of all the privates and non-commissioned officers; the addition of a sponge to their appointments, for the purpose of keeping their heads clean, the dressing right and left, the quick and slow step; the locking up and the opening of ranks, the wheeling and facing, the tossing of the firelock, the hair-cutting and the black-legging, and the polishing of arms and accoutrements; the screwing up of John Bull's broad chest in tight jerkins, and the crowning his blockhead with an Austrian cap, and the covering his large back with a faceless coat—and all that sort of important affairs, making up the drill-serjeant's science. At the same time he exhibited the higher qualities of a strategist and a tactician in his domestic campaign against Colonel Cochrane Johnstone, the officer who had been commissioned by Pitt to cut short his victorious campaigns in Flanders. Johnstone, in the year 1801, Colonel of the 8th West India regiment (blacks) and Governor of the island of Dominica, was called home in consequence of a mutiny that had broken out in the regiment. He preferred charges against John Gordon, the major of his regiment, who was in immediate command of it at the time of the mutiny. This Major Gordon, as well as a Colonel Gordon, the Duke's secretary, belonged to that distinguished family that has stocked the world with great men—such as Gordon, the Ad-

---

a I.e., the headquarters of the British army.—Ed.
rianople treaty-monger, the travelled Thane Aberdeen, and his no less illustrious son, Colonel Gordon, of Crimean memory. The Duke of York, then, had to wreak his vengeance, not only on a slanderer of the Gordons, but above all on the bearer of the delicate despatch. Notwithstanding Colonel Johnstone's importunities, John Gordon was not brought to a court-martial till the month of January 1804. Although the court pronounced his conduct to have been irregular, culpably negligent, and highly censurable, the Duke of York maintained him in full possession of his rank and pay, while he omitted from a promotion of brevet-major-generals in Oct. 1803, the name of Colonel Johnstone, who saw the names of officers, his juniors, preferred to him. On his complaints to the Duke, Johnstone, at the end of nine weeks, on Dec. 10, 1803, received the answer from his Royal Highness that he was not included in the general brevet-promotion because

"there existed charges against him, the merit of which had not been decided."  

He failed to obtain any further satisfaction until 28th of May, 1804, when he became informed that Major Gordon was his accuser. His trial was put off from one term to the other; the court-martial which was to try him being ordered now to Canterbury, now to Chelsea, and it only took place in March 1805. Johnstone being fully and honourably acquitted by the court, applied for restoration to his rank, but met with a refusal from his Royal Highness on May 16, 1805. On June 28th General Fitzpatrick, one of the Fox coterie, announced in Parliament that in the interest of Johnstone, the injuries inflicted upon whom "had spread the greatest alarm throughout the whole army," he should propose a specific proceeding at the commencement of the next session of parliament. The next session came, but having in the meantime been transformed into a war-minister, Fitzpatrick stated from the Treasury-bench that he should not bring forward the threatened motion. Some time afterwards this Secretary of war—a carpet-knight who had never seen an enemy, who had sold his company in the guards twenty years before, and never served a single day since—had a regiment given to him by the Duke of York; Fitzpatrick, the war-minister, having thus to audit the account of Fitzpatrick the Colonel. By dint of such stratagems

---


the Duke of York succeeded in crushing Colonel Johnstone and thus asserted his strategical talents.

That notwithstanding a certain dullness, hereditary in the illustrious house of Brunswick, the Duke was a sharp fellow in his own way, is sufficiently shown by the fact that he figured as the chief of George III's "domestic cabinet," the closet and family-council, and as the head of the court-party, called the King's friends. It is not less shown by the fact that, with an annual income of £61,000 he contrived to squeeze £54,000 as a loan out of the ministry, and in spite of this public credit not to pay his private debts. To perform such feats, a man must needs be of nimble spirits. As it is generally known how "upon place and greatness many eyes are stuck," it will be easily understood that the Grenville Administration was not ashamed to propose to his Royal Highness to relieve him from some subordinate duties of his office—which relief, as is complained in a pamphlet paid by the duke, would have reduced the commander-in-chief to a mere cipher. Lansdowne, be it remarked, served in the same cabinet, under the name of Lord Henry Petty. That same administration threatened to clog the illustrious warrior with a military council, falsely pretending that "the nation" would be lost, unless the inexperience of the commander-in-chief was assisted by a body of officers. Thus far was the duke pressed by this unworthy cabal as to demand an inquiry into his conduct at the Horse Guards. Happily this intrigue of the Grenville party was defeated by the immediate interposition, or rather command, of George III who, although a notorious idiot, had wit enough to understand the genius of his son.

In the year 1808 the brave and patriotic sentiments of the royal captain induced him to solicit the command of the British armies in Spain and Portugal, but then the general dread of the masses to behold England bereft of such a home-commander, at so critical a moment, burst out in most noisy, indiscreet, and almost indecent demonstrations. He was warned to remember his former ill-fortune abroad, to keep him in reserve for the enemy at home, and to beware of public execration. Nothing daunted, the magnanimous duke had a pamphlet published, to prove his hereditary claim to be beaten in Portugal and Spain, as he had

---

a Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, Act IV, Scene 2 (paraphrased).—Ed.

b This refers to the anonymous pamphlet, A Plain Statement of the Conduct of the Ministry and the Opposition, towards His Royal Highness the Duke of York, London, 1808.—Ed.
been in Flanders and Holland. But, alas! the *Morning Chronicle* of that period states that,

"in the present instance it is notorious that ministers and people, ins and outs, are fully agreed in opinion."

Yea, the talked-of appointment of the duke seemed to threaten England with a regular row. Thus, one may read in a London weekly paper of that time:—

"Not to the inns, the coffee-houses, the marts, the malls, and the settled gossiping-shops, has the conversation upon the subject been confined. It has entered into all private circles; it has been a standing dish at the dinner and tea-table; men stop each other to talk about the Duke of York's going to Spain; the eager Londoner stops even on his way to Change, to ask whether it be really true that the Duke of York is going to Spain; nay, in the very church porches of the country, among the smock-frocked politicians, whose conversation as to the public matters seldom went beyond the assessed taxes, you see half a score faces thrust almost to the point of contact, in order to know for 'zarten if the Duke of York be a goon to be sent to Spain.'"\(^a\)

It is evident, then, in spite of the numerous efforts of his envious deprecators, that it was impossible to keep the past deeds of the Duke hidden from the world. What a satisfaction for one single man, this unanimous anxiety of a whole people to keep him at home. The Duke, of course, could not but give his gallant mind the extreme pain of chilling his martial ardour, and quietly staying at the Horse Guards.

Before passing to the brightest period of this monumental life, we must stop a moment and show that as early as 1806, the Duke was fully and publicly appraised by his father's loyal subjects. In his *Political Register* of that year, Cobbett says:

"He rendered himself famous for nothing but running away, and bringing infamy upon the arms of England [...]; [...] at once half an idiot, and yet master of the utmost degree of low cunning; [...] equally conspicuous for feminine weakness and fiendlike cruelty, for pride and for abjection, for prodigality and rapaciousness. [...] While he had the command of the soldiers, he made a vile job of his trust, and, through the means thereof, shamefully robbed the people whom he was amply paid to defend. [...] Having previously bribed or intimidated every one, from whom he might apprehend exposure, he gave way to his numerous and conflicting vices, and rendered himself the object of universal, though whispering, execration."\(^b\)


\(^b\) [W. Cobbett,] "Mr. Cochrane Johnstone" [II], *Cobbett's Weekly Political Register*, Vol. X, No. 8, August 23, 1806.—*Ed.*
On the 27th January, 1809, Colonel Wardle rose in the House of Commons, to make a motion "for the appointment of a Committee to inquire into the conduct of the Commander-in-chief, with regard to promotions and exchanges in the army." In a speech lacking all sense of delicacy, detailing all the cases he had to bring forward in support of his motion, and giving the names of all the witnesses he was to call upon for substantiating his cases, he accused the pet hero of the present House of Lords that his concubine, a certain Mrs. Clarke, possessed the power of military promotion, that the military exchanges also were at her disposal, that her influence extended to appointments in the staff of the army, that she was endowed with the privilege of augmenting the military force of the country, that she received pecuniary consideration from all these sources, that the Commander-in-chief was not only a secret party to all her transactions, did not only save his own purse by her supplies, but had even endeavoured to derive himself, through her means, pecuniary accommodations, independently of Mrs. Clarke's advantages. In one word, he contended that the royal captain not only kept his mistress at the expense of the British army, but allowed himself to be kept by her in return. Upon this motion the house resolved to have an examination of the witnesses at the bar. The examination having lasted to the 22nd Feb., confirmed point for point the ungracious slander of Colonel Wardle. It was proved that the real office of the Horse Guards did not exist at Whitehall but at Mrs. Clarke's establishment in Gloucester Street, consisting of a splendid house, with a variety of carriages, and a long retinue of footmen, musicians, singers, players, dancers, parasites, pimps, and bawds. This Horse Guard of his own, the Royal captain had mounted in 1803. Although such a house could not be maintained for £20,000 a year—and there was besides a country establishment at Wybridge—it was proved from the witnesses' evidence that Mrs. Clarke never got from the duke's own pocket, more than £12,000 a year, a sum scarcely sufficient to pay wages and purchase liveries. The rest was procured from the wholesale traffic in petticoat commissions. There was produced before the House a

---

\( ^a \) Hansard's Parliamentary Debates [First Series], Vol. XII, London, 1812. This volume also contains material of the House of Commons inquiry proposed by Wardle and held in February 1809. Excerpts from it are quoted below in this article.—Ed.

\( ^b \) On January 31, 1809.—Ed.

\( ^c \) The seat of a number of government offices in London, including the army headquarters, the Admiralty and various ministries.—Ed.
written scale of Mrs. Clarke's prices. The regular price for a majority being £2,600, Mrs. Clarke sold it at 900; a company for £700, instead of the regulation price of £1,500, etc. Nay there existed actually in the city, a public office for the sale of Commissions at the same reduced prices, and the managing agents of that office stated to be the commissioners of the favourite mistress. Whenever she complained of pecuniary embarrassments, the duke told her "she had greater interest than the queen, and she ought to use it." In one case the zealous commander-in-chief punished an individual by reducing him to half-pay for non-performance of a nefarious contract with his mistress; in another he reserved to himself a bonus of £5,000; in another case, he appointed on her interference boys actually at school to lieutenancies, and surgeons who were never called upon to leave their shops to join their companies. One Colonel French obtained from Mrs. Clarke a letter of service, i.e. an authority for raising 5,000 men for the army. On this occasion the following dialogue between the Duke and his mistress was stated before the house to have taken place.

_The Duke._—I am continually worried by Mr. French about this levy. He is always wanting something more to be done in his favour. [...] How does he behave to you darling?
_Mrs. Clarke._—Middling, not very well.
_The Duke._—Master French must mind what he is about, else I will soon cut up him and his levy too.

There were also produced some love letters of the illustrious duke mixed up with mercantile-military transactions. One of them dated Aug. 4, 1803 commences thus.

"How can I sufficiently express to my sweetest, my darling love, the delight which her dear, her pretty letter gave me, or how much I feel all the kind things she says to me in it; millions and millions of thanks for it my angel."

After this sample of the Duke's style it is not to be wondered at that the learned gentlemen of St. John's College, Oxford, presented his Royal Highness with the diploma of an L.L.D. Not content with military commission, the lovers also hit upon trafficking in bishoprics and deaneries.

Other points turned up not less honourable to the illustrious scion of the House of Brunswick; for instance that an officer, named Dowler, had for years been Mrs. Clarke's paramour, and that in his company she sought for a compensation for the grudging, the disgust, and loathing experienced in the duke's society.
The Duke's friends scolding his angel "an infamous woman, an impudent baggage," a pleaded for their tender juvenile of about 50, for the husband of twenty years' standing, the paramount power of passion. Which passion, by the by, did not prevent the duke, 7 months after his separation from Mrs. Clarke, withholding from her the annuity convened between them, and on her demands becoming urgent, threatening her with the pillory and the bastile. This very threat became the next cause of Mrs. Clarke's disclosures to Colonel Wardle.

It would be tedious to wade through the whole proceedings of the Commons, with all its sordid incidents, or to expostulate on the gallant duke's begging letter dated 23rd February (1809) in which he solemnly declared, to the House of Commons "on the honour of a prince," that he knew of nothing, even of what was proved by letters in his own handwriting. It may suffice to say that General Ferguson declared in the House "that it was not for the honour of the army that the duke should remain in command;" that the Chancellor of Exchequer, Mr. Perceval, announced on March 20th, the Duke's resignation of his office, and that upon this announcement the House accepted Lord Althorp's motion that "his Royal Highness the Duke of York, having resigned the command of the army, the House did not now think it necessary to proceed any further," etc. Lord Althorp grounded his motion on his wish

"to place the duke's resignation on the journal of the House, in order to record that the Duke had forfeited the confidence of the country for ever, and in consequence he must abandon all hopes of ever returning again to that situation."

As a tribute for his bold proceedings against the duke, Colonel Wardle was deluged with thanks—addresses transmitted from every county, city, town and borough of Great Britain.

One of the first acts of the Regency of the Prince of Wales—afterwards George the Fourth—in 1811, was York's restoration to his position as commander-in-chief—an initiatory step quite in keeping with the whole reign of that royal Caliban b who, because the last of mankind, was called the first gentleman of Europe.

---

a From Beresford's speech in the House of Commons on February 3, 1809. Excerpts from it and also from the speeches of Ferguson on March 17, 1809 and Perceval and Althorp on March 20, 1809 are quoted according to Hansard's Parliamentary Debates [First Series], Vols. XII and XIII, London, 1812.—Ed.

b A character in Shakespeare's The Tempest.—Ed.
This Duke of York, then, whose monument would grace a dung-hill, is the Marquis of Clanricarde’s “eminent commander-in-chief,” Lord Lansdowne’s “illustrious and all-respected individual;” and the very same personage represented by the Earl of Aberdeen’s “sanctified monument”—in one word the guardian angel of the House of Lords. The worshippers are worthy of the saint.

Written about April 25, 1856
Reproduced from the newspaper
First published in The People’s Paper,
No. 208, April 26, 1856
Sir,—I have the honour to enclose a copy of a paper which you may perhaps think proper to communicate to your readers.

Your obedient Servant,

Dr. Karl Marx

London, 26th April, 28, Dean street, Soho

Written on April 26, 1856

First published in The Free Press and The Sheffield Free Press, May 3, 1856

Reproduced from The Free Press

---

a G. Crawshay.—Ed.
b See this volume, pp. 673-80.—Ed.
1. Falsification.—In a telegraphic despatch dated Constantinople, July 12, 1855, Lord Redcliffe summons the Foreign Office, “in order to save much valuable time,” to send “by telegraph” its decision as to the Mingrelian expedition which the Porte had proposed to undertake with the Anglo-Turkish contingent, under General Vivian’s command. In No. 249 of the Blue Book,* we find Lord Clarendon’s answer, a despatch dated “London, July 14, 1855,” bearing on its frontispiece the sacramental word “telegraphic,” rejecting the Porte’s proposal, and inviting the Turkish army to fall back from Kars and Erzeroum on Trebizond. Lord Redcliffe’s telegraphic question being dated Constantinople, July 12th, and Lord Clarendon’s telegraphic answer, London, July 14th, it appears that to run between Constantinople and London a telegraphic message wants at the most, two days. Accordingly, Lord Clarendon’s telegraphic despatch, dated London, July 14th, should have reached Constantinople on July 16. However, in a despatch dated July 19th, Lord Redcliffe complains of the silence of his Government which he had entreated “to lose no time in making known his pleasure.” From Lord Redcliffe’s later despatch dated July 23rd, it results that he had received no answer even then. In fact, the receipt of any answer from the Foreign Office, is not acknowledged before July 30th. (See No. 277.) One is thus reduced to the dilemma either that the way from London to Constantinople is about seven times longer than the way from Constantinople to London, or that

---

a Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey, and the Defence and Capitulation of Kars, London, 1856.—Ed.
the London date of Lord Clarendon's despatch, as given in the Blue Book, is false. The delay in Lord Clarendon's answer caused time of precious value to be wasted. The falsification of the Blue Book date of that answer would denote, that delay was intended. To conceal that intention, a spurious date had to be prefixed to the despatch, instead of the true one.

2. *Suppression.*—I do not allude to the numerous mutilations pointed at in the Blue Book under the convenient term of "Extract"; nor to the total suppression of the whole correspondence between General Beatson and the British Government, but rather to a telegraphic despatch sent from Sebastopol, on July 14, 1855, and received in London on July 16, 1855. On July 14th, in a conference held at the English head-quarters with the Allied Commanders-in-Chief and the Admirals, Omer Pasha proposed to make an incursion from Redout Kaleh, via Kutais, into Georgia, at the head of that part of the Turkish army then

"at Balaklava or at Kertch—25,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry from Eupatoria, and a proportional artillery."

The allied commanders, refusing to give any opinion on the subject—(see [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons' despatch to Clarendon, dated July 15)—Omer Pasha broke up the conference by declaring that "under these circumstances, he felt it his duty to proceed to Constantinople;" and so he did. *On the very same day* when Omer Pasha left the Crimea—on July 16th—Lord Clarendon, according to the Blue Book, wrote a despatch to Lord Redcliffe, stating that

"we"(the Government) "understand that Omer Pasha is about to proceed to Constantinople."

This intelligence Lord Clarendon could only have derived from a telegraphic despatch dated Balaklava, July 14. Where is this despatch? Certainly, not in the Blue Book. The same electric wire which informed Lord Clarendon of Omer Pasha's intended departure, must have informed him of the cause of that departure, viz., the resistance he met with on the part of Pélissier, *i.e.*, on the part of the French Government. Thus the question would naturally arise why Lord Clarendon quietly waited from July 16th to August 1st, a fact shown by the Blue Book, to break the matter to the French Government, and to commence negotiations with it, on a point on which the whole campaign depended. To prevent this question, the telegraphic despatch has disappeared.
3. Fraud.—In Lord Clarendon's above-mentioned despatch to Lord Redcliffe, dated July 16th, the following passage occurs:

"Her Majesty's Government would still recommend that whatever force is sent for the relief of the army of Kars, should proceed to Trebizond. If, indeed, Omer Pasha [...] should determine to take any part of his own army, with Tunisians and Albanians, to Redout Kaleh, her Majesty's Government would have nothing to say to that proceeding."

Now, Omer Pasha having just determined to take a certain part of his own army to Redout Kaleh, the unconditional sanction given to such a plan, in Lord Clarendon's despatch, must have removed all difficulties; or, if new ones arose, at all events prove them to have not originated with the British Government. Unfortunately, this despatch, dated London, July 16th, figures only in the Blue Book, was written only for the Blue Book, and has never left the shelves of the Foreign Office. No trace of its ever having reached Constantinople is to be discovered. On the contrary, it results from Lord Redcliffe's despatch, dated Constantinople, July 30th, that he had not received it on that date, when he complained of "the most serious dilemma" in which "the unfavourable judgment passed by her Majesty's Government" on the Turkish plans had placed the Porte. Nor had Lord Clarendon's despatch, dated July 16th, arrived on July 31st, when Fuad Effendi, in a letter to Lord Redcliffe, defended the plan of a Mingrelian expedition against "the substance of the English despatches," according to which "the succours must be sent through Erzeroum by way of Trebizond." Nor had it arrived on August 4th, when Lord Redcliffe, in answer to Fuad Effendi, told him that

"when latterly called upon to declare the opinions of his Government, he performed that duty with the painful sense of the embarrassments which surrounded the Porte,"

increased as they would be by the opinion "he was called upon to declare;" and added,

"though her Majesty's Government have declared their decided preference for a more distinct operation by Trebizond and Erzeroum, their objections to a diversion on the side of Circassia, would in all likelihood be modified, if the force employed were of a compact or reliable character."

Lord Redcliffe was, then, on Aug. 4th, not possessed of Lord Clarendon's despatch dated July 16th, in which her Majesty's Government had already modified its objections to a diversion on the side of Circassia, "if" Omer Pasha himself should undertake it.

---

a Queen Victoria's.—Ed.
with "any part of his own army." On August 8th, Lord Redcliff was not yet blessed with the mysterious despatch, as we find him again complaining to Lord Clarendon—(see No. 282 and enclosures)—that the British Government "still leans with all its weight to Trebizond, as the only true channel of relief;" and bewailing his own ambiguous position.

"Amidst so many motives," says he, "to vigorous support of the only practicable scheme of relief, I made no reserve in communicating the adverse opinions of her Majesty's Government to the Porte."

Yea, still, on August 13th, Lord Redcliffe did not even suspect the existence of the London despatch, dated July 16th, as he informs Lord Clarendon that "the disappointment occasioned by the terms of the preceding despatch"—according to the Blue Book, the despatch dated July 16th, should have been the preceding despatch—"which appeared to favour exclusively an advance upon Kars by Trebizond, was evident." Now, however Blue Book time and space may be allowed to differ from common time and space, nobody will venture to believe that the despatch leaving London on July 16th, should not have reached Constantinople on August 13th. But that Lord Clarendon's despatch, dated London, July 16th, has actually never left London, and was never intended to do so, results from a despatch of his own, dated London, 20th August. In this despatch (No. 283), purporting to answer Lord Redcliffe's complaints, dated August 8th, Lord Clarendon endeavours to show that her Majesty's Government, in different previous despatches had renounced its resistance to the Porte's proposal, and

"were willing that Omer Pasha should proceed to Asia to effect a diversion for the relief of Kars."

But, strange to say, while the various messages which the noble lord refers to, in proof of his assertion, have left no trace whatever in the Kars papers, his despatch, dated July 16th, so ostentatiously paraded in the Blue Book, is most discreetly ignored in his justification to Lord Redcliffe. Thus, while baffling every Turkish attempt for the relief of Kars, the British Foreign Office was carefully preparing its pièces justificatives for the fall of Kars.

4. Forgery and Shuffle.—According to Lord Redcliffe's despatch, addressed to the Foreign Office, and dated Constantinople, July 23rd,

"Omer Pasha [...] had proposed [...] to the Porte to make himself an incursion towards Georgia, starting from Redout Kaleh, and turning Kutais to good account."
This idea had been debated on the night of July 22nd, in a council at the Grand Vizier's [...], and the result of the deliberation had been,

"that the troops to be employed in the above-mentioned manner, under the command of Omer, should be taken from Eupatoria, to the amount of 20,000, and from Bulgaria to the amount of 5500, and that the (Anglo-Turkish) contingent, with its numbers completed, should occupy the vacant place at Eupatoria."

Lord Clarendon having received this despatch on August 1st, instantly forwarded it to Lord Cowley. Pointing at the just quoted "passage," he states "Her Majesty's Government to be favourably disposed to it," and expresses "his hope that the Government of the Emperor will concur in it." Here, at last, one is forced to acknowledge bonne foi\(^b\) zeal and expedition on the part of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet. But, alas! while exhibiting itself as the patron of Omer Pasha's project before the French Government, by a mere shuffling of words, it substituted for the Porte's own proposal one directly hostile to it. This tour de passe-passe\(^c\) was played off by the simple substitution in Lord Redcliffe's despatch, dated July 23rd, of the word Eupatoria, in the place of the word Balaklava.

From the despatch of [Lieut.-]Colonel Simmons, dated July 15th, it will be seen that Omer Pasha, in his memoranda to the allied generals, and in the war council at the English headquarters, insisted upon taking with him that part of the Turkish infantry which was then stationed at Balaklava, which he had brought from Eupatoria, and which he declared the only fit one for the Asiatic campaign. Did Omer Pasha, after his arrival at Constantinople, alter his opinion? The contrary is shown by a despatch, dated Constantinople, August 2nd, in which [Lieut.-] Colonel Simmons states:

"His Highness, Omer Pasha, informed me that he should be happy to give over, to complete the contingent, any of the Turkish troops under his command, except the division which is now at the camp before Sebastopol, which being composed of his best troops, he is naturally desirous to have with him if he make the proposed movement to Asia."

Will it be asserted that the Porte, at the council of the night of July 22nd, arrived at a resolution contrary to Omer Pasha's proposal? In the very despatch of July 23rd, in which Lord

\(^a\) Ali Mehmet Pasha.—\textit{Ed.}  
\(^b\) Honest.—\textit{Ed.}  
\(^c\) Trick.—\textit{Ed.}
Redcliffe reports the Porte's resolution, he tells Lord Clarendon that

"Omer Pasha has been most graciously received and most generously rewarded by the Sultan," and adds: "I need not add that he is on excellent terms with His Majesty's ministers, and particularly with the Seraskier Pasha."

Any discrepancy, therefore, between the Porte and its commander-in-chief is out of the question. The false play of Lord Palmerston's cabinet is apparent even from the arrangement of the Blue Book. To confound the reader, Lord Clarendon's despatch to Lord Cowley, dated August 1st, figures on page 248, followed up, from 248 to 252, by an extract from Lord Redcliffe's despatch of July 19th, General Simpson's letter to Lord Redcliffe of July 16th, Omer Pasha's letters and memoranda, and only in the last place by Lord Redcliffe's despatch of July 23rd, of which the instruction to Lord Cowley pretends to be the sequel. On August 4th, Lord Clarendon received the acceptance by the French Government of the proposal he had made on August 1st, in the name of the Porte, according to which 20,000 men were to be withdrawn from Eupatoria, to be placed under the command of Omer Pasha, and to be replaced at Eupatoria by General Vivian's contingent. On August 13th the Porte is at last informed of the acceptance of its own proposal by its Western Allies. Accordingly, on August 15th the Ottoman council is assembled for deliberation, and what was the result of that deliberation?

"Omer Pasha," writes Lord Redcliffe to Lord Clarendon, dated August 16th (No. 294), "objects most positively to the plan transmitted from London by telegraph, of stationing the contingent at Eupatoria, and he is not prepared to assume the responsibility of commanding the expedition, unless the Turkish troops before Sebastopol be allowed to form part of it."

Thus, then, it oozes out that the Eupatoria plan, pretended to have been forwarded on July 23rd from Constantinople to London, has, on the contrary, been transmitted on August 9th from London to Constantinople.

In the same despatch of Lord Redcliffe is enclosed a memorandum of Omer Pasha. The destruction of the last effective Turkish army, the loss of the unity of the English as well as the Ottoman army, the wilful sacrifice of the Egyptians and Tunisians, the breaking up of the permanent arrangements made for the supply of the Turkish troops at Eupatoria, the creation of unavoidable delay, the ruin of his own military reputation, and the exposure of

---

*Abdul Mejid.—Ed.*
his Mingrelian army to the fate of the garrison of Kars—such were, according to Omer Pasha, the natural consequences of "the plan transmitted from London." While communicating to Lord Clarendon this strange protest, Lord Redcliffe evinces not the slightest suspicion of having ever been himself the channel through which the Porte had transmitted that identical plan to Lord Clarendon; a sufficient proof this that the forgery, the interpolation of Eupatoria for Balaklava, was committed at London and not at Constantinople. During the whole month of August and part of September, we behold the Porte struggling against the spurious proposition Lord Clarendon had pressed in its own name on the French Government.

5. Falsehoods.—Under this head we can, of course, only give a few examples, as the whole Blue Book is sprinkled with them. In answer to Lord Redcliffe's despatch, dated August 8th, Lord Clarendon addressed him a despatch, dated August 20th (No. 283); in which he declares

"my various messages by telegraph, and my despatch of the 4th inst. ... will have shown you that her Majesty's Government ... were willing that Omer Pasha should proceed to Asia," &c.

With the exception of his despatch of July 14th, in which Lord Clarendon protested against the Mingrelian expedition, and summoned the Turks to fall back from Kars and Erzeroum on Trebizond, and of his despatch dated August 9th, which Lord Redcliffe could, of course, not have received on August 8th, Lord Clarendon had, according to the Blue Book, sent no telegraphic despatch at all to Constantinople. He would be sure not to put his own light under a bushel. His various messages by telegraph, withdrawing the veto of the British Government against the Mingrelian expedition, are only so many lying phantoms.

In a despatch dated August 26th, [Lieut.-] Colonel Simmons informs Lord Clarendon that Omer Pasha reckoned upon taking a portion of the Turkish troops from before Sebastopol, and replacing them by General Vivian's contingent. In his answer to [Lieut.-] Col. Simmons, dated September 7th (No. 302), Lord Clarendon writes:

"It appears by a despatch, of a later date, from General Simpson, that Omer Pasha had given it as his opinion that Gen. Vivian's contingent would not be fit to take a position before Sebastopol, until next spring; and, in consequence of that opinion, and by reason of Gen. Simpson's protest against having the contingent sent to him, which protest was founded upon Omer Pasha's opinion, her Majesty's Government have determined that the contingent shall not go to join the army before Sebastopol."
Now, from a despatch of [Lieut.-]Col. Simmons, dated September 23rd (No. 307), it may be seen that Omer Pasha's opinion "of a later date," refers to an opinion given by him "in a letter to Gen. Simpson, early in the month of July, [...] before he was aware of the critical position of the army in Asia;" and that he had not declared Gen. Vivian's contingent to be unfit "to take up a position before Sebastopol," but only "to make use of it in the open field (en rase campagne) in front of the enemy."

In excavating at the beginning of September an opinion tendered by Omer Pasha at the beginning of July, in perverting the substance of that opinion, and in founding on this perversion, and that anachronism a protest against Omer Pasha's project, Gen. Simpson, the lucky warrior, would, of course, only have acted up to secret instructions received from London. Supposing Gen. Simpson's despatch to have been exactly, such as it is represented by Lord Clarendon—a fact that becomes rather doubtful from the suppression of that despatch in the Blue Book—the noble lord could not have one moment hesitated as to the true date or substance of Omer Pasha's "opinion." He was fully informed of it on July 30, the day when he received [Lieut.-]Col. Simmons's despatch, dated Balaklava, July 15. His quibble then, about Omer Pasha's "inconsistency;" his making Omer Pasha's "own opinion" the reason for rejecting his proposal, were ludicrously false pretences. In point of fact, Lord Palmerston and his subordinates carried to the last their system of bullying the Porte for its want of activity, and baffling all its attempts at action. From the very beginning, we behold them devising—not means for the relief of Kars, but objections to the means devised by the Porte, carefully preparing subjects of dispute, anxiously bent on embroiling matters, huddling imbroglio upon imbroglio in this tragic comedy of errors—all their proceedings tending to one and the same end—to kill time, and thus to ensure the fall of Kars.

Written about April 26, 1856
Reproduced from The Free Press

First published in The Free Press and The Sheffield Free Press, May 3, 1856

Signed: Karl Marx
FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS
Frederick Engels

CRIMEAN WAR

1854

September 14. Landing at Old Fort [near Eupatoria].
  " 20. Battle of the Alma.
  " 25. Allies march on Sevastopol (south side).
  " 28. South side blockaded. (Apart from bluejackets only 8 battalions on the south side at that time.)

October 1. Reconnaissance; decision taken to bombard prior to the assault.
  " 9-10. First parallel 4-600 sages in front of the fortifications.
  " 17. Bombardment of Sevastopol (the shelling of the Russians on land is superior, 200 heavy guns against the attackers' 126), simultaneously bombarded by the fleet. French guns silenced.—Now too late for assault.
  " 25. Battle of Balaklava.
  " 26. Russian sortie against British with 9 battalions.

November 4. Russians superior in strength to Allies.
  " 5. Battle of Inkerman. Construction of British siege-works now virtually at a standstill. The circumvallation against a relieving force alone going ahead.

December 11. Osten-Sacken in command. Successful and more frequent sorties.
January. Beginning

British construct 2nd parallel 400 sagenes in front of the works. Sorties continue.

" 27.

Niel arrives. Main French attack switched to the Malakhov; British abandon half their approach trenches—one mile in all!

February 22-23.

Selenghinsk constructed; assault on it on the 23rd beaten off. 1,100 yards from main rampart.

28 [Feb.]-1 March

Volhynsk constructed, 1,450 yards from main rampart.

March 11-12.

Kamchatka lunette 770 yards, i.e. 470 sagenes in front of the fortress the enemy had to use the zigzag sap. Further entrenchments for riflemen in front of this work.

" 22-23.

Attacks on the entrenchments repulsed; these linked by trenches to form a whole; similarly before Bastion 3—Quarry 430 yards from the main rampart.

April

Assault on the entrenchments established by the Russians up to 200 paces before Bastions 4-6, and

" 19-20.

[attack] by the British on the Quarry; [both] repulsed.

" 20-21.

Reinforcement for the Allies (French and Sardinians) and Pélissier.

May

New offensive in strength.

" 23.

Battle for the counterapproaches in front of Bastion 5; fortune favoured Russians.

June 7.

Assault before Kamchatka and the Quarry, Selenghinsk and Volhynsk.

" 18.

First assault, repulsed.

August 16.

Chernaya.

September 8.

Assault.

[1855]

Written after September 8, 1855

Printed according to the manuscript


Published in English for the first time

a Here and below the English word is used. Towards the end Engels uses the German equivalent: “Steinbruch”.—Ed.
APPENDICES
The great points of weakness in Austria are usually supposed to be her bankrupt treasury and the revolutionary elements of Italy and Hungary. It is true that in a war with France and England those elements might be employed with great effect against her; but in a war with Russia her vulnerable point lies in another quarter. Though this point was always plain to be seen, and, indeed, has been indicated by Austrian statesmen themselves, we had, during the life of the Emperor Nicholas, no menace to show that he had firmly resolved, in any contingency, to take advantage of it. His successor, however, appears to be less scrupulous, or at any rate less reserved. He has clearly announced to Austria that in the event of her finally joining the Allies he shall put himself officially at the head of the great Slavonic brotherhood, and call to his aid all the slumbering sympathies of race or religion which naturally impel the Slavonians of Austria and Turkey to Russia, as well as all the deep-seated animosities they cherish against the nations and governments that now hold them in more or less complete subjugation.

Panslavism as a political theory has had its most lucid and philosophic expression in the writings of Count Gurowski. But that learned and distinguished publicist, while regarding Russia as the natural pivot around which the destinies of this numerous and vigorous branch of the human family can alone find a large historical development, did not conceive of Panslavism as a league against Europe and European civilization. In his view the legitimate outlet for the expansive force of Slavonic energies was Asia. As compared with the stagnant desolation of that old continent, Russia is a civilizing power, and her contact could not be

---

a Alexander II.—Ed.
other than beneficial. This manly and imposing generalization has, however, not been accepted by all the inferior minds which have adopted its fundamental idea. Panslavism has assumed a variety of aspects; and now, at last, we find it employed in a new form, and with great apparent effect, as a warlike threat. As such, its use certainly does credit to the boldness and decision of the new Czar. And how just the fear with which the threat has inspired Austria, we now propose to show.

Of the seventy millions of Slavonians living east of the Bohemian forest and the Karic Alps, about fifteen millions are subject to the Austrian Emperor, comprising representatives of almost every variety of Slavonic speech. The Bohemian, or Tshekh branch (six millions), falls exclusively in the Austrian dominions; the Polish branch is represented by about three millions of Galicians; the Russian by three millions of Malo-Russians (Red Russians, Ruthenes 448) in Galicia and the north-east of Hungary—the only Russian tribe out of the pale of the Russian Empire; the South Slavonic branch by about three millions of Slovenes (Carinthians and Croats) 449 and Serbians, including some stray Bulgarians. These Austrian Slavonians are of two different kinds. One part of them consists of the remnants of tribes whose history belongs to the past, and whose present historical development is attached to that of nations of different race and speech; and to complete their unfortunate position, these hapless relics of former greatness have not even a national organization within Austria, but are divided among different provinces. Thus the Slovenes, although scarcely 1,500,000 in number, are spread over the different provinces of Krain, Carinthia, Styria, Croatia, and South-western Hungary. The Bohemians (Tshekhs), though the most numerous tribe of Austrian Slavonians, reside partly in Bohemia, partly in Moravia, and partly (the Slovak branch) in North-western Hungary. These tribes, therefore, though living exclusively on Austrian soil, are far from being recognized as constituting separate nations. They are considered as appendages, either to the German or the Hungarian nation, and in reality they are nothing else.

The second portion of Austrian Slavonians is composed of fragments of different tribes, which, in the course of history, have become separated from the great body of their nation, and which, therefore, have their center of gravity out of Austria. Thus the Poles have their natural center of gravity in Russian-Poland; the Ruthenes in the other Malo-Russian provinces united with Russia; the Serbians in the Serbian principality. That these fragments,
torn from their respective nationalities, will continue to gravitate, each toward its natural center, is a matter of course, and becomes more and more evident as civilization, and with it the want of historical, national activity, is spread among them. In either case, the Austrian Slonians are disjecta membra,\(^a\) seeking their reunion either among each other, or with the main body of their separate nationalities.

This is the cause which formerly rendered Panslavism so active in Austria. In order to secure the restoration of each Slavonian nationality, the different tribes of Slonians in Austria long since began to work for a union of all the Slavonic tribes. The first appearance of Austrian Panslavism was merely literary. Dobrowsky, a Bohemian, the founder of the scientific philology of the Slavonic dialects, and Kollár, a Slovak poet from the Hungarian Carpathians, were its originators. With Dobrowsky it was the enthusiasm of a scientific discoverer; with Kollár, political ideas soon became predominant; but still he ventured to complain only; the greatness of the past, the disgrace, the misfortune and foreign oppression of the present, were the themes of his poetry. The dream of the Panslavic Empire dictating laws to Europe was at that time hardly hinted at.

But the lamenting period soon passed away, and historical research upon the political, literary and linguistic development of the Slavonic race, made great progress. Šafařík, Kopitar and Miklosich as linguists, Palacký as a historian, took the lead, followed by a host of lesser men like Hanka and Gaj. The glorious epochs of Bohemian and Serbian history were glowingly depicted in their contrast to the present degraded and broken state of those nations. While in Germany philosophy formed the pretext under the protection of which the most revolutionary doctrines in politics or theology were propounded, in Austria, and under the very nose of Metternich, historical and philological science was used by the Panslavists as a cloak to teach the doctrine of Slavonic unity, and to create a political party with the unmistakable aim of upsetting Austria, and instituting a vast Slavonian empire in its place.

Austrian Panslavism was destitute of the most essential elements of success. It wanted both force and unity; force, because the Panslavic party consisted of a portion of the educated classes only, had no hold upon the masses, and withal no strength capable of

---

\(^a\) Scattered limbs, dismembered parts—paraphrase of Horace’s expression “disjecti membra poetae”.—Ed.
resisting both the Austrian Government and the German and Hungarian nationalities against which it entered the list; unity, because its uniting principle was a mere ideal one, which, at the very first attempt at realization, was broken up by the fact of diversity of language. Of this diversity, a ludicrous illustration was afforded by the famous Slavonian Congress at Prague, in 1848. There, after various attempts to make out a Slavonic language that should be intelligible to all the members, they were obliged to resort to the tongue most hated by them all—the German.

In fact, so long as the movement was limited to Austria it offered no great danger, but that very center of unity and strength which it wanted, was very soon found for it. The national uprising of the Turkish Serbians, in the beginning of this century, had called the attention of the Russian Government to the fact that there were some seven millions of Slavonians in Turkey, whose speech, of all other Slavonic dialects, most resembled the Russian. Their religion too, and their ecclesiastic language—old Slavonic or Church-Slavonic—were exactly the same as in Russia. It was among these Serbians and Bulgarians that the Czar for the first time began an agitation supported by appeals to his position as the protector of the Eastern Church. It was therefore only natural that as soon as this Panslavist movement in Austria had gained consistency, Russia should extend thither the ramifications of her agencies. Where Roman Catholic Slavonians were met with the religious side of the question was dropped; Russia was merely held up as the proper head of the Slavonic race, and the strong and united people which was to realize the great Slavonic Empire from the Elbe to China, and from the Adriatic to the frozen ocean.

Metternich, in the latter years of his power, very well appreciated the danger and saw through the Russian intrigues. He opposed the movement with all the means in his power. But the only proper means—general freedom of expansion—did not belong to his system of policy. Accordingly, on Metternich's downfall in 1848, the Slavonic movement broke out stronger than ever, and embraced a large proportion of the population. But here its reactionary character at once came to light. While the German, Hungarian and Italian movements were decidedly progressive and revolutionary, the Slavonic party turned to the conservative side. It was the Slavonians that saved Austria from destruction, and enabled Radetzky to advance on the Mincio, and Windischgrätz to conquer Vienna. And to complete the drama, in
1849 the Russian army had to descend into Hungary and settle the war for Austria there.

While thus driven by her own want of vitality to depend on Slavonic aid for her very existence, Austria seized the first moment of security to react against the Slavonians in her own territory. For this purpose she had to adopt a policy at least partially progressive. The special privileges of the Provinces were broken down; a centralized empire took the place of a federal one; and instead of all the different nationalities a fictitious Austrian nationality was created. Though these changes were in some degree against the German, Italian and Hungarian nationalities, they yet fell with far greater weight on the less compact Slavonian tribes, and more especially gave the German element a considerable preponderance.

But the sentiment of race and of attachment to Russia has been strengthened rather than weakened by this process. Austrian Panslavism possesses, perhaps, at this moment a greater latent force than ever. It represents the only element in Austria which was not broken down in the late revolutionary struggle. The Italians, the Hungarians, the Germans even, all came debilitated and discouraged out of that vehement convulsion. The Slavonians alone felt themselves unconquered and unreduced. Is it surprising that Francis Joseph should hesitate before setting on foot a war in which Russia would find millions of devoted and fanatical allies within his own Empire?

Written about April 17, 1855


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The news from the war is abundant. We have the official accounts of the cavalry action at Kurulu, near Eupatoria, before reported—the intelligence of an unsuccessful assault of the Russians on Kars, of the destruction by the Allies of Taman and Phanagoria, and of the capture of Kinburn at the mouth of the Dnieper.

The cavalry action near Eupatoria was fought by twelve French squadrons (fourth hussars, sixth and seventh dragoons). According to Gen. d’Allonville’s report, which is plain and intelligible, the French and Turks made an extensive reconnaissance toward the interior on three different roads—one to the south and two to the north of Lake Sasik. The two latter columns met at a village called Dolshak, where they discovered the approach of the Russian cavalry. Here the reports begin to disagree. Gen. d’Allonville maintains that eighteen squadrons of Russians—while the French were dismounted, baiting their horses—tried to turn them by the south and cut off their retreat to Eupatoria; that he then ordered his men to mount, fell upon the flank of the Russians, routed and pursued them for two leagues. Gorchakoff says that the Russians were only one regiment (eighteenth lancers) or eight squadrons; that they were surprised by the French after having dismounted in order to unlimber a battery of artillery, and that under these circumstances they had to run for their lives. He makes Gen. Korff responsible for this mistake. Now what business a whole regiment of lancers had to dismount and assist in unlimbering a

---

*a A. Péli ssier, “Grand quartier général à Sébastopol, le 1er octobre 1855”, Le Moniteur universel, No. 289, October 16, 1855.—Ed.
battery of eight guns, and how it was that the gunners, whose business it was to do this work, were not at hand, we are left to guess for ourselves. The whole report of Gorchakoff is so confused, so unmilitary, so impregnated with the desire to palliate this first cavalry disaster, that it is impossible to treat it as a serious statement of facts. At the same time we see Gen. Korff made responsible for this defeat, as Selvan was made responsible for Silistria, Soimonoff for Inkermann, Read for the Chernaya.\textsuperscript{453} Gorchakoff, though defeated in every action, is still invincible. It is not he who is beaten, far from it; it is some unlucky subaltern who upsets the general's wise plans by some clumsy mistake, and who generally gets killed in action in punishment for this crime. In this instance, however, the blunderer is unfortunate enough to preserve his life. Perhaps he may, hereafter, have something to say to Gorchakoff's dispatch. In the mean time he has the satisfaction that his opponent represents him in a far better light than his infallible commander-in-chief does. Since then, the British light cavalry division has been sent to Eupatoria to reenforce the French.

The defeat of the Russians before Kars will very probably prove to be the crowning event of the campaign in Armenia. The Turks, badly organized and short of every requisite, had played but a poor part in this portion of the seat of war. Unable to hold the field, they confined themselves to the occupation of Kars, Erzeroum and the country immediately under the command of these fortresses. Gen. Williams, who had entered the Turkish service, commanded at Kars and superintended the construction of proper defensive works. For the greater part of the Summer the whole campaign on either side was confined to skirmishes, forays and foraging expeditions in the hill country; the general and first result of which was that the Russians, gradually gaining ground, succeeded in blockading Kars and even in cutting off its communications with Erzeroum. Kars is situated in a lateral valley of the Upper Araxes; Erzeroum at the sources of the Euphrates; Batoum on the mouth of the Churuk Su (Bathys), the upper course of which passes near both to Kars and to Erzeroum, so that one of the roads between these two places follows the basin of the Churuk Su as far as Olti, whence it strikes off across the hills toward Kars. Olti was, therefore, the central point for the Turks, as a road from Batoum there joins the one mentioned above; and Batoum was the place from which the nearest and strongest reenforcements were to be expected. Had the Russians succeeded in taking Kars, their first step would have been to establish
themselves at Olti, thereby cutting off Erzeroum from its nearest and best communication with the Black Sea and Constantinople. The Turks, however, were so dispirited that they retired as far as Erzeroum, merely occupying the mountain pass between the Upper Euphrates and the sources of the Araxes, while Olti was all but completely neglected.

At last, when Kars was more closely hemmed in, they attempted to form a convoy of provisions at Olti, and with a strong escort to force an entrance into Kars. Part of the cavalry from Kars, having been sent away, as it was useless there, actually fought its way through the Russians as far as Olti, and the convoy started shortly afterward; but this time the Russians were better on the alert—the Turks were completely defeated, and the convoy was captured by the Russians. Kars, in the mean time, began to run short of provisions; Omer Pasha was, indeed, sent to take the command in Asia and to organize at Batoum an army fit to act in the field; but this creation of a new army takes a deal of time, and a march direct to the relief of Kars by Olti would not have been the best course he could take, as Kars might any day be compelled to surrender from want of provisions before relief could arrive.

In this difficult position the Turks stood at the end of September; Kars was considered as good as lost, and the Russians were sure, by merely blockading the town, to starve it out. But the Russians themselves appear not to have been willing to wait until the last flour was baked and the last horse cooked in Kars. Whether from the fear of approaching Winter, the state of the roads, shortness of provisions, superior orders, or the fear of Omer Pasha's relieving corps, they at once made up their minds to act vigorously. Siege-guns arrived from Alexandropol, a fortress on the frontier but a few leagues from Kars, and after a few days of open trenches and cannonading, Kars was assaulted by the concentrated main body of the Russian army under Muravieff. The combat was desperate, and lasted eight hours. The Bashi-bazouks and foot irregulars, who had so often run before the Russians in the field, here fought on more congenial ground. Though the attacking forces must have been from four to six times more numerous than the garrison, yet all attempts to get into the place were in vain. The Turks had here at last recovered their courage and intelligence. Though the Russians more than once succeeded in entering the Turkish batteries (very likely lunettes open at the gorge, so as to be commanded by the fire of the second line of defense), they could no where establish themselves. Their loss is said to have been immense; four
Appendices

thousand killed are stated to have been buried by the Turks; but before crediting this we must have more detailed and precise information.

The capture of Kinburn was effected by the same fleet which made a demonstration before Odessa, whence, however, they sailed away without firing a shot, on their real errand, which was the reduction of Kinburn. This place is situated near the extremity of a tongue of land which on the south incloses the estuary of the Dnieper and Bug. At this point, the estuary is about three miles wide; a bar with fifteen feet of water (according to the Russian charts) hinders its entrance. On the north side of this entrance is situated Otshakoff, on the south side of Kinburn. Both these places first came into notoriety during the Russo-Turkish campaign of 1787, when the Bug formed the frontier of the two empires, and consequently Otshakoff belonged to the Turks and Kinburn to the Russians. At that time, Suvaroff commanded the left wing of the Russian army (under Potemkin), and was stationed at Kinburn. The Turks, then masters of the Black Sea, crossed over from Otshakoff. They first made a diversion by landing behind the town of Kinburn, to the south-east; but when they saw that Suvaroff was not to be led astray by this false maneuver, they landed with their main body at the north-western extremity of the spit, exactly opposite Otshakoff. Here they intrenched themselves, and attacked the fortress; but Suvaroff sallied forth with a far inferior number of men, engaged them, and, with the help of reenforcements, drove them into the sea. Their loss was enormous. Suvaroff himself, however, was wounded during this action, which was followed up in the following year, 1788, by the storming of Otshakoff.

The few details yet known respecting the taking of Kinburn confirm the experience of former episodes in this war, while they again tend to prove the intentional incorrectness of the Russian charts. On all their best charts there is no water of sufficient depth for ships-of-the-line or heavy frigates to be found anywhere within some miles of Kinburn. Yet when the allied fleets sent out gun-boats to take soundings within easy range of Kinburn, they found fully four and a half fathoms at sixteen hundred yards from the walls—at least, so it appears—on the north side within the estuary. Nine heavy steam-frigates could approach to that distance and shell the place; and while the mortar-boats did the

---

a For an account of the further fighting in the Kars area after the abortive Russian assault on the fortress on September 29, 1855, and of the fall of Kars see this volume, pp. 588-94 and 595-98.—Ed.
same from much nearer stations, the gun-boats enfiladed the faces of the bastions, and the floating batteries—which must have approached to some six hundred or seven hundred yards, if not closer—succeeded in making several breaches in the sea-walls.

What the precise nature of the defenses of Kinburn was, we cannot as yet make out very distinctly. The small town stretching right across the narrow spit was defended by a sort of continuous rampart of masonry, something like a bastioned pentagon or square, with guns firing on barbette, or through masonry embrasures. The guns for the most part stood uncovered, but on the points where their fire was to act with the greatest force there were two tiers, the lower one casemated, the upper one firing through masonry embrasures in a wall erected on the flat roof of the casemates. As at Bomarsund, the masonry, as soon as it was acted upon by a vastly superior fire from the ships, crumbled away, and three breaches, it appears, were formed by the floating batteries in from six to eight hours. This is explained by the very small number of guns in the fortress, of which there were only seventy; and, as the attack could be expected from any side, every front of the fortress had to be armed, so that against the main attack no more than from sixteen to twenty guns could be brought to bear. That their fire should soon have been silenced by the vertical fire of the mortar-boats, the enfilading shots of the gun-boats, the shell-storm of the steam-frigates, and the breaching front fire of the floating batteries, bringing into action at least eight to tenfold their number of guns, is not to be wondered at. And as the day was exceedingly calm, the fire from the floating batteries was as steady as it would have been from any shore battery; it therefore could really act as breaching fire. These unwieldy, floating masses, helpless and useless as soon as the least amount of swell destroys their steadiness, must necessarily be able to do great execution in perfectly calm weather, and in situations where the large vessels can approach within range and thereby draw upon themselves the principal fire of the enemy. Such favorable circumstances, however, occur but seldom; and where fortresses like Kronstadt, Sweaborg, or the sea-forts of Sevastopol, were the objects of their attack, the floating batteries would prove more cumbersome than useful. Thus on the whole, the affair at Kinburn cannot be said to have proved anything in favor of these clumsy sea-monsters.

The allied troops who landed to the south-east of Kinburn must have amounted to a couple of thousand: for of the English alone there were six battalions on board the fleet numbering, with
artillery, nearly four thousand men, of which but a portion, however, was landed; while the French had another brigade on board their ships. The part taken by the troops in this action was very inconsiderable; they sent skirmishers and field guns against the place, but as there was a broad wet ditch in front of it, the Russians appear to have treated this impotent demonstration with sovereign contempt, not even opening a heavy fire on them, for we do not hear that the allied troops lost anything to speak of. It was the overwhelming fire of the fleets alone which forced the place to surrender, and as soon as its guns had been silenced, the fleets offered a capitulation, which was accepted. The garrison marched out with the honors of war and surrendered themselves prisoners. Then it was found that the whole force in the fortress consisted of thirteen hundred or fourteen hundred men; and this at once proves what sort of a fortress Kinburn was. In bastioned fortresses, especially small ones, it is generally considered that one weak battalion, or from five hundred to six hundred men, is required for every bastion; a bastioned square, the smallest fortification possible in the bastioned system, requiring from two thousand to two thousand five hundred men for its defense. Here a little over one-half of that number only were present, and yet they had to defend not only plain ramparts, but also to serve the guns in the casemates. Thus, either the fortifications, then, must have been very insignificant indeed, or else very weakly defended; and in either case, the success of the allied fleets before Kinburn does not in any way affect the generally adopted opinion that one gun ashore, well sheltered behind earth ramparts, is worth more than six on board ship coming to attack it.

The entrance to the estuary of the Dnieper once having been forced by the Allies, and the pretended existence of a bar of great shallowness at that point having been proved to be a mere Russian stratagem, the whole estuary is opened to the action of the French and English fleets. The interior of the estuary is known to have a great depth of water, at least in the central channel, though nearer to the shores it abounds in sand-banks, none of which, however, are formidable to gun-boats and other light vessels. Thus Otshakoff, Glubokoye and other points on the shores of the estuary are exposed to the attacks of the Allies and very likely will have to suffer from them.

That the entrance to the estuary is not the shallow channel indicated on the charts, the allied admirals might have inferred from the history of the campaign of 1788. And here we may be allowed to refer again to that campaign, not only because it gives
us a clear insight into what the nature of this estuary is with reference to naval warfare, but also because it was then the scene of some of the exploits of our Revolutionary hero, Paul Jones.

At that time, Kinburn and the south shore were held by the Russians, and Otshakoff and the north shore, by the Turks. The Russians had a fleet at Glubokoye, between the mouths of the Dnieper and the Bug; its sailing vessels of deep draught were commanded by Rear-Admiral Paul Jones, and consisted of five ships of the line of eighty guns, and eight frigates, while the rowing flotilla of sixty-five light vessels was under the orders of the Prince of Nassau-Siegen. The Turks had about Otshakoff, under Hassan-Pasha, ten ships of the line, six frigates and fifty-three vessels of light draught. A second Turkish fleet of eight sail of the line, eight frigates, and twenty-four smaller sail was cruising in the offing. After a few preliminary engagements, Hassan-Pasha, on the 27th of June, entered the estuary with the whole of his first fleet, sailed up as far as Glubokoye (thus proving that ships of the line, with their full armament on board, could come up so far), and formed in order of battle, the large vessels in the first line. The Russians, on the contrary, covered their liners and frigates with the row-boats. On the morning of the 28th the battle began. The Turkish line advanced, and soon came up within range of the Russian liners. Within an hour a Turkish ship of seventy guns was aground; the admiral's flag-ship, carrying eighty guns, was ashore a few moments after. Two frigates of forty guns went to succor them, but one of them struck on a shoal almost immediately; while Paul Jones's large vessels kept the remainder of the Turkish vessels engaged, the row-boats closed up with the stranded vessels, boarded and set fire to them. The remainder of the Turkish fleet soon retired in no enviable state; but still their large ships made such a bold front that their retreat was pretty nearly unmolested by the Russian gun-boats and galleys.

But the measure of their disaster was not yet filled. Hassan-Pasha, having collected the remains of his fleet at Otshakoff, resolved to join the fleet cruising in the Black Sea, and to effect this, he had to pass round the point of the Kinburn spit. Here Suvaroff, who commanded in the peninsula, had constructed a masked battery of twenty-four guns; and when the Turks, on the night of the 30th of June, 1788, attempted to double that cape, the battery opened upon them with great effect. Before daybreak, the fire of the Russians, favored by a bright moonlight, had brought the Turkish fleet into great distress, whose ships had to
pass one after the other through the narrow channel, and were all the while within easy range of the battery. Several vessels got ashore; others showed signals of distress, some went down or were in flames; and as day broke the Russian fleet bore down upon them. Paul Jones very wisely kept his large ships back, as there was no room for them to maneuver; and indeed the liner Vladimir, venturing too much forward, was lost on a shoal. But the rowing flotilla closed with the Turks, and destroyed a great many of their ships, so that before noon the whole action was at an end. Three sail of the line, five frigates, and seventeen smaller sail were destroyed, and one liner and two frigates were taken by the Russians. Of the two sail of the line which were saved by the Turks, one went down before it could reach Constantinople, and a frigate sank as soon as she had reached the island of Poresan. A portion of the Turkish fleet sought shelter under the guns of Otshakoff, but even here Prince Nassau-Siegen attacked and destroyed them on the 1st and 2d August.

This campaign shows clearly what sort of a naval battle-field the Dnieper estuary is. The smaller sort of ships of the line, or at least the large fifty and sixty gun frigates, can enter it; but whether they will be able to maneuver in it with any degree of safety, though they be propelled by steam, remains doubtful. But that corvettes, sloops and vessels of lighter draught, especially steamers, can easily maneuver in these waters, while the larger vessels may serve, when once moored, as stationary batteries, there is not the slightest doubt whatever. And with the means of naval warfare now in the possession of the Allies, with due activity they should be able to scour the estuary from Otshakoff to the mouth of the Dnieper and the Bug.

But it is not only with a view to naval operations alone that the possession of this place is of great importance to the Allies. It gives them an unassailable position on the peninsula between the Dnieper and the Crimea; a position commanding the entrance of the estuary of that river and menacing at the same time the communications between Perekop and Kherson. There is a rumor mentioned in the Vienna papers that the Allies had landed thirty thousand men on the spit of Tendra, a long, narrow island stretching within a few miles distance along the southern shore of the peninsula of Kinburn. If the fact of the landing be true, the numbers are evidently exaggerated. But if even a small body only of the allied troops had occupied this spit, it would show their intention of establishing themselves on the peninsula, and of seriously menacing the Russian lines of communications. They
might from this position prove as troublesome to Russian convoys as the corps of Gens. d'Allonville and Paget, from Eupatoria, might to the convoys coming down from Perekop to Sympheropol. They might even, by rapidly concentrating a strong force on this peninsula, make a dash at Kherson, and burn everything with the exception of the small citadel—unless, indeed, the Russians have fortified that town too, and can spare a strong garrison to defend it. Anyhow, Kinburn and the long, flat sandy islands along the shore of the gulf leading to Perekop, form a series of positions which the Allies can easily hold with small bodies of troops, and each of which they can turn at any moment into a base for ulterior and rapid operation. The Russians may thus be obliged, by a few battalions, to disseminate a great number of their troops in order to secure most important points from sudden irruptions; and so long as the allied fleets hold command of the sea, these newly gained possessions cannot be attacked by any Russian land force.

Written in the second half of October 1855

This version of the article was first published in the New-York Weekly Tribune, No. 739, November 10, 1855 as a leading article

Reproduced from the newspaper
NOTES
AND
INDEXES
"The Struggle in the Crimea" is one of the many articles on the Crimean War written by Engels at Marx's request for the *New-York Daily Tribune*.

Marx contributed to this newspaper from August 1851 to March 1862, but not until August 1852 did he begin sending articles of his own. His first were written in German and translated into English by his friends, mostly Engels. By late January 1853, his knowledge of English had improved sufficiently for him to begin writing them in English.

Marx's and Engels' articles in the *New-York Daily Tribune* dealt with key issues of foreign and domestic policy, the working-class movement, the economic development of European countries, colonial expansion and the national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries. They immediately attracted attention by their profundity, political insight and literary merits. The *New-York Daily Tribune* editors publicly acknowledged their high quality. For instance, in a leading article on April 7, 1853, they saw fit to "pay a tribute to the remarkable ability of the correspondent... Mr. Marx has very decided opinions of his own, with some of which we are far from agreeing; but those who do not read his letters neglect one of the most instructive sources of information on the great questions of current European politics." In a letter to Jenny Marx of July 1, 1853, Charles Dana, one of the editors, wrote that the owners of the *Tribune* and the reading public had a high opinion of her husband's articles.

Many articles by Marx and Engels were reprinted in the *Tribune*‘s special issues—the *New-York Weekly Tribune* and *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, and some were reproduced in the Chartist *People’s Paper*. Other newspapers, including the *New-York Times*, quoted from them. Their articles reached Europe too. For example, in his speech in the House of Commons on July 1, 1853, John Bright, leader of the Free Traders, specially noted Marx’s article on Gladstone’s budget published in the *Tribune* (see present edition, Volume 12, p. 176).

The *Tribune* editors sometimes took liberties with the articles, printing them unsigned, in the form of editorials, especially from September 1854 onwards. In some cases they tampered with the text, making insertions, some of which were in direct contradiction to the content of the articles. Marx repeatedly protested against these practices. In the autumn of 1857 he was forced to
reduce the number of his contributions in view of the Tribune's weak financial position, the result of the economic crisis in the U.S.A. He ceased contributing to the paper altogether after the outbreak of the American Civil War, mainly because the Tribune had come under the sway of people advocating a compromise with the slave-owning states.

"The Struggle in the Crimea" is one of the series of reviews of the Crimean War of 1853-56 which Engels began to write for the New-York Daily Tribune in the autumn of 1853 and the Neue Oder-Zeitung in January 1855 (in the latter case the reviews were either German versions of articles written for the Tribune or special reports included by Marx in his articles for the Neue Oder-Zeitung). The New-York Daily Tribune published these reviews as leading articles without giving the name of the author (see present edition, Vols. 12 and 13). p. 3

2 The battle of the Alma took place on September 20, 1854. The Russian forces were commanded by A. S. Menshikov, and the numerically superior forces of the French, British and Turks by Saint-Arnaud and Raglan. It was the first battle after the Allies' landing in the Crimea (at Eupatoria) on September 14. The defeat and withdrawal of the Russian troops opened up the way to Sevastopol for the Allies. Later Engels also described this battle in his article "Alma" written for the New American (see present edition, Vol. 18). p. 3

3 Piedmont (the Kingdom of Sardinia) joined the anti-Russian coalition at Napoleon III's insistence in January 1855 and sent a corps of 15,000 troops to the Crimea. Count Camillo Cavour, the head of the Piedmontese government, who wanted to unite Italy under the aegis of the Savoy dynasty that ruled Piedmont, hoped thus to win France's support in the future struggle of the Kingdom of Sardinia for the North Italian provinces of Lombardy and Venice, which had been captured by Austria. This support was to help him avenge Piedmont's defeat in the war against Austria in 1848-49. p. 4

4 On May 4, 1811, in the course of the Peninsular War (1808-14) British, Spanish and Portuguese forces commanded by Wellington laid siege to the French-held fortress of Badajoz (south-western Spain). However, on May 14 Wellington was forced to lift the siege in order to engage the French army sent to relieve the besieged garrison. The siege was resumed on May 25, but lifted again for the same reason on June 17. The fortress was captured by Wellington's troops on April 6, 1812, after a new siege which began on March 16. p. 6

5 This article belongs to the series written by Marx for the Neue Oder-Zeitung, which gave a systematic coverage of the home- and foreign-policy debates in the British Parliament in 1855. It includes material from Engels' review "The Struggle in the Crimea" written for the New-York Daily Tribune. The series began with the article "The Opening of Parliament" (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 600-02).

The Neue Oder-Zeitung was a democratic daily published in Breslau (Wroclaw) from 1849 to 1855. In the autumn of 1854 Marx was invited to contribute to it by Ferdinand Lassalle, whose cousin, Max Friedländer, published the newspaper. Originally Marx was very critical of the Neue Oder-Zeitung. During the revolution of 1848-49 he criticised the Breslau democrats grouped round it for their vacillations and conciliatory policy, and the "Address of the Central Authority to the League" (March 1850) stressed the hostility of the Neue Oder-Zeitung towards the working-class movement (see present edition, Vol. 10, pp. 277-87). However, Marx's attitude to the
newspaper changed in later years, when it became the most radical opposition organ in Germany and was persecuted by the censorship and the Prussian government. At that time, the editorial board was headed by the bourgeois democrats Temme, Stein and Elsner. In September 1855 Elsner became Editor-in-Chief.

In a letter to Elsner of November 8, 1855, Marx noted that the Neue Oder-Zeitung was publishing “the maximum of what is possible under the present condition of the press”. In these circumstances he considered it necessary to give the newspaper every possible support. When its financial position deteriorated in the autumn of 1855, he offered to write for it without payment.

Marx began to contribute to the Neue Oder-Zeitung as its London correspondent at the end of December 1854, sending two or three reports a week. His articles were marked with the sign ×. Given the almost total absence of a working-class press in Germany during the years of reaction Marx and Engels thought it important to use the bourgeois-democratic press for the struggle against reaction. Marx's work for the Neue Oder-Zeitung enabled him to keep in touch with Germany and familiarise German readers with key issues of foreign and domestic policy, the working-class and democratic movement and the economic development of capitalist countries, above all Britain and France. He regularly sent reports on the progress of the Crimean War. Sometimes he used for this purpose Engels' military reviews written for the New-York Daily Tribune, translating them into German (in the present edition both Marx and Engels are given as their authors). Sometimes Marx abridged Engels' articles or introduced changes and additions. In October 1855 the Neue Oder-Zeitung found itself almost without means to pay its correspondents. At the end of the year the paper closed down. The last article definitely known to have been written by Marx appeared in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on November 16, 1855.

6 The Peelites were a group of moderate Tories supporting Robert Peel, who advocated economic concessions to the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie as a means of maintaining the political rule of the big landowners and financiers. In 1846, he secured the repeal of the Corn Laws (see Note 14). This move, favouring the industrial bourgeoisie, was bitterly resented by the Protectionist Tories and led to a split in the Tory party and the emergence of the Peelites as an independent group. The Peelites were represented in Aberdeen's coalition government (1852-55) and joined the Liberal party in the late 1850s and early 1860s.

7 The Manchester School—a trend in political economy reflecting the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie. It favoured free trade and non-interference by the state in the economy. The Free Traders' stronghold was Manchester, where the movement was led by Cobden and Bright, two textile manufacturers who founded the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838. In the 1840s and 1850s the Free Traders were an independent political group which later formed the Left wing of the Liberal Party.

8 The Mayfair Radicals were a group of aristocratic politicians (Molesworth, Bernal Osborne and others) who flirted with democratic circles. The name derives from Mayfair, an aristocratic district on the edge of Hyde Park in London.
Palmerston's resignation from the post of Foreign Secretary in Russell's Whig Cabinet occurred on December 19, 1851, and was caused by his approving, in a conversation with the French Ambassador, of the Bonapartist coup d'état of December 2, 1851, without consulting other Cabinet members. On the whole, however, the British government shared Palmerston's attitude and was the first in Europe to recognise the Bonapartist regime.

The battle of Balaklava took place on October 25, 1854. Units of the Russian army tried to cut off the British and Turkish troops taking part in the siege of Sevastopol from their base in Balaklava. They succeeded in inflicting serious losses on the enemy, especially on the British cavalry, but failed to achieve their main objective. For a description of this battle see Engels' article "The War in the East" (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 518-27).

The articles "Lord Palmerston" were written by Marx for the Neue Oder-Zeitung in connection with the formation of the Palmerston government on February 6, 1855, and are essentially a résumé of Marx's well-known pamphlet Lord Palmerston written for the New-York Daily Tribune in the autumn of 1853 and also published, in fuller form, in the Chartist People's Paper (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 341-406).

Carbonari—members of secret political societies in Italy and France in the first half of the nineteenth century. In Italy they fought for national independence, the unification of the country and liberal constitutional reforms. In France the movement was above all directed against the restored monarchy of the Bourbons (1815-30). In the first half of the nineteenth century the word "carbonari" was synonymous with "revolutionary".

In 1847 in Athens the house of the merchant Pacifico, a Portuguese Jew and British citizen, was burnt down. Palmerston used this as a pretext for sending units of the British Navy to Greece and presenting the Greek government with an ultimatum. The actual purpose of this move was to force Greece to cede several strategic islands in the Aegean. During the discussion of the Anglo-Greek conflict in the British Parliament in June 1850 the government's foreign policy was approved by the House of Commons. The House of Lords, on the contrary, rejected Palmerston's policy by a majority of 37. France and Russia indicated their displeasure through their ambassadors in London: the French Ambassador left the British capital, the Russian Ambassador failed to attend a dinner given by Palmerston.

The Corn Laws, the first of which were passed as early as the fifteenth century, imposed high import duties on agricultural products in order to maintain high prices for these products on the domestic market. The Corn Laws served the interests of the big landowners. The struggle between the industrial bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy over the Corn Laws ended in their repeal in June 1846.

The blockade of the River Scheldt and the Dutch coast by the British and French navies was undertaken in 1832 with a view to forcing Holland to cease hostilities it had resumed in 1831 against Belgium, which had overthrown Dutch rule. As a result, both Holland and Belgium were compelled to agree to a compromise peace treaty (1833) drawn up by Britain, France, Russia, Prussia and Austria.
The blockade of the mouths of the rivers Tagus and Douro was undertaken by Britain during the civil war in Portugal (1828-34). In this war the feudal-clerical party led by the pretender to the Portuguese throne, Dom Miguel, fought against the liberal bourgeois party of Constitutionalists. In an attempt to strengthen its influence in the Iberian Peninsula, the British government sent its navy to the Portuguese coast and thereby tipped the scales in favour of the Constitutionalists.

16 The blockade of Mexico—under the pretext of protecting French citizens in Mexico a French squadron blockaded several Mexican ports on April 16, 1838. The blockade affected British commercial interests. Despite numerous petitions from the commercial bourgeoisie urging the British government to intervene and ensure the free passage of British ships, in the Parliamentary debate of March 19, 1839, Palmerston defended the position of the government, which did not want a conflict with France.

The blockade of Buenos Aires and the Argentine coast by the British and French navies (1845-50) aimed at forcing the Argentine government to open the rivers Paraná and Uruguay to foreign ships (they had been closed to foreign shipping in 1841 in connection with the war between Argentina and Uruguay) and recognise Uruguay's independence. These demands were granted in 1850 and 1851.

17 In 1838 the King of Naples granted a French company a monopoly to mine sulphur in Sicily. This move evoked a sharp protest from the British government, which regarded it as an infringement of Britain's commercial interests, guaranteed by the Anglo-Neapolitan treaty of 1816. In 1840 the British Navy in the Mediterranean was ordered to open hostilities. Naples was forced to comply with Britain's demands.

For details of the Pacifico affair see Note 13.

In 1837 Mohammed Shah of Persia laid siege to the Afghan fortress of Herat, a junction of important trade routes. In 1838 the British government declared his actions to be hostile to Britain and demanded an end to the siege. Later it dispatched a naval squadron to the Persian Gulf, threatening war. The Shah was compelled to lift the siege and conclude an unequal trade agreement with Britain (1841).

18 A reference to Britain's intervention in the Carlist War in Spain (1833-40) in which the feudal Catholic forces, led by pretender to the throne Don Carlos, fought against the bourgeois liberals who supported the government of Regent Maria Cristina. Britain sent its navy and a legion of volunteers to Spain. The latter took part in the fighting on Maria Cristina's side in 1835-37. These moves were designed to consolidate Britain's influence in the Iberian Peninsula.

The war with China for the importation of opium—a reference to the so-called First Opium War (1839-42). Britain's war against China which marked the beginning of the latter's transformation into a semi-colony. Britain used as a pretext for this war the confiscation by the Chinese authorities in Canton of opium stocks owned by foreign merchants. As a result of this war the Treaty of Nanking was imposed on China (August 29, 1842) which obliged it to open five ports (Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai) to British trade, cede the island of Hongkong to Britain "in perpetuity" and pay Britain a huge indemnity. Under a supplementary treaty signed in 1843 China was forced to grant extraterritoriality to foreigners. In 1844 unequal treaties were imposed on China by the USA and France.
This refers to Anglo-American clashes on the US-Canadian border over disputed territories, one to the north of the American State of Maine, the other—Oregon—on the Pacific coast. These clashes became especially sharp in the late 1830s and early 1840s.

The Afghanistan campaigns—during the first Anglo-Afghan war (1838-42) in which Britain strove to establish colonial rule in Afghanistan, British troops invaded Afghan territory twice (in 1838 and 1842). Both invasions failed to achieve their purpose.

At the insistence of the British government, Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia signed a convention in London on July 15, 1840, on military assistance to Turkey in its war against Egypt (1839-41). In the autumn of 1840 British and Austrian warships bombarded Beirut, Saint-Jean-d'Acre and other fortresses on the Syrian coast, which had been captured by Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, between 1831 and 1833. Eventually Mehemet Ali was forced to relinquish his possessions outside Egypt and submit to the supreme authority of the Sultan.

Evidently a reference to the inspection of ships by the British in connection with the slave trade. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Britain, in its drive against the slave trade, claimed the right to inspect all suspect ships even in peacetime. This was strongly opposed by the U.S. government because many ships carrying slaves from West Africa sailed under the U.S. flag.

Britain's right to inspect Portuguese ships was recognised by the Anglo-Portuguese treaties of 1810, 1815 and 1817. In return for Britain's waiving of Portugal's debts the latter undertook to allow her own ships to carry only a limited number of African slaves and only to Brazil, then a Portuguese colony, and to ban the use of her flag by slavers of other countries. This agreement was often violated, especially after Brazil won independence in 1822. In 1839 the British Parliament passed a law allowing British ships to detain ships engaged in the slave traffic.

The Treaty of Adrianople was concluded by Turkey and Russia in September 1829 following the war of 1828-29. Under the treaty Russia obtained the Danube delta including the islands, and a considerable part of the eastern Black Sea coast south of the Kuban estuary. Turkey was to recognise the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia, granting them the right to elect their own hospodars (rulers). Their autonomy was to be guaranteed by Russia. The Turkish government also undertook to recognise the independence of Greece, whose only obligation to Turkey was to pay an annual tribute to the Sultan, and abide by all the previous treaties relating to the autonomy of Serbia, which was to be formalised by a special firman.

The Balta-Liman Treaty, concluded by Russia and Turkey on May 1, 1849, laid down conditions for the continued presence of their troops in Moldavia and Wallachia, which had been occupied to suppress the revolutionary movement. Under the treaty, the occupation was to continue until the threat of revolution had been fully eliminated (the foreign troops were not withdrawn until 1851), for a certain period the hospodars were to be appointed by the Sultan in agreement with the Tsar. A series of measures by Russia and Turkey, including another occupation, were envisaged to provide for the eventuality of another revolution.

On May 8, 1852, Russia, Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Sweden and Denmark signed the London Protocol on the integrity of the Kingdom of
Denmark. It was based on the protocol adopted by the same states (except Prussia) at a conference in London on July 4, 1850 and signed on August 2, 1850, which established the principle of the indivisibility of the Danish Crown possessions, including the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The London Protocol mentioned the Russian Emperor among the lawful claimants to the Danish Crown who had renounced their rights in favour of Duke Christian of Glücksburg, proclaimed successor to King Frederick VII (the Russian Emperor descended from Duke Charles Peter Ulrich of Holstein-Gottorp, who was Russian Tsar as Peter III). This created a precedent for Russian claims to the Danish Crown in the event of the Glücksburg dynasty dying out. p. 17

Under an agreement signed by Russia, Britain and the Netherlands in London on May 19, 1815, Britain and the Netherlands had undertaken to compensate Russia's military expenses connected with the expulsion of Napoleonic troops from the Dutch and Belgian provinces by gradually repaying part of Russia's debt to the Dutch bankers Hope & Co. and the interest on that debt. A special clause stipulated that the payments would be discontinued in the event of a secession of the Belgian provinces from the Netherlands. After the 1830 revolution and the establishment of an independent Belgian state, the Netherlands stopped its payments. However, Palmerston signed a new agreement with Russia on November 16, 1831, confirming Britain's financial commitments. p. 18

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was signed by Russia and Turkey on July 8, 1833. Prior to that, in the spring of the same year, Russian troops had landed in Unkiar-Skelessi, on the Bosphorus, to help protect the Turkish capital from the army of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt who had rebelled against the Turkish Sultan. In May 1833, the Porte concluded peace with Mehemet Ali through the mediation of Britain and France, ceding Syria and Palestine to Egypt. However, the Tsarist government, taking advantage of the tense situation and the presence of Russian troops in Turkey, induced the Porte to conclude a defence treaty with Russia which contained a secret clause obliging Turkey to close the Straits to all foreign warships except Russian vessels. This clause remained in force until the Turko-Egyptian war of 1839-41, when Nicholas I reached agreement with Britain and other Powers on joint action against Mehemet Ali, but was compelled to agree to the closure of the Straits to the warships of all states in peacetime. p. 18

A reference to the attempt by Mohammed Shah of Persia to gain possession of Herat in 1837-38 (see Note 17). Russia gave him diplomatic support in that campaign. p. 19

The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) (see Note 22) gave Russia control of the islands in the Danube delta but guaranteed freedom of navigation on the Danube to the merchant ships of all countries. However, in the spring of 1836 a Russian quarantine post was set up in the Sulina arm of the Danube which in effect acted as a customs office controlling passing vessels. When the question was discussed in the British Parliament in April 1836, Palmerston declared that Russia's actions were not prejudicial to Anglo-Turkish trade and therefore he saw no grounds for diplomatic intervention by Britain. p. 19

A reference to the national liberation insurrection in Poland in 1830-31. It started on November 29, 1830, when Polish patriots occupied the Belvedere Palace in Warsaw, the residence of Grand Duke Constantine, the Tsarist Commander-in-
Chief (virtually vice-regent) in the Kingdom of Poland. By November 30 the whole of Warsaw was in the hands of the insurgents. p. 19

On February 14, 1855, The Times (No. 21977) published a letter signed “A Colonial Reformer” which asked why Sidney Herbert was not being allowed to continue as Secretary of War if he really possessed the merits attributed to him by his supporters, and was, instead, being offered a high post in the Colonial Office if he really was responsible for the plight of the British wounded in the Crimea, as claimed by his opponents. p. 22

See Note 8. p. 25

This refers to the Great Exhibition held in London in 1851. A special building of metal and glass, known as the Crystal Palace, was erected for it in Hyde Park. p. 29

A reference to the lawsuit over the inheritance of Eliza Josephine Handcock, the mistress of the Earl of Clanricarde, that took place in the Irish Court of Chancery in January 1855. The action had been brought by John Stratford Handcock, the rightful heir of Josephine’s daughter Honoria who died on December 12, 1853. His rights were contested by John de Burgh, son of Josephine and the Earl of Clanricarde. In the course of the proceedings public attention was drawn to the mysterious circumstances attending the death of Josephine’s husband, William Handcock, and of their three daughters, none of whom had come of age. Some witnesses hinted that the Earl of Clanricarde was implicated in these events.

Marx draws a parallel between this case and that of Altarice-Rosalba-Fanny, the Duchess of Praslin, who was found murdered in her home in August 1847. Suspicion fell on her husband, the Duke of Praslin, who was arrested and poisoned himself during the investigation. p. 31

This article was written by Engels for the New-York Daily Tribune. The section relating to the British army was included by Marx, in free translation and with a number of alterations, in his report “Parliamentary and Military Affairs” (February 20, 1855) written for the Neue Oder-Zeitung (see this volume, pp. 40-42; the corresponding passage is indicated in Engels’ article by a footnote). Both Marx and Engels are therefore given as the authors of this report in the present edition. A considerable part of Engels’ article was reproduced by Marx, with cuts and minor alterations, in another report for the Neue Oder-Zeitung entitled “Zustand der Armeen” (“The State of the Armies”), dated by him February 21 and published on February 24, 1855. As it entirely consists of material taken from the article “The War That Looms on Europe”, this report has not been included in the present edition. The most significant alterations made by Marx have been indicated in footnotes. p. 32

A reference to the talks between the British, French and Russian Ambassadors and Austrian Foreign Minister Buol sponsored by Emperor Francis Joseph, which opened in December 1854. Their official purpose was to work out a basis for peace negotiations between the belligerents in the Crimean War. They were a sequel to an earlier round of talks between diplomats of the Western Powers, the Prussian Ambassador and the Austrian Minister (the Russian Ambassador refused to participate) held in Vienna in 1853-54 by way of mediation in the Russo-Turkish conflict. The second round failed to resolve the differences between the belligerents in the Crimean War. In mid-March 1855 representatives of Austria, Britain, France, Turkey and Russia met at a higher level at the
Vienna Conference (Britain was represented by Special Envoy Lord John Russell, France by Foreign Minister Drouyn de Lhuys). That conference also produced no results (see Note 88). p. 32

In the battle of Inkerman in the Crimea (November 5, 1854) the Anglo-French forces defeated the Russian army, but the Russians' vigorous action compelled the enemy to refrain from storming Sevastopol and instead lay siege to the city. Engels described the battle in detail in his article “The Battle of Inkerman” (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 528-35). p. 34

On January 29, 1855, Nicholas I issued a manifesto calling for the formation of a people's militia. It was to be recruited in 18 gubernias of Central Russia (not Southern Russia, as the article says) after the regular levy. p. 38

See Note 10. p. 40


See Note 88. p. 41

At the end of January 1855, John Roebuck submitted a motion in the House of Commons calling for the establishment of a committee to inquire into the condition of the British army in the Crimea and the work of the government departments responsible for its maintenance. Discussion of the motion led to a government crisis and the resignation of Aberdeen's Cabinet (see Marx's article “Comments on the Cabinet Crisis”, present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 603-04). After forming a new ministry in February 1855 Palmerston approved Roebuck's motion, but the Peelites Graham, Gladstone and Herbert, who had belonged to the former coalition government, resigned their posts in the new cabinet. As a result, Palmerston's government in its final form consisted mainly of Whigs. p. 43

This remark shows that Marx may have attended the sitting of the House of Commons on February 23, 1855. This would have enabled him to compare the speeches made there with the reports on the sitting published in The Times, No. 21986, February 24, 1855, and in other newspapers. p. 44

The Four Points—demands made by the Western Powers on Russia as preliminary conditions for peace talks in their Note of August 8, 1854. Russia was required to renounce her protectorate over Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, which was to be replaced by an all-European guarantee; to grant freedom of navigation on the Danube; to agree to a revision of the London Convention of 1841 on the closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to the warships of all nations in peacetime, and to renounce its protection of Christians in Turkey. The Tsarist government at first rejected the Four Points but in November 1854 was forced to accept them as the basis for future peace talks. The Four Points were discussed at the Vienna conferences of Ambassadors (see Note 34) but the attempts of the Western Powers to link the question of the Straits with demands for a reduction of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea caused the Russian Ambassador in Vienna, A. M. Gorchakov, to walk out of the talks. p. 44

This refers to the debates in the British Parliament in 1845 on proposals to raise subsidies to the Catholic College in Maynooth (Ireland) which was
founded in 1795 with the assistance of Pitt the Younger. By supporting this college the British government sought to ingratiate itself with the Irish landlords, certain sections of the bourgeoisie and the clergy and thus split the Irish national movement.  

This refers to the Reform Bill passed by the British House of Commons in 1831 and finally approved by the House of Lords in June 1832. It gave the vote to owners and tenants of houses rated at £10 or over. The working class and the petty bourgeoisie—the main force in the struggle for reform—were denied suffrage.  

The *People’s Charter*, which contained the demands of the Chartists, was published in the form of a Parliamentary Bill on May 8, 1838. It contained six points: universal suffrage (for men of 21 and over), annual parliaments, vote by ballot, equal electoral districts, abolition of the property qualification of MPs and payment of MPs. Petitions urging the adoption of the People’s Charter were turned down by Parliament in 1839, 1842 and 1848.  

A reference to a radical political trend among the Free Traders which in 1849 founded the National Parliamentary and Financial Reform Association. Its purpose was to agitate for the “Little Charter”, a reform bill repeatedly submitted to Parliament by Joseph Hume between 1849 and 1851. In contrast to the People’s Charter, it contained three points: voting rights for every tenant of a house or part of a house (Household Suffrage), triennial parliaments, and vote by ballot. By counterposing this programme to the demands of the Chartists while at the same time adopting, in an extremely curtailed form, some of these demands, the bourgeois radicals hoped to gain control of the working masses at a time when the Chartist movement was declining. However, most of the politically active workers, except for the reformist elements in the Chartist movement, including O’Connor’s supporters, refused to support the Little Charter. In 1855 the National Parliamentary and Financial Reform Association disintegrated.  

This article was first published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953 under the title “Palmerston and the English Oligarchy”. The title was provided by the editors.  

The Roman Emperor Caligula (A.D. 12-41) bestowed the consulship on his favourite horse.  

The *Grand Moguls* was the name given by Europeans to the rulers of an empire founded in Northern India in 1526 by Turkic conquerors then considered to be descendants of Genghis Khan’s Mongolian warriors (hence the name “Moguls”). Although the empire fell into decline in the eighteenth century and came under British domination, its rulers retained nominal sovereignty until 1858.  

This refers to Russell’s appointment as Britain’s representative at the Vienna Conference, which was to open in March 1855 (see Note 88).  

*Emancipation of the Catholics*—in 1829 the British Parliament, under pressure of a mass movement in Ireland, lifted some of the restrictions curtailing the political rights of the Catholic population. Catholics were granted the right to be elected to Parliament and hold certain government posts. Simultaneously the property qualification for electors was increased fivefold. With the aid of this manoeuvre the British ruling classes hoped to win over to their side the upper
crust of the Irish bourgeoisie and Catholic landowners and thus split the Irish national movement.

Repeal of the Corn Laws—see Note 14.

The mass movement for Parliamentary reform in Britain (see Note 45) developed in the late 1820s and early 1830s during Wellington's Tory Ministry. The reform was carried out by Grey's Whig Government (November 1830 to July 1834).

52 Court of Queen's (King's) Bench—Britain's oldest judicial institution. In the nineteenth century (up to 1873) it was an independent high court for criminal and civil cases and also supervised the lower courts. Subsequently its competence was limited to civil disputes.

This version of the article first appeared in English translation in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Articles on Britain, Moscow, 1971. The other version entitled "The Crisis in England" was written by Marx for the New-York Daily Tribune in English. It is reproduced in this volume in its original form.

A reference to the overthrow of the Stuart dynasty and the enthronement, together with his wife Mary, daughter of the deposed Stuart King James II, of William III of Orange, after which constitutional monarchy was consolidated in Britain on the basis of a compromise between the landed aristocracy and the finance bourgeoisie.

The term “millocracy” (mill+the Greek kratia) was first used by Thomas Carlyle in his work Past and Present, published in 1843.

Reform Bill of 1831—see Note 45.

The 1834 Poor Law (an Act for the amendment and better administration of the laws relating to the poor in England and Wales) permitted only one form of aid to needy able-bodied persons—their enrolment in prison-type workhouses where they were engaged in monotonous and exhausting unproductive labour. The people nicknamed them Bastilles for the Poor. The law aimed at making the poor accept hard working conditions in industry, thus increasing the supply of cheap labour.

Repeal of the Corn Laws—see Note 14.

A reference to one of the biggest strikes by British workers in the 1850s. In August 1853, the weavers and spinners at the cotton mills of Preston and its environs walked out demanding a 10 per cent increase in wages. They were supported by workers in other trades. In September the Associated Masters retaliated by organising a lockout. About 25,000 of Preston's 30,000 workers stayed away from work. Thanks to the relief given them by workers in other cities, they were able to hold out for more than 36 weeks. In February 1854, the lockout was lifted but the strike continued. To bring it to an end the Associated Masters began importing workers from Ireland and the English workhouses. In March, the leaders of the strike were arrested. As their funds ran out, workers were forced to return to the mills. The strike ended in May.

The Irish Brigade was the name given to the Irish faction in the British Parliament from the 1830s to 1850s. Up to 1847, the Irish Brigade was led by Daniel O'Connell. As neither the Tories nor the Whigs had a decisive majority the Brigade was able to tip the balance in Parliament and sometimes even decide the fate of the government.
In the early fifties, a number of MPs belonging to this faction formed an alliance with the radical Irish Tenant-Right League and set up what they called an Independent Opposition in the House of Commons. However, the leaders of the Irish Brigade soon made a deal with the British ruling circles, securing some secondary posts in Aberdeen’s Coalition Government and refusing to support the League’s demands. This demoralised the Independent Opposition and ultimately led to its collapse (1859).

By altering the beginning of this article the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune gave the impression that it had been written in America. Some other contributions by Marx and Engels published as leading articles in this newspaper were also edited in this way.

The sale of commissions in the English army dated back to the late seventeenth century and was maintained up to 1871. It ensured that members of the English aristocracy held a dominant position in the army.

The Mutiny Act was passed by Parliament annually from 1689 to 1881, empowering the Crown to maintain a standing army and navy of a fixed size, prescribe manuals and regulations for the army and navy, set up courts martial and establish a system of punishment for mutiny, refusal to obey orders, infringements of discipline, etc. The first Mutiny Act was passed in connection with riots in the British Army.

Simony (from Simon Magus, an allusion to his offer of money to the Apostles, Acts 8, 9:24)—the practice of selling or buying ecclesiastical preferments, etc. in the Middle Ages. Advocates of ecclesiastical reform challenged it as early as the twelfth century.

Revolutionary action by gold-diggers took place in Victoria in November and December 1854. On November 29, licences were burnt at a gold-diggers’ meeting. On December 2, an armed clash occurred between the insurgents and troops. Also in December the Ballarat Reform League was set up which formulated the insurgents’ demands: abolition of gold-digging licences, release of the gold-diggers arrested for setting fire to the hotel, and political reforms including four of the six Chartist points. Although the uprising was suppressed and martial law introduced, some of the insurgents’ demands had to be granted.

An allusion to the system of extortionate taxes levied by the British Parliament and Government on the North American colonies—the high tariff on sugar imports (introduced in 1764), the stamp duty (1765), the exorbitant customs duties on imports from England, etc. It was bitterly resented by the local bourgeoisie and the masses in the colonies and was one of the factors that led to the War of Independence (1775-83) in the course of which the United States of America was formed.

The Riot Act—an Act passed in 1715 on the maintenance of public peace and order. It empowered the local authorities to disperse assemblages of “trouble-makers” by force and charge them with felony. The Act obliged the authorities to read part of it to those assembled and to open fire if the latter refused to disperse within an hour.

On March 5, 1855, The Times published a letter by the English doctor Augustus Bozzi Granville (later reprinted by other London newspapers) in
which he maintained that he had predicted the imminent death of the Tsar in a conversation with Palmerston as early as July 6, 1853. The letter was reported in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on March 9, 1855.

68 The Pythia—a priestess and prophetess of Apollo at Delphi.

69 A reference to the aggravation of Anglo-French differences in the Middle East during the Turko-Egyptian war of 1839-41. The conclusion, without French participation, of the London Convention of July 15, 1840 (see Note 20) on aid by the Western Powers to the Sultan in his struggle against the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali created the danger of war breaking out between Britain and France. Fearing the formation of an anti-French coalition, France was forced to discontinue its support for Egypt.

70 In 1846 the Guizot Government managed to arrange the marriage of the Spanish infanta María Luisa Fernanda to Louis Philippe's youngest son, the Duke of Montpensier, and thwart Britain's plans to marry Leopold of Coburg to Queen Isabella II of Spain. The tension between the British and French governments over these marriage projects became very acute and after the failure of British diplomacy Palmerston sought a pretext to take revenge.

71 The Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 was one of a series of peace treaties concluding the war of the Spanish succession, which had been waged from 1701 between France and Spain, on the one hand, and the countries of the anti-French coalition (Britain, the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Savoy and Habsburg Austria), on the other. Austria did not sign the treaty and made peace with France at Rastatt in 1714. Under the terms of the treaty, Philip V, the Bourbon King of Spain and Louis XIV's grandson, retained the Spanish crown. The King of France was to renounce his right and that of his successors from the Bourbon dynasty to the Spanish crown. Several French and Spanish possessions in the West Indies and North America, as well as Gibraltar, passed into Britain's hands.

When he accused France in 1846 of violating the treaty of Utrecht, Palmerston had in mind Louis Philippe's plans for uniting the two monarchies through the marriage of his youngest son and the Spanish infanta.

72 This article was first published in English in Marx, Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question, Moscow, 1971.

73 See Note 58.

74 A reference to the agreement concluded in February 1835 by Daniel O'Connell, leader of the liberal wing of the Irish national movement, with the leaders of the Whig party. The negotiations had been held in the house of Lord Lichfield in London. Under the agreement, Irish liberals were to get certain administrative posts. O'Connell, for his part, promised to call off the mass campaign for the repeal of the Anglo-Irish Union of 1801 which abolished the autonomy of the Irish Parliament, and to support the Whigs in the British Parliament.

75 The repeal of the Anglo-Irish Union of 1801. In the 1820s repeal became the most popular slogan in Ireland. In 1840 the Repeal Association was set up. Its leader, Daniel O'Connell, sought a compromise with the British ruling circles. In January 1847 a group of radicals broke away from the Association and
formed the Irish Confederation. Its left, revolutionary wing led the national liberation movement and became the target of severe reprisals in 1848. Eventually, the Repeal Association broke up completely. p. 78

76 See Note 7. p. 78
77 See Note 51. p. 79

Between 1845 and 1847 potato blight was the occasion of widespread famine in Ireland. The poverty of the small tenants ruthlessly exploited by the big landowners made the mass of the population almost entirely dependent on a diet of potatoes grown on their own little patches. Meanwhile the British Government not only withheld any effective form of relief, but exported large quantities of grain and other agricultural products from Ireland to England. About one million people starved to death, and the wave of emigration caused by the famine swept away another million. Large areas of Ireland were depopulated. The abandoned land was turned by English and Irish landlords into pasture.

In 1848 a popular national liberation uprising was being prepared in Ireland by the revolutionary wing of the Irish Confederation (Mitchel, Lalor, Reilly and others). In May 1848 the British authorities took severe reprisals against the movement, leaving it virtually leaderless. The vacillating Confederation leaders (Smith O'Brien and others) missed the right moment for action. Instead of a country-wide insurrection, isolated and often unprepared risings occurred in a number of towns and agricultural areas in late July 1848, which were quickly put down by troops.

In 1849 Parliament passed the Encumbered Estates Act for Ireland, which was supplemented by a series of other Acts in 1852 and 1853. The 1849 Act provided for the sale of mortgaged estates by auction if their owners were proved to be insolvent. As a result, the lands of many ruined landlords passed into the hands of usurers, middlemen and rich tenants. p. 80

79 A version of this article headlined “Krimsche Angelegenheiten” (“Crimean Affairs”) and dated March 16, 1855 appeared in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 131, on March 19, 1855. It was marked with the sign x. In translating Engels’ article into German Marx abridged it slightly and made a few changes (the more important ones are indicated in the footnotes). p. 81

80 This refers to the landing in Eupatoria on February 9, 1855 of Turkish troops transferred from Bulgaria and commanded by Omer Pasha. They comprised two Turkish and one Egyptian divisions, two squadrons and two field batteries with a total strength of 21,600. p. 83

81 The text of this article, written by Engels for the New-York Daily Tribune, was included by Marx, in his own translation and with a number of alterations and additions, in his report “Criticism of the French Conduct of the War” published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on March 20, 1855. Marx’s version is published in this volume on pages 90-93.

The New-York Daily Tribune version was reproduced in full by Marx’s daughter, Eleanor Marx-Aveling, and Edward Aveling in the collection The Eastern Question. A Reprint of Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War, London, 1897. Marx was given as the author of all the articles in the collection as they were published in the New-York Daily Tribune either with his signature or unsigned. The publication of the Marx-Engels correspondence in 1913 (Der Briefwechsel zwischen F. Engels und K. Marx, Stuttgart,
1913) revealed that a considerable number of the articles sent by Marx to the Tribune had been written by Engels.

The first sentence in this article was supplied by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune. The reference is to the extracts from the pamphlet De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient which were reprinted in English translation in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4350, on March 29, 1855 under the heading "Secret History of the Crimean Expedition. Its Origin and Blunders. Revelations of Prince Napoleon".

Engels is referring to the battles of Balaklava and Inkerman (see notes 10 and 35). p. 87

On May 21 and 22, 1809 at Aspern, on the left bank of the Danube near Vienna, Napoleon I's troops lost a battle to the Austrian army commanded by Archduke Charles. However, Napoleon succeeded in saving his troops from destruction by withdrawing from the left bank. On July 5 and 6 he defeated the Austrians at Wagram. Napoleonic France won the war against the Fifth Coalition (Austria, Britain, Spain and Portugal). p. 88

In a full-scale battle fought at Leipzig from October 16 to 19, 1813, the forces of the coalition of European Powers formed after Napoleon's expulsion from Russia in 1812 (Russia, Austria, Prussia, Britain, Sweden and others) inflicted a decisive defeat on the army of Napoleonic France and her allies. p. 88

An allusion to Louis Bonaparte's abortive putsch in Strasbourg on October 30, 1836. Aided by several Bonapartist officers he succeeded in persuading two artillery regiments of the Strasbourg garrison to mutiny. The mutineers were disarmed in a matter of hours. p. 88

On the Eighteenth Brumaire (November 9) 1799 a coup d'état was staged in France which resulted in the establishment of Napoleon Bonaparte's military dictatorship. On June 14, 1800 Napoleon's troops defeated an Austrian army at Marengo (Northern Italy). This first major victory by Napoleon after the coup consolidated his power.

The second edition of the Eighteenth Brumaire—Louis Bonaparte's counter-revolutionary coup d'état of December 2, 1851—led to the establishment of the Bonapartist Second Empire in France. p. 91

The memorandum handed by Britain, France and Austria to Russia's Ambassador in Vienna, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, during the Vienna Conference on the terms for peace negotiations (see Note 34). p. 94

The Vienna Conference was to work out the terms for peace between the participants in the Crimean War. It was attended by Russia, Britain, France, Austria and Turkey and lasted, with intervals, from March 15 to June 4, 1855. The negotiations centred on the Four Points (see Note 43). While agreeing, with certain reservations, to Points 1, 2 and 4, Russia emphatically rejected Point 3 which, as interpreted by the Western Powers, called for a reduction of the Russian Navy in the Black Sea. Britain and France insisted on its acceptance and turned down Austria's compromise proposal that Russia and Turkey should be allowed to agree between themselves on the size of their naval forces in the Black Sea. The Conference ended without adopting any decisions. p. 94

The Peace Society (the Society for Promoting Permanent and Universal Peace)—an organisation founded by the Quakers in London in 1816. It was
strongly supported by the Free Traders, who believed that, given peace, free trade would enable Britain to make full use of her industrial superiority and thus gain economic and political supremacy.

90 The *Ten Hours Bill*, passed by the British Parliament on June 8, 1847, applied only to adolescents and women and was ignored by many manufacturers.

In February 1850 the Court of Chancery (one of Britain's high courts) acquitted a number of manufacturers accused of infringing the Ten Hours Bill. This ruling caused protests from the workers. On August 5, 1850 Parliament passed a new Bill which stipulated a ten-and-a-half-hour working day for women and adolescents and fixed the beginning and end of the working day.

91 This article was first published in English in the collection Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Articles on Britain*, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1971, pp. 229-32.

92 For details on the *People's Charter* see Note 46. Echoing the Chartist speakers at the meeting, Marx further mentions the Charter's five basic demands, omitting the sixth—payment of MPs.

93 See Note 10.

94 See Note 35.

95 See Note 88.

96 See Note 7.

97 A reference to the protocols signed by Britain, France, Austria and Prussia at the Vienna Conferences.

The protocol of December 5, 1853 proposed that Turkey enter into peace talks with Russia through the mediation of the four Powers (for details see Note 170).

The protocol of January 13, 1854 urged Russia to settle its military conflict with Turkey and informed the Russian government of the Porte's readiness for peace talks.

The protocol of April 9, 1854 demanded from Russia the immediate evacuation of its troops from the Danubian Principalities and a guarantee of the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire.

98 This refers to the London conventions of 1840 (see Note 20) and 1841. The latter was signed, on July 15, 1841, by Britain, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Turkey, and also by France which, faced with the prospect of an anti-French coalition, was forced to withdraw its support for the Egyptian ruler Mehemet Ali, who had attacked the Sultan, and join the Powers in backing the latter. The convention also stipulated that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles were to be closed to the warships of all Powers in peacetime.

99 See Note 43.

100 The treaty of alliance between Britain, France and Austria signed in Vienna on December 2, 1854. The signatories undertook not to enter into any agreements with Russia without preliminary consent between themselves and not to allow the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russian troops. Negotiations with Russia were to be based on the Four Points. By means of this treaty Britain and France sought to draw Austria into the war against Russia. Austria,
for its part, hoped to use the alliance to strengthen its influence in the Balkans and subjugate the Danubian Principalities.

101 An extract from this article by Engels, and his next article, "The Battle at Sevastopol", were included by Marx, in abridged form, in the report "Über die letzten Vorgänge in der Krim" ("On the Latest Events in the Crimea"), which was dated March 23, 1855 and published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 143, on March 26. The more important different readings in the English and German versions are indicated in the footnotes.

The present article was included in The Eastern Question.

102 "Les singes", which means "monkeys" and also "buffoons" and "superiors", was the name given to pro-Napoleonic generals. Marx mentioned the fact in a letter to Engels of September 13, 1854 and in several articles for the New-York Daily Tribune (see present edition, Vols. 13 and 39).

103 Prince Jerome Bonaparte, Junior, commanded a division in the Crimea in 1854. Disapproving of the Crimean expedition, lacking military talent and unpopular with the army, he feigned sickness to stay away from directing military operations and later returned to Paris without permission.

104 On the German version of this article see Note 101. The first paragraph was presumably supplied by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune.

105 Marx is presumably referring to the visit of Lord Malmesbury, the former Foreign Secretary in Derby's Tory Cabinet, to Paris in March 1853 during which he was invited to dinner by Napoleon III and had a confidential talk with him on strengthening Anglo-French relations.

106 St. James's Palace—royal residence in London since the late seventeenth century. Festive ceremonies and receptions were frequently held there.

107 The Kuchuk-Kainarji peace treaty was concluded by Russia and Turkey on July 21, 1774, following the former's victories in the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74. Russia obtained part of the Northern shore of the Black Sea between the South Bug and the Dnieper with the fortress of Kinburn; she also got Azov, Kerch and Yenikale and compelled Turkey to recognise the independence of the Crimea, which facilitated its eventual incorporation into Russia. The Sultan undertook to grant a number of privileges to the Greek Orthodox Church. Article 14, in particular, provided for the building of an Orthodox church in Constantinople.

108 See Note 6.

109 The Demagogues were members of an opposition movement of German intellectuals. The word gained wide currency following the Carlsbad conference of Ministers of German states in August 1849, which adopted a special resolution against the intrigues of "demagogues". Here the reference is to the opponents of the counter-revolutionary monarchies restored in Europe after Napoleon's fall.

110 Exeter Hall—a building in London, meeting place of religious and philanthropic societies.

Puseyism—a trend within the Anglican Church between the 1830s and 1860s. It was named after the Oxford theologian E. B. Pusey, who called for
the restoration of certain Catholic rites and dogmas. The Puseyites represented the interests of the aristocracy, which strove to retain its influence in opposition to the industrial bourgeoisie, which was on the whole Protestant. In particular, the Puseyites upheld the Catholic view of the Eucharist as the "transubstantiation" of bread and wine into the true body and blood of Christ. In contrast to this, the other Anglican and Protestant trends regarded the bread and wine merely as symbols of the "true presence" of Christ's body and blood.

p. 126

See Note 35.

p. 126

This is an altered English version of Marx's article "The Committee of Inquiry" written for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* (see this volume, pp. 124-27).

p. 128

A reference to Aberdeen's coalition ministry of 1852-55. This "Cabinet of All the Talents" included Whigs, Peelites (see Note 6) and representatives of the Irish faction in the British Parliament.

p. 130

This paragraph, especially its concluding part, shows signs of interference by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.

p. 132

The siege of Silistria (Silistra)—a fortress on the south bank of the Danube in Bulgaria—by Russian troops was one of the major operations in the Danubian theatre during the Crimean War. The siege began in the first half of May 1854, but in the fourth week of June the Russian troops withdrew beyond the Danube in view of the hostile attitude of Austria, which had concentrated considerable forces behind the Russian lines. A description of the fighting in this area was given in the articles "The Russian Retreat" by Marx and Engels and "The Siege of Silistria" by Engels (see present edition, Vol. 13, pp. 253-57 and 234-45).

p. 134

This is an altered German version of Engels' article "Progress of the War". The text was translated and edited by Marx.

p. 136

This would seem to refer to the fighting between the Turkish and Russian forces that took place at Kalafat, in the Danubian theatre of war, in mid-January 1854.

p. 136

*Bashi-bazouks*—irregular detachments of the Turkish army in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the name was also given to troops noted for their lack of discipline and for their cruelty and looting.

p. 136

The system of recruitment in force in France until 1872 (abolished by the French Revolution but reintroduced by Napoleon I) enabled members of the propertied classes called up for the army to hire substitutes. In an attempt to tighten its control over the armed forces the Bonapartist government in April 1855 introduced the law of "dotation", under which substitutes, unless close relations of the draftee, were to be provided by the state. In return the person exempted from service was to contribute a fixed sum to the "army dotation" fund.

p. 139

Under the heading "Prospect in France and England" this article (minus the first sentence) was included in *The Eastern Question*.

The opening sentence was presumably contributed by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune* in an attempt to provide some sort of explanation for the long absence of articles signed by Marx. At the time, most of Marx's articles
were published as editorials. It may be assumed that in this particular case the editors printed the article under Marx's name as they did not want to be identified with the revolutionary proletarian attitude clearly expressed in the article.

121 See Note 88.

122 See Note 6.

123 The Peace Society—see Note 89. By “peace party” Marx means the Free Traders or the Manchester School (see Note 7).

124 See Notes 2, 35 and 10.

125 A reference to the heroic uprising of Paris workers in June 1848. It was the first civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in history. The defeat of the uprising was followed by a counter-revolutionary offensive in many European countries, including France itself.

126 A German version of this article dated April 14, 1855 was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 177, on April 17 under the heading “Kritik des napoleonischen ‘Moniteur’-Artikels” (“A Critique of Napoleon’s Article in Le Moniteur”). The article was translated into German and edited by Marx. The more important changes are indicated in the footnotes.

Under the heading “Napoleon's Apology” the English version was included in The Eastern Question.

The first sentence of the article in the New-York Daily Tribune shows editorial interference. It was evidently the editors who added the lines concerning the reprinting in the Tribune of passages from the Moniteur leading article (actually there was only a brief summary of the article in the “Letters from Europe” column of the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 1035, April 27, 1855).

127 See Notes 22 and 107.

128 In the battle of Baylen on July 20, 1808, during the Spanish war of independence (1808-14), the French troops commanded by General Dupont were encircled by the Spaniards and laid down their arms.

At Culm (Bohemia) on August 29 and 30, 1813, during the war of the coalition of European Powers against Napoleonic France, the Austrian troops encircled and captured the French forces commanded by General Vandamme.

129 A reference to Mivart's (Claridge's) Hotel, 42 Brook Street, London, where Louis Napoleon stayed from 1838 to 1840, during his banishment from France after the abortive coup in Strasbourg on October 30, 1836.

130 A German version of this article dated April 15, 1855 appeared in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 179, on April 18 under the heading “Die Affäre vom 23. März” (“The March 23 Affair”). The text was translated and edited by Marx. Footnotes indicate the passages where the German version differs from the English.

The reference to the publication of the French and English reports on the events of March 23, 1855 (second paragraph of the English version) was added by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune.

131 This article was written by Engels at Marx's request for simultaneous publication in the Neue Oder-Zeitung and New-York Daily Tribune. It was based
on Engels' studies of the language, literature and history of many Slav peoples, which he began after moving to Manchester in 1850. He read Pushkin's *Eugene Onegin* and *Bronze Horseman* and Griboedov's *Wit Works Woe* in the original. His notes on the vocabulary of these works are extant, together with the passages he copied from a reader in Russian literature, and his notes on the history of Russia and Serbia. These preparatory materials and the references in Engels' articles to the works of many noted Slavists—Dobrowsky, Kollár, Miklošić, Palacký, Sařík and others—bear witness to the intensity and fruitfulness of his studies, which enabled him to draw on numerous sources, including some in Slavic languages, in his analysis of the history, culture and national movements of the Slavs.

As can be seen from the closing sentence of the second instalment of this article, Engels intended to continue his discussion of the subject, laying special emphasis on exposing the reactionary character of the Pan-Slavist ideas. He regarded them as an instrument of the great-power policies of the Habsburgs (Austro-Slavism) and a means of vindicating the aggressive tendencies of Russian Tsarism. In sending Engels' article to Elsner, the editor of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, Marx wrote on April 17, 1855 that it was "the beginning of a polemic against Pan-Slavism" (see present edition, Vol. 39). However, no further articles on this subject appeared in the newspaper.

Marx attached particular importance to publishing a critique of Pan-Slavist ideas in the *New-York Daily Tribune* because he considered it vital to counteract the influence of A. Gurowski, a propagandist of Pan-Slavism and apostle for Tsarist Russia, who contributed to the *Tribune* and had published several pamphlets on the subject, including the brochure *Russia as It Is* (1854). The two instalments of the present article were published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* on May 5 and 7 as separate articles under the headings "The European Struggle" (for this version, which differs considerably from that of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, see pp. 163-65 of this volume) and "Austria's Weakness". In the second English article several unwarranted changes were made by the *Tribune* editors who, among other things, inserted a whole paragraph extolling Gurowski's ideas. This version is therefore published in the Appendices, with the necessary explanations given in the notes (see pp. 689-93 and Note 447).

Between January and April 1856 Engels wrote fifteen articles on Pan-Slavism for the *New-York Daily Tribune*, but the editorial board turned them down and in September sent them back to Marx. The manuscripts have not been preserved. Engels' plan for a pamphlet on Pan-Slavism, to be published in Germany, was not realised.

132 The *Ruthenians*—the name given in nineteenth-century Western ethnographical and historical literature to the Ukrainians of Galicia, the Eastern Carpathians and Bukovina, who were cut off at the time from the rest of the Ukrainian people.

133 In listing the Carinthians and Croats with the Slovenes, Engels was basing himself on the then current system of classification of the South Slav peoples, which singled out an "Illyrian branch", comprising the Slavs who inhabited the north-western part of the Adriatic coast of the Balkan Peninsula and the adjoining areas captured in the Middle Ages by the Austrian Habsburgs (Styria, Carinthia, Carniola and others). A considerable section of the Slav population of these areas, including the Carinthians, does belong to the Slovenes, but the Croats are a Slav people in their own right.
The Slav Congress met in Prague on June 2, 1848. It was attended by representatives of the Slav countries forming part of the Austrian Empire. The Right, moderately liberal wing, to which Palacký and Šafařík, the leaders of the Congress, belonged, sought to solve the national problem through autonomy of the Slav lands within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy. The Left, radical wing (Sabina, Frič, Libelt and others) wanted to act in alliance with the revolutionary-democratic movement in Germany and Hungary. Radical delegates took an active part in the popular uprising in Prague (June 12-17, 1848), directed against the arbitrary rule of the Austrian authorities, and were subjected to cruel reprisals. On June 16, the moderate liberal delegates declared the Congress adjourned indefinitely. p. 159

The Serbian insurrection against the arbitrary rule and brutal reprisals of the Turkish janissaries, which flared up in February 1804, developed into an armed struggle for Serbia's independence from Turkey. In the course of the insurrection a national government was set up and in 1808 Georgi Petrović (Karageorge), the leader of the insurgents, was proclaimed hereditary supreme ruler of the Serbian people. The Serbian movement was greatly advanced by the successful operations of the Russian army in the Balkans during the Russo-Turkish war of 1806-12. Under the Bucharest peace treaty of 1812 Turkey was to grant Serbia autonomy in domestic affairs, but taking advantage of Napoleon's invasion of Russia, the Sultan sent a punitive expedition to Serbia in 1813 and restored Turkish rule there. It was overthrown in 1815 as a result of a new Serbian insurrection and diplomatic support from Russia. After the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, which ended in the signing of the Adrianople peace treaty of 1829, Turkey recognised the autonomy, i.e. virtual independence, of the Serbian Principality by a special firman of the Sultan issued in 1830. p. 160

This article is an altered version of part of the article “Germany and Pan-Slavism”. The latter was written for the Neue Oder-Zeitung. Under the heading “Panslavism” the English version was printed in The Eastern Question. See Note 131. p. 163

A reference to the adjournment of the Vienna Conference caused by disagreement between the participants on the Third Point of the terms presented to Russia (see Note 88). It was adjourned on April 26, 1855, following Russia’s rejection of the Western Powers’ demand that it should limit its naval forces in the Black Sea. It met for the last time on June 4, 1855. p. 163

The Reform Movement—see Note 51.

The Anti-Corn Law movement—see Note 14.

The Bank Restriction Act, passed in 1797, introduced a compulsory rate for notes and abolished their convertibility into gold. These measures were re-introduced virtually in full in 1821 on the basis of an Act passed in 1819. p. 166

The Association for Administrative Reform was set up in London in May 1855 on the initiative of liberal circles in the City. Taking advantage of the outcry caused in the country by press reports and the findings of the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry on the plight of the British army in the Crimea, the Association hoped by means of mass rallies to bring pressure to bear on Parliament and win broader access for members of the commercial and finance bourgeoisie to government posts, monopolised by the aristocracy. In their
campaign the Association's leaders sought to obtain the support of the Chartists. However, at rallies organised by the Association and at their own rallies the Chartists refused to back the moderate bourgeois demands for administrative reform and instead urged a Parliamentary reform based on the People's Charter (see Note 46). The administrative reform campaign was a failure, and the Association soon ceased to exist. In his subsequent reports Marx frequently touched on the Association's activities and relations with the Chartists.

In Christoph Martin Wieland's *Die Abderiten, eine sehr wahrscheinliche Geschichte* a trifling dispute causes the population of the ancient Thracian city of Abdera to divide into two parties, the struggle between which nearly leads to the city's destruction. The first edition of the novel appeared in Weimar in 1774, the second, enlarged one, in 1781.

In the 1806 general election the Radical James Paull, a friend of William Cobbett's, was put forward as a candidate for Westminster. However, the authorities refused to endorse his nomination because of his denunciations of the Viceroy of India, Richard Wellesley. The Westminster electorate retaliated by returning to Parliament another Radical, Francis Burdett, who had actively defended Paull.

The Thirty Years' War (1618-48)—a war in which the Pope, the Spanish and Austrian Habsburgs and the Catholic German princes fought against the Protestant countries: Bohemia, Denmark, Sweden, the Republic of the Netherlands and a number of German states. The rulers of Catholic France—rivals of the Habsburgs—supported the Protestants. Germany was the main arena of this struggle, the object of pillage and territorial claims. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) sealed her political dismemberment.

Marx is referring to Pius IX, who between 1846 and early 1848 introduced a number of moderate liberal reforms in the Papal States in the interests of the nobility and the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. In this way he sought to counteract the mounting revolutionary movement in Italy.

A group of French deputies (called the Dynastic Opposition) headed by Odilon Barrot took part in the campaign of banquets for electoral reform conducted by the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois opposition in France on the eve of the February 1848 revolution. The group had joined the movement in an attempt to render it innocuous to the July monarchy. The Dynastic Opposition favoured moderate electoral reform as a means of preventing revolution and preserving the Orleans dynasty.

An abridged and altered version of this article by Engels was published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 217, on May 11, 1855, under the heading "Die Belagerung von Sebastopol" ("The Siege of Sevastopol"). It was marked with the sign × and dated May 8. The translation and editing were done by Marx. Footnotes indicate the passages where the German version differs from the English.

The report turned out to be false. Engels stated this on the basis of verified data in his article "The Crimean War" (see this volume, pp. 201-07). The Russian fortifications mentioned were taken by the Allies on June 7, 1855.

On April 28, 1855, Giovanni Pianori, an Italian revolutionary and associate of Garibaldi, shot at Napoleon III when the French Emperor was riding on
horseback in the Champs Elysées. The abortive attempt was provoked, among other things, by the part Louis Bonaparte played in 1849, when still President, in sending an expeditionary corps against the Roman Republic and crushing the Italian revolution. Pianori was executed in May 1855. p. 177

A German version of Engels' article “The New Move in the Crimea” appeared in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* under the heading “Der Feldzug in der Krim” (“The Campaign in the Crimea”), dated May 11. The translation and editing were done by Marx.

The opening lines and further passages in the English version show alterations made by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. A comparison of the two versions reveals changes in the estimate of the strength of the Allied forces in the Crimea and a somewhat different presentation of figures, which was probably based on the reports of other *Tribune* correspondents, including A. Pulszyk. However, the overall conclusions in the two versions are identical. p. 180

The second half of this article beginning with the words “The anti-aristocratic movement” was first published in English under the heading “The Character of the Whigs and Tories” in Karl Marx, *Surveys From Exile, Political Writings*, Vol. 2, Harmondsworth, 1973. p. 186

On May 14, 1855, Ellenborough moved in the House of Lords that a message be sent to the Queen informing her that the House was dissatisfied with the conduct of the Crimean War and that the success of the campaign could only be ensured by appointing deserving people to government posts. The proposal was discussed and rejected on the same day. p. 187

The *Anti-Corn Law League* was founded by the Manchester factory owners Cobden and Bright in 1838. By demanding complete freedom of trade, the League fought for the abolition of the Corn Laws (see Note 14). In this way it sought to weaken the economic and political position of the landed aristocracy and lower the cost of living thus making possible a lowering of the workers' wages. The repeal of the Corn Laws under Peel's Tory government led to a split in the ranks of the Tories and facilitated the coming to power of the Whigs (1846). Having achieved its end, the League ceased to exist. p. 187

See Note 139. p. 187

The Act for a Seven-Year Parliament (the *Septennial Act*), passed by Parliament in the interests of the Whig oligarchy in 1716, extended the term of Parliament from three to seven years.

By the latest Workhouse and Factory legislation the 1834 Poor Law is meant (see Note 56). p. 188

A reference to the British naval expedition to the mouth of the Scheldt in 1809, during the war waged by the Fifth Coalition (Austria, Britain, Portugal and Spain) against Napoleonic France. The British captured Walcheren Island, but were unable to launch further operations and had to evacuate the island after about 10,000 of their landing party of 40,000 had died of hunger and disease. p. 190

The *rotten boroughs* were sparsely populated constituencies which had retained the right to a seat in Parliament from the Middle Ages. In practice the election of MPs from the rotten boroughs depended on the landlords who controlled them. The 1832 Reform Act (see Note 45) deprived most of the rotten
boroughs of Parliamentary representation, but the old system of demarcating electoral districts, which favoured the landed aristocracy, was largely preserved.

A reference to the London Chartist Organising Committee set up in February 1855 as a successor to the Welcome and Protest Committee. The latter had been formed by Ernest Jones in October 1854 to arrange a festive welcome to London for Armand Barbès, a participant in the 1848 revolution in France who had been released from prison, and to organise a demonstration of protest against the proposed visit to London of Napoleon III, who was expected to come at about the same time. Together with the Executive of the National Charter Association the London Organising Committee worked for the revival of the Chartist movement in London and for closer international co-operation of democratic forces. The Committee included Ernest Jones, George Harrison, James Taylor and other noted Chartists. It set up a seven-man commission charged with the task of establishing international ties. Together with representatives of French, German and other refugees in London the commission formed an International Committee. At the end of 1855 the London Organising Committee was disbanded, and the International Committee was set up as an independent organisation. Renamed the International Association in 1856, it operated until 1859.

In the battle of Jena (October 14, 1806) the French army, commanded by Napoleon, routed the Prussian army, thus forcing Prussia to surrender.


In July 1854, a French force commanded by Espinasse invaded the Dobruja. The expedition was a total failure. Many French soldiers died of cholera and other diseases.

On the night of December 1, 1851, a battalion of the regiment commanded by Espinasse was on guard duty at the National Assembly. On December 2 Espinasse, bribed by the Bonapartists, ordered his troops to occupy the Assembly building, thereby contributing to the success of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état.

A reference to Disraeli’s statement in the House of Commons on May 22, 1855, that he would shortly submit for discussion a draft message to the Queen censuring the Palmerston government's vacillating policy on the issue of war and peace. A motion to this effect was in fact tabled on May 24 and evoked a lively debate in Parliament. Marx described this debate in a number of his articles (see this volume, pp. 227-36, 245-48 and 257-59).

Marx included this article in an abridged and somewhat revised form in his report for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* headlined “Prologue at Lord Palmerston's.—Course of the Latest Events in the Crimea”, which is published in this volume as a joint article by Marx and Engels (see pp. 218-21).

The section of this article dealing with the latest events in the Crimea (up to
the last but one paragraph, which describes the circumstances of Pélissier's appointment) is an abridged German version of Engels' article "The New French Commander", published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4414, on June 12, 1855 (see this volume, pp. 215-17). The editing and translation were done by Marx. p. 218

See Note 162. p. 218

See Note 162. p. 222

On May 11, 1855, T. M. Gibson stated in the House of Commons that he was going to submit for discussion a draft message to the Queen expressing the desire for a successful conclusion of the Vienna Conference and for an honourable peace. p. 223

A reference to the third of the Four Points put forward by the Allies as terms for peace talks with Russia (see Note 43). It was interpreted by Western diplomats as calling for a limitation of the Russian naval forces in the Black Sea and was rejected by Russia's representatives at the Vienna Conference (see Notes 88 and 137). p. 228

On December 5, 1853, the British, French and Prussian representatives at the Vienna Conference and the Austrian Foreign Minister Buol signed a protocol under which Notes were sent to Turkey and Russia offering Western mediation in settling the Russo-Turkish dispute. The following terms were stipulated as a basis for negotiations: evacuation by Russia of Moldavia and Wallachia, renewal of the former Russo-Turkish treaties, a guarantee of the rights of Christians by all European powers, and reform of Turkey's administrative system. p. 228

See Note 107. p. 229

See Note 43. p. 229

Probabilism—a theory that, truth being unattainable, all knowledge can only be probable. According to it, any action is permissible since some kind of plausible justification can always be found for it. p. 231

See Note 43. p. 232

See Note 110. p. 233

See Note 107. p. 235

Categorical imperative—the basic concept of the ethics of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). It denotes the moral obligation of the individual to act according to rules that could serve as principles of universal legislation. p. 236

See Note 43. p. 238

This article was first published in English under the heading "The Association for Administrative Reform.—People's Charter" in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Britain, Moscow, 1962. p. 240

See Note 139. p. 240

The alignment of class forces in France after the defeat of the uprising of Paris workers in June 1848 enabled the Bonapartist circles to take advantage of universal suffrage in order to get Louis Napoleon elected President (December 10, 1848). On May 31, 1850, the French Legislative Assembly abolished
universal suffrage. Louis Napoleon demagogically used the slogan of its restoration in staging his coup d'État on December 2, 1851. An analysis of these events is given in Marx's The Class Struggles in France, 1848 to 1850 (see present edition, Vol. 10) and The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (Vol. 11).

In 1842 the radical and liberal Free-Trade circles made several attempts to enlist the working-class movement in the campaign for the repeal of the Corn Laws and for moderate reforms. To distract the workers from the struggle for the implementation of the Chartists' social and political programme, they put forward the vague demand for "full suffrage". With the aid of some conciliatory Chartist leaders (Lovett, Vincent and others) the radicals succeeded in convening in Birmingham two conferences of representatives of the bourgeoisie and Chartists (in April and December 1842) which discussed joint campaigns for electoral reform. However, on December 27 the Chartist majority at the conferences rejected the proposal to replace the People's Charter with a new "Bill of Rights" and the demand for "full suffrage". From then onwards the Charter was the exclusive demand of the proletarian masses.

See Note 88.

On the Peelites see Note 6.
On the Manchester School see Note 7.

The works of Thomas Hobbes were published in 1839-45, eleven volumes in English and five in Latin, by Molesworth.

A reference to the Protocol of December 5, 1853 (see Note 97).

The opening lines of the first and third paragraphs (the references to the reports brought by the Asia and to those received from Halifax, as well as to the publication in the preceding issue—No. 4424, June 22, 1855—of reports on the fighting in the Crimea) were added by the Tribune editors. The article was reproduced by Marx in German translation and with some alterations in his report published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on June 11, 1855, under the heading "Zur Kritik der Vorgänge in der Krim" ("A Critique of the Events in the Crimea").

This article is, in part, a German version of Engels' report "From the Crimea" written for the New-York Daily Tribune (see this volume, pp. 249-52). The translation and editing were done by Marx. The description of the Allies' expedition to the Sea of Azov, their landing of May 25, 1855, and the capture of Kerch and Yenikale may have been taken from the same report, the relevant passage of which might have been left out by the Tribune editors because reports on this expedition had been published in the paper earlier (see the leading articles "From the Crimea" and "The Crimea War" in the New-York Daily Tribune, Nos. 4415 and 4422, June 14 and 21, 1855).

See Note 151.

The first paragraph of this article (the reference to the publication of the dispatches by General Pélissier and Lord Raglan under the common heading "The Recent Successes Before Sevastopol" in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4428, June 28, 1855) was added by the Tribune editors.
An abridged version of this article with a few editorial changes by Marx (dated June 12, 1855 and marked with the sign ×) was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on June 15 under the heading “Kritik der Krimischen Unternehmungen” (“Criticism of the Operations in the Crimea”).

191 After the defeat of the Prussian troops by Napoleon's army at Jena and Auerstadt in the autumn of 1806, many Prussian fortresses surrendered to the advancing French without a fight. However, the garrison of Colberg (Polish name: Kolobrzeg) on the Baltic coast offered staunch resistance. The siege began in mid-March 1807 and lasted for three and a half months. The defence, directed by Gneisenau, was supported by Schill's guerrilla detachment, operating behind the French lines.

The fortress of Danzig (Gdansk), occupied by the French after their defeat in Russia in 1812, was besieged by the Russians and Prussians from land and sea in early 1813. The garrison withstood three regular sieges, but was ultimately forced to surrender. On January 2, 1814, the Allied troops entered the city.

192 After the successful start of the North Italian campaign by General Bonaparte's army in the spring of 1796—a series of victories over the Austrians, the defeat of their allies, the Piedmontese, and the capture of Lombardy's capital, Milan—its advance was arrested by the resistance of Mantua. In June the French beleaguered the fortress. At the same time, Napoleon had to use some of his men for active operations against the Austrian troops attempting to relieve the city. It was only after a nine-month siege and the defeat of the Austrian relief army that the Mantua garrison surrendered (February 2, 1797).

Danzig (Gdansk) was besieged by the French in March 1807, in the course of Napoleonic France's war against the Fourth European coalition (Prussia, Russia, Britain and Sweden). The garrison, consisting of Prussian troops and a Russian detachment, offered stiff resistance, supported by the attempts of another Russian detachment to break the siege from without. The fortress surrendered to the superior French forces at the end of May 1807.

193 The text of this article by Engels was translated by Marx into German and included, with a certain amount of editing, in two reports for the Neue Oder-Zeitung: “The Debate on Layard's Motion.—The War in the Crimea”, dated June 16 and published June 19, 1855 and “The Local War.—Debate on Administrative Reform.—Report of the Roebuck Committee, etc.”, dated June 20 and published June 23, 1855. The two reports are therefore published here as written jointly by Marx and Engels (see this volume, pp. 277-79 and 287-91).

194 A reference to the French intervention against the Roman Republic which led to the latter's fall (July 1849) and the restoration of the temporal power of the Pope. Louis Napoleon, as President of the French Republic, was one of the organisers of the intervention.

195 See Note 43.

196 The Treaties of Tilsit—the peace treaties concluded on July 7 and 9, 1807 by Napoleonic France with Russia and Prussia, members of the Fourth anti-French coalition which was defeated in the campaigns of 1806 and 1807. In an attempt to divide the defeated powers, Napoleon made no territorial claims on Russia and even managed to have part of Prussia's Eastern possessions (the Bialystok region) transferred to it. At the same time, harsh terms were imposed on
Prussia, who lost nearly half its territory to the German states dependent on France, was obliged to pay an indemnity, had its army limited, etc. However, Russia, as well as Prussia, had to sever its alliance with Britain and, to its own disadvantage, join the Continental System. Napoleon formed the vassal Duchy of Warsaw on Polish territory seized by Prussia during the partitions of Poland in the late eighteenth century, and planned to use the duchy as a bridgehead in the event of war with Russia. The further aggravation of Russo-French differences led to Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1812.

A reference to the Austro-Prussian treaty of April 20, 1854, obliging the two states to take joint action against Russia in the event of her refusing to evacuate the Danubian Principalities or of the Russian troops' advancing further in the Balkans.

Lower Empire (Bas Empire)—the name given in historical literature to the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire); also used with reference to states at the stage of decline or disintegration. Here an allusion to the Second Empire in France.

Acting on instructions from the Home Secretary James Graham, the British authorities in 1844 opened the correspondence of a number of Italian revolutionary refugees, including letters from the Bandiera brothers to Mazzini in which they set forth their plan for an expedition to Calabria to organise an uprising against the Neapolitan Bourbons and Austrian rule in Italy. In June 1844 the members of the expedition, betrayed by one of their number, were arrested. The Bandiera brothers were shot.

In this report Marx drew on Engels' article "Napoleon's War Plans" written for the New-York Daily Tribune (see this volume, pp. 267-72).

In his House of Commons speech on June 15, 1855, Layard tabled a resolution stating that the traditional practice of appointing members of influential families to government posts had caused incalculable harm to the country and was discrediting the nation. Layard's motion, discussed on June 15 and 18, was rejected.

The Vienna Congress of European monarchs and their Ministers (September 1814 to June 1815) concluded the wars of the European coalition against Napoleonic France. It was attended by representatives of all European states, except Turkey. The congress revealed sharp differences between the principal participants: Russia and Prussia, on the one hand, and Austria, Britain and France, on the other. The extremely protracted negotiations were accompanied by endless balls, masquerades and theatrical events. The decisions of the congress (further in the text Marx calls them the Vienna treaty, meaning the sum total of international acts, including the Final Act of June 9, 1815) helped re-install several royal dynasties overthrown during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, sealed the political disunity of Germany and Italy, sanctioned the annexation of Belgium by Holland and the partition of Poland, and outlined measures to combat the revolutionary and national liberation movement, thereby preparing the ground for the Holy Alliance, a counter-revolutionary union of European monarchs.
Marx is referring to the secret treaty of alliance against Russia and Prussia signed by France, Austria and Britain in the Austrian capital on January 3, 1815, during the Congress of Vienna. Along with Chancellor Metternich of Austria and British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh, an important part in preparing the treaty was played by Talleyrand-Périgord, the French representative at the Congress, who sought to exploit the differences between the members of the former anti-Napoleonic coalition. The formation of the Anglo-Austro-French alliance forced Prussia to reduce her claims on the Kingdom of Saxony and with regard to the Polish lands. p. 283

The treaties signed by Russia, Prussia and Austria in Vienna on May 3, 1815, and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, signed on June 9, 1815, sanctioned the abolition of the Duchy of Warsaw, set up by Napoleon in 1807, and a new partition of the Polish lands between Austria, Prussia and Russia. p. 284

See Note 198. p. 286

The last paragraph of this article was presumably added by the New-York Daily Tribune editors. p. 286

In this report Marx drew on Engels' article "Napoleon's War Plans", which was written for the New-York Daily Tribune (see this volume, pp. 267-72). p. 287

Speaking in the House of Commons on June 15, 1855, Edward George Bulwer-Lytton tabled a proposal (in the form of an amendment to a proposal by Layard) urging stricter regulations for the filling of government posts and a number of other administrative reforms. The proposal, largely aimed at depriving the Administrative Reform Association (see Note 139) of its raison d'être, was discussed by the House on June 15 and 18 and adopted on June 20. p. 289

On May 26, 1855, the British frigate Cossack stopped off Gange (Hangö) in the Gulf of Finland and sent a boat under a flag of truce to treat with the Russians. Mistaking the envoys for an intelligence party, the Russian commanding officer, an ensign, laid an ambush. In the ensuing clash half the British sailors were killed and the others wounded and taken prisoner. The incident was discussed by the British Parliament. Marx describes the debate in question in his next report for the Neue Oder-Zeitung (see this volume, pp. 292-96). p. 291

The beginning of Marx's article (the part concerning the false report about the seizure of Sevastopol) appeared in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on June 25 with an editorial note saying that the conclusion would be published in the next morning issue of the paper. p. 292

On June 18, 1855, one of the major battles of the Crimean War was fought at Sevastopol, ending in defeat for the Allies. The nearly nine-month-long siege of the city, the destruction caused by the bombardment, and the capture by French and British troops on June 7, 1855 of the outlying fortifications, the Selenghinsk and Volhynsk redoubts and the Kamchatka lunette (which had been erected by the defenders in the course of the siege) induced the Allied command to undertake a full-scale assault on the Southern (Korabelnaya) part
of the city. It was launched on the fortieth anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, fought on June 18, 1815. The assault was preceded by massive bombardment of the city from land and sea. Despite the Allies' substantial superiority in numbers, their attack, launched along the whole line of Russian fortifications at dawn on June 18, 1855, was repulsed at every point. The attackers suffered heavy losses. The fighting on June 18 showed the strength of Sevastopol's defences and the staunchness of the Russian troops. Marx gave a detailed account of the battle in his report “The Mishap of June 18.—Reinforcements”; Engels described it in his articles “From Sevastopol” and “The Late Repulse of the Allies” (see this volume, pp. 297-301, 313-19 and 328-32).

During an inspection of troops in Boulogne at the end of September 1854 Napoleon III declared that the Allies had taken Sevastopol. This statement was based on false reports.

A reference to the law on a new internal loan passed by the Legislative Corps on June 20, 1855. The loan was to total 750 to 800 million francs.

See Note 213.

In the battle of Waterloo fought on June 18, 1815, the Anglo-Dutch and Prussian forces commanded by the Duke of Wellington and Blücher defeated Napoleon's army.

The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi—see Note 25.

The Dardanelles Treaty—a reference to the London Straits Convention signed on July 13, 1841 (see Note 98).

Marx's description of the mass demonstration held in Hyde Park on June 24, 1855, in protest against a series of anti-popular measures adopted by Parliament (in particular, the prohibition of Sunday trading) is based mainly on his own observations. Wilhelm Liebknecht writes in his memoirs that Marx and other German revolutionary democrats took part both in this demonstration and in one organised by the Chartists at Hyde Park on the following Sunday, July 1, 1855. According to Liebknecht, in the course of the latter demonstration, which was dispersed by the police, Marx was very nearly arrested. Two days after the events of June 24, Marx wrote to Engels: “The demonstration held at Hyde Park on Sunday afternoon looked very revolutionary.” The present article was first published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Britain, Moscow, 1953. It was printed together with another article by Marx, describing the demonstration on July 1 (see this volume, pp. 302-07 and 323-27) under the joint editorial heading: “Anti-Church Movement. [—Demonstration in Hyde Park”].

The High Church—a trend in the Anglican Church which stressed the latter's derivation from Catholicism, maintained the traditional rituals and originally drew its following mainly from the aristocracy.

The Low Church—a trend in the Anglican Church which laid special emphasis on Christian morality; its following originally consisted predominantly of members of the bourgeoisie and the lower clergy.

Dissidents or dissenters were members of various Protestant sects and trends in England who to some degree or other rejected the dogmas of the Established Church.

According to British Parliamentary procedure the House of Commons, when discussing certain important questions, may declare itself a Committee of the
Whole House. Each of its sittings is presided over by one of a list of chairmen who is appointed by the Speaker.

A reference to the Executive Committee of the National Charter Association. Founded in July 1840 and numbering nearly 50,000 members in its heyday, the Association was the first mass working-class party in the history of the labour movement. In 1848, the defeat of the Chartists and division in their ranks drastically reduced the Association’s following. Nevertheless, in the 1850s the Association, headed by Ernest Jones and other revolutionary leaders, launched a campaign for the revival of Chartism on a revolutionary basis. It urged the implementation of the People’s Charter and the socialist principles proclaimed by the Chartist Convention in 1851.

In 1855 widespread discontent with the policy of the ruling oligarchy induced the revolutionary Chartists to make another attempt to reorganise Chartism. In the summer of that year a number of local Chartist committees were elected, and in August the Executive Committee of the National Charter Association was formed. It included Ernest Jones, Abraham Robinson and James Finlen. The Association ceased its activities in 1858.

An Act passed in Britain in the early eighteenth century obliged newly elected Members of Parliament to swear what was known as the Oath of Abjuration, which was a solemn denial of the right of James II’s descendants to the Crown. The Oath included a statement of devotion to Christianity. Refusal by an MP to take the Oath virtually debarred him from participation in Parliamentary proceedings. Despite repeated motions for amending the text of the Oath, it was not until 1866 that the passage on devotion to Christianity was omitted.

Lord John Russell’s Jewish Disabilities Bill (1853) to allow elected Jews to swear a non-Christian oath had been carried in the Commons but rejected by the Lords.

An abridged German version of this article dated June 29, 1855 was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on July 2, 1855 under the title “Über die Ereignisse in der Crimea” (“On the Events in the Crimea”). The translation and editing were done by Marx. The first paragraph in the New-York Daily Tribune version shows signs of editorial interference.

On Marx’s participation in the second mass demonstration against the Anti-Sunday Trading Bill, held in Hyde Park on Sunday, July 1, 1855, see Note 221. On July 3, 1855 Marx wrote to Engels about this demonstration: “The scenes in Hyde Park last Sunday were disgusting, firstly because of the constables’ brutality and secondly because of the purely passive resistance put up by the huge crowds. Meanwhile things are clearly seething and fermenting and we can only hope that great disasters in the Crimea will bring them to a head.”

The article was first published in English in: Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, On Britain, Moscow, 1953, pp. 420-25, as Part II, together with Marx’s article on the demonstration of June 24, 1855 (see this volume, pp. 302-07) under the common editorial heading “Anti-Church Movement—Demonstration in Hyde Park”.

224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231 A reference to the battle of Inkerman (November 5, 1854) in which the British suffered heavy losses (see Note 35). p. 326

232 The text of this article by Engels was used by Marx in two reports for the Neue Oder-Zeitung: “Clashes between the Police and the People.—The Events in the Crimea” (published in this volume as a joint work by Marx and Engels, see pp. 333-36) and “Über den Sturm vom 18. Juni” (“On the Assault of June 18”). The latter has not been included in this volume as it is an almost word for word translation of part of Engels’ article “The Late Repulse of the Allies”.

The first paragraph of the New-York Daily Tribune version of this article shows signs of editorial interference. p. 328

233 A reference to the defeat of the British and Turkish forces in the battle of Balaklava (see Note 10). Particularly heavy losses were suffered by the British cavalry. p. 332

234 The section of this article dealing with military events is part of Engels’ article “The Late Repulse of the Allies” which was written for the New-York Daily Tribune (see this volume, pp. 328-32). p. 333

235 Maine Law—the first law passed in the US banning the production and sale of alcoholic beverages. It was first adopted in the State of Maine in 1841 and renewed in amended form in 1851. p. 333

236 Napoleon III and Empress Eugénie visited London in April 1855. p. 334


238 See Note 139. p. 334

239 “Infantry Balaklava”—see Note 233.

Marx continued his analysis of the military events of June 18, 1855 in a report dated July 7 and headlined “Über den Sturm vom 18. Juni” (“On the Assault of June 18”). It was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on July 11. The report reproduced in German a large section of Engels’ article “The Late Repulse of the Allies” (see this volume, pp. 328-32). p. 335

240 Quakers (or Society of Friends)—a religious sect founded in England during the seventeenth-century revolution and later widespread in North America. The Quakers rejected the Established Church with its rites and preached pacifist ideas. The “wet” Quakers, so called in opposition to the orthodox or “dry” Quakers, were a trend which emerged in the 1820s and sought to renew the Quaker doctrines. p. 335

241 See Note 51. p. 337

242 Part of this article, beginning with the words “For two years...” and up to the end, was first published in English in Marx, Engels, Ireland and the Irish Question, Moscow, 1971. p. 340

243 Court of Chancery—one of England’s highest courts, a division of the High Court of Justice following the Judicature Act of 1873. It was presided over by the Lord Chancellor and dealt with matters relating to inheritance, observance of contracts, joint-stock companies and similar legal problems. It was notorious for red tape and procrastination. p. 340
Committee of Supply (or Committee of Ways and Means)—in accordance with parliamentary procedure, the House of Commons, when discussing major questions concerning the national budget, declares itself a Committee of Ways and Means. This is one of the cases when the House sits as a Committee of the Whole House (see Note 223).

For the Irish Brigade see Note 58.

The Bills in question were submitted by Aberdeen’s coalition Government in June 1853 to reduce the class struggle in the Irish countryside by granting the tenants certain rights and protecting them from landlord arbitrariness. Marx discussed the Bills in his article “The Indian Question.—Irish Tenant Right” (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 157-62). As Marx had foreseen, the British Parliament, reluctant to impinge on the interests of the landed aristocracy, refused to grant even minor concessions to the tenants. Even in curtailed form, the Bills were virtually quashed.

The text of this article was reproduced by Marx in an abridged and altered German version (dated July 14) which was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on July 17 under the heading “Russell’s Resignation.—The Events in the Crimea”. In the present edition the Neue Oder-Zeitung version is given as a joint article by Marx and Engels (see this volume, pp. 348-51).

The nickname of Gebhard Leberecht von Blücher, the Prussian field marshal, who advocated active offensive tactics during the 1813 campaign against Napoleon. For more on this see the article “Blücher” by Marx and Engels in Volume 18 of the present edition.

The section of this article relating to the events in the Crimea is a somewhat abridged and altered version of Engels’ article “The Great Crimean Blunder” (see this volume, pp. 344-47).

See Note 247.

I. e. from the sittings of the Vienna Conference (see Note 88).

Previous question—(in British parliamentary procedure) the question as to whether a vote shall be taken on a question or issue, debated before the main question is put. A vote on the previous question—whether it was expedient “that this question be now put”—was often taken to avoid a division on some important matter. If the vote was negative the question was postponed, if positive it was put without further debate.

According to custom, Ministers and Members of Parliament accused of illegal actions may be tried before the House of Lords at the instance of the House of Commons, a judicial process known as impeachment. This custom, which enabled the House of Commons to supervise the activities of Ministers, was frequently resorted to in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but was practically abandoned in the nineteenth.

Marx included the text of this article, in an abridged German translation, in his report of July 20 for the Neue Oder-Zeitung. It appeared on July 23 under the heading “From Parliament.—From the Theatre of War” (see this volume, pp. 363-66). In the present edition this report is given as a joint item by Marx and Engels.

For the battle of Inkerman (November 5, 1854) see Note 35.

On the fighting for the Mamelon (the Kamchatka lunette) and other
outlying Russian fortifications at Sevastopol in June 1853 see Engels' article “From Sevastopol” (this volume, pp. 313-19).

On the assault of June 18, 1855 see Engels' article “The Late Repulse of the Allies” (this volume, pp. 328-32) and Note 215. p. 358


See Note 251. p. 363

See Note 254. p. 363

A reference to the dismissal on January 3, 1851 by President Louis Bonaparte of General Changarnier from the posts of commander of the Paris garrison and chief of the Paris National Guard. The General was a placeman of the Party of Order, which comprised the two monarchist factions—the Legitimists and the Orleanists—in the Legislative Assembly, whose conflict with the Bonapartists was growing increasingly acute. As a pretender to dictatorial power Changarnier was also a personal rival of Louis Bonaparte. p. 364

On June 27, 1855 Britain, France and Turkey concluded an agreement by which the British and French governments undertook to grant Turkey a loan of £5 million. In July the British Government tabled a Bill in the House of Commons calling for a guarantee of the loan. It encountered strong opposition and was only passed by an insignificant majority. In August the Bill was sanctioned by Queen Victoria. p. 367

See Note 88. p. 367

By the Wakefield School Marx means the supporters of the plan for “systematic colonisation” advanced by the British economist and statesman Edward Gibbon Wakefield in his work England and America (Vols. 1 & 2; London, 1833) and in other writings. Wakefield advocated colonisation through emigration, but held that there should be restrictions on the purchase of land by settlers. This was to ensure the colonies an ample supply of wage labour and reduce social conflicts in the home country by providing an outlet for redundant labour.

Wakefield's theory of colonisation attracted Marx's attention as early as the beginning of the 1850s, when he made a number of notes from Wakefield's book A View of the Art of Colonisation (London, 1849). Later he gave a detailed critique of this theory in the last chapter of the first volume of Capital (see present edition, Vol. 31). p. 368

Marx later used the findings of the parliamentary committee in question (“First Report from the Select Committee on Adulteration of Food. Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be printed, 27 July, 1855) in a number of notes to the first volume of Capital (see present edition, Vol. 31, Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature). p. 369

Marx subsequently discussed the problem of industrial accidents stemming from employers' neglect of safety precautions in the first volume of Capital, notably the chapter “Machinery and Modern Industry” (see the section “The Factory”). As in the present article, he compared industrial accident reports to military bulletins, pointing out that the development of capitalist machine industry “with the regularity of the seasons, issues its list of the killed and wounded in the industrial battle”. Characteristically, there too Marx corrobo-
rated his conclusions with quotations from reports of factory inspectors, notably that of Leonard Horner for the second half of 1855 ("Reports of the Inspectors of Factories for the Half Year Ending 31st October, 1855." London, 1856). The "Reports of the Inspectors of Factories for the Half Year Ending 30th April, 1855", which he analyses in the present article, were also used by him, but in a different context, in the chapter in *Capital* on the rate of surplus value (see present edition, Vol. 31. Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature).

The satirical pamphlet *Lord John Russell*, which Marx wrote in connection with the crisis of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet and John Russell's resignation, was intended as a series of articles for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* and the *New-York Daily Tribune*. It was to be a portrait of this Whig leader, presenting all the major aspects of his activity. While he was collecting the relevant material for the pamphlet—Parliamentary reports, political brochures, articles in periodicals and Russell's own writings—Marx wrote to Engels (July 17, 1855): "Do you know of any book about the êtres of little Johnny Russell?" By the beginning of August 1855 a considerable part of the pamphlet had been written, and its publication began in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*. On August 7 Marx wrote to Engels: "In the last few weeks I have sent the *Tribune* a series of articles—to be precise, three—reviewing the career of this little man from the outset."

However, the pamphlet was published in full only in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, as a series of six articles under the common heading "Russell". The *New-York Daily Tribune* published one big article (August 28) under the heading "Lord John Russell", which was an abridged English version of instalments II to VI of the series that appeared in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*. The cuts may have been by the *Tribune* editors, who condensed the series into a single article. It appeared unsigned.

Instalment I of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* series was first published in English in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *On Britain*, Moscow, 1953. It was followed by the condensed version of articles II to VI reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*.

In the present edition the pamphlet is published in full, according to the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, but under the heading given in the *New-York Daily Tribune*. Where the German version differs substantially from the English the relevant passages are given in the footnotes.

On the *Utrecht Peace* (1713) see Note 71.

Marx knew some of Russell's historical works earlier. For instance, in July 1843 he familiarised himself with the German edition of his constitutional history of Britain (*Geschichte der englischen Regierung und Verfassung von Heinrichs VII bis auf die neueste Zeit*, Leipzig, 1825). Excerpts from it are contained in one of his Kreuznach notebooks on world history (Notebook III).

On the Reform Bill (submitted by Russell in the House of Commons on March 1, 1831) see Note 45.

The English version, which was published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* and reproduced in abridged form instalments II to VI of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* series, has no date at the beginning and starts with the following paragraph, in all probability added by the editors: "We have recently had occasion to notice the funeral obsequies of this politically departed statesman, and to utter a few farewell words above his grave. The part which his birth, and his position as
the only presentable member of the great revolutionary family and old Whig house of Bedford enables him to play in the drama of European Affairs, and the connection of his name with some of the great progressive measures of the day, seem to us to entitle him to a somewhat more lengthened and analytic obituary.”

268 Following the massacre of workers at a mass meeting in support of electoral reform on St. Peter’s Field near Manchester on August 16, 1819, the British Parliament passed the Six Acts, proposed by Lord Castlereagh, which virtually abolished Habeas Corpus and the freedom of the press and assembly. They became known as the “gagging acts”, and Marx uses the phrase in the English version of the article where he speaks of “Castlereagh’s six gagging acts”.

269 Boroughs (in the English version: “nomination boroughs”)—a reference to the rotten boroughs (see Note 155).

Copyholders, leaseholders—types of tenant farmers in England whose legal status was formalised as early as the Middle Ages. The former held land by copy of the manorial court roll and were liable to the payment of a fixed rent. The latter held land under a lease, the terms of which were agreed upon by the landlord and the tenant.

270 This refers to the widespread movement of farm labourers throughout the south of England in late 1830 and early 1831. The movement, which began apparently spontaneously in the south-east, was largely directed against the use of threshing machines, which the labourers held responsible for growing impoverishment and unemployment. As it spread rapidly from county to county to embrace the whole of southern England there were definite signs of some sort of collective plan behind it, and the participants claimed to represent a legendary “Captain Swing”—whence the name of the “Swing” movement. Large gangs went out at night systematically destroying all the threshing machines in the neighbourhood, and also burning down ricks and sometimes the houses of landlords and of parsons, whom they held to be in league with the landlords. The majority of tenant farmers, however, appear to have had a certain sympathy with the labourers, since they preferred the old methods and felt themselves obliged to purchase threshing machines only under pressure from landlords and of competition from other farmers who had been persuaded to buy one. Thus the farmers put up little resistance to the destruction of the machines, and on occasion even encouraged it. The Swing uprisings were crushed by the authorities. Nevertheless, they succeeded in their aims in as much as the destroyed machines were not restored and the threshing machine virtually disappeared from British agriculture for twenty years, until the 1850s.

271 Tenants-at-will—tenants holding land on conditions dictated by the landlord at the given moment and dependent on his arbitrary will.

272 Freeholders—a category of small landowners in England dating back to the Middle Ages.

273 In keeping with English parliamentary tradition, the speaker of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor, sits on a woollen sack, symbolising what once used to be the main source of England’s national wealth.

274 See Note 6.
In April 1833 the British Parliament adopted a police law for Ireland. This was caused by the spread of peasant unrest, in particular, the refusal of Irish peasants, the vast majority of whom were Catholics, to pay tithes to the Anglican Church in Ireland. The British Government was also forced to resort to other measures to control the profound social conflict in Ireland and safeguard the position of the Established Church. Marx discusses them further on in the text. Despite the mass movement, it was not until 1838 that tithes were abolished (by the Commutation Act). However, under the new regulations too the peasants continued to pay for the maintenance of the Anglican Church, now indirectly in the form of an increase in rents which the landlords were obliged to transfer to the church funds.

The Bill introduced by Peel into the House of Commons in the spring of 1846 to legalise the arbitrary police regime in Ireland under the guise of prohibiting the bearing of arms. The bill was lost because of the opposition of the Whigs, who took advantage of the situation to overthrow the Peel ministry. When they came to power the Whigs themselves tried to take police measures against the Irish national liberation movement. In 1847 they passed on emergency law for Ireland which ushered in a new regime of atrocious repression of the Irish people.

A writ of *Habeas Corpus*—the name given in English judicial procedure to a document enjoining the appropriate authorities to present an arrested person before a court on the demand of the persons interested to check the legitimacy of the arrest. Having considered the reasons for the arrest, the court either frees the arrested person, sends him back to prison or releases him on bail or guarantee. The procedure, laid down by an Act of Parliament of 1679, does not apply to persons accused of high treason and can be suspended by decision of Parliament. The British authorities frequently made use of this exception in Ireland.

The *Corporation Act*, adopted by the British Parliament in 1661, required that persons holding elective posts (mainly members of municipal bodies) should take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England.

The *Test Act* of 1673 required the same of all persons holding government posts.

Originally directed against the Catholic reaction, these Acts later became instruments for fighting every form of opposition to the Established Church, including the various sectarian movements (the dissidents or dissenters), and protecting its privileges.

I. e. the anniversary of the Gunpowder Plot, a Catholic conspiracy to blow up
Parliament. It was uncovered on November 5, 1605. Guy Fawkes was one of the plotters. Their aim was to restore Catholicism in England.

The Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, which became law in August 1851, declared invalid the Pope’s edict of 1850 on the nomination of Catholic bishops and archbishops in Britain.

Irish Brigade—see Note 58.

Manchester men, Manchester school—see Note 7.

A German version of the article, dated July 27 and 28, 1855, was published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* under the heading “Birmingamer Konferenz.—Die dänische Erbfolge.—Die vier Garantien” (“The Birmingham Conference.—The Danish Succession.—The Four Guarantees”) on July 30 and 31. It differs slightly from the English version in content and the way of quoting (as a rule, the quotations are more condensed and treated more freely). Where the German differs substantially from the English this is indicated in the footnotes. Marx’s main sources were the reports of the committees of the Birmingham Conference, which were published soon after it ended on June 23, 1855.

Under the heading “The Birmingham Conference” the article was included in *The Eastern Question*.

A reference to the London Protocol of May 8, 1852 on the integrity of the Danish monarchy (see Note 23).

The *State Reform Association* was set up by the Left, radical wing of the bourgeois opposition in July 1855. In contrast to the Administrative Reform Association, it urged Parliamentary reform based on universal suffrage. The Radicals leading the Association sought an agreement with the Chartists, hoping to bring the working-class movement under their ideological and political influence. Jones, Finlen and other Chartist leaders became members of the Association’s Executive Committee, but soon resigned under pressure from the Chartist rank and file, who realised the danger of the Radicals’ gaining control of the Chartist organisation.

See Note 43.

See Note 22.

The *London convention of 1841*—see Note 98.

Russo-Dutch loan—see Note 24.

The *Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi*—see Note 25.

The *Treaty of the Dardanelles*—presumably the London convention on the Straits of 1841 (see Note 98).

On the *Balla-Liman Treaty* see Note 22.

Engels wrote this survey at the request of Marx, who received an order for it from the US journal *Putnam’s Monthly* through Charles Dana, editor of the
New-York Daily Tribune. In forwarding Dana’s letter to Engels on June 15, 1855, Marx asked him to write “one printed sheet on all the European armies for *Putnam’s Monthly*”. However, Engels’ survey turned out much longer and took a considerable time to write. Marx helped Engels by collecting data on various European armies, the Spanish and the Neapolitan, in particular, at the British Museum library. After receiving the first article of the series for forwarding to New York, Marx wrote to Engels (August 7, 1855): “The article on the ‘Armies’ is excellent.” On September 1 he informed Engels of the *New York Times* review—on the whole, favourable—of this article, which had been published in the August issue of *Putnam’s Monthly*, and of the reviewer’s awkward attempts to dispute the instances of corporal punishment of the lower ranks in the British Army cited by Engels. The continuation and conclusion of the series were published in the September and December issues of the journal. They were numbered articles two and three (the first article appeared without a number). By printing the survey unsigned, the editors tried to suggest that the author was an American. This may also have been the reason for the minor editorial changes in the text, in particular the use of the pronoun “our” with reference to the US army (see p. 407).

---

296 *Putnam’s Monthly* has the following note here, in all probability supplied by the editors: “We must not omit to state that our own country has produced a military history of the first class for impartiality, becoming language, and even handed justice to friend and foe: we refer to *The War with Mexico*, by Major Ripley.” R. S. Ripley’s book, published in New York in 1849, was known to Marx and Engels. Marx describes it in letters to Engels of November 30 and December 2 and 15, 1854. No statements by Engels on it have come to light.

p. 401

297 See Note 157.

p. 405

298 A reference to the operations of the British forces, commanded by Wellington, in the Peninsular War, which was waged by Britain against Napoleonic France on the territory of Spain and Portugal from 1808 to 1814. Simultaneously, throughout the Iberian Peninsula, the Spanish and Portuguese peoples were fighting for independence against the French occupation. In the course of the war Wellington won the battles of Oporto in 1809, Busano in 1810, and Fuentes de Oñoro in 1811. He also took Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in 1812.

p. 405

299 *Boulogne Camp*—the bridgehead set up by Napoleon I at Boulogne-sur-Mer on the English Channel between 1803 and 1805 for invading England. The threat of an attack by the forces of the third anti-French coalition (Russia, Austria, Britain and Sweden) formed in 1805 prevented him from carrying out his plan.

At *Austerlitz* on December 2, 1805 Napoleon’s troops defeated the Russians and Austrians.

p. 405

300 The battle of New Orleans (USA) between the British and American forces coincided with the receipt of a dispatch on the signing of the Ghent Treaty (December 24, 1814) which ended the British-American war of 1812-14 (the Second War of Independence) by restoring the pre-war position.

p. 405

301 At *Borodino*, near Moscow, a full-scale battle was fought by the French and Russian forces on September 7, 1812. It turned the tide in the war of 1812 in favour of Russia, even though the Russian army was forced to leave Moscow.

p. 407
The French Imperial Guards, disbanded after the fall of Napoleon I, were restored by a special decree of Napoleon III on May 1, 1854.

TheSeven Years' War—the war of 1756-63 between Britain and Prussia, on the one hand, and France, Russia and Austria, on the other. It was caused mainly by colonial and commercial rivalry between Britain and France and the clash between Prussia's policy of aggrandizement and the interests of Austria, France and Russia. In the course of the war the Prussian army of Frederick II won a series of victories over the French and Austrians, but suffered a number of serious defeats in battles against the Russian forces. As a result of the war, Britain expanded her colonial empire at the expense of France. Austria and Prussia retained, by and large, their former frontiers.

This section was used by Marx as material for several articles for the Neue Oder-Zeitung. The text from the beginning up to the words “a small heroic detachment of Britons was almost lost in the mass of Allied troops” was reproduced in almost literal translation with a few insignificant cuts in the report “Die britische Armee”, dated by Marx August 25, 1855 and published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 399, August 28. The continuation up to the paragraph beginning with the words “The uniform and equipment of the British soldiers”, edited and enlarged by Marx, provided the basis for the article “The Punishment of the Ranks”, dated August 28, 1855 and published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 405, August 31, 1855. In this volume it is given as a joint work by Marx and Engels (see pp. 501-03). The rest of the section beginning with the words “The uniform and equipment of the British soldiers” and up to the end was used by Marx with a few cuts and additions in his article “Uniformirung und Equipirung des britischen Soldaten” (“Uniform and Equipment of the British Soldier”), dated August 23, 1855 and published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 407, September 1, 1855. All these articles in the Neue Oder-Zeitung are marked with the sign X. Where the article “Uniform and Equipment of the British Soldier” differs substantially from the corresponding English text, this is pointed out in the footnotes.

Speaking of his personal experience, Engels may have had in mind his service as a volunteer in a brigade of the Guards' Artillery in Berlin in 1841-42.

The Military frontier or the Military Border Area—the southern border regions of the Austrian Empire where military settlements began to be set up in the sixteenth century for protection against Turkish invasions. The inhabitants of these regions—Serbs, Croats, Romanians, Szeklers, Saxons, and others—were allotted plots of land by the state, for which they had to serve in the army, pay taxes and perform certain public duties. In 1848-49 the granicharya, as the soldiers from these regions were called, formed part of the Austrian armies deployed against the revolutionary movement in Northern Italy and Hungary.
Todtleben was actually alive at the time. The statement in the text is based on inaccurate information then circulated by the European press. Wounded on June 20, 1855, Todtleben was forced to leave Sevastopol and was undergoing treatment when Engels wrote his survey. p. 443

The battle of Chetatea, in the Danubian theatre, between the Turkish and Russian armies, took place in the early period of the Crimean War, on January 6, 1854. It resulted from the Turks' attempts to take the offensive in the Kalafat area, at the juncture of Wallachia, Serbia and Bulgaria. After a stiff fight the Russian detachment was compelled to retreat under pressure from considerable Turkish forces (about 18,000 men), but following the arrival of Russian reinforcements the Turks were forced to go over to the defensive and eventually retreated to Kalafat. For a description of these events see Engels' article "The Last Battle in Europe" (present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 579-82).

On the Russians' siege of Silistria in May-June 1854 see Note 115. p. 445

German Confederation was an association of German states set up by the Congress of Vienna on June 8, 1815. Initially it included 34 states, mostly with a feudal-absolutist system of government, and four free cities. For all practical purposes the Confederation sealed Germany's political and economic fragmentation and retarded her development. After the defeat of the revolution of 1848-49 and the failure of the attempts to establish a more stable political union, the German Confederation was restored in its old decentralised and amorphous form. p. 448

In 1826 Sultan Mahmud II brutally suppressed a mutiny of the Janissaries, who rebelled against a reform of the Turkish army aimed at replacing the feudal Janissary forces with regular units. After the mutiny was crushed, the Janissary corps was disbanded.

On the Treaty of Adrianople see Note 22. p. 451

The Turks besieged Vienna twice, in 1529 and 1683, both times unsuccessfully. In 1683 the Austrian capital was relieved by the troops of Polish King John III. p. 453

At Oltenitza (south-east Wallachia) in the Danubian theatre, the Russian and Turkish forces fought one of the first battles of the Crimean War (November 4, 1853). A Russian detachment attacked the Turkish forces which had crossed to the left bank of the Danube. The attack failed, but the Turkish troops were soon compelled to withdraw to the right bank. Engels described the battle in his article "The War on the Danube" (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 516-22). p. 456

Engels is referring to the strength of the Sardinian army at the time of the Austro-Italian war of 1848-49. Sparked off in March 1848 by the national liberation uprising in Lombardy and Venice, then under Austrian rule, the war was fought in two stages. Following the entry into the war of the King of Sardinia (Piedmont), the main fighting took place between the Sardinian and Austrian forces, the latter commanded by Field Marshal Count Josef von Radetzky. On July 25, 1848 the Austrians beat the Italians at Custozza, and on August 9 Sardinia signed an armistice obliging her to withdraw her troops from Lombardy and Venice. The mounting revolutionary movement in Italy forced the King of Sardinia to resume hostilities (March 20, 1849), and the second stage of the war began. However, on March 21-23 the Sardinian army
was defeated at Mortara and Novara. The rout of Sardinia also enabled the Austrians to crush the other centres of resistance in Northern Italy. p. 457

This refers to the military convention concluded on January 26, 1855 by Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont), on the other. Sardinia undertook to send a corps of 15,000 to fight against Russia in the Crimean War, while Britain and France guaranteed the integrity of the Kingdom of Sardinia. By entering the war Sardinia's ruling quarters sought to secure Napoleon III's support for their future struggle for the North Italian territories held by Austria. p. 457

On August 16, 1855 Russian troops attacked the French and Sardinians on the river Chernaya about twelve kilometres southeast of Sevastopol in an attempt to weaken the Allies' siege of the city. However, the Russians were repulsed and suffered heavy losses due to inadequate preparation of the attack and errors on the part of the Russian command. Engels analysed this important episode of the Crimean War in his article “The Battle of the Chernaya” (see this volume, pp. 504-12). p. 458

In 1796, during France's war against the Second Coalition, which included Naples (the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), the French defeated the army of the Neapolitan King Ferdinand I and seized Naples.

In July 1820 the carbonari, aristocratic and bourgeois revolutionaries, rose in revolt against the absolutist regime in the Kingdom of Naples and succeeded in having a moderate liberal constitution introduced. However, in 1821 Austria, acting in accordance with a decision of the Laibach congress of the Holy Alliance, invaded Naples. The Austrian troops defeated the Neapolitan army and occupied Naples. The absolutist regime was restored. p. 460

This refers to the participation of the Kingdom of Naples in the French and Austrian invasion of the Roman republic in May-July 1849. The republican forces, commanded by Garibaldi, launched two vigorous offensives, putting the Neapolitans to flight. p. 460

A reference to the Constitution of the Swiss Confederation adopted on September 12, 1848. It ensured a measure of centralisation for the country, which from a loose union of cantons with an extremely weak central administration was turned into a federative state. In place of the former Diet a central legislative body, the Federal Assembly, consisting of a National Council and a Council of States, was set up. Executive power was vested in the Federal Council, whose chairman acted as President of the republic. p. 461

The Sonderbund—a separatist union of the seven economically backward Catholic cantons of Switzerland, formed in 1843 to resist progressive bourgeois reforms and to defend the privileges of the church and the Jesuits. The decree of the Swiss Diet of July 1847 dissolving the Sonderbund served as a pretext for the latter to start hostilities against the other cantons early in November. On November 23, 1847 the Sonderbund forces, consisting largely of militia detachments, were defeated by the federal army. p. 462

In the spring of 1798 the forces of the French Directory defeated the Swiss army and occupied Switzerland. As a result, Swiss territory became one of the main theatres of operations between France and the Second Coalition (Austria, Britain, Russia, the Kingdom of Naples and Turkey). p. 462

Norway was a Danish possession from the late fourteenth century. Under the Treaty of Kiel (1814) Denmark ceded it to Sweden. Early in the same year
Norway made an abortive bid for independence, but was forced to accept union with Sweden. The union had been backed by a number of European powers who wanted Sweden to join the anti-French coalition of 1813-14. The annexation of Norway to Sweden was sanctioned by the Congress of Vienna (1814-15). Under the terms of the union Norway retained its parliament (Storting) and administration and also its officer corps in the army, the King of the united kingdom of Sweden and Norway acting as Commander-in-Chief. In 1905 the union was dissolved and Norway regained its independence.

327 See Note 142.
328 See Note 84.
329 This refers to the Kingdom of Denmark's war against the secessionist duchies of Schleswig and Holstein (1848-50). Prussia entered the war on the side of the duchies, seeking to exploit the national liberation movement there for its own ends. However, the need to combat the revolutionary movement in their own country, and diplomatic pressure from the European powers, compelled Prussia's ruling circles to conclude an armistice with Denmark on August 26, 1848 at Malmö. Hostilities were resumed in the spring of 1849, followed by another armistice on July 10. The Schleswig-Holstein forces, now fighting the Danes single-handed, were defeated. The war ended in the restoration of Danish rule in Schleswig-Holstein.

330 Engels is referring to the second and third bourgeois revolutions in Spain. The former began with the mutiny of a unit of the Spanish army at Cadiz on January 1, 1820. Preparations for the mutiny started in the previous year. The revolution was suppressed in 1823 by the French occupation army sent to Spain in accordance with the decision of the Verona congress of the Holy Alliance. The third revolution (1834-43) was touched off by the first Carlist war of 1833-40 (see Note 18).

331 "Entente cordiale"—the relations established between Britain and France after the July 1830 revolution by an agreement signed in April 1834, when Britain, France, Spain and Portugal formed an alliance. However, already at that stage differences between Britain and France emerged, which intensified as time went on. Marx is referring here to the strongly anti-French attitude taken by the British Government, in particular Palmerston, during the Turko-Egyptian conflict of 1839-41 (see Note 69).

332 Bill regulating leasehold tenure in Ireland—see Note 245. The Irish Brigade—see Note 58.

333 No articles on India by Marx appeared in any subsequent issues of the Neue Oder-Zeitung.

The Parliamentary recess lasted from August 14, 1855 to January 31, 1856.

334 A reference to Palmerston's flirting with the Italian liberal movement on the eve of and during the revolution of 1848-49. In an attempt to avert a revolutionary crisis in Italy he sent Lord Minto to Rome and Naples in the autumn of 1847 to try and persuade Italy's rulers to make certain concessions to the Liberals and introduce some moderate reforms. During the revolution Palmerston's ambiguous attitude gave the Italian Liberals, and even Republi-
cans, grounds to expect diplomatic and military support from Britain. Actually, however, Britain supported the Austro-French invasion of the Roman Republic, thereby greatly contributing to the victory of the counter-revolutionary forces in Italy.

Marx is referring to the treaty concluded by Britain, France and Austria in Vienna on December 2, 1854 (see Note 100).

Some details in Marx’s account of the meeting, in particular his description of the speakers, show that his article was based either on his own impressions or those of eyewitnesses. It is possible therefore that he attended the meeting. He may also have used the report on the meeting published in The People's Paper, No. 171, August 11, 1855, which gave the text of the amendment tabled by the Urquhartist Collet and adopted by the meeting (Marx quotes it). Marx also had at his disposal copies of leaflets distributed in the hall, from which he quotes, though their contents were not included in newspaper reports.

The Literary Association of the Friends of Poland was set up in London in 1832 and was modelled on the Literary Society established in Paris by the conservative, aristocratic-monarchist wing of the Polish refugee community (Adam Czartoryski’s followers) in the same year.

The Democratic Polish Association was formed by radical nationalist or democratic Polish refugees—noblemen and bourgeois—in France in 1832. In 1836 the Centralisation, the Association’s executive committee, was established. The Association worked for a popular revolution involving the peasant masses. It aimed at national independence, the abolition of feudal services and inequality stemming from the existence of social estates, the transfer of plots to the peasants without redemption, and a number of other progressive measures. The Democratic Association took an active part in preparing the 1846 Cracow uprising and in the 1848-49 revolution. In the summer of 1849, after the Association was banned in France, the Centralisation’s headquarters were transferred to London. The 1850s were marked by dissent within the Association. After the establishment in Poland of the Central National Committee for the Preparation of a National Liberation Uprising, the Association dissolved (1862).

In 1846 a national liberation uprising took place in the Cracow republic, which by decision of the Congress of Vienna was controlled jointly by Austria, Prussia and Russia, who had partitioned Poland at the end of the eighteenth century. The seizure of power in Cracow by the insurgents on February 22, 1846 and the establishment of a National Government of the Polish republic, which issued a manifesto abolishing feudal services, were part of the plan for a general uprising in the Polish lands, which was inspired mainly by the revolutionary democrats. In March the Cracow uprising, lacking active support in other parts of Poland, was crushed by the forces of Austria and Tsarist Russia. In November 1846, Austria, Prussia and Russia signed a treaty incorporating the “free town of Cracow” into the Austrian Empire.

In 1848 a revolutionary movement again spread in many regions of Poland, in particular, Posen and Silesia, and also among the Ukrainian peasants in Galicia. In 1848-49 Polish revolutionaries were active in the revolutionary struggle in Germany, Austria, Hungary, France and Italy.

Addressing the House of Commons on December 12, 1854, Peel urged the British Government to take repressive measures against the political refugees
and put an end to public criticism by refugees, above all Victor Hugo and Lajos Kossuth, of the governments of their countries.  

341 See Note 139.  

342 Later Marx sent an enlarged English version of this article to the New-York Daily Tribune. It appeared as a leading article under the heading “Austria and the War” on September 13, 1855 (see this volume, pp. 495-500).  

343 An English version of the second instalment of this article, written by Engels, appeared in the New-York Daily Tribune on September 1, 1855 as a leading article headlined “The War”. It is considerably shorter than the German version and in some passages, particularly at the beginning, contains editorial changes. In all probability it was the Tribune editors who shortened the text considerably. Where the German differs substantially from the English, this has been indicated in the footnotes in the present volume.  

344 See Note 320.  

345 Sveaborg was a fortress situated on a group of islands at the entrance to the Helsinki harbour in the Gulf of Finland (modern Finnish name: Suomenlinna). The bombardment of Sveaborg by British and French ships described in the article took place on August 9 and 10, 1855.  

346 In August 1855 Queen Victoria visited France. According to the official British press, the visit was meant to strengthen the “Holy Alliance of England and France”.  

347 See Note 320.  

348 In the second half of this article Marx included a large section of his report “On the Critique of Austrian Policy in the Crimean Campaign” published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on August 18 (see this volume, pp. 481-83). The first paragraph of the article contains changes made by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune, who may, in particular, have added the reference to the report on Emperor Francis Joseph’s inspection tour.  

The article was published in The Eastern Question under the heading “Austria and England”. In a footnote to the first sentence the compilers—Eleanor Marx and Edward Aveling—suggest that the report of the Austrian officer mentioned in it was sent to the Tribune by Marx in his own translation. However, no evidence to support this has come to light.  

349 The concentration of Austrian troops on the Austro-Russian border began in May 1854 and was accompanied by large-scale conscription. Prior to this, on April 20, 1854, Austria concluded a defensive and offensive treaty with Prussia. Austria’s military preparations were a major factor behind Russia’s decision to withdraw its troops from the Danubian Principalities. However, on June 24, 1855 a reduction of the Austrian troops concentrated along the Galician frontier began on the orders of the Austrian Emperor. This was tantamount to an open refusal by Austria to enter the war on the side of the Allies.  

350 This article is a fragment of the section “The English Army” from Engels’ survey The Armies of Europe, published in Putnam’s Monthly in August-December 1855 (see this volume, pp. 401-69 and Note 295). Marx translated this fragment into German and made a number of additions and other changes.  

351 See Note 35.
A somewhat altered German version of this article was prepared by Marx for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*. It was dated August 31 and September 1 and published on September 3 and 4 under the heading “Über die Schlacht an der Tschernaja” (“On the Battle of the Chernaya”).

The first paragraph in the *New-York Daily Tribune* version contains changes made by the editors who, in particular, added the reference to the publication of the Péllissier and Simpson reports in the *Tribune* (No. 4493, September 13, 1855). p. 504

See Note 10. p. 507

The battles mentioned were fought by the British and their allies against the armies of Napoleonic France. The battle of *Bussaco* (Portugal) was on September 27, 1810; the battle of *Pamplona* was during the siege of that Spanish fortress in 1813, and the battle of *Waterloo* was on June 18, 1815 (see Note 219). p. 511

See Notes 2 and 35. p. 511

This article was published in *The Eastern Question* under the heading “Napier and Graham”. p. 513

In 1839 the British Parliament issued a Blue Book on Persia and Afghanistan containing, among other documents, a number of letters by A. Burnes, the British representative in Kabul, on the Anglo-Afghan war (see Note 20). The letters had been selected and presented by the Foreign Office in such a way as to conceal Britain's provocative role in unleashing the war. Shortly before his death Burnes sent duplicates of his letters to London. Those not included in the Blue Book were published by his family. p. 513

A reference to the following facts connected with James Graham's activities as Home Secretary and First Lord of the Admiralty: the opening, on his instructions, of the letters of Italian revolutionary refugees (see Note 199); his part in the welcome given to Russian Emperor Nicholas I during the latter's visit to Britain in June 1844; his administration of the 1834 Poor Law and especially his responsibility for the notorious scandal at the Andover workhouse in 1845; and the attempt to put Captain Christie, head of port and transport facilities in Balaklava, on trial for neglect of duty, an attempt which caused Christie's premature death. p. 514

The Sind, an area in Northwest India bordering on Afghanistan, was seized in 1843. During the Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42, the East India Company by threats and violence forced the feudal rulers of the Sind to agree to the transit of its troops through their territory. In 1843 the British demanded that the local feudal lords become vassals of the Company. This caused an uprising of the Baluch tribes (the Sind's indigenous population) after whose suppression by British troops under Sir Charles Napier the whole area was annexed to British India. p. 514

A German version of this article prepared by Marx and dated September 11, 1855 was published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* under the heading “Zur Einnahme von Sebastopol” (“On the Capture of Sevastopol”). In a letter to Engels dated September 11, 1855 Marx wrote that he had made a number of changes on the basis of the latest telegraphic dispatches.

The last two paragraphs in the English version were presumably added by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. p. 519
The Red Cap was the headgear of the ancient Phrygians. During the French Revolution it was adopted by the Jacobins and came to symbolise freedom.

Part of this article was reproduced by Marx in his report for the Neue Oder-Zeitung published on September 18, 1855 under the heading “Events in the Crimea”. In the present edition this version is given as an item by Marx and Engels (see this volume, pp. 531-33).

The first and last paragraphs of the English version contain insertions made by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune. The London correspondent mentioned in them was probably A. Pulszky.

The battles of Oltenitza and Chetatea—see Notes 317 and 313.

The battle of the Chernaya—see Note 320.

The battle of Inkerman—see Note 35.

On the Allies' abortive assault on Sevastopol of June 18, 1855 see Note 215.


See Note 305.

In October 1805, during the war of the Third Coalition (Austria, Britain, Russia and Sweden) against Napoleonic France, the Austrian army of General Mack was encircled by the French at Ulm and forced to surrender.

This article is Marx's adaptation for the Neue Oder-Zeitung of part of Engels' article “Crimean Prospects” published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4508, October 1, 1855 (see this volume, pp. 525-29).

On the battles of Oltenitza and Chetatea see Notes 317 and 313.

On the battle of the Chernaya see Note 320.

On the battle of Inkerman see Note 35.

The Société générale du Crédit mobilier was a big French joint-stock bank founded by the Péreire brothers in 1852. It was closely associated with Napoleon III's government and under the latter's protection engaged in large-scale speculation. It went bankrupt in 1867 and was liquidated in 1871.

An abridged German version of this article was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung on September 29, 1855 under the heading “Die Widerstandskraft Rußlands” (“Russia's Power of Resistance”). The translation and changes were made by Marx.

The patrimonial court was a feudal court whose jurisdiction was based on the right of the landowners to try and punish their peasants.

The unsalaried magistrates were justices of the peace appointed from among members of the propertied classes.

Under the laws on local administration adopted on July 7, 1852 and May 5, 1855 the general councils of the French departments were deprived of the right to elect their presidents, vice-presidents and secretaries. These were...
appointed by the head of state; the general councils were to meet in closed session; the prefects and the head of state had the right to dissolve the municipal councils, whose officials were appointed by the local prefects.

p. 545

374 An abridged German version of this article was prepared for the Neue Oder-Zeitung by Marx. It was dated September 29, 1855 and appeared under the heading “Zur Erstürmung Sebastopols” (“The Assault on Sevastopol”) on October 4, 1855. The first paragraph in the New-York Daily Tribune version contains changes made by the editors.

The English version was included, under the same heading, in The Eastern Question.

p. 546

375 See Note 215.

p. 549

376 See Notes 10 and 35.

p. 550

377 The Federal Diet (Bundestag) was the central representative body of the German Confederation (see Note 314). The Diet consisted of representatives of the German states and met in Frankfurt am Main. Though virtually powerless, it was nevertheless an instrument of feudal and monarchist reaction. The Diet ceased its activities during the revolution of 1848-49 in connection with the drafting of the German Imperial Constitution by the Frankfurt National Assembly and the attempts to unite Germany on this basis. Its powers were restored in March 1851. The formation of the North German Union in 1867 under Prussia’s hegemony put an end to the German Confederation and the Federal Diet.

p. 553

378 See Note 370.

p. 555

379 See Note 219.

p. 559

380 The Committee in Newcastle-upon-Tyne was one of the Foreign Affairs Committees set up by Urquhart and his supporters between the 1840s and 1860s with the prime purpose of counteracting the foreign policy of Palmerston. Marx was highly critical of the Urquhartists' conservative views, as can be seen from his articles “David Urquhart” (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 477-78) and “The Association for Administrative Reform. [— People’s Charter]” (see this volume, pp. 240-44) and other newspaper items, also from his letters to Engels of March 9, 1853, February 9 and April 22, 1854, and others. At the same time he held that their foreign-policy statements could be used by Britain’s working-class spokesmen in the struggle against the bourgeois-aristocratic oligarchy.

The report of the Committee in Newcastle-upon-Tyne quoted by Marx was published in The Sheffield Free Press. A summary of the documents included in the report was issued by this Urquhartist newspaper in the form of a leaflet entitled “The Case of the Alleged Bribery against Lord Palmerston. (Reprinted from the Free Press). Sheffield”. Marx probably used The Sheffield Free Press, though he may have obtained the report from other sources.

p. 560

381 No sequel to this report was published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung. This is most probably due to the fact that on October 7, 1855 its editor, M. Elsner, asked Marx by letter to stop sending articles for the time being in view of the newspaper’s financial straits and obstacles raised by the censors. That is presumably why Marx left this article unfinished. Available material gives no
indication as to whether Marx resumed his regular contributions to the Neue Oder-Zeitung later. Although articles and reports marked with the sign × used by Marx continued to appear in the newspaper until it ceased publication in late 1855, only one of them was definitely written by Marx, the article "Big Meeting in Support of Political Refugees" (published on November 16, 1855; see this volume, pp. 581-82), as is indicated by the fact that its basic propositions coincide with those of Marx's letter to Elsner of November 8, 1855 (see present edition, Vol. 39).

The first paragraph of this article was probably added by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune. This is suggested, among other things, by the reference to the publication in the same issue of comments on Gorchakov's report.

Like many other articles by Marx and Engels, this one was reprinted in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune and the New-York Weekly Tribune. The first reprint reproduced the text unchanged, while in the second, which appeared five days later, the section dealing with the operations of the Anglo-French fleet and landing troops against Kinburn (in the Dnieper estuary) was substantially altered and enlarged. The new information may have been drawn from another report by Engels, received in the meantime and not published in the Daily Tribune, containing details of the fall of Kinburn (October 17, 1855) which were not yet available to him when he was writing the present report. At the same time, the new text contained additions clearly made by the Tribune editors, who may have drawn on the reports of other correspondents. In view of this the Weekly Tribune version of the article is given in this volume in the Appendices and not in the main text (see pp. 694-702).

The Daily Tribune version was reprinted in The Eastern Question under the heading "Alarums and Excursions". The article was attributed to Marx, as also a number of other articles by Engels included in the collection.

On the battle of Silistria see Note 115, on that of Inkerman—Note 35, and on that of the Chernaya—Note 320.

A reference to the first campaign of the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91. Austria took part in it on the side of Russia, but concluded a separate peace with Turkey in 1790. In the course of the war the Russian forces inflicted a number of serious defeats on the Turkish army and navy. The war ended in the signing of the Treaty of Jassy, which confirmed the incorporation of the Crimea into Russia (1783) and fixed Russia's Western frontier along the river Dniester.

This article and the next ("The Russian Army") belong to the series of works in which Engels reveals the causes of Tsarist Russia's defeat in the Crimean War, the negative effect of serfdom and economic backwardness on the state of armed forces, and the inadequacy of its military potential to satisfy tsarism's foreign-policy ambitions which increased particularly after its participation in suppressing the revolution of 1848-49 (notably the Tsarist intervention in Hungary in 1849). It is from that angle that Engels considers Russia's military history, and this in great measure explains why he gives a rather one-sided account of some of its episodes. It will be noted that in his later writings, based on more objective sources, including works by Russian authors, Engels modified his views on this subject. For instance, he pointed out that in the eighteenth century Turkey was not Russia's strongest opponent, Sweden being more powerful, that even the Ottoman Empire, though in a state of decline,
still possessed a considerable defence potential, and that Frederick II, the
Prussian king, had been placed in a critical position by the advance of Russian
troops in Prussia during the Seven Years' War (see Engels' article "The Foreign
Policy of Russian Tsarism", 1890, present edition, Vol. 28). He had a high
opinion of Suvorov's crossing of the Alps in 1799 ("Po and Rhine", 1859,
Vol. 16), the operations of the Russian army and partisans during Napoleon's
retreat from Moscow in 1812, and the part played by Russian forces in
the campaigns against Napoleonic France in 1813 and 1814 (see his articles
"Barclay de Tolly" and "Blücher", 1857, Vol. 18, and "The Position in
the American Theatre of War", 1862, Vol. 19). The defence of Sevastopol in
the Crimean War was later characterised by Engels as active, not passive (see his
article "Saragossa-Paris", and instalment XXXIII of his series "Notes on the
War", 1870, Vol. 22).

The article was reprinted in The Eastern Question under the heading "The
Russians as Fighters". p. 569

A reference to two major battles in the Seven Years' War (1856-63), waged by
Prussia and Britain against Austria, France and Russia.

At Zorndorf (Eastern Prussia) on August 25, 1758 the Russian army suffered
heavy losses in a battle with the Prussian forces commanded by Frederick II.
However, there was no victor in the battle, nor did it prevent a fresh Russian
offensive the following year.

At Kunersdorf (east of Frankfurt an der Oder) on August 12, 1759 the
Russian and Austrian forces under the joint command of P. Saltykov inflicted a
heavy defeat on Frederick II's army. The Russian forces, in particular the
infantry, played a decisive part in securing the victory. At the same time, the
successful operations of the Austrian cavalry corps under Gideon Ernst von
Loudon contributed to the rout of the Prussian cavalry. p. 569

During the war of the Second Coalition (it was formed in 1798 and included
Austria, Britain, Naples, Russia, Turkey and other states) against France, the
Russian and Austrian forces under the command of Alexander Suvorov freed
almost the whole of Northern Italy from the French in the spring and summer
of 1799. At the insistence of the Austrian government Suvorov's army was then
sent to Switzerland to link up with the Russian corps of Rimsky-Korsakov, which
was being pressed by the forces of the French General Masséna. After
the Russian army had heroically fought its way across the Saint Gotthard and
several other mountain passes it was encircled by superior French forces, which
had defeated Korsakov's corps at Zurich on September 25. Under extremely
hard conditions Suvorov's troops succeeded in making their way through a
number of Alpine mountain passes and on October 12 reached the upper
Rhine. In his work "Po and Rhine" (see present edition, Vol. 16) Engels wrote:
"This passage was the most impressive of all Alpine crossings in modern
times." p. 569

On the battle of Austerlitz see Note 299.

At Friedland (Eastern Prussia) the closing battle of the war of the Fourth
Coalition (Britain, Prussia, Russia and Sweden) against Napoleonic France
was fought on June 14, 1807. After the rout of the Prussian Army by Napoleon in
1806, the main theatre of operations in the war shifted to Eastern Prussia, where
the French encountered stiff resistance from the allied armies of Russia and
Prussia. In the battle of Friedland Napoleon won a victory over the Russian forces.
It was preceded by a bloody battle at Preussisch-Eylau (February 7 and 8, 1807)
which ended indecisively. The Prussian General Lestocq distinguished himself in
that battle as well as the Russian General Pyotr Bagration, who commanded the rearguard.

389 On the battle of Borodino see Note 301. Engels' judgment of it was based on information drawn from a number of West-European military writers who represented the outcome of the battle as a victory for Napoleon and ignored the fateful consequences it had for the French army even though the Russians did leave Moscow temporarily. Later research produced a substantially different picture of the battle. It was established, in particular, that the French rather than the Russian army was superior in numbers and suffered heavier losses.

390 A reference to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, which ended in the Treaty of Adrianople (see Note 22) and the suppression by the Tsarist forces of the Polish national insurrection in 1830-31.

391 See Note 2.

392 On the battles of Inkerman and the Chernaya and on the siege of Silistria see Notes 35, 320 and 115.

On the Russians' abortive assault on Kars (September 29, 1855) see this volume, pp. 563-68.

393 On the battle of Oltenitza see Note 317.

The Russian troops took the fortresses of Akhalsikhe and Erzeroum in Transcaucasia during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. Under the Treaty of Adrianople (1829) Erzeroum was returned to Turkey.

By capturing Warsaw in September 1831 Tsarist forces dealt the final blow to the Polish national insurrection of 1830-31.

The Turkish fortress of Ismail on the Danube was taken by Russian troops by storm under Alexander Suvorov on December 22, 1790, during the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91.

On November 4, 1794 Russian troops under Suvorov sent by the Tsarist Government to suppress the Polish national insurrection led by Tadeusz Kościuszko (which started in March 1794) captured Praga, a suburb of Warsaw, thus compelling the Polish capital to surrender. The suppression of the insurrection was followed, in 1795, by the third partition of Poland between Austria, Prussia and Russia, and the final abolition of the Polish state. (The first two partitions took place in 1772 and 1793.)

394 See Note 215.

395 In June 1854 Russia contracted a 50 million silver rubles loan at 5 per cent interest through the St. Petersburg bank of Stieglitz & Co. It was mainly intended to finance the Crimean War.

396 On October 10, 1855 the French petty-bourgeois democrat Félix Pyat addressed an open letter to Queen Victoria in connection with her visit to France in August of that year. It was printed in L'Homme, a refugee newspaper published in Jersey. Anti-Bonapartist in content, the letter, like all public statements by Pyat, was adventurist in character and provided Bonapartist circles and the conservative British press with a pretext for launching a sustained attack on the refugees. It was rumoured that the British Government was contemplating repressive measures against the refugees. The Governor of Jersey ordered the publisher of L'Homme, Sventoslawski, and some other refugees to leave the island. Victor Hugo too was threatened with expulsion.
This in turn gave rise to an angry protest campaign by the progressive public in Britain.

Concerning Marx's authorship of this article see Note 381. p. 581

The *Alien Bill* (Marx uses the English term) was passed by the British Parliament in 1793 and renewed in 1802, 1803, 1816, 1818 and, finally, in 1848, this time in connection with revolutionary developments on the Continent and Chartist demonstrations in Britain. The Bill authorised the Government to expel any foreigner from the Realm at any moment. It remained in force for one year. Subsequently conservative circles repeatedly urged its renewal.

In connection with the developments in Jersey, the proposed expulsion of revolutionary refugees was discussed for several months and finally rejected at the beginning of 1856. On February 1 of that year Palmerston told the House of Commons that the Government would not seek a renewal of the Alien Bill. p. 581

The *Fusionists* advocated a merger (fusion) of the Legitimists (supporters of the elder branch of the French house of Bourbons) with the Orleanists (supporters of the younger branch). p. 581

The name of Viscount Henry Addington Sidmouth, Home Secretary in Liverpool's Tory Cabinet from 1812 to 1821, was associated with a number of anti-popular laws and reactionary measures: the introduction of the Corn Laws in the interests of the landowners in 1815, the restriction of the right of assembly and the virtual introduction of censorship in 1817, the bloody dispersal of a workers' meeting near Manchester in 1819 (the Peterloo massacre), the passage of the "gagging acts" (see Note 268) and others. p. 582

This article was reprinted under the same heading in *The Eastern Question*. p. 584

The attitude of the European powers during the American War of Independence (1774-83) was determined by their commercial and colonial rivalry with Britain. France entered the war against Britain in 1778, Spain in 1779, and Holland in 1780. Despite the British Government's attempts to secure the support of Russia, the latter maintained an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards the United States and thereby contributed to the victory of the American republic. p. 584

The principle of armed neutrality (the armed protection of the merchantmen of neutral countries trading with Britain's opponents) was proclaimed by Catherine II in 1780 and recognised by a number of states. It stipulated the right of neutral countries to trade with the belligerents, a ban on privateering, refusal to recognise the blockade of ports access to which was not actually prevented by armed force, and a number of other rules. The declaration of armed neutrality objectively favoured the struggle of the North Americans for independence. p. 585

Britain declared war on Holland in December 1780 on the pretext that the latter was violating the Westminster peace treaty of 1674, which ended the Anglo-Dutch war of 1672-74. Holland was accused, in particular, of infringing a secret clause under which the two parties undertook not to aid any powers hostile to either side. Britain objected to Holland's trade with France, Spain and the United States of North America, against which Britain was waging war.
In taking this attitude Britain ignored another clause of the treaty, one guaranteeing freedom of trade and navigation.

The Anglo-Dutch war ended in 1784 in a victory for Britain. Holland was forced to cede the port of Negapatam (Southern India) to it and grant it freedom of navigation in the waterways of the Dutch East India Company.

p. 586

The capture of Kars on November 28, 1855 concluded the successful operations by the Russian forces against the Turks in the Caucasian theatre of the Crimean War. Assisted by the British, the Turks had turned Kars into a bridgehead for the invasion of Transcaucasia. In the course of the fighting the Russian forces inflicted a series of defeats on the Turks (at Akhaltsikh on November 26, 1853, at Bash-Kadykar on December 1, 1853, at Cholok on June 15, 1854, at Bayazid on July 20, 1854 and at Kuruk-Dar on August 5, 1854), thus thwarting their attempts to force their way into Armenia and Georgia. In October 1855 Omer Pasha's army was transferred from the Crimea to the Caucasus and marched from Sukhum-Kaleh to Mingrelia in an unsuccessful attempt to relieve the Turkish garrison. The capture of Kars, the last important event of the war, accelerated the conclusion of peace.

p. 588

A reference to the campaigns of the Arab tribes of the Arabian Peninsula in the course of which the Arabian Caliphate subjugated and annexed the countries of the Middle East, Northern Africa and Southwest Europe. The Arabs' advance in Europe was stopped in 732 as a result of the battle of Poitiers, in which the Franks under Charles Martel, the virtual ruler of the Merovingian state, defeated the Arabs who had invaded France from Spain.

p. 590

Engels is referring to the sieges of the Balkan fortresses of Varna, Brăila and Silistria during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. Despite stiff resistance from the Turks, these fortresses were taken by the Russian troops.

p. 590

A reference to the secret meetings of the military representatives and diplomats of Britain, France and Sardinia held under Louis Bonaparte's chairmanship in Paris in January 1856. According to press reports, they discussed co-ordinated action by the Allies in the event of another military campaign against Russia.

p. 595

An allusion to an episode in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29: the march of advance units of the Russian army towards Constantinople in the summer of 1829.

p. 595

A reference to the Five Points, the terms for peace talks presented to Russia by Austria on behalf of the Allied Powers in December 1855. An elaboration of the earlier Four Points (see Note 43), they called for replacement of the Russian protectorate over the Danubian Principalities by a protectorate of all the contracting parties, a revision of the Bessarabian border involving the relinquishing by Russia of the territory along the Danube, the neutralisation of the Black Sea, the closure of the Straits to warships, a ban on the maintenance of arsenals and navies in the Black Sea by Russia and Turkey; and collective protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey by the Great Powers. Presented in the form of an ultimatum, these terms were accepted by the Tsarist Government and provided the basis for the Paris peace talks.

p. 598

In the second half of this article Marx drew on a letter from Engels of February 7, 1856 describing the position in France.
411 A reference to the struggle between Britain and the United States for domination in Central America. It found reflection in the sharp differences over the interpretation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, under which Britain and the United States guaranteed the neutrality of the projected Isthmian canal and undertook to refrain from occupying Nicaragua, the Mosquito Coast and certain other areas. However, Britain, in violation of the Treaty, continued to hold the Mosquito Coast and the territories she captured in the 1840s. The United States supported the adventurer William Walker, who had seized power in Nicaragua in 1855. Relations were further aggravated by Britain's attempts to recruit mercenaries in the United States for her Crimean army. The governments of the two countries each threatened to break off diplomatic relations with the other. In October 1855 Britain sent warships to the American coast. The conflict was settled in October 1856 by the signing of a convention neutralising the Mosquito Coast and the adjacent sea zone.

412 The peace of Amiens—the peace treaty concluded by Napoleonic France and its allies (Spain and Holland) with Britain on March 27, 1802. It was actually a brief truce in these states' armed struggle for supremacy, which was resumed in May 1803.

413 Marx is ironically comparing the Franco-British alliance of the Crimean War period with the rapprochement between Britain and France in the early years of the July monarchy, which went down in history as the "Entente cordiale" (see Note 331).

414 This refers to the Five Points (see Note 409).

415 Speaking in the French Legislative Assembly on May 22, 1850, Montalembert urged the Government to launch a military expedition against the revolutionary and democratic forces in France similar to that undertaken against the Roman Republic in 1849 (see Note 194).

416 On December 29, 1855, during the ceremony held in Paris to welcome the French army returning from the Crimea, students of the École Polytechnique refused to greet the troops and the Emperor. The Government retaliated by repressive measures.

In his speech to the troops Louis Bonaparte compared himself to the Roman Senate, which usually went out in a body to welcome the victorious legions at the gates of Rome.

417 Sire de Franc Boissy—a French song containing satirical allusions to royalty and the government.

418 At the end of August 1855 several hundred workers in Angers (north-west France) rose in revolt in an attempt to set up a republic. Their leaders were associated with Marianne, a secret republican society established in 1850. Numerous arrests were made and trials held in late 1855 and early 1856 in connection with unrest in different parts of the country.

419 This article, written for the New-York Daily Tribune in connection with the publication of a number of documents relating to the fall of Kars, was Marx's first public reaction to this event. Soon after that he wrote a serialised pamphlet under the same heading for the Chartist People's Paper (see this volume, pp. 621-54). In it he used some of the formulations and developed the content of the present article, virtually the first version of the exposé. As the text of
the article differs substantially from that of the pamphlet, the article is reproduced in full in the present edition.

The first paragraph contains insertions made by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.  

The decision to enter into negotiations with the Russians on the terms of capitulation was taken by the commanding officers of the Kars garrison on November 24, 1855. The fortress surrendered on November 28.  

Besides *The People’s Paper*, Marx also sent this article to the *New-York Daily Tribune*, which published it as a leading article under the heading “Bonapartean Victims and Tools” on April 14, 1856. It was reprinted under that heading in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* on April 15. The *Tribune* version differs somewhat from *The People’s Paper* one. Certain passages were omitted and a number of—presumably editorial—insertions made. One such insertion, referring to Tassilier’s letter, is the phrase “which will be found in another column” at the beginning of the article (the letter, possibly translated by Marx, was published in the same issue of the *New-York Daily Tribune*). Both versions contain numerous misprints in figures, which have been corrected on the basis of the sources used by Marx.

*The People’s Paper*, founded in May 1852, was a weekly published by the revolutionary Chartists. Marx contributed to it without claiming remuneration and helped Ernest Jones, the chief editor, with the editing and organisational matters, especially in the weekly’s early years. He also enlisted as regular contributors his associates Adolf Cluss (who lived in the USA), Georg Eccarius and Wilhelm Pieper. In the period between October 1852 and December 1856 *The People’s Paper*, in addition to publishing Marx’s articles written specially for it, reprinted the most important articles by Marx and Engels from the *New-York Daily Tribune*. At the beginning of 1856 Marx’s contributions to *The People’s Paper* became especially frequent. However towards the end of the year Marx and Engels temporarily broke off relations with Jones and ceased to contribute to his weekly because of Jones’ increasing association with bourgeois radicals. In June 1858 the paper was taken over by J. Baxter Langley, a follower of Richard Cobden, with the proviso that Jones should have two columns in each issue for Chartist news. However, the paper met with no success and ceased publication in September 1858.

The reference is to French Guiana where political prisoners were sent for penal servitude. The high mortality caused by the harsh prison regulations and the unhealthy tropical climate earned Cayenne the nickname of the “Dry Guillotine”.

*Lambessa* (Lambèse) was a French penal colony in North Africa set up on the ruins of the ancient Roman town of Lambaesis. From 1851 to 1860 it was a place of deportation for political prisoners.

*Belle-Île* is an island in the Bay of Biscay. From 1849 to 1857 political prisoners, including participants in the June 1848 uprising of Paris workers, were confined there.

An allusion to the methods Louis Bonaparte employed to win supporters while preparing the coup d’état of December 2, 1851. At the receptions and military reviews he held as President of the Republic at Satory and elsewhere army officers and men were served sausage, cold meat and champagne (see Marx’s *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 99-197).
Furcae Caudinae (Caudine Forks)—a gorge near the Roman town of Caudium, where in 321 B.C., during the second Samnite war, the Samnites defeated the Roman legions and made them “pass under the yoke”, which was considered a terrible disgrace to a defeated army. Hence the expression to “pass under Furcae Caudinae”—to be subjected to extreme humiliation.

On the Lower Empire (the New-York Daily Tribune has New Lower Empire everywhere) see Note 198.


The Batrachomyomachia (The Battle of the Frogs and Mice) was an Ancient Greek anonymous mock-heroic poem parodying Homer's Iliad.

Instead of this sentence the New-York Daily Tribune has the following one partly or wholly added by the editors: “The wretched state of the French army in the Crimea was broadly asserted in our columns before the London press dared hint at it.”

Marx wrote the pamphlet The Fall of Kars for the Chartist People's Paper as a series of four articles which were published in four consecutive issues of the weekly in April 1856. The individual instalments appeared under Marx's name, unnumbered (for convenience they have been numbered by the editors of this volume). The second, third and fourth instalments were preceded by a note saying that they were continuations of the instalment published in the previous issue. After the first and third instalments there were notes to the effect that they were to be continued in the next issue. The pamphlet was based on Marx's article on the same subject written for the New-York Daily Tribune and likewise entitled “The Fall of Kars” (see this volume, pp. 605-14). The text of this article was thoroughly revised and considerably enlarged. In a letter to Engels of April 16, 1856 (see present edition, Vol. 40) Marx wrote that in the absence of the original he was compelled, in preparing the pamphlet, to restore the Tribune article from memory as well as he could. His main source in writing both the article and the pamphlet was a Blue Book on the defence of Kars published soon after the surrender of the fortress on November 28, 1855. In late April and early May 1856 Marx compiled a summary of his pamphlet for The Free Press and The Sheffield Free Press, two periodicals published by David Urquhart and his supporters (see this volume, pp. 673-80).

The People's Paper version of “The Fall of Kars” was reprinted in The Eastern Question.

The Five Points—see Note 409.

The Paris Treaty—the peace treaty that concluded the Crimean War (1853-56). It was signed by the representatives of Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey, on the one hand, and of Russia on the other, at the Congress of Paris on March 30, 1856. Under the treaty, Russia ceded the mouth of the Danube and part of Bessarabia, renounced its protectorate over the Danubian Principalities and its protection of Christians in Turkey, agreed to the neutralisation of the Black Sea (involving the closure of the Straits to foreign warships and a ban on Russia and Turkey maintaining navies and naval arsenals on the Black Sea) and returned the fortress of Kars to Turkey in
exchange for Sevastopol and other Russian towns held by the Allies. By skillfully exploiting the differences between Britain and France the Russian diplomats at the congress succeeded in foiling the attempts to impose still more onerous peace terms on Russia.

The Paris Treaty failed to settle the Eastern Question. In the 1870s relations between the European Powers in the Balkans and the Near East became tense again.

"Take care of Dowb" Panmure—a nickname for the British Secretary at War Panmure who, in an official dispatch informing General Simpson of his appointment to the post of commander-in-chief in the Crimea, asked him to look after Panmure's nephew, the young officer Dowbiggin.

The Fanariots were inhabitants of the Fanar, the main Greek quarter in Constantinople, mostly descendants of aristocratic Byzantine families. Due to their wealth and political connections many of them held high administrative posts in the Ottoman Empire.

A reference to the capture of Kars by the Russians during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29. Under the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829 the fortress was returned to the Turks.

On April 14, 1856 Marx was invited as an official representative of the revolutionary refugees in London to a banquet commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Chartist People's Paper. He used the occasion to demonstrate the internationalist solidarity that united the proletarian revolutionaries, among whom he had established himself as the outstanding leader, with the revolutionary wing of the Chartist movement, and show that in contrast to the French and German petty-bourgeois democrats, who were merely flirting with the Chartist leaders, the German Communists were true allies of the Chartists, sharing with them the aim of achieving the rule of the working class in all countries (for more on this see Marx's letter to Engels of April 16, 1856 in Vol. 40 of the present edition). In his address (he was the first speaker) Marx concentrated on the historic role of the proletariat. The banquet was also addressed by another representative of the German Communists, Wilhelm Pieper. The other speakers were mostly Chartists (James Finlen, Ernest Jones and others).

Marx did not intend to publish his speech. It was, however, included in the newspaper report under the heading "Fourth Anniversary Banquet of The People's Paper". The following text preceded the speech:

"On Monday last at the Bell Hotel, Strand, Ernest Jones entertained the compositors of The People's Paper and the other gentlemen connected with its office, at a supper, which was joined by a large number of the leading Democrats of England, France and Germany now in London. The entertainment was of the choicest description, and reflected the greatest credit on the enterprising proprietor of the Hotel, Mr. Hunter; the choicest viands and condiments of the season being supplied in profusion. The tables were well filled with a numerous company of both sexes, Ernest Jones occupying the chair, and Mr. Fawley, manager of The People's Paper office, the vice-chair. The banquet commenced at seven, and at nine o'clock the cloth was cleared, when a series of sentiments was given from the chair."
“The Chairman then proposed the toast: ‘The proletariat of Europe’, which was responded to by Dr. Marx as follows:"

Then follows the text of the speech. p. 655

In this article Marx used information on the economic position of Prussia and other European countries which he had received from Engels in a letter of April 14, 1856. p. 657

See Note 370. p. 657.

*Chambre introuvable* was the name given by King Louis XVIII to the Chamber of Deputies in France, which in 1815-16 consisted of extreme conservatives. It attacked the Government from the right and was eventually disbanded by the King because of its arch-reactionary views. p. 659

Marx’s authorship of this article, published in *The People’s Paper* anonymously, is evident from his letter to Engels of April 26, 1856 (see present edition, Vol. 40) where the article is mentioned in the list of items enclosed. “In it I imitate, *tant bien que mal*, the style of old Cobbett,” he writes. p. 662

A reference to the Duke of York’s part in the wars of the First and Second European coalitions (1792-97 and 1799-1800) against the French republic. In 1793 the British army commanded by the Duke unsuccessfully besieged Dunkirk and, following the defeat of the coalition forces at Hondschoote on September 6-8 of that year, narrowly escaped annihilation by hastily retreating without a fight. Later the Duke of York commanded the British corps of the Anglo-Russian army that landed at Helder (Northern Holland) at the end of August 1799. In October the allied troops were defeated by a Franco-Dutch army commanded by Brune. p. 663

The *convention of Alkmaar* was signed on October 18, 1799 after the defeat in Holland (then the Batavian Republic) of the Anglo-Russian forces commanded by the Duke of York. It provided for the withdrawal from Holland of the forces of the anti-French coalition and the release of the French and Dutch prisoners. p. 664

A reference to the group of Whig radicals headed by Charles James Fox. They opposed the war against the French republic and advocated a reform of Parliament favouring the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. p. 665

“*Friends of the King*”—a group of close associates of George III, mostly extreme Tories. They supported George III’s attempts to extend the Royal prerogative at the expense of Parliament and establish his personal rule. Members of the group repeatedly headed the government and held ministerial posts between 1760 and the early 1780s. p. 666

This article is Marx’s summary of his pamphlet *The Fall of Kars*, which was published in April as a series of articles in *The People’s Paper* (see Note 428). He substantially abridged and rearranged the text of the pamphlet in preparing the summary. The editors of *The Free Press* published it together with the covering letter (see this volume, p. 672), adding the following note in brackets below the heading: “The subjoined paper has been supplied to us by Dr. Karl Marx”. p. 673

Engels’ summary “Crimean War”, written in German, listed in chronological order the major military events in the Crimea beginning with the landing of the
Allied troops in Eupatoria on September 14, 1854 and ending with their capture of the Southern side of Sevastopol by storm on September 8, 1855. We do not know for what particular purpose it was compiled. One may assume, however, that Engels, who continued to cover the war after the capture of Sevastopol, was intending to write a retrospective review of the hostilities in the Crimea and drew up this outline of the fighting for that purpose. The review evidently never materialised.

Engels described the main episodes of the war—the battles of the Alma, Balaklava, Inkerman and the Chernaya, the construction of the Selenghinsk redoubt and the Kamchatka lunette, the abortive assault of June 18, 1855, the assault of September 8, 1855, and others—in a series of articles which will be found in Volume 13 (pp. 492-97, 518-27 and 528-35) and in the present volume (pp. 113-17, 132-35, 151-55, 328-32 and 504-12, 546-52). See also Notes 2, 10, 35, 215 and 320.

This article is the English version of part of Engels' article "Germany and Pan-Slavism", published in full in the Neue Oder-Zeitung in April 1855, and—in content—a sequel to the article "The European Struggle", which was the English version of another part of "Germany and Pan-Slavism", published in the New-York Daily Tribune on May 5 of the same year (see this volume, pp. 156-62 and Note 131). The Tribune editors altered Engels' text considerably. In particular, they added the second paragraph, setting forth the views on Pan-Slavism of the Tribune correspondent, A. Gurowski, which were at variance with those of Marx and Engels. The closing paragraph too contains editorial changes. Marx was incensed by this treatment and even considered ceasing to work for the newspaper. On receipt of the issue containing the article he wrote to Engels (May 18, 1855): "The devil take the Tribune. It is absolutely essential now that it should come out against Pan-Slavism" (see present edition, Vol. 39).

The article was published under the same heading in The Eastern Question.

See Note 132.

See Note 133.

See Note 134.

See Note 135.

This is an enlarged version of an article published under the same heading in the New-York Daily Tribune and the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune (see this volume, pp. 563-67, and Note 282). It shows clear signs of editorial interference. This applies especially to the passages which do not occur in the Daily or Semi-Weekly Tribune (the details of the capture of Kinburn by the Allies on October 17, 1855). In all probability, the editors added the second passage on the fighting at Kinburn during the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91 (on which see Note 384) and the part played in it by Rear-Admiral Paul Jones, a veteran of the American War of Independence (1774-83).

On the battle of Silistria see Note 115, the battle of Inkerman, Note 35, and the battle of the Chernaya, Note 320.

A reference to the destruction of the fortifications of Bomarsund, a fortress on one of the Aland islands in the Gulf of Bothnia, by the Anglo-French navy and a French landing party in August 1854.
NAME INDEX

A

Abdul Mejid (1823-1861) — Sultan of Turkey (1839-61).—92, 103, 397, 481, 589, 595, 614, 629, 637, 643, 678

Aberdeen, George Hamilton Gordon, Earl of (1784-1860) — British statesman, Tory, leader of the Peelites from 1850; Foreign Secretary (1828-30, 1841-46) and Prime Minister of the Coalition Government (1852-55).—8, 18, 24, 27, 28, 41, 44, 50, 102, 224, 229, 237, 258, 290, 353, 354, 356, 363, 399, 652, 662, 665, 671

Acland, James (1798-1876) — British politician, Free Trader; organised the movement by commercial and financial circles for administrative reform in 1855.—168, 195, 196

Adair, Robert Alexander Shafto (b. 1811) — British colonel, member of the House of Commons; member of the Financial Committee of the Patriotic Fund in 1855. —355, 356

Addington — see Sidmouth, Henry Addington, Viscount

Aeschines (389-314 B.C.) — Athenian orator and politician, leader of the Macedonian party.—77

Airey, Richard, Lord Airey (1803-1881) — British general; quartermaster-general of the army in the Crimea (1854-55).—654

Alberoni, Giulio (1664-1752) — Spanish statesman and cardinal; First Minister of King Philip V (1717-19).—24

Albert, Prince Consort of Queen Victoria of Great Britain (1819-1861).—274-76, 280, 281, 299-300, 321, 558

Alexander I (1777-1825) — Emperor of Russia (1801-25).—68, 104, 283


Ali Mehmet Pasha (1815-1871) — Turkish statesman, ambassador to London (1841-44), Foreign Minister (1846-52), Grand Vizier (July 1855-October 1856).—609, 624, 636, 653, 667

Allonville, Armand Octave Marie d’ (1800-1867) — French general; commanded cavalry units in the Crimea (1854-55).—563, 564, 694, 702

Alsager, Thomas Massa (1779-1846) — English journalist, an editor and co-owner of The Times (1817-46).—122

Althorp, John Charles, Viscount Althorp, Earl Spencer (1782-1845) — British statesman; member of the House of Commons and, from 1834, of the House of Lords, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1830-34).—378, 379, 670

Anne (1665-1714) — Queen of Great Britain and Ireland (1702-14).—64
Archimedes (c. 287-212 B.C.)—Greek mathematician; made discoveries in mechanics and hydrostatics.—304
Argyll, George John Douglas Campbell, Duke of (1823-1900)—British statesman, Peelite; Lord Privy Seal (1853-55), Postmaster-General (1855-58, 1860), Secretary for India (1868-74).—49
Arif Bey (1786-1866)—Turkish statesman, ambassador to Austria (1850-54), Sheikh ul-Islam (Grand Mufti) (March 1854-1858).—473
Arnim, Ludwig Joachim (Achim) von (1781-1831)—German romantic poet.—651
Ashley (Cooper, Anthony Ashley, Earl of Shaftesbury) —see Shaftesbury
Auber, Daniel François Esprit (1782-1871)—French composer.—141
Aumale, Henri Eugène Philippe Louis d’Orléans, duc d’ (1822-1897)—fifth son of King Louis Philippe of France; took part in the conquest of Algeria (1840-47).—110
Autemarre, d’—French general; commanded a brigade in General Boscquet’s Second Division in the Crimea (1855).—547

B

Babbage, Charles (1792-1871)—English mathematician and economist.—247
Backhouse, John (1772-1845)—British official; Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1827-42).—20
Baillie, Henry James (b. 1804)—Tory member of the House of Commons.—213
Bakewell, R. Hall—English surgeon; worked at a field hospital in the Crimea in 1855.—492
Ballantine, William (1812-1887)—English lawyer.—334
Balzac, Honoré de (1799-1850)—French novelist.—31
Bandiera brothers, Attilio (1810-1844) and Emilio (1819-1844)—leaders of the Italian national liberation movement, members of the Young Italy society; executed for their attempt to raise a revolt in Calabria (1844).—273, 513
Banks—police inspector in London in 1855.—305, 324
Baraguay d’Hilliers, Achille, comte (1795-1878)—French general, Marshal of France from 1854, Bonapartist; ambassador to Constantinople (1853-54); commanded the French expeditionary corps in the Baltic in 1854.—220
Barbès, Armand (1809-1870)—French revolutionary, a leader of secret societies during the July monarchy; deputy to the Constituent Assembly (1848); sentenced to life imprisonment for his participation in the popular uprising of May 15, 1848; emigrated to Belgium after an amnesty in 1854.—121, 655
Baring, Sir Francis Thornhill (1796-1866)—British statesman, Whig M.P.; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1839-41), First Lord of the Admiralty (1849-52).—22, 227, 228, 245, 257
Barnes, Thomas (1785-1841)—editor of The Times (1817-41).—122
Barrington, William Wildman, Viscount (1717-1793)—British statesman, Tory; Secretary at War (1755-61, 1765-78), Chancellor of the Exchequer (1761-62).—64
Barrot, Camille Hyacinthe Odilon (1791-1873)—French politician and lawyer; leader of the liberal dynastic opposition during the July monarchy; headed the monarchical Coalition Ministry (December 1848-October 1849).—168, 616
Bates, Robert Makin (born c. 1791)—English banker.—310
Batory, Stefan (1533-1586)—King of Poland (from 1576) and general.—285
Bauer, Bruno (1809-1882)—German philosopher, Young Hegelian; in the 1850s published several pamphlets on Russia’s international position.—162
Beale, James—English radical.—99
Beaton, William Ferguson—British general; commanded a Turkish cavalry detachment on the Danube (1854) and in the Crimea (1854-September 1855).—608, 612, 624, 631, 674
Bebutoff (Bebutov), Vasily Osipovich, Prince (1791-1858)—Russian general; commanded Russian troops in the Caucasus during the Crimean war.—593, 627
Bedau, Marie Alphonse (1804-1863)—French general and moderate republican politician; Vice-President of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies during the Second Republic; expelled from France after the coup d’état of December 2, 1851.—87
Bedford, Dukes of—English noble family.—187
Bedford, John Russell, Duke of (1766-1839)—English aristocrat, father of John Russell.—373, 374, 379
Bell, Jacob (1810-1859)—founder of the Pharmaceutical Society and the Pharmaceutical Journal; member of the House of Commons (1850-51).—99
Bellini, Vincenzo (Vincenzo) (1801-1835)—Italian composer.—292
Benkendorf, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1817-1857)—Russian general; carried out military and diplomatic missions for the Russian armies (1853-55).—573
Bentley—innkeeper at the Ballarat goldfields in Victoria (Australia).—64, 65
Beresford, J. C.—member of the House of Commons (1808).—670
Berg, Fyodor Fyodorovich, Count (Berg, Count Friedrich Wilhelm Rembert) (1793-1874)—Russian general, later field marshal-general; Governor-General of Finland (1855-63).—361
Berkeley, Francis Henry Fitzhardinge (1794-1870)—British Liberal politician, member of the House of Commons.—369
Berkeley, Maurice Frederick Fitzhardinge, Baron Fitzhardinge (1788-1867)—British admiral, Whig, member of the House of Commons; Lord of the Admiralty (1833-39, 1846-57).—273
Bernadotte, Jean Baptiste Jules (1763-1844)—Marshal of France; became heir to the Swedish throne in 1810; took part in the war against Napoleon I in 1813; King of Sweden and Norway as Charles XIV John (1818-44).—464
Bernstorff, Albrecht, Count von (1809-1873)—Prussian diplomat; envoy to Naples (1852-54) and to London (1854-61, 1862-67), Foreign Minister (1861-62).—106
Bird, T.O'M.—Vienna correspondent of The Times (1848-66).—178
Bizot, Michel Brice (1795-1855)—French brigadier-general, military engineer, head of the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris; commanded the engineers in the Crimea (1854-55).—114
Blanqui, Louis Auguste (1805-1881)—French revolutionary, utopian communist; organised secret societies and plots; leader of the extreme Left wing of the democratic and proletarian movement during the 1848 revolution; sentenced to imprisonment several times.—655
Bligh, James—a Chartist leader in the 1850s.—304, 305
Bodenstedt, Friedrich von (1819-1892)—German poet and translator; travelled in the Caucasus, the Crimea and Asia Minor in the 1840s.—593
Böhm—Austrian general; commandant of the Olomouc (Olmütz) fortress during the Crimean war.—497
Bolingbroke, Henry St. John, Viscount (1678-1751)—English deist philosopher and politician, a Tory leader.—188
Bonald, Louis Gabriel Ambroise, vicomte
**de (1754-1840)**—French politician and writer; monarchist; an ideologist of aristocratic and clerical reaction during the Restoration.—660

**Bonaparte**—imperial dynasty in France (1804-14, 1815, 1852-70).—86, 91, 148, 259, 596

**Bonaparte, Jérôme (1784-1860)**—youngest brother of Napoleon I; King of Westphalia (1807-13), Marshal of France from 1850.—109

**Bonaparte, Prince Napoleon Joseph Charles Paul (1822-1891)**—son of Jérôme Bonaparte, cousin of Napoleon III; took the name of Jérôme after the death of his elder brother (1847); commanded a division in the Crimea (1854).—70, 76, 77, 81, 86, 89, 90, 110, 120, 146, 149

**Boniface, L.**—secretary of the editorial board of *Le Constitutionnel* (1855).—594, 599

**Bonin, Eduard von (1793-1865)**—Prussian general, War Minister (1852-54, 1858-59); advocated Prussia's alliance with the Western powers during the Crimean war.—105

**Bosquet, Pierre (1810-1861)**—French general, Marshal of France from 1856, Senator; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s-1850s; commanded a division and then a corps in the Crimea (1854-55).—551, 552

**Bourbons**—royal dynasty in France (1589-1792, 1814-15, 1815-30), Spain (1700-1808, 1814-68, 1874-1931) and some of the Italian states.—122

**Boustrapa**—see *Napoleon III*

**Bouverie, Edward Pleydell (1818-1889)**—British statesman, Whig, member of the House of Commons; Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1855); President of the Poor-Law Board (1855-58).—319, 348, 352

**Boxer, Edward (1784-1885)**—British admiral; was in charge of Balaklava harbour (1855).—22

**Brant, James**—British consul in Erzerum. —654

**Bratiano (Brățianu), Dimitri (1818-1892)**—Romanian politician; took part in the 1848 revolution in Wallachia; lived in emigration in France and then in England (1852-57); Prime Minister of Romania (1881).—481

**Brennan**—London police inspector (1855).—324

**Bright, John (1811-1889)**—English manufacturer; a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; Left-wing leader of the Liberal Party from the early 1860s.—43-45, 100, 122, 143, 168, 209, 214, 218, 258, 259, 356, 378, 381, 382, 472, 558, 561

**Brougham and Vaux, Henry Peter, Baron (1778-1868)**—British lawyer and writer, Whig; Lord Chancellor (1830-34).—295, 379, 380, 392

**Brown, Sir George (1790-1865)**—British lieutenant-general; commanded a division on the Danube and in the Crimea (1854-55).—216, 219

**Brown, John**—sailor from the British frigate *Cossack*.—293

**Bruat, Armand Joseph (1796-1855)**—French admiral; commanded a squadron (1854) and the French navy in the Black Sea (1855).—634

**Brummell, George Bryan (1778-1840)**—English aristocrat nick-named Buck Brummell for his dandyism. —479

**Brune, Guillaume Marie Anne (1763-1815)**—French general, Marshal of France from 1804; took part in the wars of the French Republic and Napoleonic France; commanded the French forces in Holland (1799).—663-64

**Brunnow, Filipp Ivanovich, Baron von, Count (1797-1875)**—Russian diplomat; envoy (1840-54, 1858-60) and ambassador (1860-70, 1870-74) to London; took part in the Paris Peace Congress (1856).—235, 396

**Brunswick (Braunschweig), House of**—dynasty of German dukes (1203-1884).—663, 666, 669
Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus) (c. 85-42 B.C.)—Roman republican politician; an organiser of a conspiracy against Julius Caesar.—338

Buchanan, Sir Andrew, Baronet (1807-1882)—British diplomat, envoy to Denmark (1853-58).—294

Bulwer—see Lytton, Edward George

Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias, Baron von (1791-1860)—Prussian diplomat, writer and theologian; envoy to London (1842-54).—105, 335

Bunsen—son of Baron Christian Karl Josias Bunsen.—335

Buol-Schauenstein, Karl Ferdinand, Count von (1797-1865)—Austrian statesman and diplomat; envoy to St. Petersburg (1848-50) and to London (1851-52), Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1852-59).—142, 230, 354, 398, 399

Burdett, Sir Francis (1770-1844)—British Radical and later Tory politician, member of the House of Commons.—168, 242, 502

Burgh, John de (b. 1841)—son of Eliza Josephine Handcock and the Earl of Clanricarde.—62

Burgh, Ulick de—see Clanricarde, Ulick John, de Burgh, Marquis and Earl of, Baron Somerhill

Burgoyne, Sir John Fox, Baronet (1782-1871)—British field marshal, military engineer; military adviser and colonel-commandant of engineers in the Crimea (1854-55).—26

Burke, Edmund (1729-1797)—British statesman and political writer, Whig M. P.; supported the Tories from 1791 onwards; at the beginning of his career advocated liberal principles, subsequently opponent of the French Revolution.—373, 587

Burnes, Sir Alexander (1805-1841)—British lieutenant-colonel; was sent on a mission to Kabul (1836-38); adviser at the British headquarters during the Anglo-Afghan war (1839-41).—513

Burnes, James—writer to the signet and provost of Montrose; father of Sir Alexander Burnes.—513

Butler, James Armar (1827-1854)—British army officer, an organiser of the defence of Silistria (1854).—455

Butt, Isaac (1813-1879)—Irish lawyer and Liberal politician, member of the House of Commons; an organiser of the Home Rule movement in the 1870s.—29

Caligula, Gaius Caesar (12-41)—Roman Emperor (37-41).—49

Cambridge, George William Frederick Charles, Duke of (1819-1904)—British general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1854); commander-in-chief of the British army (1856-95).—124, 126, 128, 596

Camou, Jacques (1792-1868)—French general, Senator; commanded a division (1855) and a corps (1855-56) in the Crimea.—507, 508

Canning, George (1770-1827)—British Tory statesman and diplomat; Foreign Secretary (1807-09, 1822-27) and Prime Minister (1827).—15, 16, 44, 188, 376

Canrobert, François Certain (1809-1895)—French general, Marshal of France from 1856, Senator, Bonapartist; division commander (1854), commander-in-chief of the French army (September 1854-May 1855) and corps commander in the Crimea.—81, 87, 91, 115, 116, 132-33, 135, 137, 138, 149, 153, 171, 173, 180, 181, 201, 205, 212, 215-16, 219-20, 249, 264, 416

Cantillon—French non-commissioned officer; brought to trial in 1818 for an attempt on the life of the Duke of Wellington, commander-in-chief of the British occupation army in France, but acquitted.—177

Cardigan, James Thomas Brudenell, Earl of (1797-1868)—British general; commanded a light cavalry brigade in the Crimea (1854).—102

Cardwell, Edward Cardwell, Viscount (1813-1886)—British statesman, Peel-
ite, later Liberal; President of the Board of Trade (1852-55), Secretary for Ireland (1859-61), Secretary for the Colonies (1864-66) and Secretary of State for War (1868-74).—43, 60, 131

Carlisle—English aristocratic family.—187

Carnot, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite (1753-1823)—French mathematician; political and military leader of the French Revolution, Jacobin; took part in the coup d'etat of Thermidor 9th, 1794.—262, 626

Carnot, Lazare Nicolas Marguerite (1753-1823)—French mathematician; political and military leader of the French Revolution, Jacobin; took part in the coup d'état of Thermidor 9th, 1794.—262, 626

Cartesian, Esprit Victor Elisabeth Boniface, comte de (1788-1862)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; took part in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—220

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Marquis of Londonderry, Viscount Castlereagh (1769-1822)—British statesman, Tory; Secretary for War and for the Colonies (1805-06, 1807-09) and Foreign Secretary (1812-22).—104, 283, 376

Cathcart, Sir George (1794-1854)—British general; commanded the Fourth Division in the Crimea (1854).—102, 444

Cathcart, Lady Georgina—wife of Sir George Cathcart.—102

Catherine II (1729-1796)—Empress of Russia (1762-96).—104, 569, 584-86

Cato, Marcus Porcius, the Elder (234-149 B.C.)—Roman statesman notable for his severity in exposing the opponents of the Roman Republic.—103, 654

Cavaignac, Louis Eugène (1802-1857)—French general and moderate republican politician; took part in the conquest of Algeria; War Minister from May 1848; suppressed the June 1848 uprising of the Paris proletariat; head of the Executive (June-December 1848).—221, 616

Cavendish, William, Duke of Devonshire, Marquis of Hartington, Earl of Devonshire and of Burlington (1808-1891)—British politician, member of the House of Lords.—100

Cecil, Robert Arthur Talbot Gascoyne, Viscount Cranborne, Marquis of Salisbury (1830-1903)—British statesman, M.P., Tory, later Conservative; held the posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary several times.—357

Cesena, Amédée Barthélemy Gayet de (1810-1889)—French journalist, Bonapartist during the Second Empire, editor-in-chief of Le Constitutionnel (1852-57).—267, 278, 287, 544

Chad, Sir Henry Ducie (1788-1868)—British admiral; took part in the operations of the British fleet in the Baltic (1854-55).—517

Changarnier, Nicolas Anne Théodule (1793-1877)—French general and politician, monarchist; took part in the conquest of Algeria (1830s-1840s); deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-51); expelled from France after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—87, 221, 364

Charles III (1716-1788)—King of Spain (1759-88).—466, 468

Charles XII (1682-1718)—King of Sweden (1697-1718).—464

Charles Albert (Carlo Alberto) (1798-1849)—King of Sardinia (1831-49).—459

Charles the Great (Charlemagne) (c. 742-814).—Frankish King (768-814) and Emperor of the West (800-814).—109

Chesney, Francis Rawdon (1789-1872)—British colonel, general from 1855.—423

Chevalier, Michel (1806-1879)—French engineer, economist and writer; follower of Saint-Simon; supported Napoleon III's economic policy; contributed to the Journal des Débats.—556

Christie, P. (d. 1855)—British captain; Principal Agent of the Transport Service (Army of the East) up to March 31, 1855.—273, 514
Cialdini, Enrico, duca di Gaeta (1811-1892)—Italian general; commanded the Third Brigade of the Sardinian corps in the Crimea (1855).—548

Clanricarde, Ulick John, de Burgh, Marquis and Earl of, Baron Somerhill (1802-1874)—British politician and diplomat, Whig; ambassador to St. Petersburg (1838-41) and Postmaster-General (1846-52).—30, 62, 310, 662, 671

Clarendon, Earls of—English aristocratic family.—45

Clarendon, George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of, Baron Hyde (1800-1870)—British statesman, Whig, later Liberal; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1847-52), Foreign Secretary (February 1853-1858).—8, 25, 49, 67, 73, 106-08, 228, 294-95, 300, 353, 386, 391, 398, 399, 481, 482, 499, 606, 609, 610, 611, 613, 614, 623-29, 633-52, 654, 673-76, 677-80

Clarke, Mary Anne (1776-1852)—mistress of the Duke of York.—503, 668-70

Clausewitz, Karl von (1780-1831)—Prussian general and strategist.—435

Clutterbuck, Edmund Lewis (b. 1824)—sheriff of the county of Wiltshire (1854-55).—21, 22

Cobbett, John Morgan (1800-1877)—English lawyer and politician, member of the House of Commons; son of William Cobbett.—96

Cobbett, William (1763-1835)—British politician and radical writer; published Cobbett's Weekly Political Register from 1802.—47, 96-97, 167, 242, 376, 502, 663, 665, 667

Cobden, Richard (1804-1865)—English manufacturer and politician; a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League; member of the House of Commons.—100, 168, 209, 247, 258, 382, 582

Cochrane, Thomas, Earl of Dundonald (1775-1860)—British admiral; took part in the wars against Napoleon I; member of the House of Commons.—273, 502

Codrington, Sir William John (1804-1884)—British general, member of the House of Commons; division commander (1854-55) and commander-in-chief of the British army (November 1855-July 1856) in the Crimea; Governor of Gibraltar (1859-65).—550, 573, 654

Colchester, Charles Abbot, Baron (1798-1867)—British admiral, Tory, member of the House of Lords.—295

Collet, Collet Dobson—English radical journalist and public figure.—478, 479

Colloredo-Waldsee (Wallsee), Franz de Paula, Count von (1799-1859)—Austrian diplomat, ambassador to St. Petersburg (1843-47), minister to London (1852-56).—108

Combermere, Sir Stapleton-Cotton, Baronet, Viscount of (1773-1865)—British general, field marshal from 1855; took part in the wars against Napoleon I.—558

Congreve, Sir William (1772-1828)—English officer and military inventor; invented a rocket which was named after him (1808).—404

Constantine (Konstantin Nikolayevich) (1827-1892)—Russian Grand Duke, second son of Nicholas I; admiral-general; was in charge of the defence of the Baltic coast (1854-55); Naval Minister (1855-81), President of the Council of State (1865-81).—537

Constantine (Konstantin Pavlovich) (1779-1831)—Russian Grand Duke, brother of Nicholas I; virtual vicegerent of Poland (1814-31).—19

Conway, Henry Seymour (1721-1795)—British statesman and general, field marshal from 1793; Whig, member of the House of Commons.—377

Cordoba (Córdova)—Spanish brigadier-general.—469

Cormontaigne, Louis de (c. 1696-1752)—French general, military engineer.—262

Courtois, A.—French writer.—535

Cowley, Henry Wellesley, Baron of, Earl of (1804-1884)—British diplomat,
ambassador to Paris (1852-67).—614, 636, 637, 640, 649, 677, 678

Crawshay, George—English journalist, supporter of David Urquhart, editor of The Free Press (1856-60).—561, 672

Croesus (d. 546 B. C.)—Last king of Lydia (560-46 B. C.); according to the legend, he misinterpreted the ambiguous prophecy of the oracle of Delphi and was defeated by the Persians under Cyrus.—109

Curzon, Robert, Baron Zouche of Harringworth (1810-1873)—English traveller and writer; took part in the demarcation of the border between Turkey and Persia in Transcaucasia (1843-44).—592

Custine, Astolphe, Marquis de (1790-1857)—French traveller and writer.—442

Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, Prince (1770-1861)—Polish magnate; Foreign Minister of Russia (1804-06); head of the Provisional Government during the Polish insurrection of 1830-31; leader of Polish monarchist émigrés in France.—20, 477

D

Dairmovaell, Georges Marie—French writer.—558

Dante Alighieri (1265-1321)—Italian poet.—355

Darkin—Police inspector in London (1855).—324

Dasent, Sir George Webbe (1817-1896)—English philologist and journalist; assistant editor of The Times (1845-70); had connections in diplomatic circles.—122

David d’Angers, Pierre Jean (1788-1856)—French sculptor. Left republican; expelled from France after the coup d’état of December 2, 1851, but soon returned.—602

Dawkins, Edward—English diplomat, resident in Greece (1827-34).—18

Delane, John Thaddeus (1817-1879)—editor-in-chief of The Times (1841-77).—122

Demosthenes (c. 384-322 B. C.)—Greek orator and politician, leader of the anti-Macedonian party in Athens.—77

Derby, Edward Geoffrey Smith Stanley, Earl of (1799-1869)—British statesman, Tory leader; Prime Minister (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68).—29, 57, 79, 140, 188, 191, 192, 195, 290, 349, 382, 389, 391, 394, 562

Dejeravin (Derzhavin), Gavriila Romanovitch (1743-1816)—Russian poet.—569

Devonshire, Duke of—see Cavendish, William, Duke of Devonshire

Devonshire, Dukes of—English noble family.—187

Diebich-Zabalkansky, Ivan Ivanovich (Diebitsch, Hans Karl Friedrich Anton), Count (1785-1831)—Russian field marshal-general, commander-in-chief of the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29; crushed the Polish insurrection of 1830-31.—446

Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881)—British statesman and writer, a Tory leader; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68); Prime Minister (1868, 1874-80).—24, 26, 27, 29, 30, 50, 118, 188, 213-14, 218, 222-25, 227-31, 234, 235, 237, 238, 245, 246, 290, 341, 352-54, 356, 482, 497-98

Dobrovský (Dobrowsky), Josef (1753-1829)—Czech scholar and public figure; founder of the scientific philology of the Slavonic languages.—158, 691

Douglas, Sir Howard, Baronet (1776-1861)—British general and author of works on artillery and fortification.—423

Dowler, William—British officer.—669

Drouyn de Lhuys, Edouard (1805-1881)—French diplomat and politician; Orleanist in the 1840s, Bonapartist after 1851; Foreign Minister (1848-49, 1851, 1852-55, 1862-66); ambassador to England (1849-50); represented
France at the Vienna Conference (1855).—139, 141-42, 397, 603

Drummond, Henry (1786-1860)—British politician, Tory, member of the House of Commons; member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—29, 122, 310

Duke, Sir James, Baronet (b. 1792)—member of the House of Commons, Free Trader.—98

Dulac—French general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—547

Dumouriez, Charles François (1739-1823)—French general, prominent figure in the French Revolution, was close to the Girondists; betrayed the revolution in March 1793.—285

Duncombe, Thomas Slingsby (1796-1861)—British radical politician; Chartist in the 1840s; member of the House of Commons.—24, 27, 273, 308, 311, 335

Dundas, Henry, Viscount Melville (1742-1811)—British statesman; Home Secretary (1791-94), President of the Board of Control for India (1793-1801), Secretary of State for War (1794-1801), First Lord of the Admiralty (1804-05).—663

Dundas, Sir James Whitley Deans (1785-1862)—British admiral, commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the Mediterranean (1852-January 1855).—69, 247

Dundas, Richard Saunders (1802-1861)—British vice-admiral, commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the Baltic (1855).—273, 293, 308-09, 488, 490, 493, 494

Dundonald—see Cochrane, Thomas, Earl of Dundonald

Dunlop, Alexander Graham—English writer.—286

Duns Scotus, John (c. 1265-1308)—Scottish scholastic philosopher and theologian.—12

Dupont de l’Etang, Pierre Antoine, comte (1765-1840)—French general; capitulated with his division at Bailen during the war in Spain (1808).—147

E

Eber—Austrian general, commandant of the Przemyśl fortress during the Crimean war.—497

Ebrington, Hugh, Viscount of, Earl Fortescue (1818-1905)—British politician, Whig, member of the House of Commons.—99, 239, 327, 479

Ellenborough, Edward Law, Baron (1750-1818)—British statesman and lawyer, Whig, later Tory; member of the House of Lords; Lord Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1802-1818).—190

Ellenborough, Edward Law, Earl of (1790-1871)—British statesman, Tory, member of the House of Lords; Governor-General of India (1842-44), First Lord of the Admiralty (1846), President of the Board of Control for India (1858); son of Baron Ellenborough.—187, 189, 191, 192, 194, 195, 483, 499

Ellis, Edward (1781-1863)—British statesman, Whig, member of the House of Commons; member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—29

Elliot, Sir George Augustus (1813-1901)—British naval officer, admiral from 1870; commanded a battleship in the Baltic (1854-55).—654

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895)—3, 6, 11, 32, 35, 62, 113, 132, 135, 137, 151, 164, 180, 201, 216, 328, 334, 344, 359, 504, 519, 521, 523, 538, 542, 588, 597, 683

Espartero, Baldomero, duque de la Vittoria (1793-1879)—Spanish general and politician; leader of the Progresista Party; Regent of Spain (1841-43), head of government (1854-56).—467

Espinasse, Charles Marie Esprit (1815-1859)—French general, Bonapartist; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s and in the coup d’état of December 2, 1851; commanded a division in Dobruja (1854) and a brigade in the Crimea (1854-55).—109, 212
Euclid (late 4th-early 3rd cent. B.C.)—Greek mathematician.—422
Eugène Louis Jean Joseph, Prince Imperial (1856-1879)—son of Napoleon III, killed in the war against the Zulus.—615, 617, 619, 620
Eugène, Prince of Savoy (François Eugène de Savoie-Carignan) (1663-1736)—Austrian general and statesman.—284, 405
Eugénie Marie Ignace Augustine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba (1826-1920)—French Empress, wife of Napoleon III.—603
Evans, David Morier (1819-1874)—British economist.—209
Evans, Sir George de Lacy (1787-1870)—British general and Liberal politician, member of the House of Commons; commanded a division in the Crimea (1854).—22, 74, 75, 98, 635
Exeter, Brownlow Cecil, Marquess of (1795-1867)—English aristocrat, Tory, member of the House of Lords.—353
Eyre, Sir William (1805-1859)—British general; fought in the Crimean War.—332

F

Fabius (Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus Cunctator) (c. 275-203 B.C.)—Roman general who defeated Hannibal by avoiding a full-scale battle; for his delaying tactics he was nicknamed Cunctator.—663
Faidherbe, Pierre Louis Charles Achille de (1810-1892)—French general, Senator; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—572
Farrell, Mr. Henry—churchwarden of St. Pancras, member of the Administrative Reform Association.—241
Faucheu—French general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—507-09
Fawkes, Guy (1570-1606)—British officer, organiser of the Catholic Gunpowder plot of November 5, 1605.—392
Ferdinand I (1751-1825)—King of the Two Sicilies (1816-25).—461
Ferdinand II (1810-1859)—King of the Two Sicilies (1830-59), nicknamed King Bomba for the bombardment of Messina in 1848.—460, 461, 474
Ferguson, Ronald Croford (1773-1841)—British general, member of the House of Commons; opposed the Duke of York’s abuse of his position.—670
Filder (b. 1790)—British Commissary-General; head of the army Commissariat in the Crimea (1854-55).—75, 654
Finlen, James—a Chartist leader; member of the Executive of the National Charter Association (1852-58).—305
Fitzgerald, John David, Lord Fitzgerald (1816-1889)—Irish Liberal politician and lawyer, member of the House of Commons.—79, 80
Fitzpatrick, Richard (1747-1813)—British general and politician, Whig M.P.; Chief Secretary for Ireland (1782), Secretary for War (1783, 1806-07).—665
Folkestone—British Radical M.P.—502
Forey, Elie Frédéric (1804-1872)—French general, later Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; took part in the coup d’état of December 2, 1851; commanded a reserve force in the Crimea (1854-early 1855); appointed Governor of the Oran province (North Africa) in April 1855.—116, 212
Fox, Charles James (1749-1806)—British statesman, Whig leader; Foreign Secretary (1782, 1783, 1806).—584, 586, 587, 665
Francis Joseph I (1830-1916)—Emperor of Austria (1848-1916).—119, 165, 178, 425, 474, 482, 495, 498, 690, 693
Frederick II (the Great) (1712-1786)—King of Prussia (1740-86).—106, 405, 414, 434
Frederick VII (1808-1863)—King of Denmark (1848-63).—395-96
Frederick William III (1770-1840)—
King of Prussia (1797-1840).—283, 659
Frederick William IV (1795-1861)—
King of Prussia (1840-61).—94, 105, 537, 553, 659, 660
French—British colonel.—669
Fuad Pasha, Mehmed (1814-1869)—
Turkish statesman; commissioner in the Danubian Principalities (1848); repeatedly held the posts of Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister in the 1850s and 1860s.—609, 642, 675

G
Gaj, Ljudevit (1809-1872)—Croatian journalist, philologist and politician; adhered to the programme of Austro-Slavism.—158, 691
Garibaldi, Giuseppe (1807-1882)—
Italian revolutionary and democrat; headed a unit of volunteers in Lombardy fighting against the Austrians (1848); organised the defence of the Roman Republic between April and June 1849; led the struggle for Italy's national liberation in the 1850s and 1860s.—460
Gazar-Hassan (Gazi-Hassan) (d. 1790)—
Turkish admiral; fought in the Russo-Turkish wars; Grand Vizier (1789-90).—700
George III (1738-1820)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1760-1820).—389, 585-86, 666, 667
George IV (1762-1830)—Prince Regent (1811-20), King of Great Britain and Ireland (1820-30).—303, 383, 670
Gibbs—London police superintendent (1855).—324
Gibson, Thomas Milner (1806-1884)—
British statesman, Free Trader.—215-14, 223, 224, 247, 341
Girardin, Émile de (1806-1881)—
French journalist and politician; republican during the 1848-49 revolution and later Bonapartist; editor of La Presse in the 1830s-1860s (with intervals); lacked principles in politics.—120
Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898)—
British statesman, Tory and later Peelite; leader of the Liberal Party in the second half of the nineteenth century; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66), Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-85, 1886, 1892-94).—8, 9, 12, 13, 25, 43, 45, 50, 70, 71, 103, 126, 131, 143, 214, 225, 227, 228, 231, 233, 234, 237, 239, 246, 258, 259, 277, 278, 290, 353, 354, 356, 398, 472-73, 475, 554, 555, 560
Gläser—Austrian lieutenant-field marshal; commandant of the Zalesczyki fortress during the Crimean war.—497
Goderich—see Robinson, Frederick John
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749-1832)—German poet.—306
Gorchakov (Gorchakov), Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince (1798-1883)—Russian statesman and diplomat; envoy in Vienna (1834-56), Foreign Minister (1856-82), State Chancellor (1867-82).—141, 142, 225, 234, 398
Gorchakov (Gorchakov), Mikhail Dmitrievich, Prince (1793-1861)—Russian general; commanded the Russian troops on the Danube (1853-54); commander-in-chief of the Southern army (September 1854—February 1855) and of the army in the Crimea (February-December 1855); Governor-General of the Kingdom of Poland (1856-61).—178, 205, 255, 484, 504, 508, 509, 522, 525-27, 529, 532, 533, 539, 541, 552, 563, 564, 572, 694, 695
Gordons—English aristocratic family.—664
Gordon, Alexander—British colonial, son of Lord Aberdeen.—664-65
Gordon, Sir James Willoughby, Baronet (1773-1851)—British general, the Duke of York's secretary (1804-09).—664
Gordon, John—British major; served on Dominica (1801).—664
Gordon, Sir John William (1814-1870)—
British officer, later general, military engineer; commander of the engineering troops in the Crimea (1854-55).—654
Gordon, Sir Robert (1791-1847)—British diplomat, brother of Lord Aberdeen; envoy extraordinary at Constantinople (1828-31) and at Vienna (1841-46).—664

Grach, Friedrich (1812-1854)—Prussian colonel; served in the Turkish army from 1841; a leader of the defence of Silistria (1854).—455


Graham, Lord Montagu William (b. 1807)—British politician, member of the House of Commons (1852-57).—108

Granby, Charles Cecil John Manners, Marquis of, Duke of Rutland (1815-1888)—English politician, Tory, member of the House of Commons.—227

Granier de Cassagnac, Bernard Adolphe (1806-1880)—French journalist, Orleanist until the 1848 revolution and later Bonapartist; deputy to the Corps législatif; editor-in-chief of Le Pays in the 1850s.—139

Grantham, Thomas Robinson, Baron (1738-1786)—British statesman and diplomat, Whig; ambassador to Madrid (1771-79), Foreign Secretary (1782-83).—586

Granville, Augustus Bozzi (1783-1872)—English physician of Italian descent.—68

Granville, George Leveson-Gower, Earl of (1815-1891)—British statesman, Whig and later Liberal; Foreign Secretary (1851-52, 1870-74, 1880-85), President of the Council (1852-54, 1855-58).—49, 57, 295, 300

Granville, Marie Louisa Pellini de Dalberg (d. 1860)—first wife of the Earl of Granville.—306

Granville, William Wyndham, Baron (1759-1834)—British statesman, Tory and later Whig; Foreign Secretary (1791-1801), Prime Minister (1806-07).—666

Grey, Earls of—English noble family.—49

Grey, Charles, Earl of, Viscount Howick, Baron Grey (1764-1845)—British statesman, a Whig leader; First Lord of the Admiralty (1806), Prime Minister (1830-34).—377, 587

Grey, Sir George (1799-1882)—British statesman, Whig; Home Secretary (1846-52, 1855-58, 1861-66), Colonial Secretary (1854-55).—49, 349, 369

Grey, Sir Henry George, Viscount Howick, Earl of (1802-1894)—English statesman, Whig; Secretary at War (1835-39), Colonial Secretary (1846-52); son of Charles Grey.—49, 391

Griffiths, W.—English clergyman.—258

Grosvenor, Richard, Marquis of Westminster (1795-1869)—English aristocrat, Whig.—323

Grosvenor, Lord Robert, Baron Ebury (1801-1893)—British politician, Whig, member of the House of Commons.—218, 239, 304, 307, 308, 320, 323, 327

Guizot, François Pierre Guillaume (1787-1874)—French historian and statesman; virtually directed the home and foreign policy of France from 1840 to the February 1848 revolution; expressed the interests of the financial bourgeoisie.—139, 209

Gurney, Samuel (1786-1856)—English banker, head of the big London discount bank of Overend, Gurney and Co. (1825-56).—335, 336

Gurowski, Adam, Count von (1805-1866)—Polish journalist; lived in emigration in the USA from 1849 onwards; contributed to the New-York Daily Tribune in the 1850s.—689

Gustavus II Adolphus (1594-1632)—King of Sweden (1611-32).—464

Guyon, Richard Debavre (Khourschid Pasha) (1803-1856)—Turkish general of British descent; took part in the Hungarian revolution of 1848-49; commanded Turkish troops in the Caucasus (1853).—629
Hafiz Pasha—Turkish general; commanded Turkish troops in the Caucasus (1855).—632

Hale, William—owner of a rocket factory in the suburbs of London in the early 1850s.—404

Halford, Sir Henry, Baronet (b. 1798)—member of the House of Commons (1832-57).—96

Hall, Sir Benjamin, Baron Llanover (1802-1867)—British statesman, member of the House of Commons; Mayfair Radical; President of the Board of Health (August 1854-July 1855), First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings (1855-58).—26, 368

Hall, Sir John (1795-1866)—British army doctor; principal medical officer and inspector-general of hospitals in the Crimea (1854-56).—12

Haller, Karl Ludwig von (1768-1854)—Swiss lawyer and historian, absolutist.—660

Handcock, John Stratford—plaintiff in the case of the inheritance of Eliza Josephine Handcock, mistress of the Earl of Claricarde.—158, 691

Hanka, Wenceslaus (Václav) (1791-1861)—Czech philologist and historian; held conservative pan-Slavist views.—158, 691

Hanover, House of—English royal dynasty (1714-1901).—596

Hardinge, Sir Henry, Viscount Hardinge of Lahore (1785-1856)—British general, field marshal from 1855, statesman, Tory; Secretary at War (1828-30, 1841-44), Governor-General of India (1844-January 1848), commander-in-chief of the British army (1852-56).—102, 130, 558

Hardwicke, Charles Philip Yorke, Earl of (1799-1873)—British admiral and politician, Tory, member of the House of Lords.—190

Harrington, Leicester Fitzgerald Charles, Stanhope, Earl of (1784-1862)—British colonel and politician, Whig.—478, 479

Harris—see Malmesbury, James Harris, Earl of and Viscount Fitzharris

Harrison, George—English worker, Chartist.—99

Hart, Jakob James—British consul in Leipzig.—561

Hart, Richard—English lawyer, supporter of David Urquhart.—478, 480

Hassan-Pasha—see Gazee-Hassan

Haxthausen, August Franz Ludwig Maria, Baron von (1792-1866)—Prussian conservative official and writer; author of works on the agrarian system and the peasant commune in Russia.—166

Höynau, Julius Jakob, Baron von (1786-1853)—Austrian general; took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolutionary movements in Italy and Hungary.—251

Heathcote, Sir William (1801-1881)—member of the House of Commons.—227, 228, 245

Henry IV (1367-1413)—King of England (1399-1413).—12, 480, 486

Henry VII (1457-1509)—King of England (1485-1509).—374

Henry VIII (1491-1547)—King of England (1509-47).—274, 615

Herbert, Sidney, Baron Herbert of Lea (1810-1861)—British statesman, Tory and later Peelite; Secretary to the Admiralty (1841-45), Secretary at War (1845-46, 1852-53).—8, 21, 22, 43-45, 50, 69, 126, 131, 214, 353, 354, 356, 357, 397

Herbillon, Émile (1794-1866)—French general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—507, 508

Herwegh, Georg Friedrich (1817-1875)—German democratic poet.—258

Hess, Heinrich Hermann Josef, Baron von (1788-1870)—Austrian general, later field marshal; took part in suppressing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops in Hungary, Galicia and the Danubian Principalities (1854-55).—178, 482, 496, 498

Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679)—English materialist philosopher.—247
Holstein-Gottorp, House of—ducal dynasty (1544-1918).—396
Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus) (65–8 B.C.)—Roman poet. —158, 571, 691
Horner, Leonard (1785-1876)—English geologist and public figure; factory inspector (1833-56), championed the workers' interests.—96, 370
Horsman, Edward (1807-1876)—British statesman, Liberal, member of the House of Commons; Chief Secretary for Ireland (1855-57).—24
Hotham, Sir Charles (1806-1855)—British naval officer; Governor of Victoria (Australia) in 1854-55. —65, 66
Houchard, Jean Nicolas (1740-1793)—French general; commanded the Northern army which defeated the Duke of York's troops (1793).—663
Howard, George William Frederick, Earl of Carlisle (1802-1864)—British statesman, Liberal, member of the House of Lords: Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1855-58, 1859-64).—79
Hughes, T. M.—English writer; lived in Spain for several years; Lisbon correspondent of The Times.—469
Hugo, Victor Marie (1802-1885)—French writer, republican; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-51); lived in emigration on Jersey (one of the Channel Islands) after the coup d'etat of December 2, 1851; expelled by the local authorities at the end of 1855.—479, 582
Hume, Joseph (1777-1855)—British politician, a Radical leader, member of the House of Commons. —17, 47, 48, 209, 243, 377, 381

I

Ibrahim Pasha (1789-1848)—foster-son of the Viceroy of Egypt Mehemet Ali; Egyptian commander-in-chief during the wars against Turkey (1831-33, 1859-41); virtual ruler of Egypt from 1847.—18
Iskender (Iskander) Bey (Alexander Iliński) (1810-1861)—Turkish general of Polish descent; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; commanded Turkish troops on the Danube (1853-54), in the Crimea (1855) and in the Caucasus (1855-56).—136, 455
Ismail Pasha (György Kmety) (1810-1865)—Turkish general of Magyar descent; took part in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; commanded Turkish troops on the Danube (1853-54) and in the Caucasus (1854-55).—591

J

Jeffreys, George, Baron Jeffreys of Wem (1648-1689)—English lawyer, Tory; Lord Chief Justice of the King's Bench (1683-85), known for his extremely harsh sentences.—190
Johnson—police commissioner in Ballarat, Victoria (Australia).—66
Johnstone, Andrew James Cochrane (b. 1767)—British colonel, member of the House of Commons, Governor of Dominica (1797-1803).—663, 666
Jomini, Henri, Baron (1779-1869)—Swiss-born general in the French and later in the Russian army; author of works on strategy and military history.—435, 539, 540, 613, 627
Jones, Ernest Charles (1819-1869)—prominent figure in the English labour movement, proletarian poet and journalist, Left-wing Chartist leader; editor of the Notes to the People and The People's Paper; friend of Marx and Engels.—71, 100, 168, 195-97, 241, 394, 524
Jones, Sir Harry David (1791-1866)—British general, military engineer; commander of the engineering troops in the Crimea (1855).—26, 114
Jones, Mrs. Jane Ernest (d. 1857)—wife of Ernest Jones.—524
Jones, John Gale (1769-1838)—British Radical politician, surgeon.—190-91
Jones, John Paul (1747-1792)—Scottish-born American naval officer, previously a contrabandist and slave-trader; fought in the American War of Independence (1775-83) and, as a rear-admiral, in the Russo-Turkish war on the side of the Russians (1788).—700, 701

Jones, William—Chartist, secretary of the committee appointed to organise Feargus O'Connor's funeral (September 1855).—524

Juvénal (Decimus Junius Juvénalis) (c. 60 - d. after 127)—Roman satirical poet.—259

K

Kelly—British lieutenant-colonel; commanded a regiment in the Crimea (1855).—153

Keogh, William Nicholas (1817-1878)—Irish lawyer and politician, a leader of the Irish Brigade in Parliament; held several high judicial posts in Ireland.—79

King, Peter John Locke (1811-1885)—British politician, Radical, member of the House of Commons.—381, 392

Kmetty—see Ismail Pasha

Knesebeck, Karl Friedrich, Baron von (1768-1848)—Prussian field marshal-general; took part in the wars against Napoleon I.—284, 285

Knight, Charles (1791-1873)—English liberal journalist and publisher.—281

Kollár (Kolar), Ján (1793-1852)—Slovak poet and philologist, representative of the Slovak and Czech Enlightenment; supported the programme of Austro-Slavism.—158, 691

Kopitar, Bartholomäus (Barlomije) (1780-1844)—Slovenian scholar, author of works on the language, literature and history of the Slavs.—158, 691

Korff, Fyodor Khristoforovich, Baron von—Russian general; commanded a cavalry division in the Crimea (1855).—564, 694, 695

Korniloff (Kornilov), Vladimir Alexeyevich (1806-1854)—Russian admiral, chief of staff of the Black Sea fleet (1849-55); an organiser of the defence of Sevastopol.—134, 135, 137

Kościusko, Thaddeus (Kościusko, Tadeusz Andrzej Bonawentura) (1746-1817)—prominent figure in the Polish national liberation movement; took part in the American War of Independence in 1776-83; leader of the Polish uprising of 1784.—285

Kossuth, Lajos (1802-1894)—leader of the Hungarian national liberation movement; head of the Hungarian revolutionary government (1848-49); emigrated to Turkey after the defeat of the revolution and later to England and the USA.—581

Kroushoff (Khrushchov), Alexander Petrovich (1806-1875)—Russian general; commanded troops in the Crimea (1853-56); took part in the defence of Sevastopol.—116

Labouchere, Henry, Baron Taunton (1798-1869)—British statesman, Whig; President of the Board of Trade (1839-41, 1847-52); Secretary of State for the Colonies (1855-58).—560

La Marmora (Lamarmora), Alfonso Ferrero, marchese de (1804-1878)—Italian general and politician; War Minister of Piedmont (1848, 1849-55, 1856-59); commanded a Sardinian corps in the Crimea (1855); Prime Minister of Piedmont and of the Italian Kingdom (1859, 1860, 1864-66).—507

Lamb (born c. 1785)—rector, held two benefices in Sussex.—51, 52

Lamb, Edward Augustus—patron of the livings in Sussex, son of the above.—52

Lamb—rector and owner of the living in West Hackney, brother of Edward Augustus Lamb.—52

Lamoricière, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de (1806-1865)—French general and politician, moderate republican; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; suppressed the uprising of Paris.
workers in June 1848; War Minister in the Cavaignac Government (June-December 1848); banished after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—87, 109, 221

La Motterouge (La Motte Rouge), Joseph Édouard de (1804-1883)—French general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—547

Langford, John Alfred (1823-1903)—English journalist, Liberal; co-editor of The Birmingham Daily Press (1855).—394-96

La Motterouge (La Motte Rouge), Joseph Edouard de

Langford, John Alfred (1823-1903)—English journalist, Liberal; co-editor of The Birmingham Daily Press (1855).—394-96

Langford, John Alfred (1823-1903)—English journalist, Liberal; co-editor of The Birmingham Daily Press (1855).—394-96

Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Marquis of (1780-1863)—British statesman, Whig; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1806-07); President of the Council (1830-41, 1846-52); Minister without portfolio (1852-63).—8, 300, 662, 666, 671

Lanskoj, Sergei Stepanovich, Count from 1861 (1787-1862)—Russian statesman; Minister of the Interior (1855-61).—576

Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin Dieudonné, comte de (1766-1842)—French historian, author of Memorial de Sainte-Hélène, a book about Napoleon I. —286

Layard, Sir Austen Henry (1817-1894)—British archaeologist and politician, Radical, subsequently Liberal, member of the House of Commons; member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—24-25, 29, 40, 57, 58, 98, 131, 167, 187, 191, 214, 218, 237, 238, 258, 272, 274, 277, 299, 340, 341, 368, 514

Ledger—publisher of the weekly Penny Times.—281

Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre Auguste (1807-1874)—French journalist and politician, a leader of the petty-bourgeois democrats, editor of La Réforme; Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848), where he headed the Montagne party; emigrated to England after the demonstration of June 13, 1849.—29

Lee, James—English physician.—68

Leroy—see Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de

Lestocq (L'Estocq), Anton Wilhelm (1738-1815)—Prussian general, commanded a corps in the war of 1806-07.—569

Le Vaillant (Levailant)—French general; commanded an infantry division in the Crimea (1854-55).—547

Lewis, Sir George Cornwall, Baronet (1806-1863)—British statesman, Whig; Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1850-52); editor of The Edinburgh Review (1852-55); Chancellor of the Exchequer (1855-58), Home Secretary (1859-61), Secretary of State for War (1861-63).—49, 103, 554, 555

Lieven, Darya (Dorothea) Khristoforovna, Princess (1785-1857)—wife of the Russian diplomat Khristofor Andreyevich Lieven; hostess of political salons in London and Paris.—300, 561

Ligne, Charles Joseph, Prince de (1735-1814)—Austrian general, diplomat and writer; fought in the Seven Years' War (1756-63).—283

Lindsay, William Schaw (1816-1877)—English shipowner and merchant, Free Trader, member of the House of Commons.—311

Liprandi, Pavel Petrovich (1796-1864)—Russian general; commanded a division on the Danube (1853-54) and a corps in the Crimea (1854-55).—486, 487, 507

Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Earl of (1770-1828)—British statesman, a Tory leader; held a number of ministerial posts; Prime Minister (1812-27).—16, 28, 104, 190, 311

Loudon, Gideon Ernst, Baron von (1716-1790)—Austrian field marshal-general; commanded a cavalry corps in the Seven Years' War (1756-63); took part in the campaign against Turkey (1788-89).—569
Louis XIV (1638-1715)—King of France (1643-1715).—405
Louis XVI (1754-1793)—King of France (1774-92); guillotined during the French Revolution.—293
Louis XVIII (1755-1824)—King of France (1814-15, 1815-24).—659
Louis Bonaparte—see Napoleon III
Louis Napoleon—see Napoleon III
Louis Philippe (1773-1850)—Duke of Orleans, King of the French (1830-48).—62, 71, 139, 141, 150, 190, 213, 311, 558, 581
Lovett, William (1800-1877)—English artisan, petty-bourgeois democrat; a Chartist leader in the 1830s.—243
Lowe, Robert, Viscount Sherbrooke (1811-1892)—British statesman and journalist, contributor to The Times; Whig and later Liberal, member of the House of Commons; Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1855-58).—29, 122, 218, 227, 228, 245, 246, 357
Lucan, George Charles Bingham, Earl of (1800-1888)—British general, later field marshal, Tory; commanded a cavalry division in the Crimea (1854-early 1855).—102
Lüders, Alexander Nikolayevich, Count (1790-1874)—Russian general; commanded a corps on the Danube (1853-54) and the Southern army (1855); commander-in-chief of the army in the Crimea (early 1856).—361, 577, 578, 579
Lyndhurst, John Singleton Copley, Baron of (1772-1863)—British statesman and lawyer, Tory; Lord Chancellor (1827-30, 1834-35, 1841-46).—104-06, 228, 482, 498
Lyons, Edmund, Baron Lyons (1790-1858)—British admiral; commander-in-chief of the British fleet in the Black Sea (1855).—216, 219, 634, 638
Lyttton, Edward George Earle Lyttton, 1st Viscount Lytton (1803-1875)—British writer and politician, Whig, Tory from 1852; member of the House of Commons.—247, 289, 337-42, 348, 352, 353, 367
M
Macdonald, John Cameron—contributor to The Times.—124
MacGregor, John (1797-1857)—Scottish statistician and historian, Free Trader; Vice-President of the Board of Trade (1840-47); member of the House of Commons from 1847.—562
MacMahon, Marie Edme Patrice Maurice, comte de, duc de Magenta (1808-1893)—French general and subsequently marshal, Senator, Bonapartist; took part in the wars waged by the Second Empire; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855); President of the Third Republic (1873-79).—547, 551, 552
McNeill, Sir John (1795-1883)—British diplomat, envoy to Teheran (1836-39, 1841-42); member of the Commission of Inquiry into the Commissariat Department and General Organisation of Troops in the Crimea (1855).—26
Magnan, Bernard Pierre (1791-1865)—Marshall of France and Senator, Bonapartist; one of the leaders of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—220, 603
Magne, Pierre (1806-1879)—French statesman, Bonapartist; Minister of Finance (1855-60, 1867-69, 1870, 1873-74).—534
Mahmud II (1785-1839)—Sultan of Turkey (1808-39).—18, 451
Maistre, Joseph Marie, comte de (1753-1821)—French writer, monarchist, an ideologist of the aristocratic and clerical reaction.—660
Malet, Alexander, Baronet (1800-1886)—British diplomat, envoy to Frankfurt am Main (German Confederation) (1849-66).—553
Malins, Sir Richard (1805-1882)—English lawyer, Tory, member of the House of Commons.—311
Malmesbury, James Harris, Earl of and Viscount Fitzharris (1746-1820)—British diplomat and statesman, Whig; ambassador to St. Petersburg (1777-82).—584-86
Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of (1807-1889)—British statesman, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1852, 1858-59).—118, 294-95, 394-97, 662

Mansfield, Sir William Rose, Baron Sandhurst (1819-1876)—British general, military adviser to the British Embassy at Constantinople (1855-56).—609, 611, 653

Manteuffel, Otto Theodor, Baron von (1805-1882)—Prussian statesman; Minister of the Interior (1848-50); Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1850-58).—105

Maria Alexandrovna (1824-1880)—Princess of Hesse-Darmstadt; Empress of Russia, wife of Alexander II (from 1841).—537

Marlborough, John Churchill, Duke of (1650-1722)—British general; commander-in-chief of the British troops in the war of the Spanish Succession (1702-11).—514

Martimprey, Edouard Charles, comte de (1808-1883)—French general, Senator; chief of the General Staff of the French army in the Crimea (1854-55).—634

Marx, Karl (1818-1883).—11, 33, 34, 39, 62, 63, 195, 209, 297, 328, 359, 394, 605, 615, 672

Masséna, André, duc de Rivoli, prince d'Essling (1756-1817)—Marshal of France; fought in the Napoleonic wars.—569

Maurice (Moritz) of Nassau, Prince of Orange and Count of Nassau (1567-1625)—Stadtholder of the Netherlands (1585-1625); military leader in the war of independence.—435

Mayne, Sir Richard (1796-1868)—Chief Police Commissioner in London (from 1850).—323, 324, 333

Mayran, Joseph Decius Nicolas (1801-1855)—French general; took part in the siege of Sevastopol.—330

Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805-1872)—Italian revolutionary, democrat, a leader of the national liberation movement in Italy; head of the Provisional Government of the Roman Republic (1849).—581

M'Dickey—Chartist.—240

Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount (1779-1848)—British statesman, Whig; Home Secretary (1830-34), Prime Minister (1834, 1835-41).—22, 30-31, 78, 384, 388, 560

Mellinet, Émile (1798-1894)—French general, Senator; commanded a guards division in the Crimea (1855).—547

Metastasio, Pietro Antonio Domenico Bonaventure Trapassi (1698-1782)—Italian poet, author of librettos.—382

Metternich-Winneburg, Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince von (1773-1859)—Austrian statesman and diplomat; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1809-21), Chancellor (1821-48); an organiser of the Holy Alliance.—159-60, 247, 283, 691, 692

Miall, Edward (1809-1881)—British Radical politician and writer; preacher of non-conformism; member of the House of Commons.—581, 582

Michael (Mikhail Nikolayevich) (1832-1909)—Russian Grand Duke, fourth son of Nicholas I of Russia.—67

Michele, C. E., de—owner and an editor of The Morning Post.—562

Miklosich, Franz (Mikloszi, Franciszek) von (1813-1891)—professor of Slavic philology at Vienna University (1849-86); founder of the comparative grammar of Slavic languages; Slovenian by birth.—158, 691

Miles, William (1797-1878)—English financier, Tory, member of the House of Commons.—29

Milner Gibson—see Gibson, Thomas

Minor, Claude Étienne (1804-1879)—French colonel, inventor of a new type of rifle adopted by the French army in 1852.—412, 420, 421, 426, 436, 458, 462

Minto, Gilbert Elliot, Earl of (1782-1859)—British statesman and diplomat, Whig; First Lord of the Admiralty (1835-41), Lord Privy Seal (1846-52); was on a diplomatic mission in Italy (1847-48).—391

Mitchely—see Michele, C. E., de
M’Mahon—see MacMahon, Marie
Edme Patrice Maurice, comte de, duc de Magenta
Mohammed (Muhammad, Mahomet) (c. 570-632)—founder of Islam.—584
Mohammed-Shah (1810-1848)—Shah of Persia (1834-48).—19
Molesworth, Sir William, Baronet (1810-1855)—British statesman, Mayfair Radical, member of the House of Commons; First Commissioner of the Board of Works and Public Buildings (1853-55), Secretary of State for the Colonies (1855).—222, 223, 246-47, 368
Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count von (1800-1891)—Prussian army officer, subsequently field marshal-general, military writer and strategist; served in the Turkish army (1835-39).—147
Monet, de—French general; commanded a brigade in the Crimea (1854-early 1855).—116
Monsell, William, Baron Emly (1812-1894)—Irish politician; a leader of the Irish Brigade in Parliament; Clerk of the Ordnance (1852-57).—58, 79
Montalembert, Charles Forbes René de Tryon, comte de (1810-1870)—French politician and writer, deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-51); Orleanist, leader of the Catholic party; supported Louis Bonaparte during the coup d’état of December 2, 1851 but soon afterwards joined the opposition.—139, 601
Montalembert, Marc René, marquis de (1714-1800)—French general, military engineer, fortification specialist.—262, 435
Montecucculi (Montecuccoli), Raimund, Count, Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, Duke of Melfi (1609-1680)—Austrian general and strategist of Italian descent, field marshal from 1658; took part in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) and the wars against Turkey and France.—284
Monteith, R.—British official.—562
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de (1689-1755)—French philosopher, an ideologist of the Enlightenment.—500
Montijo—see Eugénie Marie Ignace Augustine de Montijo de Guzmán, comtesse de Teba
Morley, S.—chairman of the meeting organised by the Association of Administrative Reform in London on June 13, 1855.—290
Morny, Charles Auguste Louis Joseph, duc de (1811-1865)—French politician, Bonapartist; an organiser of the coup d’état of December 2, 1851; Minister of the Interior (December 1851-January 1852); President of the Corps législatif (1854-56, 1857-65).—139, 601, 603
Morris, Mowbray (1818-1874)—manager of The Times (1847-73).—122
Muntz, George Frederick (1794-1857)—British arms manufacturer and Radical politician, member of the House of Commons.—79
Muravieff (Muravyev), Nikolai Nikolayevich (Karski) (1794-1866)—Russian general, commander-in-chief of the Russian Caucasian army and Governor-General of the Caucasus (1854-56).—269, 288, 567, 612, 627, 640, 641, 644, 646, 696
Murrough, John Patrick (b. 1822)—British Liberal politician, member of the House of Commons.—99
Mustapha Pasha—Turkish general.—609

N

Napiers—English aristocratic family.—514
Napier, Sir Charles, Count Cape St. Vincent (1786-1860)—British admiral, member of the House of Commons; commanded the British fleet in the Baltic (1854).—247, 248, 273, 310, 493, 494, 513-18
Napier, Sir Charles James (1782-1853)—British general; fought in the Peninsular war (1808-14); commanded the British troops that conquered the
Sind (1842-43); ruler of the Sind (1843-47).—514

Napier, Edward Delaval Hungerford Elers (1808-1870)—British colonel, lieutenant-general from 1864; organised the maintenance of the British army in the Crimea (1854-55).—6

Napier, Sir William Francis Patrick (1785-1860)—British general and military historian; fought in the Peninsular war (1808-14).—34, 42, 413, 414, 419, 421, 423, 433, 514


Narváez, Ramón María, duque de Valencia (1800-1868)—Spanish general and statesman, leader of the Moderado party; head of government (1844-46, 1847-51, 1856-57, 1864-65).—467, 468

Nassau-Siegen, Karl Heinrich Nikolaus Otto, Prince von (1755-1808)—Russian admiral; commanded a Russian rowing-boat flotilla during the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91. —700, 701

Nesselrode, Karl Vasilyevich, Count (1780-1862)—Russian statesman and diplomat; Foreign Minister (1816-56); State Chancellor from 1845. —104, 229, 230, 234, 235, 397

Newcastle, Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham Clinton, Duke of (1811-1864)—British statesman, Peelite, Secretary at War (1852-54), Secretary for War (1854-55).—28, 44-45, 102, 126, 131, 353, 354, 356, 357

Nicholas I (1796-1855)—Emperor of Russia (1825-55).—17, 36-38, 54, 59, 67, 68, 94, 104, 118, 147, 164, 229, 235, 275, 288, 397, 484, 513, 578, 579, 595, 689

Nicolay, J. A.—British politician, Radical, champion of parliamentary reform; member of the Executive of the Reform League in the 1860s.—99

Niel, Adolphe (1802-1869)—French general and later marshal; commander of the engineering troops in the French expeditionary force in the Baltic (1854) and in the French army in the Crimea (1855).—87, 91, 98, 114, 517, 542, 546-49, 686

Nightingale, Florence (1820-1910)—an organiser of the medical service in the British army during the Crimean war.—125, 129

Nisard, Jean Marie Napoleon Désiré (1806-1888)—French journalist and literary historian, professor at the Sorbonne in the 1850s; justified the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—602

Nordenstam, Johann Moritz, Baron—lieutenant-general, Governor of Helsingfors (1845).—309

O

O'Brien, William Smith (1803-1864)—Right-wing leader of the Young Ireland society; sentenced to death in 1848 after an unsuccessful attempt to organise an uprising, commuted to life deportation; amnestied in 1856.—386

O'Connell, Daniel (1775-1847)—Irish lawyer and politician, leader of the Liberal wing of the national liberation movement.—47, 78, 79, 243, 343, 383-84, 386

O'Connor, Feargus Edward (1794-1855)—Left-wing Chartist leader,
editor-in-chief of *The Northern Star*; reformist after 1848.—47, 524

**Oliphant, Laurence** (1829-1888)—English traveller and journalist; the *Times* correspondent attached to Omer Pasha's expeditionary corps in the Caucasus (1855).—652

**O'Meara, Barry Edward** (1786-1836)—Irish physician and writer; Napoleon III's doctor during his exile on Saint Helena (1815-18).—122

**Omer Pasha (Michael Lattas)** (1806-1871)—Turkish general of Croatian descent; commanded the forces on the Danube (1853-54), in the Crimea (1855) and in the Caucasus (1855-56).—5, 10, 33, 74, 132, 135, 136-38, 180-82, 184, 185, 205, 217, 220, 250, 265, 344, 349, 368, 454, 456, 485, 528, 566-67, 591-93, 597, 609, 612, 627, 629, 633-54, 674-80, 696

**Orleans**—royal dynasty in France (1830-48).—110

**Orsi, Count** (d. 1899)—stockbroker, Napoleon III's agent, of Corsican descent.—293

**Osten-Sacken, Dmitry Yerofeyevich, Count** (c. 1789-1881)—Russian general, commander of a corps in the south of Russia during the Crimean war (1853-54) and of the Sevastopol garrison (late 1854-1855).—685

**Ostrowski, Josaphat Boleslas (Józefat Bolesław)** (1805-1871)—Polish historian and writer, author of works on Polish history.—477

**Otto I** (1815-1867)—King of Greece (1832-62), member of the Bavarian ruling family of Wittelsbach.—92

**Otway, Sir Arthur John, Baronet** (1822-1912)—British politician, Tory, member of the House of Commons in the 1850s.—277, 308

**P**

**Pacifico, David** (1784-1854)—British trader of Portuguese origin in Athens.—17

**Paget, Lord George Augustus Frederick** (1818-1880)—British general, Whig, member of the House of Commons; commanded a light cavalry brigade in the Crimea (1855).—572, 702

**Palacký (Palatzyk), František** (1798-1876)—Czech historian and liberal politician; supported Austro-Slavism, a federation of autonomous Slav areas within the framework of the Habsburg monarchy.—158, 691


**Paniutin, Fyodor Sergeyevich** (1790-1865)—Russian general, commanded a corps at the beginning of the Crimean war and a reserve army in the south-west of Russia (1855-56).—251, 507

**Panmure, Fox Maule, Baron Panmure, Earl of Dalhousie** (1801-1874)—British statesman, Whig; Secretary at War (1846-52, 1855-58).—22, 25, 26, 28, 44, 102, 140, 192, 320, 611, 612, 614, 626-28, 649, 654

**Parseval-Deschênes, Alexandre Ferdinand** (1790-1860)—French admiral, a squadron commander in the Baltic in 1854.—517

**Paskiewitsch (Paskevicz), Ivan FYodorovich, Prince** (1782-1856)—Russian field marshal-general; commander-in-chief on the western and southern borders of Russia (1854) and on the Danube (April to June 1854).—446

**Paul, Sir John Dean, Baronet** (1802-1868)—English banker, head of the banking house Strahan, Paul and Co.—310
Paxton, Sir Joseph (1801-1865)—English architect, designer of the building for the 1851 Exhibition in London, member of the House of Commons.—29
Peel, Sir Frederick (1823-1906)—British politician, Peelite; Under-Secretary for War (1855-57).—22, 58, 492
Peel, Jonathan (1799-1879)—British general, member of the House of Commons; member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—355-57
Peel, Sir Robert, Baronet (1788-1850)—British statesman, moderate Tory; Home Secretary (1822-27, 1828-30), Prime Minister (1834-35, 1841-46).—18, 22, 45, 50, 71, 126, 131, 188, 198, 199, 247, 357, 384-86, 388-90, 392, 514, 560, 561
Peel, Sir Robert, Baronet (1822-1895)—British politician and diplomat, son of Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel; Peelite, member of the House of Commons; Junior Lord of the Admiralty (1855-57).—94, 108, 479, 480
Périsier, Aimable Jean Jacques, duc de Malakoff (1794-1864)—French general, marshal from September 1855; participated in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s-1850s; commander of a corps (early 1855) and commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea (May 1855-July 1856).—201, 206, 212, 213, 215-17, 219-21, 249-51, 253-54, 260, 262-63, 267, 293, 297, 298, 313, 315-18, 328-30, 332, 335, 344, 347, 349, 351, 486, 504, 508-10, 519, 532, 539, 541, 542, 549, 563, 572, 573-75, 601, 619, 633-35, 638, 648, 649, 651, 674, 686, 694
Pellatt, Apsley (1791-1863)—English businessman, Radical, member of the House of Commons.—99
Pénaut, Charles (1800-1864)—French admiral; commanded the French squadron in the Baltic (1855).—488, 490
Perceval, Spencer (1762-1812)—British statesman, Tory; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1807-09), Prime Minister (1809-12).—16, 188, 190, 191, 311, 670
Pèreire, Jacob Émile (1800-1875)—French banker, a founder and director of the Crédit Mobilier; adhered to the Saint-Simonists (1825-31), later a Bonapartist.—555
Peter I (the Great) (1672-1725)—Russian Tsar from 1682, Emperor of Russia from 1721.—104, 585
Philip II of Macedon (c. 382-336 B.C.)—King of Macedon (359-36 B.C.).—77
Phillimore, John George (1808-1865)—English lawyer and politician, Liberal, member of the House of Commons.—357
Pianori, Giovanni (1827-1855)—Italian revolutionary; took part in the revolution of 1848-49 and in the defence of the Roman Republic; executed in May 1855 for his attempt to assassinate Napoleon III.—177
Pierce, Franklin (1804-1869)—President of the USA (1853-57).—599
Pindar (c. 522-c. 442 B.C.)—Greek lyric poet, famous for his odes.—16, 190
Pisani, Étienne—interpreter at the British Embassy in Constantinople (1854-55).—635
Pitt, William (1759-1806)—British statesman, a Tory leader; Prime Minister (1783-1801, 1804-06).—50, 166, 188, 190, 311, 599, 663
Pius IX (Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti) (1792-1878)—Pope (1846-78).—92, 391-92, 473, 474
Plessen, Othon, Baron von—Danish envoy to St. Petersburg (1849-67).—294
Poniatowski, Joseph Anthony (1763-1813)—Polish general and politician; took part in the Polish insurrection of 1794 and Napoleon I's military campaigns of 1809-13.—285
Porchester, Henry Herbert, Baron (1741-1811)—Whig, member of the House of Commons.—190
Porter, George Richardson (1792-1852)—English economist and statistician, Free Trader; joint secretary to the
Board of Trade from 1841.—560, 562

Portland, William Henry Cavendish Bentinck, Duke of (1738-1809)—British statesman, a Whig leader; Home Secretary (1794-1801), Prime Minister (1783, 1807-09).—16

Potemkin, Grigory Alexandrovich, Prince Taourichesky (1739-1791)—Russian statesman, field marshal-general, commander-in-chief of the Russian army in the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91.—565, 697

Pozzo di Borgo, Karl Osipovich, Count (1764-1842)—Russian diplomat of Corsican descent; envoy to Paris (1814-21), ambassador to Paris (1821-35) and to London (1835-39).—104

Pradl, Dominique Dufour de (1759-1837)—French clergyman, diplomat, historian and writer.—283, 469

Praslin, Altarice Rosalba Fanny, Duchess de (1807-1847)—wife of duc de Choiseul.—30

Praslin, Charles Lauré Hugues Théobald, duc de Choiseul (1805-1847)—Peer of France; committed suicide in consequence of a trial in which he was accused of murdering his wife.—62

Prichett, Robert Taylor (1828-1907)—British gunsmith, perfected Minié's rifle.—420, 421

Prokesch-Osten, Anton, Count von (1795-1876)—Austrian general and diplomat; Austrian representative at the Vienna Conference (1855).—398

Pufendorf, Samuel, Baron von (1632-1694)—German historian and lawyer, a theoretician of "natural law".—156, 164

R

Radetzky, Josef, Count of Radetz (1766-1858)—Austrian field marshal; suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy (1848-49); Governor-General of the Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia (1850-56).—160, 425, 619, 692

Raglan, Lord Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, Baron (1788-1855)—British field marshal, commander-in-chief of the British forces in the Crimea (1854-55).—4-5, 10, 26, 75, 81, 86, 87, 90, 91, 102, 116, 127, 130, 135, 138, 144, 149, 153, 216, 219, 251, 260, 297, 329, 331, 335, 484, 549, 650

Raspail, François Vincent (1794-1878)—French naturalist and writer; socialist close to the revolutionary proletariat; took part in the revolutions of 1830 and 1848.—655

Read, Nikolai Andrejevich (c. 1793-1855)—Russian general, commanded a corps in the Crimea (1855).—507, 564, 695

Rede—Ballarat police commissioner, Victoria (Australia).—66

Redington, Sir Thomas Nicholas (1815-1862)—British politician, Whig; Under-Secretary for Ireland (1846). Secretary to the Board of Control for India (1852-56).—57

Reed, Joseph Haythorne—British major, member of the House of Commons.—471

Regnault (Regnaud) de Saint-Jean d'Angély, Auguste Michel Étienne, comte (1794-1870)—French general, later marshal, Bonapartist; War Minister (1851), commander of the guards (1854-69) and of a reserve corps in the Crimea (1855).—358-59, 364

Richard II (1367-1400)—King of England (1377-99).—25, 40

Richard III (1452-1485)—King of England (1483-85).—49

Richards, Alfred Baw (pseudonym: An Englishman) (1820-1876) —English playwright and journalist.—70

Richards, George Henry—British admiral, Lord of the Admiralty (1854-55).—273

Richmond, Charles Gordon-Lennox, Duke of (1791-1860)—British Tory politician, protectionist.—320

Rickmann, Pyotr Ivanovich (1790-1845)—Russian Privy Councillor, chargé d'affaires in Greece (1830-33).—18

Robespierre, Maximilien François Marie Isidore de (1758-1794)—leader of the
Jacobs in the French Revolution, head of the revolutionary government (1798-94).—29

Robinson, Frederick John, Viscount Goderich, Earl of Ripon (1782-1859)—British statesman, Tory; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1823-27), Prime Minister (1827-28).—16, 63

Rodwell, Josiah—English clergyman.—51, 52


Roguet, Christophe Michel, comte de (1800-1877)—French general, Bonapartist, took part in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—220

Rokeby, Henry Robinson-Montagu, Baron (1798-1883)—British general; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—22

Romanoffs (Romanovs)—Russian royal dynasty (1613-1917).—596

Ross, D.—witness called before the Urquhartist Committee in Newcastle-upon-Tyne on the issue investigating the “Action of Diplomacy”.—561

Rothschilds—a family of bankers.—558

Rothschild, Lionel Nathan, Baron (1808-1879)—head of the Rothschild banking house in London, Whig, member of the House of Commons (from 1858).—331, 392

Rüdiger, Fyodor Vasilyevich, Count (1784-1856)—Russian general, acted as Governor-General of the Kingdom of Poland (1854); commanded the forces on the western border of Russia (1855).—361

Rushdi Pasha (Mehemet) (1809-1879)—Turkish statesman; held the post of War Minister (Seraskier) several times in the 1850s and 1860s.—606, 609, 611, 629, 632, 635, 637, 644, 646, 653, 654, 678

Russell—participant in the demonstration against the bill on banning Sunday trade, held in London on July 1, 1855.—327

Russells—English aristocratic family.—373, 379

Russell, John Russell, Earl (1792-1878)—British statesman, Whig leader; Prime Minister (1846-52, 1865-66), Foreign Secretary (1852-53, 1859-65), President of the Council (1854-55); British representative at the Vienna Conference (1855).—9, 24, 26, 27, 31, 44-45, 47, 50, 57, 58, 118, 120, 130, 131, 139, 141, 142, 163, 223-25, 228-31, 234-36, 238, 246-48, 258, 275, 277, 300, 311, 339, 341, 342, 348, 352-54, 371, 373-82, 384-86, 388-93, 398, 399, 472-74, 482, 483, 497, 499, 514, 584, 662

Russell, Sir William Howard (1820-1907)—the Times correspondent attached to the British army in the Crimea (1854-55).—10, 134, 137, 154, 584

S

Sadleir, John (1814-1856)—Irish banker and politician, a leader of the Irish Brigade in Parliament; Junior Lord of the Treasury (1853).—62, 343, 654

Šafařík (Schafarik), Pavel Josef (1795-1861)—Slovak philologist, historian and archaeologist; a Liberal-Wing leader in the movement for national independence; supported the programme of Austro-Slavism. —156, 689

Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de (1801-1854)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; took part in the conquest of Algeria (1830s-1840s); one of the organisers of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; War Minister (1851-54); commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea (1854).—76, 86, 88, 90, 109, 130, 146-49, 211, 212, 220, 411, 484

Saint-Georges—eighteenth-century French adventurer.—76

Saint-Germain, comte—a celebrated adventurer who enjoyed influence at
the court of Louis XV and of other European monarchs in the eighteenth century.—76

Saint-Simon, Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de (1760-1825)—French utopian socialist.—555

Salles, Charles Marie, comte de (1803-1858)—French general and Senator; commanded a division in the Crimea (1855).—521, 549

San Luis, Luis José Sartorius, conde de (1820-1871)—Spanish statesman and writer; a leader of the Moderado party; Minister of the Interior (1847-51); head of government (1853-54).—468

Sartorius—see San Luis, Luis José Sartorius, conde de.

Scharnhorst, Gerhard Johann David von (1755-1813)—Prussian general and politician; War Minister (1807-10) and Chief of the General Staff (1807-13); engaged in reorganising the Prussian army.—435

Schilder, Karl Andreyevich (1785-1854)—Russian general, military engineer and inventor; directed siege-works on the Danube during the wars against Turkey (1828-29, 1854).—134

Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich von (1759-1805)—German poet, playwright, historian and philosopher.—357

Scholefield, William (1809-1867)—British politician, Radical, member of the House of Commons.—369, 370

Schönhal, Karl, Baron von (1788-1857)—Austrian field marshal and military writer; took part in suppressing the revolution of 1848-49 in Italy.—459

Scribe, Augustin Eugène (1791-1861)—French playwright and librettist.—141

Scully, Vincent (1810-1871)—Irish lawyer and politician, M.P.—480

Seaton, Sir John Colborne, Baron (1778-1863)—British general, later field marshal; fought in the wars against Napoleon I (1808-14, 1815); commanded the British troops in Ireland (1855-60).—22

Sedlmayer—Austrian general, commandant of the Karlsburg fortress during the Crimean war.—497

Selim Pasha (c. 1797-1855)—Turkish general; commanded Turkish forces in the Caucasus (1855).—654

Selvan (d. 1854)—Russian general; commanded Russian forces on the Danube (1854).—564, 695

Serrano y Domínguez, Francisco, conde de San Antonio, duque de la Torre (1810-1885)—Spanish general and statesman; Minister of War (1843); took part in the coup d’état in 1856; Foreign Minister (1862-63), head of government (1868-69, 1871, 1874) and Regent (1869-71).—469

Seymour, George Hamilton (1797-1880)—British diplomat, envoy to St. Petersburg (1851-54).—229, 235

Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of (1801-1885)—British politician; head of the parliamentary faction of Tory philanthropists (1840s); Whig from 1847; Chairman of the Sanitary Commission in the Crimea (1855).—302, 491

Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—English playwright and poet.—12, 49, 247, 385, 480, 486, 615, 656, 662, 666, 670

Shee, Sir William (1804-1868)—Irish lawyer and Liberal politician; member of the House of Commons.—79, 341, 342

Shelley, John Villiers, Baronet (1808-1867)—British politician, Free Trader, member of the House of Commons.—98

Shoberl, Frederick, Junior (1804-1852)—owner of a printshop in London.—20

Sidmouth, Henry Addington, Viscount (1757-1844)—British statesman, Tory, Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer (1801-04); Home Secretary (1812-21).—16, 188, 582

Sievers, Vladimir Karlovich, Count (1790-1862)—Russian general; commanded the Russian forces in the Baltic provinces (1854-55).—361
Sieyès, Emmanuel Joseph, comte de (1748-1836)—abbot, prominent figure in the French Revolution; deputy of the Convention, moderate constitutionalist (Feuillant).—293

Simmons, Sir John Lintorn Arabin (1821-1903)—British lieutenant-colonel, subsequently field marshal; British military commissioner attached to the Turkish Headquarters during the Crimean war.—633-36, 641, 644, 646-47, 649-51, 674, 677, 679, 680

Simolin, Ivan Matveyevich, Baron (1720-1790)—Russian diplomat, ambassador to London (1779-85).—586

Simson, Sir James (1792-1868)—British general, chief of staff (February to June 1855), commander-in-chief (June to November 1855) of the British army in the Crimea.—22, 26, 470, 504, 542-44, 549-50, 558, 573, 633-35, 637, 649-51, 654, 678, 679, 680

Simpson, John—stockbroker.—51, 52

Slocombe, William—Chartist, took part in the movement in the 1850s.—194

Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—Scottish economist.—531

Smith, Sir Andrew (1797-1872)—British medical officer, director-general of the army and ordnance medical departments (1846-58).—125, 129, 654

Smith, Robert Vernon, Baron Lyveden (1800-1873)—British statesman, Whig; Secretary at War (1852); President of the Board of Control for India (1855-58).—49, 472

Sobieski, John (Jan) (1624-1696)—King of Poland (1674-96); commanded the Polish and Austro-German forces which defeated the Turkish army at Vienna (1683).—284

Soimonoff (Soymonov), Fyodor Ivanovich (1800-1854)—Russian general; commanded an infantry division on the Danube and in the Crimea during the Crimean war; killed at the battle of Inkerman.—564, 695

Solon (c. 638-c. 558 B.C.)—Athenian politician and legislator.—480

Somerset, Sir Henry (1794-1862)—British general; appointed command-in-chief of the forces of the East India Company in Bombay in 1855.—22

Stackelberg, Ernest, Count (1813-1870)—Russian diplomat and general.—571

Stafford, Augustus O'Brien (1811-1857)—Tory, member of the House of Commons.—131

Stanley—see Derby, Edward Geoffrey

Smith Stanley, Earl of

Stanley, Edward Henry, Earl of Derby (1826-1893)—British statesman, son of Edward Derby; Tory, subsequently Liberal; Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs (1852), Secretary of State for India (1858-59).—29, 57, 227

Sterling, Edward (1773-1847)—correspondent (1811-15) and an editor (1815-40) of The Times.—122

Steuart, Sir James, afterwards Denham (1712-1780)—Scottish economist, one of the last representatives of mercantilism.—531

Stevens, Francis I.—British vice-consul in Trebizond during the Crimean war.—632

Stewart, Sir Houston (1791-1875)—British admiral, Whig; Lord of the Admiralty (1850-52); second in command in the Black Sea (1855).—634

Stonor, Henry—British official, judge in the State of Victoria (Australia).—62

Stormont, David Murray, Viscount Stormont, Earl of Mansfield (1727-1796)—British statesman and diplomat, Tory; secretary of state for the southern departments (1779-82).—585

Stratford, Sir John Byng, Viscount Enfield, Earl of (1772-1860)—British general, field marshal from 1855; fought in the wars against Napoleon I (1808-14, 1815).—558, 559

Strahan, William (born c. 1808)—English banker, head of the banking house Strahan, Paul and Co.—310, 335

Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, Viscount (1786-1880)—British diplomat, envoy to Constantinople (1810-12, 1825-28, 1841-58).—19,
T

Tahir Pasha—Turkish general; commanded Turkish forces in the Caucasus (1855).—654

Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice, prince de (1754-1838)—French diplomat; Foreign Minister (1797-99, 1799-1807, 1814-15); represented France at the Vienna Congress (1814-15).—141, 283

Tassilier—French printer; exiled to Cayenne in June 1848.—615

Taylor, James—British politician, champion of parliamentary reform.—98, 100

Terentianus Maurus (end of the 2nd cent. A.D.)—Roman grammarian.—556

Thompson, George (1804-1878)—British politician, Radical; prominent figure in the National Association of Parliamentary and Financial Reform (1850s).—209, 479

Thouvenel, Édouard Antoine (1818-1866)—French diplomat, ambassador to Turkey (1855-60).—647

Tiberius (Tiberius Claudius Nero Caesar) (42 B.C.—37 A.D.)—Roman Emperor (14-37).—602

Timur (Tamerlane) (1336-1405)—Central Asian conqueror, founder of a large state in the East with Samarkand as its capital.—67

Tite, Sir William (1798-1873)—English architect and politician; member of the House of Commons; Vice-Chairman of the Association of Administrative Reform (1855).—240, 480

Titoff (Titov), Vladimir Pavlovich (1805-1891)—Russian diplomat, ambassador to Constantinople (1843-53); represented Russia at the Vienna Conference (1855).—225, 234

Todtleben (Totleben), Eduard Ivanovich, Count (1818-1884)—Russian military engineer, colonel, general from April 1855; an organiser of the defence of Sevastopol.—135, 175, 443, 446, 484, 487, 570, 597

Toussenel, Alphonse (1803-1885)—French writer.—558

Toussoun Pasha—Turkish general, commanded Turkish forces in the Caucasus (1855).—632

Travers, Ingraham—British politician, leader of the movement by the commercial and financial bourgeoisie for administrative reform (1855).—196

Troiti—Italian general; commanded a division of the Sardinian corps in the Crimea (1855).—507, 509
Tyler, Wat (or Walter) (d. 1381)—leader of the peasants' revolt in England (1381).—25, 40

U

Urquhart, David (1805-1877)—British diplomat, writer and politician, Turkophile; carried out diplomatic missions in Turkey in the 1830s; Tory, member of the House of Commons (1847-52); opponent, of Palmerston.—20, 68, 243-45, 248, 274, 348, 394, 395, 561, 562

V

Vaillant, Jean Baptiste Philibert, comte (1790-1872)—Marshal of France, Senator, Bonapartist; War Minister (1854-59).—86, 90, 251

Vandamme, Domnique René, comte d'Unebourg (1770-1830)—French general; fought in Napoleon I's wars.—149, 261-63

Vattel, Emerich von (Emer de Vattel) (1714-1767)—Swiss lawyer and diplomat in Saxon service; theoretician of international law.—156, 164

Vauban, Sébastien Le Prêtre (Prestre) de (1633-1707)—Marshal of France, military engineer and economist; worked out new methods of fortification and siege.—149, 261-63

Victoria (1819-1901)—Queen of Great Britain and Ireland (1837-1901).—120, 192, 274, 299, 301, 305, 320, 348, 380, 390, 481, 490, 610, 611, 625, 675-76, 679

Vivian, Sir Robert John Hussey (1802-1887)—British general; commanded the Turkish troops on the Kerch Peninsula (1855-56).—609-11, 614, 624, 626, 628-30, 634, 639-41, 643, 647, 649, 650, 673, 678, 679

Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de (1694-1778)—French philosopher, writer and historian of the Enlightenment.—303, 334

W

Wakley, Thomas (1795-1862)—British politician and doctor, Radical; champion of parliamentary reform.—98

Walewski, Alexandre Florian Joseph Colonna, comte (1810-1868)—French statesman, son of Napoleon I and the Polish Countess Marie Walewska; took part in the Polish insurrection of 1830-31; emigrated to France after its suppression; French Foreign Minister (1855-60).—640

Walker—London police superintendent (1855).—324

Walmsley, Sir Joshua (1794-1871)—British politician, Radical member of the House of Commons; a founder and Chairman of the National Association of Parliamentary and Financial Reform.—209

Walpole, Horatio (Horace), Earl of Orford (1717-1797)—English author and art historian.—377

Walpole, Spencer Horatio (Horace) (1806-1898)—British statesman, Tory; Home Secretary (1852, 1858-59 and 1866-67).—259

Walters—English family whose members were the main shareholders of The Times.—122

Ward, Lord William, Baron (b. 1817)—English politician, Tory, member of the House of Lords.—355

Wardle, Gwyllym Lloyd (c. 1762-1833)—British colonel, member of the House of Commons; exposed the Duke of York's abuses (1809).—668, 670

Warwick, Richard Neville, Earl of Warwick and Salisbury (1428-1471)—English feudal lord nicknamed "the Kingmaker"; fought in the Wars of the Roses (1455-85).—47, 338

Wedell, Leopold Heinrich, von (1784-1861)—Prussian general; visited Paris on a diplomatic mission in 1855.—94

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of (1769-1852)—British general and statesman, Tory; commanded the British forces in the wars against Napoleon I (1808-14, 1815); commander-in-chief (1827-28, 1842-52);
Prime Minister (1828-30).—5, 6, 16, 51, 130, 177, 297, 377, 405, 415, 418, 501, 549
Westminster—see Grosvenor, Richard, Marquis of Westminster
Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of (1784-1859)—British diplomat, ambassador to Vienna (1851-55).—223, 224
Whately, Mr. Q. C.—Tory; stood for election to Parliament from Bath (1855).—240
Whiteside, James (1804-1876)—Irish lawyer and politician, Tory, member of the House of Commons; held several high judicial posts in Ireland.—29
Wieland, Christoph Martin (1733-1813)—German writer of the Enlightenment.—167
Wilks, Washington (c. 1826-1864)—English radical journalist, an editor of The Morning Star.—582
Willet—publisher of the weekly Penny Times.—281
William I (1797-1888)—Prince of Prussia, Prince Regent (1858-61), King of Prussia (1861-88) and Emperor of Germany (1871-88).—660
William III (1650-1702)—Prince of Orange, Stadtholder of the Netherlands (1672-1702), King of England, Scotland and Ireland (1689-1702).—24, 51
William IV (1765-1837)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1830-37).—19-20, 385
Williams, Nathaniel—agricultural worker.—544
Williams, Sir William Fenwick, Baronet "of Kars" (1800-1883)—British general, Commissioner with the Turkish army in the Caucasus (1854-55); took a leading part in the defence of Kars.—566, 589, 591, 593, 605, 606, 611-12, 623, 624, 626, 628, 633, 640, 648, 652, 654, 695
Willisen, Karl Wilhelm, Baron von (1790-1879)—Prussian general and strategist; was in the Austrian army that suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49.—460
Wilson, James (1805-1860)—British economist and politician, Free Trader; founder and editor of The Economist; Financial Secretary to the Treasury (1853-58).—30
Wilson, Sir Robert Thomas (1777-1849)—British general and military writer, Radical, member of the House of Commons; Governor of Gibraltar (1842).—502
Windham, Sir Charles Ash (1810-1870)—British colonel, general from October 1855, brigade commander in the autumn of 1855; chief of staff in the Crimea (November 1855-July 1856).—543, 550
Windischgrätz, Alfred Candidus Ferdinand, Prince zu (1787-1862)—Austrian field marshal; commanded the troops which crushed the uprisings in Prague and Vienna (1848); led the Austrian army against the Hungarian revolution (1848-49).—160, 425, 692
Wise, John Aylshford (b. 1810)—member of the House of Commons.—213
Wiseman, Nicholas (1802-1865)—English Catholic priest; Archbishop of Westminster and Cardinal from 1850.—391
Wolter, Johann, Edler von Eckwehr (1789-1857)—Austrian general, military engineer; commandant of the Cracow fortress (1853-1857).—497
Wood, Sir Charles, Viscount Halifax of Monk Breton (1800-1885)—British statesman, Whig; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1846-52), President of the Board of Control for India (1852-55), First Lord of the Admiralty (1855-58), Secretary for India (1859-66).—24, 49, 118, 308, 311, 356, 357
Wood, Lady Mary Charles (d. 1884).—wife of Sir Charles Wood.—49
Workman—Chartist, active in the movement in the 1850s.—196
Woronoff (Vorontsov), Mikhail Semyonovich, Prince (1782-1856)—Russian field marshal-general, commander-in-chief of the Russian Caucasian army and Governor-General of the Caucasus (1844-March 1854); brother of Sidney Herbert’s mother, Y. S. née Vorontsova.—22
**Name Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wright, Sir Nathan (1654-1721)</strong>—British lawyer and statesman; Lord Keeper of the Great Seal and Privy Councillor (1700-05).—64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yorke, Charles Philip (1764-1834)</strong>—British statesman, Tory; Secretary at War (1801-03), Home Secretary (1803-04), First Lord of the Admiralty (1810-11).—190, 191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Y**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yea, Lacy Walter Giles (1808-1855)</strong>—British colonel; commanded a regiment in the Crimea (1854-55).—331</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Z**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zamoyski, Ladislas (Wladyslaw), Count (1803-1868)</strong>—Polish magnate; took part in the insurrection of 1830-31; later a leader of the Polish conservative monarchist refugees in Paris; made attempts to muster a Polish legion against Russia during the Crimean war.—19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**INDEX OF LITERARY AND MYTHOLOGICAL NAMES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achilles (Gr. Myth.)</strong>—the bravest of the Greek heroes in Homer’s <em>Iliad</em>, invulnerable except in the heel.—620</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agamemnon (Gr. Myth.)</strong>—a king of Mycenae, a character in Homer’s <em>Iliad</em>, leader of the Greeks in the Trojan War; sacrificed his daughter Iphigienia to Artemis to obtain a safe passage of the Greek fleet to Troy.—382</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alba, Duke of</strong>—a character in Schiller’s <em>Don Carlos</em>.—357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caliban</strong>—a character in Shakespeare’s play <em>The Tempest</em>.—670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cerberus (Gr. Myth.)</strong>—a three-headed dog guarding the entrance to Hades.—503</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cobourg, Lord</strong>—a character in Auber’s opera <em>Fra Diavolo</em> written to Scribe’s libretto.—141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Danaides (Gr. Myth.)</strong>—the daughters of Danaus, a king of Argos, who at their father’s command murdered their bridegrooms on the wedding night and were condemned in Hades to pour water eternally into a bottomless vessel.—654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Don Quixote de la Mancha</strong>—the title character in Cervantes’ novel.—16, 191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dromio (Dromio of Ephesus and Dromio of Syracuse)</strong>—characters in Shakespeare’s <em>The Comedy of Errors</em>, twin brothers as like as two peas.—27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eugene Aram</strong>—the title character of Bulwer-Lytton’s novel, a scholar who disregards reality and becomes a victim of an encounter with it.—247</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Falstaff, Sir John</strong>—a fat, merry, ribald and boastful knight in Shakespeare’s <em>Henry IV</em> and <em>The Merry Wives of Windsor</em>.—12, 480</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Habakuk (Habacuc) (Bib.)</strong>—a Hebrew prophet.—334</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hamlet</strong>—the title character of a tragedy by Shakespeare.—247, 297</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hesperides (Gr. Myth.)</strong>—the nymphs, daughters of Hesperus, who, together with a dragon, guarded the garden of the golden apples in the Isles of the Blest.—311</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hotspur, Percy—a gay, jesting, fiery-tempered soldier in Shakespeare's Henry IV.—486

Iphigenia—a daughter of King Agamemnon; the title character of a tragedy by Euripides.—382

Issachar (Bib.)—one of the twelve sons of the Hebrew patriarch Jacob, ancestors of the twelve tribes of Israel; because of his exceptional patience and endurance Jacob compared him to a bony ass.—280

John Bull—a generic name for the English, from John Arbuthnot's The History of John Bull (1712).—34, 141, 142, 211, 269, 444, 664

Lumpkin, Tony—a character in Goldsmith's comedy She Stoops to Conquer; or, the Mistakes of a Night; a provincial nobleman's son, an ignorant and rude fellow who gives himself airs.—479

Manu—legendary law-giver of ancient India; the Laws of Manu were compiled by Brahmins between the first and fifth centuries A. D.—472

Mephistopheles—a character in Goethe's Faust.—306

Moloch (Molech)—a Semitic deity whose cult involved human sacrifices, especially of first-born children.—95

Pallas Athena (Pallas Athene) (Gr. Myth.)—one of the greater Olympian deities, pre-eminent as a civic goddess, wise in the industries of peace and the arts of war; tutelary goddess of Athens.—620

Pilate, Pontius (Bib.)—the Roman procurator of Judea (c. 26-c. 36 A.D.) who gave Jesus up to be crucified.—309

Pontius Pilatus—see Pilate, Pontius.

Robin Goodfellow—a genial domestic spirit in English popular mythology; a character in Shakespeare's comedy A Midsummer Night's Dream.—656

Samson (Bib.)—an Israelite judge of extraordinary strength; hence person of great strength.—22

Shallow—a character in Shakespeare's Henry IV and The Merry Wives of Windsor, a haughty and mercenary village judge, a litigious person.—480

Sibyl—one of a number of women regarded as oracles or prophetesses by the ancient Greeks and Romans. The best known of them was the sibyl of Cumae, a Greek colony in Southern Italy. The oracles and prophecies attributed to her were collected in the Sibylline Books kept in ancient Rome.—68

Siegfried (Sigfrid)—hero of the Nibelungenlied and other old German epics. He slayed a dragon and rendered himself invulnerable by bathing in his blood.—225

Sindbad (Sinbad) the Sailor—a character in the Arabian Nights.—339

Sly, Christopher—a character in Shakespeare's comedy The Taming of the Shrew.—383

Tantalus (Gr. Myth.)—a king who for his crimes was condemned in Hades to stand in water that receded when he tried to drink, and with fruit hanging above him that receded when he reached for it.—125, 129

Thersites—a character in Homer's Iliad and in Shakespeare's Troilus and Cressida, a cantankerous and abusive person.—300, 654

Warwick—the hero of Bulwer-Lytton's novel The Last of the Barons, idealised image of a participant in fifteenth-century internecine feudal wars.—47, 247
INDEX OF QUOTED
AND MENTIONED LITERATURE

WORKS BY KARL MARX AND FREDERICK ENGELS

Marx, Karl

Agitation over the Tightening-up of Sunday Observance (this volume)

Anti-Church Movement. [—Demonstration in Hyde Park] (this volume)

The British Constitution (this volume)
— Die britische Constitution. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 109, March 6, 1855.—95

A Critique of the Crimean Affair.—From Parliament (this volume)

From Parliament. [—Roebuck's and Bulwer's Motions] (this volume)

Herbert's Re-election.—The First Measures of the New Ministry.—News from India (this volume)

Kars Papers Curiosities (this volume). In: The Free Press, May 3, 1856.—672

A Meeting (this volume)
— Ein Meeting. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 141, March 24, 1855.—195

The Mishap of June 18.—Reinforcements (this volume)

The Morning Post versus Prussia.—The Character of the Whigs and Tories (this volume)
Napoleon and Barbès.—The Newspaper Stamp (this volume)

On the History of Political Agitation (this volume)

On the New Ministerial Crisis (this volume)
— Zur neuen Ministerkrisis. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 97, February 27, 1855.—50

Palmerston (this volume)

Parliament (this volume)

Parliamentary News (present edition, Vol. 13)
— Parlamentarisches. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 49, January 30, 1855.—63

Engels, Frederick
The Armies of Europe (this volume). In: Putnam’s Monthly, Nos. XXXII, XXXIII, XXXVI, August, September, December, 1855.—588


A Battle at Sevastopol (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4358, April 7, 1855.—133, 317

A Battle at Sevastopol (this volume)
— Ueber die letzten Vorgänge in der Krim. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 143, March 26, 1855.—137

The Crimean War (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4411, June 8, 1855.—216, 316, 344


The Fall of Sevastopol (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4506, September 28, 1855.—548

The Fall of Sevastopol (this volume)

From the Crimea (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4424, June 23, 1855.—318

From Sevastopol (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4401, May 28, 1855.—206

From Sevastopol (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4439, July 12, 1855.—344, 549

From Sevastopol (this volume)
— Ueber die Ereignisse in der Krim. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 301, July 2, 1855.—549
The Late Repulse of the Allies (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4447, July 21, 1855.—549

The Late Repulse of the Allies (this volume)


Napoleon's Last Dodge (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4358, April 7, 1855.—317

Napoleon's War Plans (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4431, July 2, 1855.—567

The New French Commander (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4414, June 12, 1855.—317

The New Move in the Crimea (this volume)
— Der Feldzug in der Krim. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 221, May 14, 1855.—253

The New Move in the Crimea (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4402, May 29, 1855.—201


The Results in the Crimea (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4353, April 2, 1855.—132, 136

Sevastopol (this volume)

Sevastopol (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4429, June 29, 1855.—317-18


The Situation in the Crimea (this volume)
— Ueber die Situation in der Krim. In: Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 155, April 2, 1855.—212

The Struggle in the Crimea (this volume). In: New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4323, February 26, 1855.—32, 115


Marx, Karl and Engels, Frederick

The Anglo-French War against Russia (this volume).

From Parliament.—From the Theatre of War (this volume)


The Local War.—Debate on Administrative Reform.—Report of the Roebuck Committee, etc. (this volume)


Prologue at Lord Palmerston’s.—Course of the Latest Events in the Crimea (this volume)


WORKS BY DIFFERENT AUTHORS

Aberdeen, G. [Speech in the House of Lords, April 10, 1856.] In: The Times, No. 22339, April 11, 1856.—662, 671

Adair, R. A. S. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 17, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—355-56


Auber, D.-F.-E. Fra-Diavolo, ou l'hôtellerie de Terracine. Opéra-comique en trois actes (libretto by A. E. Scribe).—141

Babbage, Ch. On the Economy of Machinery and Manufactures, London, 1832.—247

Baillie, H. [Speech in the House of Commons, May 22, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22061, May 23, 1855.—213

[Bakewell, R. H.] The Wounded before Sebastopol. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 22098, July 5, 1855.—492

Baring, F. [Speech in the House of Commons, May 24, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—227-28, 245, 257

Batrachomyomachia.—618

Bauer, B. Deutschland und das Russenthum, Charlottenburg, 1854.—162
— Die jetzige Stellung Russlands, Charlottenburg, 1854.—162
— Russland und England, Charlottenburg, 1854.—162
— Russland und das Germanenthum, Charlottenburg, 1853.—162

Bellini, V. La Sonnambula. Opera (libretto by F. Romani).—292

Bible
Matthew — 393
Luke — 302


Bodenstedt, F. *Die Völker des Kaukasus und ihre Freiheitskämpfe gegen die Russen. Ein Beitrag zur neuesten Geschichte des Orients*, Frankfurt am Main, 1848.—592


Boniface, L., *D’après les nouvelles qui viennent de Constantinople...* In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 8, January 8, 1855.—594
— *Une question intéressante...* In: *Le Constitutionnel*, No. 37, February 6, 1856.—599

Bouverie, E. P. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— June 29, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22094, June 30, 1855.—321
— July 16, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22108, July 17, 1855.—352

Bright, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 23, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—44
— June 7, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22075, June 8, 1855.—259
— July 17, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—356
— August 7, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22127, August 8, 1855.—472


Brougham, H. P. [Speech in the House of Lords, June 21, 1855.] In: *The Times*, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.—295

Brussels Mémoire—see De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient...

— [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— June 4, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22072, June 5, 1855.—247
— June 15, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22082, June 16, 1855.—289
— July 12, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—341
— July 16, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22108, July 17, 1855.—353


Canrobert, F. [Dispatch to the Minister of War, dated the 27th of February.] In: The Times, No. 22008, March 22, 1855.—135

Cathcart, G. Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813, London, 1850.—444

Cecil, R. A. T. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 17, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—357

Cervantes de Saavedra, M. Vida y hechos del ingenioso hidalgo Don Quixote de la Mancha...—16

Cesena, A. de. On ne peut pas dire.... In: Le Constitutionnel, No. 267, September 24, 1855.—544
— Un des phénomènes les plus instructifs.... In: Le Constitutionnel, No. 169, June 18, 1855.—267-68, 278-79, 287, 289

Chesney, [F. R.] Observations on the past and present State of Fire-arms, and on the probable Effects in War of the new Musket: with a Proposition for Reorganizing the Royal Regiment of Artillery by a Subdivision into Battalions in each special Arm of Garrison, Field, and Horse Artillery, with Suggestions for Promoting its Efficiency, London, 1852.—423

Clanricarde, U. J. [Speech in the House of Lords, April 10, 1856.] In: The Times, No. 22339, April 11, 1856.—662, 671

Clarendon, G. W. F. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— March 20, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22007, March 21, 1855.—106-08
— June 21, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.—294
— June 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—482-83, 499

Cobbett, J. M. [Speech in the House of Commons, March 15, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22003, March 16, 1855.—96-97

— Mr. Cochrane Johnstone [I]. In: Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, Vol. X, No. 1, July 5, 1806.—663-65
— Mr. Cochrane Johnstone [II]. In: Cobbett's Weekly Political Register, Vol. X, No. 8, August 23, 1806.—667

Cobden, R. [Speech in the House of Commons, June 5, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22073, June 6, 1855.—247-48, 259

Colchester, Ch. A. [Speech in the House of Lords, June 21, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.—295

A Colonial Reformer. The Future Conduct of the War. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 21977, February 14, 1855.—21-22

Courtois fils, A. Des opérations de Bourse ou Manuel des fonds publics français et étrangers et des actions et obligations de sociétés françaises et étrangères négociés à Paris. Précédé d'une appréciation des opérations de bourse dites de jeu, et de rapports de la bourse avec le crédit public et les finances de l'état, Paris, 1855.—535
Curzon, R. Armenia: A Year at Erzeroom, and on the Frontiers of Russia, Turkey and Persia. The first edition appeared in London in 1854.—593

Custine, [A.] de. La Russie en 1839, T. I-IV, Paris, 1843.—442


Dairnvaell, G. Histoire édifiante et curieuse de Rothschild Ier, Roi des Juifs, par Satan. The first edition appeared in Paris in 1846.—558
— Rothschild Ier, ses valets et son peuple. The first edition appeared in Paris in 1846.—558

Dante, Alighieri. La Divina Commedia.—355

De la conduite de la guerre d'Orient. Expédition de Crimée. Mémoire adressé au gouvernement de S. M. l'Empereur Napoléon III par un officier général. Bruxelles, février 1855 (the pamphlet was attributed to Prince Napoleon, Jérôme Bonaparte Jr., the French journalist Tavernier and the Belgian officer, Sterckx, aide-de-camp of the War Minister).—70, 76, 81, 86, 90, 146, 149

Derby, E. G. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— February 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—8

Derzhavin, G. R. On the Capture of Warsaw.—569, 571

Disraeli, B. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21980, February 17, 1855.—26-27
— May 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—222, 238
— June 18, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.—290
— July 12, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—341
— July 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22108, July 17, 1855.—352-54
— July 23, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22114, July 24, 1855.—482, 498


Drummond, H. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— March 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22012, March 27, 1855.—122
— June 18, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.—310

Duncombe, Th. S. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21980, February 17, 1855.—27-28
— June 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—311

— Off Sweaborg, Aug. 11. In: The Times, No. 22134, August 16, 1855.—488

Dunlop, A. G. Cossack Rule, and Russian Influence in Europe, and over Germany. A few Notes and Suggestions for the present Crisis, London, 1855.—286

Ellenborough, E. L. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature

— June 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—483, 499

Euclidis Elementorum libri XIII.—422
[Evans, D. M.] The City; or, the Physiology of London Business; with Sketches on 'Change, and the Coffee Houses, London, 1845.—209

Evans, G. de Lacy. [Speech in the House of Commons, February 29, 1856.] In: The Times, No. 22304, March 1, 1856.—635
— [Statements to the Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea.] In: The Times, No. 21994, March 6, 1855; No. 21995, March 7, 1855.—74-75


Gibson, Th. M. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— May 11, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22052, May 12, 1855.—223, 341
— May 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—224
— June 4, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22072, June 5, 1855.—246

Girardin, E. de. La Paix, Paris, 1855.—120

Gladstone, W. E. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—12-13
— February 23, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—45, 69
— May 24, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—225, 231-34
— June 15, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22082, June 16, 1855.—277-78, 290
— July 20, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22112, July 21, 1855.—472

Goderich, F. J. [Speech in the House of Commons, March 1, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 21991, March 2, 1855.—63

God Save the Queen (British national anthem).—292, 305, 519


Goldsmith, O. She Stoops to Conquer; or, The Mistakes of a Night. A Comedy. 479

Gorchakov, M. D. [Dispatch, dated the 11th of September.] In: Russky Invalid, No. 211, September 16, 1855.—552
— [Dispatch, dated the 17th of September.] In: The Times, No. 22169, September 26, 1855.—539

Graham, J. R. G. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 23, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—43-44, 69
— March 8, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 21997, March 9, 1855.—515
— May 18, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22058, May 19, 1855.—514
— May 25, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—225
— July 17, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—357

Graham, W. [Speech in the House of Commons, March 20, 1855.] In: *The Times*, No. 22007, March 21, 1855.—108

Granville, G. [Speech in the House of Lords, June 21, 1855.] In: *The Times*, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.—295

Grosvenor, R. *The Sunday Trading Bill. To the Editor of “The Times”*. In: *The Times*, No. 22093, June 29, 1855.—323
— [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— June 13, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22080, June 14, 1855.—304
— June 26, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—320

Gurowski, A. von. *Die letzten Ereignisse in den drei Theilen des alten Polens*, München, 1846.—689-90
— *Le Panslawisme, son histoire, ses véritables éléments: religieux, sociaux, philosophiques et politiques*, Tome 1, Florence, 1848.—689-90
— *La Vérité sur la Russie et sur la révolte des provinces polonaises*, Paris, 1834.—689-90

Halford, H. [Speech in the House of Commons, March 8, 1855.] In: *The Times*, No. 21997, March 9, 1855.—96

[Harris, J.] *Diaries and Correspondence of James Harris, First Earl of Malmesbury; Containing an Account of His Missions to the Courts of Madrid, Frederick the Great, Catherine the Second, and the Hague; and His Special Missions to Berlin, Brunswick, and the French Republic*. Edited by his grandson, the third Earl. The first edition in four volumes appeared in London in 1844.—584-86

Haxthausen, A. *Studien über die innern Zustände, das Volksleben und insbesondere die ländlichen Einrichtungen Russlands*, Dritter Theil, Berlin, 1852.—166

Heathcote, W. [Speech in the House of Commons, May 24, 1855.] In: *The Times*, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—227, 228, 245

Herbert, S. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— January 26, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—44
— February 23, 1855. In: *The Times*, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—44-45, 69-70

Herodoti Halicarnassei *Historiarum libri* IX.—109

Herwegh, G. *Aus den Bergen* (from the cycle *Gedichte eines Lebendigen*).—258


Homer. *Iliad*.—382, 618
Horatius Flaccus, Quintus. Carminum liber III.—573
— Satirarum liber 1.—158, 691


Hume, J. [Speeches in the House of Commons]

Jones, E. Political Felony. Infamous Chicanery and Fraud of the Administrative Reform Association. In: The People's Paper, No. 158, May 12, 1855.—197
— [Speech in St. Martin's Hall, February 27, 1855.] In: The People's Paper, No. 148, March 3, 1855.—71

Juvenalis. Satirae.—259


Lansdowne, H. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— February 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—8
— April 10, 1856. In: The Times, No. 22399, April 11, 1856.—662, 671


Layard, A. H. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— January 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—131
— April 27, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22040, April 28, 1855.—341
— May 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—238
— June 15, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22082, June 16, 1855.—277, 368

Lee, J. The Emperor of Russia's Death—Remarkable Circumstance. To the Editor of "The Morning Advertiser". In: The Morning Advertiser, No. 19877, March 6, 1855.—67

Lewis, G. C. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— March 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21997, March 9, 1855.—103
— March 19, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22006, March 20, 1855.—103

Lowe, R. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— May 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22064, May 26, 1855.—228, 245, 246
— July 17, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—357

Lucan, G. Ch. [Speech in the House of Lords, March 19, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22006, March 20, 1855.—102
Lyndhurst, J. S. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— March 20, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22007, March 21, 1855.—104-06
— June 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22091, June 27, 1855.—482, 498

Malins, R. [Speech in the House of Commons, June 25, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—311

Malmesbury, J. H. H. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— June 21, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22087, June 22, 1855.—294-95
— April 10, 1856. In: The Times, No. 22339, April 11, 1856.—662

Manteuffel, O. Th. von. [Speech in the Credit Committee of the First Chamber of the Prussian Diet, April 22, 1854.] In: Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrtten Sachen, No. 95, April 23, 1854.—105
— Speech in the First Chamber of the Prussian Diet, April 25, 1854.] In: Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats- und gelehrtten Sachen, No. 97, April 26, 1854.—105

La Marseillaise (French patriotic song, later the national anthem of the French Republic; text and music by C. J. Rouget de Lisle).—292


Moltke, H. K. B. The Russians in Bulgaria and Rumelia in 1828 and 1829; during the Campaigns of the Danube, the Sieges of Brailow, Varna, Silistria and the Passage of the Balkan by Marshal Diebitch, London, 1854.—147
— Der russisch-türkische Feldzug in der europäischen Türkei 1828 und 1829, Berlin, 1845.—147

Montalembert, Ch. [Speech at the sitting of the Legislative Assembly, May 22, 1850.] In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 143, May 23, 1850.—601

Montesquieu, Ch.-L. de. De l'Esprit des lois. The first edition in two volumes appeared anonymously in Geneva in 1748.—300

Napier, Ch. [Correspondence with Sir James Graham.] In: The Times, Nos. 22149, 22150, 22152, 22154, September 3, 4, 6, 8, 1855.—493, 513, 515-18
— [The first letter about the Baltic fleet.] In: The Morning Advertiser, June 15, 1855.—273
— Sir Charles Napier on the Bombardment of Sweaborg. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 22141, August 24, 1855.—493-94, 515, 517

Napier, E. E. The Prospects of the Crimean Campaign. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 21970, February 6, 1855.—6

Napier, W. F. P. History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the year 1807 to the year 1814. The first edition in six volumes appeared in London in 1828-1840.—34, 42, 415, 419, 423, 433, 514

Das Nibelungenlied (German epic of the early Middle Ages).—225

Niel, A. Sebastopol, Sept. 11. In: The Times, No. 22170, September 27, 1855.—542, 546

No Bitter Observer. To the Editor of “The Times”. In: The Times, No. 22165, September 21, 1855.—544


O'Meara, B. E. Napoleon in Exile; or, A Voice from St. Helena. The Opinions and Reflections of Napoleon on the Most Important Events of His Life and Government, in His Own Words, Vols. I-II, London, 1822.—122


Otway, A. J. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— June 15, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22082, June 16, 1855.—277
— June 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—308

Ovidius. Remédia amoris.—63

Palmerston, H. J. [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21980, February 17, 1855.—23-24, 45
— February 19, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21982, February 20, 1855.—40-41
— February 23, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21986, February 24, 1855.—44
— March 1, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21991, March 2, 1855.—63
— March 20, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22007, March 21, 1855.—108
— May 21, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22060, May 22, 1855.—213-14, 224-25
— May 22, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22061, May 23, 1855.—213
— June 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22076, June 9, 1855.—257
— June 18, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22084, June 19, 1855.—290
— June 22, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22088, June 23, 1855.—298
— June 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—308
— July 10, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22103, July 11, 1855.—341
— July 12, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—341
— July 17, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—356
— July 20, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22112, July 21, 1855.—480, 653
— July 23, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22114, July 24, 1855.—482, 498
— August 7, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22127, August 8, 1855.—472-73

Panmure, F. [Speeches in the House of Lords]
— May 14, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22054, May 15, 1855.—192
— June 28, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22093, June 29, 1855.—320

Partant pour la Syrie (official anthem of the Second Empire in France, text by A. de la Borde, music by L. Drouet).—292, 519

Peel, J. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 17, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—355-57
Peel, R. [Speeches in the House of Commons]

Pélissier, A. Crimée, 9 septembre, huit heures du soir. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 254, September 11, 1855.—519
— Grand quartier général à Sébastopol, le 11 septembre 1855. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 268, September 25, 1855.—539
— Grand quartier général, à Sébastopol, le 1er octobre 1855. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 289, October 16, 1855.—563, 694
— Sébastopol, le 10 septembre, à onze heures du soir. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 256, September 13, 1855.—532

Pénaud, Ch. Vaisseau de Sa Majesté Impériale le Tourville, devant Sweaborg, le 11 août 1855. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 230, August 18, 1855.—490
— Vaisseau le Tourville, le 11 août 1855. In: Le Moniteur universel, No. 227, August 15, 1855.—488


Phillimore, J. G. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 17, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—357

A Plain Statement of the Conduct of the Ministry and the Opposition, towards His Royal Highness the Duke of York, London, 1808.—666

Porter, G. R. The Progress of the Nation, in its Various Social and Economical Relations, from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century to the Present Time. The first complete edition in three volumes appeared in London in 1843.—560

— Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d’Espagne, Paris, 1816.—469

Pufendorf, S. De jure naturae et gentium libri octo. The first edition appeared in London in 1672.—156, 164

Reed, J. H. [Speech in the House of Commons, August 2, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22123, August 3, 1855.—471

R. G. A. The Boat’s Grew Destroyed at Hangoe. To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle. In: The Morning Chronicle, No. 27607, June 20, 1855.—291

[Richards, A. Letters of] An Englishman. In: The Times, No. 20990, December 20, 1851; No. 21007, January 9, 1852; No. 21020, January 24, 1852; No. 21044, February 21, 1852; No. 21091, April 16, 1852; No. 21231, September 27, 1852; No. 21262, November 2, 1852.—70

Richmond, Ch. [Speech in the House of Lords, June 28, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22093, June 29, 1855.—320

— [Speeches in the House of Commons]
— February 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21980, February 17, 1855.—25, 27
Rule Britannia (patriotic song from J. Thomson's drama The Mask of Alfred, music by Th. A. Arne).—292

Russell, J. Don Carlos, or, Persecution; a tragedy in five acts and in verse, London, 1822.—374


— Letter to the Electors of Stroud on the Reform Act, London, 1839.—378, 380

— Lord John Russell to the Electors of the City of London. Edinburgh, Nov. 22. In: The Times, No. 19092, November 27, 1845.—390


— To the Right Reverend the Bishop of Durham. Downing street, Nov. 4. In: The Times, No. 20640, November 7, 1850.—392

— [Speeches in the House of Commons]


— January 26, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—131
— February 8, 1855. In: The Times, No. 21973, February 9, 1855.—9, 27
— May 24, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22063, May 25, 1855.—225, 228, 234-36, 339
— June 5, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22073, June 6, 1855.—248
— July 6, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22100, July 7, 1855.—342
— July 12, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—341
— July 16, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22108, July 17, 1855.—352
— July 19, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22111, July 20, 1855.—482, 483, 498, 499
— July 23, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22114, July 24, 1855.—482, 498, 499
— August 7, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22127, August 8, 1855.—472, 473
— April 10, 1856. In: The Times, No. 22339, April 11, 1856.—662

— Camp before Sebastopol, March 10. In: The Times, No. 22324, March 25, 1856.—619
— Fourth Division Camp, Friday Night, March 30. In: The Times, No. 22028 (second edition), April 14, 1855.—154


[Scharnhorst, G. J. D. von.] Kriegs-Artikel für das Preussische Heer, Amtliche-Ausgabe, Berlin, 1853.—435

Schiller, J. Ch. F. von. Don Carlos.—357


Scully, V. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 10, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22103, July 11, 1855.—480

Shaftesbury, A. A. C. [Speech in the House of Lords, June 12, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22079, June 13, 1855.—302

Shakespeare, W. The Comedy of Errors.—27
— Hamlet, Prince of Denmark.—247, 297
— King Henry IV.—12, 480, 486
— King Henry V.—480
— King Henry VIII.—615
— King Richard III.—49
— Measure for Measure.—666
— A Midsummer Night’s Dream.—656, 662
— The Taming of the Shrew.—383
— The Tempest.—670

Shee, W. [Speech in the House of Commons, July 12, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22104, July 13, 1855.—341


Sire de Franc Boissy (French song).—603

Smith, R. V. [Speech in the House of Commons, August 7, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22127, August 8, 1855.—472

Stafford, A. [Speech in the House of Commons, January 29, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 21964, January 30, 1855.—131


Tassilier. To the Minister of Marine. In: The People's Paper, No. 206, April 12, 1856; New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4676, April 14, 1856.—615

Terentianus Maurus. De litteris, syllabis et metris (from the cycle Carmen heroicum).—556

Thousand and One Nights.—339

Toussenel, A. Les Juifs rois de l'époque, histoire de la féodalité financière. The first edition appeared in Paris in 1845.—558

Urquhart, D. [Correspondence with J. Backhouse.] In: The Times, No. 16948, January 25, 1839.—19

— On the Death of the Emperor Nicholas. To the Editor of "The Morning Advertiser". In: The Morning Advertiser, No. 19877, March 6, 1855.—68


Wieland, Ch. M. Die Abderiten, eine sehr wahrscheinliche Geschichte. The first edition appeared in Weimar in 1774, the first complete edition in 1781.—165

Willisen, W. Der Italienische Feldzug des Jahres 1848; Berlin, 1849.—460

Wilson, R. Th. Inquiry into the Present State of the Military Force of the British Empire with a View to its Reorganization, London, 1804.—502

Wise, J. A. [Speech in the House of Commons, May 22, 1855.] In: The Times, No. 22061, May 23, 1855.—213


Wood, Ch. [Speeches in the House of Commons]

— June 25, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22090, June 26, 1855.—308-09

— July 17, 1855. In: The Times, No. 22109, July 18, 1855.—356, 357
DOCUMENTS

An act for better enabling Her Majesty to confer certain powers and immunities on trading and other companies [1837].—322

An act for confirming and continuing, for a limited time, the restriction contained in the minute of council on the twenty-sixth of February one thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven, on payments of cash by the bank [1797].—166

An act for continuing two former acts for punishing officers and soldiers who shall mutiny or desert their Majesties service and for punishing false musters and for payment of quarters for one year longer [Mutiny Act, 1694].—63

An act for enlarging the time of continuance of parliaments, appointed by an act made in the sixth year of the reign of King William and Queen Mary, intituled, An act for the frequent meeting and calling of parliaments [1716].—188

An act for the more effectual preserving the King's person and government by disabling papists from sitting in either house of parliament [Second Test Act, 1678].—390

An act for preventing dangers which may happen from popish recusants [First Test Act, 1673].—390

An act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing of rioters [Riot Act, 1715].—66

An act for the well-governing and regulating of corporations [Corporation Act, 1661].—390

An act to amend the acts relating to labour in factories [1850].—97, 188

An act to amend the laws for the importation of corn [1842].—388

An act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to the militia in England [1852].—140

An act to continue the restrictions contained in several acts on payments in cash by the Bank of England, until the first day of May one thousand eight hundred and twenty-three, and to provide for the gradual resumption of such payments; and to permit the exportation of gold and silver [1819].—387

An act to limit the hours of labour of young persons and females in factories [1847].—95

An act to regulate the issue of bank notes, and for giving to the governor and company of the Bank of England certain privileges for a limited period [1844].—198-99


Constitution fédérale de la Confédération suisse, délibérée par la Diète dans ses séances du 15 mai au 27 juin 1848 et déclarée acceptée le 12 septembre 1848, Genève, 1848.—461

Corn Laws.—16, 51, 54, 60, 166, 195, 386-90, 392, 563
Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. [First series], Vol. XII, London, 1812.—668-70

Kars Papers—see Papers Relative to Military Affairs in Asiatic Turkey....


Lanskoy, S. S. [Circular to the Nobility, August 28, 1855.] In: Severnaya Pchela, No. 223, October 12, 1855.—576

Ordenanzas de S. M. para el regimen, disciplina, subordinacion, y servicio de sus ejercitos. T. I-II, Madrid, 1768.—493

Papal Brief by Pius P. P. IX. [On the 30th day of September, in the year 1850.] In: The Annual Register, or a View of the History and Politics of the Year 1850, London, 1851.—391-92


The People's Charter; being the Outline of an Act to provide for the Just Representation of the People of Great Britain in the Commons' House of Parliament. Embracing the principles of Universal Suffrage, No Property Qualification, Annual Parliaments, Equal Representation, Payment of Members, and Vote by Ballot. Prepared by a committee of twelve persons, six members of Parliament and six members of the London Working Men's Association and addressed to the People of the United Kingdom, London, 1838.—46, 99-101, 241-43

Poor Law [1834].—54, 188

The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers, etc., etc. Illustrative of the History of Our Times, Vols. I-VI, London, 1836-1837.—19

Report of Committee on the Salaries and Emoluments of Offices held during the pleasure of the Crown by Members of Parliament, Judicial Offices in the Law Courts, and on the Expense of Diplomatic Establishments; Evidence, Appendix and Index, [London] 1850.—213

Reports of the Inspectors of Factories to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, for the Half Year Ending 30th April 1855. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty. London, 1855.—369-70


ANONYMOUS ARTICLES AND REPORTS PUBLISHED IN PERIODIC EDITIONS

Allgemeine Zeitung (Augsburg), No. 125 (supplement), May 5, 1855: Von der polnischen Gränze, 30 April.—183

The Argus (Melbourne), No. 2359, December 1, 1854: Ballaarat. Wednesday, November 29th, 1854.—65

Le Constitutionnel, No. 192, July 11, 1855: Devant Sébastopol, 26 juin.—359, 364

The Daily News, No. 2731, February 19, 1855. Representative Government is on its trial....—30
Index of Quoted and Mentioned Literature

— No. 2742, March 3, 1855: The Death of the Czar. (Communicated).—68
  — June 13, 1855: [Prince Albert's toast.]—280

The Economist, No. 599, February 17, 1855: Two Much Needed Reforms.—30
  — No. 630, September 22, 1855: Paris Banks.—536

The Globe and Traveller, June 23, 1855: [On the defeat of the Allies on June 18.].—298

The Leader, No. 260, March 17, 1855: Humiliation "ex-officio".—95
  — No. 260, March 17, 1855: A Proclamation. For a Day of Solemn Fast,
  Humiliation and Prayer. Victoria R.—95
  — No. 274, June 23, 1855: News of the Week.—298

Manchester Daily Examiner and Times, No. 193, September 24, 1855: The condition of
the money market.—534-35

The Manchester Guardian, No. 2724, February 14, 1855: Markets for Manufacture.—
23

Le Moniteur universel, No. 48, February 17, 1855: Paris, le 16 février.—170
  — No. 88, March 27, 1855: Paris, le 26 mars.—147
  — No. 101, April 11, 1855: Paris, le 10 avril. Expédition d'Orient.—146-50, 211
  — No. 126, May 6, 1855: Paris, le 5 mai. Rapport à l'Empereur.—177
  — No. 198, July 17, 1855: Francfort, le 14 juillet 1855.—357, 364
  — No. 263, September 20, 1855: Paris, le 19 septembre.—535
  — No. 80, March 20, 1856: Paris, le 19 mars.—616-17
  — No. 81, March 21, 1856: Paris, le 20 mars.—617
  — No. 84-85, March 24-25, 1856: Paris, le 24 mars.—618

The Morning Advertiser, No. 19863, February 17, 1855: A Minister must be
ambitious....—41
  — No. 19864, February 19, 1855: Faithful are the wounds of a friend....—41
  — No. 19872, February 28, 1855: The Ministry of Titles.—149
  — No. 19875, March 3, 1855: No event of greater importance....—67
  — No. 19875, March 3, 1855: Secret History of the Crimean Expedition.—70
  — No. 19878, March 7, 1855: The Reported Dissolution.—73
  — No. 19887, March 17, 1855: The National and Constitutional Association.—98

The Morning Chronicle, No. 27504, February 19, 1855: It is useless to disguise....—29-
30, 40-41
  — No. 27504, February 19, 1855: The prudence, fairness and consistency of
nominating Mr. Roebuck's committee....—29-30
  — No. 27541, April 3, 1855: The British public....—139-40
  — No. 27571, May 9, 1855: Banks of the Spree, May 6.—178
  — No. 27571, May 9, 1855: The trial of the assassin....—177

The Morning Herald, No. 22372, March 6, 1855: England and France. Probable
Dissolution of Parliament.—69
  — No. 22373, March 7, 1855: A more audacious and unconstitutional attempt....—
73-74
  — No. 22378, March 13, 1855: It is quite right that the Conservative people....—80
  — No 22383, March 19, 1855: Portsmouth—Saturday. (From our own correspon-
dent.)—94
  — No. 22385, March 21, 1855: So astonished we were....—118
  — No. 22432, May 16, 1855: The public has been disappointed....—194
  — No. 22438, May 23, 1855: Siege of Sebastopol.—212
— No. 22450, June 6, 1855: Gulf of Finland, 16 Miles off Cronstadt.—259
— No. 22450, June 6, 1855: Visit to Bomarsund Faro, May 21.—259
— No. 22465, June 23, 1855: Evil tidings—the truth of which was denied...—298

The Morning Post, No. 25325, March 3, 1855: Nicholas Paulovitch, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias...—67
— No. 25328, March 7, 1855: “By a General Officer”. This much is on the title-page...—76-77
— No. 25328, March 7, 1855: Memoir Addressed to the Government of H. M. the Emperor Napoleon III. By a General Officer.—76
— No. 25338, March 19, 1855: National and Constitutional Association.—98-100
— No. 25338, March 19, 1855: Paris, Friday Evening.—94
— No. 25348, March 30, 1855: The discussion upon the Third Point...—136
— No. 25386, May 14, 1855: A paper has lately been presented to Parliament...—186
— No. 25422, June 25, 1855: A scene in the highest degree disgraceful and dangerous...—307
— No. 25455, August 2, 1855: The Command of the Army in the East.—470

Le Nord, No. 19, January 19, 1856: Paris, 17 janvier.—600
— No. 37, February 6, 1856: Paris, 4 février.—603

The People's Paper, No. 157, May 5, 1855: London Organisation Committee.—168
— No. 170, August 11, 1855: The Two “Shams”.—477-80
The Press, No. 99, March 24, 1855: Paris, Thursday.—120

Russky Invalid, No. 118, June 1, 1855: News from the Baltic. No. 209.—304

Severnaya Pchela, No. 11, January 14, 1856: [Article on the results of the Crimean war].—600

The Times, No. 16949, January 26, 1839: It is not for us to understand...—19
— No. 21941, January 3, 1855: There is a singular but not real consolation for failure...—103
— No. 21964, January 30, 1855: [Report on the sitting of the House of Commons on January 29, 1855]—26
— No. 21972, February 8, 1855: The Sick and Wounded Fund. (From our own Correspondent.)—12
— No. 21979, February 16, 1855: All that we yet know of our present Government...—21, 22
— No. 21979, February 16, 1855: Among all the political changes...—23, 53, 59
— No. 21979, February 16, 1855: Re-election of Mr. Sidney Herbert.—21-22
— No. 21981, February 19, 1855: In the gloomy autumn of 1847...—30-31
— No. 21982, February 20, 1855: Marylebone.—Conduct of the War...—30
— No. 21988, February 27, 1855: Court of Queen’s Bench. Guildhall, Feb. 26.—51
— No. 21990, March 1, 1855: Mr. Layard and His Constituents.—57-58
— No. 21992, March 3, 1855: The Emperor of Russia is Dead.—67
— No. 21992, March 3, 1855: Scarcely had the intelligence...—67
— No. 22005, March 19, 1855: If any reliance is to be placed on the last intelligence...—103
— No. 22006, March 20, 1855: The Chancellor of the Exchequer last night propounded his measure for restricting the circulation of “The Times”...—103
— No. 22006, March 20, 1855: The Conferences at Vienna were opened in due form...—102
— No. 22007, March 21, 1855: The State of the Army before Sebastopol.—125-26, 129
— No. 22011, March 26, 1855: The issue raised upon the question....—122
— No. 22012, March 27, 1855: The last accounts from the Crimea....—135, 138
— No. 22014, March 29, 1855: Camp near Kadikoi, Friday, March 16.—135, 138
— No. 22028, April 14, 1855: Nobody can deny....—154
— No. 22028, April 14, 1855: Paris, Thursday, April 12, 6 p. m.—150
— No. 22040, April 28, 1855: Administrative Reform.—196
— No. 22043, May 2, 1855: [Report in “Latest Intelligence”.]—170
— No. 22044, May 3, 1855: [Report in “Latest Intelligence”.]—170
— No. 22045, May 4, 1855: [Report in “Latest Intelligence”.]—170
— No. 22054, May 15, 1855: State of the Army before Sebastopol.—515
— No. 22063, May 25, 1855: The Ministry and Its Supporters.—218
— No. 22080, June 14, 1855: Prince Albert on Public Affairs.—274-76, 280
— No. 22084, June 19, 1855: State of the Army before Sebastopol.—290, 296, 299, 300
— No. 22086, June 21, 1855: The Massacre at Hango.—293
— No. 22087, June 22, 1855: It is not often that such a display of feeling....—294, 296
— No. 22087, June 22, 1855: The Sebastopol Committee.—296
— No. 22090, June 26, 1855: Hyde Park on Sunday was the scene....—308
— No. 22095, July 2, 1855: The Demonstration in Hyde Park.—326-27
— No. 22095, July 2, 1855: Surely at the present moment we have got real troubles....—324
— No. 22104, July 13, 1855: In the course of a very short speech Lord John Russell....—341
— No. 22115, July 25, 1855: House of Commons, Tuesday, July 24.—470
— No. 22120, July 31, 1855: House of Commons, Monday, July 30.—470-71
— No. 22123, August 3, 1855: House of Commons, Thursday, August 2.—470-71
— No. 22128, August 9, 1855: Poland and a Polish Legion.—477-80
— No. 22135, August 17, 1855: Paris, Wednesday, Aug. 15, Mid-day.—490
— No. 22139, August 22, 1855: We never felt more strongly the necessity of guarding ourselves....—492
— No. 22172, September 29, 1855: [An account of Alexander Malet's speech.]—553
— No. 22173, October 1, 1855: The Revenue.—554-55
— No. 22177, October 5, 1855: [An account of John Bright's speech at the meeting of October 3, 1855.]—558
— No. 22195, October 26, 1855: When the first news....—573
— No. 22200, November 1, 1855: Paris, Wednesday Evening.—572
— No. 22200, November 1, 1855: Russian Army of the South.—577, 578
— No. 22210, November 13, 1855: The Rights of Refugees.—581
— No. 22254, January 3, 1856: Constantinople, Dec. 24.—592
— No. 22275, January 28, 1856: The seat of the forthcoming negotiations....—600
— No. 22277, January 30, 1856: Assuredly Russia....—600
— No. 22278, January 31, 1856: We are informed....—600
— No. 22320, March 20, 1856: The Capitulation of Kars [I].—605, 606
— No. 22322, March 22, 1856: The Capitulation of Kars [II].—605, 606
— No. 22323, March 24, 1856: The Capitulation of Kars [III].—605, 606
INDEX OF PERIODICALS

Advertiser—see The Morning Advertiser

Allgemeine Zeitung—a conservative daily founded in 1798; it was published in Augsburg from 1810 to 1882.—183

The Argus—a liberal daily published in Melbourne from 1846(7) to 1934.—65

Augsburg Gazette—see Allgemeine Zeitung

The Birmingham Journal and Commercial Advertiser—a daily published from 1825 to 1869.—601

The Birmingham Daily Press—a daily founded in May 1855.—395

Chronicle—see The Morning Chronicle

Cobbett’s Weekly Political Register—a radical weekly published in London from 1802 to 1835 under different titles.—663, 665, 667

Le Constitutionnel—a daily published in Paris from 1815 to 1817 and from 1819 to 1870; the mouthpiece of the monarchist bourgeoisie (Thiers party) during the 1848 revolution; a Bonapartist newspaper after the 1851 coup d'état.—267, 278, 287, 358, 594, 599

The Daily News—a liberal newspaper, organ of the industrial bourgeoisie, published in London from 1846 to 1928.—30, 68, 167, 177, 280, 310, 481, 554


The Edinburgh Review, or Critical Journal—a liberal literary and political journal published in Edinburgh and London from 1802 to 1929, quarterly in the 1850s.—103
The Free Press. Journal of the Foreign Affairs Committees—a journal opposed to the Palmerston Government, published by David Urquhart and his followers in London from 1855 to 1865, weekly till April 1858, and later monthly; it was renamed Diplomatic Review in 1866; it carried a number of works by Marx.—672

Gazzetta di Roma—a daily, official organ of the Papal States government, published in 1848-49.—391

Gazzetta Ufficiale di Milano—a daily published from 1816 to 1875 under different titles; official organ of the Austrian authorities in Northern Italy till 1859.—619

Globe—see The Globe and Traveller

Le Globe. Journal Politique, Philosophique et Littéraire—a daily published in Paris from 1824 to 1832; organ of the Saint-Simon school from January 18, 1831.—139

The Globe and Traveller—a daily published in London from 1803 to 1921; organ of the Whigs till 1866, and later of the Conservatives.—298, 334

Herald—see The Morning Herald

Illustrated Times Weekly Newspaper—a newspaper published in London from 1855 to 1862 and from 1862 to 1872 (a new series).—281

L'Indépendance belge. Journal mondial d'informations politiques et littéraires—a daily founded in Brussels in 1831, organ of the liberals.—657

Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1944; organ of the moderate Orleanist opposition after the 1851 coup d'état.—556

The Lancet—a medical journal published in London from 1823 onwards.—310

The Leader—a liberal weekly founded in London in 1850.—95, 298

Lloyd's Weekly London Newspaper—a liberal newspaper founded in 1842; it came out under this title from 1843 to 1918.—291

Manchester Daily Examiner and Times—a liberal newspaper founded in 1848 by the merger of the Manchester Times and Manchester Examiner; supported the Free Traders in the 1840s and in 1850s; published till 1894 under different titles.—534, 535

The Manchester Guardian—a daily founded in 1821; organ of the Free Traders, and, from the mid-nineteenth century, of the Liberal Party.—23

Melbourne Argus—see The Argus

Le Moniteur universel—a daily founded in Paris in 1789; published under this title
from 1811; official government organ from 1799 to 1869.—70, 146, 147, 149, 150, 177, 211, 359, 364, 411, 488, 490, 519, 532, 535, 539, 563, 616-20, 694

*The Morning Advertiser*—a daily published in London from 1794 to 1934; organ of the radical bourgeoisie in the 1850s.—41, 49, 67, 68, 70, 73, 98, 167, 177, 342, 512, 619

*The Morning Chronicle*—a daily published in London from 1770 to 1862; organ of the Whigs in the 1840s, of the Peelites in the early 1850s, and later of the Conservatives.—29, 30, 122, 139, 167, 177, 178, 291, 667

*The Morning Herald*—a conservative daily published in London from 1780 to 1869.—69, 73, 80, 94, 118, 194, 212, 216, 259, 281, 298, 606


*Neue Oder-Zeitung*—a democratic daily published in Breslau (Wrocław) from March 1849 to 1855; founded as a result of the split in the editorial board of the opposition Catholic *Allgemeine Oder-Zeitung* established in 1846; came out twice a day, morning and afternoon; the most radical German newspaper in the 1850s. Marx was its correspondent in 1855.—18, 33, 34, 37-39, 81, 83, 84, 85, 110, 111, 113-16, 137, 146, 147, 148-51, 153, 154, 170-74, 180, 181-85, 254, 264-65, 298, 313, 315-18, 328-32, 380, 394, 396, 398-99, 421, 422, 504, 509-12, 519, 521-23, 537, 538, 539-40, 542, 546-49, 550-52

*New-York Daily Tribune*—a daily published from 1841 to 1924; organ of the Left-wing American Whigs till the mid-1850s, and later of the Republican Party; expressed progressive views, and denounced slavery; Marx and Engels contributed to it from August 1851 to March 1862.—6, 33, 37, 41, 81, 141, 147, 205, 207, 286, 377-82, 383-86, 388-90, 392-93, 398, 486-88, 489, 542, 615-20

*New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*—a special issue of the *New-York Daily Tribune* whose most important articles it reprinted; it came out on Tuesdays and Fridays.—504, 592, 619

*New-York Weekly Tribune*—a special issue of the *New-York Daily Tribune*, whose most important articles it reprinted; it came out on Saturdays.—504, 592

*Le Nord. Journal International*—a daily published in Paris and Brussels from 1855 to 1892 and from 1894 to 1899.—600, 603

*The People's Paper*—a Chartist weekly founded by Ernest Jones in London in May 1852 and appearing till 1858; Marx and Engels contributed to it from October 1852 to December 1856; Marx and Engels helped in its editing.—71, 168, 197, 208, 240, 241, 281, 477, 615, 655, 668

*The Pilot*—a Catholic weekly published in London.—281

*Political Register*—see *Cobbett's Weekly Political Register*

*The Portfolio*—a collection of diplomatic documents and papers published by David Urquhart in London; the series *The Portfolio; or a Collection of State Papers* came out from 1835 to 1837, and a new series, *The Portfolio. Diplomatic Review*, from 1843 to 1845.—19
Post—see The Morning Post

The Press—a weekly, organ of the Tories published in London from 1853 to 1866.—118-20

Preussische Lithographische Correspondenz—a semi-official daily of the Prussian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in Berlin from 1849 to 1865.—657

Punch, or the London Charivari—a comic weekly paper voicing liberal views, founded in London in 1841.—16, 212, 514

Putnam's Monthly Magazine of American Literature, Science and Art—a Republican magazine published in New York from 1853 to 1857; it carried Engels’ series of articles The Armies of Europe in 1855.—402

Reynolds' Newspaper. A Weekly Journal of Politics, History, Literature and General Intelligence—a radical newspaper published by George Reynolds in London from 1850; it was closely connected with the labour movement, and supported the Chartists in the early 1850s.—280, 281

Russky Invalid («Русский Инвалид»)—organ of the War Ministry published in St. Petersburg from 1813 to 1917, daily from 1816.—293, 552

Severnaya Pchela («Северная пчела»)—a political and literary newspaper, semi-official organ of the Tsarist Government, published in St. Petersburg from 1825 to 1864.—600


Town and Country Paper—a weekly published in London from May 1855 to June 1856.—281

Tribune—see New-York Daily Tribune

The Westminster Review—a radical quarterly published in London from 1824 to 1914.—381
SUBJECT INDEX

A
Albania, Albanians (Arnauts)—454, 456
American War of Independence, 1775-83 and European powers—584-86
Ancient Rome—269, 340
Ancient world—531
See also Ancient Rome
Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42—17, 513
Anglo-American war of 1812-14—405
Anti-Corn Law League—187, 209, 259, 389
See also Corn Laws; Free trade
Aristocracy (nobility), English
— general characteristics—21, 54, 194, 303, 387
— new nobility, its alliance with the bourgeoisie—51, 54, 389
— and the bourgeoisie in the 18th-19th cent.—54, 56, 61, 187, 192, 242, 258, 259, 310, 369, 389
— and political power—21, 53-54, 60, 194, 322
— its domination in the army and navy—51, 54, 422
— landed aristocracy, landlords—53-54, 387, 389
— financial—51, 53, 311, 321, 387, 389
Armaments, weapons—408, 411, 420, 426, 436, 447, 458, 462
Armenia, Armenians—589, 625, 634
Army
— general characteristics—288, 404-07
— and economy—406, 441, 469
— and social relations—406, 416-17, 447, 453, 469
— under capitalism—403-04
— and expatriate classes—51, 54, 60, 411, 421, 503
— and peasantry—144, 145
— irregular volunteer and guerrilla armies—453, 469
— militia—140, 144, 300, 417, 418, 461-62
— soldiers—4, 404-06, 411, 418, 433, 435, 455, 465
— non-commissioned officers—35, 43
— officers—421-24, 426, 427, 434, 435, 589-90
— generals—443-45
— Swiss mercenaries—405, 460-62
— Landsknechte—405, 434
— recruits—429, 432, 441-42, 575-77
— Belgian—412, 458, 466
— Danish—420, 464-65
— Dutch—412, 462-64
— of German states—5, 447-19
— Hungarian—407, 426, 427
— of Italian states—5, 460
— Neapolitan (of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies)—460-61
— Norwegian—463-65
— Portuguese—466
— Sardinian (Piedmontese)—5, 10, 407, 457-60
— Spanish—5, 405, 467-69
— Swedish—463-65
— Swiss—405, 461-62
— of the USA—404, 407, 467
— miscellaneous—432-33, 434, 569
See also Armaments, weapons; Army (in different countries); Artillery; Cavalry; Engineering troops; Infantry; War, wars

Army, Austrian—405, 413, 415, 418, 420, 424-29, 433, 444, 497, 501

Army, British
— general characteristics—516, 542, 547
— composition, organisation, armament—41-42, 144, 294, 396-97, 399, 405-08, 412, 414, 502
— its domination by aristocracy—54, 60, 503, 542
— selling of officers' commissions and corruption of high officers—51, 63-64
— as mercenary army—140, 418, 434
— corporal punishment—10, 33, 418-19, 501-03
— military art, military qualities—3, 5, 6, 10, 314, 316, 396-98, 405, 419-24, 445, 447, 465, 511, 549, 551, 571, 573
— shortcomings in its organisation and administration—34, 53, 59, 125-26, 128-31, 300, 416, 422, 423, 517
— poor officer cadres—34, 41, 42, 130-31, 421-24, 427, 590-91
— reorganisation in—25-27, 34, 131
— militia volunteers—140, 144, 300, 417
— miscellanea—320, 326, 524

See also Navy, British

Army, French
— composition, organisation, armament, military expenditures—144, 407-13, 426, 427, 429, 434, 441, 576, 603, 617-18
— as support of Bonapartism during the Second Empire—213, 366, 415, 602, 617, 619
— corruption of its commanders—601, 618
— revolutionary and oppositional moods—110, 602-03, 620
— its art of warfare, training, fighting qualities—3, 5, 314, 315, 405, 407, 410-11, 413-17, 424, 433, 510, 571, 579
— system of finding substitutes—411
— miscellanea—418, 501

Army, Prussian
— as a weapon of the reactionaries—433
— position of soldiers, drilling—433
— military art, training, military qualities—405, 413, 415, 420, 427, 433-36
— universal compulsory service and its realisation—432, 433
— Landwehr (army reserve)—429-34, 436, 454
— Landsturm (people's militia)—430
— miscellanea—418, 446, 501

Army, Russian
— and socio-economic backwardness of tsarist Russia—447
— its fighting qualities—405, 413, 433, 444-46, 526, 532, 552, 569-74, 580
— its art of warfare—3, 316, 443-44, 447, 510, 569-70

Army, Turkish—33, 136, 446, 451-56, 565, 570, 571, 588-90, 603, 613, 614, 631, 677, 695, 696

Artillery—263, 408, 409, 413, 415, 417, 421, 431, 434

Asia Minor—453, 633

Assimilation, national—159

Australia—55, 61, 64-66
— riot in Ballarat—62-64

See also Working class in Australia

Austria
— in the Middle Ages—425-26, 453
— during the 1848-49 Revolution—160, 425
— railways—496
— political system—161
— national question—89, 157-61, 427-28
— and France—597
— and Galicia—157
— and Italian states—161
— and Poland—157, 161
— and Prussia—107
— and Russia—39, 160, 425, 495
— prospects of revolution—89
See also Army, Austrian; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Crimean war of 1853-56; Peasantry
Austro-Italian war of 1848-49—4-5, 10, 160, 425, 427-28, 457, 459-60

B

Bank of England—166-68, 198-200, 535, 557
— bank restriction acts of 1797-1821—166-67, 388
— Bank Act of 1844-45—198-99
Bank of France—534, 536, 557
Banks—198-200, 310, 534, 535, 555, 557, 620, 657, 658
See also Bank of England; Bank of France
Bills of exchange—200, 293, 534
Bohemia, Bohemians (Czechs)—157-60, 690-91
Bonapartism—50, 617-19
See also France during the Second Empire
Bosnia—453, 454, 456
Bourgeois political economy—54-55, 60-61
Bourgeoisie—54, 61, 143, 168, 187, 389, 658
See also Bourgeoisie (in different countries)
Bourgeoisie, English
— general characteristics—31, 53, 54, 60, 143, 168, 195, 290
— alliance with the nobility which became bourgeois—51, 54, 389
— and aristocracy—54, 56, 187, 261, 369
— industrial—389
— commercial—146-48, 189, 191-95, 208, 240-41
— free trade—60, 258-59
— foreign policy of Free Traders, their cosmopolitanism—96, 120, 144, 195, 224, 227, 231, 246, 258, 369

C

California—55, 61
Canada—368
Carinthia, Carinthians—157, 159, 690
Caucasus—19
Chartism, Chartist movement
— People’s Charter, the Chartists’ political programme—47, 209, 242
— People’s Charter as a programme of establishing political rule of the proletariat—243
— and bourgeois radicals—47, 243
— in the 1850s—99-100, 121, 168, 195-97, 240-41, 304-07, 333, 334, 395, 524
— London Workers’ Association—243
— and the Polish question—478
Child labour—369-70
China as an object of colonial expansion—55-61
Church—51-52, 64, 95, 160, 302-03, 310, 384, 391-92, 660, 692
See also Clergy, the
Civilisation—3, 158, 160, 243, 268, 278, 294, 405, 447, 453, 689, 690
Class, classes—53-54, 56, 61, 168, 303, 304, 656, 660
Class struggle—304, 656
Clergy, the—79-80
Communism—656
Constitution
— class limitations of bourgeois constitution—379
Corn Laws
— general characteristics—16, 387, 389
— struggle against Corn Laws—60, 166, 209, 388, 389
— their repeal in 1846—51, 54, 385, 390, 391, 392
See also Anti-Corn Law League; Free trade

Corruption as a typical feature of bourgeois society—190, 378

Courts, judiciary system—16, 102, 190, 340, 661

Cracow, Cracow Republic—478, 497

Crimean war of 1853-56
— general remarks—32, 87, 91, 156, 201, 234, 275, 278-79, 284-89, 360, 403, 474, 484-85, 528, 570, 595-96, 598, 623
— and the working class and popular masses in European states—28, 70-71, 144, 303-04
— and the national question—233, 596
— and prospects of revolution—89, 145, 271, 278, 596
— war operations on the Danube in 1853-54—4, 9, 74, 75, 87, 136, 146-47, 212, 298, 454, 485, 526, 528, 532, 570, 596, 609, 628, 694
— battle of Oltenitza, November 4, 1853—456, 526, 532, 571
— battle of Citate, January 6, 1854—444, 456, 523, 532
— siege of Silistria in 1854—75, 134, 135, 445, 456, 482, 498, 564, 571, 577, 590, 695

— battle of Alma, September 20, 1854—3, 5, 71, 411, 444, 446, 565, 571, 685
— battle of Balaklava, October 25, 1854—12, 40, 70, 87, 102, 335, 417, 424, 445, 456, 507, 549, 685
— battle on the Chernaya, August 16, 1855—487, 490-91, 509-11, 520, 526, 527, 532, 564, 571, 573, 687, 695
— heroism of the defenders of Sevastopol—116-17, 135, 174, 175, 250, 254, 445-46, 552, 597
— and Turkey—33, 37, 269, 368, 451, 453, 456, 474, 566, 588, 589, 609, 610, 611, 628, 653, 654, 675, 680 — miscellaneous—405, 408, 558 
See also "Eastern question" 
Croatia, Croats—157, 425, 690 
Cuba—467 

D 
Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50—420, 465 
Danubian Principalities—143 
Dardanelles—18, 142, 300 
Democratic Polish Association (Polish émigrés' organisation, 1832-62)—477-79 
Denmark—395-96 
See also Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50 
Drunkenness (as social phenomenon)—369 

E 
"Eastern question"—160-61, 229, 248, 294 
See also Crimean war of 1853-56; Dardanelles 
Economic crises 
— and condition of the working people—55, 61 
— and prospects of socialist movement and revolution—55 
— prognostication of—23, 55, 61 
— their chronic character—55, 60 
— overproduction as the basic form of their manifestation—23, 55, 61 
— glut in the world market—54, 60 
— industrial, commercial—54, 60 
— critique of bourgeois theories of crises—54-55, 60-61 
Egyptian crisis of 1839-41—17, 71, 300 
Electoral system (in the bourgeois state) 
— as ruling classes' monopoly—208, 322 
— corruption—190, 378 
Emigrants, political 
— Polish—477-80, 588 
— French—121 
Emigration (as social phenomenon)—80, 368
Engineering troops—134-35, 175, 263, 408, 427, 435, 446, 597

England (Great Britain)
— general characteristics—51, 56, 61, 144, 145, 188, 242, 243, 417
— Glorious Revolution of 1688—51, 53, 63, 188
— and the French Revolution—283, 311
— in the first half of the 19th cent. (before 1848)—71, 195, 376-77, 384-85, 387-89, 393
— symptoms of crisis in the early 1850s—54-55, 60-61, 145, 198
— social and political system—49, 51, 53-54, 55-60, 62, 100-01
— classes, class struggle—145, 167, 168, 187, 304, 325-26, 370
— bourgeois rule, description of bourgeois social system—16, 50, 53, 54, 60, 177-78, 190, 303-07, 369, 513, 667-68
— constitutional monarchy—51, 53-54, 62, 69-70, 320, 379
— oligarchic nature of government—31, 49, 53-54, 57, 60, 194, 302, 311, 321, 338, 542
— and the army—63-64, 120-26, 320-21, 517, 664-66
— police—325-26
— two-party system as the instrument of domination by the ruling classes—50-51, 78, 187, 338, 339, 373-74
— political parties of the ruling classes (general characteristics)—24-25, 391
— coalition ministry of “All the Talents” (1853-55)—31, 53, 79, 130, 275, 382
— political crisis during the Crimean war of 1853-56—31, 59, 142-45, 168, 258
— Bonapartist methods in Palmerston’s policy, his attempts to establish personal dictatorship—50
— Peelites—8, 23, 45, 50, 130, 143, 224, 246, 258, 277, 391
— Free Traders as a party of industrial bourgeoisie—8, 31, 103, 168, 258
— Radicals—8, 25, 29, 44, 47, 222, 243, 375
— legislation—54, 96, 303-04, 308, 340, 386
— electoral system, electoral reforms—21-22, 47, 54, 190, 191, 196, 208-09, 242-43, 322, 338, 377-79
— bourgeois-democratic movement for electoral reform in the 1840s and in the 1850s—47, 51, 208-09, 243, 381-83, 393, 394
— preconditions and prospects of social revolution—56, 62, 145, 243
— the press—121-22, 281-82
— English Church and religion—51-52, 64, 302, 303, 310, 384, 390-91
— Catholic Church and religion—79-80, 391-92
— Catholic Emancipation Bill of 1829—51, 79, 391
— colonial policy (general characteristics)—295-96, 368
— colonial policy in Persia (Iran)—18
— colonial policy in Ireland—295, 383-86
— colonial policy in Canada—368
— projects of agrarian reforms in Ireland—79, 80, 342
— foreign policy, diplomacy (general characteristics)—15-17, 584
— aristocracy’s monopoly on foreign policy—394
— interconnection between foreign and home policies—9, 245
— foreign policy before the 19th cent.—584-86
— foreign policy in the first half of the 19th cent.—15-17, 19, 71, 388, 474, 586
— and the "Eastern question"—230-32, 233-34
— foreign policy during the Crimean war of 1853-56—143, 223-39, 245-48, 269, 275, 277, 367-68
— foreign policy of free-trade (industrial) bourgeoisie—15, 120, 143, 168, 224, 227, 231, 246, 258, 370
— and Argentina—17
— and Austria—108, 223, 498-99
— and France—9, 59, 70, 72, 74, 118, 286, 368, 470, 599
— and Greece—17, 18, 368
— and Holland—15, 585
— and Hungary—108
— and Italy—17, 475
— and Poland—15, 474
— and Portugal—17
— and Russia—17-19, 142, 143, 234, 584-86
— and Spain—17, 368
— and Sweden—17
— and Turkey—17, 18, 367-68
— and the USA—599, 600
See also Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42; Anglo-American war of 1812-14; Anti-Corn Law League; Aristocracy (nobility), English; Army, British; Bank of England; Bourgeoisie, English; Chartism, Chartist movement; Corn Laws; Crimean war of 1853-56; "Eastern question"; Literature; Manchester; Manchester School; Navy, British; Parliament, British; Tories, English; Urquhartism, Urquhartists; Wales; Whigs, English; Working class in Great Britain; Working-class movement in Great Britain; World market

Europe—89, 145, 691

F

Famine (as social phenomenon)—80, 389
Female labour—369-70
Fortification
— general features—435
— permanent work—175, 262, 435, 549
— strategic significance of fortresses—251-62, 528
— fortified camp—262-63, 528-29
— siege and defence of fortresses—90, 137, 148-49, 172, 261-63, 314, 528, 529, 547, 549

France
— general description—35, 144, 177, 242, 412, 414, 416, 557
— during the First Empire—441, 557
— during the Restoration—285, 603, 659
— July 1830 revolution and July monarchy—285, 558, 620
See also Army, French; Bank of France; France during the Second Empire; French Revolution; June insurrection of the Paris proletariat in 1848; Literature; Napoleonic wars; Working class in France

France during the Second Empire
— general features—615, 617, 618
— coup d’etat of December 2, 1851—9, 213, 416, 616-17
— agriculture—144
— trade—534, 535
— finances—293, 534, 557, 558, 601, 602, 620
— banks—534, 535, 557
— Crédit Mobilier—535, 620
— Stock Exchange, speculation—293, 558, 604, 657
— internal situation—212, 601-04
— corruption of the ruling circles—601, 615, 616, 620
— army as the bulwark of the Bonapartist regime—213, 268, 415-16, 602, 615, 617-20
— counter-revolutionary terrorism—60, 603, 615-17
— working class—144, 602, 603
— peasantry—110, 144, 212
— growth of opposition in all strata of the society—602-04
— growth of opposition in the army—110, 602, 603, 619
— Bonapartist regime and wars—86, 87, 91, 120, 142, 278, 484, 618-19
— and Austria—600
— and Britain—62, 69, 70, 118, 213, 286, 368, 470, 599, 600
— and Greece—92
— and Italy—35, 92
— and Russia—267, 286, 289, 600
— colonial policy of the Second Empire—35, 110, 286
See also Crimean war of 1853-56
Free trade—60, 258-59
French Revolution (18th cent.)—144, 311, 618

G

Galicia—157
Georgia—627
German Confederation (1815-66)—448
German philosophy—159, 161, 691
Germany
— general description—156, 434-35
— history—656, 657, 659
— economy—658-59
— education—660
— foreign policy—156-62, 462, 596
See also Army; Crimean war of 1853-56; German Confederation; Prussia

Greece—15, 18, 368

H

Habeas Corpus Act—386
Highland Gaels—426
“Historical Irony”
— as transformation of realisable intentions into their opposite—91
— examples of—91, 212, 617

Historiography
— its class nature, as expression of the ruling classes’ ideology—656
— bourgeois (19th cent.)—158, 514-15, 656
— bourgeois falsification of history—405, 656
History (as science)—158, 404, 691
See also “Historical Irony”; Historiography

See also Army; Crimean war of 1853-56; National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary

I

India
— its subjugation by Great Britain and conversion into a market for sale—49, 55, 61, 142, 418, 514
Industrial revolution—655-56

Infantry
— general features—5, 361, 405, 406, 414, 423, 434, 445, 446-47, 456
— in the Middle Ages—469
— light—5, 406, 414, 426, 465

Interests—81, 86, 90, 105, 107, 121, 142, 395, 659

Ireland
— general description—80, 426
— as British colony and citadel of English landlordism—295, 385-86
— agrarian relations—80, 342
— famine in Ireland as a result of British rule—389
— potato blight and famine (1845-47)—80, 389
— Repeal agitation—78, 79, 385-86
— Lichfield-House Compact of 1835—78, 79, 384
— Irish deputies in British Parliament (Irish Brigade, Irish Quarter)—58, 78-80, 130, 342-43, 392
— and English Established Church, persecution of Catholics—383-84
— struggle of Catholic population for equal rights, Catholic Emancipation Bill—51, 79, 391

Islam
— as a weapon of ruling classes, its fanaticism—455, 586

Italy—15, 428, 460-61
See also Army; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Crimean war of 1853-56; Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont); Literature; Papal States (Roman State)

J

Joint-stock companies—53, 310, 321, 535, 555, 620, 658, 659

June insurrection of the Paris proletariat in 1848
— its suppression by the bourgeoisie—616

K

Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont)—459-60
See also Army; Crimean war of 1853-56
Kraina (Carniola)—157, 690
Kurdistan, Kurds—453

L

Landed property, landowners—80, 387-89, 659
Large-scale industry—531, 656, 659
Law, legislation—54, 326, 340
Literary Association of the Friends of Poland (from 1832)—477-79
Literature
— English—247, 297, 374, 383, 480
— French—31, 303
— Italian—355, 382
— Slav—158-59

M

Manchester—247, 370, 531
Manchester School—8, 78, 103, 120, 168, 246, 247, 258, 259, 282
Masses, the, People, the
— antagonistic interests of the masses and exploiter classes—303
Military art
— its laws (rules of warfare)—88, 92-93, 202, 349
— strategy—92-93, 270-71, 435, 529, 627
— tactics—414-15, 420, 424, 426, 435, 463-64, 509-11, 528-29, 627
Military science
— military history—404-05
— military literature—423, 427, 435, 443
Military training—34, 42, 433, 578, 579
Monarchy, absolute—403
Money circulation and banks—198-290
Money market—198-200
See also Money circulation and banks
Morality—50, 656
Mortgage—661
Moscow—537, 538

N

Napoleonic wars
— general characteristics—88, 91-92, 204, 248, 261, 283, 414, 523, 549
— France’s wars with European coalitions (1804-15)—6, 11, 88, 91, 92, 106, 147, 204, 261, 263, 269, 288, 405, 412, 414, 427, 441, 444, 464, 469, 511, 529, 549, 559, 569-70, 579
— and Britain—190, 300, 311, 383, 502, 503
— and Prussia—106
— and Russia—283
— miscellanea—43, 414, 427, 514, 665
See also Wars of the First French Republic (late 18th-early 19th cent.)
Nation—145, 157-59, 404, 690, 691
See also Nationality; National question
Nationalism
— national prejudices—15, 144
Nationality—157-61, 425, 427, 428
National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary—425, 427-28, 569, 692-93
National question—89, 143, 144
See also Pan-Slavism, Polish question
Navy, British—53, 54, 59, 60, 515, 517

P

Pan-Slavism—156-62, 689, 690, 691-93
Papal States (Roman state)—460, 474
Paris—263
Parliament (in the bourgeois state)—100-01
See also Parliament, British
Parliament, British
— general features—54, 90, 187, 188, 226, 338, 340, 343, 380, 394
— House of Commons—53, 60, 68, 68, 190-92, 208, 213, 226, 322, 337-38, 340-41, 379
— Irish MPs (Irish Brigade)—58, 78-80, 130, 342-43, 391-92
— House of Lords—189-94, 661-70
Patriotic war of 1812 in Russia—88, 92, 407, 441, 475, 569, 574
Peasantry
— in Austria—661
— in England—144, 377
— in France—110, 144, 212
— in Ireland—86
Subject Index 829

— Polish—576
— in Prussia—661

Persia (Iran)—18, 625, 633

Petty bourgeoisie—145, 657

Poland, Poles—15, 18, 108, 157, 161, 284, 474, 477-80, 570, 576, 588-89, 596, 690

See also Cracow, Cracow Republic; Crimean war of 1853-56; Democratic Polish Association; Literary Association of the Friends of Poland; Peasantry; Polish question, the Polish question, the—89, 284, 477-78

Poor Laws—54, 188, 513

Press, the—121-23, 659

Probabilism—231

Prussia
— general characteristics—429, 430, 433-34, 661
— history—106, 657-61
— economy—429, 657-59
— social and political system—659-61
— foreign policy—39, 105-07, 283

See also Army, Prussian; Bourgeoisie, Prussian; Crimean war of 1853-56; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Germany; Peasantry

R

Railways—209-10, 658

Revolution—31, 80, 89, 655-56

See also Revolutions of 1848-49 in Europe

Revolutions of 1848-49 in Europe—31, 61, 71, 80, 145, 161, 267, 425, 427, 457, 460, 616, 655, 660, 661

Russia (Russian Empire)
— population—441
— serfdom—442
— in the first half of the 19th cent.—575, 576
— autocracy as the bulwark of reaction and counter-revolution—586-87
— state apparatus and officials—442, 443
— education—443
— Russian language—160
— religion—442
— foreign policy and diplomacy—38-39, 67, 269, 283, 284, 288, 576

— and Austria—39, 105, 156, 160, 271, 289, 496
— and England—59, 67, 143, 234, 584-85
— and France—269, 289, 441
— and Persia (Iran)—19
— and Prussia—105
— and Turkey—18-19, 584

See also Army, Russian; Crimean War of 1853-56; Moscow; Patriotic war of 1812 in Russia

Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74
— Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, 1774—229, 235

Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91—564-66, 697, 700, 701

Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29—571

Ruthenians—see Ukraine, the, Ukrainians

S

Science—158, 443, 655-56

See also History (as science)

Second Empire—see France during the Second Empire

Serbia, Serbs—157-60, 425, 428, 690-92

Seven Years' War, 1756-63—414, 528, 569, 570

Slavonians—157, 690, 691

Slavs—39, 89, 156-61, 425, 428, 689-93

Social system
— ancient, slave-owners’—531
— bourgeois, capitalist—60, 89, 531

Society—80, 243, 244, 656

See also Social system; Society, bourgeois

Society, bourgeois—61, 89, 243, 244, 531, 655, 665

State, the—244, 403

Stock Exchange—293, 558, 604, 657

Styria—157, 690

 Suffrage—243-44

See also Electoral system (in the bourgeois state)

Switzerland—460-63

T

Thirty Years' War, 1618-48—168, 464

Tories, English
— general features, class nature of the Party—50-51, 78, 187, 195, 390
— and electoral reform of 1832—377, 378
— and British foreign policy—118, 259
— decay of the Party—31
Treaty of Adrianople, 1829—17, 399, 451, 664-65
Treaty of Balta-Liman, 1849—17, 400
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833—18, 300, 400
Turkey
— history—453, 474, 485
— economic relations—367-68, 653
— social and political system—9, 451, 453, 454, 588, 589, 654
— role of national factor in its life—456, 588-89
— privileges of the Turks, special features of national character—126-27, 455, 588-89
— Albanians (Arnauts)—453, 454, 456
— oppression of the Slavs—39, 156-58, 160
— and Britain—18, 367, 625
— and Egypt—453, 454, 456
— and France—368
— and Prussia—104-05
— and Russia—18, 156, 232, 300, 625
— and Syria—71, 453, 454, 588
— and Tunisia—453, 454, 456
— as an object of colonial expansion—102, 104, 232, 235, 284, 286, 367-68, 456, 474
— religious question—160, 454
See also Army, Turkish; Crimean war of 1853-56; “Eastern question”; Egyptian crisis of 1839-41; Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74; Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91; Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29; Treaty of Adrianople, 1829; Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, 1833

W

Wales—426
War, wars—143, 144, 429, 430, 516
See also Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42; Anglo-American war of 1812-14; Austro-Italian war of 1848-49; Crimean war of 1853-56; Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50; Military art; Military science; Military training; Napoleonic wars; National liberation war of 1848-49 in Hungary; American War of Independence, 1775-83 and European powers; Patriotic war of 1812 in Russia; Russo-Turkish war of 1768-74; Russo-Turkish war of 1787-91; Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29; Thirty Years’ War, 1618-48; Wars of the First French Republic
Wars of the First French Republic (late 18th-early 19th cent.)—90-91, 106, 144, 261, 300, 311, 383, 462, 502, 569, 572, 599, 654, 664
Wealth—531
Whigs, English
— general features of the Party—49, 130, 188, 384, 388, 482
— class character of the Party—187, 387
— as a ruling party, its policy—78, 187, 188, 194, 195, 352-53, 377, 385, 388, 584
— policy on the Irish question—78-80, 383-86, 391
— Whiggism—15, 380
— decay of the Party—8
Working class—55, 145, 258, 655-56
— conditions of its life and work under capitalism—369-70
See also Working class (in different countries)
Working class in Australia—65-66
Working class in France—145, 602, 603
Working class in Great Britain—55, 95, 145, 243
See also Working-class movement in Great Britain
See also Chartism, Chartist movement
World market
— Britain’s monopoly—331
## Glossary of Geographical Names

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Original Name</th>
<th>Modern Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adrianople</td>
<td>Edirne</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aitodor</td>
<td>Goristoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akaltzik</td>
<td>Akhaltsikh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aleppo (Haleb)</td>
<td>Aleppo or Haleb-es-Shabba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alexandropol</td>
<td>Leninakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arbrot</td>
<td>Rybatskoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Araxes (river)</td>
<td>Aras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Astrachan</td>
<td>Astrakhan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austerlitz</td>
<td>Slavkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baidar</td>
<td>Onlinoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakshiserai</td>
<td>Bakhchisarai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batum (Batoum)</td>
<td>Batumi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayazid</td>
<td>Dogubayazit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bazardshik (Bazargic)</td>
<td>Tolbukhin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berdiansk</td>
<td>Ospenko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Braila (Ibrailla, Brai-lov)</td>
<td>Bráila</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breslau</td>
<td>Wroclaw</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Busaco</td>
<td>Bussaco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candia</td>
<td>Crete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Careening Bay</td>
<td>Kilen Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carlzburg</td>
<td>Alba Julia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charkoff</td>
<td>Kharkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherson</td>
<td>Kherson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chotin</td>
<td>Hotin or Khotin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coblenz</td>
<td>Koblenz or Koblenz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colberg</td>
<td>Kolobrzeg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantinople</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culm</td>
<td>Chlumec</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dantzic (Danzig)</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>(Yekaterinoslav)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erzeroum</td>
<td>Erzerum or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funfkn</td>
<td>Funfkn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galata</td>
<td>Galati</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallipoli</td>
<td>Gelibolu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gumri—see Alexandropol</td>
<td>Gumri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haly (river)</td>
<td>Kizil Irmak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingfors</td>
<td>Helsinki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inkermann</td>
<td>Inkerman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaffa</td>
<td>Theodosia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafat</td>
<td>Calafat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kars Chai (river)</td>
<td>Kars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamtchatka</td>
<td>Kamchatka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katsha</td>
<td>Kacha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamiesh</td>
<td>Kamyshev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kertch</td>
<td>Kerch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kief</td>
<td>Kiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Königsberg</td>
<td>Kaliningrad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krain</td>
<td>Carniol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurulu</td>
<td>Stolbovoye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kutais</td>
<td>Kutais</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lemberg</td>
<td>Lvov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malakoff</td>
<td>Malakhov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memel</td>
<td>Klaipeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasgen (Nargö)</td>
<td>Naisar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nikolaieff</td>
<td>Nikolayev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olmütz</td>
<td>Olomouc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oltenitza</td>
<td>Olteniža</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olti</td>
<td>Oltu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otshakoff</td>
<td>Ochakov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampeluna</td>
<td>Pamplona</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekin</td>
<td>Peking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persia</td>
<td>Iran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Rico (isl)</td>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Posen</td>
<td>Poznań</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preussisch Eylau</td>
<td>Bagrationovsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redout Kaleh</td>
<td>Kulevi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reval (Revel)</td>
<td>Tallinn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rioni</td>
<td>Rion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustchuk</td>
<td>Ruse or Rusčuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint-Jean-d'Acre</td>
<td>Akka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scinde</td>
<td>Sind or Sindh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>