Karl Marx

REVOLUTIONARY SPAIN
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The revolution in Spain has now so far taken on the appearance of a permanent condition that, as our correspondent at London\(^a\) has informed us, the wealthy and conservative classes have begun to emigrate and to seek security in France.\(^b\) This is not surprising; Spain has never adopted the modern French fashion, so generally in vogue in 1848, of beginning and accomplishing a revolution in three days.\(^c\) Her efforts in that line are complex and more prolonged. Three years seems to be the shortest limit to which she restricts herself, while her revolutionary cycle sometimes expands to nine. Thus her first revolution in the present century extended from 1808 to 1814; the second from 1820 to 1823; and the third from 1834 to 1843. How long the present one will continue, or in what it will result, it is impossible for the keenest politician to foretell; but it is not much to say that there is no other part of Europe, not even Turkey and the Russian war, which offers so profound an interest to the thoughtful observer, as does Spain at this instant.

Insurrectionary risings are as old in Spain as that sway of court favorites against which they are usually directed. Thus in the middle of the fifteenth century the aristocracy revolted against King Juan II\(^b\) and his favorite, Don Alvaro de Luna. In the fifteenth century still more serious commotions took place against King Henry IV and the head of his camarilla, Don Juan de Pacheco, Marquis de Villena. In the seventeenth century the people at Lisbon tore to pieces Vasconcellos, the Sartorius of the

\(^a\) F. A. Pulszky.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) John II.— *Ed.*
Spanish Viceroy in Portugal, as they did at Catalonia with Santa Coloma, the favorite of Philip IV. At the end of the same century, under the reign of Carlos II, the people of Madrid rose against the Queen’s camarilla, composed of the Countess de Berlepsch and the Counts Oropesa and Melgar, who had imposed on all provisions entering the capital an oppressive duty, which they shared among themselves. The people marched to the royal palace, forced the King to appear on the balcony, and himself to denounce the Queen’s camarilla. They then marched to the palaces of the Counts Oropesa and Melgar, plundered them, destroyed them by fire, and tried to lay hold of their owners, who, however, had the good luck to escape, at the cost of perpetual exile. The event which occasioned the insurrectionary rising in the fifteenth century was the treacherous treaty which the favorite of Henry IV, the Marquis de Villena, had concluded with the King of France, according to which Catalonia was to be surrendered to Louis XI. Three centuries later, the treaty of Fontainebleau, concluded on October 27, 1807, by which the favorite of Carlos IV and the minion of his Queen, Don Manuel Godoy, the Prince of Peace, contracted with Bonaparte for the partition of Portugal and the entrance of the French armies into Spain, caused a popular insurrection at Madrid against Godoy, the abdication of Carlos IV, the assumption of the throne by Ferdinand VII, his son, the entrance of the French army into Spain, and the following war of independence. Thus the Spanish war of independence commenced with a popular insurrection against the camarilla, then personified in Don Manuel Godoy, just as the civil war of the fifteenth century commenced with the rising against the camarilla, then personified in the Marquis de Villena. So, too, the revolution of 1854 commenced with the rising against the camarilla, personified in the Count San Luis.

Notwithstanding these ever-recurring insurrections, there has been in Spain, up to the present century, no serious revolution, except the war of the Holy League in the times of Carlos I, or Charles V, as the Germans call him. The immediate pretext, as usual, was then furnished by the clique who, under the auspices of Cardinal Adrian, the Viceroy, himself a Fleming, exasperated the Castilians by their rapacious insolence, by selling the public offices to the highest bidder, and by open traffic in law-suits. The opposition against the Flemish camarilla was only at the surface of

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a María Anna of Neuburg.—Ed.
b María Luisa of Parma.—Ed.
the movement. At its bottom was the defense of the liberties of medieval Spain against the encroachments of modern absolutism.

The material basis of the Spanish monarchy having been laid by the union of Aragon, Castile and Granada, under Ferdinand the Catholic, and Isabella I, Charles I attempted to transform that still feudal monarchy into an absolute one. Simultaneously he attacked the two pillars of Spanish liberty, the Cortes and the Ayuntamientos—299—the former a modification of the ancient Gothic concilia, and the latter transmitted almost without interruption from the Roman times, the Ayuntamientos exhibiting the mixture of the hereditary and elective character proper to the Roman municipalities. As to municipal self-government, the towns of Italy, of Provence, Northern Gaul, Great Britain, and part of Germany, offer a fair similitude to the then state of the Spanish towns; but neither the French States General,300 nor the British Parliaments of the Middle Ages, are to be compared with the Spanish Cortes. There were circumstances in the formation of the Spanish kingdom peculiarly favorable to the limitation of royal power. On the one side, small parts of the Peninsula were recovered at a time, and formed into separate kingdoms, during the long struggles with the Arabs. Popular laws and customs were engendered in these struggles. The successive conquests, being principally effected by the nobles, rendered their power excessive, while they diminished the royal power. On the other hand, the inland towns and cities rose to great consequence, from the necessity people found themselves under of residing together in places of strength, as a security against the continual irruptions of the Moors; while the peninsular formation of the country, and constant intercourse with Provence and Italy, created first-rate commercial and maritime cities on the coast. As early as the fourteenth century, the cities formed the most powerful part in the Cortes, which were composed of their representatives, with those of the clergy and the nobility. It is also worthy of remark, that the slow recovery from Moorish dominion through an obstinate struggle of almost eight hundred years, gave the Peninsula, when wholly emancipated, a character altogether different from that of cotemporaneous Europe, Spain finding itself, at the epoch of European resurrection, with the manners of the Goths and the Vandals in the North, and with those of the Arabs in the South.

Charles I having returned from Germany, where the imperial dignity had been bestowed upon him, the Cortes assembled at Valladolid, in order to receive his oath to the ancient laws and to
invest him with the crown. Charles, declining to appear, sent commissioners who, he pretended, were to receive the oath of allegiance on the part of the Cortes. The Cortes refused to admit these commissioners to their presence, notifying the monarch that, if he did not appear and swear to the laws of the country, he should never be acknowledged as King of Spain. Charles thereupon yielded; he appeared before the Cortes and took the oath—as historians say, with a very bad grace. The Cortes on this occasion told him: "You must know, Señor, that the King is but the paid servant of the nation." Such was the beginning of the hostilities between Charles I and the towns. In consequence of his intrigues, numerous insurrections broke out in Castile, the Holy League of Avila was formed, and the united towns convoked the assembly of the Cortes at Tordesillas, whence, on October 20, 1520, a "protest against the abuses" was addressed to the King, in return for which he deprived all the deputies assembled at Tordesillas of their personal rights. Thus civil war had become inevitable; the commoners appealed to arms; their soldiers under the command of Padilla seized the fortress of Torre Lobatón, but were ultimately defeated by superior forces at the battle of Villalar on April 23, 1521. The heads of the principal "conspirators" rolled on the scaffold, and the ancient liberties of Spain disappeared.

Several circumstances conspired in favor of the rising power of absolutism. The want of union between the different provinces deprived their efforts of the necessary strength; but it was, above all, the bitter antagonism between the classes of the nobles and the citizens of the towns which Charles employed for the degradation of both. We have already mentioned that since the fourteenth century the influence of the towns was prominent in the Cortes, and since Ferdinand the Catholic, the Holy Brotherhood (Santa Hermandad) had proved a powerful instrument in the hands of the towns against the Castilian nobles, who accused them of encroachments on their ancient privileges and jurisdiction. The nobility, therefore, were eager to assist Carlos I in his project of suppressing the Holy League. Having crushed their armed resistance, Carlos occupied himself with the reduction of the municipal privileges of the towns, which, rapidly declining in population, wealth and importance, soon lost their influence in the Cortes. Carlos now turned round upon the nobles, who had assisted him in putting down the liberties of the towns, but who themselves retained a considerable political importance. Mutiny in his army for want of pay obliged him, in 1539, to assemble the
Cortes, in order to obtain a grant of money. Indignant at the misapplication of former subsidies to operations foreign to the interests of Spain, the Cortes refused all supplies. Carlos dismissed them in a rage; and, the nobles having insisted on a privilege of exemption from taxes, he declared that those who claimed such a right could have no claim to appear in the Cortes, and consequently excluded them from that assembly. This was the death-blow of the Cortes, and their meetings were henceforth reduced to the performance of a mere court ceremony. The third element in the ancient constitution of the Cortes, viz: the clergy, enlisted since Ferdinand the Catholic under the banner of the Inquisition, had long ceased to identify its interests with those of feudal Spain. On the contrary, by the Inquisition, the Church was transformed into the most formidable tool of absolutism.

If after the reign of Carlos I the decline of Spain, both in a political and social aspect, exhibited all those symptoms of inglorious and protracted putrefaction so repulsive in the worst times of the Turkish Empire, under the Emperor at least the ancient liberties were buried in a magnificent tomb. This was the time when Vasco Núñes de Balboa planted the banner of Castile upon the shores of Darien, Cortés in Mexico, and Pizarro in Peru; when Spanish influence reigned supreme in Europe, and the Southern imagination of the Iberians was bewildered with visions of Eldorados, chivalrous adventures, and universal monarchy. Then Spanish liberty disappeared under the clash of arms, showers of gold, and the terrible illuminations of the auto-da-fe.303

But how are we to account for the singular phenomenon that, after almost three centuries of a Habsburg dynasty, followed by a Bourbon dynasty—either of them quite sufficient to crush a people—the municipal liberties of Spain more or less survive? that in the very country where of all the feudal states absolute monarchy first arose in its most unmitigated form, centralization has never succeeded in taking root? The answer is not difficult. It was in the sixteenth century that were formed the great monarchies which established themselves everywhere on the downfall of the conflicting feudal classes—the aristocracy and the towns. But in the other great States of Europe absolute monarchy presents itself as a civilizing center, as the initiator of social unity. There it was the laboratory in which the various elements of society were so mixed and worked, as to allow the towns to change the local independence and sovereignty of the Middle Ages for the general rule of the middle classes, and the common sway of civil society.304 In Spain, on the contrary, while the aristocracy sunk
into degradation without losing their worst privilege, the towns lost their medieval power without gaining modern importance.

Since the establishment of absolute monarchy they have vegetated in a state of continuous decay. We have not here to state the circumstances, political or economical, which destroyed Spanish commerce, industry, navigation and agriculture. For the present purpose it is sufficient to simply recall the fact. As the commercial and industrial life of the towns declined, internal exchanges became rare, the mingling of the inhabitants of different provinces less frequent, the means of communication neglected, and the great roads gradually deserted. Thus the local life of Spain, the independence of its provinces and communes, the diversified state of society originally based on the physical configuration of the country, and historically developed by the detached manner in which the several provinces emancipated themselves from the Moorish rule, and formed little independent commonwealths—was now finally strengthened and confirmed by the economical revolution which dried up the sources of national activity. And while the absolute monarchy found in Spain material in its very nature repulsive to centralization, it did all in its power to prevent the growth of common interests arising out of a national division of labor and the multiplicity of internal exchanges—the very basis on which alone a uniform system of administration and the rule of general laws can be created. Thus the absolute monarchy in Spain, bearing but a superficial resemblance to the absolute monarchies of Europe in general, is rather to be ranged in a class with Asiatic forms of government. Spain, like Turkey, remained an agglomeration of mismanaged republics with a nominal sovereign at their head. Despotism changed character in the different provinces with the arbitrary interpretation of the general laws by viceroys and governors; but despotic as was the government it did not prevent the provinces from subsisting with different laws and customs, different coins, military banners of different colors, and with their respective systems of taxation. The oriental despotism attacks municipal self-government only when opposed to its direct interests, but is very glad to allow those institutions to continue so long as they take off its shoulders the duty of doing something and spare it the trouble of regular administration.

Thus it happened that Napoleon, who, like all his cotemporaries, considered Spain as an inanimate corpse, was fatally surprised at the discovery that when the Spanish State was dead, Spanish society was full of life, and every part of it overflowing
Title page of one of Marx's notebooks containing excerpts on the history of Spain
with powers of resistance. By the treaty of Fontainebleau he had got his troops to Madrid; by alluring the royal family into an interview at Bayonne he had forced Carlos IV to retract his abdication, and then to make over to him his dominions; and he had intimidated Ferdinand VII into a similar declaration. Carlos IV, his Queen and the Prince of Peace conveyed to Compiègne, Ferdinand VII and his brothers imprisoned in the castle of Valençay, Bonaparte conferred the throne of Spain on his brother Joseph, assembled a Spanish Junta at Bayonne, and provided them with one of his ready-made constitutions. Seeing nothing alive in the Spanish monarchy except the miserable dynasty which he had safely locked up, he felt quite sure of this confiscation of Spain. But, only a few days after his coup de main, he received the news of an insurrection at Madrid. Murat, it is true, quelled that tumult by killing about 1,000 people; but when this massacre became known, an insurrection broke out in Asturias, and soon afterward embraced the whole monarchy. It is to be remarked that this first spontaneous rising originated with the people, while the “better” classes had quietly submitted to the foreign yoke.

Thus it is that Spain was prepared for her more recent revolutionary career, and launched into the struggles which have marked her development in the present century. The facts and influences we have thus succinctly detailed still act in forming her destinies and directing the impulses of her people. We have presented them as necessary not only to an appreciation of the present crisis, but of all she has done and suffered since the Napoleonic usurpation—a period now of nearly fifty years—not without tragic episodes and heroic efforts,—indeed, one of the most touching and instructive chapters in all modern history.
We have already laid before our readers a survey of the earlier revolutionary history of Spain, as a means of understanding and appreciating the developments which that nation is now offering to the observation of the world. Still more interesting, and perhaps equally valuable as a source of present instruction, is the great national movement that attended the expulsion of the Bonapartes, and restored the Spanish Crown to the family in whose possession it yet remains. But to rightly estimate that movement, with its heroic episodes and memorable exhibition of vitality in a people supposed to be moribund, we must go back to the beginning of the Napoleonic assault on the nation. The efficient cause of the whole was perhaps first stated in the treaty of Tilsit, which was concluded on July 7, 1807, and is said to have received its complement through a secret convention, signed by Prince Kurakin and Talleyrand. It was published in the Madrid *Gaceta* on August 25, 1812, containing, among other things, the following stipulations:

"Art. I. Russia is to take possession of European Turkey, and to extend her possessions in Asia as far as she may think it convenient.

"Art. II. The Bourbon dynasty in Spain and the house of Braganza in Portugal will cease to reign. Princes of the Bonaparte family will succeed to both of these crowns."

Supposing this treaty to be authentic, and its authenticity is scarcely disputed, even in the recently published memoirs of King Joseph Bonaparte,\(^{307}\) it formed the true reason for the French invasion of Spain in 1808, while the Spanish commotions of that
time would seem to be linked by secret threads with the destinies of Turkey.

When, consequent upon the Madrid massacre and the transactions at Bayonne, simultaneous insurrections broke out in Asturias, Galicia, Andalusia and Valencia, and a French army occupied Madrid, the four northern fortresses of Pamplona, San Sebastian, Figueras and Barcelona had been seized by Bonaparte under false pretenses; part of the Spanish army had been removed to the island of Fünen, destined for an attack upon Sweden; lastly, all the constituted authorities, military, ecclesiastic, judicial and administrative, as well as the aristocracy, exhorted the people to submit to the foreign intruder. But there was one circumstance to compensate for all the difficulties of the situation. Thanks to Napoleon, the country was rid of its King, its royal family, and its government. Thus the shackles were broken which might else have prevented the Spanish people from displaying their native energies. How little they were able to resist the French under the command of their Kings and under ordinary circumstances, had been proved by the disgraceful campaigns of 1794 and 1795.308

Napoleon had summoned the most distinguished persons in Spain to meet him at Bayonne, and to receive from his hands a King\(^a\) and a Constitution. With very few exceptions, they appeared there. On June 7, 1808, King Joseph received at Bayonne a deputation of the grandees of Spain, in whose name the Duke of Infantado, Ferdinand VII's most intimate friend, addressed him as follows:

"Sire, the grandees of Spain have at all times been celebrated for their loyalty to their Sovereign, and in them your Majesty will now find the same fidelity and adhesion."\(^b\)

The royal Council of Castile assured poor Joseph that "he was the principal branch of a family destined by Heaven to reign." Not less abject was the congratulation of the Duke del Parque, at the head of a deputation representing the army. On the following day the same persons published a proclamation,\(^c\) enjoining general submission to the Bonaparte dynasty. On July 7, 1808, the new Constitution was signed by 91 Spaniards of the highest distinction; among them Dukes, Counts and Marquises, as well as several

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\(^a\) Joseph Bonaparte.— Ed.

\(^b\) Quoted from [Bonaparte, Joseph.] Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph, T. IV, p. 290.— Ed.

\(^c\) R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, Vol. I, pp. 318-21.— Ed.
heads of the religious orders. During the discussions on that Constitution, all they found cause to remonstrate against was the repeal of their old privileges and exemptions. The first Ministry and the first royal household of Joseph were the same persons who had formed the ministry and the royal household of Ferdinand VII. Some of the upper classes considered Napoleon as the providential regenerator of Spain; others as the only bulwark against revolution; none believing in the chances of national resistance.

Thus from the very beginning of the Spanish War of Independence the high nobility and the old Administration lost all hold upon the middle classes and upon the people, because of their having deserted them at the commencement of the struggle. On the one side stood the Afrancesados (the Frenchified), and on the other the nation. At Valladolid, Cartagena, Granada, Jaen, San Lucar, Carolina, Ciudad Rodrigo, Cadiz and Valencia, the most prominent members of the old Administration—governors, generals, and other marked personages presumed to be French agents and obstacles to the national movement—fell victims to the infuriated people. Everywhere the existing authorities were displaced. Some months previous to the rising, on March 19, 1808, the popular commotions that had taken place at Madrid, intended to remove from their posts El Choricero (the sausage-maker, a nickname of Godoy) and his obnoxious satellites. This object was now gained on a national scale, and with it the internal revolution was accomplished so far as contemplated by the masses, and as not connected with resistance to the foreign intruder. On the whole, the movement appeared to be directed rather against revolution than for it. National by proclaiming the independence of Spain from France, it was at the same time dynastic by opposing the “beloved” Ferdinand VII to Joseph Bonaparte; reactionary by opposing the old institutions, customs, and laws to the rational innovations of Napoleon; superstitious and fanatical by opposing “holy religion,” against what was called French Atheism, or the destruction of the special privileges of the Roman Church. The priests, terrified by the fate that had fallen upon their brethren in France, fostered the popular passions in the interest of self-preservation.

"The patriotic fire," says Southey, “flamed higher for this holy oil of superstition."  

All the wars of independence waged against France bear in common the stamp of regeneration, mixed up with reaction; but nowhere to such a degree as in Spain. The King appeared in the imagination of the people in the light of a romantic prince, forcibly abused and locked up by a giant robber. The most fascinating and popular epochs of their past were encircled with the holy and miraculous traditions of the war of the cross against the crescent; and a great portion of the lower classes were accustomed to wear the livery of mendicants and live upon the sanctified patrimony of the Church. A Spanish author, Don José Clemente Carniceró, published in the years 1814 and '16, the following series of works: *Napoleon, the True Don Quixote of Europe; Principal Events of the Glorious Revolution of Spain; The Inquisition Rightly Re-established*; it is sufficient to note the titles of these books to understand this one aspect of the Spanish revolution which we meet with in the several manifestoes of the provincial juntas, all of them proclaiming the King, their holy religion, and the country, and some even telling the people that

"their hopes of a better world were at stake, and in very imminent danger."^b

However, if the peasantry, the inhabitants of small inland cities, and the numerous army of the mendicants, frocked and unfrocked, all of them deeply imbued with religious and political prejudices, formed the great majority of the national party, it contained on the other hand an active and influential minority which considered the popular rising against the French invasion as the signal given for the political and social regeneration of Spain. This minority was composed of the inhabitants of the seaports, commercial towns, and part of the provincial capitals, where, under the reign of Charles V, the material conditions of modern society had developed themselves to a certain degree. They were strengthened by the more cultivated portion of the upper and middle classes, authors, physicians, lawyers, and even priests, for whom the Pyrenees had formed no sufficient barrier against the invasion of the philosophy of the XVIIIth century. As a true manifesto of this faction may be considered the famous memorandum of Jovellanos on the improvements of agriculture and the agrarian law, published in 1795, and drawn up by order of the

^a J.C. Carniceró, *Napoleon o El verdadero D. Quixote de la Europa; Historia razonada de los principales sucesos de la gloriosa revolución de España; La Inquisición justamente restablecida.*—Ed.

^b Quoted from the anonymous book: *The Crisis of Spain*, pp. 21-22.—Ed.
royal Council of Castile. There was, finally, the youth of the middle classes, such as the students of the University, who had eagerly adopted the aspirations and principles of the French Revolution, and who, for a moment, even expected to see their country regenerated by the assistance of France.

So long as the common defense of the country alone was concerned, the two great elements composing the national party remained in perfect union. Their antagonism did not appear till they met together in the Cortes, on the battleground of a new Constitution there to be drawn up. The revolutionary minority, in order to foment the patriotic spirit of the people, had not hesitated themselves to appeal to the national prejudices of the old popular faith. Favorable to the immediate objects of national resistance, as these tactics might have appeared, they could not fail to prove fatal to this minority when the time had arrived for the conservative interests of the old society to intrench themselves behind these very prejudices and popular passions, with a view of defending themselves against the proper and ulterior plans of the revolutionists.

When Ferdinand left Madrid upon the summons of Bonaparte, he had established a Supreme Junta of government under the Presidency of the Infante Don Antonio. But in May this Junta had already disappeared. There existed then no central government, and the insurgent towns formed juntas of their own, presided over by those of the provincial capitals. These provincial juntas constituted, as it were, so many independent governments, each of which set on foot an army of its own. The Junta of Representatives at Oviedo declared that the entire sovereignty had devolved into their hands, proclaimed war against Bonaparte, and sent deputies to England to conclude an armistice. The same was done afterward by the Junta of Seville. It is a curious fact that by the mere force of circumstances these exalted Catholics were driven to an alliance with England, a power which the Spaniards were accustomed to look upon as the incarnation of the most damnable heresy, and little better than the Grand Turk himself. Attacked by French Atheism, they were thrown into the arms of British Protestantism. No wonder that Ferdinand VII, on his return to Spain, declared, in a decree re-establishing the Holy Inquisition, that one of the causes

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a G. M. Jovellanos, Informe de la Sociedad económica de esta corte al real y supremo consejo de Castilla, en el expediente de ley agraria.—Ed.
"that had altered the purity of religion in Spain was the sojourn of foreign troops of different sects, all of them equally infected with hatred against the holy Roman Church."a

The provincial juntas which had so suddenly sprung into life, altogether independent of each other, conceded a certain, but very slight and undefined degree of ascendancy to the Supreme Junta of Seville, that city being regarded as the capital of Spain while Madrid was in the hands of the foreigner. Thus a very anarchical kind of federal government was established, which the shock of opposite interests, local jealousies, and rival influences made a rather bad instrument for bringing unity into the military command, and to combine the operations of a campaign.

The addresses to the people issued by these several juntas, while displaying all the heroic vigor of a people suddenly awakened from a long lethargy and roused by an electric shock into a feverish state of activity, are not free from that pompous exaggeration, that style of mingled buffoonery and bombast, and that redundant grandiloquence which caused Sismondi to put upon Spanish literature the epithet of Oriental. b They exhibit no less the childish vanity of the Spanish character, the members of the juntas for instance assuming the title of Highness and loading themselves with gaudy uniforms.

There are two circumstances connected with these juntas—the one showing the low standard of the people at the time of their rising, while the other was detrimental to the progress of the revolution. The juntas were named by general suffrage; but “the very zeal of the lower classes displayed itself in obedience.” They generally elected only their natural superiors, the provincial nobility and gentry backed by clergymen and very few notabilities of the middle class. So conscious were the people of their own weakness that they limited their initiative to forcing the higher classes into resistance against the invader, without pretending to share in the direction of that resistance. At Seville, for instance, “the first thought of the people was that the parochial clergy and the heads of the Convents should assemble to choose the members of the junta.” Thus the juntas were filled with persons chosen on account of their previous station, and very far from being revolutionary leaders. On the other hand, the people when

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a Decree of King Ferdinand VII of Spain of July 21, 1814. Le Moniteur universel, No. 214, August 2, 1814.—Ed.

b Sismondi, De la Littérature du Midi de l'Europe, T. IV, pp. 259-60.—Ed.
appointing these authorities did not think either of limiting their power or of fixing a term to their duration. The juntas, of course, thought only of extending the one and of perpetuating the other. Thus these first creations of the popular impulse at the commencement of the revolution remained during its whole course as so many dykes against the revolutionary current when threatening to overflow.

On July 20, 1808, when Joseph Bonaparte entered Madrid, 14,000 French, under Generals Dupont and Vedel, were forced by Castaños to lay down their arms at Bailén, and Joseph a few days afterward had to retire from Madrid to Burgos. There were two events besides which greatly encouraged the Spaniards; the one being the expulsion of Lefebvre from Saragossa by General Palafox, and the other the arrival of the army of the Marquis de la Romana, at Coruña, with 7,000 men, who had embarked from the island of Fünen in spite of the French, in order to come to the assistance of their country.

It was after the battle of Bailén that the revolution came to a head, and that part of the high nobility who had accepted the Bonaparte dynasty or wisely kept back, came forward to join the popular cause—an advantage to that cause of a very doubtful character.
The division of power among the provincial juntas had saved Spain from the first shock of the French invasion under Napoleon, not only by multiplying the resources of the country, but also by putting the invader at a loss for a mark whereat to strike; the French being quite amazed at the discovery that the center of Spanish resistance was nowhere and everywhere. Nevertheless, shortly after the capitulation of Bailén and the evacuation of Madrid by Joseph, the necessity of establishing some kind of central government became generally felt. After the first successes, the dissensions between the provincial juntas had grown so violent that Seville, for instance, was barely prevented by General Castaños from marching against Granada. The French army which, with the exception of the forces under Marshal Bessières, had withdrawn to the line of the Ebro in the greatest confusion, so that, if vigorously harassed, it would then have easily been dispersed, or at least compelled to repass the frontier, was thus allowed to recover and to take up a strong position. But it was, above all, the bloody suppression of the Bilbao insurrection by General Merlin,309 which evoked a national cry against the jealousies of the juntas and the easy laissez-faire of the commanders. The urgency of combining military movements; the certainty that Napoleon would soon reappear at the head of a victorious army, collected from the banks of the Niemen, the Oder, and the shores of the Baltic; the want of a general authority for concluding treaties of alliance with Great Britain or other foreign powers, and for keeping up the connection with, and receiving
tribute from Spanish America; the existence at Burgos of a French central power, and the necessity of setting up altar against altar—all these circumstances conspired to force the Seville Junta to resign, however reluctantly, its ill-defined and rather nominal supremacy, and to propose to the several provincial juntas to select each from its own body two deputies, the assembling of whom was to constitute a Central Junta, while the provincial juntas were to remain invested with the internal management of their respective districts, "but under due subordination to the General Government." \(^a\) Thus the Central Junta, composed of 35 deputies from provincial juntas (34 for the Spanish juntas, and one for the Canary Islands), met at Aranjuez on September 26, 1808, just one day before the potentates of Russia and Germany prostrated themselves before Napoleon at Erfurt.\(^310\)

Under revolutionary, still more than under ordinary circumstances, the destinies of armies reflect the true nature of the civil government. The Central Junta, charged with the expulsion of the invaders from the Spanish soil, was driven by the success of the hostile arms from Madrid to Seville, and from Seville to Cadiz, there to expire ignominiously. Its reign was marked by a disgraceful succession of defeats, by the annihilation of the Spanish armies, and lastly by the dissolution of regular warfare into guerrilla exploits. As said Urquijo, a Spanish nobleman, to Cuesta, the Captain-General of Castile, on April 3, 1808:

> "Our Spain is a Gothic edifice, composed of heterogeneous morsels, with as many forces, privileges, legislations, and customs, as there are provinces. There exists in her nothing of what they call public spirit in Europe. These reasons will prevent the establishment of any central power of so solid a structure as to be able to unite our national forces." \(^b\)

If, then, the actual state of Spain at the epoch of the French invasion threw the greatest possible difficulties in the way of creating a revolutionary center, the very composition of the Central Junta incapacitated it from proving a match for the terrible crisis in which the country found itself placed. Being too numerous and too fortuitously mixed for an executive government, they were too few to pretend to the authority of National Convention.\(^311\) The mere fact of their power having been delegated from the provincial juntas rendered them unfit for

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\(^a\) R. Southey, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 301-05.—Ed.

\(^b\) Urquijo's letter is apparently quoted from D. Pradt, Mémoires historiques sur la révolution d'Espagne, p. 360.—Ed.
overcoming the ambitious propensities, the ill will, and the capricious egotism of those bodies. These juntas—the members of which, as we have shown in a former article, were elected on the whole in consideration of the situation they occupied in the old society, rather than of their capacity to inaugurate a new one—sent in their turn to the "Central" Spanish grandees, prelates, titulares of Castile, ancient ministers, high civil and military officials, instead of revolutionary upstarts. At the outset the Spanish revolution failed by its endeavor to remain legitimate and respectable.

The two most marked members of the Central Junta, under whose banners its two great parties ranged themselves, were Floridablanca and Jovellanos, both of them martyrs of Godoy's persecution, former ministers, valetudinarians, and grown old in the regular and pedantic habits of the procrastinating Spanish regime, the solemn and circumstantial slowness of which had become proverbial even at the time of Bacon, who once exclaimed, "May death reach me from Spain: it will then arrive at a late hour!".

Floridablanca and Jovellanos represented an antagonism, but an antagonism belonging to that part of the eighteenth century which preceded the era of the French Revolution; the former a plebeian bureaucrat, the latter an aristocratic philanthropist; Floridablanca, a partisan and a practicer of the enlightened despotism represented by Pombal, Frederick II and Joseph II; Jovellanos, a "friend of the people", hoping to raise them to liberty by an anxiously wise succession of economic laws, and by the literary propaganda of generous doctrines; both opposed to the traditions of feudalism, the one by trying to disentangle the monarchical power, the other by seeking to rid civil society of its shackles. The part acted by either in the history of their country corresponded with the diversity of their opinions. Floridablanca ruled supreme as the Prime Minister of Charles III, and his rule grew despotic according to the measure in which he met with resistance. Jovellanos, whose ministerial career under Charles IV was but short-lived, gained his influence over the Spanish people, not as a minister, but as a scholar; not by decrees, but by essays. Floridablanca, when the storm of the times carried him to the

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a These words, ascribed to Bacon, are quoted from the book of the Spanish historian J. M. Toreno, *Historia del levantamiento, guerra y revolución de España*, T. I, p. 278.—*Ed.*
head of a revolutionary Government, was an octogenarian, unshaken only in his belief in despotism, and his distrust of popular spontaneity. When delegated to Madrid he left with the Municipality of Murcia a secret protest, declaring that he had only ceded to force and to the fear of popular assassinations, and that he signed this protocol with the express view to prevent King Joseph from ever finding fault with his acceptance of the people’s mandate. Not satisfied with returning to the traditions of his manhood, he retraced such steps of his ministerial past as he now judged to have been too rash. Thus, he who had expelled the Jesuits from Spain \(^{312}\) was hardly installed in the Central Junta, when he caused it to grant leave for their return “in a private capacity.” If he acknowledged any change to have occurred since his time, it was simply this: that Godoy, who had banished him, and had dispossessed the great Count of Floridablanca of his governmental omnipotence, was now again replaced by that same Count of Floridablanca, and driven out in his turn. This was the man whom the Central Junta chose as its President, and whom its majority recognized as an infallible leader.

Jovellanos, who commanded the influential minority of the Central Junta, had also grown old, and lost much of his energy in a long and painful imprisonment inflicted upon him by Godoy. But even in his best times he was not a man of revolutionary action, but rather a well-intentioned reformer, who, from over-niceness as to the means, would never have dared to accomplish an end. In France, he would perhaps have gone the length of Mounier or Lally-Tollendal, but not a step further. In England, he would have figured as a popular member of the House of Lords. In insurrectionized Spain, he was fit to supply the aspiring youth with ideas, but practically no match even for the servile tenacity of a Floridablanca. Not altogether free from aristocratic prejudices, and therefore with a strong leaning toward the Anglomania of Montesquieu, this fair character seemed to prove that if Spain had exceptionally begot a generalizing mind, she was unable to do it except at the cost of individual energy, which she could only possess for local affairs.

It is true that the Central Junta included a few men—headed by Don Lorenzo Calvo de Rosas, the delegate of Saragossa—who, while adopting the reform views of Jovellanos, spurred on at the same time to revolutionary action. But their numbers were too few and their names too unknown to allow them to push the slow State-coach of the Junta out of the beaten track of Spanish ceremonial.
This power, so clumsily composed, so nervelessly constituted, with such outlived reminiscences at its head, was called upon to accomplish a revolution and to beat Napoleon. If its proclamations were as vigorous as its deeds were weak, it was due to Don Manuel Quintana, a Spanish poet, whom the Junta had the taste to appoint as their secretary and to intrust with the writing of their manifestoes.

Like Calderón’s pompous heroes\(^a\) who, confounding conventional distinction with genuine greatness, used to announce themselves by a tedious enumeration of all their titles, the Junta occupied itself in the first place with decreeing the honors and decorations due to its exalted position. Their President received the predicate of “Highness,” the other members that of “Excellency,” while to the Junta \textit{in corpore} was reserved the title of “Majesty.” They adopted a species of fancy uniform resembling that of a general, adorned their breasts with badges representing the two worlds, and voted themselves a yearly salary of 120,000 reals. It was a true idea of the old Spanish school, that, in order to make a great and dignified entrance upon the historical stage of Europe, the chiefs of insurgent Spain ought to wrap themselves in theatrical costumes.

We should transgress the limits of these sketches by entering into the internal history of the Junta and the details of its administration. For our end it will suffice to answer two questions. What was its influence on the development of the Spanish revolutionary movement? What on the defense of the country? These two questions answered, much that until now has appeared mysterious and unaccountable in the Spanish revolutions of the nineteenth century will have found its explanation.

At the outset the majority of the Central Junta thought it their main duty to suppress the first revolutionary transports. Accordingly they tightened anew the old trammels of the press and appointed a new Grand Inquisitor, who was happily prevented by the French from resuming his functions. Although the greater part of the real property of Spain was then locked up in mortmain—in the entailed estates of the nobility, and the unalienable estates of the Church—the Junta ordered the selling of the mort mains, which had already begun, to be suspended, threatening even to amend the private contracts affecting the

\(^{a}\) An allusion to the monologue of Floripes from Calderón’s \textit{La puente de Mantible} in which she extols the valour of her father Almirante (Act I). Marx and Engels made use of this monologue earlier in \textit{The German Ideology} (see present edition, Vol. 5, p. 450).—Ed.
ecclesiastical estates that had already been sold. They acknowledged the national debt, but took no financial measure to free the civil list from a world of burdens, with which a secular succession of corrupt governments had encumbered it, to reform their proverbially unjust, absurd and vexatious fiscal system, or to open to the nation new productive resources, by breaking through the shackles of feudalism.
Already at the time of Philip V, Francisco Benito la Soledad had said: "All the evils of Spain are derived from the abogados" (lawyers). At the head of the mischievous magisterial hierarchy of Spain was placed the Consejo Real of Castile. Sprung up in the turbulent times of the Don Juans and the Enriques, strengthened by Philip II, who discovered in it a worthy complement of the Santo Oficio, it had improved by the calamities of the times and the weakness of the later kings to usurp and accumulate in its hands the most heterogeneous attributes, and to add to its functions of Highest Tribunal those of a legislator and of an administrative superintendent of all the kingdoms of Spain. Thus it surpassed in power even the French Parliament which it resembled in many points, except that it was never to be found on the side of the people. Having been the most powerful authority in ancient Spain, the Consejo Real was, of course, the most implacable foe to a new Spain, and to all the recent popular authorities threatening to cripple its supreme influence. Being the great dignitary of the order of the lawyers and the incarnate guaranty of all its abuses and privileges, the Consejo naturally disposed of all the numerous and influential interests vested in Spanish jurisprudence. It was therefore a power with which the revolution could enter into no compromise, but which had to be swept away unless it should be allowed to sweep away the

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a The quotation is presumably from Francisco Benito la Soledad, Memorial histórico y político.—Ed.
b Royal Council.—Ed.
c The Holy Office (of the Inquisition).—Ed.
revolution in its turn. As we have seen in a former article, the Consejo had prostituted itself before Napoleon, and by that act of treason had lost all hold upon the people. But on the day of their assumption of office the Central Junta were foolish enough to communicate to the Consejo their constitution, and to ask for its oath of fidelity, after having received which they declared they would dispatch the formula of the same oath to all the other authorities of the kingdom. By this inconsiderate step, loudly disapproved by all the revolutionary party, the Consejo became convinced that the Central Junta wanted its support; it thus recovered from its despondency, and, after an affected hesitation of some days, tendered a malevolent submission to the Junta, backing its oath by an expression of its own reactionary scruples exhibited in its advice to the Junta to dissolve, by reducing its number to three or five members, according to Ley 3, Partida 2, Titulo 15; and to order the forcible extinction of the provincial juntas. After the French had returned to Madrid and dispersed the Consejo Real, the Central Junta, not contented with their first blunder, had the fatuity to resuscitate the Consejo by creating the Consejo Reunido—a reunion of the Consejo Real with all the other wrecks of the ancient royal councils. Thus the Junta spontaneously created for the counter-revolution a central power, which, rivaling their own power, never ceased to harass and counteract them with its intrigues and conspiracies, seeking to drive them to the most unpopular steps, and then, with a show of virtuous indignation to denounce them to the impassioned contempt of the people. It hardly need be mentioned that, having first acknowledged and then re-established the Consejo Real, the Central Junta was unable to reform anything, either in the organization of Spanish tribunals, or in their most vicious civil and criminal legislation.

That, notwithstanding the predominance in the Spanish rising of the national and religious elements, there existed, in the two first years, a most decided tendency to social and political reforms, is proved by all the manifestations of the provincial juntas of that time, which, though composed as they mostly were of the privileged classes, never neglected to denounce the ancient régime and to hold out promises of radical reform. The fact is further proved by the manifestoes of the Central Junta. In their first address to the nation, dated 26th October, 1808, they say:

"A tyranny of twenty years, exercised by the most incapable hands, had brought them to the very brink of perdition; the nation was alienated from its Government

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\[a\] See this volume, p. 401.—Ed.
by hatred and contest. A little time only has passed since, oppressed and degraded, ignorant of their own strength, and finding no protection against the governmental evils, either in the institutions or in the laws, they had even regarded foreign dominion [as] less hateful than the wasting tyranny which consumed them. The dominion of a will always capricious, and most often unjust, had lasted too long; their patience, their love of order, their generous loyalty had too long been abused; it was time that law founded on general utility should commence its reign. Reform, therefore, was necessary throughout all branches. The Junta would form different committees, each entrusted with a particular department to whom all writings on matters of Government and Administration might be addressed."

In their address dated Seville, 28th October, 1809, they say:

"An imbecile and decrepit despotism prepared the way for French tyranny. To leave the state sunk in old abuses would be a crime as enormous as to deliver you into the hands of Bonaparte."

There seems to have existed in the Central Junta a most original division of labor—the Jovellanos party being allowed to proclaim and to protocol the revolutionary aspirations of the nation, and the Floridablanca party reserving to themselves the pleasure of giving them the lie direct, and of opposing to revolutionary fiction counter-revolutionary fact. For us, however, the important point is to prove from the very confessions of the provincial juntas deposited with the Central, the often-denied fact of the existence of revolutionary aspirations at the epoch of the first Spanish rising.

The manner in which the Central Junta made use of the opportunities for reforms afforded by the good will of the nation, the pressure of events, and the presence of immediate danger, may be inferred from the influence exercised by their Commissioners in the several provinces they were sent to. One Spanish author candidly tells us that the Central Junta, not overflowing with capacities, took good care to retain the eminent members at the center, and to dispatch those who were good for nothing to the circumference. These Commissioners were invested with the power of presiding over the provincial juntas, and of representing the Central in the plenitude of its attributes. To quote only some instances of their doings: General Romana, whom the Spanish soldiers used to call Marquis de las Romerias, from his perpetual

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a Proclamation issued by the Central Junta of Spain to the Spanish Nation. Aranjuez. October 26, 1808.—Ed.

b Quoted from R. Southey, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 497-98.—Ed.


d Literally "Marquis of the pilgrimages" from the Spanish romero (pilgrim), romeria (pilgrimage).—Ed.
marches and counter-marches—fighting never taking place except when he happened to be out of the way—this Romana, when beaten by Soult out of Galicia, entered Asturias, and as a Commissioner of the Central. His first business was to pick a quarrel with the provincial junta of Oviedo, whose energetic and revolutionary measures had drawn down upon them the hatred of the privileged classes. He went the length of dissolving and replacing it by persons of his own invention. General Ney, informed of these dissensions, in a province where the resistance against the French had been general and unanimous, instantly marched his forces into Asturias, expelled the Marquis de las Romerias, entered Oviedo and sacked it during three days. The French having evacuated Galicia at the end of 1809, our Marquis and Commissioner of the Central Junta entered Coruña, united in his person all public authority, suppressed the district juntas, which had multiplied with the insurrection, and in their places appointed military governors, threatening the members of those juntas with persecution, actually persecuting the patriots, affecting a supreme benignity toward all who had embraced the cause of the invader, and proving in all other respects a mischievous, impotent, capricious blockhead. And what had been the shortcomings of the district and provincial juntas of Galicia? They had ordered a general recruitment without exemption of classes or persons; they had levied taxes upon the capitalists and proprietors; they had lowered the salaries of public functionaries; they had commanded the ecclesiastical corporations to keep at their disposition the revenues existing in their chests. In one word, they had taken revolutionary measures. From the time of the glorious Marquis de las Romerias, Asturias and Galicia, the two provinces most distinguished by their general resistance to the French, withheld from partaking in the war of independence, whenever released from immediate danger of invasion.

In Valencia, where new prospects appeared to open as long as the people were left to themselves and to chiefs of their own choosing, the revolutionary spirit was broken down by the influence of the Central Government. Not contented to place that province under the generalship of one Don José Caro, the Central Junta dispatched as “their own” Commissioner, the Baron Labazora. This Baron found fault with the provincial junta because it had resisted certain superior orders, and cancelled their decree by which the appointments to vacant canonship, ecclesiastical benefices, and commandries had been judiciously suspended and the revenues destined for the benefit of the military hospitals.
Hence bitter contests between the Central Junta and that of Valencia; hence, at a later epoch, the sleep of Valencia under the liberal administration of Marshal Suchet; hence its eagerness to proclaim Ferdinand VII on his return against the then revolutionary Government.

At Cádiz, the most revolutionary place in Spain at the epoch, the presence of a Commissioner of the Central Junta, the stupid and conceited Marquis de Villel, caused an insurrection to break out on the 22d and 23d of February, 1809, which, if not timely shifted to the war of independence, would have had the most disastrous consequences.

There exists no better sample of the discretion exhibited by the Central Junta in the appointment of their own Commissioners, than that of the delegate to Wellington, Señor Lozano de Torres, who, while humbling himself in servile adulation before the English General, secretly informed the Junta that the General’s complaints on his want of provisions were altogether groundless. Wellington, having found out the double-tongued wretch, chased him ignominiously from his camp.

The Central Junta were placed in the most fortunate circumstances for realizing what they had proclaimed in one of their addresses to the Spanish nation.

“It has seemed good to Providence that in this terrible crisis you should not be able to advance one step toward independence without advancing one likewise toward liberty.”

At the commencement of their reign the French had not yet obtained possession of one-third of Spain. The ancient authorities they found either absent or prostrated by their connivance with the intruder, or dispersed at his bidding. There was no measure of social reform, transferring property and influence from the Church and the aristocracy to the middle class and the peasants, which the cause of defending the common country could not have enabled them to carry. They had the same good luck as the French Comité du salut public—that the convulsion within was backed by the necessities of defense against aggressions from without; moreover they had before them the example of the bold initiative which certain provinces had already been forced into by the pressure of circumstances. But not satisfied with hanging as a dead-weight on the Spanish revolution they actually worked in the sense of the counter-revolution, by re-establishing the ancient

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authorities, by forging anew the chains which had been broken, by stifling the revolutionary fire wherever it broke out, by themselves doing nothing and by preventing others from doing anything. During their stay at Seville, on July 20, 1809, even the English Tory Government thought necessary to address them a note strongly protesting against their counter-revolutionary course "apprehending that they were likely to suffocate the public enthusiasm." It has been remarked somewhere that Spain endured all the evils of revolution without acquiring revolutionary strength. If there be any truth in this remark, it is a sweeping condemnation passed upon the Central Junta.

We have thought it the more necessary to dwell upon this point, as its decisive importance has never been understood by any European historian. Exclusively under the reign of the Central Junta, it was possible to blend with the actualities and exigencies of national defense the transformation of Spanish society, and the emancipation of the native spirit, without which any political constitution must dissolve like a phantom at the slightest combat with real life. The Cortes were placed in quite opposite circumstances—they themselves driven back to an insulated spot of the Peninsula, cut off from the main body of the monarchy during two years by a besieging French army, and representing ideal Spain while real Spain was conquered or fighting. At the time of the Cortes Spain was divided into two parts. At the Isla de Leon, ideas without action—in the rest of Spain, action without ideas. At the time of the Central Junta, on the contrary, particular weakness, incapacity and ill will were required on the part of the Supreme Government to draw a line of distinction between the Spanish war and the Spanish revolution. The Cortes, therefore, failed, not, as French and English writers assert, because they were revolutionists, but because their predecessors had been reactionists and had missed the proper season of revolutionary action. Modern Spanish writers, offended by the Anglo-French critics, have nevertheless proved unable to refute them, and still wince under the bon mot of the Abbé de Pradt: "The Spanish people resemble the wife of Sganarelle who wanted to be beaten."  

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a J. M. Toreno, op. cit., T. II, p. 3.—Ed.
b Witticisms.—Ed.
c D. Pradt, op. cit., p. 224.—Ed.
d Allusion to the words of Martine, wife of Sganarelle, principal character in Molière's Le Médecin malgré lui (Act I, Scene 2).—Ed.
The Central Junta failed in the defense of their country, because they failed in their revolutionary mission. Conscious of their own weakness, of the unstable tenor of their power, and of their extreme unpopularity, how could they have attempted to answer the rivalries, jealousies, and overbearing pretensions of their generals common to all revolutionary epochs, but by unworthy tricks and petty intrigues? Kept, as they were, in constant fear and suspicion of their own military chiefs, we may give full credit to Wellington when writing to his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, on September 1, 1809:

"I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the Central Junta, that in the distribution of their forces, they did not consider military defense and military operations so much as they do political intrigue and the attainment of trifling political objects."\(^a\)

In revolutionary times, when all ties of subordination are loosened, military discipline can only be restored by civil discipline sternly weighing upon the generals. As the Central Junta, from its incongruous complexion, never succeeded in controlling the generals, the generals always failed in controlling the soldiers, and to the end of the war the Spanish army never reached an average degree of discipline and subordination. This insubordination was kept up by the want of food, clothing, and all the other material requisites of an army—for the morale of an army, as Napoleon called it, depends altogether on its material condition. The Central

Junta was unable regularly to provide for the army, because the poor poet Quintana's manifestoes would not do in this instance, and to add coercion to their decrees they must have recurred to the same revolutionary measures which they had condemned in the provinces. Even the general enlistment without respect to privilege and exemptions, and the facility granted to all Spaniards to obtain every grade in the army, was the work of the provincial juntas, and not of the Central Junta. If the defeats of the Spanish armies were thus produced by the counter-revolutionary incapacities of the Central Junta, these disasters in their turn still more depressed that Government, and by making it the object of popular contempt and suspicion, increased its dependence upon presumptuous but incapable military chiefs.

The Spanish standing army, if everywhere defeated, nevertheless presented itself at all points. More than twenty times dispersed, it was always ready again to show front to the enemy, and frequently reappeared with increased strength after a defeat. It was of no use to beat them, because, quick to flee, their loss in men was generally small, and as to the loss of the field, they did not care about it. Retiring disorderly to the sierras, they were sure to reassemble and reappear when least expected, strengthened by new reinforcements, and able, if not to resist the French armies, at least to keep them in continual movement, and to oblige them to scatter their forces. More fortunate than the Russians, they did not even need to die in order to rise from the dead.

The disastrous battle at Ocaña, November 19, 1809, was the last great pitched battle which the Spaniards fought; from that time they confined themselves to guerrilla warfare. The mere fact of the abandonment of regular warfare proves the disappearance of the national before the local centers of Government. When the disasters of the standing army became regular, the rising of the guerrillas became general, and the body of the people, hardly thinking of the national defeats, exulted in the local successes of their heroes. In this point at least the Central Junta shared the popular delusion. "Fuller accounts were given in the Gaceta of an affair of guerrillas than of the battle of Ocaña."

As Don Quixote had protested with his lance against gunpowder, so the guerrillas protested against Napoleon, only with different success.

"These guerrillas," says the Austrian Military Journal\(^a\) (Vol. I, 1821), "carried

\(^a\) Oesterreichische militärische Zeitschrift.—Ed.
their basis in themselves, as it were, and every operation against them terminated in the disappearance of its object."

There are three periods to be distinguished in the history of the guerrilla warfare. In the first period the population of whole provinces took up arms and made a partisan warfare, as in Galicia and Asturias. In the second period, guerrilla bands formed of the wrecks of the Spanish armies, of Spanish deserters from the French armies, of smugglers, etc., carried on the war as their own cause, independently of all foreign influence and agreeably to their immediate interest. Fortunate events and circumstances frequently brought whole districts under their colors. As long as the guerrillas were thus constituted, they made no formidable appearance as a body, but were nevertheless extremely dangerous to the French. They formed the basis of an actual armament of the people. As soon as an opportunity for a capture offered itself, or a combined enterprise was meditated, the most active and daring among the people came out and joined the guerrillas. They rushed with the utmost rapidity upon their booty, or placed themselves in order of battle, according to the object of their undertaking. It was not uncommon to see them standing out a whole day in sight of a vigilant enemy, in order to intercept a carrier or to capture supplies. It was in this way that the younger Mina captured the Viceroy of Navarra, appointed by Joseph Bonaparte, and that Julian made a prisoner of the Commandant of Ciudad Rodrigo. As soon as the enterprise was completed, everybody went his own way, and armed men were seen scattering in all directions; but the associated peasants quietly returned to their common occupation without "as much as their absence having been noticed." Thus the communication on all the roads was closed. Thousands of enemies were on the spot, though not one could be discovered. No courier could be dispatched without being taken; no supplies could set out without being intercepted; in short, no movement could be effected without being observed by a hundred eyes. At the same time, there existed no means of striking at the root of a combination of this kind. The French were obliged to be constantly armed against an enemy who, continually flying, always reappeared, and was everywhere without being actually seen, the mountains serving as so many curtains.

"It was," says the Abbé de Pradt, "neither battles nor engagements which exhausted the French forces, but the incessant molestations of an invisible enemy, who, if pursued, became lost among the people, out of which he reappeared
immediately afterward with renewed strength. The lion in the fable tormented to death by a gnat\(^a\) gives a true picture of the French army.\(^b\)

In their third period, the guerrillas aped the regularity of the standing army, swelled their corps to the number of from 3,000 to 6,000 men, ceased to be the concern of whole districts, and fell into the hands of a few leaders, who made such use of them as best suited their own purposes. This change in the system of the guerrillas gave the French, in their contests with them, considerable advantage. Rendered incapable by their great numbers to conceal themselves, and to suddenly disappear without being forced into battle, as they had formerly done, the guerrilleros were now frequently overtaken, defeated, dispersed, and disabled for a length of time from offering any further molestation.

By comparing the three periods of guerrilla warfare with the political history of Spain, it is found that they represent the respective degrees into which the counter-revolutionary spirit of the Government had succeeded in cooling the spirit of the people. Beginning with the rise of whole populations, the partisan war was next carried on by guerrilla bands, of which whole districts formed the reserve and terminated in *corps francs* continually on the point of dwindling into banditti, or sinking down to the level of standing regiments.

Estrangement from the Supreme Government, relaxed discipline, continual disasters, constant formation, decomposition, and recomposition during six years of the *cadrez* must have necessarily stamped upon the body of the Spanish army the character of praetorianism, making them equally ready to become the tools or the scourges of their chiefs. The generals themselves had necessarily participated in, quarrelled with, or conspired against the Central Government, and always thrown the weight of their sword into the political balance. Thus Cuesta, who afterwards seemed to win the confidence of the Central Junta at the same rate that he lost the battles of the country, had begun by conspiring with the *Consejo Real* and by arresting the Leonese deputies to the Central Junta. General Morla himself, a member of the Central Junta, went over into the Bonapartist camp, after he had surrendered Madrid to the French. The coxcombical Marquis de las Romerias, also a member of the Junta, conspired with the vainglorious Francisco Palafox, the wretched Montijo, and

\(^a\) Aesop, "The Lion and the Gnat".\(—Ed.\)

\(^b\) D. Pradt, op. cit., pp. 202-03.\(—Ed.\)
the turbulent Junta of Seville against it. The Generals Castaños, Blake, La Bisbal (an O'Donnell) figured and intrigued successively at the times of the Cortes as regents, and the Captain-General of Valencia, Don Javier Elío, surrendered Spain finally to the mercies of Ferdinand VII. The praetorian element was certainly more developed with the generals than with their troops.

On the other hand, the army and guerrilleros—which received during the war part of their chiefs, like Portier, Lacy, Eroles and Villacampa, from the ranks of distinguished officers of the line, while the line in its turn afterward received guerrilla chiefs, like Mina, Empecinado, etc.—were the most revolutionized portion of Spanish society, recruited as they were from all ranks, including the whole of the fiery, aspiring and patriotic youth, inaccessible to the soporific influence of the Central Government; emancipated from the shackles of the ancient regime; part of them, like Riego, returning after some years' captivity in France. We are, then, not to be surprised at the influence exercised by the Spanish army in subsequent commotions; neither when taking the revolutionary initiative, nor when spoiling the revolution by praetorianism.

As to the guerrillas, it is evident that, having for some years figured upon the theater of sanguinary contests, taken to roving habits, freely indulged all their passions of hatred, revenge, and love of plunder, they must, in times of peace, form a most dangerous mob, always ready at a nod, in the name of any party or principle, to step forward for him who is able to give them good pay or to afford them a pretext for plundering excursions.
On September 24, 1810, the Extraordinary Cortes assembled on the Island of Leon; on February 20, 1811, they removed their sittings thence to Cadiz; on March 19, 1812, they promulgated the new Constitution; and on September 20, 1813, they closed their sittings, three years from the period of their opening.

The circumstances under which this Congress met are without parallel in history. While no legislative body had ever before gathered its members from such various parts of the globe, or pretended to control such immense territories in Europe, America and Asia, such a diversity of races and such a complexity of interests—nearly the whole of Spain was occupied by the French, and the Congress itself, actually cut off from Spain by hostile armies, and relegated to a small neck of land, had to legislate in the sight of a surrounding and besieging army. From the remote angle of the Isla Gaditana they undertook to lay the foundation of a new Spain, as their forefathers had done from the mountains of Covadonga and Sobrarbe. How are we to account for the curious phenomenon of the Constitution of 1812, afterward branded by the crowned heads of Europe, assembled at Verona, as the most incendiary invention of Jacobinism, having sprung up from the head of old monastic and absolutionist Spain at the very epoch when she seemed totally absorbed in waging a holy war against the Revolution? How, on the other hand, are we to account for the sudden disappearance of this same Constitution, vanishing like a shadow—like “la sombra de un sueño,” say the

>a Cadiz.—Ed.

b The shadow of a dream.—Ed.
Spanish historians—when brought into contact with a living Bourbon\textsuperscript{a}? If the birth of that Constitution is a riddle, its death is no less so. To solve the enigma, we propose to commence with a short review of this same Constitution of 1812, which the Spaniards tried again to realize at two subsequent epochs, first during the period from 1820-23, and then in 1836.


Proceeding from the principle that

"the sovereignty resides essentially in the nation, to which, therefore, alone belongs exclusively the right of establishing fundamental laws,"

the Constitution, nevertheless, proclaims a division of powers, according to which:

"the legislative power is placed in the Cortes jointly with the King;" "the execution of the laws is confided to the King," "the application of the laws in civil and criminal affairs belongs exclusively to the tribunals, neither the Cortes nor the King being in any case empowered to exercise judicial authority, advocate pending cases, or command the revision of concluded judgment."

The basis of the national representation is mere population, one deputy for every 70,000 souls. The Cortes consists of one house, viz: the commons, the election of the deputies being by universal suffrage. The elective franchise is enjoyed by all Spaniards, with the exception of menial servants, bankrupts and criminals. After the year 1830, no citizen can enjoy this right who cannot read and write. The election is, however, indirect, having to pass through the three degrees of parochial, district and provincial elections. There is no defined property qualification for a deputy. It is true that according to Art. 92, "it is necessary, in order to be eligible as a deputy to the Cortes, to possess a proportionate annual income, proceeding from real personal property," but Art. 93 suspends the preceding article, until the Cortes in their future meetings declare the period to have arrived in which it shall take effect. The King has neither the right to dissolve nor prorogue the

\textsuperscript{a} Ferdinand VII.—\textit{Ed.}
Cortes, who annually meet at the capital on the first of March, without being convoked, and sit at least three months consecutively.

A new Cortes is elected every second year, and no deputy can sit in two Cortes consecutively; i.e., one can only be re-elected after an intervening Cortes of two years. No deputy can ask or accept rewards, pensions, or honors from the King. The secretaries of state, the councilors of state, and those fulfilling offices of the royal household, are ineligible as deputies to the Cortes. No public officer employed by Government shall be elected deputy to the Cortes from the province in which he discharges his trust. To indemnify the deputies for their expenses, the respective provinces shall contribute such daily allowances as the Cortes, in the second year of every general deputation, shall point out for the deputation that is to succeed it. The Cortes cannot deliberate in the presence of the King. In those cases where the ministers have any communication to make to the Cortes in the name of the King, they may attend the debates when, and in such manner as, the Cortes may think fit, and may speak therein, but they cannot be present at a vote. The King, the Prince of Asturias, and the Regents have to swear to the Constitution before the Cortes, who determine any question of fact or right that may occur in the order of the succession to the Crown, and elect a Regency if necessary. The Cortes are to approve, previous to ratification, all treaties of offensive alliances, or of subsidies and commerce, to permit or refuse the admission of foreign troops into the kingdom, to decree the creation and suppression of offices in the tribunals established by the Constitution, and also the creation or abolition of public offices; to determine every year, at the recommendation of the King, the land and sea forces in peace and in war, to issue ordinances to the army, the fleet, and the national militia, in all their branches; to fix the expenses of the public administration; to establish annually the taxes, to take property on loan, in cases of necessity, upon the credit of the public funds, to decide on all matters respecting money, weights and measures; to establish a general plan of public education, to protect the political liberty of the press, to render real and effective the responsibility of the ministers, etc. The King enjoys only a suspensive veto, which he may exercise during two consecutive sessions, but if the same project of new law should be proposed a third time, and approved by the Cortes of the following year, the King is understood to have given his assent, and has actually to give it. Before the Cortes terminate a session, they appoint a permanent
committee, consisting of seven of their members, sitting in the capital until the meeting of the next Cortes, endowed with powers to watch over the strict observance of the Constitution and administration of the laws; reporting to the next Cortes any infraction it may have observed, and empowered to convene an extraordinary Cortes in critical times. The King cannot quit the kingdom without the consent of the Cortes. He requires the consent of the Cortes for contracting a marriage. The Cortes fix the annual revenue of the King’s household.

The only Privy Council of the King is the Council of State, in which the ministers have no seat, and which consists of forty persons, four ecclesiastics, four grandees of Spain, and the rest formed by distinguished administrators, all of them chosen by the King from a list of one hundred and twenty persons — nominated by the Cortes; but no actual deputy can be a councilor, and no councilor can accept offices, honors, or employment from the King. The councilors of state cannot be removed without sufficient reasons, proved before the Supreme Court of Justice. The Cortes fix the salary of these councilors whose opinion the King will hear upon all important matters, and who nominate the candidates for ecclesiastical and judicial places. In the sections respecting the judicature, all the old consejos are abolished, a new organization of tribunals is introduced, a Supreme Court of Justice is established to try the ministers when impeached, to take cognizance of all cases of dismissal and suspension from office of councilors of state, and the officers of courts of justice, etc. Without proof that reconciliation has been attempted, no law-suit can be commenced. Torture, compulsion, confiscation of property are suppressed. All exceptional tribunals are abolished but the military and ecclesiastic, against the decisions of which appeals to the Supreme Court are however permitted.

For the interior government of towns and communes (communes, where they do not exist, to be formed from districts with a population of 1,000 souls), Ayuntamientos shall be formed of one or more magistrates, aldermen and public councilors, to be presided over by the political chief (corregidor) and to be chosen by general election. No public officer actually employed and appointed by the King can be eligible as a magistrate, alderman or public councilor. The municipal employments shall be public duty, from which no person can be exempt without lawful reason. The

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a The figure 120 is omitted in Article 234 of the Constitution.—Ed.
b Councils.—Ed.
municipal corporations shall discharge all their duties under the inspection of the provincial deputation.

The political government of the provinces shall be placed in the governor (jefe político) appointed by the King. This governor is connected with a deputation, over which he presides, and which is elected by the districts when assembled for the general election of the members for a new Cortes. These provincial deputations consist of seven members, assisted by a secretary paid by the Cortes. These deputations shall hold sessions for ninety days at most in every year. From the powers and duties assigned to them, they may be considered as permanent committees of the Cortes. All members of the Ayuntamientos and provincial deputations, in entering office, swear fidelity to the Constitution. With regard to the taxes, all Spaniards are bound, without any distinction whatever, to contribute, in proportion to their means, to the expenses of the State. All custom-houses shall be suppressed, except in the seaports and on the frontier. All Spaniards are likewise bound to military service, and, beside the standing army, there shall be formed corps of national militia in each province, consisting of the inhabitants of the same, in proportion to its population and circumstances. Lastly, the Constitution of 1812 cannot be altered, augmented, or corrected in any of its details, until eight years have elapsed after its having been carried into practice.

When the Cortes drew up this new plan of the Spanish State, they were of course aware that such a modern political Constitution would be altogether incompatible with the old social system, and consequently, they promulgated a series of decrees, with a view to organic changes in civil society. Thus they abolished the Inquisition. They suppressed the seignorial jurisdictions; with their exclusive, prohibitive, and privative feudal privileges, i.e., those of the chase, fishery, forests, mills, etc., excepting such as had been acquired on an onerous title, and which were to be reimbursed. They abolished the tithes throughout the monarchy, suspended the nominations to all ecclesiastic prebends not necessary for the performance of divine service, and took steps for the suppression of the monasteries and the sequestration of their property.

They intended to transform the immense wastelands, royal domains and commons of Spain into private property, by selling one half of them for the extinction of the public debt, distributing another part by lot as a patriotic remuneration for the disband soldiers of the war of independence and granting a third part,
gratuitously, and also by lot, to the poor peasantry who should desire to possess but not be able to buy them. They allowed the inclosure of pastures and other real property, formerly forbidden. They repealed the absurd laws which prevented pastures from being converted into arable land or arable land converted into pasture, and generally freed agriculture from the old arbitrary and ridiculous rules. They revoked all feudal laws with respect to farming contracts, and the law according to which the successor of an entailed estate was not obliged to confirm the leases granted by his predecessor, the leases expiring with him who had granted them. They abolished the voto de Santiago, under which name was understood an ancient tribute of a certain measure of the best bread and the best wine to be paid by the laborers of certain provinces principally for the maintenance of the Archbishop and Chapter of Santiago. They decreed the introduction of a large progressive tax, etc.

It being one of their principal aims to hold possession of the American colonies, which had already begun to revolt, they acknowledged the full political equality of the American and European Spaniards, proclaimed a general amnesty without any exception, issued decrees against the oppression weighing upon the original natives of America and Asia, cancelled the milas, the repartimientos, etc., abolished the monopoly of quicksilver, and took the lead of Europe in suppressing the slave-trade.

The Constitution of 1812 has been accused on the one hand—for instance, by Ferdinand VII himself (see his decree of May 4, 1814)—of being a mere imitation of the French Constitution of 1791, transplanted on the Spanish soil by visionaries, regardless of the historical traditions of Spain. On the other hand, it has been contended—for instance, by the Abbé de Pradt (De la Révolution actuelle de l'Espagne)—that the Cortes unreasonably clung to antiquated formulas, borrowed from the ancient fueros, and belonging to feudal times, when the royal authority was checked by the exorbitant privileges of the grandees.

The truth is that the Constitution of 1812 is a reproduction of the ancient Fueros, but read in the light of the French Revolution, and adapted to the wants of modern society. The right of insurrection, for instance, is generally regarded as one of the boldest innovations of the Jacobin Constitution of 1793, but you meet this same right in the ancient Fueros of Sobrarbe, where it is

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*a Santiago de Compastela—a city in north-west Spain, the seat of an archbishopric, a famous place of pilgrimage.—Ed.*
called the *Privilegio de la Union*. You find it also in the ancient Constitution of Castile. According to the Fueros of Sobrarbe, the King cannot make peace nor declare war, nor conclude treaties, without the previous consent of the Cortes. The Permanent Committee, consisting of seven members of the Cortes, who are to watch over the strict observance of the Constitution during the prorogation of the legislative body, was of old established in Aragon, and was introduced into Castile at the time when the principal Cortes of the monarchy were united in one single body.

To the period of the French invasion a similar institution still existed in the kingdom of Navarre. Touching the formation of a State Council from a list of 120 persons presented to the King by the Cortes and paid by them—this singular creation of the Constitution of 1812 was suggested by the remembrance of the fatal influence exercised by the camarillas at all epochs of the Spanish monarchy. The State Council was intended to supersede the camarilla. Besides, there existed analogous institutions in the past. At the time of Ferdinand IV, for instance, the King was always surrounded by twelve commoners, designated by the cities of Castile, to serve as his privy councilors; and, in 1419, the delegates of the cities complained that their commissioners were no longer admitted into the King's Council. The exclusion of the highest functionaries and the members of the King's household from the Cortes, as well as the prohibition to the deputies to accept honors or offices on the part of the King, seems, at first view, to be borrowed from the Constitution of 1791, and naturally to flow from the modern division of powers, sanctioned by the Constitution of 1812. But, in fact, we meet not only in the ancient Constitution of Castile with precedents, but we know that the people, at different times, rose and assassinated the deputies who had accepted honors or offices from the Crown. As to the right of the Cortes to appoint regencies in case of minority, it had continually been exercised by the ancient Cortes of Castile during the long minorities of the fourteenth century.

It is true that the Cadiz Cortes deprived the King of the power he had always exercised of convoking, dissolving, or proroguing the Cortes; but as the Cortes had fallen into disuse by the very manner in which the Kings improved their privileges, there was nothing more evident than the necessity of cancelling it. The alleged facts may suffice to show that the anxious limitation of the royal power—the most striking feature of the Constitution of 1812—otherwise fully explained by the recent and revolting souvenirs of Godoy's contemptible despotism, derived its origin
from the ancient Fueros of Spain. The Cadiz Cortes but transferred the control from the privileged *estates* to the national representation. How much the Spanish kings stood in awe of the ancient Fueros may be seen from the fact that when a new collection of the Spanish laws had become necessary, in 1805, a royal ordinance ordered the removal from it of all the remains of feudalism contained in the last collection of laws, and belonging to a time when the weakness of the monarchy forced the kings to enter with their vassals into compromises derogatory to the sovereign power.

If the election of the deputies by general suffrage was an innovation, it must not be forgotten that the Cortes of 1812 were themselves elected by general suffrage, that all the juntas had been elected by it; that a limitation of it would, therefore, have been an infraction of a right already conquered by the people; and, lastly, that a property qualification, at a time when almost all the real property of Spain was locked up in mortmain, would have excluded the greater part of the population.

The meeting of the representatives in one single house was by no means copied from the French Constitution of 1791, as the morose English Tories will have it. Our readers know already that since Charles I (the Emperor Charles V) the aristocracy and the clergy had lost their seats in the Cortes of Castile. But even at the time when the Cortes were divided into *brazos* (arms, branches), representing the different estates, they assembled in one single hall, separated only by their seats, and voting in common. From the provinces, in which alone the Cortes still possessed real power at the epoch of the French invasion, Navarre continued the old custom of convoking the Cortes by *estates*; but in the Vascongadas the altogether democratic assemblies admitted not even the clergy. Besides, if the clergy and aristocracy had saved their obnoxious privileges, they had long since ceased to form independent political bodies, the existence of which constituted the basis of the composition of the ancient Cortes.

The separation of the judiciary from the executive power, decreed by the Cadiz Cortes, was demanded as early as the eighteenth century, by the most enlightened statesmen of Spain; and the general odium which the *Consejo Real*, from the beginning of the revolution, had concentrated upon itself, made the necessity of reducing the tribunals to their proper sphere of action universally felt.

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*See this volume, pp. 394-95.—Ed.*
The section of the Constitution which refers to the municipal government of the communes, is a genuine Spanish offspring, as we have shown in a former article. The Cortes only re-established the old municipal system, while they stripped off its medieval character. As to the provincial deputations, invested with the same powers for the internal government of the provinces as the ayuntamientos for the administration of the communes, the Cortes modelled them in imitation of similar institutions still existing at the time of the invasion in Navarre, Biscay and Asturias. In abolishing the exemptions from the military service, the Cortes sanctioned only what had become the general practice during the war of independence. The abolition of the Inquisition was also but the sanction of a fact, as the Holy Office, although re-established by the Central Junta, had not dared to resume its functions, its holy members being content with pocketing their salaries, and prudently waiting for better times. As to the suppression of feudal abuses, the Cortes went not even the length of the reforms insisted upon in the famous memorial of Jovellanos, presented in 1795 to the Consejo Real in the name of the economical society of Madrid.a

The ministers of the enlightened despotism of the latter part of the eighteenth century, Floridablanca and Campomanes, had already begun to take steps in this direction. Besides, it must not be forgotten that simultaneously with the Cortes, there sat a French Government at Madrid, which, in all the provinces overrun by the armies of Napoleon, had swept away from the soil all monastic and feudal institutions, and introduced the modern system of administration. The Bonapartist papers denounced the insurrection as entirely produced by the artifices and bribes of England, assisted by the monks and the Inquisition. How far the rivalry with the intruding government must have exercised a salutary influence upon the decisions of the Cortes, may be inferred from the fact that the Central Junta itself, in its decree dated September, 1809, wherein the convocation of the Cortes is announced, addressed the Spaniards in the following terms:

“Our detractors say that we are fighting to defend old abuses and the inveterate vices of our corrupted government. Let them know that your struggle is for the happiness as well as the independence of your country; that you will not depend henceforward on the uncertain will or the various temper of a single man,” etc.b

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a G. M. Jovellanos, op. cit.—Ed.
b The reference is to the initial draft of the decree which was rejected at the insistence of the British envoy. R. Southey, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 482.—Ed.
On the other hand, we may trace in the Constitution of 1812 symptoms not to be mistaken of a compromise entered into between the liberal ideas of the eighteenth century and the dark traditions of priestcraft. It suffices to quote Art. 12, according to which

"the religion of the Spanish nation is and shall be perpetually Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman, the only true religion. The nation protects it by wise and just laws, and prohibits the exercise of any other whatever";

or Art. 173, ordering the King to take, on his accession to the throne, the following oath before the Cortes:

"N., by the grace of God and the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, King of Spain, I swear by the Almighty and the Holy Evangelists, that I will defend and preserve the Catholic, Roman, and Apostolic religion, without tolerating any other in the kingdom."

On a closer analysis, then, of the Constitution of 1812, we arrive at the conclusion that, so far from being a servile copy of the French Constitution of 1791, it was a genuine and original offspring of Spanish intellectual life, regenerating the ancient and national institutions, introducing the measures of reform loudly demanded by the most celebrated authors and statesmen of the eighteenth century, making inevitable concessions to popular prejudice.
There were some circumstances favorable to the assembling at Cadiz of the most progressive men of Spain. When the elections took place, the movement had not yet subsided, and the very disfavor which the Central Junta had incurred recommended its antagonists, who, to a great extent, belonged to the revolutionary minority of the nation. At the first meeting of the Cortes, the most democratic provinces, Catalonia and Galicia, were almost exclusively represented; the deputies from Leon, Valencia, Murcia and the Islas Baleares, not arriving till three months later. The most reactionary provinces, those of the interior, were not allowed, except in some few localities, to proceed with the elections for the Cortes. For the different kingdoms, cities and towns of old Spain, which the French armies prevented from choosing deputies, as well as for the ultramarine provinces of New Spain, whose deputies could not arrive in due time, supplementary representatives were elected from the many individuals whom the troubles of the war had driven from the provinces to Cadiz, and the numerous South Americans, merchants, natives and others, whose curiosity or the state of affairs had likewise assembled at that place. Thus it happened that those provinces were represented by men more fond of innovation, and more impregnated with the ideas of the eighteenth century, than would have been the case if they had been enabled to choose for themselves. Lastly, the circumstance of the Cortes meeting at Cadiz was of decisive influence, that city being then known as the most radical of the kingdom, more resembling an American than a Spanish town. Its population filled the galleries in the Hall of the Cortes and domineered the reactionists, when their opposition grew too obnoxious, by a system of intimidation and pressure from without.
It would, however, be a great mistake to suppose that the majority of the Cortes consisted of reformers. The Cortes were divided into three parties—the Serviles, the Liberales (these party denominations spread from Spain through the whole of Europe), and the Americanos, the latter voting alternately with the one or the other party, according to their particular interests. The Serviles, far superior in numbers, were carried away by the activity, zeal and enthusiasm of the Liberal minority. The ecclesiastic deputies, who formed the majority of the Servile party, were always ready to sacrifice the royal prerogative, partly from the remembrance of the antagonism of the Church to the State, partly with a view to courting popularity, in order thus to save the privileges and abuses of their caste. During the debates on the general suffrage, the one-chamber system, the no-property qualification and the suspensive veto the ecclesiastic party always combined with the more democratic part of the Liberals against the partisans of the English Constitution. One of them, the Canon Cañedo, afterward Archbishop of Burgos, and an implacable persecutor of the Liberals, addressed Señor Muñoz Torrero, also a Canon, but belonging to the Liberal party, in these terms:

"You suffer the King to remain excessively powerful, but as a priest you ought to plead the cause of the Church, rather than that of the King."  

Into these compromises with the Church party the Liberals were forced to enter, as we have already seen from some articles of the Constitution of 1812. When the liberty of the press was discussed, the parsons denounced it as "contrary to religion." After the most stormy debates, and after having declared that all persons were at liberty to publish their sentiments without special license, the Cortes unanimously admitted an amendment, which, by inserting the word political, curtailed this liberty of half its extent, and left all writings upon religious matters subject to the censure of the ecclesiastical authorities, according to the decrees of the Council of Trent. On August 18, 1813, after a decree passed against all who should conspire against the Constitution, another decree was passed, declaring that whoever should conspire to make the Spanish nation cease to profess the Catholic Roman religion should be prosecuted as a traitor, and suffer death. When the Voto de Santiago was abolished, a compensatory

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a Marliani, *Historia política de la España moderna*—Ed.
b The decree on the freedom of the press adopted by the Cortes on November 10, 1810, and also the decrees of August 18, 1813 on the protection of the
resolution was carried, declaring Saint Teresa de Jesus the patroness of Spain. The Liberals also took care not to propose and carry the decrees about the abolition of the Inquisition, the tithes, the monasteries, etc., till after the Constitution had been proclaimed. But from that very moment the opposition of the Serviles within the Cortes, and the clergy without, became inexorable.

Having now explained the circumstances which account for the origin and the characteristic features of the Constitution of 1812, there still remains the problem to be solved of its sudden and resistless disappearance at the return of Ferdinand VII. A more humiliating spectacle has seldom been witnessed by the world. When Ferdinand entered Valencia, on April 16, 1814,

"the joyous people yoked themselves to his carriage, and testified by every possible expression of word and deed their desire of taking the old yoke upon themselves, shouting, 'Long live the absolute King! 'Down with the Constitution!'"

In all the large towns, the Plaza Mayor, or Great Square, had been named Plaza de la Constitución, and a stone with these words engraved on it, erected there. In Valencia this stone was removed, and a "provisional" stone of wood set up in its place with the inscription: Real Plaza de Fernando VII. The populace of Seville deposed all the existing authorities, elected others in their stead to all the offices which had existed under the old regime, and then required those authorities to re-establish the Inquisition. From Aranjuez to Madrid Ferdinand's carriage was drawn by the people. When the King alighted, the mob took him up in their arms, triumphantly showed him to the immense concourse assembled in front of the palace, and in their arms conveyed him to his apartments. The word Liberty appeared in large bronze letters over the entrance of the Hall of the Cortes in Madrid; the rabble hurried thither to remove it; they set up ladders, forced out letter by letter from the stone, and as each was thrown into the street, the spectators renewed their shouts of exultation. They collected as many of the journals of the Cortes and of the papers and pamphlets of the Liberals as could be got together, formed a procession in which the religious fraternities and the clergy, regular and secular, took the lead, piled up these papers in one of the public squares, and sacrificed them there as a political auto-da-fe, after which high mass was performed and the Te

Constitution and the Catholic religion are given according to R. Southey, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 899. The decrees mentioned below were published in Colección de los decretos y órdenes que han expedido las Cortes generales y extraordinarias.—Ed.
Deum sung as a thanksgiving for their triumph. More important perhaps—since these shameless demonstrations of the town mob, partly paid for their performances, and like the Lazzaroni of Naples, preferring the wanton rule of kings and monks to the sober regime of the middle classes—is the fact that the second general elections resulted in a decisive victory of the Serviles; the Constituent Cortes being replaced by the ordinary Cortes on September 20, 1813, who transferred their sittings from Cadiz to Madrid on January 15, 1814.

We have shown in former articles how the revolutionary party itself had participated in rousing and strengthening the old popular prejudices, with a view to turn them into so many weapons against Napoleon. We have then seen how the Central Junta, at the only period when social changes were to be blended with measures of national defense, did all in their power to prevent them, and to suppress the revolutionary aspirations of the provinces. The Cadiz Cortes, on the contrary, cut off, during the greater part of their existence, from all connection with Spain, were not even enabled to make their Constitution and their organic decrees known, except as the French armies retired. The Cortes arrived, as it were, post factum. They found society fatigued, exhausted, suffering; the necessary product of so protracted a war, entirely carried on upon the Spanish soil; a war in which the armies, being always on the move, the Government of today was seldom that of tomorrow, while bloodshed did not cease one single day during almost six years throughout the whole surface of Spain, from Cadiz to Pamplona, and from Granada to Salamanca. It was not to be expected that such a society should be very sensible of the abstract beauties of any political constitution whatever. Nevertheless, when the Constitution was first proclaimed at Madrid, and the other provinces evacuated by the French, it was received with "exultant delight," the masses being generally expecting a sudden disappearance of their social sufferings from mere change of Government. When they discovered that the Constitution was not possessed of such miraculous powers, the very overstrained expectations which had welcomed it turned into disappointment, and with these passionate Southern peoples there is but one step from disappointment to hatred.

There were some particular circumstances which principally contributed to estrange the popular sympathies from the constitu-

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a See this volume, pp. 403-04.—Ed.

b Ibid., pp. 414-18.—Ed.
tional regime. The Cortes had published the severest decrees against the Afrancesados or the Josephites. The Cortes were partly driven to these decrees by the vindictive clamor of the populace and the reactionists, who at once turned against the Cortes as soon as the decrees they had wrung from them were put to execution. Upwards of 10,000 families became thus exiled. A lot of petty tyrants let loose on the provinces evacuated by the French, established their proconsular authority, and began by inquiries, prosecution, prison, inquisitorial proceedings against those compromised through adherence to the French, by having accepted offices from them, bought national property from them, etc. The Regency, instead of trying to effect the transition from the French to the national regime in a conciliatory and discreet way, did all in their power to aggravate the evils and exasperate the passions, inseparable from such changes of dominion. But why did they do so? In order to be able to ask from the Cortes a suspension of the Constitution of 1812, which, they told them, worked so very offensively. Be it remarked, en passant, that all the Regencies, these supreme executive authorities appointed by the Cortes, were regularly composed of the most decided enemies of the Cortes and their Constitution. This curious fact is simply explained by the Americans always combining with the Serviles in the appointment of the executive power, the weakening of which they considered necessary for the attainment of American independence from the mother country, since they were sure that an executive simply at variance with the sovereign Cortes would prove insufficient. The introduction by the Cortes of a single direct tax upon the rental of land, as well as upon industrial and commercial produce, excited also great discontent among the people, and still more so the absurd decrees forbidding the circulation of all Spanish specie coined by Joseph Bonaparte, and ordering its possessors to exchange it for national coin, simultaneously interdicting the circulation of French money, and proclaiming a tariff at which it was to be exchanged at the national mint. As this tariff greatly differed from that proclaimed by the French in 1808, for the relative value of French and Spanish coins, many private individuals were involved in great losses. This absurd measure also contributed to raise the price of the first necessaries, already highly above the average rates.

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a Supporters of the French influence, or adherents of Joseph Bonaparte.— Ed.
b Orden para que se indemnice en la Casa de Moneda a los tenedores de la del Rey intruso (Cádiz 4 de Abril de 1811) in: Colección de los decretos y órdenes que han expedido las Cortes generales y extraordinarias ..., T. I, p. 123.— Ed.
The classes most interested in the overthrow of the Constitution of 1812 and the restoration of the old regime—the grandees, the clergy, the friars and the lawyers—did not fail to excite to the highest pitch the popular discontent created by the unfortunate circumstances which had marked the introduction on the Spanish soil of the constitutional regime. Hence the victory of the Serviles in the general elections of 1813.

Only on the part of the army could the King apprehend any serious resistance, but General Elío and his officers, breaking the oath they had sworn to the Constitution, proclaimed Ferdinand VII at Valencia, without mentioning the Constitution. Elío was soon followed by the other military chiefs.

In his decree, dated May 4, 1814, in which Ferdinand VII dissolved the Madrid Cortes and cancelled the Constitution of 1812, he simultaneously proclaimed his hatred of despotism, promised to convene the Cortes under the old legal forms, to establish a rational liberty of the press, etc. He redeemed his pledge in the only manner which the reception he had met on the part of the Spanish people deserved—by rescinding all the acts emanating from the Cortes, by restoring everything to its ancient footing, by re-establishing the Holy Inquisition, by recalling the Jesuits banished by his grandsire, by consigning the most prominent members of the juntas, the Cortes and their adherents to the galleys, African prisons, or to exile; and, finally, by ordering the most illustrious guerrilla chiefs, Porlier and de Lacy, to be shot.

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\(^a\) Charles III.—\textit{Ed.}\)
During the year 1819 an expeditionary army was assembled in the environs of Cadiz for the purpose of reconquering the revolted American colonies. Enrique O'Donnell, Count La Bisbal, the uncle of Leopoldo O'Donnell, the present Spanish Minister, was intrusted with the command. The former expeditions against Spanish America having swallowed up 14,000 men since 1814, and being carried out in the most disgusting and reckless manner, had grown most odious to the army, and were generally considered a malicious means of getting rid of the dissatisfied regiments. Several officers, among them Quiroga, López Baños, San Miguel (the present Spanish La Fayette), O'Daly, and Arco Agüero, determined to improve the discontent of the soldiers, to shake off the yoke, and to proclaim the Constitution of 1812. La Bisbal, when initiated into the plot, promised to put himself at the head of the movement. The chiefs of the conspiracy, in conjunction with him, fixed on July 9, 1819, as the day on which a general review of the expeditionary troops was to take place, in the midst of which act the grand blow was to be struck. At the hour of the review La Bisbal appeared, indeed, but instead of keeping his word, ordered the conspiring regiments to be disarmed, sent Quiroga and the other chiefs to prison, and dispatched a courier to Madrid, boasting that he had prevented the most alarming of catastrophes. He was rewarded with promotion and decorations, but the Court having obtained more accurate information, afterward deprived him of his command, and ordered him to withdraw to the capital. This is the same La Bisbal who, in 1814, at the time of the King's return to Spain, sent an officer of his staff with two letters to Ferdinand. Too great a distance from the
spot rendering it impossible for him to observe the King's movements, and to regulate his conduct according to that of the Monarch—in one letter La Bisbal made a pompous eulogy of the Constitution of 1812, on the supposition that the King would take the oath to support it. In the other, on the contrary, he represented the constitutional system as a scheme of anarchy and confusion, congratulated Ferdinand on his exterminating it, and offered himself and his army to oppose the rebels, demagogues, and enemies of the throne and altar. The officer delivered this second dispatch, which was cordially received by the Bourbon.

Notwithstanding the symptoms of rebellion which had shown themselves among the expeditionary army, the Madrid Government, at the head of which was placed the Duke of San Fernando, then Foreign Minister and President of the Cabinet, persisted in a state of inexplicable apathy and inactivity, and did nothing to accelerate the expedition, or to scatter the army in different seaport towns. Meanwhile a simultaneous movement was agreed upon between Don Rafael de Riego, commanding the second battalion of Asturias, then stationed at Las Cabezas de San Juan, and Quiroga, San Miguel, and other military chiefs of the Isla de Leon, who had contrived to get out of prison. Riego's position was far the most difficult. The commune of Las Cabezas was in the center of three of the headquarters of the expeditionary army—that of the cavalry at Utrera, the second division of infantry at Lebrija, and a battalion of guides at Arcos, where the commander-in-chief and the staff were established. He nevertheless succeeded, on January 1, 1820, in surprising and capturing the commander and the staff, although the battalion cantoned at Arcos was double the strength of that of Asturias. On the same day he proclaimed in that very commune the Constitution of 1812, elected a provisional alcalde, and, not content with having executed the task devolved upon him, seduced the guides to his cause, surprised the battalion of Aragon lying at Bornos, marched from Bornos on Jerez, and from Jerez on Fort St. Marie, everywhere proclaiming the Constitution, till he reached the Isla de Leon, on the 7th January, where he deposited the military prisoners he had made in the fort of St. Petri. Contrary to their previous agreement Quiroga and his followers had not possessed them-

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a Calleja del Rey.—Ed.
b Puerto de Santa Maria.—Ed.
c San Pedro.—Ed.
selves by a coup de main of the bridge of Suazo, and then of the Isla de Leon, but remained tranquil to the 2d of January, after Oltra, Riego's messenger, had conveyed to them official intelligence of the surprise of Arcos and the capture of the staff.

The whole forces of the revolutionary army, the supreme command of which was given to Quiroga, did not exceed 5,000 men, and their attacks upon the gates of Cadiz having been repulsed, they were themselves shut up in the Isla de Leon.

"Our situation," says San Miguel, "was extraordinary; the revolution, stationary twenty-five days without losing or gaining an inch of ground, presented one of the most singular phenomena in politics." 328

The provinces seemed rocked into lethargic slumber. During the whole month of January, at the end of which Riego, apprehending the flame of revolution might be extinguished in the Isla de Leon, formed, against the counsels of Quiroga and the other chiefs, a movable column of 1,500 men, and marched over a part of Andalusia, in presence of and pursued by a ten times stronger force than his own, proclaiming the Constitution at Algeciras, Ronda, Malaga, Cordova, etc., everywhere received by the inhabitants in a friendly way, but nowhere provoking a serious pronunciamiento. Meanwhile his pursuers, consuming a whole month in fruitless marches and countermarches, seemed to desire nothing but to avoid, as much as possible, coming to close quarters with his little army. The conduct of the Government troops was altogether inexplicable. Riego's expedition, which began on January 27, 1820, terminated on March 11, he being then forced to disband the few men that still followed him. His small corps was not dispersed through a decisive battle, but disappeared from fatigue, from continual petty encounters with the enemy, from sickness and desertion. Meanwhile the situation of the insurrectionists in the Isla was by no means promising. They continued to be blocked up by sea and land, and within the town of Cadiz every declaration for their cause was suppressed by the garrison. How, then, did it happen that, Riego having disbanded in the Sierra Morena the constitutional troops on the 11th of March, Ferdinand VII was forced to swear to the Constitution, at Madrid, on the 9th of March, so that Riego really gained his end just two days before he finally despaired of his cause?

The march of Riego's column had riveted anew the general attention; the provinces were all expectation, and eagerly watched every movement. Men's minds, struck by the boldness of Riego's sally, the rapidity of his march, his vigorous repulses of the
enemy, imagined triumphs never gained, and aggregations and re-enforcements never obtained. When the tidings of Riego's enterprise reached the more distant provinces, they were magnified in no small degree, and those most remote from the spot were the first to declare themselves for the Constitution of 1812. So far was Spain matured for a revolution, that even false news sufficed to produce it. So, too, it was false news that produced the hurricane of 1848.

In Galicia, Valencia, Saragossa, Barcelona and Pamplona, successive insurrections broke out. Enrique O'Donnell, alias the Count La Bisbal, being summoned by the King to oppose the expedition of Riego, not only offered to take arms against him, but to annihilate his little army and seize on his person. He only demanded the command of the troops cantoned in the Province of La Mancha, and money for his personal necessities. The King himself gave him a purse of gold and the requisite orders for the troops of La Mancha. But on his arrival at Ocaña, La Bisbal put himself at the head of the troops and proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. The news of this defection roused the public spirit of Madrid where the revolution burst forth immediately on the intelligence of this event. The Government began then to negotiate with the revolution. In a decree, dated March 6, the King offered to convoke the ancient Cortes, assembled in Estamentos (Estates), a decree suititing no party, neither that of the old monarchy nor that of the revolution. On his return from France, he had held out the same promise and failed to redeem his pledge. During the night of the 7th, revolutionary demonstrations having taken place in Madrid, the Gaceta of the 8th published a decree by which Ferdinand VII promised to swear to the Constitution of 1812.

"Let all of us," he said, in that decree, "and myself first, fairly enter upon the path of the Constitution."

The people having got possession of the palace on the 9th, he saved himself only by reestablising the Madrid Ayuntamiento of 1814, before which he swore to the Constitution. He, for his part, did not care for false oaths, having always at hand a confessor ready to grant him full remission of all possible sins. Simultaneously a consultative junta was established, the first decree of which set free the political prisoners and recalled the political refugees. The prisons, now opened, sent the first constitutional Ministry to the royal palace. Castro, Herreros, and A. Argüelles—who formed the first Ministry—were martyrs of 1814, and deputies of 1812.
The true source of the enthusiasm which had appeared on the accession of Ferdinand to the throne, was joy at the removal of Charles IV, his father. And thus the source of the general exultation at the proclamation of the Constitution of 1812, was joy at the removal of Ferdinand VII. As to the Constitution itself, we know that, when finished, there were no territories in which to proclaim it. For the majority of the Spanish people, it was like the unknown god worshipped by the ancient Athenians.

In our days it has been affirmed by English writers, with an express allusion to the present Spanish revolution, on the one hand that the movement of 1820 was but a military conspiracy, and on the other that it was but a Russian intrigue. Both assertions are equally ridiculous. As to the military insurrection, we have seen that, notwithstanding its failure, the revolution proved victorious; and, besides, the riddle to be solved would not be conspiracy of 5,000 soldiers, but the sanction of that conspiracy by an army of 35,000 men, and by a most loyal nation of twelve millions. That the revolution first acted through the ranks of the army is easily explained by the fact that, of all the bodies of the Spanish monarchy, the army was the only one thoroughly transformed and revolutionized during the war of independence. As to Russian intrigue, it is not to be denied that Russia had her hands in the business of the Spanish revolution; that, of all the European powers, Russia first acknowledged the Constitution of 1812, by the treaty concluded in Veliki Luki, on July 20, 1812; that she first kindled the revolution of 1820, first denounced it to Ferdinand VII, first lighted the torch of counter-revolution on several points of the Peninsula, first solemnly protested against it before Europe, and finally forced France into an armed intervention against it. Monsieur de Tatischeff, the Russian Ambassador, was certainly the most prominent character at the Court of Madrid—the invisible head of the camarilla. He had succeeded in introducing Antonio Ugarte, a wretch of low station, at Court, and making him the head of the friars and footmen who, in their back-staircase council, swayed the scepter in the name of Ferdinand VII. By Tatischeff, Ugarte was made Director-General of the expeditions against South America, and by Ugarte the Duke of San Fernando was appointed Foreign Minister and President of the Cabinet. Ugarte effected from Russia the purchase of rotten ships, destined for the South American Expedition, for which the order of St. Ann was bestowed upon him. Ugarte prevented Ferdinand and his brother Don Carlos from presenting themselves to the army at the first moment of the crisis. He was the
mysterious author of the Duke of San Fernando's unaccountable apathy, and of the measures which led a Spanish Liberal to say at Paris in 1836:

“One can hardly resist the conviction that the Government was rendering itself the means for the overthrow of the existing order of things.”

If we add the curious fact that the President of the United States praised Russia in his message for her having promised him not to suffer Spain to meddle with the South American colonies, there can remain but little doubt as to the part acted by Russia in the Spanish revolution. But what does all this prove? That Russia produced the revolution of 1820? By no means, but only that she prevented the Spanish Government from resisting it. That the revolution would have earlier or later overturned the absolute and monastic monarchy of Ferdinand VII is proved: 1. By the series of conspiracies which since 1814 had followed each other; 2. By the testimony of M. de Martignac, the French Commissary who accompanied the Duke of Angoulême at the time of the Legitimist invasion of Spain; 3. By testimony not to be rejected—that of Ferdinand himself.

In 1814 Mina intended a rising in Navarre, gave the first signal for resistance by an appeal to arms, entered the fortress of Pamplona, but distrusting his own followers, fled to France. In 1815 General Porlier, one of the most renowned guerrilleros of the War of Independence, proclaimed the Constitution at Coruña. He was beheaded. In 1816, Richard intended capturing the King at Madrid. He was hanged. In 1817, Navarro, a lawyer, with four of his accomplices, expired on the scaffold at Valencia for having proclaimed the Constitution of 1812. In the same year the intrepid General Lacy was shot at Majorca for having committed the same crime. In 1818, Colonel Vidal, Captain Sola, and others, who had proclaimed the Constitution at Valencia, were defeated and put to the sword. The Isla de Leon conspiracy then was but the last link in a chain formed by the bloody heads of so many valiant men from 1808 to 1814.

M. de Martignac who, in 1832, shortly before his death, published his work: L'Espagne et ses Révolutions, makes the following statement:

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\(^a\) Miraflores, Essais historiques et critiques pour servir à l'histoire d'Espagne de 1820 à 1823, T. 1, p. XII.—Ed.

\(^b\) James Monroe.—Ed.

\(^c\) This data is taken from D. Urquhart, Progress of Russia, p. 33.—Ed.
"Two years had passed away since Ferdinand VII had resumed his absolute power, and there continued still the proscriptions, proceeding from a camarilla recruited from the dregs of mankind. The whole State machinery was turned upside down; there reigned nothing but disorder, languor and confusion—taxes most unequally distributed—the state of the finances was abominable—there were loans without credit, impossibility of meeting the most urgent wants of the State, an army not paid, magistrates indemnifying themselves by bribery, a corrupt and do-nothing Administration, unable to ameliorate anything, or even to preserve anything. Hence the general discontent of the people. The new constitutional system was received with enthusiasm by the great towns, the commercial and industrial classes, liberal professions, army and proletariat. It was resisted by the monks, and it stupefied the country people."

Such are the confessions of a dying man who was mainly instrumental in subverting that new system. Ferdinand VII, in his decrees of June 1, 1817, March 1, 1817, April 11, 1817, November 24, 1819, etc., literally confirms the assertions of M. de Martignac, and resumes his lamentations in these words:

"The miseries that resound in the ears of our Majesty, on the part of the complaining people, overset one another."

This shows that no Tatischeff was needed to bring about a Spanish revolution.
Karl Marx

THE REACTION IN SPAIN

London, Friday, September 1, 1854

The entrance into Madrid of the Vicálvaro regiments has encouraged the Government to greater counter-revolutionary activity. The revival of the restrictive press-law of 1837, adorned with all the rigors of the supplementary law of 1842,\(^{333}\) has killed all the “incendiary” portion of the press which was unable to offer the required cautionnement.\(^a\) On the 24th the last number was given out of El Clamor de las Barricadas with the title of Últimas Barricadas, the two editors having been arrested. Its place was taken on the same day by a new reactionary paper called Las Cortes.

"His Excellency, the Captain-General, Don San Miguel," says the program of the last-mentioned paper, "who honors us with his friendship, has offered to this journal the favor of his collaboration. His articles will be signed with his initials. The men at the head of this enterprise will defend with energy that revolution which vanquished the abuses and excesses of a corrupt power, but it is in the enceinte of the Constituent Assembly that they will plant their banner. It is there that the great battle must be fought."\(^b\)

The great battle is for Isabella II, and Espartero. You will remember that this same San Miguel, at the banquet of the press, declared that the press had no other corrective but itself, common sense and public education, that it was an institution which neither sword nor transportation, nor exile, nor any power in the world could crush. On the very day on which he offers himself as a

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\(^a\) Caution money.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) The quotation from *Las Cortes* is probably taken from *L’Indépendance belge*, No. 244, September 1, 1854.—*Ed.*
contributor to the press, he has not a word against the decree confiscating his beloved liberty of the press.

The suppression of the liberty of the press has been closely followed by the suppression of the right of meeting, also by royal decree. The clubs have been dissolved at Madrid, and in the provinces the juntas and committees of Public Safety, with the exception of those acknowledged by the Ministry as "deputations." The Club of the Union was shut up in consequence of a decree of the whole Ministry, notwithstanding that Espartero had only a few days previously accepted its honorary Presidency, a fact which The London Times vainly labors to deny. This club had sent a deputation to the Minister of the Interior, insisting on the dismissal of Señor Sagasti, the Jefe Político of Madrid, charging him with having violated the liberty of the press and the right of meeting. Señor Santa Cruz answered that he could not blame a public functionary for taking measures approved by the Council of Ministers. The consequence was that a serious trouble arose; but the Plaza de la Constitución was occupied by the National Guard, and nothing further occurred. The petty journals had scarcely been suppressed when the greater ones that had hitherto granted their protection to Sagasti, found occasion to quarrel with him. In order to silence El Clamor Público, its chief editor, Señor Corradi, was appointed Minister. But this step will not be sufficient, as all editors cannot be attached to the Ministry.

The boldest stroke of the counter-revolution, however, was the permission for Queen Cristina's departure for Lisbon, after the Council of Ministers had engaged to keep her at the disposal of the Constituent Cortes—a breach of faith which they have tried to cover by an anticipated confiscation of Cristina's estates in Spain, notoriously the least considerable portion of her wealth. Thus Cristina had a cheap escape, and now we hear that San Luis, too, has safely arrived at Bayonne. The most curious part of the transaction is the manner in which the decree alluded to was obtained. On the 26th some patriots and National Guards assembled to consider the safety of the public cause, blaming the Government on account of its vacillation and half and half measures, and agreeing to send a deputation to the Ministry calling upon them to remove Cristina from the Palace, where she was plotting liberticide projects. There was a very suspicious

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a Report of the Madrid correspondent of August 23, 1854. The Times, No. 21832, August 29, 1854.—Ed.
b Rios y Rosas.—Ed.
circumstance in the adhesion of two aides-de-camp of Espartero with Sagasti himself, to this proposition. The result was that the Ministry met in council, and the upshot of their meeting was the elopement of Cristina.

On the 25th the Queen appeared for the first time in public, on the promenade of the Prado, attended by what is called her husband, and by the Prince of Asturias. But her reception appears to have been extremely cold.

The committee appointed to report on the state of the finances at the epoch of the fall of the Sartorius Ministry has published its report in the *Gaceta*, where it is preceded by an *exposé* by Señor Collado, the Minister of Finance. According to this the floating debt of Spain now amounts to $33,000,000, and the total deficit to $50,000,000. It appears that even the extraordinary resources of the Government were anticipated for years and squandered. The revenues of Havana and the Philippines were anticipated for two years and a half. The yield of the forced loan had disappeared without leaving a trace. The Almadén quick-silver mines were engaged for years. The balance in hand due to the *Caja* of deposits did not exist. Not did the fund for military substitution. 7,485,692 reals were due for the purchase of tobacco obtained, but not paid for. Ditto 5,505,000 reals for bills on account of public works. According to the statement of Señor Collado the amount of obligations of the most pressing nature is 252,980,253 reals. The measures proposed by him for the covering of this deficit are those of a true banker, viz: to return to quiet and order, to continue to levy all the old taxes, and to contract new loans. In compliance with this advice Espartero has obtained from the principal Madrid bankers $2,500,000 on a promise of a pure *Moderado* policy. How willing he is to keep this promise is proved by his last measures.

It must not be imagined that these reactionary measures have remained altogether unresisted by the people. When the departure of Cristina became known, on the 28th August, barricades were erected again; but, if we are to believe a telegraphic dispatch from Bayonne, published by the French *Moniteur*,

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*a* A boulevard in Madrid.—*Ed.*

*b* Francisco de Asis.—*Ed.*

*c* The committee's findings on the state of the finances in Spain and the account addressed by the Minister of Finance to the Crown (August 25, 1854) from the Spanish *Gaceta* are probably taken from a report from Madrid of August 26 published in *The Times*, No. 21836, September 2, 1854.—*Ed.*

*d* Bank.—*Ed.*
“the troops, united to the National Guard, carried the barricades and put down the movement.”

This is the cercle vicieux in which abortive revolutionary governments are condemned to move. They recognize the debts contracted by their counter-revolutionary predecessors as national obligations. In order to be able to pay them they must continue their old taxes and contract new debts. To be able to contract new loans they must give guaranties of “order,” that is, take counter-revolutionary measures themselves. Thus the new popular Government is at once transformed into the handmaid of the great capitalists, and an oppressor of the people. In exactly the same manner was the Provisional Government of France in 1848 driven to the notorious measure of the 45 centimes, and the confiscation of the savings banks’ funds in order to pay their interest to the capitalists.

“The revolutionary governments of Spain,” says the English author of the Revelations on Spain, “are at least not sunk so deep as to adopt the infamous doctrine of repudiation as practiced in the United States.”

The fact is that if any former Spanish revolution had once practiced repudiation, the infamous Government of San Luis would not have found any banker willing to oblige it with advances. But perhaps our author holds the view that it is the privilege of the counter-revolution to contract, as it is the privilege of revolution to pay debts.

It appears that Saragossa, Valencia and Algeciras do not concur in this view, as they have abrogated all taxes obnoxious to them.

Not content with sending Bravo Murillo as Ambassador to Constantinople, the Government has dispatched González Bravo in the same capacity to Vienna.

On Sunday, 27th August, the electoral reunions of the District of Madrid assembled in order to appoint, by general suffrage, the Commissioners charged with the superintendence of the election at the capital. There exist two Electoral Committees at Madrid—the Liberal Union, and the Unión del Comercio.

The symptoms of reaction above collected appear less formidable to persons acquainted with the history of Spanish revolutions than they must to the superficial observer—since Spanish revolu-

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a Telegram from Paris of August 30, 1854. L’Indépendance belge, No. 243, August 31, 1854.—Ed.
b Vicious circle.—Ed.
c Probably [Hughes,] Revelations of Spain in 1845.—Ed.
tions generally only date from the meeting of the Cortes, usually
the signal for the dissolution of Government. At Madrid, besides,
there are only a few troops, and at the highest 20,000 National
Guards. But of the latter only about one half are properly armed,
while the people are known to have disobeyed the call to deliver
up their arms.

Notwithstanding the tears of the Queen, O'Donnell has dis-
solved her bodyguard, the regular army being jealous of the
privileges of this corps, from whose ranks a Godoy, noticed as a good
player upon the guitar and a singer of seguidillas graciosas y
picantes, could raise himself to become the husband of the King's
niece, and a Muñoz, only known for his private advantages,
become the husband of a Queen Mother.

At Madrid a portion of the republicans have circulated the
following Constitution of a Federal Iberian Republic:

TITULO I. Organization of the Federal Iberian Republic.

Art. 1. Spain and its isles and Portugal will be united and form the Federal
Iberian Republic. The colors of the banner will be a union of the two actual
banners of Spain and Portugal. Its device will be Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.

Art. 2. The sovereignty resides in the universality of the citizens. It is inalienable
and imprescriptible. No individual, no fraction of the people can usurp its exercise.

Art. 3. The law is the expression of the national will. The judges are appointed
by the people through universal suffrage.

Art. 4. All citizens of 21 years of age and enjoying their civil rights to be
electors.

Art. 5. The punishment of death is abolished, both for political and common
crimes. The jury is to judge in all cases.

Art. 6. Property is sacred. The estates taken from political emigrants are
restored to them.

Art. 7. The contributions will be paid in proportion to incomes. There will be
one tax only, direct and general. All indirect contributions, octroi, and on
consumption are abolished. Likewise abolished are the Government monopolies of
salt and tobacco, the stamps, the patent dues, and the conscription.

Art. 8. The liberty of the press, of meeting, of association, of domicile, of
education, of commerce, and of conscience, is granted. Every religion will have to pay
for its own ministers.

Art. 13. The administration of the republic is to be federal, provincial and
municipal.

TITULO II. Federal Administration.

Art. 14. It will be intrusted to an Executive Council appointed and revocable by
the Central Federal Congress.

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a Isabella II. Royal decree of August 25, 1854, countersigned by Leopoldo
O'Donnell, *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 245, September 2, 1854.—Ed.

b María Teresa de Borbón.—Ed.
Art. 15. The international and commercial relations, the uniformity of measures, weights and coins, the Post-Office, and the armed force are the domain of the Federal Administration.

Art. 16. The Central Federal Congress will be composed of nine Deputies for every province, elected by universal suffrage and bound by their instructions.

Art. 17. The Central Federal Congress is in permanency.

Art. 20. Whenever a law is to be enacted, the Administration thinking it necessary will bring the project under the cognizance of the confederation six months before if it be for the Congress, and three months if it be for the Provincial Legislation.

Art. 21. Any Deputy of the people failing to adhere to his instructions is handed over to justice.

Titulo III refers to the Provincial and Municipal Administration, and confirms similar principles. The last article of this chapter says:

There are to be no longer any colonies; they will be changed into provinces and administered on provincial principles. Slavery shall be abolished.

TITULO IV. The Army.

Art. 34. The whole people will be armed and organized in a National Guard, one portion to be mobile and the other sedentary.

Art. 35. The mobile guard to consist of the solteros between the ages of 21 and 35; their officers to be chosen in the military schools by election.

Art. 36. The sedentary militia consists of all citizens between 35 and 56 years; officers to be appointed by election. Their service is the defense of the communities.

Art. 38. The corps of artillery and engineers are recruited by voluntary enlistment, permanent, and garrisoning the fortresses on the coast of the frontiers. No fortresses shall be suffered in the interior.

Art. 39, alluding to the marine, contains similar provisions.

Art. 40. The staffs of the provinces and captain-generalcies are suppressed.

Art. 42. The Iberian Republic renounces all wars of conquest, and will submit its quarrels to the arbitration of Governments disinterested in the question.

Art. 43. There shall be no standing armies.

Written on September 1 and 2, 1854

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune


Signed: Karl Marx
Ernest Jones’ letter of September 8, 1854 to Marx asking him to write a leader for The People’s Paper. The address is in Marx’s handwriting.
The papers contain diverse rumors about Mazzini's arrest at Bâle. I have received the following information from a friend: Mazzini was really arrested by two gendarmes at Zurich, but only for a few hours, after which he escaped. This escape was facilitated by another Italian causing himself to be arrested simultaneously at another place by pretending to be Mazzini. By this coup the authorities were misled, and M. Druey himself telegraphed from Berne to Geneva, that no further investigations would be required, as Mazzini was in prison. It is supposed that the person arrested in Mazzini's stead is Saffi, while some say it is a Hungarian officer of the name of Türr.

The Milan Gazette\textsuperscript{a} of the 31st August takes pleasure in announcing that the municipal council of Pavia have resolved in their sitting of the 28th August, to participate in the national loan by subscribing for 200,000 florins. In contrast to this statement a non-official paper publishes the following as the real resolution of the Council in question:

"The Municipality of Pavia subscribes for the quota imposed on and fixed for the town of Pavia; but it does so neither as Representative of the Commune, nor in their quality as contributors, but only as an organ of Government, and as dependent on the executive power to which it is bound by the circular of 1830 to absolute obedience, as well as in execution of the orders transmitted to it by the Lieutenant-General\textsuperscript{b} on Aug. 7."

At Treviso also the voluntary loan has only been subscribed to in consequence of direct menace. From the statement of the

\textsuperscript{a} Gazzetta Ufficiale di Milano.— Ed.
\textsuperscript{b} Radetzky.— Ed.
Trieste Council, it appears that even in that arch-Austrian loyal city the loan is neither voluntary nor so very generally taken as represented by the Austrian journals:

“Our commune has subscribed for another million of the national loan. The Magistrates hereby announce that this sum will be distributed among the contributors who have taken no part hitherto in the loan or not in proportion to their fortune. The 6th of September is, at the same time, fixed as the last term for voluntary subscriptions. The Council hope that everybody will hasten to profit by the advantages held out by the loan, the more so as, after the above term, the Council will be under the grievous necessity of proceeding by force.”

The reactionary press is not yet satisfied with the late measures of the Spanish Government; they grumble at the fact that a new compromise had been entered into with the revolution. Thus we read in the *Journal des Débats*:

“It was only on the 7th August when Espartero declared ‘that in conformity with the wishes of the people of Madrid, the Duchess of Ríánsares\(^a\) should not leave the capital, either by day or night, or in any furtive manner.’ It is only on the 28th August that Queen Cristina, after a detention of twenty-one days, is allowed to depart in broad day, with a sort of ostentation. But the Government has been weak enough to order, simultaneously, the confiscation of her estates.”\(^b\)

The *Débats* now hopes that this order will be cancelled. But the hopes of the *Débats* are, perhaps, in this instance, even more doomed to disappointment than when it uttered faint hopes that confiscation of the Orleans estates\(^340\) would not be carried out by Bonaparte. The *Jefe Político* of Oviedo has already proceeded to sequestrate the coal mines possessed by Cristina in the Province of Asturias. The directors of the mines of Siero, Langreo, and Piero Corril have received orders to make a statement and to place their administration under the Government.

With regard to the “broad day” in which the *Débats* effects the departure of Cristina, they are very wrongly informed. Queen Cristina on leaving her apartments, crossed the corridors in dead silence—everybody being studiously kept out of the way. The National Guard occupying the barracks in the court of the Palace were not aware of her departure. So secretly was the whole plan arranged that even Garrigó, who was to have charge of her escort, only received his orders on the moment of starting. The escort only learned the mission with which they were intrusted at a distance of twelve miles from Madrid, when Garrigó had all sorts of difficulties in preventing his men from either insulting Cristina

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\(^a\) María Cristina.—*Ed.*
\(^b\) *Journal des Débats*, September 12, 1854.—*Ed.*
or returning direct to Madrid. The chiefs of the National Guard did not learn anything of the affair until two hours after the departure of Mme. Muñoz. According to the statement of the *España* she reached the Portuguese frontier on the morning of the 3d September. She is said to have been in very good spirits on the journey, but her Duke was somewhat *triste*. The relations of Cristina and this same Muñoz can only be understood from the answer given by Don Quixote to Sancho Panza's question why he was in love with such a low country wench as his Dulcinea, when he could have princesses at his feet:

"A lady," answered the worthy knight, "surrounded by a host of high-bred, rich, and witty followers, was asked why she took for her lover a simple peasant. 'You must know,' said the lady, 'that for the office I use him he possesses more philosophy than Aristotle himself.'"

The view taken by the reactionary press in general on Spanish affairs may be judged of by some extracts from the *Köl nische Zeitung* and the *Indépendance belge*:

"According to a well-informed and trustworthy correspondent, himself an adherent of O'Donnell and the Moderado party,—says the former,—the position of affairs is grievous, a deep conflict continuing to exist among parties. The working classes are in a state of permanent excitement, being worked upon by the agitators."

"The future of the Spanish monarchy," says the *Indépendance*, "is exposed to great dangers. All true Spanish patriots are unanimous on the necessity of putting down the revolutionary orgies. The rage of the libelers and of the constructors of barricades is let loose against Espartero and his Government with the same vehemence as against San Luis and the banker Salamanca. But, in truth, this chivalrous nation cannot be held responsible for such excesses. The people of Madrid must not be confounded with the mob that vociferated 'Death to Cristina,' nor for the infamous libels launched among the population, under the title of 'Robberies of San Luis, Cristina and the Acolytes.' The 1,800 barricades of Madrid and the ultra Communist manifestations of Barcelona bespeak the intermeddling of foreign Democracy with the Spanish Saturnalia. So much is certain, that a great number of the refugees of France, Germany and Italy have participated in the deplorable events now agitating the Peninsula. So much is certain, that Spain is on the brink of a social conflagration; the more immediate consequences will be the loss of the Pearl of the Antilles, the rich Island of Cuba, because it places Spain in the impossibility to combat American ambition, or the patriotism of a Soulé or Saunders. It is time that Spain should open her eyes, and that all honest men of civilized Europe should combine in giving the alarm."

It certainly requires no intervention of foreign democracy to stir up the population of Madrid when they see their Government

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*a* Sad.—*Ed.*  
*b* Cervantes, *Don Quixote*, T. 1, Ch. 25.—*Ed.*  
break on the 28th the word given on the 7th; suspend the right of freely assembling, and restore the press-law of 1837, requiring a cautionnement\textsuperscript{a} of 40,000 reals and 300 reals of direct taxes on the part of every editor.\textsuperscript{341} If the provinces remain agitated by uncertain and undecided movements, what other reason are we to find for this fact, but the absence of a center for revolutionary action? Not a single decree beneficent to the provinces has appeared since the so-called revolutionary government fell into the hands of Espartero. The provinces behold it surrounded by the same sycophancy, intrigues, and place hunting that had subsisted under San Luis. The same swarm hangs about the Government—the plague which has infested Spain since the age of the Philips.\textsuperscript{342}

Let us just cast a glance at the last number of the Madrid \textit{Gaceta} of the 6th September.\textsuperscript{b} There is a report of O'Donnell announcing a superabundance of military places and honors to such a degree that out of every three generals only one can be employed on active service. It is the very evil which has cursed Spain since 1823—this superincumbence of generals. One would fancy that a decree was to follow abating the nuisance. Nothing of the sort. The decree following the report convokes a consultative junta of war, composed of a certain number of generals, appointed by the Government from generals holding at present no commission in the army. Besides their ordinary pay these men are to receive: each Lieutenant-General 5,000 reals, and each Maréchal-de-Camp 6,000 reals. General Manuel de la Concha has been named President of this military sinecurist junta. The same number of the \textit{Gaceta} presents another harvest of decorations, appointments, etc., as if the first great distribution had failed to do its work. San Miguel and Dulce have received the grand-cross of the order of Charles III; all the recompenses and provisional honors decreed by the junta of Saragossa are confirmed and enlarged. But the most remarkable portion of this number of the \textit{Gaceta} is the announcement that the payment of the public creditors will be resumed on the 11th inst. Incredible folly of the Spanish people not to be satisfied with these achievements of their revolutionary government!

Travellers who have recently arrived from Wallachia give a very distressing account of the state of that Principality. It\textsuperscript{2} is known

\textsuperscript{a} Caution money.—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} The review of the Madrid \textit{Gaceta} for September 6 is given according to a reprint in \textit{Le Moniteur universel}, No. 255, September 12, 1854.—\textit{Ed.}
that Russia saddled the Principalities with a debt of 14,000,000 francs, on account of the occupation in 1848-49. This sum has been raised by the Russian generals during the late occupation. The Russians retreat after having emptied all the chests—the vestry chests, the central chests of the monasteries, the municipal chests—and it is with the contents of these that they have paid the supplies contracted for with the Wallachian proprietors and peasants. But the transports, which make a very important item in an agricultural country, wood, coals, straw, etc., were not paid at all, but simply foraged. The treasury of the Principalities accordingly is so much exhausted that the vestries are expected to become bankrupt. All this without taking into account the use of the houses transformed into hospitals, and the thousands of property intrusted to Russian hands from the fear of the boyards of Turkish robbery.

We read in a letter from Athens, dated 29th August:

"The King continues to refuse any indemnity to Turkey. The hatred against the Occidental troops increases, and already several French soldiers have been ill-treated by the people."

It would be a curious history to expose to your readers how the Greek communities have been dissolved by British influence—how Capo d’Istria was imposed upon them, and how the whole of this people has been demoralized by the agency of Lord Palmerston. The honest intentions of the British Government even at this moment of their intervention in Greece, are sufficiently betrayed by the support it gives to General Kalergis, a man, like Capo d’Istria, born, bred and domiciliated in Russia.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and the British Government have at length obtained what they have labored to bring about—a revolution in Turkey, if not in Europe, at least in Anatolia. We knew already by reports from Rhodes, that on the coast opposite this island, the Zeybeks, a warlike Ottoman mountain-tribe, had revolted. The Journal de Constantinople of 20th Aug. now announces that anarchy in those parts is daily increasing. The rebels, in the absence of the regular army, constantly descend from the mountains, invade the villages, raise the tithes, plunder the inhabitants and caravans, violate the women, and murder every one that resists. Their excesses are gravest in the province of Mestescak. From Aiden the Governor has been obliged to flee to Thira. Denissli is in their hands, and the mufti Sahib Effendi, who went to inform the Governor-General, has been seized and beheaded with his followers. Their strength amounts to thousands. The source of these disturbances are the Bashi-Bazouks return-
ing from Kars and Bayazid, who denounce the Porte for its oppression toward the Turks and its submission toward Russia.

If we cast a look at Europe, we meet with symptoms of revolution in Spain, Italy, Denmark, the Danubian Principalities, Greece, Asiatic Turkey; and even in the ranks of the French army at Varna, the cry has resounded, "À bas les singes!" 343

Written on September 12, 1854


Signed: Karl Marx
London, Friday, Sept. 15, 1854

We read in yesterday's Moniteur the following telegraphic dispatch:

"Therapia, Sept. 7.—The French and the Turks left Varna on the 5th. The English fleet was to join them at the Island of the Serpents. The weather is beautiful."\(^a\)

The delay in the departure of this first portion of the expeditionary army was caused by the violent storms which visited the Bosphorus up to the 27th of August. The wind having come round from the north-east on the 27th, the fleet of transports was enabled to leave Constantinople for the Black Sea. The Isle of the Serpents (Ilade Adessi) is a little rocky islet at some distance from the Bessarabian coast, and nearly opposite the mouth of the Danube. Its circumference is not more than three English miles. The departure not having been effected until the 5th, the disembarkation of the troops cannot have taken place before the 9th of September.

A curious passage occurs in an article published by the Moniteur, in which the chances of the expedition are discussed.

"If," says the Moniteur, "if the number of the Russian troops stationed in the Crimea should be found to be more considerable than we are led to believe by the previous reports; if the force of Sevastopol should offer a protracted defense; if obstacles should be afforded by the season; if, finally, an important Russian army should succeed in reenforcing the Crimea, we should be quits for this time with a simple reembarkation, and the attack of Sevastopol would be resumed in the spring."\(^b\)

\(^a\) Le Moniteur universel, No. 257, September 14, 1854.—Ed.
\(^b\) Report from Constantinople. Le Moniteur universel, No. 254, September 11, 1854.—Ed.
In one word, if any serious difficulties should be encountered by that "powerful armada, with its thousand of agencies of destruction," it will quickly return to the Bosphorus. At all events, it will not be their fault if such difficulties should not be met with, due notice of the expedition having been given to the Czar months ago, and it having been delayed up to the very last days of the season. The confidence felt by the French mariners in their commander may be judged of by the following extract of a letter from Constantinople, published by the Augsburger Zeitung:

"In the fleet St. Arnaud is generally called Florival, the name under which he made his début at the Ambigu Comique at Paris." 345

According to the latest dispatches from Hamburg and Copenhagen, part of the French fleet, transports and soldiers, have passed through the Belt on their return to France. A Bonapartist paper, the Constitutionnel, makes a revelation on the Bomarsund affair:

"His majesty the Emperor Napoleon III did not wish that the devotion of the navy should be deprived of the recompense merited by it after such a prolonged and painful cruise in the Baltic." 3

Bomarsund, then, was only bombarded for the amusement of the fleet, and as a concession to the impatience and ennui of the officers. Those two laconic allusions of the Moniteur and Constitutionnel contain more in qualification of the character of the war than all the swaggering leading articles of the ministerial English press.

The Czar has ordered the arrest of all the engineers who were engaged in the construction of the forts of Bomarsund. They are to be put on their trial. One of the charges raised against them is that the fortifications should have been constructed entirely of blocks of pure granite, while it has been proved since their fall that the interior of the walls was simply filled with sand and rough stones. All the commanders of the different fortresses along the Gulf of Finland have received orders from St. Petersburg to inquire into the most minute details of their construction, and to report on this subject without delay. It is now ascertained that Fort Gustavsvärm at Hango Head was blown up by the Russians themselves, at the moment when Baraguay d'Hilliers and General Jones appeared before it on their reconnoitering expedition. The Russians feared an attack on Abo, and in order to make the troops

3 Quoted from a reprint in L'Indépendance belge, No. 255, September 12, 1854.— Ed.
of Fort Gustavsvärn disposable for the defense of that town the fort was destroyed.

Being still in the Baltic I may as well give a place here to the following piece of news contained in the *Aftonbladet*.

"A correspondent from Copenhagen announces as certain that the Danish Government authorized on Aug. 16, Mr. T. P. Shaffner to establish a line of electric telegraph extending from North America through Greenland, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Norway to Copenhagen. On the 26th a line was opened from Stockholm to Malmö. The extent of this line is 68,670 yards."

Some of the London papers to-day give telegraphic news of a victory gained by Shamyl somewhere in the neighborhood of Tiflis. The French and German papers contain no mention of this fact. On September 4 the Turks crossed the Danube near Matchin, and occupied the island situated between that fortress and Ibraila. A great portion of the Turkish flotilla of the Danube has also cast anchor off Matchin. The occupation of Ibraila by the Turks was to take place on the 5th inst. You will notice the proclamation of General Krusenstern, posted up on the walls of Odessa on the 30th August, in which the inhabitants are warned, under heavy penalties, not to oppose the setting fire to the city should this act be deemed necessary by the troops for the defense of the country.

The Russians have also given orders in all the districts of Bessarabia to burn towns and villages at the approach of the enemy. The order is the more ludicrous as the Russians are well aware that the Roumans of Bessarabia would no more regret their withdrawal than the Roumans of Wallachia and Moldavia.

I have described the circumstances accompanying the enrolment in the Russian service of the Wallachian and Moldavian militia. From the English papers of to-day you will learn the details of the scenes which took place on the 28th August, between M. de Budberg and the officers of the Rouman militia, scenes which ended in Captain Phillippescu telling the Russian general to his face that the Wallachians considered the Sultan as their only suzerain. He was, of course, placed under arrest, in company with two brother officers who had indulged in similar remonstrances. The following account of the events which occurred on the 29th, the day on which the Russian campaign in the Principalities was brought to such a glorious conclusion, is from the Paris *Presse* of to-day:

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*Marx probably refers to his article "Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.—The Events in Spain.—A New Danish Constitution.—The Chartists" (see this volume, p. 351).—*Ed.
"The arrest of Captain Phillippescu and two other officers, who dared to set at defiance the injunctions of General Budberg, had caused a great irritation in the ranks of the Moldavian militia, and augmented its reluctance to serve in the Russian army. On the 29th, shortly before the hour fixed for their review, the Hetman Maurocordatos repaired to the barracks of the cavalry, situated opposite the Administrative Palace. Great was his consternation at finding it completely deserted. The soldiers, instead of saddling their horses for the review, had contrived to make their escape from the stables, abandoning their arms and baggage. The unfortunate Hetman hastened to the barracks of the artillery to meet with a new surprise. The cannon were in their places in the Court, but the men had disappeared. Maurocordatos, in despair, fancied himself already on the road to Siberia. But he succeeded in reuniting about 30 men. Trembling with rage and fear, he ordered them to put the horses to the guns and to march out to the place of the review. 'Let us be carried away by force,' they shouted. 'We receive no orders from the Russians.' With these words they shut up the gates of the barracks. At that moment drums resounded in the place. It was the whole division of Osten-Sacken, composed of twelve battalions, one regiment of dragoons, and three battalions of artillery, which, after intercepting the communications, formed up on the place and completely blocked up both the Administrative Palace and the barracks of the Moldavian cavalry. Sixty Moldavian horsemen who had been brought back were drawn up before the barracks. Opposite to them were 12,000 Russians—infantry, cavalry and artillery. Osten-Sacken arrived, followed by General Budberg and a numerous staff. The Muscovite troops deployed in columns, and defiled before their generals, with bayonets fixed, shouting their hurrahs. They next formed in squares at a distance of 150 yards from the Moldavian horsemen. They received the command to load. The Russian soldiers after having made the sign of the cross, executed the order. Aim was taken at the sixty horsemen. This being done, Osten-Sacken advanced with his staff toward the little body of Moldavian militia-men, and summoned them to follow his army with the threat of having them all shot in case of refusal. A silence of several minutes followed his injunction. A terrible emotion seizes upon the crowd who had assembled on the place. Then one of the Moldavians steps from the ranks and in a calm voice addresses the Russian General. 'We are Moldavian soldiers, and our duty is to defend our country, not to fight for the foreigner. Do with us as you please. We shall not march with you.' 'You may murder us, but we shall not march with you,' repeat the sixty soldiers with one voice. On hearing this bold answer, Osten-Sacken ordered them to dismount from their horses and to lay down their arms, as though for immediate execution. They obey, prepared to die. In a moment thousands of soldiers surround them, rush upon them, and take them prisoners. This great feat of arms accomplished, the Muscovites advance to the Moldavian artillery barracks where the thirty men continue to keep the gates closed. The gates having been forced, they penetrate into the interior; a struggle takes place, and the artillerists also, overwhelmed by superior numbers, are taken prisoners. They are hurried away in the midst of insults and menaces of death. They remain impassible. Only one, a young cornet of 22 years, his eyes kindled with rage, advances toward General Wrangel, and uncovering his breast, exclaims: 'There is my breast, pierce it with your balls if you dare.' The General did not dare. The cornet and his comrades disarmed, were conducted between two rows of bayonets and brought to the camp of Osten-Sacken, outside the gates of Jassy. What has become of them, nobody knows. As to the three officers arrested on the evening before, it is generally feared that they will be shot. On the same evening the Russians surrounded the place where the regiment of Moldavian infantry was
encamped. But they found only 150 men, the rest having escaped. The population of Jassy uttered loud execrations against their protectors. Sixty horsemen, thirty artillerists, and one hundred and fifty infantry captured and disarmed by 12,000 Russians with three batteries. This is the only victory, the laurels of which the Russians carry home from their campaign in the Principalities."

In a former letter I mentioned the order given by Omer Pasha to suppress the publication of the Austrian manifesto of General Hess.346 We are now informed on what grounds this order was given, viz.: because the said proclamation called upon the Wallachian authorities to apply exclusively to the Austrian commander in all affairs. Omer Pasha sent word to General Hess that he had better abstain from intermeddling with the civil Administration of Wallachia, which belonged to his (Omer Pasha's) province. Having only intended his proclamation as a feeler how far he might go, General Hess apologised for the objectionable passage, and in order to convince Omer Pasha that it was all a mistake, he communicated to him the original German text, where the Wallachian authorities are only invited to apply to his Aide-de-Camp in such matters as are connected with the Austrian troops. The Austrian General Popovitch, who had entered Bucharest with the Austrian vanguard on the 3d September, and immediately commenced to play the part of Haynau, was likewise checked by Omer Pasha. How welcome the Austrian occupation is to the Wallachians in general may be understood from an extract from to-day's Daily News:

"Many of the villages on the road by which the Austrians advanced, have been deserted by their inhabitants, carrying with them all their worldly goods, fearing that they would be obliged to supply provisions or means of transport in return for paper money;—worth exactly half its nominal value. The consequence is, that bread for the Austrian troops must be forwarded from Bucharest, twenty and even thirty miles distant."

It is certainly with respect to the infamies committed in the Principalities—the consequences of English diplomacy—that the sober Economist, alluding to some comparatively very slight faults of American diplomacy in Europe, draws the following line of distinction between English and American diplomacy:

"Now, we have no doubt that men of gentlemanly feeling, of deep sense of decorum, of a clear perception of what is due to others, abound in America as well as here. The difference between us, and the misfortune of our cousins, are these: that such men do not at the other side of the Atlantic either elect a government or give the tone to the nation, or guide the language of the press. With us the educated and the upper classes have the power in their own hands. In the United States it is the mass who govern; it is the populace who usurp the name and title of the nation; it is they who dictate what shall be done or said; it is they who elect the government and whom the government must serve; it is they who support the
press and whom the press must please; in fact, it is they who have to be acted down to and written down to."  

Thus speaks the servant of the English stockjobbers, as if English diplomacy were not an identical term with infamy, and as if the "gentlemen" appointed by Mr. Wilson, the editor of *The Economist*, and Mr. Gladstone, his superior, had not been convicted before Parliament of swindling, gambling and larceny.

From Spain news is scarce. On the 8th inst. the Consultative Junta of Madrid definitively dissolved itself. The Junta of Seville only dissolved after a strong protest against the reactionary course of the Central Government. The Democrats of Catalonia have published a manifesto against General Prim, who had sent in his adhesion to the present Government from Turkey, in order not to be excluded from a share in the spoils. He contracted the hatred of the Catalonians by the investment of the Castle of Figueras in 1843, marked by the most shocking barbarities, committed from pure rage at the brave defense of the place by a comparatively small force under the command of Ametller. This Prim was characterized at that time as "a person of ridiculous vanity, whose head had been turned by fortuitous success and by being made a count and a lieutenant-general."

We read in the *Época* that on the 7th a small battle was fought at Aranjuez between the National Guard and a band of which it is not yet known whether it was composed of Carlists or Republicans. Quick and certain as the success of the reaction seems to be, the counter-revolutionary journals do not cease to give vent to their apprehensiveness that matters may not even yet be settled in Spain.

From the accounts of trade and navigation just issued I extract the following statement:

*Total declared Value of the Exports of British and Irish Produce and Manufactures in each of the following years*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOREIGN</th>
<th>1831</th>
<th>1842</th>
<th>1855</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia, northern ports and Black Sea</td>
<td>£1,195,565</td>
<td>£1,885,953</td>
<td>£1,228,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden and Norway</td>
<td>115,707</td>
<td>334,017</td>
<td>556,183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>92,294</td>
<td>194,304</td>
<td>569,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prussia</td>
<td>192,816</td>
<td>376,651</td>
<td>579,588</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*b* *The Economist*, No. 576, September 9, 1854.— Ed.
The Actions of the Allied Fleet

Hanover & Hanseatic towns 3,642,952 6,202,700 7,565,493
Holland and .......... 2,082,536 H. 3,573,362 4,482,955
Belgium .................. B. 1,099,490 1,371,867
France .................. 602,688 3,193,939 2,636,330
Portugal ............... 975,991 947,855 1,210,481
Azores and Madeira .... 80,698 64,909 124,971
Spain and Balearic Isles 597,848 322,614 1,360,719
Canary Islands .......... 33,282 54,564 107,638

Italy —
Sardinian Territories .. 1,112,447
Duchy of Tuscany ....... 639,794
Papal Territories ....... 207,491
Naples and Sicily ...... 639,544
Austrian Territories .. 637,353

Greece ................ 135,315
Turkey ............... 899,100 1,489,826 2,029,305
Wallachia and Moldavia .... 179,510
Syria and Palestine .. 306,580
Egypt .............. 122,832 221,003 787,111
Morocco .............. 426 41,952 75,257
French Possessions in Senegambia .... 1,725

West Coast of Africa .. 234,768 459,685 617,764
Java and Sumatra ....... 285,296 306,132 558,212
Philippines ........... 39,513 47,019 386,552
China ................ 519,443 969,381 1,373,689
Cuba ................. 663,531 711,938 1,124,864
Hayti ............... 376,103 141,896 133,804

United States and California ..
Mexico .............. 9,053,583 3,535,381 23,658,427
New-Granada .......... 728,858 374,969 791,940
Venezuela ........... 248,250 231,711 450,804
Brazile .............. 1,238,371 1,756,805 3,186,407
Uruguay ............. 339,870 969,791 529,883
Buenos Ayres ......... 551,035
Chili ................ 215 7,223 912,662

Total of foreign countries £26,909,432 £34,119,587 £65,551,579
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
<th>Value 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Channel Islands</td>
<td>£324,634</td>
<td>£364,359</td>
<td>£470,107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>367,285</td>
<td>937,719</td>
<td>670,840</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>134,519</td>
<td>289,304</td>
<td>297,906</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ionian Islands</td>
<td>50,883</td>
<td>83,600</td>
<td>116,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>257,245</td>
<td>369,076</td>
<td>1,212,630</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>148,475</td>
<td>244,922</td>
<td>385,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Indies</td>
<td>3,857,969</td>
<td>5,169,888</td>
<td>8,185,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>357,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>403,223</td>
<td>998,952</td>
<td>14,513,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>North American Colonies</td>
<td>2,089,327</td>
<td>2,333,525</td>
<td>4,898,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Indies</td>
<td>2,581,949</td>
<td>2,591,425</td>
<td>1,906,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Possessions</td>
<td>39,431</td>
<td>18,675</td>
<td>347,787</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total to British possessions</td>
<td>£10,254,940</td>
<td>£13,261,436</td>
<td>£33,382,202</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total of British &amp; Foreign</td>
<td>£37,164,372</td>
<td>£47,381,023</td>
<td>£98,933,781</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Economist selects the year of 1842, in order to exhibit the advantages of free trade since that period, forgetting, with its usual candour, that 1842 was a year of commercial depression, and 1853 a year of the greatest prosperity. If the progress of English exports were produced by the magic of free trade, it would have been better proved by comparison of the relative exports to countries maintaining a strict protectionist system, Russia and France for instance; the former of these countries being moreover that from which imports have most increased, and which had been most subject to the influence of British free trade. Now we find that the exports to both these countries have declined.

The export to Russia having been .......................................................... £1,106,767
While in 1831 it was ...................................................................................... 1,195,565
And the export to France having been in 1853 ........................................... 2,636,330
While in 1842 it was ...................................................................................... 3,193,939

The aggregate value of British exports in the seven months ending 5th August, 1854, compared with those during the corresponding months of 1853, shows an increase, in consequence of the metals having increased in value; but in the other ruling
products of British industry we find a marked decline, as shown by the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>1853</th>
<th>1854</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Linen manufactures</td>
<td>£2,650,050</td>
<td>£2,456,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linen yarn</td>
<td>646,578</td>
<td>581,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk manufactures</td>
<td>965,345</td>
<td>834,275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk, thrown</td>
<td>132,689</td>
<td>120,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool manufactures</td>
<td>3,741,261</td>
<td>3,731,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton manufactures</td>
<td>15,515,224</td>
<td>14,762,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn</td>
<td>3,897,080</td>
<td>3,838,393</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The decline in cotton appears still more striking since the quantity of exports has increased, while the value realised has decreased. In 1854 there were exported 981,994,130 yards of cotton manufactures, exclusive of lace and patent net, while in 1853 there were only exported 969,293,663 yards.

Written on September 15, 1854

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4198, October 2; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 976, October 3 and partly in the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 682, October 7, 1854

Signed: Karl Marx
At last it seems possible that the French and English may strike a serious blow at the power and prestige of Russia, and we in this country are accordingly looking with renewed interest to the movement against Sevastopol, the latest intelligence from which is detailed in another column.\textsuperscript{349} As a matter of course, the British and French journals make a great parade about this undertaking, and if we can believe them, nothing grander was ever heard of in military history; but those who look at the facts in the case—at the inexplicable delays and senseless apologies attending the setting out of the expedition, and all the circumstances preceding and attending it—will refuse to be imposed upon. The termination of the enterprise may be glorious, but its origin would rather seem to be disgraceful.

Look at the past history of the allied armies in Turkey. At first these very heroic, but also exceedingly cautious warriors intended to land at Enos, on this side of the Dardanelles, and to approach that peninsula\textsuperscript{a} only after everything should have turned out to be quite safe. Before this daring feat, however, was accomplished, they stretched their courage to an unexpected extent, and risked a landing on the Thracian Chersonesus at Gallipoli. But this was merely done in order to have the defensive works across the peninsula completed in less time, thus securing to themselves that most essential of all requisites, a base of operations. All the while the Turks on the Danube were facing those formidable opponents

\textsuperscript{a} Gallipoli.—\textit{Ed.}
whose presence in Wallachia was the pretext for those learned maneuvers of the allies; and they were facing them, too, with considerable success. But as more ships and more troops arrived, it was found out that the Dardanelles and peninsula cannot harbor them all. Thus another hole is made in the scientific arrangements agreed upon between Paris and London. A portion of the troops had actually to endure the dangers and risks of a landing at that very exposed spot, Constantinople! To remedy this, the fortification of this town was at once taken in hand. Fortunately, a good deal of time was spent in all these operations, and thus the main object was secured—not to gain time, but to lose it. Then it was ascertained that a division might, with little risk, be sent to Varna, to garrison that important place, for surely the Turks, who so gloriously defended it in 1828, had since then made such progress in European discipline, that the defense of such a post could no longer be entrusted to them. The division was sent accordingly, and one or two divisions more. When finely every pretext for keeping the troops in the Bosphorus was fairly worn out, the grand combined army was very leisurely concentrated at Varna. This was done at the same time when an Austrian army appeared like a menacing thunder cloud on the flank and rear of the Russians, and when thus, by political combinations, the base of the allied operations was at once transferred, for the moment, from Constantinople to Transylvania and Galicia. Without this, there is every reason to believe there would never have been an allied army in Bulgaria. The proof of it is in their behavior during the siege of Silistria. Everybody knows that there was the turning point of the campaign, and that in such an emergency, when both parties have been straining their powers to the utmost, the smallest extra weight added on one side, will in nine cases out of ten, turn the balance in its favor. Yet, during this decisive siege, there were 20,000 English and 30,000 French soldiers, "the flower of the two armies," smoking their pipes, and very quietly getting themselves in trim for the cholera at a very few days' march from the fortress. And, but for the havoc made by disease among the Russians, and for the unaccountable bravery of a handful of Arnauts ensconced in a ditch plowed by shells in every direction, Silistria would have fallen into the hands of the enemy. There is no instance in the history of war of an army within easy reach, thus cowardly leaving its allies to shift for themselves. No expedition to the Crimea, and no victory will ever clear away that stain from the honor of the French and English commanders. Where would the British have been at Waterloo if old Blücher, after his defeat at Ligny, two days
before, had thus conscientiously acted in the manner of Raglan and St. Arnaud? 350

The handful of Arnauts in the skirmishing ditch of Arab Tabiassi proved a match for the skill, intellect and military strength of Russia. No relieving army drove the Russians across the Danube; their own foolishness, the valor of the defenders, the marsh fever, the passive weight of the Austrians on the Dniester and of the allies on the Devna (for who could think they would act as they did?) made them finally abandon the siege, and give up both the campaign, the Principalities and the Dobrodja. After this great success, the allied generals of course thought of following it up—always according to the rules of that strategic system which they had hitherto applied with so much effect. Consequently, Lord Cardigan led the British cavalry to the Danube, on a reconnoitering expedition, in which they saw no Russians, lost many horses, and earned nothing but sickness and ridicule; while General Espinasse, mainly known by his betrayal of the National Assembly on December 2, 1851, 351 led his division into the Dobrodja for no other purpose than having a couple of fine regiments half destroyed by cholera, and bringing the germ of that epidemic into the allied camp. The great invasion of cholera which ensued among the allies at Varna was thus the well earned result of their fine strategic combinations. The soldiers fell off by thousands before they had even seen an enemy; they died like flies in a camp where, unattacked and undisturbed, they were enabled to live in comparative luxury. Discouragement, distrust in their commanders, disorganization ensued, not so much among the English, who suffered less and who have more power of endurance, as among the French, whose national character is more apt to give way to such influences, especially while their commanders hold them in a state of inactivity. But there was visible in the riots that actually broke out among the French troops, the natural effect of the abnormal state in which they have existed since 1849. The French soldier has been taught by the Bourgeoisie he rescued from the terrors of the revolution, to look upon himself as the savior of his country and of society at large. He has been petted by Louis Bonaparte as the instrument that restored the Empire. He was treated all the while in a way which taught him to command and made him forget to obey. Superior as he was instructed to consider himself to civilians, he very soon got a notion that he was at least equal to his commanders. Every effort was used to make him a pretorian, and all history shows that pretorians are but degenerate soldiers. They begin by commanding to the civilians,
they next proceed to dictating to their generals, and they end by being thoroughly thrashed.

Now look at what occurred at Varna. When whole battalions dropped down on the burning sands, writhing in the agonies of cholera, the old soldiers began to compare the adventurers who now are at their head, with the old commanders that led them successfully through those very African campaigns which the heroes of the modern Lower Empire affect so much to disdain. Africa was a hotter country than Bulgaria, and the Sahara is a good deal less pleasant than even the Dobrodja; but no such mortalities ever marked the paths of African conquest as attended the repose of Devna, and the easy reconnoitering marches around Kustendje. Cavaignac, Bedeau, Changarnier, Lamoricière led them through greater dangers, with far less loss, at a time when Espinasse and Leroy St. Arnaud were still buried in the obscurity from which political infamies only could raise them. Accordingly the Zouaves, the men who had done most work and smelt most powder, the best representatives of the African army, rose in a body and shouted: "À bas les singes! Il nous faut Lamoricière!" Down with the apes! give us Lamoricière! His Imperial Majesty, Napoleon III, the head and soul of this actual official apery of a great past, must have felt, when this came to his knowledge that the cry of the Zouaves was for him "the beginning of the end." At Varna, it had a magic effect. We may say it was the chief cause of the expedition to the Crimea.

After the experience of this summer's campaigning, or rather promenading, from Gallipoli to Scutari, from Scutari to Varna, from Varna to Devna, Aladyn and back again, nobody will expect us to treat seriously the pretexts put forth by the allied commanders, why the expedition, after being so long delayed, was finally so hurriedly undertaken. One instance will sufficiently show what their arguments are worth. The delay was owing, it was said, to the French siege artillery not having arrived. Well, when the cholera riots occurred, and Leroy St. Arnaud saw that he must now play his best card and that without delay, he sent to Constantinople for Turkish siege artillery and ammunition, and it was got ready and embarked in a very short time; and if the French siege train had not arrived in the meantime, they would have sailed without it. But the Turkish siege artillery was ready many a month before, and thus all the delays that had occurred are proved to have been needless.

Thus we see that this grandiloquent expedition to the Crimea, with six hundred ships and sixty thousand soldiers, with three
siege-trains and nobody knows how many field-pieces, instead of being the deliberate result of skilful movements, prepared scientifically long beforehand, is nothing but a hurried coup de tête, undertaken to save Leroy St. Arnaud from being massacred by his own soldiers; poor old soft Lord Raglan not being the man to resist, especially as any longer delay would bring his army down to the same state of discipline and despondency which has already seized the French troops.

The irony of events, as a German writer has it, is still at work in contemporary as much as in past history, and poor Lord Raglan is its present victim. As to Leroy St. Arnaud, nobody ever treated him as a commander. He is a member of the swell mob of too long standing—this notorious old companion of female thieves and swindlers—this worthy acolyte of the man whom “Debt, not Destiny,” hurried on to the expedition of Boulogne. In spite of the censorship, his character and antecedents are known well enough in gossiping Paris. The twice cashiered Lieutenant—the Captain who robbed the regimental cash-box when Paymaster in Africa, is known well enough, and whatever he may accomplish in the Crimea, his successful expedition to a London pawn-shop with his landlady’s blankets, followed up by his well-executed retreat to Paris, will still form his chief title to military glory. But poor Raglan, the Duke of Wellington’s Adjutant-General, a man grown hoary among the theoretical labors and minute details of a staff-command, no doubt actually believes in the motives he gives for his actions. And upon him falls the full weight of the curious fact that the whole of the campaign has been so scientifically planned, so skilfully executed, that ten thousand men, or about one in seven, died before they saw an enemy, and that the whole of these elaborate proceedings have served only to bring about a helter skelter expedition into the Crimea at the close of the season. There is nothing so pungent as this very “irony of events.”

For all that the expedition may be successful. The allies almost deserve it, for nothing would hold up to greater contempt the way in which they have previously carried on the campaign. So much fuss, such an expenditure of caution, such a profusion of science, against an enemy who succumbs to an undertaking which has for its end, not his destruction, but the preservation of their own army; this would be the greatest condemnation the allies could pass upon themselves. But then, they are not yet in Sevastopol.

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a Impulsive act.—Ed.
They have landed at Eupatoria and at Staroye Ukreplienie. Thence they have respectively fifty and twenty miles march to Sevastopol. Their heavy artillery is to be landed close to the latter place, to save the trouble of land-carriage; the landing then is far from completed. The force of the Russians is not exactly known, but there is no doubt it is large enough to allow them to be stronger than the allies on most points in the immediate vicinity of Sevastopol. The hilly ground and the bay cutting into the land some ten miles deep, will force the allies to expand on a very long line as soon as they attempt to invest the fortress. To break their line cannot, with a determined commander, be a matter of great difficulty. We do not of course know what the land-defenses of the place are; but what we know of old Menchikoff, leads us to presume that he will not have lost his time.

The first attack, we are led to believe from statements in the British journals, and from the line of operations chosen by the allies, will be the fort commanding the town from a hill on the north side. This is called by the Russians Severnaya Krepost, the Northern Fort. If this fort is anything like solidly constructed, it is capable of lengthy resistance. It is a large square redoubt, constructed upon Montalembert’s polygonal, or caponnière, system, the flanking defense being formed by a low casemated work lying at the bottom of the ditch in the middle of each side of the square, and sweeping the ditch both right and left. These works have the advantage of not being exposed to the direct fire of the enemy until he has come with his works to the very brink of the ditch. The proximity of this work to the main fortress allows it to be made use of offensively as a support and base for strong sorties, and altogether its presence must force the allies to confine their main operations to the northern shore of the bay.

But the experience of Bomarsund has taught us that nothing certain can be said about Russian fortifications until they are actually put to the test. The chances of success for the Crimean expedition cannot, therefore, now be ascertained with any probability. But this much is pretty certain, that if the operation should be of a protracted character, if the setting in of winter should cause a fresh irruption of sickness, if the troops should be wasted in hurried and unprepared attacks, like those of the Russians against Silistria, the French army, and most likely the Turkish army, will relapse into that state of dissolution which the former underwent at Varna, and the latter has more than once

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*a* Stary Fort (Old Fort).— *Ed.*
exhibited in Asia. The English are sure to hold together longer; but there is a point at which even the best disciplined troops give way. This is the real danger for the allies, and if the Russian resistance brings this state of things about, it must make a reembarkation before a victorious enemy a very hazardous thing. The expedition may very likely prove successful; but on the other hand, it may turn out a second Walcheren.355

Written on September 25, 1854
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4209, October 14, 1854 as a leader

Reproduced from the newspaper
Our columns this morning are filled with the stirring news of sanguinary battles in the Crimea, including the capture of Sevastopol, the destruction of its principal forts and of a great part of the Russian fleet, and the final surrender of Prince Menchikoff, and the remains of his defeated and more than decimated forces as prisoners of war. If these reports are strictly correct, for nearly forty years the world has witnessed no such gigantic bloodshed, nor any martial event pregnant with consequences so momentous. As to the correctness of the news, that is a point on which some light may perhaps be thrown by carefully separating what we know officially and positively from what we have only from vague and uncertain sources.

We must, then, distinguish the statements into two classes—those relating to the battle of the Alma, fought on Sept. 20, and those announcing the capture of Sevastopol itself. According to the dispatches of Lord Raglan and Marshal St. Arnaud, the allied armies on the 20th stormed the Russian intrenched camp on the heights to the south of the river Alma, and forced the Russians to retreat. The British took two guns. The French, in their dispatch, mention no trophies at all. The French loss was about 1,400; British the same. The Russians were estimated at 45,000 to 50,000 men; their loss at 4,000 to 6,000. These dispatches are evidently written in the full flush of a maiden victory. The 50,000 Russians present on the Alma contrast very strongly with the 45,000 troops which were said to be the maximum of what was spread over the length and breadth of the Crimea. The two guns taken in an intrenched camp, defended by a "numerous heavy artillery," look like very insignificant trophies when it is considered that it is
almost impossible to save guns out of field-fortifications when once carried. Still more ominous is Marshal St. Arnaud's silence about the taking of guns by the French.

Supposing Menchikoff had actually concentrated 45,000 to 50,000 men in the intrenched camp on the Alma, what would it prove? Either that he had far more troops than was expected, being able to bring so many to the open field, or that the fortifications of Sevastopol were so weak on the land side that he could not hold the place, except by defeating the allies in the open field; or, thirdly, that he made a tremendous mistake in exposing his troops to an open battle, and to the demoralisation consequent upon a decisive defeat.

If we are to trust the earlier reports the Russian camp on the Alma mustered not more than 10,000 men. These might have been reenforced, but to bring them up even to 25,000 or 30,000 men the Russians must have made considerable effort. With 50,000 men within easy reach of the Alma, or within fifteen miles of the place of landing, how are we to account for their not having pounced upon the allies in the very act of debarkation?

The country between the Old Fort, where the allies landed, and Sevastopol is intersected by three watercourses, forming, by their deep ravines, as many military positions. The one nearest to Sevastopol is the Chornaya, emptying itself into the eastern end of the bay of Sevastopol. While Fort Severnaya defends the northern shore of this bay, that rivulet, or rather its deeply-cut valley forms a sort of natural ditch on the east of the town. There, then, is naturally the last important position for the defense. The next river is the Kacha, running east and west a few miles to the north of Severnaya; and again about twelve miles to the northward runs the Alma. Of the three lines of defense, in spite of tactical advantages which may exist, and which cannot be judged at this distance, it is hardly to be supposed that the Russians should have chosen the first and the remotest for a pitched battle in which the fate of Sevastopol could have been decided. The absence of the main body of the allied cavalry, however, might have encouraged the Russians to send a strong corps into the intrenchments of the Alma, as their own momentary superiority in that arm would secure them against flank movements of the hostile horse. The impossibility of making use of this arm when once cooped up in Sevastopol may have acted as an inducement.

The Russian defeat on the Alma becomes still more reduced in its tactical extent when more closely examined. The Russians are not fond of intrenching themselves in open walls. They prefer,
wherever they have time and intend furious resistance, closed square redoubts. To save the artillery from such redoubts is impossible, as soon as the assault is actually carried through. But even from that class of works, technically known as lunettes, open at the gorge, there is almost no chance of saving artillery in the face of a storming enemy. For, if the guns be withdrawn at the very moment of the assault, the defense deprives itself of its own weapon; the ditch once crossed, who is to drag the guns from the embankments or the platform, who to re-limber them and drive off under the close fire of the enemy?

"Guns in intrenchments must be considered as lost when the intrenchments themselves can no longer be held; the only thing you can do is to sell them as dearly as possible,"

says General Dufour in his Manual of Field Fortifications.\(^a\) The fact that the Russians lost but two guns is a proof that the camp was not defended to the last extremity, and that, perhaps, only one or two intrenchments were actually taken at the point of the bayonet. The remainder cannot have been defended with that arm, but must have been all but abandoned, before the storming column were in the ditch. The retreat of the Russians appears to have been executed in good order; their cavalry would protect them, and the impossibility of bodies of allied cavalry rapidly crossing the Alma and ravine would give them an advantage. But then, the saving of almost all their artillery is a sufficient proof that they broke off the battle before any great blow had thrown them into disorder.

This is all we know about the victory on the heights to the south of the Alma which was announced in England on the 1st inst. by the thunder of cannon and the ringing of bells, proclaimed at the Royal Exchange on Saturday evening, Sept. 30, at 10 o'clock by the Lord Mayor, preceded by a trumpeter sounding his bugle; cheered at the theaters, and registered by *The London Times* as the anticipated effect of the Archbishop of Canterbury's\(^b\) thanksgivings prayer.\(^c\) Correspondents announce that Marshal St. Arnaud had been unable to mount on horseback. Historians relate the same of Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo. The victory of the Alma was perhaps due to the same circumstance as the defeat of Waterloo.

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\(^a\) G. H. Dufour, *De la fortification permanente*, p. 309.—Ed.

\(^b\) J. Sumner.—Ed.

\(^c\) *The Times*, No. 21861, October 2, 1854, leader.—Ed.
We come now to the class of more startling news referring to the capture of Sevastopol.\(^a\) The first announcement of this event reached London from Bucharest by telegraph, is dated from the latter town Sept. 28. It stated that Sevastopol had fallen into the hands of the allies after a combined attack by sea and by land. It purported to be derived in the first place from a French steamer dispatched from Sevastopol to Constantinople with this intelligence, which steamer was fallen in with by another French steamer en route for Varna. If the capture of the fortresses took place on the 25th, as is asserted, the news could have reached Varna in the night from the 26th to the 27th, and could have been conveyed to Bucharest by noon on the 28th—the distance between Varna and Bucharest being somewhat more than 100 miles and generally traversed by couriers in 24 hours. This was the news on which Bonaparte founded his address to the camp of Boulogne, which will be found in another column.\(^{357}\) But it turns out that no courier arrived at Bucharest before September 30. The second news of the fall of Sevastopol, which is at least within topographical probability, is only dated from Bucharest at the very day on which Bonaparte made his announcement. This telegraphic dispatch, received by the Austrian Government at 6 p.m. on Oct. 1, and communicated to The Times by the Austrian Minister at London\(^b\) on the 3d, is published by the Moniteur of the same day, with the remark that

"it had been forwarded to the French Government by M. de Buol, who had commanded M. de Hübner to congratulate the French Emperor, in the name of the Emperor of Austria, on the glorious success which had attended the French arms in the Crimea."\(^c\)

It should be observed that the value of this intelligence entirely rests upon the verbal statement of the courier sent from Constantinople to Omer Pasha, which courier, not finding Omer Pasha at Bucharest, started again for Silistria, where Omer Pasha then had his quarters. According to the statement of this courier, Sevastopol had been taken, 18,000 Russians killed, 22,000 made prisoners, Fort Constantine destroyed, the other forts with 800 guns captured, six Russian ships-of-war sunk, and Prince Menchikoff retired to the head of the bay, with the remainder of the

\(^a\) The telegrams here analysed were published in The Times, No. 21861, October 2, 1854.—Ed.

\(^b\) Fr. Colloredo-Waldsee.—Ed.

\(^c\) Telegram from Vienna of October 2, 1854. Le Moniteur universel, No. 276, October 3, 1854.—Ed.
squadron, declaring that he would blow them up rather than make an unconditional surrender. The allies had allowed him six hours for consideration. Constantinople was to be illuminated for ten days.

After what we have witnessed of Russian fortifications at Aland, and after the success of the allies on the Alma, a surrender of Sevastopol within something like a fortnight offered strong probabilities. But who can think of an army of 50,000 men having had the good fortune to save almost all its artillery out of a lost battle, commanded by the most daring officer who has yet appeared on the Russian side during this campaign, who can think of such an army laying down their arms after the first attack on the town? Nevertheless, this war has already offered such improbabilities and extraordinary features that we must not be reluctant to "march from surprise to surprise," as Napoleon did at the receipt of Sebastiani's dispatches from Constantinople in 1807. The allies have done everything throughout the war to meet with an unprecedented disaster. Why should it not have pleased fortune to force upon them a triumph without comparison? History, never without a grain of irony, perhaps desired to reserve to the world the curious treat of lodging in a modest tower of the Bosphorus that old Muscovite Rodomonte who but a year ago left the capital of the dying man with the proud threat of swallowing up his empire. What a bitter punishment for the proud and arrogant Menchikoff, the fomenter and beginner of the war, to return to Constantinople a prisoner!

If this courier spoke truth, the history of the Crimean campaign may be resumed in a very few words: On the 14th and 16th the army landed at Old Fort without meeting resistance; on the 19th it marched; on the 20th it won the battle of the Alma, and on the 25th captured Sevastopol.

The next steamer due from Liverpool is the Africa, which comes directly to this port, and does not touch at Halifax. We can hardly expect her to arrive before Friday, till when we cannot hope for absolute certainty on this most interesting question. Meanwhile it will probably be most fashionable to believe implicitly the whole story of this Turkish courier, and we hope that those who thus receive it may not be taken down as much as our friend Louis Bonaparte was at Boulogne on the same subject. That imperial gentleman, as our readers may see by referring to another part of

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a See this volume, pp. 384-88.—Ed.
b Presumably Liprandi.—Ed.
this paper, proclaimed the intelligence at a review the other morning, in a rather melodramatic style, in the clear and positive words *Sébastopol est pris*. As he said this he, perhaps, appeared to himself a real Napoleon announcing a great victory to his troops. Unfortunately for the nephew, the uncle never stood in need of announcing a victory: he fought his own battles, and his soldiers, who saw the enemy fly, required no confirmation. More unfortunately, the announcement which Louis Bonaparte could not withhold had to be qualified in the evening by the sous-préfet of Boulogne, who placarded a statement that some dispatch had arrived stating the capture of Sevastopol, but that its correctness could not be vouched for. The Emperor of the French was thus corrected by his own sous-préfet of Boulogne! It is a striking circumstance, also, that the official journal of the French Government of October 3, the latest date, contains no confirmation of the reported great event. Still it may all prove true enough, and we wait with intense interest for positive intelligence.

Written on October 2 and 3, 1854

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*a* "Sevastopol is taken." This report of October 1 from Vienna was published together with the speech of Napoleon III made in Boulogne on September 30, 1854, in *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 275, October 2, 1854.—*Ed.

*b* Sub-prefect.—*Ed.*

*c* *Le Moniteur universel.*—*Ed.*
"Catch a Tartar," is an English proverb. It happens that not only the English, but the French and Austrians as well, have been caught by a Tartar.\(^a\) We may, perhaps, be pardoned for expressing a little satisfaction that The Tribune and those of its readers who carefully follow the course of the present campaign in the Crimea were not caught with the rest.

When the extraordinary story of the capture of Sevastopol first reached us, we endeavored to show,\(^b\) by an examination of the alleged channels of the intelligence, as well as on critical military grounds, that the victory of the Alma, however decisive it might have been, could scarcely have been followed in so close succession by the surrender of the object of the campaign. But we think we established, at the same time, the fact that no very decisive victory had been gained at all by the allies, the Russians having retired in good order with all their guns. Lastly, we took particular care to point out how the whole statement, in so far as it exceeded the limits of the official report on the battle of the Alma, rested exclusively on the verbal relation of a Tartar sent to Omer Pasha with sealed dispatches. Thus we were fully prepared for receiving the news that the tremendous "Fall of Sevastopol" was nothing

\(^a\) Here Marx and Engels pun on the word "Tartar". The Tartars were famous for their fast horses and were employed by the Turks as couriers. In the nineteenth century the word "Tartar" was used in the European languages as a synonym for courier, and it was so used in the news on the capture of Sevastopol printed in the European papers, The Times and Le Moniteur universel of October 3, 1854 in particular.—Ed.

\(^b\) See this volume, pp. 477-82.—Ed.
but an imaginary exaggeration of the victory of the Alma, reported by a jocose Tartar at Bucharest, announced by the melodramatic Louis Napoleon at Boulogne, and implicitly believed by that excellent specimen of humanity, the English shopkeeper. The English press in general has proved a worthy representative of that class, and it would seem that the very name of Sevastopol need only be pronounced in England to put everybody in a fool’s paradise. Perhaps our readers will recollect that at the close of the last Parliamentary session the destruction of Sevastopol was announced by Lord John Russell to be in the plans of the English Government, which announcement, though in the same sitting duly recanted, kept the honorable members five hours in a fool’s paradise—to use the words of Mr. Disraeli, uttered on that occasion.\(^a\) The London Times has now written no less than nine leaders, by actual count, all conceived, bona fide or mala fide,\(^b\) in this identical fool’s paradise; all, as it would appear, only with a view to entrap Sir Charles Napier into a headlong attack upon Kronstadt or Sveaborg. Affecting to be drunk with glory and flushed with success, that journal even proceeded to bombard—in imagination of course—the Prussian coasts on the Baltic, as well as King Bomba at Naples, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany,\(^c\) at Leghorn. In fact it was ready to make war on all the world, not omitting “the rest of mankind,”\(^d\) of course.

The actual state of the land fortifications of Sevastopol is too little known to admit of any positive prognostication as to how long that fortress may be able to hold out. The success on the Alma is an almost certain indication that the place will be taken, as it must have raised the courage and spirit of the allied troops, and will prove a powerful preventive against sickness—the most dangerous enemy they have to deal with in the Crimea, and one which is reported to be already at work. But it is foolish to expect that the allies should walk into Sevastopol as they would into a coffee-house.

After the great mystification of the conquest of the place, with its 30,000 killed and wounded and 22,000 prisoners—a mystification whose like was never known in all the history of hoaxes—it would be natural to expect that the real official documents would at least possess the merit of affording clear and positive

\(^a\) See this volume, p. 326.—\(Ed.\)

\(^b\) In good or bad faith.—\(Ed.\)

\(^c\) Ferdinand II and Leopold II.—\(Ed.\)

\(^d\) The Times, No. 21864, October 5, 1854, leader.—\(Ed.\)
information as far as they go. Still the report published in London on the 5th of October in an extraordinary number of *The Gazette*, and copied in our columns this morning, is, after all, not free from ambiguous expressions. Indeed, it is most open to criticism—a circumstance which must be ascribed to its proceeding from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, one of the Palmerston school of diplomacy. This dispatch, in the first place, purports to have been sent to England from Bucharest on the 30th of September at 3 1/2 p.m., while Lord Redcliffe dates it from Constantinople on the 30th at 9 1/2 p.m.; so that the dispatch purports to have been actually received at Bucharest six hours before it was sent off from Constantinople. In the second place, the dispatch omits all mention of what passed in the Crimea between the 20th and 28th of September, telling us that

"the allied armies established their basis of operations at Balaklava on the morning of the 28th, and were preparing to march without delay to Sevastopol. The *Agamemnon*"

(with Admiral Lyons)

"and other vessels of war were in the Bay of Balaklava. There were facilities there for disembarking the battering train."

Assuming this dispatch to be exact, the English press has naturally concluded that the allied armies had passed the Belbek and Severnaya, forced the heights at the back of the Bay of Sevastopol, and penetrated in a straight line to the Bay of Balaklava. We have here to observe that, on military grounds, it is inconceivable that an army in possession of the heights commanding Sevastopol should quietly descend from them on the other side, in order to march to a bay eleven miles distant, for no other purpose than to "establish a base of operations." On the other hand, it is quite conceivable that Admiral Lyons should go around Cape Chersonesus with a portion of the fleet for the purpose of securing a harbor of refuge, at once close to Sevastopol and adapted to the debarkation of the siege artillery, which, we have always contended, had not before been landed. The guns, of course, would not be landed without a protecting force, which may have been either detached from the main body of the army after landing at Old Fort, or may consist of a portion of the reserve shipped from Constantinople and Varna.

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\[a\] See this volume, p. 475.—*Ed.*
The new dispatch further states that

"Prince Menchikoff was in the field at the head of 20,000 men, expecting reinforcements."

Hence the English papers conclude that the Russians must have lost 25,000 to 30,000 men in the combats between September 20 and 28, assuming with Lord Raglan that they were from 45,000 to 50,000 strong in the battle of the Alma. We have previously stated\(^a\) our *prima facie*\(^b\) disbelief in these numbers, and have never allowed more than about 25,000 men to Prince Menchikoff, disposable for field operations, and in this it turns out that we were within the mark of the Russian statements.\(^c\)

The dispatch next proceeds to state that

"the fortified place of Anapa has been burned by the Russians. Its garrison was marching to the scene of action."

We cannot believe this news to be true. If Prince Menchikoff expects any reinforcements at all to reach him in time, they can do so much better from Perekop than from Anapa, which is nearly two hundred miles distant; if none could be expected by him from the former place, it would have been most foolish, by calling up the garrison of Anapa, on the other side of the Black Sea, to sacrifice in addition to Sevastopol the last stronghold upon the Caucasus. It will be seen, then, that with all the "information" of this official dispatch, we are still sent back to the battle of the Alma as the chief event whose authenticity must be admitted. Of this event, however, the details are also still wanting, and the Duke of Newcastle has now warned the British public that they must not expect to receive them before Monday, October 9. All that we have learned, in addition to the official report by telegraph from Lord Raglan, amounts to this: That the hero of the London pawnshop, Marshal St. Arnaud, was "indisposed" on the day of battle—(who ever heard the like of other heroes?)—that Lord Raglan had the chief command, that the English loss was not 1,400 but 2,000, including 96 officers, and that already six steamers with wounded had arrived at Constantinople.

The movements of Omer Pasha's army, which is directed from Bucharest and Wallachia, by way of Rustchuk, Silistria and Oltenitza, to the coast of the Black Sea, appear to confirm the

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\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 477-78.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) Based on the first impression.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) These figures are given in a telegram from Vienna of October 4, published in *The Times*, No. 21864, October 5, 1854.—*Ed.*
The Sevastopol Hoax

report that the allied commanders in the Crimea have asked for reenforcements. But this retreat of the Turks from Wallachia may also be attributed to Austria's desire to keep them from every road in the direction of Bessarabia, except the impracticable one through the Dobrodja.

In the enormous credulity of which the English public have given us such imposing proofs, it deserves to be noted that the London Exchange was very little caught by the general enthusiasm, the rise in the funds having never exceeded 3/8 per cent. At Paris, however, the rentes rose immediately 1 1/2 per cent., a rise which, after all, is insignificant when compared with the rise of 10 per cent. after the defeat of Waterloo. Thus the hoax, if, as is possible, it was invented for commercial purposes, has altogether failed to realize the great results its authors must have counted on.

Written on October 5 and 6, 1854
Repotted from the newspaper
First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4215, October 21, 1854 as a leader
London, Friday, Oct. 6, 1854

It is impossible to describe the excitement and suspense of the English during the week. On Saturday last the dispatch about the victory of the Alma was proclaimed by the Lord Mayor\(^a\) before the Exchange, with the sound of the trumpet; but the unauthenticated news of the fall of Sevastopol spread all over the country. All the world was taken in. Napoleon announced it to his army at Boulogne, the English and French papers contained leaders on the happy event, the Emperor of Austria congratulated the Emperor and the Queen upon their success, but cautiously did not mention Sevastopol; bonfires were lighted, and the cannon boomed. We soon obtained the dispatch which originated all this joy and exultation; and indeed it proved to proceed from a very suspicious source. A Tartar—that is to say, a Turkish postman—has arrived at Bucharest with dispatches from Constantinople for Omer Pasha, which, as the General was absent, had to be sent to him unopened—therefore we don’t know their contents. But the postman related that at his departure from Constantinople the town was illuminated, and that orders were given to continue the illumination for ten days. He concluded, therefore, that Sevastopol was taken, and gave just such details as a Turkish or London postboy could give in a pothouse. He mentioned 18,000 Russians killed, but only 200 guns taken, though the forts contain above 500 guns; 22,000 Russians were of course prisoners, since it was known that the garrison amounted to about 40,000. The fleet was first taken; then again a portion of it was destroyed, and Prince

\(^a\) Sidney.—Ed.
Menchikoff was on the point of blowing himself up with the remainder, &c., &c.

But it remained rather curious that such an important event had not been communicated by Lord Redcliffe to the Consul at Bucharest, and that no dispatch had reached the French Government. Still, the news was too good not to be believed, and accordingly it was believed. Next day, it is true, there arrived a report from St. Petersburg mentioning a dispatch of Prince Menchikoff of the 26th, which showed that after the battle of the Alma he was retreating toward Simferopol. Still the papers believed that it was a misprint, and that the real date of the dispatch was the 20th, rather than to give up the agreeable delusion of the fall of Sevastopol at the first onset. To-day, however, has brought the English public to reason; the miraculous capture of a great fortress without a siege proves to have been a cruel hoax, which will make the papers more cautious in future.

In Spain disturbances have taken place not only in Malaga, where the Republican party, as I remarked in my last letter, is very strong, but even in Logroño, where Espartero resided for many years; and in Jaen, the telegraph adds that a Republican conspiracy has been discovered, and that the Infant Don Enrique, the brother of the idiotic husband of the Queen, has been exiled to the Balearic Islands. Still the excitement about Sevastopol is so great that nobody pays attention to Spain.

In Denmark the Diet was opened on the 2d. The royal speech from the throne breathes defiance to the Assembly. It was received by hisses and by hearty cheers for the Constitution. The *Frankfort Journal* reiterates the statement that the allied powers have resolved to reconsider the famous treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, by which the succession to the Danish throne was eventually made over to the Emperor of Russia. Urquhart has not ceased to bring this discreditable piece of European diplomacy before the public over and over again, and his endeavors seem now at last to have succeeded. The object of this movement, if there be anything in the rumor, is simply by reopening the question to get Prussia, who dissented from that protocol, to ally

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\(^{a}\) Colquhoun.—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) Francisco de Asis.—*Ed.*

\(^{c}\) Isabella II.—*Ed.*

\(^{d}\) Reference to the speech made by Frederick VII.—*Ed.*

\(^{e}\) *Frankfurter Journal.*—*Ed.*

\(^{f}\) The reference is to Chapter IV ("Treaty of the 8th of May, 1852") in: D. Urquhart, *Progress of Russia.*—*Ed.*
herself with the western powers. It is worthy of note that Palmerston called the protocol, like the treaty of 1840, measures against Russia, while its suspension is now to be considered as an act of hostility toward Russia.

Austria is reported to have sent a note to St. Petersburg, offering once more the four conditions as the basis of peace, and declaring that the refusal of the Czar to accept them will be taken for a *casus belli* by Francis Joseph. This is one of the results of the victories in the Crimea.

The following observations on a recent article in *The Economist* are taken from the trade circular of Messrs. Smith & Charles:

"Of all the announcements or intimations that have appeared since the war began, that put forth on Saturday last by *The Economist* is by far the most important in a Russo-commercial point of view. *It must be borne in mind that this weekly journal is the property of one of the Secretaries to the Treasury (Mr. Wilson) and hence the remarks to which we are about to draw attention may be regarded as semi-official.* Having explained the course of exchange in Petersburg, and shown that, as a consequence of our trade with Prussia, British gold must necessarily be furnished by this country to Russia for its belligerent purposes; having stated that this was all foreseen by our Government, but that they considered such a state of things the lesser of two evils, *The Economist* proceeds to say, that after the fall of Sevastopol 'we shall be in undisturbed possession of the Black Sea and its shores, and masters of the Danube. But in the meantime Russia may take a posture which we can never by our arms reach, in the hope of wearying the patience of England, as in such a posture Russia can only be reached by her trade, and it may become a question whether our national interests will not dictate before long a different policy from that we have hitherto followed. We shall find that we blockade the ports in vain, so long as our produce finds a ready market through neighboring countries; so long as we permit Prussia to profit so much by being the medium through which our blockade of Russian shores can be so easily evaded, &c. If, therefore, considerations of general policy shall render it needful again to consider the question of the extent to which the blockade shall be enforced and the trade restricted by land as well as by sea, &c. *The Economist* concludes with a most solemn warning, saying: 'It will be well for those who are disposed to engage in such hazardous undertakings (as supplying the Russians with capital to purchase goods in the winter, to be forwarded to this country next year) to consider that it may be found needful to pursue a very different policy in the second year of a Russian campaign, from that which was wisest and best in the first.' We need hardly point out that the upshot of all this (and we strongly recommend our friends carefully to consider the entire article) is, that the Allied Powers have determined—as the only way of bringing the war to a close—to prohibit the overland traffic next year; and to prevent capitalists from embarking in a trade which will then be prohibited, the Government has very considerately allowed one of the Secretaries of the Treasury to make known their intentions in sufficient time to prevent the serious consequences to our merchants which would otherwise ensue. On Saturday the tallow market was quiet, at a shade under Friday's prices. It is probable that but for the article in *The Economist*, to which we have drawn attention, our market would

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[a] See this volume, pp. 579-84.—*Ed.*
have declined to-day in consequence of the news from Sevastopol, there being an opinion that the fall of this important fortress is likely to bring the Emperor to terms. Our opinion is the very reverse, and that the catastrophe in question is calculated only to excite the exasperation of the Czar, and to lead him to seek revenge in some other direction. It is quite certain that until he is compelled to fly from his own great cities he may consider himself not utterly beaten, and he has too much at stake to give in until he is driven to the utmost extremity. We therefore look on this war as one which may be protracted through many years, unless the course intimated by *The Economist* as likely to be adopted by the allies is actually put in force."

The *Moniteur* of the 5th October announces that Barbès, for the last three years a prisoner at Belle-île, has been set at liberty without condition by order of Bonaparte on account of a letter in which he expresses anxious feelings of hope for the success of Decembrist civilization against Muscovite civilization,\(^\text{364}\) the former of which, by the way, has recently manifested itself at Athens by reproducing the days of June, 1849\(^\text{365}\)—the French *Soldateska* there seizing an "obnoxious" newspaper editor, burning his books and letters, and throwing him into prison. From this moment Barbès has ceased to be one of the revolutionary chiefs of France. By declaring his sympathies for the French arms in whatever cause, and under whatever command they may be employed, he has irretrievably associated himself with the Muscovites themselves, sharing their indifference as to the object of their campaigns. Barbès and Blanqui have long shared the real supremacy of revolutionary France. Barbès never ceased to calumniate and throw suspicion upon Blanqui as in connivance with the Government. The fact of his letter and of Bonaparte's order decides the question as to who is the man of the Revolution and who not.

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\(^{a}\) "Money Market and City News", *The Morning Post*, No. 25195, October 3, 1854.—*Ed.*
Frederick Engels

THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA

The official accounts of the battle of the Alma have finally arrived, and the dispatches of the commanders, the reports of English journalists who were present, and of several naval officers, are given at great length in our columns this morning, confirming in every important respect the conclusions we drew from the first telegraphic reports of the action. The following are the facts as they appear to have occurred:

About three miles from the coast, the river Alma makes a bend so as to form a crescent, the two horns of which point toward the North. The southern side of the river, generally formed by cliffs about 300 feet high, here offers an amphitheater sloping down, more or less gently, toward the stream. This slope, supported on the right and left by abrupt high cliffs forming the edges of the plateau, was selected by the Russians as their position. If repulsed, their superior cavalry could always cover the retreat on the level ground of the plateau, which also offered almost everywhere facilities for carrying off the artillery. On a sort of terrace midway between the plateau and the valley of the river, the Russians had placed their main body of infantry, protected, on the left, by the steep cliffs, considered impracticable, and on the right by equally steep cliffs, by a redoubt on the terrace, and a heavy enfilading battery on the commanding heights. Admiral Hamelin maintains that this battery was mounted with twelve 32-pounders, but how such heavy ordnance could have been carried off during the retreat, as it most assuredly was, remains a secret to be explained.

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* See this volume, pp. 477-82.—Ed.
by that officer. The ground in front of the Russian position, intersected by vineyards and rocks, was favorable to the defense, and rendered still more difficult by abattis and other artificial obstacles, which, however, from the want of wood in the country, cannot have been very formidable. On the high plateau, behind and on both flanks of the Russians, were placed their reserves and cavalry. In front, their skirmishers extended beyond the river Alma, occupying the villages of Alma and Bourliouk.

Against this strong position the allies advanced on the 20th; the French had the right, the English the left wing. Early in the morning the French sent General Bosquet’s division (the 2d) with eight Turkish battalions along the sea-shore to climb the cliffs on that side, under the protection of the guns of the steamers, and thus to turn the Russian left. The English were to execute a similar movement against the enemy’s right. They, however, could not be protected by ships, and had the principal mass of the enemy’s cavalry against them on the plateau, so that this part of the plan of attack was not executed. The French, under Bosquet, in the meantime succeeded in climbing the rocky edge of the plateau, and while the Russian troops on this elevation were shelled by the heavy guns of the steamers, the third French division under Prince Napoleon advanced in front against the Russian left. Further off, the Russian center and right were attacked by the English. Next to Prince Napoleon’s came the second English division under Sir De Lacy Evans, the commander of the British Legion in Spain during the Carlist War. He was supported by General England (3d division), while the extreme left wing of the allies was formed by the British light division under Sir G. Brown, supported by the division of Guards under the Duke of Cambridge. The reserve (4th division, Sir G. Cathcart, and cavalry division, Earl of Lucan) maneuvered in the rear of the left to prevent any outflanking attempts of the enemy.

The battle appears to have been distinguished by the feature, that its first phase—that of skirmishing along the whole line, while the real decisive maneuvers are carried on behind this covering curtain—was very much shortened. The position of the Russians was, indeed, so clearly defined, and their powerful artillery so placed, that any lengthened skirmishing would have not only been useless to the allies but positively damaging. The French appear to have had to expose themselves for a while to this galling fire, the English being the last in line; but, this once carried out, the French columns and the English extended line advanced steadily into the difficult ground before them, dislodged the Russians from
the villages of Alma and Bourliouk (the latter of which was burned by the retreating force, so as to prevent its being used as shelter by the allies); passed the river and pressed up the heights without any unnecessary formalities. Here the combat on many points of the ground, in the vineyards, among the rocks and abattis, partook of the character of the battles between Verona and Castiglione in 1848. No regular advance was possible; a thick, irregular cloud of skirmishers, mostly acting independently, worked their way up to the first terrace, where the Russian lines awaited them. In the meantime, General Bosquet succeeded in establishing one of his brigades on the plateau, whence he menaced the Russian left; a brigade of the fourth division (Forey's) was sent to his assistance, while Forey's second brigade supported Napoleon's division. Thus the French made good a position by which the Russian left was seriously compromised. On the Russian right, Sir George Brown took the Russian redoubt—the key of that part of their position on the terrace; and though an advance of the Russian reserve from the heights for a moment dislodged him, an attack of the Highlanders (Cambridge's division) finally secured the possession of this work. Thus the left wing of the Russians was turned, and their right wing was broken. The center, completely engaged along its front, could only beat a retreat up the slope toward the plateau, which, once reached, they found themselves secure from any serious attack by the presence of their cavalry and horse-artillery, in a country eminently adapted for the employment of these two arms. Nevertheless, some disorder must have reigned for a while on their left when outflanked by Bosquet; the French reports are unanimous as to that point, and the fact that Menchikoff's carriage here fell into the hands of the French, fully proves it: On the other hand, the carrying off of all their artillery, even of the heavy siege-guns in the battery on the right (the French took no guns, the English but three, and those probably dismounted), proves the great order in which the retreat, generally speaking, was executed, as well as the wise resolution of Menchikoff, to break off the struggle as soon as the scales had turned against him.

The bravery of the allied troops appears to have been very great. There are few examples of a battle consisting, like this, of an almost uninterrupted, slow but steady advance, and offering none of the vicissitudes and incidents which give such a dramatic interest to most other great battles. This single fact is sufficient to prove at least a considerable numerical superiority on the part of the allies, and to show that the allied generals in their reports have
far overrated the strength of the Russians. We shall recur to this presently.

The generalship of the allies was good, but shows more confidence in the valor of their troops and the assistance of the fleet than in the inventive capacities of the generals themselves. It was, so to say, a plain, homely sort of battle, of a purely tactical nature, destitute in a rare degree of all strategical features. The flank maneuver of Bosquet was a very natural conception, and well executed by the African soldiers, who had been taught how to do such work in the defiles of the Atlas. The British broke the Russian right by unsophisticated hard fighting, facilitated, very likely, by good regimental and brigade maneuvering; but the monotony of the British advance in two successive long lines was broken by the obstacles of the ground alone, not by grand maneuvers intended to mislead or surprise the enemy.

Prince Menchikoff had well selected his position. He does not, however, appear to have made all the use of his cavalry he might have done. Why was there no cavalry on the left, to precipitate Bosquet's isolated brigade down the cliffs again as soon as it attempted to form? The breaking off of the battle, the disengaging [of] his troops from fire, the carrying off of his artillery, and the retreat in general, appear to have been carried out in a highly creditable style, and do more honor to his generalship than the victory does to that of the allied generals.

As to the forces engaged, the allies had under fire three French and four English divisions, besides their artillery, leaving one French and one English division, and all the cavalry, in reserve, besides eight Turkish battalions, which were sent to support Bosquet, but arrived after the close of the action. Now, the French having left stronger detachments and suffered greater losses at Varna than the British, the divisions may be considered almost equal on the day of the battle—the French about 6,000, the British about 5,500 strong, each. This would give an infantry force actually engaged of 40,000 infantry, with a reserve of about 16,000 men, including the Turks, which appears to agree with the statements as to the force of the expedition, deducting for the sick and for detachments. The Russians are stated by Marshal St. Arnaud to have mustered two divisions of the line, the 16th and 17th, with two brigades of reserve (soldiers on furlough, recalled to duty), the 14th and 15th, besides the 6th battalion of rifles. This force would comprise forty-nine battalions if the brigades had the full number of battalions. Every battalion counting 700 men (they have never mustered stronger in this war, although in
the Hungarian war they were fifty men stronger) would give a total of 34,300 men. But the above are about as many regular land troops as we knew to be in and about Sevastopol, and it is most likely that five or six battalions at least were left behind as a garrison in that fortress. This would bring the Russians to a strength of 30,000 infantry, which may have been about the correct number. Their cavalry is said to have mustered 6,000 sabres, but of course a good number of them were mere Cossacks. This marked superiority of the allies deprives the victory of that excessive glory which, as our readers will see in our extracts from the English papers, it is attempted to attach to it. The bravery appears to have been equal on both sides; and certainly the allied generals, were they ever so flushed with victory, never thought of marching into Sevastopol after their success, without any further delay or opposition, banners flying and bands playing.

The result of the battle, though morally great for the allies, can hardly produce any profound dejection in the Russian army. It is a retreat like that of Lützen or Bautzen; and if Menchikoff, from his flanking position at Bakshiserai, understands as well how to draw the allies after him as Blücher did before the battle of the Katzbach, they may yet learn that such fruitless victories are of no great use to the gainer. Menchikoff is yet in force at their rear, and till they have defeated him a second time and entirely driven him away, he will still be formidable. Almost everything now will depend upon the arrival of reenforcements of the allied reserve on one hand, and of the Russian troops from Perekop, Kerch and Anapa on the other. Whoever is first the stronger, may strike a great blow. But Menchikoff has this advantage that he can at any time elude an attack by falling back, while the allies are tied to the spot where their dépôts, camps and parks are.

For the moment, Sevastopol, though invested on one side, appears safe, the superiority of the allies not being marked enough to make front in two directions. But should their reserve of 20,000 men arrive sooner than Menchikoff's support,—as appears almost certain from our dispatch by the Niagara, received last night by telegraph from Halifax—a few days may decide much. A place like Sevastopol, if once seriously and vigorously attacked, cannot be expected to hold out a fortnight against open trenches. The reserve had all sailed from Varna and should have arrived by the 4th or 5th, though our Halifax dispatch does not mention their arrival; at any rate before the 16th or 18th, therefore, Sevastopol can hardly be expected to fall. There are chances that an active campaign in the open field might prolong
its holding out for some time longer; but unless Menchikoff, with
his moveable army in the rear of the allies, should gain some
important advantage in the field, or unless sickness decimates the
allied troops, it must certainly fall. But we may be sure, from the
preparations and temper of the Russians that it will not be taken
without desperate resistance, and terrible bloodshed; the sanguin-
ary details of the battle on the Alma will certainly be exceeded in
their kind by those of the storm and capture of Sevastopol.

Written on October 9, 1854

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Weekly Tribune*, No. 685, October 28, 1854 as a leader.

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*
Frederick Engels

THE MILITARY POWER OF RUSSIA

We may safely leave John Bull and Jacques Bonhomme, for a while, to their rejoicings at the “glorious victory” of the Alma and their anticipations of the fall of Sevastopol. The war on the Danube and in the Crimea, whatever importance it may have in the eyes of the allies and of the united Middle Class Liberalism of Europe, has very little weight, as far as Russia is concerned. The center of gravity of that country is in no wise affected by its possible results; while a defeat in the Crimea and forced retreat of the allies would cripple their land operations for a considerable time, and give them a moral check to recover from which would require their utmost exertions.

Some authentic reports of the distribution and late movements of the Russian forces have lately come to hand, and it may be well to sum them up in order to show how little, comparatively speaking, of the Russian force is as yet engaged, and what the remainder is expected to perform.

As is well known, the Russian army consists, as nearly as can be stated, of the following bodies:

I. THE GRAND ACTIVE ARMY—
   2 corps of élite, Guards and Grenadiers, containing 76 battalions, 92 squadrons, 228 guns.
   6 corps of the line, —”—, 300 battalions, 192 squadrons, 672 guns.
   3 Cavalry corps, —”—, 176 squadrons, 96 guns.
   Total, 376 battalions, 460 squadrons, 996 guns.

II. SPECIAL CORPS—
   Finland corps, 12 battalions.
   Orenburg corps, 10 battalions.
   Siberian corps, 15 battalions.
A page from Engels' preparatory material for the article
“The Military Power of Russia”
Caucasian corps, 55 battalions, 10 squadrons, 180 guns.
Reserve Caucasian corps, 36 battalions, 2 squadrons,—guns.
Caucasian line, 47 battalions,—squadrons,—guns.
Total, 175 battalions, 12 squadrons, 180 guns.

III. COSSACKS AND OTHER IRREGULARS—
About 700 squadrons, 32 battalions, and 224 guns.

IV. RESERVES—
1. About 50 battalions of Interior Guards, besides invalids, penal companies, 77.
2. Reserve of the grand army, or 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of Guards and Grenadiers, 5th and 6th battalions of the line, viz: three battalions for 24 regiments, and two battalions each for 72 regiments, or in all, 216 battalions.

As all the reserves are called in and fully organized, so far that the formation of the 7th and 8th battalions of each regiment has been commenced out of the lately decreed levy of 300,000 men, the above 216 battalions may be comprised in the grand total, which would give 726 battalions, 472 squadrons of regular, 700 squadrons of irregular cavalry, and considerably above a thousand guns. The organization of the reserves for cavalry and artillery not being well known out of Russia, they are not included in the above.

This array, fortunately, looks more formidable than it really is. From it we must deduct, to arrive at the number of troops actually available for a European war, the Siberian corps, the Internal Guard, and at least one-half of the Cossacks; thus leaving available about 650 battalions, 472 squadrons of regular and 350 squadrons of irregular cavalry, with about 1,200 guns. These troops may be estimated, at a very low figure, at 520,000 infantry, 62,000 cavalry, and 30,000 Cossacks, or rather more than 600,000 together, spread on the long line from the Caspian along the Black Sea and Baltic to the White Sea.

Since the beginning of the war with Turkey, the following troops have been successively engaged against the allies on the southern frontier of the empire:

1. The 3d, 4th and 5th corps of the line, with some of their reserves, which are, however, mostly still on the march.
2. The whole of the three Caucasian corps.
3. The two divisions (two-thirds) of the first corps of the line, without reserves.
4. A portion of the third cavalry corps (dragoons) in the Crimea.

This makes a total of about 240,000 men, before entering on the campaign, but now reduced to 184,000 men at the outside, of
whom 84,000 may be taken as the strength of the army in Bessarabia, 54,000 in the Crimea, or marching toward it, and 46,000 in the Caucasus.

On the Baltic there were, up to the end of August:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Finland, the reserve of the 6th Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Finnish Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guards and their reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Of the Grenadier Corps at Revel</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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There were in Poland, or marching for it:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The remainder of the Grenadiers and their reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1st and 2d Corps and their reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks and cavalry of different corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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</tbody>
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Making all together about 575,000 men, which, with the Orenburg Corps (at Astrakhan), the Reserve Cavalry Corps, and the detachments of the White Sea and others, comes up to the number stated before of the grand total. Of the troops in Poland, about 30,000 were on the march, about 20,000 garrisoned Warsaw, about 100,000 occupied the right bank of the Vistula, in the late Kingdom of Poland, and about 80,000 remained as a reserve in Volhynia and Podolia, on the Bug and Dniester. Thus the main bulk of the Russian army, and among them the crack regiments of Guards and Grenadiers, was concentrated on a line from St. Petersburg to Chotin, or along the western frontier of the Empire. But these positions did not appear significant enough. The Grenadiers left Revel, to be replaced by a division of Guards, and with the other two divisions of Guards marched off to Poland, the latter four battalions or regiments strong, leaving only the 5th and 6th battalions in Petersburg. Thus the army of the West was increased to above 270,000 men, and the greater portion of the three Reserve Cavalry Corps, *which have as yet not been engaged at all*, are marched off to join them; this will bring the army of the West to some 300,000 men.
Now the positions are changed. The 100,000 men, occupying the south-eastern portion of the Kingdom of Poland, have crossed the Vistula and taken up a position along the Austrian frontier. The 80,000 men have advanced from Volhynia into Poland, and continue the line along that frontier. Guards, Grenadiers—possibly the cavalry corps, when they arrive—take a central position to the rear. During the winter more troops can be spared from the ice-bound Baltic. By May the new levies, forming the 7th and 8th or new battalions of the different regiments, or 192 battalions in all (130,000 to 140,000 men), will be so far drilled as to replace them.

There is no doubt, then, that Nicholas cares comparatively little what happens to the south of his Empire, so long as he can concentrate above 300,000 men in the splendid strategical position of Poland. And a splendid position it is. Driven in like a wedge between Prussia and Austria, it outflanks both, while it is protected by the strongest means of resistance which art and nature combined can produce. Napoleon knew the military importance of the country inclosed by the Vistula and its affluents. He made it his base of operations for the campaign of 1807, until he took Danzig. But he neglected permanently to fortify it, and paid dearly for it after the retreat of 1812. The Russians, especially since 1831, have done what their predecessors in power omitted to do. Modlin, (Novo-Georgievsk), Warsaw, Ivanorod, Brzesc Litewski form a system of fortifications stronger, in its strategical combination, than any other in the world. This system offers a position in which a beaten army may defy double its numbers as long as it has plenty to eat; and to cut off a whole country from all communications is a thing that has not yet been attempted. This whole complex system of fortresses, says a German military writer who knows the country, indicates even more an aggressive than a defensive spirit. It is planned not so much to maintain the ground on which it stands as to serve as a base for offensive attacks toward the west.

And there are people who believe that Nicholas will sue for peace if Sevastopol be taken! Why, Russia has not played one-third of her trumps yet, and the momentary loss of Sevastopol and of the fleet is hardly felt at all by the giant to whom Sevastopol and the fleet were but a plaything. Russia knows full well that her decisive action does not lie along the sea shores or within reach of debarking troops; but on the contrary, on the broad interior of the Continent, where massive armies can be brought to act concentrated on one spot, without frittering away their forces in a
fruitless coast defense against evanescent enemies. Russia may lose the Crimea, the Caucasus, Finland, St. Petersburg and all such appendages; but as long as her body, with Moscow for its heart, and fortified Poland for its sword-arm, is untouched, she need not give in an iota.

The grand actions of 1854 are, we dare say, but the petty preludes of the battles of nations which will mark the annals of 1855. It is not until the great Russian army of the West, and the Austrian army come into play, no matter whether against each other or with each other, that we shall see real war on a large scale, something like the grand wars of Napoleon. And, perhaps, these battles may be the preludes merely of other battles far more fierce, far more decisive— the battles of the European peoples against the now victorious and secure European despots.

Written on October 16, 1854


Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*
Next to the battle of the Alma, the principal achievement of the allies in the Crimea has been Lord Raglan's famous flank march from the Alma to Balaklava, by which he changed the apparent object of the campaign from the capture and occupation of Sevastopol to a *coup de main* against a portion,—and the weaker portion, too,—of the fortifications, including, of course, the destruction of the Russian fleet, dockyards and arsenals, but involving the withdrawal of the allied forces as soon as this object should be attained. That such must be the case, was plain, from the entire movement in question. It was an abandonment of the idea of attacking the northern front of the fortress, which is the commanding front, where alone an attack could really be decisive; and thus it was a patent confession of incompetence on the part of the expedition to accomplish what was laid down in its program,—the complete capture and occupation of the place. Nevertheless, as we said, this very march has been glorified as a most brilliant stroke of generalship through columns on columns of high-sounding phrases and rhetorical gibberish; and even the great journals of London, with their correspondents on the spot, did not discover the truth till a month afterward, when the Government seems to have given them a hint of it. Thus, *The London Times* of October 28, for the first time opening its eyes to the true state of the case, gently indicates that the minor object of the campaign may be the only one accomplished, and that the forts on the north

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*a* Sudden attack in force.—*Ed.*  
*b* See this volume, p. 485.—*Ed.*
side of the bay, if they do not voluntarily surrender, can hardly be taken. But The Times hopes they will behave respectably, and surrender, inasmuch as all dependent fortifications ought to give in when once the main body of the place is taken. But the truth is that it is not the North Fort which depends upon the town of Sevastopol, but the town of Sevastopol which depends upon the North Fort, and we fear the argument of our cotemporary will hardly suffice to take so strong a fortress.

It is true that since the "glorious march" in question nothing has been done by the allies of which anybody could boast much, and, therefore, our transatlantic cotemporaries are not to blame for making the most of it. As for the siege itself so far as it has proceeded, it is one of those things of which they may well think that the less said the better. But as we are bound to nothing but impartiality in the premises, we shall not be so delicate. The truth is that the war in general being an exceedingly curious war, this siege is one of its most curious points. The great feature of the war appears to be a belief that fieldworks are impregnable. First at Oltenitza, the old-fashioned way of cannonading was employed for a couple of hours and then the works were stormed but without success. At Kalafat the Russians did not even dare to make an attack. At Silistria a mere earthwork bore the brunt of the battle, and held out, even when almost leveled, against the frantic onslaught of the enemy. Now at Sevastopol a simple line of fieldworks is honored with more extensive breaching batteries, and with far heavier artillery, than were ever brought to bear against the most regular fortress. This siege is a striking proof of the fact that in the same proportion as the materiel of warfare has, by industrial progress, advanced during the long peace, in the same proportion has the art of war degenerated. A Napoleon, on seeing the batteries before Sevastopol, bristling with eight- and ten-inch guns, would burst out in a fit of irresistible laughter. But this is not the whole story by a great deal.

About the 1st of October, the allies were in position, but it was not till the 8th or 9th that the first ground was broken, and fire was not opened till the 17th. The reason of this delay was that the guns could not be brought up sooner. There were only four or five miles of ground to go over—all good, hard soil, with little undulation, and part of it a passable road. But they had no draught cattle. No draught cattle in the Crimea—the richest country for cattle in the whole world! Why, there were more

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a The Times, No. 21884, October 28, 1854, leader.—Ed.
bullocks in the valley of Baidar, within sight from the heights off the Chernaya, than would have been required to drag all the united fleet across the hills. But the valley of Baidar was open to the Cossacks, and the allied cavalry, in protecting a razzia, might be exposed to these formidable opponents. Besides, the allies must keep on good terms with the inhabitants, and not seize their property. With such excuses, our English cotemporaries seek to hide the truth that Raglan and Canrobert, while blockading Sevastopol on the south, are themselves blockaded by Menchikoff's outposts on the Chernaya. And yet, that they are so is proved by the simple fact that the allied soldiers, up to the latest report, were compelled to live upon salt meat, no fresh meat being at hand.

On the 3d of October five Russian battalions crossed the Chernaya near Inkerman, and were allowed to enter the fortress from the south, as "this could but be favorable to the allies." An original mode of making war! The enemy, represented as beaten, demoralized, dejected, sends 3,000 men into Sevastopol, under the very nose of the allies. He must have had a reason for doing so. But if he has reasons for sending them, Raglan has his reasons for bowing them in. He supposes the place to be overcrowded, though upon what grounds, is not clear. At all events, beside the four square miles inclosed within the Russian lines, there is the whole of the north shore and all the country lying behind it, to which any excess of troops may be sent in ten minutes. To represent a place as overcrowded, which is blockaded on one side only, is certainly the height of absurdity.

When the landing was first reported, we said that disease would be the worst enemy of the allies if the campaign should be lengthened.a Disease is there in its worst forms, coupled, at least as far as the British are concerned, with the very worst sort of attendance. Indeed, to such an extent have the sick been neglected from this cause, that Lord Raglan has been obliged to issue a very peremptory reprimand to the medical staff. But this is not all. The doctors are at Constantinople, the medical stores at Varna, and the sick at Balaklava. Is not this a splendid illustration of the new military doctrine lately held forth by Louis Bonaparte at Boulogne, that every army, to have a good position, must be placed in a triangle?b The sickness increases with the roughness of the season, the regiments dwindle down—a British regiment, sent

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a See this volume, pp. 475-76.—Ed.
b Speech of Napoleon III before the troops at Boulogne on September 2, 1854. Le Moniteur universel, No. 248, September 5, 1854.—Ed.
out 1,000 strong, now cannot count more than 600 men under arms—and the slowness of operations goes on its even course. The routine of the Horse Guards, the fruit of forty years' peaceful schooling, is not to be upset by trifles of that sort. Perish the army, but let Sevastopol be taken according to Her Majesty's regulations!

In common sieges the besiegers usually try to place their first batteries as near as possible to the enemy's works, and six or seven hundred yards is considered a great distance. But in a grand siege like this, particularly if against mere fieldworks, just the reverse should be done, according to Raglan. The enemy allows us to come within seven hundred yards, but we must never do what the enemy wants us to do. So says Raglan, and opens his batteries at 2,500 and 3,000 yards distance—a fact we could not believe did the reports leave it possible to doubt. Next he comes down to 1,500 and 1,200 yards, and then states, as a reason for not opening fire, that breaching batteries, to be effective, must be within three or four hundred yards from the works to be breached! The distant batteries are to have Lancaster and long-range ten-inch guns, since it seems the British artillerists are of opinion that these guns are like telescopes, only good at a great distance. Indeed, this long-range question, which is perfectly in its place for naval armaments, has caused more confusion and humbug than real good when applied to land artillery; we have an example of it in these ridiculous batteries.

The landward fortifications of Sevastopol, which have provoked all these outbursts of genius and perspicacity, are as follows: On the western side (attacked by the French) one or two faces of the Quarantine Fort are exposed. Behind this is a loopholed wall running up toward the head of the Quarantine Bay, and ending on a hill, in a round tower which forms a *réduit* for an earthwork constructed around it. Thence a wall of three feet average thickness is continued to the upper end of the harbor, thus inclosing Sevastopol on the south-west. This wall is said to be incapable of any defense, although it might easily have been made so; it is, therefore, protected by small earthworks lying in front of it. From the end of the harbor eastward to the Careening Bay (the British front of attack) there are no regular defenses whatever, except two towers surrounded and sheltered by lunettes, in a similar manner with the one described above. There are besides some earthworks of irregular form, the whole forming an entrenched camp of no great pretensions, if we are to believe the published plans of Captain Biddulph, sketched on the spot. At all
events they show only one line of defenses, consisting of works open in the rear; there are no closed redoubts, of which as a general thing the Russians are so exceedingly fond. But we cannot believe that this is the case; if this was the only line to take, the British ought long since to have taken it with the bayonet. There must be a second line of redoubts behind it.

The whole of the Russian works have been armed with heavy guns from the fleet—the best use the Russians could make of them. Yet their practice with them is despicable. They fire away whole days and nights at the enemy, and make one hit for a hundred rounds. Perhaps it was this very bad practice which induced Lord Raglan to open his trenches at the safe distance of 3,000 yards. After three days' bombardment by the allied fleets and armies, it is stated that the British, on their side, had made one breach, while the French had not yet completed theirs. As soon as this was completed, the assault was to take place. That it should take 200 guns of immense caliber three or four days to breach such defenses would be incredible, had we not very good authority for the respectful distance at which the allied batteries had been constructed. So much for the results already achieved; but whatever event may crown the operations, it is certain that the siege of Sevastopol will stand unparalleled in military history.

Written on October 30, 1854

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune

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a General Canrobert to Drouyn de Lhuys, October 13, 1854. The Times, No. 21885, October 30, 1854.—Ed.
Our readers cannot but be struck with the novel spirit breathing through the intelligence from the seat of war in the Crimea, received by the Baltic yesterday, and published in our columns this morning. Hitherto an overweening and arrogant confidence has distinguished the comments of the British press, and the reports of British and French correspondents concerning the movements and prospects of the war. But now this has given way to a feeling of anxiety and even of alarm. It is confessed on all hands that there is no such superiority as has been claimed on the part of the allied armies over their antagonists. That Sevastopol is stronger, Menchikoff an abler General, and his army far more formidable than was supposed; and that instead of certain and decisive victory, the French and English now stand exposed to possible failure and disgrace. Such is the feeling expressed by our correspondent at Liverpool, himself an Englishman, alive to all the patriotic impulses and prejudices of his country; and this feeling is equally manifested by the very energetic action of both the French and English Governments. Desperate efforts are made to hurry reenforcements to Sevastopol; the United Kingdom is drained of its last soldier; many steamships are taken up as transports; and 50,000 French troops are sent forward, all in the hope of arriving at the scene of action before it shall be too late to take part in the final, decisive struggle.

We published on Saturday a copious quantity of documents, relating principally to the earlier stages of the siege, and the

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partially effective but yet disastrous cooperation of the fleets; and we now add the official reports concerning Liprandi's murderous attack on the allies near Balaklava, with other accounts of the subsequent progress of operations, all of them, we must say, quite unfavorable to the allies. From a careful examination of these documents we conclude that though the position is, as we have often stated, a difficult and even precarious one, it is hardly so bad as is implied by our Liverpool correspondent. We do not think that they are in danger of any worse disaster than a compulsory retreat and embarkation. And, on the other hand, there is still the possibility of their carrying the town by a desperate and sanguinary assault. But however this may be, it must, we think, be decided long before the reenforcements leaving France and England can reach the Crimea. The campaign is evidently near its turning point; the movements, the errors and the omissions which have shaped its character and generated its results, are made; we are in possession of authentic and indisputable information as to the principal facts; and we accordingly propose succinctly and briefly to review the course of the contest.

It is now established that when the allies landed at Old Fort, Menchikoff had under his command in the field only forty-two battalions and two regiments of cavalry, besides some Cossacks, while Sevastopol was garrisoned by the marines and sailors of the fleet. These forty-two battalions were of the 12th, 16th and 17th divisions of infantry; and supposing each battalion to have had its full complement of 700 men, there were in all 29,400 men of infantry; with 2,000 Hussars, the Cossacks, artillery, sappers and miners; in all some 32,000 men in the field. With these he could not oppose the landing of the allies, as by so doing he would have exposed his troops, without a sufficient reserve, to the fire of the allied fleets. A powerful army, which could afford to have sacrificed a part of its strength, might have detached a force to open a petty war of surprises and night attacks against the invaders while landing; the Russians, in this instance, required every man for the great battle to come; besides, the Russian foot soldier is the clumsiest fellow alive for petty war operations; his forte is action in column by close order. As to the Cossacks, on the other

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\[ a \] New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4245, November 25, 1854.—Ed.

\[ b \] "Reported Battle on Fourth of November, etc.", New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4246, November 27, 1854.—Ed.

\[ c \] See this volume, pp. 496-97.—Ed.
hand, their mode of warfare is too petty, and is effective in proportion only as the chance of plunder increases. Besides, the campaign of the Crimea seems to prove that the regularization of the Cossacks, which has been gradually carried out for the last thirty years, has broken their individual spirit of enterprise, and reduced them to a subdued condition, in which they are spoiled for irregular and not yet fit for regular service. They seem incapable now either of outpost and detached duty, or of charging an enemy in line. The Russians, then, were quite right in reserving every sabre and bayonet for the battle of the Alma.

On the banks of this river, the 32,000 Russians were attacked by 55,000 allies. The proportion was almost one to two. When about 30,000 allies had been engaged, Menchikoff ordered the retreat. Of the Russians, up to then, not more than 20,000 were engaged; a further attempt to hold the position would have converted the Russian retreat into a complete rout, for it would have required the engaging of the whole Russian reserve in the battle. The success of the allies, with their tremendous numerical superiority, being established beyond doubt, Menchikoff broke off the battle, covered his retreat by his reserves, and after overcoming the first disorder created on his left by Bosquet's flank movement retired unpursued and unmolested, "in proud order," from the field. The allies say they had no cavalry for the pursuit; but since we know that the Russians had but two regiments of Hussars—less, if anything, than the allies—this excuse falls to the ground. As at Zorndorf, at Eylau, at Borodino, the Russian infantry, though beaten, behaved up to the character given them by General Cathcart, who commanded a division against them, and who pronounced them "incapable of panic!"

But if the Russian infantry remained cool and unterrified, Menchikoff himself was panic-struck. The great numerical force of the allies, coupled with their unexpected decision and impetuosity in the attack, deranged, for a moment, his plans. He abandoned the idea of retreating into the interior of the Crimea, and marched to the south of Sevastopol, in order to hold the line of the Chernaya. This was a great and unpardonable mistake. Overlooking, from the heights of the Alma, the whole allied position, he must have been able to make out the strength of his opponents within 5,000 men. He must have known that, whatever was their relative superiority over his own forces, they were not strong enough to leave an army to observe Sevastopol while following him into the interior. He must have known that if the allies were two to one against him on the sea-shore, he could bring
two against their one at Simferopol. And yet he marched, as he himself confesses, to the south side of Sevastopol. But, after this retreat had been effected, without any molestation from the allies, and his troops had rested a day or two on the hills behind the Chernaya, then Menchikoff resolved to redress his mistake. He did this by a perilous flank movement from the Chernaya to Bakshiserai. It was contrary to one of the first rules of strategy; yet it promised great results. When a blunder is once committed in strategy, you can seldom get over its consequences. The question then merely is, whether it is less disadvantageous to abide by them or to get over them by a second, but intentional, erroneous movement. In this case we think Menchikoff was perfectly right in risking a flank-march within reach of the enemy, in order to get out of his absurdly "concentrated" position around Sevastopol.

But in this contest between strategical mediocrities and routine generals, the movements of hostile armies assumed forms hitherto unknown in warfare. The fancy for flank-marches, like the cholera, was epidemic in both camps. At the same time that Menchikoff resolved on a flank-march from Sevastopol to Bakshiserai, Saint Arnaud and Raglan took it into their heads to move from the Kacha to Balaklava. The rear of the Russians and the van of the British met at Mackenzie's farm (so called from a Scotchman, later an admiral in the Russian service), and, as a matter of course, the van beat the rear. The general strategical character of the flank-march of the allies having already been criticised in *The Tribune*, we need not now revert to it.

On the 2d or 3d of October Sevastopol was invested, and the allies took up that very position from which Menchikoff had just extricated himself. From that moment the memorable siege of Sevastopol began, and at the same time a new era in the campaign. Hitherto the allies, by their uncontested superiority, had it all their own way. Their fleets, commanding the sea, insured their landing. Once landed, their superior numbers, and certainly also their superior storming qualities, insured the victory at the Alma. But now the equilibrium of forces, which sooner or later is sure to be brought about in operations distant from their base and in an enemy's country, began to develop itself. Menchikoff's army, it is true, did not show itself yet; but it made necessary the placing of a reserve on the Chernaya, fronting to the east. Thus the actual besieging army was seriously weakened, and

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*See this volume, pp. 505-06.—Ed.*
reduced to numbers not much superior to those of the garrison.

Want of energy, want of system, especially in the cooperation of the different departments of the British land and sea forces, difficulties of ground, and, above all, an invincible spirit of routine, inherent, it appears, in the British administrative and scientific departments, delayed the commencement of actual siege operations to the 9th of October. At last the trenches were opened on that day, at the enormous distance of from 1,500 to 2,500 yards from the Russian works. Such a thing was never seen nor heard of in any previous siege. It proves that the Russians were still able to dispute the ground around the fortress, to the distance of at least a mile; and they actually held it up to the 17th. On the morning of that day the siege-works were far enough advanced to allow the allies to open their fire. Probably this would have been delayed a few days longer, as the allies were by no means in a fit position to do so with success on that day, had it not been for the arrival of the glorious news that all England and France were rejoicing at the capture of Sevastopol on the 25th of October. This news, of course, exasperated the armies, and, in order to tranquilize them, the fire had to be opened. But it turns out that the allies brought 126 guns against 200 or 250. Now, the great axiom of Vauban, which has been again and again used by the Anglo-French to keep public opinion quiet, viz:

"that a siege is an operation of mathematical certainty and success, a mere matter of time, unless interrupted from without."

This great axiom is based upon that other axiom of the same engineer that

"in a siege the fire of the attack can be made superior to that of the defense."

Now, here at Sevastopol, we have exactly the reverse; the fire of the attack, when opened, was decidedly inferior to that of the defense. The consequences were very soon made apparent. In a couple of hours the Russians silenced the fire of the French batteries and kept up an almost equal contest, throughout the day, with the English. To create a diversion, a naval attack was made. But it was neither better conducted nor more successful. The French ships, attacking the Quarantine Fort and Fort Alexander, supported the land attack upon these forts; and had it not been for their aid, there is no doubt the French would have been far more roughly handled. The English ships attacked the north side of the harbor, including Fort Constantine and the Telegraph Battery, as well as a temporary battery constructed to the
north-east of Constantine. That cautious man, Admiral Dundas, had ordered his ships to anchor at 1,200 yards from the forts—he is evidently a friend of the long-range system. Now it is an old established fact that in a combat between ships and batteries on shore, the ships are beat unless they can close up within 200 yards or less to the batteries, so that their shot is certain to tell, and with the greater effect. Consequently, Dundas got his ships knocked about in a terrible manner and would have suffered a glorious defeat, had it not been for Sir Edmund Lyons, who, it appears, almost in defiance of orders, got three ships-of-the-line as close as he could to Fort Constantine and did it some damage in exchange for what he received. As, however, the British and French Admirals' reports have not yet said a single word about the actual damage done to the forts, we must conclude that here, as well as [at] Bomarsund, Montalembert Coast—forts and casemated batteries—proved a match for twice their number of guns on board ship. This is the more remarkable, as it is now pretty certain that the exposed masonry of these forts, as was already partially proved at Bomarsund, cannot withstand the breaching fire of heavy ship guns, established on shore, for more than twenty-four hours.

The French were almost silent for a couple of days afterward. The English, having established their batteries at a greater distance from the Russian lines, and mounting heavier calibers than their allies, were enabled to maintain their fire and to silence the upper tier of guns in a masonry redoubt. The naval attack was not renewed—the best proof of the respect inspired by the casemated forts. The Russians made a defense which very much undeceived the conquerors of the Alma. For every dismounted gun a fresh one was brought up. Every embrasure destroyed during the day by the enemy's fire was restored during the night. Earthworks against earthworks, the contest was very nearly equal, until measures were taken to give the allies the superiority. Lord Raglan's ridiculous order "to spare the town" was revoked, and a bombardment opened which, by its concentric effect upon crowded masses of troops, and by its harassing nature, must have done the garrison great harm. Skirmishers were, besides, sent out in advance of the batteries, to pick off, from any covered position they could find, the Russian gunners. As at Bomarsund, the Minié rifle did its work well. In a few days, what with the heavy guns and the Minié rifles, the Russian artillerymen were mostly put hors de combat. So were the sailors from the fleet, the portion of the

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*a Out of action.—Ed.*
garrison best instructed in the use of heavy guns. The usual resource of besieged garrisons had then to be resorted to: the infantry were commanded to serve the guns, under the superintendence of the remaining artillerymen. But their fire, as may be imagined, was almost without effect, and thus the besiegers were enabled to push their trenches nearer and nearer the place. They have opened, it is stated, their third parallel at 300 yards from the outworks. We do not know yet what batteries they have erected in this third parallel; we can only say that a third parallel, in regular sieges, is always made at the foot of the glacis of the works attacked, that is, about 50 or 60 yards from the ditch. If this distance has been exceeded before Sevastopol, we can but see in this fact a confirmation of a report contained in several British papers, that the irregularity of the lines of defense, instead of giving the British engineers fresh scope for their inventive capacities, has but disconcerted these gentlemen who can demolish, upon the most approved principle, a regular bastioned front, but who seem to be badly off as soon as the enemy deviates from the rule prescribed by the best authorities on the subject.

The southern attack once decided upon, the parallel and its batteries should have been directed against one, or at most two well-defined fronts of the defenses. Two of the outer forts next to each other—or, at the very outside, three—should have been attacked with concentrated forces; and, once demolished, then all the other outworks would have been useless. In this way, the allies, by bringing all their artillery to bear upon one point, could have easily established at once a great superiority of fire, and shortened the siege considerably. As far as can be judged from plans and maps, the front, from the Quarantine Fort to the upper end of the inner harbor, or the front against which the French now direct their efforts, would have been the best to attack, as its demolition would lay the town itself completely open. The one hundred and thirty guns of the allies would have at once insured them a superiority of fire on this limited front. Instead of this, the desire to let each army act independently of the other produced this unprecedented mode of siege, in which the whole of the ramparts, extending over a length of three miles, is simultaneously cannonaded on its whole extent. Such a thing has never been seen before. Who ever heard of an attack which allowed the defense to bring into play at once, from plain bastioned works and lunettes the enormous mass of two hundred and fifty guns? A single bastioned front can hardly mount twenty guns; and in an ordinary siege no more than three or four fronts can contribute to the
defense. Unless the allied engineers can show, hereafter, very substantial reasons for their curious proceedings, we must conclude that they were unable to find out the weakest points of the defenses, and, therefore, in order not to miss them, fired upon every portion of the line.

In the meantime, reenforcements arrive to both parties. Liprandi's harassing and partially successful attacks on the allied outposts have shown the presence of a stronger Russian force than Menchikoff had led to Bakhiserai. As yet, he does not, however, appear strong enough for a relieving battle. Considering the progress made by the besiegers, considering that the damage done to the defense increases in a geometrical ratio as the besiegers approach the ramparts, considering that the outworks still hold out, but that the inner wall appears to be weak, we may expect that something decisive will have occurred from the 9th to the 15th of November; that either the south side of the town has fallen, or that the allies have suffered a decisive defeat and been obliged to raise the siege. But it must be recollected that all such predictions depend upon circumstances which cannot be fully known beforehand at such a distance from the spot.

Written on November 9, 1854


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
The arrival of the Africa has put us in possession of three days later dates from Europe, but nothing of additional interest from the seat of war beyond an infernal episode describing the roasting alive of a vast number of sick and wounded in hospital, and accounts of sufferings that render language a pauper in attempting to portray them. Of the bloody and undecisive battle of the 5th November, brief intelligence of which was brought by the Baltic, we have now Lord Raglan's curt dispatch, but not yet the customary voluminous and exciting details by correspondents, whether actors or lookers-on. Much anxiety—much more than appears on the surface of things—exists in England as well as in France in regard to the increased and increasing difficulties of the war; and the stubborn refusal of Sevastopol to fall before the allies, those rivals in courage and sacrifices, is most ominously viewed. The extracts in another column of this journal, from The London Times, exhibit an altered temper, and a spirit of doubt which may be mistaken by some for approaching despair. In the absence of details respecting the battle of the 5th sufficiently coherent to base remarks upon, we shall now offer some on the operations of the siege just previous to that time.

The 25th of October was the day on which the slow monotony of the siege of Sevastopol was first interrupted by a dramatic incident. The Russians, on that day, attacked the allied position covering the siege, and the advantages being more equally

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\(^a\) Lord Raglan’s telegraphic dispatch to the Duke of Newcastle of November 6, 1854. The Times, No. 21900, November 16, 1854.— *Ed.*
Engels' rough draft of the article “The War in the East”
with a sketch of the battle
distributed, this time, to either side, the result was very different from that of the battle of the Alma. This action, in fact, was the very counterpart of that of the Alma: it was a cavalry fight almost exclusively, while at the Alma no cavalry was engaged; and instead of occupying a defensive position, the Russians were the assailants, while the advantages of strong positions were with the allies. It was, indeed, a drawn battle as nearly as that of the Alma, but this time the advantages remained to the Russians.

The Heracleatic Chersonese, the peninsula south of the Bay of Sevastopol, borders toward the main land of the Crimea by a range of heights running from the mouth of the Chernaya, or the head of the Bay of Sevastopol, to the south-west. This range slopes down gradually on its north-west side toward Sevastopol, while it is generally steep and bold toward the south-east, facing Balaklava. The allies occupying the Heracleatic Chersonese, this range was their natural defensive position against any Russian army trying to raise the siege. But unfortunately, Balaklava was the "base of operations" of the British, the chief harbor for their fleet, the grand dépôt for their stores; and Balaklava lay about three miles to the south-east of this range of hills. It was, therefore, necessary to include Balaklava in the system of defense. The country about Balaklava is formed by a group of very irregular heights, running from the southern extremity of the aforesaid range, nearly due east and west along the coast, and like all hills in the Crimea, sloping gently toward the north-west, but steep and craggy toward the south-east. Thus an angle formed between these two groups of heights is filled up by an undulating plain, rising gradually toward the east, until it ends in a steep descent toward the valley of the Chernaya.

The most remarkable feature of this plain is a range of hillocks and of slightly elevated ground running north-west and south-east, uniting what we call the Heracleatic range with the mountains on the south coast. It was on this elevation, about three miles east and north-east of Balaklava, that the allies had thrown up their first line of defenses, consisting of four redoubts, defending the roads from Bakshiserai and from the Upper Chernaya. These redoubts were garrisoned by Turks. A second line of fieldworks was erected immediately in front of Balaklava, and continued up to the apex of the angle formed by the coast heights and the Heracleatic range, which latter were fortified by the French division of General Bosquet, stationed there. Thus, while the second line, defended by English soldiers, marines and sailors, was continued and flanked by the French line of redoubts, the first or Turkish line, nearly
two miles in advance, not only was completely unsupported, but strange to say, instead of forming a line perpendicular to the road on which the enemy could come, it was constructed almost in the prolongation of that line, so that the Russians might first take one, then the second, then the third and finally the fourth redoubt, gaining ground each time, and without the possibility of one redoubt much supporting the other.

The allied position was occupied: toward Balaklava, by the Turks in the redoubts, or first line; by British marines, on the heights, in the immediate vicinity of Balaklava; by the 93d Highlanders, and some convalescents in the valley north of Balaklava. Further north was the camp of the British cavalry; and on the Heracleatic heights, that of the advance guard of Bosquet’s division.

At 6 o’clock on the morning of the 25th, General Liprandi led the Russians to the attack of this position. He had under him a combined division consisting of six regiments of infantry (Dnieper, Azoff, Ukraine, Odessa, Vladimir, Suzdal, the 6th battalion Rifles, and one battalion Tchornomorski Cossacks, or 25 battalions in all); three regiments of cavalry (the 11th and 12th Hussars, and a combined regiment of Lancers, or 24 to 26 squadrons), about two regiments of Cossacks, and 70 guns, of which 30 were 12-pounders.

He sent General Gribbe by a defile on his left to occupy, with three battalions Dnieper Infantry, the village of Kamara, in front of which the first and strongest redoubt is situated. General Gribbe occupied the village, and his three battalions appear to have spent the day there very quietly, as they have never been named during the fight which followed.

The main column, following first the course of the Chernaya, and then a by-road, gained the high-road from Bakshiserai to Balaklava. Here they met the redoubts, manned by Turks. The first redoubt being pretty strong, Liprandi had a fire of artillery opened upon it, and then sent the storming parties forward. A line of skirmishers hid the first, second and third battalion. Azoff, advancing in columns of companies, which were again supported behind either wing, by the fourth battalion Azoff and one battalion Dnieper, in close attacking columns. The redoubt, after a lively resistance, was taken; the 170 dead and wounded the Turks left in it show that, in spite of the invidious assertions of the British press, this redoubt was valiantly defended. The second, third, and fourth redoubts, however, being hastily constructed, were taken by the Russians almost without resistance, and by seven o’clock in the
morning, the first line of defense of the allies was completely in their hands.

The abandonment of these redoubts by the Turks may have the good effect of dispelling the monstrous superstitions regarding Turkish bravery which have been commonly adopted since Olteniza and Silistria, yet the British generals and press play a very shabby part in turning, all at once, upon the Turks on this occasion. It is not so much the Turks who should be blamed, but the engineers who contrived to shape their line of defense in such a faulty manner, and who neglected to finish it in time, as well as the commanders, who exposed the first line to an overwhelming shock of the enemy without any support being at hand.

The 93d Highlanders, steady and slow, as it behoves Scotchmen, got in line by-and-by, and then advanced up the heights toward the redoubts, but not before they were taken. The fugitive Turks, decimated by Russian cavalry, at last formed again on the flanks of the Highlanders. These, in order to shelter themselves from the Russian fire, laid down behind the crest of an undulation of ground, in advance of all the positions still held by the allies, and supported by the cavalry division only to their left. In the meantime the Russians had formed their line of battle on the heights where the redoubts were situated—on their left flank Azoff, next to the right the Ukraine, next the Odessa infantry. These three regiments filled up the space between the redoubts, and occupied what had been the first line of the allies. Further on, to the right of the Odessa regiment, the undulating plain formed a favorable theater for cavalry movements. Thither the two Hussar regiments were sent and they found themselves directly opposed to the British cavalry, which was drawn up about two miles distant. The regiments of Suzdal and Vladimir, part of the artillery and the Lancers, which were just coming up, remained in reserve.

When the 93d Highlanders, reenforced by the convalescent battalion and the Turks, made a stand against the Russians, the Hussars were launched against them. But before they could come up, the British heavy brigade of cavalry charged them. The seven or eight hundred British heavy dragoons dashed at the Russians and dispersed them in one of the most brilliant and successful charges on record, considering their far inferior numbers. The Russian Hussars, twice as numerous, were scattered in a moment. The few Russian squadrons which had charged the 93d Highlanders were received with a quiet Scotch volley at fifteen yards from the infantry, and reeled back as well as they could.

If the Turks had run away, the English, up to this time, had
earned nothing but glory. The daring of the Highlanders who received cavalry in line, without deigning to form squares, the dashing attack of the heavy cavalry, were certainly things to boast of, especially as they were performed before any reenforcements came up. But now the First (Duke of Cambridge’s) and Fourth (Cathcart’s) Divisions, as well as Bosquet’s French Division and the brigade of Chasseurs d’Afrique (cavalry) came up. The line of battle was formed, and only now could it be said that there were two armies in presence. The French of Bosquet forming upon the Heracleatic heights, Liprandi sent the regiments of Vladimir and Suzdal to form the extreme right wing on the heights beyond the position of the cavalry.

Then, the fire having almost ceased, because the armies were out of range of each other, a misunderstanding, which is not cleared up, caused a charge of the British light cavalry—a charge which had no object and ended in defeat. An order arrived to advance, and, in a few moments, the Earl of Cardigan led his light brigade up a valley opposite his position—a valley flanked by covering heights, crowned by batteries, concentrating their fire on the lower ground below. The whole brigade amounted but to 700 sabres; when within range of grape, they were received by the fire of the artillery and of the rifles stationed on the slopes; they charged the battery at the upper end of the valley, received fire at twenty yards, rode down the gunners, dispersed the Russian Hussars, who made a second but wavering charge, and were on the point of turning back when the Russian Lancers took them in flank. They had just come up, and fell at once upon the panting horses of the British. This time, in spite of partial successes, the British had to turn back, and were fairly defeated by the Russians, but, it must be said, by far superior numbers, and by the aid of a mistake, which sent them, without an object, right against the cross-fire of a numerous artillery. Of the 700 men that advanced, not 200 came back in a fighting condition. The light cavalry brigade may be considered destroyed, until re-formed by fresh arrivals.

This disaster to the British would have been far greater, and hardly a man would have come back, had it not been for two movements made on either flank of the charging light horse. On their right, Lord Lucan ordered the heavy brigade to demonstrate against the Russian batteries in front of them. They maneuvered forward during a few minutes, lost about ten men by the Russian fire and galloped back. On the left, however, the French Chasseurs d’Afrique, two of the finest cavalry regiments in the
The War in the East

world, on seeing their allies broken, rushed forward to disengage them. They charged the battery which took the British light horse in flank, and which was placed higher up the hill, in front of the infantry regiments of Vladimir, were within the line of guns in a moment, sabred the gunners, and then retreated, having accomplished their object—which, too, they would have done, even without the advance the Vladimir infantry instantly made on them.

Here was another instance of the British system of warfare as manifested in this campaign, such as, more than once, we have had occasion to point out. They first made a blunder, and then recoiled from the untactical movement which could have alone averted its consequences. But the French Chasseurs instantly felt what was to be done. On their side of the cavalry action no flank attack of Russian horse took place, because their dash prevented it: while the cautious "heavies" of Brigadier Scarlett merely demonstrated, and that, of course, was not enough to prevent the Russian Lancers from falling on the flank of the Hussars. Had they charged, like the French, the Russian Lancers would have turned tail very soon. But while their fellow-brigade was ordered to be over-daring, they were ordered to be over-cautious, and the result was the ruin of the light brigade.

After this the action ceased. The Russians demolished the two redoubts nearest the allies, and kept the two others strongly occupied. They maintained the conquered ground, and Lord Raglan, not venturing to attack them, ordered the second line of redoubts to be strengthened, and confined himself to its defense. The first line was given up.

In this action the behavior of the 93d Highlanders is beyond all praise. To receive cavalry in line in the way they did, merely wheeling backward one company on their right flank en potence, to hold back their fire to the decisive moment, and then deliver it with such deadly steadiness, is a feat which very few troops can perform, and which shows in them the highest qualities required in the infantry soldier. The Austrians and the British may be considered the only troops with whom such an experiment can be pretty safely tried; perhaps, also, with some Russian troops, for their length of service qualifies them for such a task, although we do not recollect them having ever been put to the test and stood it.

The superiority of the British and French cavalry over the Russian is incontestably proved by this action. The three brigades

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a T-shaped.— *Ed.*
of the allies were about the same strength as the three regiments of the Russians; and had they been sent to the charge simultaneously instead of one after the other, and supported by artillery driving up, and the whole line of infantry moving onward, Liprandi and his troops were in great danger of being thrown down the steep descent toward the Chernaya, and meeting with the fate Blücher prepared for the French at the Katzbach.

The strength of the two armies may be thus computed: The Russians had 25 battalions, which mostly had been engaged at the Alma, cannot have counted more than 14,000 men at the very outside. Cavalry, 24 squadrons, having mostly marched all the way from Moscow and Kaluga, certainly not above 2,400 men; besides about 1,000 Cossacks. Artillery, 70 guns.

The allies had of infantry the greater part of the first and fourth British divisions, and of Bosquet's French division; besides them an uncertain number of Turks, which we can only come at by computing the number of Turkish battalions landed. There were ten Turkish battalions with the expedition from the first, and according to Lord Raglan's dispatch of 18th October, six more battalions were landed at Balaklava. As they were not employed on the siege, nor moved far from Balaklava, all these Turks must have been present there; although, after their retreat from the redoubts, they were no longer mentioned in the dispatches and not considered worth mentioning. Thus we shall be pretty near the fact, if we take the British at about 6,500, the French at about 3,500, and the Turks at 6,000 at least. Besides, there were about 1,000 British marines and sailors in the redoubts around Balaklava. Total infantry, 17,000; or, if the Turks count for nothing, 11,000. Of cavalry, the two British brigades amounted to about 1,400 (in the British reports rank and file only are counted); the Chasseurs d'Afrique at least 800; total, 2,200. Artillery, unknown, but inferior to the Russian in number, though far superior in quality.

Take it all in all, we consider that on this occasion the allies were at least as strong as the Russians, had the advantage of strong positions to fall back upon, and might have, by a bold attack, cavalry and infantry combined, gained a decisive victory—not like the one of the Alma, which had no results, but a victory which would have saved them the trouble of fighting that murderous battle on the 5th of November. As it was, they did not even retrieve the disadvantages which they had suffered, and by that

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* The Times, No. 21897, November 13, 1854.— Ed.
curious mixture of over-daring and over-caution, of misplaced dash and misplaced timidity, of military fury not heeding the rules of the art, and of scientific disquisitions, letting slip the moment for action—by that singular way of doing always the wrong thing at the wrong moment, which has signalized all the doings of the allies, the battle of Balaklava was fairly lost to them.

From the battle of the 5th November, we can up to the present only draw the conclusion that it was the beginning of that crisis which we thought would occur from the 5th to the 10th. As we said long since,a as The London Times now says toob—it is merely a question of supplies and reenforcements.

Written on November 16, 1854

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a See this volume, p. 496.—Ed.
b The Times, No. 21900, November 16, 1854, leader.—Ed.
Frederick Engels

THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN

This sanguinary battle took place on the 5th of November, and yet it was not till the 23d that the reports of the allied commanders and of the correspondents of the leading journals reached London. Very brief accounts of the affair were brought to this country by the two recent steamers, but nothing in sufficient detail to enable us to form any satisfactory judgment on the features of the struggle. To-day, however, the mails of the Pacific enable us to furnish the most complete accounts of the whole, including the dispatches of Raglan, Canrobert and Menchikoff, with the very excellent and spirited letters of the special correspondents of The London Times and The Morning Herald, both of which journals are served on the spot by writers of distinguished ability. With all these, and other documents at hand, we proceed to analyze the story of the battle, with a view to enable our readers to arrive at an impartial and intelligent opinion concerning it.

Like the Prussians at Jena, the British forces facing toward Inkerman were stationed on a range of heights accessible in front by a few defiles only. Like the Prussians, the British had altogether neglected to occupy an elevation on their extreme left, on which, like Napoleon at Jena, Menchikoff threw a portion of his army—there establishing himself upon the flank of the enemy before daybreak. The intention of the Russians was evidently to profit by this circumstance in order to bring the mass of their troops to bear upon the flank of the British, to deploy upon the

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The Times, Nos. 21906 and 21907, November 23 and 24, 1854.—Ed.
hights thus secured, and crush the British divisions as they came up singly during the fatal but inevitable maneuver of changing their front, or to "roll them up," as it is technically called. To this maneuver Napoleon owed his brilliant success over an army which, though clumsy, slow, and badly commanded, was yet at that time the best of the old continental armies. The rapidity of his movements, executed with troops versed in the new mode of warfare introduced by the American war of independence, by the French revolutionary wars, and by Napoleon himself, favored this bold stroke. Here, at Inkerman, it was with slow and clumsy troops that Menchikoff attempted this same surprise upon the active and quick-moving troops of the British and French; and the result was accordingly the opposite of that at Jena.

The negligence shown by the British in the manner of occupying their positions is utterly disgraceful to their commander. There is no excuse, either for the non-occupation of the knoll on the south side of [the] Chernaya, or for the absence of field-works in this important position, for the attack of which, as he well knew, many thousand Russians were concentrating. The Russians, as we have said, profited by this neglect at once, by occupying the knoll on the north end of the range, forcing the British position with heavy field artillery. The British papers say the Russians had 24- and 32-pounders in the field, but this only shows their utter ignorance of artillery matters. The transport of their own artillery from Balaklava to the trenches should have shown them that 24- and 32-pounders cannot be taken into the field, much less into a night surprise. The fact is, what they call 24- and 32-pounders were howitzers, having a caliber similar to that of the 24- and 32-pound gun, but in fact light field guns, not heavier than the British field-howitzers. The howitzer, throwing a hollow projectile with a small charge, and obtaining range by elevation chiefly, can be made of a larger bore than the cannon for solid shot. The 24-pound howitzer corresponds in weight and effect to the 6-pound gun, and the so-called 32-pound (about 6-inch) howitzers to 12-pounders; these howitzers are attached in the Russian service to the batteries of these calibers. This shows how ignorance and national vanity unite in manufacturing heroes and enhancing the glory of a nation's arms.

So far, everything went in favor of the Russians. Their generalship had proved far superior to that of Lord Raglan. Their plan was excellent, and in a fair way of execution. A pivot had been secured, and the enemy's flank was turned. Immense superiority of numbers, ready to attack the long and weak line of
the British at its weakest point, appeared to be a guarantee of final success. But the Russians did not yet fully know the soldiers they had to deal with. The British, surprised as they were, coolly changed their front from east to north, and met the assailing columns with a deadly fire. And now a fight began such as has not occurred in Europe since the day of Albuera, as at Albuera the stubborn bravery of the British troops had to regain, with the blood of three-fourths of their number, a battle already lost by the presumptuous stupidity of their commander. It is a fact that at Inkerman there was more actual bayonet-fighting than in the whole Peninsular war, where the two bravest armies of their time combated each other for six years. From half-past six to half-past nine about 8,000 British stood the shock of a Russian army, which, according to the Russians' own statement, had at least 30,000 men engaged. The firmness with which they again and again repulsed the Russian attacks, made often with fresh troops, is above all praise, and it is doubtful whether any other troops in Europe, except the best battalions of Radetzky's army, could have done the same. This bravery, it must be said, was aided by the nature of the position. The front, toward the east, was established on heights so abrupt that they could not be forced. The knoll to the north, occupied by the Russians, was also separated from these heights by a couple of ravines, forming so many defiles leading to the English position. Every advancing column of the Russians was, therefore, exposed to the full plowing fire of the British artillery, and had to advance in close order up to the top of the heights before it could deploy. Weakened by the fire of the artillery, and, when nearer, of the musketry, the Russian columns arrived on the crest, and, before they could deploy into line, a discharge and a rush with the bayonet threw them down again. It was found, in this fight, that, at close distances, the Minie bullet has an immense superiority over the common musket bullet, whose force of penetration is barely sufficient to kill one man, while a Minie bullet often killed four or five, and had a telling effect upon the deep Russian columns.

As the British divisions came up, the fight became general, and extended upon a longer front. The Russians, unable to make much headway, attacked the original front of the British position with their left, while their right tried to penetrate toward Sevastopol. They succeeded, partly, in establishing themselves on the British heights, without, however, being able to form a regular

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a Beresford.—Ed.
line of battle. They tried to surround, and cut up, one by one, the separate small bodies of British troops. Though the struggle was hard, and the British fought wonderfully, yet they would have been crushed in this unequal contest, had not the French division of Bosquet come up. The Zouaves and the Foreign Legion charged the Russian left flank, and completely rolled it up, while the Chasseurs d’Afrique found an occasion to charge, and the Russian infantry had to retire. Thus, fourteen thousand allies, with a loss of one-third of their number, defeated thirty thousand Russians, and yet it is acknowledged that the Russians, individually, fought very well, while we have seen that their generalship, as far as the plan of attack was concerned, was far superior to that of the allies.

How, then, were they beaten? It must be said that most of the troops engaged were the broken and dispirited remnants of the besiegers of Silistria, and it is certain that Dannenberg’s corps, next to Osten-Sacken’s late corps, is at present the worst in the Russian army. But this was not the decisive circumstance. The battle was lost, next to the bravery of the English, through the essentially Russian way in which it was conducted. It is Russian warfare which has succumbed to European warfare. And this is the characteristic feature of the battle.

The Russian commander\(^a\) begins by drawing up a very good plan of attack, borrowed from one of Napoleon’s most celebrated battles (for no Russian General ever had an original thought, not even Suworoff, whose only originality was that of direct advance). He follows this up by setting about its execution in the very best manner possible. He establishes himself on the enemy’s flank. The strategical movement is completed; the tactical performance begins. And here, all at once, the scientific and learned mode of warfare, the work of western civilization, is thrown away, and the pure barbarism breaks forth. This splendid army, with its old troops, many of whom had been twenty-five years under arms, this model of parade-drill, is so clumsy, so incapable of skirmishing and fighting in small bodies, that its officers can do nothing with it but throw its heavy bulk in a single mass upon the enemy. All idea of tactical maneuvering is abandoned; advance, advance, advance, is the only thing that can be done. This dense mass of living flesh was, of course, by its very compactness, the best mark an artillerist could wish for; and while the thin British lines, lying down behind the crest of the hill, were protected from fire,

\(^a\) Menshikov.—\textit{Ed.}
they plowed up the deep columns with round shot, killing them by thirties and forties at a discharge, and rained a storm of Minié bullets upon them hardly one of which could miss a target of such extent. The mere brute pressure, the weight of this mass was to break the allied lines. But here they found an opponent accustomed to that style of warfare. The British, in their Indian wars, have learned to withstand the shock of dense masses, even if of superior numbers. And, if the Russians are far above the Sikhs or Beloochis, yet the troops which were accustomed to beat six or eight times their number of Sikhs or Beloochis might well stand the attack of three times their number of Russians, as soon as the Russians adopted the tactics of the Sikhs. The Russian column, when they arrived on the top of the hill, were already broken and disordered by the fire, and another volley at fifty yards and a charge with the bayonet was sufficient to break them. Afterward, as the Russians came up more numerously, the British, like Napoleon's squares among the Mamelukes, at the Pyramids, stood among the flood of Russians surrounding them. The steadiness of forces having that full confidence in themselves which only the men of a highly civilized nation can possess, and the superiority of the armament and fire of the British, did the rest. The Russians are the worst shots of all known troops, and they showed it here, else they must have laid low every Englishman present.

This was the character, and this is the significance of the battle of Inkerman. It shows that the glories of the Russian infantry are passing away. It shows that whatever progress Russia may make, the West advances at twice her rate, and that she can have no chance with western troops in an even fight, nor even with such odds as she had at Inkerman. But for the disastrous loss of the allied transports in the Black Sea we should say that this battle would be sufficient, without very gross blunders on the part of the English and French generals, to render their final success in the Crimea beyond a doubt. Of that heavy calamity we have as yet no details beyond those of a telegraphic dispatch, from London, received by our agent at Liverpool just before the Pacific sailed; we do not know whether the last vessels carried troops or only victuals and munitions, and from the silence of the telegraph we infer that they did not carry troops; but, if the large bodies of troops destined for the Crimea were lost in this storm, then, indeed, the allies have suffered a harder blow from the elements

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a Baluchis.— Ed.
than from the enemy, and their forces before Sevastopol may be destroyed, by disease and harassing attacks, before it can be possible to send them new reenforcements. Another and a no less serious danger menaces them in the very attitude of the German powers. Austria now for the first time seems really inclined to break with the western powers and join the Czar, and all Germany will go with her. At any rate, it cannot be doubted that the moment for the war to swell into more gigantic and terrible proportions, and to wrap all Europe in its flames, is now close at hand.

Written on November 27, 1854

Frederick Engels

THE CRIMEAN CAMPAIGN

Since the desperate and sanguinary day of Inkerman, the campaign in the Crimea has been marked by no military event of any importance; but, the advent of winter without the capture of Sevastopol having given a new character to the enterprise, it becomes proper to review the course of events since the landing of the Expedition, in order to determine what are the circumstances and chances amid which it enters upon the new developments that now await it. First, however, we must add a few words to our former observations upon the last memorable battle. With regard to this event, extraordinary confusion and want of perspicacity characterizes the official reports, all of which we have published. Lord Raglan’s dispatch was evidently written in a great hurry. Confounding that front of his army toward the Chernaya with that toward Sevastopol, he calls the same flank of his position sometimes the right, sometimes the left, in the same dispatch, so that it is impossible to get a clear idea of the events from this source. Canrobert’s dispatch is as diffuse and indefinite as it is short, and therefore quite useless; and whoever compares the so-called Menchikoff dispatch of the Russian Invalid with the

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a See this volume, pp. 528-35.—Ed.
b Lord Raglan’s dispatch of November 8, 1854. The Times, No. 21906, November 23, 1854.—Ed.
c Canrobert’s dispatch of November 7, 1854. Le Moniteur universel, No. 326, November 22, 1854.—Ed.
d Menshikov’s dispatch on the battle of Inkerman dated November 6, 1854 and published in the Russian Invalid (Русский ивалг) is given according to The Times, No. 21906, November 23, 1854.—Ed.
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The Crimean Campaign

former reports of Prince Menchikoff, must see at a glance that this was not penned by the same man. Nicholas, evidently, has found that he has allowed quite enough of the liberty of the press, and since telling the truth like a gentleman does not prevent his troops from getting beaten, he considers it quite as well to return to the old system of lying. By his Imperial will, the ordinary course of events is altered after the fact, and a defeated attack from his relieving army against the besiegers is changed to a victorious sally from within the town. The reason is evident: The sallying force necessarily retires into its fortifications so soon as the object of the sally is obtained; the retreat thus is explained and made a matter of course; while, if the facts were stated as they actually occurred, the disgrace of the defeat could not be hidden.

And well might Nicholas do his best to hide the circumstances of this battle from his people. Never since the battle of Narva has such disgrace been heaped upon the Russian arms. And, considering the tremendous difference between the Russians of Narva and the Russians of Inkerman, the undrilled hordes of 1700, and the well-drilled army of 1854, the day of Narva must, in comparison, be considered a bright one in Russian military history. Narva was the first grand disaster of a rising nation, whose determined spirit learnt how to conquer by defeat itself. Inkerman almost appears a certain indication of the decay of that hot-house development which Russia has experienced since Peter the Great. The artificial growth and the mere effort to keep up, with a barbarian material, a splendid show of civilization, appears already to have exhausted the nation and inflicted a sort of pulmonary consumption upon it. In all the battles of the present century, from Austerlitz and Eylau down to Silistria, the Russians had shown themselves excellent soldiers. Their defeats, wherever they occurred, could be explained; they left no stain upon the honor of the army, if they did upon the reputation of its generals. But now the matter is completely changed. If Balaklava showed the superiority of the allied cavalry, if the whole of the siege of Sevastopol shows the enormous superiority of the allied artillery over the Russian, still the Russian infantry remained in possession of its high reputation. Inkerman has settled this point too. Strange to say, the Russian infantry has forfeited its renown in a battle, in which, perhaps, the individual Russian foot-soldier fought more bravely than ever. The sovereign mediocrity which has been the chief characteristic of all military operations in this war, both on the Russian and the allied side, has never been made more apparent. Every movement, and every step taken, has produced a
result exactly the opposite of what was intended. A *coup de main*¹ is undertaken, and it turns out to involve a campaign—a winter campaign even. A battle is fought, but its gain is only momentary, vanishing in less than a week from the hands of the victors. An open town is assailed with heavy siege artillery; but, before the siege train is brought up, the open town is changed into a fortified camp of the first order. A siege is undertaken; and, when at the point of being successful, it has to be given up, because a relieving army comes up, and is—not victorious, but defeated. A strong position taken up against the relieving army becomes, by the very shortness of its front, the means in the hands of the relieving army to turn the besiegers into the besieged! Thus ten weeks are occupied with a series of efforts, combats, trench-works, plans and counter-plans; winter sets in, and finds both armies—but especially the allies—quite unprepared for the season; and all this with no result but a tremendous loss on both sides, leaving a decision of the campaign as remote and unlikely as ever.

The forces which the allies brought into the Crimea, from the first invasion to the 5th of November, did not exceed 25,000 British, 35,000 French, and 10,000 to 15,000 Turks, or from 70,000 to 75,000 altogether. When the expedition was undertaken, no more reenforcements from England or France were expected; a few battalions and squadrons were on the road, but they are comprised in the above estimate. All the additional forces they might have been able to bring up, at a short notice, must have been Turks; and, in spite of Chetatea and Silistria, neither the allied commanders nor the allied troops have ever shown any confidence in them. The 60,000 French and English were, then, the actually reliable portion of the expedition, and they alone can be counted as really effective. Now, this army was too small for a campaign, and too large for a *coup de main*. It could not be embarked with rapidity; the months employed in preparation were sufficient to put the Russians on their guard; and, if the presence of the Austrians guaranteed the Principalities and Bulgaria from Russian attacks, it also guaranteed Bessarabia and Odessa from any serious danger; for, the position of the Austrians being on the flank and rear of either line of operations, neither army could have marched forward without being at their mercy. Thus, the Russians must have been certain that all these preparations were directed against Sevastopol; beside which, the ports of Kherson and Nikolayev, the dock-yards of the Russian fleet, were the only

¹ Sudden attack in force.—*Ed.*
points in any way seriously menaced. Russian preparation in the Crimea was, therefore, sure to follow, step by step, the preparations of the allies. And so they did, until, at last, the contemplated coup de main was converted into a regular campaign, conducted, however—as was clear from the way it was commenced—in the most irregular manner.

When, at the Alma, the allies had to allow the Russians to withdraw in perfect order from the field of battle, although attacked by far superior numbers, the first glimpse of the truth burst upon them; the original plan was upset, the coup had failed, a new set of eventualities had to be provided for. Vacillation followed; days were lost; the march to Balaklava was at last resolved upon, and the advantages of a strong defensive position overruled the chance of soon obtaining possession of the north side of Sevastopol which commanded the town, and was, therefore, the decisive point. At the same time Menchikoff made similar mistakes by his hasty march to Sevastopol, and his equally hasty counter-march to Bakshiserai. Then followed the siege. Nineteen days elapsed before the batteries of the first parallel could open their fire, and then the advantages remained pretty equally divided. The siege went on with enormous slowness, but not very surely for all that. Hard work in the trenches, arduous outpost duty acting upon men weakened by a climate to which they were not bred, and by a fearful epidemic, thinned the ranks of the allies wonderfully. Their commanders had scarcely reckoned upon the common wear and tear of a campaign—they were taken quite unawares by such extraordinary losses. And the medical and commissariat departments, especially with the British, were totally out of order. Within sight lay the rich valley of Baidar, full of all the supplies most wanted; yet they could not venture into it! They had no hopes of early reinforcements; yet the Russians were coming up from all sides. Then came the affair of the 25th October. The Russians gained the advantage, and one third of the allied cavalry was annihilated. Next followed the battle of the 5th November, where the Russians suffered a repulse, but at a loss to the allies which they could not for a second time afford. Since then, both the Russian relieving army and the allied besiegers have been quiet. The siege of Sevastopol, if carried on at all, is carried on pro forma. Nobody will pretend that the lazy, desultory fire which the allies have kept up since the 5th of

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a The battle of Balaklava, see this volume, pp. 518-27.—Ed.
b The battle of Inkerman, see this volume, pp. 528-35.—Ed.
November can do any harm to the defenses of the place, or even prevent the Russians from repairing the damage done up to that time. There is no doubt that the siege, if taken up again, will have to be done over afresh, with the only difference that, perhaps, the attacking batteries are brought some hundred yards nearer the place than they were at the first beginning, unless the fire from the town, supported by continuous attacks from Inkerman, should prove superior to that of the allies, and destroy the more advanced batteries.

Here, then, are the allies, in the beginning of December, in a country with cold winters, badly provided with clothing and other materials to enable them to get through the bad season in a passable manner; weak in spite of all reinforcements, arrived or on the way; having lost a vast number of men; entangled in the pursuit of objects and in modes of action which they never intended nor prepared for, and having gained nothing, absolutely nothing, but a consciousness of their individual and tactical superiority over their opponents. Twenty thousand men, chiefly French, must by this time have reinforced them, and more are expected; but if we recollect the difficulties and delays which accompanied the first allied expedition to Turkey—if we recollect, moreover, that almost all the transports used for carrying the first army have been kept back, and that new ships must be found for the divisions now under orders for the East, we must conclude that the army of the Crimea will remain without material increase of strength, for some time after the arrival of the 20,000 men above alluded to. Thus their strength may now be something like 55,000 to 60,000 men, one-third of whom come fresh from comfortable garrison life, and will have to suffer heavily before being inured to the hardships of a winter bivouac under a Crimean sky. In truth, these very reinforcements may prove an incumbrance, instead of an increase of strength, after the disasters encountered by the French and English transports, in the furious tempest of November 13. These disasters, however, cannot be said to belong to that order of fatal and overwhelming accidents, which the best contrived plans are unable to foresee or prevent. The storm of November 13th was a seasonable storm, and seasonable were the disasters that befell the allied fleets. The very date on which the Crimean expedition started, after three months of tedious and inexplicable delays, foreboded storms and wrecks, with losses of ships, crews, men and supplies. The framers of this extraordinary campaign were, moreover, again and again forewarned as to the incidents inseparable from Black Sea
navigation at so advanced a period of the year. They, then, are responsible, even for the misfortunes of November 13, which threaten the allied forces with the fate of Napoleon's army during the Muscovite campaign. The London Times estimates the total loss of men, incurred on the 13th, at the various stations of the Crimea, at a thousand, "besides those that have fallen into the hands of the Cossacks." The same journal also tells us that

"the Prince, a magnificent new screw steamer, of 2,700 tons, carried out the other day to Balaklava the 46th Regiment, all the winter clothing for the troops engaged in the siege, including 40,000 great-coats, flannel suits, under-clothing, socks and gloves, beef, pork and other provisions; hospital stores for Scutari; and a vast quantity of shot and shell to carry on the siege. These are wholly lost. The Resolute, with 900 tons of gunpowder, also went to the bottom. Thus, it seems, all the materials for carrying on the siege and providing against the severity of the winter, have been carried off at one fell swoop; and, even if we think to content ourselves with merely maintaining our position on the heights before Sevastopol, it is evident that we are not in condition to stand our worst foe—the coming winter."

Though the Crimea is an almost insulated portion of the Russian Empire, and though the troops brought up against the allies have not been able to dislodge them when only 35,000 strong, yet nobody will venture to say that these 60,000 allies are strong enough to resist all the troops Russia may bring up. The Russians have six divisions of infantry and one reserved division in the Crimea, or about 100 battalions (besides marines and seamen, whom we have not counted on either side). These 100 battalions, one-half of which have made a murderous campaign of eighteen months on the Danube, cannot muster more than 50,000 to 60,000 men; including cavalry, field artillery and Cossacks, the whole Russian force in the field will exceed that of the allies by barely 10,000 to 15,000 men. But if it is true that Lüders's corps, or another 49 battalions of about 20,000 to 25,000 men (for they, too, have left one-third of their number on the Danube), is on the march to Perekop, if some more reserves of the new formations are concentrating in the same direction the opportunity may very soon present itself to the Russians to strike a grand blow; and as superiority, moral, physical, and tactical, only goes a certain way when opposed to superior numbers and about equal generalship, the result may well be considered doubtful. At the same time, if an extraordinarily severe winter should interrupt all operations, the allied armies are avowedly not in a condition to stand it.

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\( ^a \) The Times, No. 21916, December 5, 1854, leader.—Ed.

\( ^b \) Ibid.—Ed.
This view of the state of things in the Crimea only justifies the doubt and hesitation with which we have received the announcement that Austria has joined the western powers. Certainly, the circumstances we have detailed are not such as would be likely to seduce the Cabinet of Vienna out of its wonted indecision, while the precarious position of the British Ministry, and the urgent necessity of covering this immense failure in the East by the show of something considerable gained elsewhere, affords an ample reason for exaggerating a small treaty into a grand offensive and defensive alliance. We may be quite wrong in this; but our readers know the reasons for our opinion, and time will show whether this vaunted accession of Austria to the allies is a reality, or a trick specially designed for use at the meeting of Parliament.

Written on December 4, 1854


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune

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See this volume, pp. 268-71 and 323-25.—Ed.
The sun of Austerlitz\textsuperscript{a} has melted in water. A great battle, as was confidentially announced and believed in Paris, was to be fought before Sevastopol in celebration of the Second of December\textsuperscript{395}; but from a dispatch of General Canrobert, of the 3d of December, it appears that

\begin{quote}
"rain was falling in torrents, the roads were cut up, the trenches filled with water, and the siege operations—as well as all the works—put in a state of suspense."\textsuperscript{b}
\end{quote}

The Russians hitherto had the offensive, the Allies the defensive, superiority on the Chernaya; at the walls of Sevastopol it was the reverse. In other words, the Russians were strong enough on the Chernaya to hold the field, but the Allies were not, though able to keep their position; while at Sevastopol the Allies, strong enough to carry on the siege, were so nearly equally matched by the garrison, that the operations, though not stopped from without, yet proceeded with hardly any visible effect. The proportions of force seem about to change, and the Allies appear on the point of becoming strong enough to repulse the Russians from the Chernaya. In that case the Russians can act in two ways, after having lost their position above Inkerman. Either they can go round and take up the intrenched camp about the North Fort, or they can with their main body retreat into the interior, where the Allies cannot follow them far. The Allies can hardly be strong enough before February either to invest the northern camp or

\textsuperscript{a} An allusion to Napoleon I's words before the battle of Borodino: "This is the sun of Austerlitz."—\textit{Ed.}

\textsuperscript{b} \textit{Le Moniteur universel}, No. 346, December 12, 1854.—\textit{Ed.}
follow a retreating army much further than Bakhisrai. They
could scarcely fight a second battle against an army intrenched
somewhere about Simferopol. In either case, they would have to
fall back on the Chernaya, and thus this game of alternate advance
and retreat is likely to be played all the winter over, unless,
indeed, Sevastopol, on the south side, succumbs to an assault. But
as the news, which we receive by the Atlantic, respecting the
siege is very meager, we cannot say more on this point than that it
is not at all likely. We are, indeed, aware that, according to a
dispatch of December 7th, published in the Paris Moniteur, and
reprinted in the London papers, the allied armies had all of a
sudden got the upper hand, and only two days after the deluge,
“almost completed the investment of the town.” This spurious
dispatch was evidently concocted with a view to make amends for
the baffled 2d of December prophecy.

A short time ago we gave a statement of the sum total of the
Russian army, together with its disposal. We then showed that of
these nearly three-quarters of a million soldiers, up to the present
time, hardly one-third had been engaged in active operations, and
that the far greater portion of the remaining two-thirds were
employed to menace Austria. In spite of the reenforcements sent
to the Crimea, matters have not been much altered since then; for
Dannenberg’s corps, the 4th, which marched to the relief of
Sevastopol, was withdrawn from the army of the Danube, where it
had been previously reenforced. The only essential change in the
position of the great Western Army of Russia, as we may call the
corps of some 300,000 men concentrated on the Austrian frontier,
is a slight extension of its left wing towards Bessarabia, and the
Middle Dniester, in which position it is enabled, in case of need, to
receive the remnants of the army of the Danube in case of their
retreat from Bessarabia. The great Western Army may, besides,
have detached a couple of divisions to the Crimea, and a few
reenforcements to the Danube, but in the whole its strength is
unimpaired, and the march of the 3d division of the Guards from
Revel, and of some more reserves, will have made up for these
detachments.

The Danubian army, however, may be considered as entirely
broken up, and reduced to a mere corps of demonstration, placed
in Bessarabia to keep up the appearance of a Russian occupation

\[a\] Report from Bucharest of December 11, 1854. *Le Moniteur universel*, No. 347,
December 13, 1854, reprinted in *The Times*, No. 21924, December 14, 1854.—*Ed.*

\[b\] See this volume, pp. 498-504.—*Ed.*
as long as possible. By Liprandi's and afterwards Dannenberg's departure, that army was deprived of the whole of the 4th corps (10th, 11th and 12th Divisions), deducting from the remaining five divisions, the 7th, 8th, 9th, 14th, and 15th, the troops necessary for the occupation of the coast, and the garrisons of the fortresses from Bender and Ismail, to Kherson and Nikolayev, and, considering the enormous losses of the two Danubian campaigns, these five divisions could not muster for field operations more than 15,000 men. They are placed near the coast, and wherever there is coast, the Russian defensive, so efficient in the heart of the continent, is lame in the extreme. It has to guard numerous fortresses and dépôts against the attacks of the hostile fleet, and thus it is explained, that of the 30,000 or 35,000 men composing these five divisions not one-half is disposable for the field.

The dissolution of the army of the Danube, like most of the great strategical measures taken by Russia (for the blunders generally commence with the execution of them), is a very well-chosen step. Since the Anglo-French have engaged themselves over head and ears in the Crimea, no enemy opposes the Russians on the Danube. Omer Pasha's army, hardly amounting to some 40,000 men after the wear and tear of two campaigns, never made up for, has, by the aid of western diplomacy, been so broken up, as to leave it scarcely sufficient to invest Ismail, much less to detach a corps to cover the siege, or to repel the Russians in the field. Besides, an attack upon Bessarabia, which would have afforded a powerful diversion some months ago, would now lack a definite military object, and, consequently, Omer Pasha's army is now sent to the Crimea. The only force, then, purporting to menace the Russians on the south-west, is now the Austrian army, which, in a force of some 270,000, occupies Galicia, Transylvania and Moldavia. This force must, above all things, be held in check. For, should it declare itself hostile to Russia, Bessarabia, and even the country up to the Bug, would have to be abandoned, and operations have to be conducted either from the offensive basis of the Polish fortresses, or from the defensive basis of Kiev and the Dnieper. In both cases a Danubian army would be cut off, and have to find a base of its own somewhere in the steppes of the South, which is no easy matter, in a country which feeds many horses and sheep, but very few men. On the other hand, should Austria declare for Russia, or turn the points of her neutral bayonets towards the Alps and the Rhine, then the Polish army might either march into Germany as a reserve to the Austrians, after sending a strong corps toward the Danube, or the Austrians
pour in a mass upon the Danube and risk a march to Constantinople. In either case, a separate army on the Danube, stronger than a demonstration corps, was superfluous.

As to the cooperation of Austria in this war, we can, of course, only speak in an altogether hypothetical way. The noisily trumpeted Treaty of Alliance said to have been concluded by her with France and England on the 2d of December, turns out to be but a snare laid for Parliament, as we warned our readers immediately on the announcement of the Treaty.\(^a\)

In the Queen’s speech the Treaty is alluded to in these words:

“It is with satisfaction I inform you that, together with the Emperor of the French, I have concluded a treaty with the Emperor of Austria, from which I anticipate important advantages to the common cause;”\(^b\)

but, being hardly pressed by Lord Derby, Aberdeen went the length of declaring:

“We propose only that the House should learn with satisfaction that Her Majesty has made a treaty from which she (viz, old Aberdeen) anticipates important advantages.”\(^c\)

This is all the satisfaction he gave. Lord John Russell, in the Lower House, was forced by Mr. Disraeli to advance a step further, and plainly to confess that the boasted Treaty of Alliance means neither a treaty nor an alliance. He avows that it binds Austria to nothing at all, while it forces the Western Powers into an alliance offensive and defensive with Austria, if she should choose to declare war on Russia, and obliges them besides to propose to Russia, before the end of the year, conditions of peace on the basis of the famous four points.\(^d\) After all, Austria might then, “without a breach of faith,” release herself from the alliance by saying, “at the last moment,” she did not concur in the interpretation put on the four points by the Western Powers. The result of Lord John Russell’s explanation of the glorious treaty of December 2, was an immediate fall of the funds, both at London and at Paris.

A year ago, the coalition pretended to have allowed the massacre of Sinope to take place in order to obtain the alliance of

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\(^a\) See this volume, p. 542.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^b\) Victoria R. Speech at the opening of Parliament on December 12, 1854. \textit{The Times}, No. 21923, December 13, 1854.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^c\) The Earl of Aberdeen’s speech in the House of Lords on December 12, 1854. \textit{The Times}, No. 21923, December 13, 1854.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^d\) Lord John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on December 12, 1854. \textit{The Times}, No. 21923, December 13, 1854.—\textit{Ed.}
the German powers. Now, a sham treaty with one of these powers is held out as the equivalent for the loss not of a Turkish fleet, but of a British army. We are even assured by the latest German papers that the opening of the British Parliament has given the signal for the reappearance of the specter of the Vienna Conference, which was about once more to set its cumbrous machinery at work.397

However, as Austria, according to Lord John Russell, declares it possible that she may be driven to war with Russia, and as the position taken by the Russian army on the Austrian frontier indicates the same thing, we may suppose, for a moment, that Austria and the rest of Germany, even including Prussia, are to join the Western Powers. How far would Russia be prepared to meet such an eventuality?

If in 1812 the Continental force launched against Russia was far weaker than that which she may perhaps see on her frontiers in April or May; if then England was her ally instead of her foe, Russia may console herself with the reflection that the more numerous the armies are which penetrate into her interior, the more chance is there of their speedy destruction, and that, on the other hand, she has now three times the troops under arms which she had then.

Not that we think “Holy Russia” unassailable. On the contrary, Austria alone we consider fully her equal as to military resources, while Austria and Prussia united, are quite able, if merely military chances are taken into account, to force her to an ignominious peace. Any forty millions of men, concentrated upon a country of the size of Germany proper, will be able to cope successfully with the scattered sixty millions of Russian subjects. The strategy of an attack upon Russia from the west has been clearly enough defined by Napoleon, and had he not been forced by circumstances of a non-strategic nature to deviate from his plan, Russia’s supremacy and integrity were seriously menaced in 1812. That plan was to advance to the Dvina and the Dnieper, to organize a defensive position, both as to fortifications, dépôts and communications, to take her fortresses on the Dvina, and to delay the march to Moscow, until the spring of 1813. He was induced to abandon this plan, late in the season, from political reasons, from the outcry of his officers against winter quarters in Lithuania, and from a blind faith in his invincibility. He marched to Moscow, and the result is known. The disaster was immensely aggravated by the mal-administration of the French Commissariat, and by the want of warm clothing for the soldiers. Had these things been better
attended to, Napoleon, on his retreat, might have found himself at Wilna at the head of an army twice in numbers that which Russia could oppose to him. His errors are before us; they are none of them of a nature irremediable: the fact of his penetrating to Moscow, the march of Charles XII to Poltava, prove that the country is accessible, though difficult of access; and as to maintaining a victorious army in its heart, that all depends upon the length of the line of operations, on the distance and the security of the bases. Napoleon's line of operations from the Rhine to Aylau and Friedland, if we consider long lines of operations in their capacity of drawbacks upon the active force of an army, will be about equal to a line of operations from Brest Litovski (supposing the Polish fortresses to be taken in the first year) to Moscow. And in this supposition no account is taken of the circumstance that the immediate base of operations would have been advanced to Vitebsk, Mogilev and Smolensk, without which preparatory act a march on Moscow would certainly be hazardous.

Russia is certainly thinly populated; but we must not forget that the central provinces—the very heart of Russian nationality and strength—have a population equal to that of central Europe. In Poland—that is, the five governments constituting the Russian kingdom of Poland—the average is about the same. The most populous districts of Russia—Moscow, Tula, Riasan, Nijni-Novgorod, Kaluga, Yaroslav, Smolensk, &c.—are the very heart of Great Russia, and form a compact body; they are continued, in the south, by the equally populous Little Russian Provinces of Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Voronezh, &c. There are, in all, 29 Provinces or Governments, in which the population is quite half as dense as that of Germany. It is only the eastern and northern Provinces, and the steppes of the south, where population is very thin; partly also the formerly Polish Provinces of the west—Minsk, Mogilev and Grodno—on account of extensive swamps between the (Polish) Bug and Dniester. But an advancing army, having in its rear the corn-producing plains of Poland, Volhynia and Podolia, and in front, and for its theater of operations, those of Central Russia, need not be afraid of its subsistence, if it manages the matter anything like well, and if it learns from the Russians themselves how to employ the means of transport of the country. As for a devastation of all resources by the retreating army, as in 1812, such a thing is only possible on one line of operations, and in its immediate vicinity; and if Napoleon had not, by his hurried advance from Smolensk, tied himself down to a very short time in which to complete his campaign, he would have found plenty of
resources around him. But being in a hurry, he could not forage out the country at a short distance from his line of march, and his foraging parties, at that time, appear actually to have been afraid of penetrating far into the immense pine forests which separate village from village. An army which can detach strong cavalry parties to hunt up provisions, and the numerous carts and wagons of the country, can easily provide itself with everything necessary in the shape of food; and it is not likely that Moscow will burn down a second time. But even in that case, a retreat to Smolensk cannot be prevented, and there the army would find its well-prepared base of operation provided with every necessary.

But not only military questions are to be decided. Such a war must be brought to a close by political action too. It is possible that the declaration of Germany against Russia would be the signal for the restoration of Poland by Russia herself. Nicholas would certainly not part with the Lithuanian and other West-Russian provinces; but the kingdom of Poland, Galicia, Posen, and perhaps West and East Prussia, would form a pretty good-sized kingdom. Whether such a revival of Poland would be durable, who can tell? One thing is certain: it would put an end to what is hollow in the enthusiasm for Poland, which, for the last forty years, has been affected by everybody and anybody calling himself liberal or progressive. A Russian appeal to Hungary would be sure to follow; and, if the Magyars should demur, we must not forget that two-thirds of the population of Hungary consists of Slavs, who consider the Magyars as a ruling and intruding aristocracy. On the other hand, Austria would, in such a case, not hesitate to restore the ancient Hungarian Constitution, thus aiming to blot Hungary out of the map of revolutionary Europe.

This suffices to show what a wide perspective of military and political interest would be opened by the accession of Austria to the western alliance, and a chance of a war of all Europe against Russia. On the contrary supposition, the spring is likely to see a million and a half of soldiers arrayed against the Western Powers, and an Austro-Prussian army marching on the French frontiers. And then the management of the war is sure to be taken out of the hands of its present leaders.

Written on December 14 and 15, 1854

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune

19*
Frederick Engels

THE MILITARY POWER OF AUSTRIA

It is a curious fact that the English press, which, for the last six months, has busied itself with nothing but the position of Austria, should never have given us any positive information about the real military force which Austria can throw into the scale the moment she may choose to follow a definite line of policy. The London daily journals have been divided upon the question whether the Austrian alliance or an open rupture with Austria was the preferable thing. But these journals, which represent the public opinion of a nation priding itself upon being the most businesslike in the world, have never condescended to enter into those details and statistics which, not only in trade and political economy, but also in national policy, form the ground-work of every measure intelligently adopted. In truth, the British press would seem to be conducted by gentlemen who are as ignorant in their line of business as those British officers who think they are doing all their duty when they buy a commission.\(^a\) One paper says the Austrian alliance must be cultivated at all hazards and under all circumstances, because Austria is an immense military power. Another says the Austrian alliance is worse than useless, because all her energies are required to keep in check Hungary, Poland and Italy. What the real military forces of Austria are, neither the one nor the other ever trouble themselves to know.

The Austrian army, though managed up to 1849 according to a cumbrous and old-fashioned system, was entirely remodeled in that year. The defeats in Hungary had as great a part in it as the victories in Italy. The Administration was freed from old traditional hindrances. The army, employed in a country where

\(^a\) See this volume, p. 210.—*Ed.*
revolution in the capital and civil war in the provinces had only just been subdued, was organized on a regular war footing. The distribution of the army into permanent brigades, divisions, and corps, as it existed under Napoleon, and as it exists now in the Russian active army, was introduced with success. The 77 regiments of infantry, beside riflemen, and 40 regiments of cavalry, which had been split up during both the Italian and Hungarian campaigns, not only battalions of the same regiment, but even companies of the same battalions being employed partly in Hungary and partly in Italy at the same time—were now reunited and brigaded in such a manner as to prevent any similar disorder and to insure the regular course of regimental administration. According to this new plan, the Austrian force is divided into four armies, composed of twelve corps d'armée and two corps of cavalry. Every army is not only complete in the three arms, but provided with a perfectly independent administrative staff, and the material to insure its immediate readiness for action. The first army—1st, 2d, and 9th army corps—generally occupies the German provinces of the Empire; the second army—5th, 6th, 7th and 8th army corps, and 2d cavalry corps, and the third army—10th, 11th and 12th army-corps, and 1st cavalry corps—generally occupy the Hungarian and Slavonic provinces; while the fourth army, consisting only of the 4th army corps, occupies Italy.

Every army corps consists of from two to three divisions of infantry, one or two brigades of cavalry, four batteries of reserve artillery, and the necessary detachments of pontoniers, train-commissariat, and medical officers. A cavalry corps consists of two divisions, equal to four brigades, or eight regiments of cavalry, with a corresponding number of light batteries. An infantry division consists of two brigades of five battalions, with one foot battery each, and from two to four squadrons of cavalry.

The whole force thus distributed consists, as we have stated above, of seventy-seven regiments of infantry, beside riflemen, forty regiments of cavalry, and fourteen regiments of field-artillery, beside garrison-artillery, engineers, sappers, etc. The infantry is composed of sixty-two regiments of the line, fourteen regiments of frontier infantry, and one regiment and twenty-five battalions of riflemen. A regiment of the line consists of five active and one dépôt battalions, or of twenty-eight active and four dépôt companies. The active company numbers two hundred and twenty men, the dépôt company one hundred and thirty. A regiment of the line, consequently, is expected to number, in its five active battalions, 5,964 men, or, for 62 regiments, inclusive of dépôts,
369,800 men. The frontier infantry, counting fourteen regiments, has two active and one reserve battalions to each regiment, equal to twelve active and four reserve companies. The active company has the strength of 242 men, inclusive of 22 riflemen. A frontier regiment, therefore, numbers 3,850 men, and the whole of the fourteen regiments numbers 55,200. The rifle-force, or Jägers, consists of one regiment of seven battalions—32 companies, inclusive of dépôt; and 25 battalions—125 companies, inclusive of dépôts; every company numbering 202 men, making the entire rifle-force 32,500. The total is thus 470,000 men.

The Austrian cavalry consists of 16 heavy regiments (8 cuirassiers and 8 dragoons) and 24 light regiments (12 hussars and 12 lancers). In the arm of cavalry, the different nationalities composing the Austrian Empire have each been used, very properly, according to their distinctive capabilities. The cuirassiers and dragoons are almost exclusively Germans and Bohemians; the hussars are all Hungarians, and the lancers are all Poles. In the infantry a similar distinction could hardly be kept up with any profit. As a general rule, the Germans and Hungarians form the élite battalions of grenadiers, while the Tyrolese (German and Italian) and the Styrians generally furnish the riflemen; and the great majority of the frontier infantry is composed of Croats and Servians, who are equally well adapted to the duties of light infantry.

The heavy cavalry counts six active squadrons and one dépôt squadron to each regiment—the squadron numbering 194 men. The light cavalry counts eight active and one dépôt squadron to each regiment, with 227 men to each squadron. The entire active cavalry force is 62,500, without dépôts, and 67,000 men, including dépôts.

The artillery consists of twelve field regiments, one coast regiment, and one rocket regiment. The Austrians have no horse-artillery. In what they call cavalry-artillery, the men serving the guns are transported on the carriages. Every field regiment has four cavalry batteries (six-pounders) and seven foot batteries (four six-pounders and three twelve-pounders), beside reserve companies. Every battery has eight guns. The coast regiment has no permanent batteries, but is only divided into battalions and companies, and employed for garrisoning the coast defenses. The rocket regiment has 18 batteries, of eight tubes each. The total of Austrian artillery is thus seen to be 1,056 guns and 144 rocket-tubes. The artillery has, besides, eight battalions of garrison artillery, of about 10,400 men, with technical detachments consisting of 4,500 men. The engineering troops number about 16,700 men.
Beside these active, reserve and garrison troops, Austria possesses separate corps organized for special service, who, although not available as active combatants, prevent a reduction of the active force by those drafts of men which very often reduce battalions to companies, and regiments of cavalry to squadrons. There are three sanitary battalions, train-troops, and with every army corps a detachment of cavalry to do duty as orderlies. The latter institution has just been introduced into the English army, by the formation of the Mounted Staff Corps. The whole Austrian army counts altogether something like 476,000 men, and 1,140 guns of active troops; including dépôts, technical troops, staff, garrison and police troops (gendarmes), they count about 620,000.

The Austrian soldier serves eight years, remaining for two years more in the reserve. By this arrangement a reserve is kept available, which, in the case of war, can be called out to the strength of about 120,000 men. In the military frontier every Grenzer has to serve from his twentieth to his fiftieth year. Thus the active force of 55,000 frontier infantry can be increased up to 150,000 or 200,000 men. During the year of 1849 there were at least 150,000 of them under arms. But at that time the military frontier was so deserted that the women had to do all the work of husbandry.

The sum total of these details, for the correctness of which we can vouch, shows that the military organization of Austria allows her to take the field, at once, with a force of 600,000 men, of whom 300,000, at the utmost, may be made available on any given point; and, at the same time, a reserve of about 200,000 veteran soldiers may be called out, without the necessity of any extra recruiting, or extra strain upon the productive forces of the country.

The Russian army is organized upon a footing which allows of far greater numbers being admitted into its framework. The population of Russia is 60,000,000 to Austria’s 40,000,000; yet, we have seen that Austria, by merely calling in the reserves, can increase her army beyond 800,000; while Russia, in order to attain the same number, has been obliged not only to call in the reserves, but also to recruit fresh troops, at a ratio equal to four years’ regular conscription.

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1855 as a leader
London, December 29.

"The meeting between Count Buol, M. de Bourqueney and Prince Gorchakov at the home of the Earl of Westmorland, the English Ambassador in Vienna, was solely intended to give the Emperor of Russia the desired information as to the meaning of the Triple Alliance of December 2,\(^401\) and as to the conditions under which the three big powers would be ready to open peace negotiations on the basis of the Four Points.\(^3\) Prince Gorchakov immediately reported to Petersburg on the information received. The Tsar must accept or reject the preliminary conditions within the next few days. A decisive turning-point will mark the beginning of the new year."

Thus *The Morning Post*, Lord Palmerston's private *moniteur*,

"The Viennese negotiations," says the Tory *Press*, "are designed to give Austria a new opportunity to postpone its definitive statement to the Western powers on the date fixed in the Agreement of December 2."\(^4\)

It may be a decisive fact that, while politicians are discussing the new Vienna Conference\(^402\) with ponderous political wisdom in the leading articles of both daily and weekly press, businessmen are bluntly calling it a "farce" in the stock-exchange columns of the same papers. Thus, for instance, the businessman in the money article\(^b\) of today's *Morning Post*. Indeed the event at Vienna seemed to be a matter of such indifference to the London Stock Exchange that its publication gave neither bears nor bulls,\(^403\) neither pessimists nor optimists of the stock exchange\(^b\) cause for any action of the least significance. Minor fluctuations in quotations of Government securities during the past three days

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\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 579-84.---Ed.

\(^b\) Marx used the English term.---Ed.
were connected not with Vienna diplomacy but with the Paris budget. It is supposed that English capitalists will have a share in the new Paris loan of 500 million francs, and will thus bring about a contraction of the money market which, moreover, looks increasingly dubious, as a result of the repercussions of the North American crisis (a crisis more important in dimension than that of 1837), the latest unfavourable business news from East India, the rising prices of grain, and several unexpectedly heavy bankruptcies in London and Liverpool. Illusions of peace prevail, in any case, on the part of the English Ministry, if not of the Tsar of Russia. It was the oligarchy that led the English people into the great war with France which began in the last century. It was the people that forced the English oligarchy into the current war with Russia. The reluctance of the oligarchy to conduct this war, which was forced upon it, is clearly visible in all its diplomatic, military and financial operations. Even the latest measure of the Ministry—the law concerning the recruiting of a foreign legion—was, above all, designed to make the English “dislike” the war. There can be no question of the recruiting pool being exhausted in a country from where more than 100,000 able-bodied men emigrate annually without that emigration having a more than temporary effect on the wage level. And there was just as little question of providing an exceptional and sudden supply of auxiliary troops, since the ministerial measure is not calculated to help either suddenly or by way of exception. The Militia Bill passed in May empowered the Ministry to call up 80,000 soldiers in England and Wales alone, and the result has shown that a full quarter of the volunteers in all regiments called up in the spring opted for active service, yet up to the beginning of this month the Government had mobilised only eighteen militia regiments (approximately 13,500 men). It is well known that Englishmen have always protested against the introduction of foreign mercenaries into Great Britain—they have done so at the time of Charles I, under William III, under the early Georges, and finally, during the great anti-Jacobin war. But it is new and unheard-of in English history for the use of foreign mercenaries outside English territory to arouse a storm of indignation. This very fact proves how wholly different the character of the present war is from all former English wars, as far as they belong to modern times. The ruling aristocracy is therefore deliberately conjuring up the spectre of the past, the long-standing practice of its agents, whereby soldiers would be bought in the

— George I and George II.— Ed.
cheapest market. It does this—as Sidney Herbert admitted in the House of Commons—without being in any way convinced of the success of the proposed measure. It does this therefore not to wage war, but to prepare for peace. Today, in order to create an adequate English army, the Government would be compelled to increase pay, abolish corporal punishment, hold out the prospect of advancement from the ranks, in brief, to democratise the army and to transform it from its own property into the property of the nation. Up to now, says today’s Times,

"in war, and in peace, the army is only a Government organ for the advancement of the aristocracy and the support of the Ministry."b

And here we come to the crucial point. For the English aristocracy war with Russia is equivalent to the loss of its monopoly of government. Forced since 1830 to conduct its internal policy exclusively in the interests of the industrial and commercial middle classes, the English aristocracy has nevertheless retained possession of all government posts, because it has retained the monopoly of foreign policy and of the army.

This monopoly, however, has remained secure only as long as there was no people's war—and such a war was possible only against Russia—which would make foreign policy the concern of the people. The whole of English diplomacy from 1830 to 1854, therefore, can be reduced to the one principle: to avoid war with Russia at all costs. Hence the continual concessions which have been made to Russia in Turkey, in Persia, in Afghanistan, in Denmark, and, indeed, everywhere in the world, for the past twenty-four years. That the aristocracy has calculated correctly is proved by the actual facts. War with Russia has hardly broken out when even The Times declares:

"The aristocracy is incapable of conducting our wars. The oligarchic state machinery stands in the sharpest contradiction to our social machinery."

II


"Under the pressure of the present war our military departments [...] have completely broken down."c

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a Sidney Herbert’s speech in the House of Commons on December 19, 1854. The Times, No. 21929, December 20, 1854.—Ed.
b The Times, No. 21938, December 30, 1854, leader.—Ed.
c The Times, No. 21939, January 1, 1855, leader.—Ed.
Thus today's *Times*. Indeed, if one considers the organisation of the military administration, or any other official administration in this country, it would seem as though it had been intended to serve as a concrete example of the so-called principle of the constitutional balance of power. The different authorities have been co-ordinated in such a way that they keep each other completely in check, and the entire machinery is therefore bound to grind to a halt. That is why, during the present war, it was possible for the wounded soldiers to be at Balaklava, the military surgeons at Constantinople and medical supplies at Scutari. Hence the revolt of the Crimean army against a system which sacrifices it; for must we not call it a revolt when all ranks, from colonel down to private, commit breaches of discipline, writing thousands of letters to the London press every week and appealing to public opinion against their superiors? However, Lord Raglan is unjustly made responsible for a state of affairs which is conditioned by the system. What he is responsible for is military leadership.

Casting a retrospective glance at the Crimean campaign, we find that Lord Raglan made his first mistake during the battle of the Alma by ordering that the Russian army's left wing, which was covered by the sea, should be outflanked instead of its right. By the latter operation, one section of the Russians would have been pushed towards the sea and the other towards the North Fort, whereas now they have, in fact, been flung on Simferopol, i.e. on the line of retreat most favourable to them. While during the battle of the Alma the Allies took the bull by the horns to no purpose whatever, they shrank from taking that step when circumstances demanded it. The famous “outflanking march to Balaklava” was the abandonment of an attack on the northern front of the fortress; this front, however, is the commanding, and therefore the crucial, point; the North Fort is the key to Sevastopol. Thus the Allies gave up the bolder, and therefore in fact the safer, offensive in order to secure a strong defensive position.

The same mistake was made by Omer Pasha when he entrenched himself near Kalafat instead of marching from Oltenitza on Bucharest, breaking through the enemy's extended lines. Then came the siege of Sevastopol, proving, at any rate, that as a result of a long peace the art of war has deteriorated to the same degree as, thanks to industrial development, war materials have improved. Never before has there been a war where simple earthworks have played so important a role. It was at Oltenitza that the Russians first had recourse, albeit unsuccessfully, to the
old system of bombarding them for several hours before making an assault. At Kalafat, earthworks which they did not dare attack kept the Russians in check. At Silistria, a half-demolished earthwork frustrated all the efforts of the Russian army, and now, at Sevastopol, a line of earthworks was favoured by more extensive assault batteries and heavy artillery than had ever before been used against a regular fortress. However, even before the siege-train had been set up, the open city had been transformed into a first-rate fortified camp. It is known that in the battle of Balaklava, on October 25, the English cavalry had been sacrificed against all rhyme and reason and contrary to all accepted rules. Finally, we come to the battle of Inkerman, the most important military event of this campaign. Like the Prussians at Jena, British troops before Inkerman were drawn up on a number of hillocks which, at the front, were accessible only through a few defiles. Like the Prussians, the British had neglected to occupy a hillock on their extreme left wing, and it was there that, like Napoleon at Jena, 405 Menshikov at Inkerman flung a part of his army, thus establishing himself in the enemy flank before daybreak. The Russians, never given to original ideas, borrowed Napoleon's plan of operation, but, as soon as the strategic movement was completed and the tactical performance had to begin, the mask of Western civilisation was dropped and the Tartar emerged. This magnificent Russian army with its old soldiers—many of them of twenty-five years' standing—these models of parade-ground drill, shows itself so clumsy, so ponderous, so incapable of skirmishing and fighting in small units, that its officers can think of nothing better to do with it than to fling its heavy mass at the enemy in one fell swoop. The sheer brutal pressure of this mass was meant to break the thin ranks of the British, while on the one hand these deep columns of human flesh ensured the unfailing and devastating effect of the English rifles 4 and artillery, and on the other hand, where an overwhelming number of Russians made bayonet attacks, the British received them with the same superiority as Napoleon's squares received the Mamelukes in the battle of the Pyramids. 406 Fourteen thousand Allied soldiers, with a loss of one-third of their total strength, defeated 30,000 Russians, although it is acknowledged that individually the Russians fought valiantly, and that their plan of attack was superior to that of the Allies. Never since the battle of Narva has such a disaster befallen Russian arms. And if we consider the extraordinary difference

a Marx used the English word.—Ed.
between the Russians of Narva and the Russians of Inkerman, between the half-savage hordes of 1700 and the well-drilled army of 1854, the day of Narva seems brilliant compared to that of Inkerman. Narva was the first great disaster of a rising nation which knew how to turn even defeats into means of victory. Inkerman appears almost as the certain indication of a decline in that hot-house development which Russia had undergone since Peter the Great. The artificially accelerated growth, and the tremendous effort of maintaining with semi-barbaric means the semblance of a brilliant civilisation seem to have already exhausted the nation and to have inflicted upon it some kind of consumption. The battle of Inkerman is for the Russian infantry what the battle of Rocroi was for the Spanish infantry. \textsuperscript{407}

Written on December 29, 1854 and January 1, 1855

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Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
London, January 3. A correspondent of The Times writes from the encampment at Sevastopol:

“It is said that the Emperor Nicholas engages to send all that are left of us in the spring away in a single line-of-battle ship.”

There follows a graphic description of the mortality, distress, disorder and disintegration prevailing in the English camp. Today this state of affairs provides almost the exclusive subject for the leading articles in London's daily press.

“The British army,” says The Times, “is found to be no army at all in the general military sense of the word. It is a mob of brave men, not more than a mob, and rather less, inasmuch as it is evidently commanded by those who should not command it, and so deprived of its rude natural efficiency... The command of the British army before Sevastopol is worse than a mere name... it is deliberately asserted by officers of distinction that the army might just as well be commanded by its sergeants as by the men who pretend to command it. We are aware that it is a painful act to supersede brave and loyal men, full of honours and years.”

However, à la guerre comme à la guerre.

“If there ever was a Ministry that had its path open for such a measure it is the present.”

Why?

“Because it put off the war as long as it could,” that is why the “Government surely has the game in its own hands, and is bound by no respect of persons.”

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\(^{a}\) Letter of a British army officer from the encampment at Sevastopol dated December 12, 1854. *The Times*, No. 21941, January 3, 1855.—*Ed.*

\(^{b}\) *The Times*, No. 21941, January 3, 1855, leader.—*Ed.*
Well roared, lion! It is because the present Ministry is conducting the war with Russia against its own will that mistakes in the conduct of the war cannot be ascribed to it, but must be blamed on the commanding general, and the public must understand that it is not the Ministry that stands in Lord Raglan's way, but Lord Raglan who stands in the way of the Ministry.

While The Times thus attacks Lord Raglan in order to shield the Ministry, The Morning Chronicle, the Peelite organ, attacks The Times, ostensibly to defend Lord Raglan, but really so as gratefully to accept The Times admission of the Ministry's innocence, to exploit it, and, at the same time, to create a diversion by a sham fight between two ministerial organs.

According to the worthy Chronicle:

"The despondency which has enveloped public opinion for the last few days, must, we regret to write it, be attributed to the sole influence of The Times. Events have been blackened, disasters exaggerated, the well-earned reputations of our general officers aspersed, and the Briton's proverbial generosity towards the absent disdained, with the sole view of causing a sensation—of creating an effect. It is, however, on the head of Field-Marshal Lord Raglan that the rancour and venom of these attacks have been accumulated.... The distress to which the army in the Crimea was reduced from the commencement of December until the last accounts, which are more favourable, must chiefly be attributed to the terrible hurricane of the 13th of November...."b

And the Ministry is magnanimous enough not to blame Lord Raglan for the hurricane of November 13. So all that is left is the claptrap of The Times.

Now we come to that section of the London press which represents certain special interests within the Ministry, that is, The Daily News, for some time Palmerston's secret organ, and The Morning Post which, for years, has been his official organ.

"Our administrative systems," says The Daily News, "are nearly as unchangeable as if they had been contrived by the Medes and Persians. [...] let an unforeseen crisis impend—and they utterly and disastrously break down. Yet in face of the most appalling sacrifices of life and property they are seldom so changed or modified as to enable them to meet similar catastrophes in future.... It is nearly the same now with the War Department. It was hoped that, when a Minister of Warc was appointed, all the active business of the army would be concentrated under his responsible management.... Up to this day not a single abuse has it reformed, not [...] a particle of improvement has it effected.... Shall we blame the Duke of Newcastle? or shall we not rather strike at a deeper root, and aim the axe of Reform at the paralysing system, [...] a system that confines the functions of the state to the [...] 'cold shade of aristocracy'? ... In truth, whatever the merits of the Duke of Newcastle may be, he is not the official Hercules to be able to extinguish

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a Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V, Scene 1.—Ed.
b The Morning Chronicle, No. 27464, January 3, 1855, leader.—Ed.
c The Duke of Newcastle.—Ed.
the system... but what he cannot do, the [...] people of England will insist upon having done.”

*The Daily News* is still new in its ministerial role. Besides, it has to take into account its bourgeois public. Nevertheless, one realises at first sight that the point of the article is the “official Hercules” who is needed. And who is this official Hercules? And how is one to come by him? *The Morning Post* provides the answer. It says:

“To begin by attacking Lord Raglan is certainly commencing at the wrong end, [...] Lord Raglan is” above the attacks of *The Times*... But, “there can be no doubt about the shortcomings of the Government at home.... Take simply the War Department, is it to be conducted throughout in the spirit and after the model of the last nine months?... Let it be remembered that the army abroad is entirely at the mercy of the Administration at home.... Of what terrible importance is it, then, that the head of this department have a master mind, and work like a master.... *The old system*, it is said, stands in the way. But the master mind would, ere this, have kicked the system to the winds on his own responsibility.... The secret is, that the head of the Government is a dead weight upon Departmental exertion. The slow movement of the *Aberdeen* pulse communicates itself to every member of the Administration and gives its tone and time to the whole system... The whole be re-cast, and a real and vigorous head put upon its shoulders.”

In other words: make Palmerston Prime Minister. He is the *official Hercules* of whom *The Daily News* has been dreaming, the same Palmerston whom Lord Melbourne, at the suggestion of the Russian Princess Lieven, appointed Foreign Secretary in 1830; who, in the Afghan war, had sacrificed a British army in so mysterious a manner that Sir Robert Peel, in a public session of the House of Commons, threatened him with “revelations” if he [Lord Palmerston] continued to provoke him with his boasting: the same Palmerston who was able to steer the offensive alliance against Russia proposed by France in 1839 and apparently already operative so adroitly that one fine day in 1840 it had been transformed into an Anglo-Russian alliance against France.

Although Palmerston is the *most influential* member of the present Administration, who acts, and must act, as its champion in all parliamentary circles, he continually summons up all his diplomatic skill to appear in the press as the determined opponent of Aberdeen and thus to preserve his popularity should the Coalition be wrecked. At the same time, the opposition is kept from taking decisive steps and kept in a state of futile tension about the internal quarrels of the Ministry. For instance, today, for the

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*a* *The Daily News*, No. 2691, January 3, 1855.— *Ed.

*b* *The Morning Post*, No. 25274, January 3, 1855, leader.— *Ed.

hundredth time the Tory *Morning Herald* has fallen into the trap by declaring the breaking up of the Coalition to be final and talking at great length about the patriotic indignation of Palmerston and Russell against Aberdeen, Newcastle and Gladstone.\(^a\) Ad vocem\(^b\) *Gladstone*, it should be noted that, according to a leading article about the French loan in today's *Chronicle*,\(^c\) Gladstone does not intend resorting to loans, but is determined to conduct the war through direct taxation, that is to say, in the most unpopular, oppressive and uneconomical form.

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Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) The *Morning Herald*, No. 22319, January 3, 1855, leader.—*Ed.*
\(^b\) With regard to.—*Ed.*
\(^c\) The *Morning Chronicle*, No. 27464, January 3, 1855, leader.—*Ed.*
The entire British public, starting from the recent vehement leaders of *The London Times*, seems to be in a state of great anxiety and excitement respecting the condition of the forces in the Crimea. Indeed, it is impossible longer to deny or palliate the fact that, through unparalleled mismanagement in every branch of the service, the British army is rapidly approaching a state of dissolution. Exposed to the hardships of a winter campaign, suffering cold and wet, with the most harassing and uninterrupted field duty without clothing, food, tents, or housing, the veterans who braved the burning sun of India and the furious charges of the Beloochis and Afghan, die away by hundreds daily, and as fast as reenforcements arrive, they are eaten up by the ravages of disease. To the question who is to blame for this state of things the reply just now most popular in England is that it is Lord Raglan, but this is not just. We are no admirers of his Lordship's military conduct, and have criticised his blunders with freedom, but truth requires us to say that the terrible evils amid which the soldiers in the Crimea are perishing are not his fault, but that of the system on which the British war establishment is administered.

The British Army has a Commander-in-Chief, a personage dispensed with in almost all other civilized armies. But it would be a mistake to suppose that this commander-in-chief really com-

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*a The Times, No. 21941, January 3, 1855, leader.—Ed.*

*b See this volume, pp. 474 and 507-08.—Ed.*
mands anything. If he has some control over the infantry and cavalry, the artillery, engineers, sappers and miners are entirely beyond his sphere. If he has any authority over trowsers, coatees, and socks, all great-coats are exempt from his influence. If he can make every foot-soldier carry two cartridge-pouches, he cannot find him a single musket. If he can have all his men tried by court-martial and well flogged, he cannot make them stir a single inch. Marching is beyond his competency, and as to feeding his troops, that is a thing which does not concern him at all.

Then there is the Master-General of the Ordnance. This person, a lamentable relic of the times when science was considered unsoldierlike, and when all scientific corps, artillery and engineers, were not soldiers, but a sort of nondescript body, half savants, half handicraftsmen, and united in a separate guild or corporation, under the command of such a Master-General. This Master-General of the Ordnance, beside artillery and engineers, has under him all the great-coats and small-arms of the army. To any military operation, of whatever nature, he must, therefore, be a party.

Next comes the Secretary at War. If the two preceding characters were already of comparative nullity, he is beyond nullity. The Secretary at War can give no order to any part of the army, but he can prevent any portion of the army from doing anything. As he is the chief of the military finances, and as every military act costs money, his refusal to grant funds is equivalent to an absolute veto upon all operations. But, willing as he may be to grant the funds, he is still a nullity, for he cannot feed the army; that is beyond his sphere. In addition to all this, the Commissariat, which really feeds the army, and, in case of any movement, is supposed to find it means of transport, is placed under the control of the Treasury. Thus, the Prime Minister, the first lord of the Treasury, has a direct hand in the getting up of every military operation, and can at his pleasure either push it, retard it, or stop it. Everybody knows that the Commissariat is almost a more important portion of the army than the soldiers themselves; and for this very reason, the collective wisdom of Great Britain has thought proper to make it quite independent of the army, and to place it under the control of an essentially different Department. Finally, the army, formerly put in motion by the Colonial Secretary, is now subject to the orders of the new War-Minister.\(^a\)

\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 227-28.—Ed.
He dislocates the troops, from England to China, and from India to Canada. But, as we have seen, his authority, taken singly, is as ineffectual as that of any of the four preceding military powers; the cooperation of all the five being required, in order to bring about the least movement.

It was under the auspices of this wonderful system that the present war began. The British troops, well fed and well cared for at home, in consequence of a forty years' peace, went out in high condition, persuaded that whatever the enemy might do, England would not let her gallant lads want for anything. But scarcely had they landed at their first stage, at Gallipoli, when the comparison with the French army showed the ludicrous inferiority of all British arrangements, and the pitiable helplessness of every British official. Although it was here comparatively easy to provide for everything, although sufficient notice had been given, and a very small body of troops only was sent out, everything went wrong. Everybody made himself very busy, and yet nobody would perform duties that had not fallen to his lot at home in time of peace, so that not a man was to be found to do that business which was created by the very war itself. Thus shiploads of stores were left to rot on the shore where they were first landed, and troops had to be sent on to Scutari for want of room. Chaotic disorder announced itself in unmistakable signs, but as it was the beginning of the war, an improvement was expected from growing experience.

The troops went to Varna. Their distance from home increased, their number increased, the disorder in the administration increased. The independent working of the five departments composing that administration, each of them responsible to a different Minister at home, here first resulted in open and unmistakable clashing. Want reigned in the camp, while the garrison of Varna had the best of comforts. The Commissariat, lazily indeed, got together some means of transport from the country; but as the General-in-Chief\(^a\) did not appoint any escort wagons, the Bulgarian drivers disappeared again as fast as they had been brought together. A central dépôt was formed at Constantinople—a sort of first base of operations; but it served no purpose except to create a fresh center of difficulties, delays, questions of competency, quarrels between the army, the Ordnance, the paying staff, the Commissariat, and the War Office.

\(^a\) Hardinge.—Ed.
Wherever anything was to be done, everybody tried to shove it off his own shoulders upon those of somebody else. The avoiding of all responsibility was the general aim. The consequence was that everything went wrong, and that nothing whatever was done. Disgust at these proceedings, and the certainty of seeing his army rot in inactivity, may have had some influence in determining Lord Raglan to risk the expedition to the Crimea.

This expedition crowned the success of John Bull's military organization. There, in the Crimea, came the "decided hit." So long as the army was, in point of fact, in a state of peace, as at Gallipoli, Scutari and Varna, the magnitude of the disorder, the complicity of the confusion, could hardly be expected fully to develop itself. But now, in the face of the enemy, during the course of an actual siege, the case was different. The resistance of the Russians gave full scope to the British officials for the exercise of their business-like habits. And it must be confessed, never was the business of destroying an army done more effectually than by these gentlemen. Of more than 60,000 men sent to the East since February last, not more than 17,000 are now fit for duty; and of these, some 60 or 80 die daily, and about 200 or 250 are every day disabled by sickness, while of those that fall sick, hardly any recover. And out of the 43,000 dead or sick, not 7,000 have been disabled by the direct action of the enemy!

When it first was reported in England that the army in the Crimea wanted food, clothing, housing, everything; that neither medical nor surgical stores were on the spot; that the sick and wounded had either to lie on the cold, wet ground, exposed to the weather, or to be crowded on board ships moored in an open roadstead, without attendance, or the simplest requisites for medical treatment; when it was reported that hundreds were dying for want of the first necessaries; everybody believed that the Government had neglected to send proper supplies to the scene of action. But soon enough, it became known, that if this had been partially the case in the beginning, it was not so now. Everything had been sent there even in profusion; but, unfortunately, nothing ever happened to be where it was wanted. The medical stores were at Varna, while the sick and wounded were either in the Crimea or at Scutari; the clothing and provisions arrived in sight of the Crimea, but there was nobody to land them. Whatever by chance got landed, was left to rot on the beach. The necessary cooperation of the naval force brought a fresh element of dissension to bear upon the already distracted councils of the Departments whose conflicts were to insure triumph to the British
army. Incapacity, sheltered by regulations made for peace, reigned supreme; in one of the richest countries of Europe, on the sheltered coast of which hundreds of transports laden with stores lay at anchor, the British army lived upon half-ration; surrounded by numberless herds of cattle, they had to suffer from scurvy, in consequence of being restricted to salt meat; with plenty of wood and coal on board ship, they had so little of it on shore that they had to eat their meat raw, and could never dry the clothes which the rain had drenched. Think of serving out the coffee, not only unground, but even unroasted. There were stores of food, of drink, of clothing, of tents, of ammunition, by tens and hundreds of tens, stowed away on board the ships, whose masts almost touched the tops of the cliffs, where the camp was placed; and yet, Tantalus-like, the British troops could not get at them. Everybody felt the evil, everybody ran about, cursing and blaming everybody else for neglect of duty, but nobody knew, to use the vernacular expression, “which was which;” for everybody had his own set of regulations carefully drawn up, sanctioned by the competent authority, and showing that the very thing wanted was no part of his duty, and that he, for one, had no power to set the matter right.

Now, add to this state of things the increasing inclemency of the season, the heavy rains setting in and transforming the whole Heracleatic Chersonese into one uninterrupted pool of mud and slush, knee-deep if not more; imagine the soldiers, two nights at least out of four in the trenches, the other two sleeping, drenched and dirty, in the slush, without boards under them, and with hardly any tents over them; the constant alarms completing the impossibility of anything like proper rest and adequate sleep; the cramps, diarrhea and other maladies arising from constant wet and cold; the dispersion of the medical staff, weak though it was from the beginning, over the camp; the hospital-tents, with 3,000 sick almost in the open air and lying on the wet earth, and it will be easily believed that the British army in the Crimea is in a state of complete disorganization—reduced to “a mob of brave men,” as The London Times says, and that the soldiers may well welcome the Russian bullet which frees them from all their miseries.

But what is to be done? Why, unless you prefer waiting till half a dozen acts of Parliament are, after due consideration by the

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a The Times, No. 21941, January 3, 1855, leader.—Ed.
Crown lawyers, discussed, amended, voted on and enacted—till, by this means, the whole business connected with the army is concentrated in the hands of a real War Minister—till this new Minister—supposing him to be the right man—has organized the service of his office, and issued fresh regulations—in other words, unless you wait till the last vestige of the Crimean army has disappeared, there is only one remedy. This is the assumption by the General-in-Chief of the expedition\(^a\) upon his own authority, and his own responsibility, of that dictatorship over all the conflicting and contending departments of the military administration which every other General-in-Chief possesses, and without which he cannot bring the enterprise to any end but ruin. That would soon make matters smooth; but where is the British General who would be prepared to act in this Roman manner, and on his trial defend himself, like the Roman, with the words, "Yes, I plead guilty to having saved my country?"\(^b\)

Finally, we must inquire who is the founder and preserver of this beautiful system of administration? Nobody but the old Duke of Wellington. He stuck to every detail of it as if he was personally interested in making it as difficult as possible to his successors to rival him in warlike glory. Wellington, a man of eminent common sense, but of no genius whatever, was the more sensible of his own deficiencies in this respect, from being the cotemporary and opponent of the eminent genius of Napoleon. Wellington, therefore, was full of envy for the success of others. His meanness in disparaging the merits of his auxiliaries and allies is well known; he never forgave Blücher for saving him at Waterloo. Wellington

\(^a\) Raglan.—Ed.

\(^b\) In the Neue Oder-Zeitung the next paragraph reads as follows: "The origin of this system lies apparently in constitutional precautions against a standing army. Instead of a division of labour, which would have given the army the greatest elasticity, a division of authority, which reduces its mobility to a minimum. Yet the system was by no means maintained for parliamentary or constitutional considerations, but because the influence of the oligarchy would be broken at least in this field, simultaneously with a timely reform of military administration. In the preceding session of Parliament, the Ministers had refused to allow any innovation except the separation of the Ministry of War from the Ministry of the Colonies. Wellington obstinately maintained the system from 1815 until his death, although he knew very well that with the system he would never have brought the Spanish war to a successful close had not his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, by chance been the Minister. In 1832 and 1836, before the commissions instituted by Parliament for a reform of the old system, Wellington defended the old system to its full extent. Was he afraid to make it easier for his successors to gain fame?"—Ed.
knew full well that had not his brother\(^a\) been Minister during the Spanish war, he never could have brought it to a successful close. Was Wellington afraid that future exploits would place him in the shade, and did he therefore preserve to its full extent this machinery so well adapted to fetter generals and to ruin armies?

Written on January 4, 1855

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\(^a\) Richard Wellesley.—*Ed.*
London, January 8. While clubs and newspapers here are fully occupied with self-important gossip about “ministerial crises”, they have no time to realise the far more important fact that once again one of the great British crises in trade and industry has broken out, and in more calamitous dimensions than in 1847 and 1836. At long last this realisation—which had not been produced even by the bankruptcies which have been breaking out sporadically for the past three months and recently increased in number and intensity—has become unavoidable as a result of the publication of the annual trade reports and of the tables issued by the Board of Trade which give the export and import figures for the past eleven months. It follows from these figures that exports have decreased by £1,710,677, if compared with the corresponding eleven months of the year 1853, and by £1,856,988 when only the last month of both years—November 5 to December 5—is compared. From the export figures we have taken the following details which show a decline in some of the most important branches of industry:

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a Marx used the English term—Ed.
b “Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation for the Eleven Months Ended 5th December 1854. III. Exports of British and Irish Produce and Manufactures from the United Kingdom”, The Economist, No. 593, January 6, 1855.—Ed.
In the *trade reports* an attempt is of course made to blame the war for the crisis of 1854, just as the revolution of 1848 was blamed for a crisis which had already broken out in 1847. However, this time even the London *Economist*—which, as a matter of principle, tends to explain all crises as due to accidental circumstances, extraneous to trade and industry—has been forced to admit that the commercial misfortunes and losses of 1854 are the beginning of a natural reaction against the "convulsive prosperity" of 1853. In other words, the commercial cycle has again reached the point where overproduction and over-speculation turn into a crisis. Most effective proof: *the United States of North America*, which were affected by the oriental war only insofar as it gave an unheard-of impetus to shipbuilding and shipping trade, and created markets for many American raw products formerly supplied exclusively by Russia. In the United States the crisis has already lasted more than four months and is still growing steadily, although already 109 of 4,208 banks, or about 2½ per cent, have gone bankrupt; moreover, there has been such a stagnation of industry combined with such a depression of wages in the industrial states of the East that last month more than 4,000 European immigrants "migrated back" to Europe. The American crisis of 1837 *followed* on the British crisis of 1836. This time the course is reversed. America has taken the initiative in the matter of bankruptcies. The United States and Australia are equally flooded with British products. How important this is for British trade can be seen from the fact that out of approximately £100 million which Great Britain exported in the form of goods in 1853, £25 million went to the United States and £15 million to Australia. After the United States and Australia, the East Indies were the most important export market. However, even in 1852 the East Indies were so glutted that only by an entirely new expansion of trade across the Punjab and Sind to Bokhara, Afghanistan and Baluchistan and from there, on the one
hand, to Central Asia, and on the other hand to Persia, could exports with difficulty be kept at the old level of £8 million. Now even in those areas all outlets are so congested that, a short while ago, goods were shipped from Hindustan to Australia, thus “carrying coals to Newcastle”. The only market which, due to the oriental war, was for a time supplied “cautiously”, was the Levantine market. However, it is an open secret in the City that, since the crisis in the United States and stagnation in Australia forced the commercial world to look out anxiously for any markets not yet glutted, Constantinople has become the store-house for all goods requiring buyers, and it, too, must now be considered as “closed”. Similarly, the most recent movement in Spain has been used to smuggle in as much British merchandise as the country can hold. The last attempt of this kind is now being made in South American countries whose very small consumer capacity requires no proof.

In view of the vital importance of the British crisis for the social and political state of the whole world, it will be necessary to return at greater length and in more detail to the history of British trade before 1854.

**II**

*London*, January 9. The increase of British trade and of British industry in the period 1849 to 1853 may be judged by the following figures. In 1846 the tonnage of ships carrying goods from and into British seaports amounted to 9,499,000, in 1850 this had increased to 12,020,000 tons, and in 1853 to no less than 15,381,000, exactly double the tonnage of 1843. In 1846 the value of exported British manufactured goods and raw materials was £57,786,000, in 1850 £71,367,000, and in 1853 more than £98,000,000, that is to say, more than double the total exports of 1842. What part is played by the United States of North America and by Australia in this increase in exports? In 1842, the value of British exports to Australia amounted to less than £1,000,000, in 1850 they reached almost three million, and in 1853 as much as £14,513,000. In 1842, exports to the United States amounted to £3,582,000, in 1850 to almost 15 million, and in 1853 to no less than £23,658,000.

From these figures it follows, first of all, that the year 1854 represents a turning-point in the history of modern trade, analogous to the years 1825, 1836 and 1847; secondly, that the crisis in the United States is only a factor of the British crisis, and
finally that the war of 1854—called, most aptly, *une guerre pacifique* by the *Pays, Journal de l'Empire*—has exercised no influence whatever on this social catastrophe, or, if any influence at all, it has been restricting and inhibiting. Individual branches of industry, e.g. the manufacture of leather, iron and woollen goods, as well as ship-building, have actually been helped by the demand created by the war. For a short time, the consternation caused by a declaration of war after forty years of peace, paralysed the flight of speculation. The loans of various European countries brought about by the war kept interest rates at a level which prevented rash industrial undertakings and thus retarded the crisis. However, says the Peace Society,\(^2\) has not the war raised corn prices? Is not the rising of corn prices tantamount to a decline in domestic trade,\(^a\) i.e. in British consumption of industrial products? And is not this contraction of the *home* market the main element of the crisis?—To begin with, it must be remembered that the year of greatest British prosperity—1853—was a year of *high* corn prices, and that corn prices of 1854 range, on average, *below* those of 1853, so that neither the prosperity of 1853 nor the crisis symptoms of 1854 can be explained from the level of corn prices. However, leaving aside the influence of corn prices on industry for the time being: what influence has the war had on corn prices? In other words: have corn prices risen, because supplies from Russia have dropped? Of the total corn and flour which Great Britain imports, Russia's share is about 19 per cent, and as total imports satisfy only about 20 per cent of national consumption, Russia supplies some 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) per cent of national consumption.

The *latest official* report on the comparative corn and flour imports from different continents and countries to Great Britain was published at the beginning of November 1854,\(^b\) giving a comparative table for the first nine months of 1853 and 1854. According to this, in 1853 the total imports of wheat amounted to 3,770,921 quarters, of which 773,507 came from Russia and 209,000 quarters from Moldavia and Wallachia. Total imports of flour amounted to 3,800,746 hundredweights, of which Russia supplied 64 and the Danubian Principalities none at all. In the war year 1854, Great Britain received 505,000 quarters of wheat from Russia and 118,000 quarters from Moldavia and Wallachia. No one would wish to claim that *this* reduction (which, moreover, was

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\(^a\) Marx used the English phrase.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) "The Supplies of Wheat. Home and Foreign", *The Economist*, No. 584, November 4, 1854.—*Ed.*
offset by larger imports of flour from other countries) has pushed up the prices of the excellent harvest of 1854 to approximately the level of the bad years, 1852 and 1853. On the contrary. Even a total cessation of Russian grain imports would not have had that effect. What remains enigmatic—although unimportant as far as the economic question is concerned—is the reduction of supplies from the Danubian Principalities. The solution of the riddle is simple. Though nominally the Coalition has blockaded the Russian Black Sea ports, in fact, however, it has blockaded first the Bosphorus and later the mouth of the Danube; instead of Russia, it blockaded Turkey and the Danubian Principalities. The Russian crusades against the Crescent—of 1812, 1828, 1848 (at that time reputedly against the rebels of Jassy and Bucharest) and 1854—were, as everyone knows, partly determined by trade competition of the southern Russian provinces against the Danubian Principalities and, incidentally, against the Danube trade of Bosnia, Serbia and Bulgaria. What a stroke of genius, therefore, on the part of an English Ministry to punish Russia by leaving her trade at Odessa and Taganrog free, but suppressing, blockading the trade of Russia's competitors on the Danube, thus cutting off their own [i.e. England's] supplies.

III

London, January 16. With reference to the present crisis in trade and industry, the London Economist remarks:

"Whatever may be the falling off in the export of other articles, there is none in machinery. The value in 1854 exceeds the value in 1853. Other countries, therefore, are now taking into use our machinery. We have no longer any advantage of this kind over them. France, Germany, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and the United States are all now great manufacturing countries; and some of them have advantages over us. We have a race to run, and we cannot succeed if we tie our legs. [...] Experience has satisfied every person that the restrictions imposed for the benefit of the landlord injured him, that restrictions imposed for the benefit of the master manufacturers injured them; and by and by the factory workers will find out that the restriction imposed for their benefit will injure them. It is to be hoped, however, that they will find it out before the countries before mentioned have made such progress as to supersede England in their own and third markets, and have reduced the factory hands to destitution."a

Mr. Wilson, editor of The Economist and factotum in the Ministry of Finance of the anointed and unctuous Mr. Gladstone, apostle of freedom and place-hunter rolled into one, a man who in one

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a “Exports.—The Factory Act”, The Economist, No. 594, January 13, 1855.—Ed.
column of his paper denies the necessity of the state in general and in another proves the indispensability of the coalition government in particular—Mr. Wilson, then, begins his homily with a deliberately distorted fact. The export tables for 1854 contain two columns on the export of machinery. The first, relating to railway locomotives, shows that in 1853 exports amounted to £443,254, but in 1854 to £525,702 which is undoubtedly an increase of £82,448. The second column, however, which includes all machines used in factories, i.e. every kind of machinery except locomotives, shows £1,368,027 for 1853, as against £1,271,503 for 1854, or a decrease of £96,524. If both columns are taken together, they reveal a decrease of £14,076. This detail is characteristic of the gentlemen of the Manchester school. They consider the present moment opportune for the abolition of “restrictions” benefiting industrial workers, that is the legal limitation of the working hours of young people under 18, of women, and of children under 12. To achieve so lofty a purpose, the falsification of a few figures may surely be permitted. But, according to the Manchester Examiner, the special organ of the Quaker Bright, and to every trade circular in the factory districts, the foreign markets, those traditional outlets for our surplus manufactures, are groaning under the weight of our over-production and over-speculation.

If such glutting of the world market has been achieved in spite of the improvisation of two new golden markets—Australia and California, in spite of the electric telegraph which has transformed the whole of Europe into one big commodity exchange, in spite of railways and steamships which have improved communication, and therefore commerce, to an incredible degree,—how long would it have taken for the crisis to come if the factory owner had been at liberty to order his workers to work eighteen hours instead of eleven? The arithmetical problem is too simple to require a solution. However, the relative acceleration of the crisis would not have been the only difference. A whole generation of workers would have forfeited 50 per cent of their physical strength, spiritual development and vitality. The same Manchester school which will answer our misgivings with the words:

[why] should this distress distress us, since it increases our pleasures? b

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a “Accounts Relating to Trade and Navigation...”, The Economist, No. 593, January 6, 1855.—Ed.
b Goethe, “An Suleika”, from West-östlicher Divan.—Ed.
deafens England with sentimental lamentations about the human sacrifice which is the price of her war with Russia, the price of any war! In a few days we shall hear Mr. Cobden at Leeds, protesting against the mutual slaughter of Christians. In a few weeks we shall hear him in Parliament, protesting against the “restrictions” which impede the too rapid consumption of human beings in the factories. Does he, of all heroic deeds, consider only one to be justified, that of Herod?

We agree with the Manchester school that compulsory legal restrictions of working hours do not exactly indicate a high level of social development. But we find the fault not in the laws, but in the conditions which make them necessary.

IV

London, January 22. It is well known that the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Robinson, opened the Parliament of 1825 with a dithyramb on the unprecedented boom in trade and industry. Some weeks later, the Bank of England was on the point of suspending cash payments. Since then Mr. Robinson has kept the nickname of “Prosperity-Robinson”, given him by Cobbett. As the English are fond of historical precedents, it was inevitable that Prosperity-Robinson should have successors. The Queen’s Speech which inaugurated the last extraordinary session of Parliament, congratulated the country on the exceptional state of prosperity in agriculture, manufacture and trade. And yet, by then even the semblance of prosperity which might possibly have deceived Mr. Robinson had vanished. Ministerial congratulations seem to be part of the ceremonial with which, in England, disasters affecting the world market are suitably announced. Even stranger than the language of Ministers is the silence of the press at this moment. Does it believe it will be able to burke the trade crisis, in the same way as in the literary coteries of Paris unpopular books are burked—by a conspiracy of silence? However, price lists talk, the lists of bankruptcies in the Gazette talk, and the letters of “business friends” talk. Soon, too, the newspapers will talk. Last week, very

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b Marx used the English word.—*Ed.*

c Queen Victoria’s speech in Parliament on December 12, 1854. *The Times*, No. 21923, December 13, 1854.—*Ed.*
significant suspensions of payment occurred in the City, among the most important being that of Messrs Lonergan & Co., in the Spanish and West Indian trade; that of Messrs Rogers, Lowrey, trading with Manchester and the surrounding factory districts; that of Messrs Kotherington & Co., in the American trade; and finally that of the Aubert ten brothers, an old and respected firm. The liabilities of these various firms are said to amount to an average of £100,000 to £150,000. For the current week, new suspensions of payment by at least seven important City firms are expected.

From a business letter of January 20, from Birmingham, we have extracted the following details concerning the situation of industry in South Staffordshire:

"With the exception of firms in iron manufacture which are producing war materials for the Government, only very few have any orders at all, and those in hand are at extremely reduced prices. At present, £8 10s. will buy a ton of bar-iron, which in mid-summer was quoted at £12, but even at these reduced prices it is scarcely possible to make a sale, so that production has to be restricted. There are few of the important interests of the United States of North America which have suffered more on account of the trade crisis there than heavy industry. Nearly all the great iron works in the United States in which enormous sums have been invested, have turned their workers out into the street without any chance of early re-engagement. America's consumption of iron must therefore be regarded as almost completely suspended, and we may expect no further orders from there.

"Last Saturday many workers from the tin factories" (of Birmingham) "were sacked and many more will follow tonight" (January 20). "Ore and brass workers are no better off, since most of the big works here are on short time.

"Orders in hand for fashion articles are very scarce, and commercial travellers seeking spring orders in this branch are sending home very discouraging reports.

"The situation in the money market continues to have a disrupting effect on all branches of trade. The banks are raising their rate of interest in a most detrimental way, and at this moment only one business is doing well—that of the money-lender. Clients are flocking to the small pawnbrokers' shops, and discount houses are reaping a rich harvest."

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Published in English for the first time
Karl Marx

[THE FOUR POINTS]

I

London, January 9. The telegram from Vienna concerning the acceptance of the Four Points on the part of Russia produced, on the one hand, a rise in Consols on the London Stock Exchange—for one moment [they were] 2 1/2 per cent above Saturday's rate; on the other hand, a veritable panic in the tallow, oil and seed markets, where an early conclusion of peace would be the signal for large-scale bankruptcies. Today the excitement among City men has subsided, and, with a fair amount of agreement, they regard negotiations on the Four Points as a second edition of negotiations on the “Vienna Note”. According to the thoroughly ministerial Morning Chronicle, it was premature to speak of an actual acceptance by Russia of the guarantees demanded. Russia had merely declared herself ready to negotiate on their basis, as interpreted jointly by the three powers. The Times believes that a victory of Western policy may legitimately be celebrated and declares on this occasion:

“We cannot too strongly repudiate the assumption, [...] that this war is to bring about what is called a revision of the map of Europe, by means of conquests or revolutions in which this country, at least, has no sort of interest.”

“The Allies,” says The Morning Post, “have done enough to be able to withdraw from the theatre of war with honour, if their terms are accepted.”

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a The telegram from Vienna of January 7, 1855. The Times, No. 21945, January 8, 1855.—Ed.
b January 6, 1855.—Ed.
c The Morning Chronicle, No. 27469, January 9, 1855, leader.—Ed.
d The Times, No. 21946, January 9, 1855, leader.—Ed.
e The Morning Post, No. 25279, January 9, 1855, leader.—Ed.
According to The Daily News, by resuming negotiations Russia intends to strengthen Prussia's belief in her moderation, to sow discord between the German powers, and to loosen the relationship between the Western powers and Austria. The only important aspect of the Four Points was the extra clause, according to which the Dardanelles Agreement of July 13, 1841 was to be revised "in the sense of a limitation of Russian naval power in the Black Sea". It was rumoured in the City that the Ministry was prepared to drop this extra clause. Lastly, The Morning Advertiser declares that the final Russian step had been agreed upon with Austria so as to give the latter an opportunity of getting rid of her obligations towards the Western powers. According to a newly arrived dispatch it has been stipulated that the negotiations must not interrupt war operations.

II

London, January 12. The unconditional acceptance of the "Four Points"—that is to say of the "Four" Points in the sense of the "three" powers—by Russia has turned out to be a hoax of The Morning Post and The Times. We were the more inclined to believe in the hoax, as we know from Pozzo di Borgo's secret dispatches (which, however, had become known following the Warsaw insurrection) that this master of diplomacy has laid down the principle that "in all cases of conflict Russia should induce the great European powers to force her own conditions upon her".

And in the "Four" Points we can see only "four" Russian points. If Russia, for the time being, does not accept them, we shall find the explanation once more with master Pozzo di Borgo. Russia, he declares, ought to make such apparent concessions to the West only from a victorious army camp. This would be necessary to maintain the "prestige" on which her power was based. And so far, Russia, it is true, has got an "army camp", but she has not yet managed to gain the "victory". If Silistra had fallen, the "Four Points" would have been established long ago. According to The Times and The Morning Post, the "Four Points" in the sense of the "three powers" had been adopted as basis for negotiations in order to start from them as a minimum. Now it

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a Marx used the English word.—Ed.
b The Times, No. 21946, January 9, 1855, leader; The Morning Post, No. 25282, January 12, 1855, leader.—Ed.
turns out that Prince Gorchakov sees them as a problematical maximum from which to bargain down, or which are in effect intended only to furnish a pretext for another "Vienna Conference". Today, The Morning Post, in a self-important, diplomatically oracular leader,\(^a\) confides that the provisional meetings of diplomats at Vienna are merely a preliminary to the actual conference which would not assemble until February 1 and which would not fail to surprise the world to a greater or lesser degree.

Yesterday the following announcement by the Admiralty was displayed at Lloyd's\(^b\):

> "With reference to the last paragraph of my letter of the 8th November" (1854), "stating that the French and English Admirals in the Black Sea have received orders from their respective Governments to extend the blockade of the mouths of the Danube to all the ports in the Black Sea, and in the Sea of Azoff, which still remain in the possession of the enemy, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, in order that the same may be made known to the mercantile community, that the Governments of England and France have further decided that the blockade in question shall take place on and after the 1st of February" (1855) "and that due notice will be given in the London Gazette of the blockade of the particular ports so soon as the same shall have been effected.

> "I am etc.

> "W. A. B. Hamilton."

Here, then, it is openly admitted that up to now the allied fleets have blockaded only their own allies on the Danube estuary, but neither Russian ports in the Black Sea nor in the Sea of Azov. Nevertheless the Ministry has repeatedly declared in Parliament—in April, August and October—that it had issued the "strictest orders" for the blockade of Russian ports and coasts. As late as December 21, Lord Granville, in the name of the Ministry, announced to the House of Lords that

> "Odessa was blockaded by five warships which have been constantly cruising in front of [Odessa]; reports have been constantly sent to [Her Majesty's] government....\(^d\)

In a letter addressed to a daily paper, a well-known English pamphleteer sums up the consequences of the blockade measures taken, or rather not taken, by the Coalition, as follows:

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\(^a\) Marx used the English word.—Ed.

\(^b\) Lloyd's offices located in the Royal Exchange, London.—Ed.

\(^c\) The Times, No. 21948, January 11, 1855.—Ed.

\(^d\) G. Granville's speech in the House of Lords on December 21, 1854. The Times, No. 21934, December 22, 1854.—Ed.
“(1) The English Government supplies England’s enemy with money from England so that enemy may continue the war against her. (2) The Danube is blockaded in order to impoverish the Principalities and to cut off our own corn supplies. (3) Odessa, Taganrog, Kerch, etc., remain unmolested so that they may supply reinforcements, ammunition and provisions to the Russian troops in the Crimea. (4) The mock blockade is ruining our merchants while it enriches Greek, Russian and Austrian merchants.”

The Times too takes the occasion of Mr. Hamilton’s announcement to launch violent attacks on the Ministry’s “blockade diplomacy”. It is characteristic of the Thunderer of Printing House Square that his thunderclaps have always been flung post festum. From March 26, 1854 till today The Times has defended “blockade diplomacy”. Today when its rumblings obstruct no ministerial measures but may well gain it popularity, it suddenly turns into a clairvoyant.

The naval minister, or, as he is called here, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir James Graham, is sufficiently well known on the Continent on account of that magnificent achievement in black cabinet which led the Bandiera brothers to the scaffold. It may be a less well known fact that in 1844, when Tsar Nicholas landed on the English coast, Sir James Graham did not dare to shake the proffered Imperial hand, but only to kiss it. (See The Portfolio, second series, 1844.)

III

London, January 15. As for the meaning of the Four Points:

“Nothing can be done in the way of further diplomacy till the first day of February.” (Till February 5 or 6, says the Vienna correspondent of The Times.) “Meantime, the Czar has a clear month to move his forces where he will. [...] A month’s time gained by acceptance of the four points may be lengthened to two months, by disputing the subsequent terms step by step, as the Envoy of Russia will probably be instructed to do; while it is far from improbable that strenuous efforts will be made to attract Austria into contentment with terms short of those which would be acceptable to England and France. To divide the three Powers would be the obvious thing to aim at....”

Thus The Morning Post.

More important than the bandying of words in the English press

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a The Times, No. 21949, January 12, 1855, leader.—Ed.


c The Morning Post, No. 25284, January 15, 1855, leader.—Ed.
about Russia's secret intentions is its open confession (with the exception, of course, of the ministerial organs) that the basis of negotiations, the Four Points, are not worth negotiating for.

“The World, when the struggle commenced, was artfully made to believe,” wrote The Sunday Times, “that the object to be secured by it was the breaking up of the Russian empire, or, at least, the extorting from her of material guarantees for the preservation of the peace of Europe. Towards accomplishing either of these ends nothing has been done, and nothing will be done should peace be concluded upon the basis of what are called the ‘Four Points’. If there be any triumph in the matter, it will be a triumph achieved by Russia.”

“The Ministry of all the Incapacities,” says The Leader, “cannot get beyond the Four Points: it may go down to posterity as the Ministry of the Four Points. No more of this dull comedy of war without a purpose.” [...] Peace on the basis of the Four Points could only be concluded because “they fear that in the tumult of war, the peoples may become too important [...] and possibly to prevent Englishmen from regaining those rights which Cromwell won for them. [...] That might be the motive for patching up the conspiracy with Russia, and for restoring to her the permission of renewing her encroachments upon Europe under the cover of a flag of truce.”

The Examiner which incontestably commands the first position among middle-class weeklies carries a detailed account of the “basis” of peace negotiations, the essential points of which are summarised below.

“...if such concessions as even the most rigid construction of the Four Points can alone be held to involve, are to be considered equivalents for all the treasure that has been lavished and all the blood that has been shed by Englishmen in this contest,—then the Emperor of Russia” in starting this war has shown that he is a great statesman.... “She [Russia] is not even to be mulcted of the large sum she annually receives from us for not observing the treaty of Vienna. The mouth of the Danube, which, according to the correspondence recently published, she had laboured most earnestly to close against English commerce, is to be left in her hands. This latter point [...] would simply amount practically to the status quo, for Russia never denied that the provisions relating to the navigation of rivers which are contained in the treaty were applicable to the Danube.” The abrogation of the treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople419 is of little singificance, for it is that these treaties do not justify the claims Russia has made upon Turkey; “and when we consider that Russia is to be one of the five powers which are to exercise a joint protectorate over the Principalities and the Christian subjects of the Sultan ... we believe that the benefits expected from the change will prove altogether illusory, whilst it will be attended with the enormous disadvantage of giving a legal character to the machinations of Russia for the dismemberment of Turkey. [...] We shall of course be reminded that the Four Points include stipulations for a revision of the Treaty of 1841 in the interest of the balance of power. The expression is vague and mysterious enough, and we are not at all satisfied, from recent indications, that

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a The Sunday Times, No. 1684, January 14, 1855.— Ed.
b “The Coming Peace” and “Russia Winning the Game”, The Leader, No. 251, January 13, 1855.— Ed.
the change contemplated under it may not be far more menacing to the independence of our ally” (Turkey) “than to the predominance of our enemy.... We should have rejected as utterly incredible any such possibility as we assume to be now under discussion at Vienna, but for that speech of Lord John's, in answer to Mr. Cobden, to the effect that the Government had no wish to deprive Russia of any of her territories.”

The last point is indeed crucial since, for instance, even the freedom of navigation on the Danube could only be secured if Russia were to lose the “territory” in the Danube estuaries which she seized, partly through the Treaty of Adrianople, in violation of the Treaty of London of 1827, and partly through a ukase of February 1836, in violation of the Treaty of Adrianople. The point which The Examiner fails to emphasise refers to the Treaty of the Dardanelles of 1841. This treaty differs from the treaty concluded by Lord Palmerston in 1840 only insofar as France joined as a contracting party. The contents are identical. Only a few months ago, Lord Palmerston declared the Treaty of 1840, and thus also the Treaty of the Dardanelles of 1841, to be a victory by Britain over Russia, and himself the originator of that treaty. Why, then, should the cancellation of a treaty which was a victory by Britain over Russia, suddenly become a defeat of Russia by Britain? Or, if at the time, Britain had been deceived by her own Ministers, believing herself to be acting against Russia, while, in fact, she was acting for her, why not now? Disraeli, during the last extraordinary session of Parliament, cried: “No Four Points.”

From the above extracts it can be seen that he has found an écho in the liberal press. Surprise at Russia's having accepted the Four Points, with or without reservations, is beginning to give way to surprise at Britain's having suggested them.

Written between January 9 and 15, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, Nos. 20, 23 and 29; January 13, 15 and 18, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

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a “Terms of Peace and Causes of War”, The Examiner, No. 2450, January 13, 1855.—Ed.
b B. Disraeli's speech in the House of Commons on December 12, 1854. The Times, No. 21923, December 13, 1854.—Ed.
Karl Marx

THE COMMERCIAL CRISIS IN BRITAIN

The English commercial crisis, whose premonitory symptoms were long ago chronicled in our columns, is a fact now loudly proclaimed by the highest authorities in this matter—the annual circulars issued from the British Chambers of Commerce, and the leading commercial firms of the kingdom, along with extensive bankruptcies, mills running short-time, and stunted export tables, which speak to the same effect. According to the latest official “accounts relating to trade and navigation,” the declared value of enumerated articles of export in the month ending Dec. 5, was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1852</td>
<td>6,033,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1853</td>
<td>7,628,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854</td>
<td>5,771,772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Decrease in 1854 ..... £261,258 £1,856,988

One cannot be astonished at the endeavor of the professional free-traders of Great Britain to show that the present crisis, instead of flowing from the natural working of the modern English system, and being altogether akin to the crises experienced at periodical intervals almost since the end of the 18th century, must, on the contrary, proceed from accidental and exceptional circumstances. According to the tenets of their school, commercial crises were out of the question after the corn laws were abrogated, and free-trade principles adopted by the British legislature. Now they not only have high prices of corn with an abundant harvest, but also a commercial crisis. California and Australia added to the markets of the world and pouring forth

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\(^{a}\) See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 95-96, 249 and 304-05 and this volume, pp. 468-69.—Ed.
their golden streams, with electric telegraphs transforming the whole of Europe in one single Stock Exchange, and with railways and steamers centuplicating the means of communication and of exchange. If their panacea had to be put to the test, they could not have expected to do it under circumstances more favorable than those which signalize the period from 1849 to 1854 in the history of trade and commerce.

They have failed to realize their promises, and naturally enough the war is now to be made the scapegoat of free-trade, just as the revolution in 1848 was. They cannot deny, however, that to a certain extent, the Oriental complication has delayed the revulsion, by acting as a check on the spirit of reckless enterprise, and turning part of the surplus capital to the loans recently contracted by most of the European powers; that some trades, like the iron trade, the leather trade and wool trade, have received some support from the extraordinary demand the war has created for these products; and, lastly, that in other trades, like the shipping, the woad trade, etc., where exaggerated notions as to the effects of the war fostered over-speculation on both sides of the Atlantic, only a partial outlet has been furnished to the already ruling and universal tendency to over-trading. However, their principal argument amounts to this, that the war has produced high prices for all sorts of grain, which high prices have engendered the crisis.

Now, it will be recollected that the average prices of corn ruled higher in 1853 than in 1854. If, then, these high prices are not to account for the unprecedented prosperity of 1853, they can as little account for the revulsion of 1854. The year 1836 was marked by commercial revulsion, notwithstanding its low corn prices; 1824 as well as 1853 were years of exceptional prosperity, notwithstanding the high prices that ruled in all sorts of provisions. The truth is, that although high corn prices may cripple industrial and commercial prosperity by contracting the home market, the home market in a country like Great Britain will never turn the balance, unless all foreign markets be already hopelessly overstocked. High corn prices must, therefore, in such a country, aggravate and prolong the revulsion; which, however, they are unable to create. Besides, it must not be forgotten that, conforming to the true doctrine of the Manchester School, high corn prices, if produced by the regular course of nature, instead of by the working of protection, prohibitive laws and sliding scales, altogether lose their fatal influence, and may even work advantageously by benefiting the farmers. As the two very deficient harvests of 1852 and 1853 cannot be denied to have been natural events, the free-traders
turn around upon the year 1854, and affirm that the Oriental war, working like a protective duty, has produced high prices notwithstanding a plentiful harvest. Putting aside, then, the general influence of the prices of breadstuffs upon industry, the question arises as to the influence exerted by the present war upon these prices.

The Russian importation of wheat and flour constitutes about 19 per cent. of the entire importation of the United Kingdom, and its whole importations forming but about 20 per cent. of its aggregate consumption, Russia affords but little more than $2^{1/2}$ per cent. of the whole. According to the latest official returns which do not extend over the first nine months of 1853, the entire imports of wheat into Great Britain were 3,770,921 qrs., of which 773,507 were from Russia, and 209,000 from Wallachia and Moldavia. Of flour, the entire imports amounted to 3,800,746cwts., of which 64 were supplied from Russia, and none at all from the Principalities. Such was the case before the war broke out. During the corresponding months of 1854, the importation of wheat from Russian ports direct was 505,000 qrs., against 773,507 in 1853, and from the Danubian Principalities 118,000 against 209,000; being a deficiency of 359,507 qrs. If it be considered that the harvest of 1854 was a superior, and that of 1853 a very bad one, nobody will affirm that such a deficiency could have exerted any perceptible influence on prices. We see, on the contrary, from the official returns of the weekly sales in the English market of home-grown wheat—these returns representing but a small portion of the entire sales of the country—that in the months of October and November, 1854, 1,109,148 qrs. were sold, against 758,061 qrs. in the corresponding months of 1853—more than making up for the deficiency said to have been caused by the Russian war. We may remark, also, that had the English Cabinet not caused large stores of Turkish wheat to rot in the granaries of the Principalities by stupidly or treacherously blockading the Sulina, mouth of the Danube, and thus cutting off their own supplies, the war with Russia would not have stinted the importation of wheat even to the small amount it has done. Nearly two-thirds of the London imports of foreign flour being derived from the United States, it must be admitted that the failure of the American supply in the last quarter of 1854 was a much more important event for the provision trade than the Russian war.424

If we are asked how to explain the high prices of corn in Great Britain in the face of an abundant harvest, we shall state that more than once during the course of 1853, the fact was pointed at in
that the free-trade delusions had caused the greatest possible irregularities and errors to take place in the operations of the British corn-trade, by depressing prices in the summer months below their natural level, when their advance alone should have secured the necessary supplies and sufficient orders for future purchases. Thus it happened that the imports in the months of July, August, September and October, 1854, reached but 750,000 qrs. against 2,132,000 qrs. in the corresponding months of 1853. Besides, it can hardly be doubted that consequent upon the repeal of the corn laws such large tracts of arable land were transformed into pasture in Britain, as to make even an abundant harvest, under the new regime, relatively defective.

"Consequently," to quote a circular of the Hull Chamber of Commerce, "the United Kingdom commences the year 1855 with very small stocks of foreign wheat, and with prices almost as high as in the beginning of 1854, while depending almost entirely on its own farmers' supplies until spring."

The reason of the English commercial revulsion of 1854, which is not likely to assume its true dimensions before the spring of the present year, is contained in the following few arithmetical characters: The exports of British produce and manufactures having amounted, in 1846, to £57,786,000, reached, in 1853, the enormous value of £98,000,000. Of those £98,000,000 of 1853, Australia, which, in 1842, had taken off less than one million, and in 1850, about three millions, absorbed near fifteen millions; while the United States, which, in 1842, had only consumed £3,582,000, and, in 1850, somewhat less than £15,000,000, now took the enormous amount of £24,000,000. The necessary reaction upon the English trade of the American crisis, and the hopelessly glutted Australian markets, need no further explanation. In 1837 the American crisis followed at the heels of the English crisis of 1836, while now the English crisis follows in the tracks of the American one; but, in both instances, the crisis may be traced to the same source—the fatal working of the English industrial system which leads to over-production in Great Britain, and to over-speculation in all other countries. The Australian and the United States markets, so far from forming exceptions, are only the highest expressions of the general condition of the markets of the world, both being about equally dependent upon England.

"We have the facts staring us in the face of glutted foreign markets and unprofitable returns, with few exceptions," exclaims a Manchester circular, relating to the cotton trade. "Most of the foreign markets," says another circular, relating

to the silk trade, "usual vents for our surplus manufactures, have been groaning under the effects of overtrading." "Production was enormously increased," we are told by an account of the Bradford Worsted trade, "and the goods, for a time, found an outlet in foreign markets. Much irregular business has been done in reckless consignments of goods abroad, and we need scarcely remark that the results generally have been of the most unsatisfactory character."\(^a\)

And so we might quote from a score of leading commercial circulars that reached us by the *Pacific*.\(^425\)

The Spanish Revolution and the consequent activity of smuggling in that quarter, has created an exceptional market for British produce. The Levant market, consequent upon the apprehensions arising from the Oriental war, seems to be the only one which had not been overdone, but some three months since, as we learn, Lancashire set about retrieving what had been neglected in that quarter, and at this very moment we are told that Constantinople is also groaning under the overwhelming masses of cottons, woolens, hardware, cutlery, and all sorts of British merchandise. China is the only country where it can be pretended that political events have exerted a perceptible influence on the development of the commercial revulsion.

"The hopes entertained about the gradual increase in our export trade with China," says a Manchester house, "have been almost entirely dispelled, and the rebellion spreading at present, in that country, at first considered as favorable to foreign intercourse, seems now to be organized for the depredation of the country and the total ruin of trade. The export trade with China, which once was expected to increase greatly, has almost entirely ceased."\(^b\)

Our readers will perhaps remember that when the Chinese revolution\(^426\) first assumed anything like serious dimensions, we predicted the disastrous consequences\(^c\) now complained of by the English exporting houses.

While denying all connection between the war and the commercial crisis, the symptoms of which had become apparent before the war was ever thought of, we are of course aware that the latter may dangerously aggravate the severe ordeal Great Britain will now have to pass through. The continuance of the war is tantamount to an increase of taxation, and increased taxes are certainly no cure for diminished incomes.

Written on January 11, 1855

Reproduced from the newspaper

First published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4294, January 26, 1855 as a leader

\(^a\) "Trade of 1854", *The Economist*, No. 593, January 6, 1855.— *Ed.*

\(^b\) Ibid.— *Ed.*

\(^c\) See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 97-98.— *Ed.*
London, January 19. In The Morning Advertiser, a lively discussion is taking place at this moment as to whether the accusation of "stupidity" levelled against the Coalition Ministry is just. From his point of view which presupposes a secret agreement of the Ministry with Russia, Urquhart has successfully defended the Ministry against the accusation of incompetence.

The Morning Advertiser is a peculiar phenomenon of the London press. Owned by the "Society of Licensed Victuallers", founded for charitable purposes, namely for the support of orphans, veterans and bankrupt members of the trade, it unquestionably enjoys the widest circulation among London dailies, after The Times. This is certainly not because of its editorial board, which is directed by a certain Grant, formerly a shorthand writer. This Grant married the daughter of Homer, the most influential man in the Society of Licensed Victuallers, that is the great Homer, as the united publicans call him, and the great Homer has made his little son-in-law chief editor of The Morning Advertiser. Since the Society had it in its power to push the Advertiser into every pub and even into most parlours, a the material foundations for the prosperity of the paper were laid. However, it owes its influence to the fact that it is not edited, but rather offers a forum where any member of the public may join in the discussion. Not admitted to the meetings of "respectable" London journalists because it is considered inferior, it takes its revenge on the fraternity by

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a Marx used the English word.—Ed.
opening its columns, not only to the general public, but from time
to time also to important writers who have not sold themselves to
any party.

It is but a short step from *The Morning Advertiser* to *beer* and the
latest *Beer Acts* of Mr. Wilson-Patten. This latest *ecclesiastical coup
d'état* has caused much mirth and has proved that Shakespearean
prototypes, etc., still flourish in the second half of the nineteenth
century. The serious aspect, though, is the *surprise* of the masses at
the presumption of the Church in meddling in an interfering and
regulating manner in the lives of the citizens. The masses have
become alienated from the Church to such a degree that its
attempted encroachments are looked upon merely as practical
jokes a which are rebuffed when they become tedious. Last night at
Nottingham the ecclesiastical party, unaware of its position, had
the effrontery to hold a public meeting during which it proposed
that Parliament be petitioned for the closing of all public houses,
not only during the times of day recently laid down by
Wilson-Patten, but during the whole of Sunday. There was a huge
audience of workers, and after a stormy session the following
amendment was proposed by a factory worker, called Halton, and
passed by a large majority

"that Parliament be petitioned to close all churches and chapels on Sundays."

We are assured that shortly after the opening of Parliament,
Lord Lyndhurst, in the House of Lords, is going to summarise all
the points of accusation against the Ministry. Everyone knows that
during the session of 1853/54 the Marquess of Clanricarde was the
would-be a leader of the anti-Russian opposition among the Peers.
Of course, the letters which he and his son, Lord Dunkellin, sent
to Tsar Nicholas b on the occasion of Lord Dunkellin’s release
from Russian imprisonment make it impossible for him to play
this role any longer. With reference to Dunkellin’s letter, the
well-known humorist, Douglas Jerrold, remarks in *Lloyd’s Paper*:

According to Lord Dunkellin, “Nicholas is ‘a really great man,’ for this
tremendous reason— he liberated Lord Dunkellin! ‘Great let me call him, for he
conquered me!’ Says the giantess of Tom Thumb; but here it is the dwarf that
glorifies the ogre!” c

a Marx used the English words.—*Ed.*
b Clanricarde’s letter to the Russian War Minister, Prince Dolgorukov, of
November 18, 1854; and Dunkellin’s letter to the Kaluga Governor, Count Tolstoi,
of November 10, 1854. *The Times*, No. 21946, January 9, 1855.—*Ed.*
c *Lloyd’s Weekly London Newspaper*, No. 634, January 14, 1855.—*Ed.*
Anyone who has studied the Blue Books\(^a\) published in 1841 on Turko-Egyptian affairs,\(^b\) and has gathered from their contents what position the Marquess of Clanricarde was accorded when British Ambassador at the Court of St. Petersburg, will also have realised that the Marquess' anti-Russian tirades in the House of Lords belonged exclusively to the category of opposition which every true Whig practises as a matter of principle whenever God does not give him an office.

Written on January 19, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 35, January 22, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

\(^a\) Marx used the English title.—*Ed.*

\(^b\) *Correspondence, 1839-41, relative to the Affairs of the East, and the Conflict between Egypt and Turkey, 4 parts.*—*Ed.*
London, January 19. Sir Howard Douglas has added a critical appendix on the events of the recent war to a new edition of his famous work on Naval Gunnery\(^a\). Among other things, he proves, from most recent experience and on the basis of official material at his sole disposal, that fleets are inadequate against casemat ed forts if the latter are correctly constructed and properly defended; the uselessness of bombs against solid masonry; and finally, that it is possible to make a breach in towers and casemat ed forts, such as the ones at Bomarsund and Sevastopol, only with heavy siege-guns—32-pounders at least—and that, moreover, in the old manner, because the unsteady aim from a ship would never cause a breach without exposing the ship to certain destruction. As to the Crimean campaign in particular, Douglas, in spite of his partisanship for the commanders in the Crimea, and with all due semi-official consideration for his official position, comes to the conclusion that ultimately the Crimean expedition will prove a failure. But has not the Thunderer of The Times imparted the great news that Sevastopol was to be taken by storm after a forty-eight-hour cannonade! It had this, said The Times, from a reliable source, and it was solely to withhold its information from the Russians that it did not reveal all concerning an event which would definitely take place within the next few days (see The Times from December 26 to 31). There was no doubting it: Sevastopol was to be taken within the next few days.\(^b\)

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\(^{a}\) Engels gives the title in English.—Ed.

\(^{b}\) The Times, No. 21942, January 4, 1855, leader.—Ed.
This is what happened. As everyone knows, The Times displayed furious opposition to the Foreign Legion Bill, because it learned about this measure only when the rest of the general public did. Then it began to fret and fume and to grumble at the Ministry. To keep the paper quiet, the latter was cowardly enough to fling it a bit of news—the storming of Sevastopol, in doing which the Ministry transformed a design, considered by the generals for use in certain contingencies and under certain conditions, into a positive plan of campaign. That French papers—that is to say, semi-official organs—made similar reports is not surprising, for the loan of five hundred millions was near at hand. That The Times was duped is equally obvious. It believes every news item which it receives twenty-four hours earlier than any other paper.

The situation in the Crimea has slightly improved. While the French suffer comparatively few losses from illness, their cavalry being well mounted and their infantry lively and active, the British continue daily to send 150 men into hospital and to bring out forty to fifty dead. Their artillery has no horses and their cavalry has to dismount, so that their horses may wear themselves out in hauling up the heavy cannon from Balaklava. Every two to three days the weather alternates between rain and light frost, so that there has been no decrease at all in the expanse of mud. Since almost all means of transport are occupied in supplying provisions for the army, the procuring of which remains the foremost necessity, neither cannon nor ammunition can be brought up. In the meantime, trenches have been dug close to the enemy positions, and a third parallel has been constructed which, although it cannot be provided with arms, must nevertheless be defended against sorties. It is impossible to say how close these trenches are to the nearest points under attack, since reports are contradictory and, of course, not published officially. Some say 140 or 150 yards, while, according to a French report, the nearest point is still 240 yards away. In the meantime, French batteries, now completed and mounted, must wait because the desultory and utterly ineffectual November cannonade has reduced supplies of ammunition, and a repetition of so desultory a fire would be inept. Thus the Russians have had, and still have, sufficient time, not only to repair any damage suffered through earlier attacks, but to raise new works, and they are doing this with so much enthusiasm that at present Sevastopol is stronger than ever before. Any decisive storm is quite outside the realm of possibility, as there are several lines of defence one behind another, and as the large stone buildings in the town behind the last circular wall have been
transformed into as many redoubts. Whenever the siege recommences, everything will have to start again from the beginning, but with the difference that the batteries have come considerably closer to the town and hence are more effective. But at what a price has this advantage been bought! It was precisely the task of guarding these extended communication trenches which caused most of the cases of sickness in the British army by depriving the soldiers of their sleep to an excessive degree. Besides, the Russians were active enough in making sorties which, although not always successful, served to exhaust an already overworked enemy.

In the meantime, the Turkish army has gradually arrived in Eupatoria whence it will have to operate against Simferopol and, simultaneously, watch the northern side of Sevastopol. This operation which completely divides the Turks from the Anglo-French army, thus forming two quite separate armies, is another strategic blunder which invites the Russians to defeat each one separately. However, it was unavoidable. It would have been an even greater mistake to accumulate yet more troops on the small Heracleatic Chersonese.

This is how the results of the famous Balaklava “flank march” are developing.

Written on January 19, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 37, January 23, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
The reason for this appears to be the knocking up of the horses in dragging heavy guns and provisions from Balaklava, both the artillery and commissariat being destitute of draught animals. The mud, however, is so deep that the transportation of cannon and ammunition had ceased, and a supply of food, such as it was, was all that was being brought up. The average number of daily admissions to the hospitals was 150, and of deaths about 50. In the meantime the trenches have been brought up nearer the enemy's works, and a third parallel constructed, which cannot be armed yet, though it must be defended against sorties. How near the trenches are now to the nearest attacked points, it is impossible to say, as reports are so contradictory, while nothing official, of course, is published; some say 140 or 150 yards, but a French report states that the nearest point is as far distant as 240 yards. The French batteries, which are completed and armed, have to wait, because the desultory, and as now appears, perfectly useless cannonade of November has reduced the stores of ammunition, and a repetition of such desultory firing would be equally useless. Thus the Russians have had ample time not only to repair all the damage done by the former attack, but to construct new works, and they have done so with such application, that Sevastopol is now stronger than ever. A decisive assault is entirely out of the question, where several succeeding lines of defense have to be taken in succession, and where, behind the last enceinte, the large stone buildings of the scattered town have been turned into as many redoubts.

The siege, whenever it is recommenced, will have to be done over again, with the only difference that the batteries are
considerably more advanced toward the town, and consequently more efficient. But at the price of how many lives, lost by the hand of the enemy or by sickness, has this advantage been bought! It is the very work of guarding these extensive trenches which, by depriving the men of sleep, has produced many of the casualties by sickness in the British army. And the Russians have been active enough in sorties, which, if not always successful, have had their full effect as far as harassing an already overworked enemy is concerned.

It appears, too, that the reenforcements of the British and French have nearly all arrived, and unless fresh regiments are ordered for embarkation, very small additions will be made to the strength of either army in the Crimea. The Turkish army is getting very leisurely transported to Eupatoria, whence it is to operate toward Simferopol, observing, at the same time, the north side of Sevastopol. This operation, by entirely separating the Turks from their Allies, and forming two distinct armies, is another strategic blunder, inviting the Russians to defeat each army separately. But it could not be avoided; it would have been still worse to collect more troops on the little Heracleatic Chersonese. Thus, we see, the consequences of the celebrated flank march to Balaklava are developing themselves again and again in fresh false moves. That the Turks will get well beaten is very likely; they are no longer the army of Kalafat and Silistria. Disorganization, neglect, and want of everything have transformed that army, and Turkey has no second to replace it. Under these circumstances, nothing is so improbable as that the negotiations for peace should be disturbed by the fall of Sevastopol. There has been no time since the Allies landed when that event was not more likely than at present. It is not too much to say that in all military history there is no more signal failure than this Crimean campaign.

Written on January 19, 1855


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
Karl Marx

THE AIMS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.—
POLEMIC AGAINST PRUSSIA.—
A SNOWBALL RIOT

London, January 23. The Western powers have declared that negotiations at Vienna must not for one moment interrupt their military operations. What immediate military advantage could Russia therefore gain by sham negotiations? This question, raised by the Sun, permits of a very positive answer. The sixth and part of the fifth (Russian) army corps formed the original garrison of the Crimea. The fourth corps arrived a few days before the battle of Balaklava; at this moment, the third corps is in the peninsula; the eighth division arrived at Bakhisierai on December 18, and the seventh and eighth divisions, together with the first division of Dragoons and about 240 cannon and four Cossack regiments are drawn up at Perekop. The Light Cavalry division, part of the third army corps, has been thrown out towards Eupatoria, which it is observing. Thus about half of the active Russian army (not counting reserves) is either in the Crimea or in garrison at Odessa, Kherson and Nikolayev, and sections of the second corps (Panyutin) are to march up to support them. It cannot, of course, be determined how great is the actual strength of these twelve infantry and six cavalry divisions following on the losses of an unsuccessful campaign and enormous marches, since we do not know whether the losses have been made good by fresh reinforcements. But, in any case, they must number at least 100,000 troops fit for active service, not counting the soldiers, marines and sailors there may be at Sevastopol. This great troop concentration in the Crimea, which absorbs at least a quarter of the entire Russian striking force, shows how important it is for Tsar Nicholas to involve Austria in renewed negotiations until the gaps in his Volhynian and Podolian armies, caused by the latest movements, have again been filled.
On the eve of the regular parliamentary session, the publication of the latest Prussian, Austrian and French dispatches is being exploited just as the treaty of December 2\(^{430}\) had been on the eve of special parliamentary session. It is very convenient for pro-government newspapers to reply to attacks on the English conduct of the war by attacks on Prussian diplomacy. The *Globe* and *The Morning Chronicle*, the two papers with the strongest pro-government bias, adopt the most violent tone in the polemic against Prussia.

A snowball riot which took place here last Sunday supplies new proof of how the importunate presumption of the ecclesiastical party and the Bill for the stricter observance of Sunday it smuggled through Parliament have only provoked the English people to hold somewhat rough, high-spirited and facetious demonstrations. Last Sunday, during morning service, a crowd of about 1,500 people assembled in Trafalgar Square near St. Martin's[in-the-Field], where they amused themselves by bombarding buses, cabs and pedestrians with snowballs. Because of the noise outside the church doors, the service had to be discontinued. As soon as the police intervened, they became the main object of attack, and within a few minutes, some constables were unable to look either left or right because of the piles of snow which had collected on their shoulders, helmets, etc. Soldiers who wanted to return to their barracks from church, were definitely forced to retreat, and their English phlegm was put to a severe test. About 100 special constables had to be sent to the scene of battle. Eventually the police made use of their truncheons, and fierce fighting ensued. Four ringleaders were captured and dragged to the police station in spite of several attempts in Chandos Street and Russell Street to free them from the arm of the law. Yesterday these gentlemen appeared before the police magistrate at Bow Street. The churchwardens of St. Martin's appeared also, to give evidence against them. Each hero was sentenced to forty shillings, or fourteen days' imprisonment, and here end the records of the snowball riot. At any rate it has served to refute the Prince de Ligne who, at the time of the revolt in the Netherlands\(^{481}\) against Joseph II, refused his assistance because it was winter, snow and insurrection being mutually exclusive.
London, January 24. The parliamentary session was opened yesterday. In the House of Lords, Lord Ellenborough gave notice that on Thursday, February 1, he would move for an official account of the number of troops—infantry, cavalry and sailors—sent out to the Crimea, and also the number of killed, wounded, sick and otherwise disabled.\(^a\) The Duke of Richmond asked the Secretary for War why those who fought at Balaklava had been passed over in the awarding of medals. Not only those who fought at Balaklava would receive medals, but also all the sailors in the Black Sea area who had not been in combat, thus the Duke of Newcastle, the Secretary for War, trumped the Duke of Richmond. The Duke of Richmond, on the other hand, together with Lords Ellenborough and Hardwicke, asserted the truth of the proposition advanced long ago by Adam Smith that the value of fancy goods, hence of medals too, is in inverse proportion to their quantity.\(^b\) After this important debate, which lasted about half an hour, the Lords adjourned.

The House of Commons was crowded. But the proceedings did not come up to expectations. Disraeli was not present, and Sir Benjamin Hall spoke. Having begun at a quarter to four, the sitting was over by 6 p.m. The Roman Senate has been admired for the dignified tranquility with which it received the news of the

\(^a\) The debates in the House of Lords and the House of Commons on January 23 are given according to The Times, No. 21959. January 24, 1855.—Ed.

defeat at Cannae. The *patres conscripti* of Rome have now been surpassed by the Commons of England. It was impossible to see these faces and to believe in the destruction of the British armies in the Crimea. The state of health of the Crimean army seems to have prompted Sir Benjamin Hall to introduce two Bills to improve the running of the health inspectorate in England. Sir Benjamin Hall is one of the so-called Radicals, of the same type as Sir William Molesworth, Osborne and Co. The radicalism of these gentlemen lies in their demanding ministerial posts even though they neither belong to the oligarchy nor possess plebeian talent. But their mere presence in the Ministry is a radical fact. So say their friends. Hence, when cholera was raging with great virulence in England in the summer of 1854 and the Board of Health, until then under the control of Palmerston, the Home Secretary, proved as incompetent as the medical department of the camp outside Sevastopol, the Coalition considered it a suitable time to create a new ministerial post, an independent President of the Board of Health, and to strengthen itself by making the "Radical" Sir Benjamin Hall a member of the Government. So Sir Benjamin Hall became Minister of Health. Cholera, it is true, did not disappear from London as soon as his appointment appeared in the *Gazette*, but a certain Taylor disappeared from *Punch*, where he had been poking fun at the Coalition and the Emperor of Russia. For Sir Benjamin Hall appointed him Secretary of the Board of Health at a salary of £1,000. As a Radical, Sir Benjamin Hall loves radical cures. As for the merits of his Bills, there will be time enough to discuss them when they are introduced. Yesterday they merely served to give him the opportunity of making his ministerial début in the House of Commons.

In answer to Layard's question,

"whether the Ministry has any objection to lay on the table of the House the correspondence that has taken place with foreign Powers with regard to the treaty of the 2d of December, 1854, and especially any document communicated to the Russian Government containing the interpretation put by the British and French governments on the Four Points, not for negotiation but for acceptance",

Lord John Russell stated that he could not say if it would be possible to lay on the table any of the documents in question. Such a thing was not parliamentary. With reference to the history of the Four Points, however, he was able to tell his honourable friend, quite in general, the following: At the end of November Russia, through Gorchakov, had declared her acceptance of what is

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*a* Honorary title of the ancient Roman senator.— *Ed.*

*b* See this volume, pp. 579-84.— *Ed.*
known as the Four Points; then came the treaty of December 2; then on December 28 a meeting in Vienna between Gorchakov and the ambassadors of England, France and Austria. The French Ambassador had, in the name of the Allies, read out a document in which they gave their interpretation of the Four Points—an interpretation which was to be considered as the basis of negotiations. In the third point it was proposed to put an end to Russia’s preponderance in the Black Sea. Gorchakov did not accept this interpretation, he said however that he wanted to contact his Government for instructions. Ten days later he informed Count Buol that he had received these instructions. On January 7 or 8 another meeting was held in the offices of the Austrian Foreign Minister. Gorchakov read out a memorandum containing the views of his Government. Count Buol, Lord Westmorland and Baron de Bourqueny declared that they had no authority to accept the memorandum. The basis of negotiations had to be acceptance of the interpretation of the Four Points. Gorchakov then withdrew his memorandum and accepted the interpretation as the basis of negotiations. Russell added that despite her acceptance of this “basis” Russia had the right to dispute “every point” of the same as soon as it was definitely formulated. (A preliminary draft existed already.) The British Government stated that it was ready to open negotiations on the aforementioned basis. “But hitherto it has not yet given its ambassador any authorisation to negotiate.” The last sentence is the only new piece of information Russell conceded to the Commons. The most important moment of the sitting was Roebuck’s announcement that

“on Thursday next he should move for a select committee to inquire into the numbers and condition of our army before Sevastopol, and into the conduct of those departments of the Government whose duty it was to administer to the wants of that army”.

*The Times* “implores” Roebuck to “cry aloud and spare not”. The imploring of *The Times* and the past of Mr. Roebuck are neither of them likely to remove entirely the suspicion that Roebuck will cry, or rather croak, to prevent others from speaking. Thersites, as far as we know, was never used by Ulysses, but Roebuck is certainly being used by the Whigs, who in their own way are as cunning as Ulysses.

Written on January 24, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 45, January 27, 1855

*The Times*, No. 21959, January 24, 1855, leader.—*Ed.*
Karl Marx

COMMENTS ON THE CABINET CRISIS

London, January 26. When an envoy of Sultan Malik-Shah came to Alamut and called on Hasan-i Sabbah to surrender, the “old man of the mountains”, instead of answering, beckoned to one of his fidawis, commanding him to kill himself. At once the youth plunged his dagger into his breast and fell to the floor, a lifeless corpse. In the same way the “old man” of the Coalition had ordered his Lord John Russell to commit suicide on his behalf in the House of Commons. Russell, the old parliamentary philanthropist, who always interpreted the commandment “Love thy neighbour as thyself” to mean that every man is his own neighbour, has preferred to kill the “old man” instead. We were not mistaken about Roebuck. His motion was arranged with Russell in order to salvage the “better part”—the Whigs—from the shipwreck.

Indeed! This motion is not directed against the Ministry but against the “departments” that are directly responsible for the conduct of the war, i.e., against the Peelites. Furthermore, it was obvious that at the opening of Parliament he had good reasons for making the declaration that the basis for negotiations was no basis insofar as Russia reserved the right to dispute each of the Four Points—and, that the negotiations were likewise no negotiations insofar as the English Cabinet had still not appointed a negotiator. Scarcely had Roebuck proposed his motion—on Tuesday—when Russell writes the same evening to the “old man” that this motion amounts to a vote of censure against the War Office (the Peelites),

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Aberdeen.—Ed.
and that he must therefore tender his resignation. Aberdeen goes to the Queen at Windsor Castle and advises her to accept his [Russell’s] resignation, which is what happens. The courage of the “old man” is understandable when one learns that Palmerston has not handed in his resignation.

At the Thursday sitting the House of Commons is informed of these important events. It adjourns its sitting (and Roebuck his motion) until this evening. Now the whole of the House of Commons rushes into the House of Lords where clarification is expected of Aberdeen, but Aberdeen is clever enough to be absent—reportedly back in Windsor—and the Duke of Newcastle recounts the same tale in the Lords as Palmerston has told in the Commons. In the meanwhile the Whigs of the Commons are appalled to discover in the House of Lords that their plan has been seen through and their retreat cut off. The Tories, not at all eager to re-install the Whigs, at the expense of the Peelites, in their old privilege as “divinely-appointed tenants of the British Empire”, have prevailed on Lord Lyndhurst to propose a motion which, in contrast to Roebuck’s motion, does not merely censure—à la Roebuck—individual departments of the Government but puts the entire Government formally in the dock. Lord Lyndhurst’s motion reads as follows:

“I shall move on Friday, February 2, that in the opinion of this House the expedition to the Crimea was undertaken by Her Majesty’s Government with very inadequate means and without due caution or sufficient inquiry into the nature and extent of the resistance to be expected from the enemy: and that the neglect and mismanagement of the Government in the conduct of the enterprise have led to the most disastrous results.”

There is no mistaking it: Lyndhurst’s motion is aimed at the Whigs just as Roebuck’s is aimed at the Aberdeenites. An incidental observation: Lord John Russell has informed the Commons through Hayter that he will explain the reasons for his resignation at the earliest opportunity, that is tonight. “He who expects nothing will not be disappointed.”

Written on January 26, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 47, January 29, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time

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a The Times, No. 21961, January 26, 1855, leader.—Ed.
b Speeches of Roebuck, Palmerston and Hayter in the House of Commons and of the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Lyndhurst in the House of Lords on January 25, 1855 were published in The Times, No. 21961, January 26, 1855.—Ed.
London, January 27. The tone and physiognomy of yesterday’s Commons sitting showed precisely to what level the British Parliament has sunk.a

At the opening of the sitting, at about 4 p.m., the House was packed because a scene was expected, a scandal: Lord Russell’s explanation of his resignation. As soon as the personal debate was over and the proper parliamentary debate, of Roebuck’s motion, began the indignant patriots hurried off to dinner; the House thinned out and several voices shouted, “Divide, divide!” A considerable pause ensued until the Secretary at War, Sidney Herbert, rose and directed a long and well-worded speech at empty benches. Then the sated Members gradually strolled back to their seats. When Layard began his speech at about 9.30 p.m. there were some 150 Members present. When he concluded about an hour before the House adjourned, it was full again. The rest of the sitting, however, strongly resembled a parliamentary siesta.

Lord John Russell—all of whose merits can be reduced to one: expertise in parliamentary tactics—did not make his speech from the Speaker’s table, as is customary on such occasions, but from the third bench behind the ministerial seats, where the discontented Whigs are installed. He spoke in a low, hoarse voice, drawling, mistreating English pronunciation as always, and frequently at odds with the rules of syntax. (Nota bene: One must on no account confuse the speeches as they are presented in the

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a Parliamentary debates on January 26, 1855 were published in The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—Ed.
newspapers with the speeches as they are delivered.) While ordinary orators make up for poor content by good delivery, Russell sought to excuse poor content by means of even worse delivery. The way in which he spoke was, as it were, an apology for what he said.

And an apology was certainly necessary! The previous Monday he had still not thought of resigning, he said, but on Tuesday, as soon as Roebuck had tabled his motion, he had found it unavoidable. This reminds one of the lackey who was by no means averse to telling a lie but whose conscience was troubled as soon as the lie was discovered. From what point of view should he oppose the request for a parliamentary inquiry, as his duty as ministerial Leader of the House required! Because the evils were not great enough to call for an inquiry! Nobody, he said, could deny the melancholy state of the army at Sevastopol. It was not only painful but shocking and heart-rending. Or ought he to have maintained before the House that its committee of inquiry was pointless as better arrangements to remedy the evils were in progress? Russell is on slippery ground when raising this question for he was directly responsible for adopting such arrangements, not only as a member of the Ministry but especially as Lord President of the Privy Council. He admits that he consented to the appointment of the Duke of Newcastle as “supreme” War Minister. He cannot deny that precautionary measures to ensure provisions, clothing and medical care for the army should have been taken by August and September at the latest. What did he do, on his own admission, during this critical period? He was travelling about the country giving small talks to “literary institutions” and editing the correspondence of Charles James Fox. While he was travelling about in England, Aberdeen was travelling in Scotland, and there was no Cabinet meeting from August until October 17. At this meeting, Lord John, according to his own account, made no proposals worth informing Parliament of. Lord John then takes another whole month to think things over and then, on November 17, sends a letter to Aberdeen suggesting to him the amalgamation of the office of Secretary of State for War with that of Secretary at War and the appointment of Palmerston to fill them both—in other words, the dismissal of the Duke of Newcastle. Aberdeen rejects this. Russell writes to him again on November 28 in the same spirit. On November 30 Aberdeen replies to him quite

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a See this volume, p. 602.—Ed.
b Marx used the English term.—Ed.
correctly that his whole proposal amounts to the replacement of one man by another, of Newcastle by Palmerston. But when the Colonial Office had been separated from the War Office, he said, Russell had readily consented to Newcastle taking over the latter, in order to bring one of his Whigs, Sir George Grey, into the Colonial Office. Aberdeen then asked Russell himself whether he wanted to put his proposal to the Cabinet. Russell declined to do this, as he said, “so as not to cause the break-up of the Ministry”. Hence, the Ministry first, then the army in the Crimea.

No measures had been taken to remedy the evils, confesses Russell. All reform of the management of the war was limited to the placing of the Commissariat under the Secretary of State for War. Nevertheless, although no remedial measures are taken, Russell calmly remains in the Government, making no further suggestions from November 30, 1854 until January 20, 1855. On this day—last Saturday—Aberdeen informs Russell of certain proposals for reforms in the management of the war; these are found unsatisfactory by the latter, who submits counter-proposals of his own in writing. Not until three days later does he deem it necessary to hand in his resignation, because Roebuck has tabled his motion and Russell is not inclined to share responsibility with a Cabinet with which he has shared office and actions. He had heard—declares Russell—that Aberdeen was never resolved to appoint Palmerston dictator in the War Office. If this were the case he—Curtius—congratulated himself on not having leapt in vain from the firm ground of the Ministry into the hollow tomb of the Opposition. After rolling thus far down his precipitous path our Lord John then destroys the last ostensible pretext for his resignation, declaring: 1. that the prospects for the war are by no means such as to give rise to the prevailing depression; 2. that Aberdeen is a great Minister, Clarendon a great diplomat, and Gladstone a great financier; 3. that the Whig Party does not consist of office-seekers but of fervent patriots, and finally that he, Russell, would abstain from voting on Roebuck’s motion, although he is supposed to have resigned because a patriot can have no objection to Roebuck’s motion. Russell’s speech was received even more coldly than it was delivered.

Palmerston gets up on behalf of the Ministry. His situation is rather strange. Curtius Russell resigns because Aberdeen is

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a These facts are cited according to Lord Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—Ed.
b See this volume, p. 228.—Ed.
unwilling to appoint Palmerston dictator over the war. Brutus Palmerston attacks Russell for leaving Aberdeen in the lurch in the moment of danger. Palmerston was quite pleased with this bizarre situation. It enabled him, as he usually does in critical moments, to laugh off the seriousness of the situation and transform it into a farce. When he rebuked Russell for not taking his heroic decision back in December, Disraeli—who at least does not conceal his joy at the demise of the Venetian Constitution—laughed out loud, and Gladstone, who makes seriousness his speciality, was evidently murmuring all the Puseyite prayers he knew to stop himself from exploding. Palmerston declared that if the Roebuck motion were passed it would mean the fall of the Ministry. If it were defeated the Cabinet would meet to discuss its own reorganisation (including Palmerston's dictatorship).

A great magician this Palmerston! With one foot in the grave he can make England believe that he is a homo novus, and that his career is only just beginning. Twenty years Secretary at War, and as such known only for his systematic defence of flogging and of the purchase of commissions in the Army, he ventures to pass himself off as the man whose mere name is enough to eliminate the faults in the system. Of all the English Ministers the only one to have been repeatedly denounced in Parliament, especially in 1848, as a Russian agent, he is able to make himself out to be the only man in a position to lead England in the war against Russia. A great man, this Palmerston!

About the debate on Roebuck's motion, which has been adjourned until Monday evening, next time. So cleverly is the latter formulated that the opponents of the Ministry declared that they would vote for it despite its insipidness, and the supporters of the Ministry declared that they would speak in favour of it, although they would vote against it. The Lords sitting contained nothing of interest. Aberdeen added nothing to Russell's explanation, except his surprise: Russell had surprised the whole Cabinet.

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Printed according to the newspaper

Published in English for the first time
Frederick Engels

THE EUROPEAN WAR

As the term approaches for the opening of the new Conference at Vienna, the probability of any concessions on the part of Russia dwindles away into misty and most uncertain tenuity. The brilliant success of that great diplomatic coup, the prompt acceptance by the Czar of the proposed basis of negotiations, puts him, for the moment at least, in a commanding position, and renders it certain that, under whatever appearances he may agree to proposals for peace, the only real basis on which he will now consent to arrange the quarrel is substantially that of the status quo. By accepting the Four Points he has thrown Austria back into a doubtful position, while he retains Prussia in his leading strings, and gains time to bring all his reserves and new formations of troops to the frontier before hostilities can begin.

The very fact of negotiations having been agreed upon, sets free at once as many Russian soldiers of the army of observation on the Austrian frontier as can be replaced in two months or ten weeks—that is, at least sixty to eighty thousand men. As the whole of the late Danubian army has ceased to exist as such, the fourth corps having been in the Crimea since the end of October, the third corps having arrived there in the latter part of December, and the rest of the fifth corps, beside cavalry and reserves now being on the way thither, these troops must be replaced on the Bug and Dniester by fresh men, to be taken from the western army in Poland, Volhynia and Podolia. Accordingly, if the war is to be transferred to the center of the Continent, two or three

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a Move.—Ed.
b See this volume, pp. 579-84.—Ed.
months' time is of the utmost importance to Russia; for, at the present moment, the forces she has scattered on the long line from Kalish to Ismail are no longer sufficient, without reenforcements, to withstand the increasing number of Austrian troops opposed to them. That time she has now gained, and we proceed to show what is the present state of her military preparations.

We have, on former occasions, given an outline of the Russian military organization.\(^a\) In the great active army, the one destined to act against the South and West of Europe, there were originally six army-corps, of forty-eight battalions each; two corps of selected troops, of thirty-six battalions each, beside a comparatively strong force of cavalry, regular and irregular, with artillery. As we have before stated, the Government has not only called in the reserves to form the fourth, fifth and sixth battalions of the selected troops, and the fifth and sixth of the other six army-corps; but even the seventh and eighth battalions of each regiment had been formed by new levies, so that the number of battalions has been doubled for the six corps of the line, and more then doubled for the selected troops (Guards and Grenadiers). These forces may now be approximately estimated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Battalions per Regiment</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guards and Grenadiers</td>
<td>96 bns. at 900 men</td>
<td>86,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96 bns. at 700 men</td>
<td>67,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First and Second Corps (not yet engaged)</td>
<td>96 bns. at 900 men</td>
<td>86,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>96 bns. at 700 men</td>
<td>67,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Corps—the active battalions</td>
<td>192 bns. at 500 men</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192 bns. at 700 men</td>
<td>134,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Finland</td>
<td>16 bns. at 900 men</td>
<td>14,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>784</td>
<td>552,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Add: Cavalry, regular</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cavalry, irregular</td>
<td></td>
<td>46,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>758,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 498-504.—*Ed.*
A part of these estimates may appear high, but in reality they are not so. The enormous recruiting which has taken place since the war began, should have swelled the ranks of the army higher than this, in spite of the losses sustained, which, all of them, fell upon the 96 active battalions of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth corps; but we have allowed amply for the many recruits who die before they reach their regiments. Besides, for cavalry our estimate is very low.

Of the above troops, 8,000 men (one division of the fifth corps) are in the Caucasus, and must, therefore, be deducted; for we leave unnoticed here the forces employed out of Europe. The remaining 750,000 troops are distributed nearly as follows: On the shores of the Baltic, the Baltic Army, under General Sievers, consisting of the Finland corps, and reserves of the Guards, Grenadiers, and sixth corps, amounting, with cavalry and artillery, to about 135,000 men, part of whom, however, may be considered as raw recruits and battalions hardly organized. In Poland and on the frontier of Galicia, from Kalish to Kamenicz, the Guards, the Grenadiers, the first corps, one division of the sixth corps, and some reserves of the Grenadiers and first corps, with cavalry and artillery, about 235,000 men. This army is the finest part of the Russian troops; it contains the select troops, and the best of the reserves. In Bessarabia, and between the Dniester and Bug, are two divisions of the second corps, and part of its reserves, about 60,000 men. These formed part of the army of the West, but upon the army of the Danube being sent to the Crimea, they were detached to take its place. They now oppose the Austrian troops in the Principalities, and are commanded by General Panyutin. For the defense of the Crimea are destined the third and fourth corps, one division of the fifth corps, two divisions of the 6th, and some reserves already there, beside one division each of the second and fifth corps on the march, the whole composing, with cavalry and artillery, a force which can hardly be estimated at less than 170,000 men, under Menchikoff. The remainder of the reserves and new formations, especially of the first, second, third, fourth and fifth corps, are now being organized into a grand army of reserve by General Cheodayeff. They are concentrating in the interior, and must count about 150,000 men. How many of them are on the march to Poland or the South, is, of course, impossible to tell.

Thus the Emperor Nicholas, who, last summer, had less than 500,000 troops on the western frontier of his Empire, from Finland to the Crimea, now has 600,000 men placed there, beside
a reserve forming in the interior to the number of 150,000. For all that, he is weaker now against Austria than he was then. In August or September there were in Poland and Podolia 270,000 Russians, and on the Pruth and Dniester the army of the Danube, counting about 80,000 men; for this latter was also kept there more for the sake of the Austrians than for anything else. This made a total of 350,000 men who might have operated against Austria. Now there are, as we have seen, only 295,000 men concentrated along the Austrian line of outposts, while Austria must by this time have 320,000 men directly opposed to them, and 70,000 to 80,000 men in Bohemia and Moravia to support these. This momentary inferiority of numbers on the Russian side, and the great uncertainty as to the time of arrival of fresh formations from the interior, in the present season, and in a country where the whole administration is corrupt, are quite sufficient causes to make the Russian Government try to gain as much time as possible. Such an inferiority of numbers disables the Russians for offensive operations; and in an open country like Poland, with no great river-lines between the two armies, this means the necessity of a retreat, on the first encounter, to a tenable position. In this special case it means the cutting of the Russian army in two portions, one of which would have to retreat upon Warsaw, and the other upon Kiev; and between these two halves would there lie the impassable Polesian moors, extending from the Bug (tributary to the Vistula, not the Southern Bug), to the Dnieper. In fact, it would be better luck than the Russians generally have on such occasions, if large numbers escaped being driven into these morasses. Thus, even without a battle, the greater part of Southern Poland, Volhynia, Podolia, Bessarabia, the country from Warsaw to Kiev and Kherson would have to be evacuated. On the other hand, a superior Russian army could quite as easily drive the opposing Austrians, without their risking a decisive battle, out of Galicia and Moldavia, and force the passes into Hungary, and the consequences of such a result can easily be imagined. Indeed, in such a war between Austria and Russia, the first successful offensive movement is of the highest importance to either party; and either will do the utmost to establish itself first on the other's territory.

We have often said that this war would not have that military interest which properly attaches to European wars, until Austria should declare herself against Russia.\(^a\) Even the efforts in the

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\(^a\) See this volume, pp. 543-49.—Ed.
Crimea are nothing but a great war upon a small scale. The enormous marches of the Russians, the sufferings of the Allies, have hitherto reduced the contending armies to such numbers that no really great battle has been fought. What are fights where but from fifteen to twenty-five thousand men on a side are engaged? What strategical operations of really scientific interest can occur within the small space from Cape Chersonesus to Bakhiseraí? And even there, whatever occurs, there are never troops enough to occupy the whole line. The interest consists more in what is not done, than in what is done. For the rest, it is anecdote, instead of history, that is performed.

But it will be a different thing should the two grand armies, now facing each other on the Galician frontier, come into play. Whatever the intentions and capabilities of the commanders may be, the very magnitude of the armies and the nature of the ground admit of no sham war and of no indecision. Rapid concentrations, forced marches, stratagems and outflankings of the largest kind, changing bases and lines of operation—in fact, maneuvering and fighting on a grand scale, and according to real military principles, here become a necessity and a matter of course; and then the chief who is influenced by political considerations or who acts with a want of resolution must lose his army. War on such a scale and in such a country takes a serious and a business-like turn at once; and it is this which will make the Austro-Russian war, if it does break out, one of the most interesting events since 1815.

As to the prospect of peace, that is by no means so clear as it seemed a few weeks since. If the Allies are willing to put an end to the struggle on the terms, substantially, of the status quo, it may be done: but how little hope there is of that, our readers cannot require to be informed. Certainly, with half of Germany acting, morally at least, in her favor, and after having put on foot the enormous armies whose strength we have above exhibited, we cannot expect Russia to agree to any terms which France and England are likely to propose or consent to. The almost uninterrupted series of profitable treaties of peace, from Peter the Great to the peace of Adrianople, will hardly now be followed by a treaty surrendering the dominion of the Black Sea, before Sevastopol is taken, and when only one-third of the Russian forces have as yet been engaged. But if peace cannot be concluded before the fate of Sevastopol or of the allied expedition is fully developed, it will be less probable after this Crimean campaign is decided. If Sevastopol falls, the honor of Russia—if the Allies are
defeated and driven into the sea, their honor—will not admit of a settlement until more decisive results are obtained. Had the preparations for the Conference been attended by an armistice, as we intimated on hearing of the Czar’s acceptance of the Four Points, there would have been reason for continuing to entertain hopes of peace; but, under present circumstances, we are compelled to admit that a great European war is much more probable.

Written about January 29, 1855


Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, January 29. Our judgment of the English Parliament has been corroborated today by the English press.

"The Parliament of England," says The Morning Advertiser, "has met, and ... separated on the first night, in laughter more unseemly than the jesting of an idiot over his father's burial."b

The Times, too, cannot help remarking:

"There are few, we apprehend, who will rise from the perusal of Friday night's debate without a melancholy feeling, which they may not perhaps be able at once to define or analyse, but which, when examined, resolves itself into a conviction that our legislature, called together on a most urgent occasion to a consideration of the gravest nature, postpones primary to secondary objects, and gives up to party and personal considerations those hours which ought now to be exclusively devoted to the desperate situation of our army in the Crimea."c

In this situation, The Times proceeds to recommend making Palmerston prime minister because he is "too old" to be Secretary for War. It was The Times that recommended undertaking the Crimean expedition at such a time of the year and with such forces that almost certainly ensured failure, according to the testimony of Sir Howard Douglas, the greatest military critic of England.

Let us add a brief postscript to the account of Friday's sitting. Although Roebuck was forced by his old chronic ailment to break

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a See this volume, pp. 600-01.—Ed.
b The Morning Advertiser, No. 19846, January 29, 1855, leader.—Ed.
c The Times, No. 21963, January 29, 1855, leader.—Ed.
off his speech after ten minutes and abruptly propose his motion, he did have time to formulate the fatal question: We have sent out 54,000 well-equipped troops to the East. Of these 14,000 still exist. What has become of the 40,000 who are missing? And what was the answer of the Secretary at War, Sidney Herbert, the great patron of the English Pietists, the Tractarians\(^4\)? He said the system was no good.\(^a\) But when the separation of the War Office from the Colonial Office was carried out a few months ago, who resisted every thorough-going reform of the system?\(^b\) Sidney Herbert and his colleagues. Sidney Herbert, not content with hiding behind "the system", accuses the commanders of the brigades and regiments of total incompetence. Anyone who knows the system also knows that these commanders have nothing to do with administration, nor, consequently, with the maladministration which it is admitted has now sacrificed a model army. But the pious Herbert is not satisfied with confessing the sins of other people. The English soldiers, he claims, are inept. They are unable to take care of themselves. They are indeed gallant but stupid.

"At fighting they are respectable.  
When it comes to thinking—miserable."\(^c\)

He, Sidney Herbert, and his colleagues are all misunderstood geniuses. Is it any wonder that Herbert's sermon appealed to that eccentric Drummond and put the question in his mouth whether it were not time to suspend the constitution and appoint a dictator for England.\(^d\) Vernon Smith, the former Whig Minister, eventually gave the general confusion a classic expression, declaring that he knew not what the intention of the motion was, nor what he should do himself, nor whether a new ministry was in the making, nor if the old one had ever existed, and therefore he would not vote for the motion.\(^e\) The Times believes, however, that the motion will be passed this evening.\(^f\) On January 26, 1810, as we recall, resistance was mounted in the English Parliament against Lord Porchester's proposal to establish a committee of inquiry into the

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\(^a\) S. Herbert's speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—Ed.  
\(^b\) See this volume, pp. 220 and 228.—Ed.  
\(^c\) Paraphrase of a couplet from Goethe's Sprichwörtlich.—Ed.  
\(^d\) H. Drummond's speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—Ed.  
\(^e\) V. Smith's speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. The Times, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—Ed.  
\(^f\) The Times, No. 21963, January 29, 1855, leader.—Ed.
Walcheren Expedition. Similar resistance occurred on January 26, 1855. On January 29, 1810 the motion was passed, and England is a country of historical precedents.

The mere acceptance of peace negotiations allowed Russia to withdraw as many troops from the observation army on the Austrian border as can be replaced in two months or ten weeks, i.e. at least 60,000-80,000. We now know that the entire former (Russian) Danube army has ceased to exist as such, as the 4th Corps has been in the Crimea since the end of October, the 3rd arrived there in the final days of December and the rest of the 5th Corps, together with the cavalry and reserves, are at present marching thither. The new distribution of these troops, who have to be replaced on the Bug and Dniester by troops from the Western Army (stationed in Poland, Volhynia and Podolia), and the fact that in addition parts of the 2nd Corps and the reserve cavalry are likewise heading for the Crimea, are sufficient explanation, even disregarding all the other secondary diplomatic aims involved, why Russia did not hesitate a moment to resume negotiation on the so-called "basis". A period of two to three months is of decisive importance for her, because her army, spread out on the long line from Kalish to Ismail, is without reinforcements no longer capable of resisting the growing numbers of the Austrian army confronting it. In order to prove this in more detail we present here a survey, emanating from the best possible sources—and overestimating, rather than underestimating, the strength of the Russian forces—of the strength and position of the large Russian army on active service, which is to operate against the South and West of Europe. Initially it consisted of six army corps, each of 48 battalions, two corps of picked troops (Guards and Grenadiers), each 36 battalions strong, together with a relatively large number of cavalry, regular and irregular, and artillery. The Russian Government then called up reserves in order to form the 4th, 5th and 6th battalions of picked troops, and the 5th and 6th battalions of the other army corps. By raising more new troops it soon afterwards added a 7th battalion and 8th to each regiment, thus doubling the number of battalions in the line corps and more than doubling them for the picked troops.

These forces may be approximately estimated as follows: Guards and Grenadiers—the first four battalions of each regiment=96 battalions of 900 men=86,400 men, ditto the last four battalions of each regiment, ditto of 700 men=67,200 men. The 1st and 2nd Corps (not yet engaged)—the first four battalions of each
regiment=96 battalions of 900 men=86,400 men. The last four battalions of each regiment=96 battalions of 700 men=67,200 men. The 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps—the first four battalions of each regiment=192 battalions of 500 men=96,000 men; the last four battalions of each regiment=192 battalions of 700 men=134,400 men. The Finland Corps—14,400 men. [Total]=784 battalions comprising 552,000 men. Cavalry (regular)—80,000 men. Cavalry (irregular)—46,000 men. Artillery—80,000 men. Total 758,000 men. Casualties have hitherto affected only the 96 active battalions of the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Corps.

After deducting the 1st Division of the 5th Corps, which is at the Caucasus, there remain 750,000 men, that are now distributed as follows: On the shores of the Baltic Sea the Baltic Army under General Sievers, consisting of the Finnish Corps and the reserves of the Guards, Grenadiers and the 6th Corps, together with cavalry, etc., approximately 135,000 men, of which a proportion are raw recruits and recently organised battalions: In Poland and on the Galician border, from Kalish to Kamenez, the Guards, the Grenadiers, the 1st Corps, the 2nd Division of the 6th Corps, some of the reserves of the Grenadiers and of the 1st Corps, plus cavalry and artillery, approximately 235,000 men. The crack troops of the Russian Army are commanded by Gorchakov. In Bessarabia and between the Dniester and the Bug, there are two divisions of the 2nd Corps and a part of the reserves, approximately 60,000 men. These formed a part of the army of the West. But when the Danube army was sent to the Crimea they were detached from the Western army in order to take the place of the Danube army and, under the command of General Panyutin, they are now confronting the Austrian army in the Principalities. Intended for the defence of the Crimea: the 3rd and 4th Corps, two divisions of the 6th Corps and reserves, as well as one division of both the 2nd and 5th Army Corps on the march, together with cavalry they amount to some 170,000 men under Menshikov. The rest of the reserves and newly formed battalions, particularly of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Corps, are being reorganised as the great reserve army under General Cheodayev. This reserve army, numbering about 150,000 is concentrated in the interior of Russia. How many of them are marching towards Poland or southward is unknown.

Thus while at the end of last summer Russia could muster less than 500,000 men on the western borders of her empire, from Finland to the Crimea, she now has 600,000 men, besides a reserve army of 150,000. Nevertheless she is weaker vis-à-vis
Austria than at that time. Then, in August and September, there were 270,000 Russians in Poland and Podolia, while the army on the Pruth, Dniester and Danube amounted to roughly 80,000 men, making a total of 350,000 men capable of operating together against Austria. Now—there remain only 295,000 men, while Austria has 320,000 directly confronting them and can support them with another 70,000-80,000 in Bohemia and Moravia. Therefore Russia cannot risk an offensive operation at the present moment. In an open country like Poland, without any big river lines between the two armies, this is synonymous with the necessity of retiring to a tenable position. If Austria attacked now the Russian army would have to split up into two halves, one withdrawing towards Warsaw, the other towards Kiev, separated by the inaccessible marshlands of Polesye, which extend from the Bug to the Dnieper. Therefore at the present moment it is essential for Russia to gain time. Hence her “diplomatic considerations”.

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Karl Marx and Frederick Engels

THE LATE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

In recording the advent of Lord Palmerston’s Government to what we are confident must prove a brief and not very brilliant career, it seems not improper to cast a glance at the history of its predecessor, of which it is hard to say whether the splendor of its opening pretensions, the momentous nature of the events in which it participated, its unprecedented incapacity, or the ignominy of its downfall will the most distinguish the future record of its existence.

It will be remembered that Lord Aberdeen and his Coalition came into office through the vote which upset, on the 16th December, 1852, the Derby Administration. Disraeli, in a vote upon his budget, was left in a minority of nineteen, under the pretext that his extension of the house-tax and of the general area of direct taxation was not in harmony with Whig and Peelite principles of sound political economy. The vote, however, was in reality carried by the Irish Brigade, whose motives, as is well known, are of a far less theoretical nature; and even the so-called Liberals and liberal Conservatives had to belie their words by their acts when they repeated in their own budget many of Disraeli’s proposals and most of his arguments. At all events, the Tories were turned out, and, after some struggles and fruitless attempts, this Coalition was formed, by which, according to The London Times, England had now arrived “at the commencement of the political millennium.” This millennium lasted exactly two years

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\(a\) The Times, No. 21316, January 4, 1853, leader.—Ed.

\(b\) The thousand years during which holiness is to be triumphant throughout the world. Some believe that during this period Christ will reign on earth in person with his saints.—Ed.
and one month; it ended in universal defeat and disaster, amid the general indignation of the British people. The very *Times* which inaugurated the reign of "All the Talents" as a millennium, was, of all journals, the one which contributed most toward its downfall.

The Talents met Parliament on the 10th of February, 1853. They recited over again the identical Whig programme which Lord John Russell had already once inaugurated in 1850 and which had then very soon led to a ministerial turn-out. As to the main question, Parliamentary Reform, that was a matter which could not be thought of before "next session." For the present the country was to be satisfied with minor, but more plentiful and more practical administrative reforms, such as law-reform, railway-regulations, and improvements in education. The retirement of Lord John Russell from the Foreign office, where he was replaced by Lord Clarendon, was the first of the changes which characterize this talented administration, and which all ended in the institution of new places, new sinecures, new salaries for its faithful supporters. Russell was for a time a member of the Cabinet, without any function but that of Leader of the House of Commons, and without salary; but he very soon applied for the latter commodity, and finally was elevated to the style and title of President of the Council, with a good round sum per annum.

On the 24th of February Lord John brought in his bill for removal of Jewish Disabilities, which ended in nothing, being burked by the House of Lords. On the 4th of April, he followed it up by his Educational Reform bill. Both bills were as tame and innocuous as could be expected from a Do-Nothing Ministry. Meanwhile, Palmerston, in his position as Home Secretary, discovered the new gunpowder-plot, the great Kossuth-Hale rocket affair. Palmerston, it will be recollected, had Mr. Hale's rocket factory searched, and a quantity of rockets and composition seized; the matter was made a great deal of, and when discussed in Parliament, on April 15, Palmerston gave it still greater importance by his mysterious language. But about one point he used no mystery; he declared himself the general informer of the Continental police, with regard to refugees, quite as openly as Sir James Graham had done in 1844, on the occasion of the opening of Mazzini's letters. At last, however, the affair had to be virtually abandoned by the noble informer, in as much as Mr. Hale could only be charged with having carried on a manufacture of explosive matter at an unlawful proximity to the suburbs of
London; and the great plot for blowing up all Europe was reduced to a simple, fineable contravention of police regulations!

It was now Russell's turn again. On May 31, in a speech in the House, he offended the Roman Catholics—the men who had put him in office—in such a manner that the Irish members of the Administration at once resigned. This was more than the "strong Government" could stand. The support of the Irish Brigade was the first condition of its existence, and, consequently, Aberdeen, in a letter to one of the Irish members, had to disavow his colleague, and Russell had to retract in Parliament.²

The main feature of this session was the East India bill, by which the Ministry proposed, without any material improvement of Indian government, to renew the East India Company's charter for twenty years. This was too bad, even for such a Parliament, and had to be abandoned. The charter was to be revocable by Parliament at a year's notice. Sir Charles Wood, the late bungling Chancellor of the Exchequer of the Russell Cabinet, now proved his capabilities in the Board of Control, or Indian Board. The whole of the reforms proposed were confined to a few petty alterations of doubtful effect in the judicial system, and the throwing open of civil employments and the scientific military service to public competition. But these reforms were merely pretexts; the real gist of the bill was this: Sir Charles Wood got his salary as President of the Board of Control raised from £1,200 to £5,000; instead of 24 India Directors elected by the Company, there were to be only 18, six of whom were in the gift of Government, an accession of patronage which was the less despicable as the Directors' salaries were raised from £300 to £500, while the Chairman and Deputy-Chairman received £1,000. Not satisfied with this waste of public money, the Governor-General of India, formerly at the same time Governor of Bengal, was now to have a separate Governor of that Presidency under him, while a new Presidency, with a new Governor, was to be created on the Indus. Every one of these Governors must, of course, have his Council, and overpaid and luxurious sinecures the seats in these Councils are. How happy India should be, governed as it is, at last, according to unsophisticated Whig principles!

Then came the Budget. This splendid financial combination, along with Mr. Gladstone's scheme for doing away with the

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² Aberdeen to Monsell, June 3, 1853. The Times, No. 21447, June 6, 1853; Lord John Russell's speech in the House of Commons on June 6, 1853. The Times, No. 21448, June 7, 1853.—Ed.
national debt, has been so fully illustrated in *The Tribune*\(^a\) that it is needless to recount its features. Many of them were taken from Disraeli's budget, which had so much roused the virtuous indignation of Gladstone; nevertheless the reduction of the tea duty, and the extension of direct taxation, were common to both budgets. Some of its most important measures were forced upon the great financier after his opposition against them had been repeatedly voted down in Parliament; thus the repeal of the Advertisement duty, and the extension of the Succession duty to landed property. The reform of the Licensing system, several times remodeled pending the discussion, had to be dropped. The budget, brought out with pretensions to a complete system, transformed itself during the debate into a confused *mixtum compositum*\(^b\) of unconnected little items, hardly worth a hundredth part of the talk they occasioned.

As to the reduction of the national debt, Gladstone broke down still more completely. This scheme, brought forward with still greater pretensions than the budget, resulted in creating 2\(\frac{1}{2}\) per cent. Exchequer bonds, instead 1 per cent. Exchequer bills, the public thus losing 1\(\frac{1}{2}\) per cent. on the whole amount; in the necessity for the repayment, at the greatest public inconvenience, of the whole amount of the Exchequer bills, as well as of 8 millions of South Sea\(^c\) stock; and in the total failure of his Exchequer bonds, which nobody would take. By this wonderful arrangement, Mr. Gladstone had the satisfaction of seeing the balance in the Exchequer diminished, on the 1st April 1854, from £7,800,000 which it was a year before, to £2,800,000, thus reducing, on the very eve of a war, the available funds of the public treasury by five millions. All this in the face of the secret correspondence of Sir H. Seymour, by which the Government must have known a year beforehand that a war with Russia was inevitable.

The new Irish Landlords and Tenants' bill,\(^d\) brought in under Lord Derby, by the Tory Napier, passed the Commons with at least some show of consent on the part of the Ministry; the Lords threw it out, and Aberdeen stated, on the 9th of August, his satisfaction at this result. The Transportation bill,\(^e\) Navigation bill, and others which passed into law, had been inherited from the Derby Cabinet. The bills on Parliamentary Reform, National

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\(^a\) See present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 44 and 66 and this volume, pp. 117-18 and 184-88.— Ed.

\(^b\) Mixture.— Ed.

\(^c\) Joseph Napier.— Ed.
Education Reform, and almost all bills on Law Reform, had to be postponed. The British Whigs seem to consider it a misfortune that any of their measures should escape this fate. The only bill which passed, and which may be considered as the rightful property of this Ministry, is the Great Cab Act, which had to be reformed the day after its passage, in consequence of a general rebellion of the cabmen. Not even a set of regulations for cabs could All the Talents bring into successful existence.

On the 20th of August, 1853, Palmerston dismissed Parliament with the assurance that the people might be tranquil as to the Eastern difficulties; the evacuation of the Principalities was guaranteed by "his confidence in the honor and character of the Russian Emperor, which would move him to withdraw his troops from the Principalities!" On the 3d December, the Turkish fleet was destroyed by the Russians at Sinope. On the 12th, the Four Powers sent a note to Constantinople, in which, in reality, far more concessions were asked from the Porte than even in the preceding note of the Vienna Conference. On the 14th, the British Ministry telegraphed to Vienna that the Sinope affair was not considered an obstacle to the continuation of the negotiations. Palmerston consented expressly to this; but on the next day he resigned—ostensibly for some difference respecting Russell's Reform bill, in reality, in order to make the public believe that he had resigned on grounds of foreign and war-policy. His purpose being obtained, he re-entered the Cabinet after a few days and thus avoided all unpleasant explanations in Parliament.

In 1854, the performance opened with the resignation of one of the junior Lords of the Treasury, Mr. Sadleir, who also was the Ministerial broker of the Irish brigade. Scandalous disclosures in an Irish Court of law, deprived the Administration of his talents. Afterward fresh scandalous matter came forward. Mr. Gladstone, the virtuous Gladstone, attempted to procure the governorship of Australia for one of his relations, his own secretary, a certain Lawley, known only as a betting-man and a jobber on the Stock Exchange; but, fortunately, the matter crept out too soon. In the same way, the same Gladstone was unpleasantly connected with vice by the absconding with a considerable amount of public money, of one O'Flaherty, a man employed under him and placed in his post by him. Another individual, of the name of Hayward, wrote a voluminous pamphlet of no literary or scientific value against Disraeli, and was rewarded by Gladstone with an office in the Poor-Law Board.
Parliament met in the beginning of February. On the 6th Palmerston gave notice of a bill for the organization of the militia in Ireland and Scotland; but, as war was actually declared on the 27th March, he considered it his duty not to bring it forward before the end of June. On the 13th Russell brought in his Reform bill, only to withdraw it ten weeks later, "with tears in his eyes," also because war had been declared. In March, Gladstone comes forward with his budget, asking merely "for the sum which would be necessary to bring back the 25,000 men about to leave the British shores." Thanks to his colleagues, he is now saved that trouble. In the meantime the Czar, by the publication of the secret correspondence, forced the French and English Cabinets to declare war. This secret correspondence, beginning with one of Russell's dispatches of the 11th January, 1853, proved that at that time the British Ministers were fully aware of the aggressive intentions of Russia. All their assertions about the honor and character of Nicholas, and the pacific and moderate attitude of Russia, now looked like so many barefaced untruths, invented merely to humbug John Bull.

On the 7th of April, Lord Grey, feeling a strong vocation for the post of Minister of War, in order to ruin discipline in the army as he had ruined allegiance in almost every British Colony during his former Colonial administration—Lord Grey launched a philippic against the present organization of the War Department. He asked for a consolidation of all its offices under one War Minister. This speech gave Ministers an opportunity to create, in June, a new Secretaryship for War, by separating the War Department from the Colonial Department. Thus everything was left as defective as heretofore, while merely a new office with a new salary was created. The whole of that session of Parliament may be summed up thus: seven principal bills were brought in; of these, the bills for the change of the Law of Settlement, for Public Education in Scotland, and for the reconstruction of Parliamentary oaths—another shape of the Jews bill—were defeated; three others, the Bribery Prevention bill, the Civil Service Reorganization bill, and the Reform bill, were withdrawn; one bill, the Oxford University Reform bill, passed, but in a dreadfully mutilated state.

a Lord John Russell's speech in the House of Commons on April 11, 1854. The Times, No. 21713, April 12, 1854.—Ed.
b Mr. Gladstone's speech in the House of Commons on March 6, 1854. The Times, No. 21682, March 7, 1854.—Ed.
c Reference to Seymour's dispatch to Lord Russell of January 11, 1853.—Ed.
The conduct of the war, the diplomatic efforts of the Coalition need not here be alluded to. They are fresh in the memory of everybody. Parliament, prorogued on the 12th of August last, met again in December to pass hurriedly two measures of the utmost urgency; the Foreign Legion bill, and the bill permitting the Militia, as such, to volunteer for service abroad. Both of them have remained, to this day, a dead letter. In the mean time the news of the disastrous state of the British army in the Crimea arrived. The public indignation was roused; the facts were glaring and undeniable; Ministers had to think of retreat. Parliament met in January, Roebuck gave notice of his motion, Lord J. Russell at once disappeared, and a defeat unparalleled in Parliamentary history upset All the Talents after but a few days' debate.

Great Britain has had many a seedy administration to boast of, but a Cabinet so seedy, needy and greedy, and at the same time so presumptuous as All the Talents, never existed. They began with unbounded boasting, lived upon hair-splitting and defeat, and ended in disgrace as complete as it is possible for man to attain.

Written on February 1, 1855

Reproduced from the *New-York Daily Tribune*, No. 4321, February 23; reprinted in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune*, No. 1018, February 27, 1855 as a leader
London, February 2. Yesterday evening the House of Commons again adjourned after Palmerston had made the official announcement of the resignation of the Ministry.

In the House of Lords, Aberdeen gave the funeral oration of the “Cabinet of all the Talents”\(^a\). He said that he had opposed Roebuck’s motion not because his Administration wished to avoid an inquiry but because the motion was unconstitutional. Aberdeen avoided, however, giving any historical illustration of this in the manner of his friend Sidney Herbert, who asked the Commons if it was of a mind to imitate the French Directory (founded 1795), which sent out commissars to arrest Dumouriez—commissars who, as everybody knows, were extradited to Austria by Dumouriez in 1793.\(^44\) Such learning is shunned by our Scottish thane. His Cabinet, he assures us, would only stand to gain by a committee of inquiry. He goes even further. He anticipates the outcome of the inquiry in a panegyric over himself and his colleagues, firstly the Secretary for War, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, then the First Lord of the Admiralty and finally the Foreign Secretary. Each is claimed to have been a great man in his job—a talent. As far as England’s military situation is concerned, the position of the Crimean army is, he admits, vexatious, but Bonaparte has told Europe that the French army comprises 581,000 men; in addition he is said to have ordered a new levy of 140,000. Sardinia had placed 15,000 splendid troops at the disposal of Lord Raglan. If

\(^a\) Speeches by Aberdeen, Derby and Newcastle in the House of Lords on February 1, 1855 were published in *The Times*, No. 21967, February 2, 1855.— *Ed.*
the peace negotiations in Vienna should break down then they were assured of the aid of a great military power with an army of 500,000 men.

At any rate our Scottish thane does not suffer from the same fault as the great economist and historian Sismondi, who, as he relates himself, saw everything in black with one eye. Aberdeen sees rosy colours with both eyes. Thus he now discovers thriving prosperity in all districts of England, while businessmen, manufacturers and workers allege that they are suffering from a major trade crisis. His antagonist Lord Derby is sprinkled by him with a measure of the Attic salt that Lord Byron long ago lauded in the Scottish thane.a

My lords, the present need of the country is a strong Administration. How that is to be formed it was not for him to say. Rumour has asserted very confidently that Lord Derby has been commanded by Her Majesty to undertake the formation of an Administration. But seeing him in his place, he presumes that this was not the case and that public rumour errs.

In order to grasp the Attic subtlety of this statement it is necessary to compare it with Lord Derby's reply:

"The noble earl Aberdeen has certainly underrated the source of his information, because not only may general rumour have informed him on the subject, but previously to entering into this House he (Derby) had, under his own hand, given the noble earl information as to the result of this command received from the Queen. Consequently, the general rumour which led the noble earl to believe it might be possible that he (Derby) had had some communication with Her Majesty are phrases which must have been employed by the noble earl in his usual care to guard against exaggeration and to avoid overstating any part of his case."

In this situation Derby then declared that the state of the parties at the moment and the present position in the House of Commons did not permit him to undertake the formation of an Administration.

For the audience in the House of Lords, and for the noble peers themselves, the elucidations of the War Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, and the picture that he painted of the interior of the "harmonious family" not only supplanted all interest in the Crimean army but even in the ministerial crisis. Lord John Russell's declaration in the Commons obliged him—said the Duke of Newcastle—to make a statement about his personal position in the defeated Cabinet. Russell's version of the story had been neither complete nor faithful. In the matter of the separation of the War Office from the Colonial Office he had insinuated that he

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a Byron, English Bards and Scotch Reviewers.—Ed.
had only reluctantly given way to Newcastle’s “strong wish” when he consented to the bestowal of the War Office on the Duke. Rather, when this separation was decided by the Cabinet he (Newcastle) had stated that “as far as he personally was concerned he was quite prepared to assume either or neither of the two departments”. He could not, he said, remember Russell ever having expressed the desire to give the War Office to Palmerston, but recollected that Russell himself once wished to take it over. He (Newcastle) had never thought of putting obstacles in his path. He had accepted the War Office, he said, in the full awareness that in the eventuality of success he would not receive the credit for it, and, in the eventuality of failure, all blame would be thrust on him. But he had deemed it his duty not to desert in the face of the danger and difficulties of this thankless post. This was, he went on, what some people had called his “arrogance”, and Lord John Russell in his nobly patronising fashion had termed his “commendable ambition”. Lord Russell, he claimed, had deliberately withheld from the House of Commons the following passage from a letter from Aberdeen to the noble Lord:

“I have shown your letter to the Duke of Newcastle, and Sidney Herbert. They both, as might have been expected, strongly urged me to adopt any such arrangement with respect to their offices as should be thought most conducive to the public service.”

At this juncture he (Newcastle) had declared verbally to Aberdeen:

“Do not give Lord Russell any pretext for quitting the Government. On no account resist his wishes to remove me from office. Do with me whatever is best for the public service.”

Lord John Russell, he said, had referred mysteriously in the Commons to the errors which he had denounced in writing to Aberdeen. He had taken good care not to read out the relevant passages. The first concerned the failure to send the 97th Regiment from Athens to the Crimea, but the Foreign Secretary had declared the withdrawal of English troops from Athens to be impermissible and dangerous. As regards his second error, that he failed to send out 3,000 recruits, Lord Raglan had protested against the further supply of such young and undisciplined soldiers. Moreover, he said, at that time there had been no transport ships available. These two alleged errors were all that Russell had managed to concoct, relaxing with his colleagues in bathing resorts while he (Newcastle) had remained at his post toiling away throughout the year 1854. Incidentally, Russell
himself had finally written to him on October 8 regarding the “errors”:

“You have done all that could be done and I am sanguine of success.”

Moreover, he went on, Aberdeen had put Russell’s proposal concerning changes in personnel before the whole Cabinet. It had been unanimously rejected. On December 13 he (Newcastle) had defended his management of affairs in a detailed speech in the House of Lords; on December 16 Russell told Aberdeen that he had changed his mind and had given up his wishes regarding the change in posts. Russell, he continued, had never taken any measures or made any proposals as to the reform of the War Administration, with two exceptions. Three days before his resignation and, Roebuck’s motion there had been a Cabinet meeting. Russell suggested giving the meetings of the heads of all the military departments, which had been taking place at the offices of the Secretary for War, a formal and official character. Russell’s proposal was accepted. Shortly afterwards, Russell had sent in a written proposal, which, apart from the innovation already approved by the Cabinet, contained only two suggestions: 1. the creation of a supreme board headed by the Secretary of State for War to absorb the Board of Ordnance and control the entire civil administration of the army; 2. the appointment of two senior officers, apart from the heads of the war departments hitherto involved, to this supreme board. Russell declared in the Commons that he had had good reason to believe that his “written proposals” would be rejected. This was untrue. Suggestion No. 1 was accepted by Newcastle; suggestion No. 2 was rejected, among other reasons because the “Commissary General” whom Russell wished to call in had for many years been a mythical person and no longer existed in the British army. Thus, he said, Russell had never made a proposal that had not been accepted. Moreover, he (Newcastle) had already informed Lord Aberdeen on January 23 that however Parliament might decide, whether for or against the Ministry, he would resign from the Ministry. He simply did not want to give the appearance of running away before Parliament had passed judgment.

Lord John Russell, whose whole life, as old Cobbett says, was just a series of “false pretexts for living”, has, as Newcastle’s speech shows, now died on false pretexts too.

Written on February 2, 1855
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Never in the whole annals of representative government has an administration been turned out half as ignominiously as the celebrated Cabinet of “all the Talents” in England. To be in a minority is a thing which may happen to anybody, but to be defeated by 305 against 148, by more than two to one, in an assembly like the Commons’ House of Great Britain, that was a distinction reserved for the galaxy of genius commanded by *cher Aberdeen.*

There is no doubt the Cabinet considered its days as numbered as soon as Parliament met. The scandalous proceedings in the Crimea, the utter ruin of the army, the helplessness of all and every one connected with the administration of the war, the outcry in the country, fed by the diatribes of *The Times,* the evident determination of John Bull to know for once who was to blame, or at least to wreak his wrath upon some one or another—all this must have proved to the Cabinet that the time had arrived when they must put their house in order.

Notices of threatening questions and motions were given in abundance and at once; above all, the notice of Mr. Roebuck’s threatening motion, for a committee to inquire into the conduct of the war, and of all parties who had any responsibility in its administration. This brought matters to an issue at once. Lord John Russell’s political scent made it at once clear to him that this motion would be adopted in spite of minorities⁴⁵⁰; and a statesman like him, who boasts of more minorities than years, could not well afford to be again outvoted. Accordingly, Lord John Russell, with that spirit of pusillanimity and pettifogging meanness, which is visible during his entire career, through a
cloak of important talkativity and constitutional precedentism, thought discretion the better part of valor, and decamped from office without giving his colleagues even a moment's notice. Now, although he is a man who can hardly expect to be missed anywhere, yet it appears that "all the talents" were entirely upset by his sudden retreat. The press of Great Britain unanimously condemned the little statesman, but what of that? All the press and all its condemnations could not set the ministerial "higgledy piggledy" up again; and in this state of disorganization, with the Duke of Newcastle resigning the War Office, and Lord Palmerston not having taken possession of it, the Cabinet had to meet Mr. Roebuck's formidable motion.

Mr. Roebuck is a little lawyer, who would be just as funny a little Whig as Lord John Russell, and quite as inoffensive, had he only been more successful in his parliamentary career. But the *ci-devant* briefless barrister, and present parliamentary spouter, has failed, with all his sharpness and activity, to amass any political capital worth speaking of. Though generally a sort of secret and confidential understrapper to any Whig Ministry, he never succeeded in reaching that position which insures Place, the great goal of all British Liberals. Our friend Roebuck, blighted in his blandest hopes, underestimated by his own party, ridiculed by his opponents, gradually felt the milk of human kindness turning sour within his bosom, and became, by and by, as invidious, unsociable, unpleasant, provoking a little cur as ever barked on the floor of a House of Parliament. In this capacity he has served, in turns, all men who knew how to handle him, without ever gaining claims upon the gratitude or consideration of any party; and nobody knew how to make a better use of him than our old friend Palmerston, whose game he again was made to play on the 26th ult.

Mr. Roebuck's motion, as it actually stood, could hardly have any sense in an assembly like the British House of Commons. Everybody knows what clumsy, lazy, time-killing things the Committees of the Commons are; an investigation of the conduct of this war by such a committee would be of no practical use whatever, for its results would come many a month too late to do any good—even if any good did result from the inquiry. It is only in a revolutionary, dictatorial assembly like the French National Convention of 1793 that such committees might do any good. But

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\[b\] Former.—*Ed.*
there the Government itself is nothing but such a committee—its agents are the commissioners of the assembly itself, and, therefore, in such an assembly similar motions would be superfluous. Yet, Mr. Sidney Herbert was not entirely wrong in pointing out that the motion (surely quite unintentionally on Mr. Roebuck’s part) had a somewhat unconstitutional character, and in asking, with his usual historical accuracy, whether the House of Commons intended sending Commissioners to the Crimea, the same as the Directory (sic) did to General Dumouriez.\(^a\) We may as well observe here that this same precious chronology which makes the Directory (instituted 1795) send Commissaries to Dumouriez, whom this latter General had arrested and delivered up to the Austrians as early as 1793—that this chronology is quite of a piece with the confusion of time and space reigning in all the operations of Mr. Sidney Herbert and colleagues. To return to Mr. Roebuck’s motion, the informality alluded to served as a pretext to a great many candidates for place, not to vote for it, and thus to remain free to enter into any possible combination. And yet, the majority against Ministers was so crushing!

The debate itself was characterized particularly by the different departments of the Government quarreling among themselves. Each of them threw the blame upon the other. Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, said it was all the fault of the transport service; Bernal Osborne,\(^b\) Secretary of the Admiralty, said it was the viciously rotten system at the Horse Guards\(^{451}\) which was at the bottom of all the mischief; Admiral Berkeley, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, pretty distinctly advised Mr. Herbert to pull his own nose, &c. Similar amenities passed in the House of Lords, at the same time, between the Duke of Newcastle, War Minister, and Viscount Hardinge, Commander-in-Chief.\(^c\) Mr. Herbert’s position, it is true, was rendered extremely difficult by Lord John Russell, who, in explanations respecting his resignation, confessed that all that the press had said on the state of the Crimean army was substantially correct, and that the condition of the troops was “horrid and heart-rending.”\(^d\) After this, Sidney Herbert could do

\(^{a}\) See this volume, p. 627.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{b}\) The speeches of Bernal Osborne and Berkeley in the House of Commons on January 29, 1855 were published in \textit{The Times}, No. 21964, January 30, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{c}\) The speeches of the Duke of Newcastle and Viscount Hardinge in the House of Lords on January 29, 1855 were published in \textit{The Times}, No. 21964, January 30, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}

\(^{d}\) Lord John Russell’s speech in the House of Commons on January 26, 1855. \textit{The Times}, No. 21962, January 27, 1855.—\textit{Ed.}
no better than to give in to the facts without a murmur, and to make a series of extremely lame and partly unfounded excuses. He had to confess, even more pointedly, the complete incapacity and disorganization of the War Administration. We have succeeded with comparative ease in bringing 240,000 tons of stores of all descriptions, and a numerous army, after a 3,000 miles' journey, to Balaklava; and now follows a glowing account of all the clothing, the housing, the provisions, the luxuries even, sent in profusion to the army. But, alas! It was not at Balaklava they were wanted, but six miles higher up the country. Three thousand miles we can carry all the stores; but three thousand and six—impossible! The fact that they had to go six miles further has ruined everything!

For all that, his depreciating attitude might have aroused some pity for him, had it not been for the speeches of Layard, Stafford, and his own colleague, Gladstone. The two former members had but lately returned from the East; they had been eye-witnesses to what they recounted. And far from merely repeating what the papers had already published, they gave instances of neglect, mismanagement and incapacity; they described scenes of horror far surpassing what had been known before. Horses, shipped on sailing transports from Varna to Balaklava without any provender to feed them; knapsacks made to journey five or six times from the Crimea to the Bosphorus, while the men were starving, and cold and wet for want of their clothes contained in them; "reconvalescents" sent back for active duty to the Crimea while too weak to stand on their legs; then the disgraceful state of neglect, of exposure, of filth, to which the sick and wounded were exposed in Scutari, as well as in Balaklava and on board the transports—all this formed a picture, compared to which the descriptions of "Our Own Correspondent," or of private letters from the East, were pale in the extreme.

To counteract the terrible effect of these descriptions, the sapient self-complacency of Mr. Gladstone had to take its stand on the breach; and, unfortunately for Sidney Herbert, he retracted all the confessions made by his colleagues on the first night of the debate. Herbert had been asked point-blank by Roebuck: You sent 54,000 men from this country; there are now only 14,000 under arms; what has become of the remaining 40,000? Herbert merely replied

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a The speeches of Herbert and Layard in the House of Commons on January 26 and of Stafford and Gladstone on January 29, 1855 were published in The Times, Nos. 21962 and 21964, January 27 and 30, 1855.—Ed.
by reminding Roebuck that some of them had died already at Gallipoli and Varna; he never questioned the general correctness of the numbers quoted as lost or disabled. But Gladstone now turns out to be better informed than the Secretary at War, and actually makes the army number, not 14,000, but 28,200 men, besides from 3,000 to 4,000 marines and sailors serving on shore, "at the dates of the last returns which have reached us!" Of course, Gladstone takes good care not to say what these "dates of the last returns" are. But in view of the exemplary idleness displayed in all departments, and most particularly in the Brigade, Divisional and General Staffs, as evinced by the slow returns of casualties, we may be allowed to suppose that Mr. Gladstone's wonderful returns bear a date somewhere about the first of December, 1854, and include a great many men who were definitively knocked up by the six weeks bad weather and overwork following that date. Gladstone appears actually to have that blind faith in official documents which he on former occasions expected the public to have in his financial statements.

I will not enter into a more lengthened analysis of the debate. Beside a host of *dii minorum gentium,*a Disraeli spoke, also Walpole, the late Tory Home Secretary, and finally Palmerston, who "nobly" stood up for his calumniated colleagues.b Not a word had he said in the whole course of the debate, until he had ascertained its drift clearly. Then, and then only, he got up. The rumors brought up to the Treasury Bench by their understrappers, the general disposition of the House, made a defeat certain—a defeat which ruined his colleagues, but could not injure him. Though ostensibly turned out along with the remainder, he was so safe of his position, he was so sure to profit by their retirement, that it devolved upon him, almost as a duty of courtesy, to bow them out. And of this he acquitted himself by his speech just before the division.

Palmerston, indeed, has managed his resources well. Voted to be, on the Pacifico question, the "truly English Minister,"452 he has held that character ever since, to such an extent that in spite of all astounding revelations, John Bull always thought himself sold to some foreign power as soon as Palmerston left the Foreign Office. Ejected out of this office by Lord John Russell in a very

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a Lesser gods, figuratively—second-rate magnitudes.—*Ed.*

b The speeches of Walpole in the House of Commons on January 26, of Disraeli and Palmerston on January 29, 1855 were published in *The Times,* Nos. 21962 and 21964, January 27 and 30, 1855.—*Ed.*
unceremonious way, he frightened that little man into silence respecting the causes of this ejection, and from that moment the "truly English Minister" excited a fresh interest as the innocent victim of ambitious and incapable colleagues, as the man whom the Whigs had betrayed. After the downfall of the Derby Ministry, he was put into the Home Office, a position which again made him appear the victim. They could not do without the great man whom they all hated, and as they would not put him into that position which belonged to him, they put him off with a place far too low for such a genius. So thought John Bull, and was prouder still of his Palmerston, when he saw how the truly English Minister bustled about in his subordinate place, meddling with Justices of the Peace, interfering with cabmen, reprimanding Boards of Sewerage, trying his powers of eloquence upon the licensing system, grappling with the great Smoke Question, attempting police centralization, and putting a barrier in the way of intramural interments. The truly English Minister! His rule of conduct, his source of information, his treasury of new measures and reforms, were the interminable letters of "Paterfamilias"\(^a\) in *The Times*. Of course, nobody was better pleased than Paterfamilias, whose like form the majority of the voting middle classes of England, and Palmerston became their idol. "See what a great man can make of a little place! what former Home Secretary ever thought of removing such nuisances!" For all that, neither were cabs reformed, nor smoke suppressed, nor intramural churchyards done away with, nor the police centralized, nor any of these great reforms carried—but that was the fault of Palmerston's envious and thick-headed colleagues! By and by, this bustling, meddling propensity was considered as the proof of great energy and activity; and this unsteadiest of all English statesmen, who never could bring either a negotiation or a bill in Parliament to a satisfactory issue, this politician who stirs about for the fun of the thing, and whose measures all end in being allowed to go quietly to sleep—this same Palmerston was puffed up as the only man whom his country could count upon in great emergencies. The truth is, he contributed a great deal to this puffing himself. Not content with being co-proprietor of *The Morning Post*, where he was advertised every day as the future savior of his country, he hired fellows like the Chevalier Wykoff to spread his praise in France and America; he bribed, a few months ago, *The Daily News*, by communication of telegraphic dispatches and other

\(^a\) Presumably, Martin Farquhar Tupper.—*Ed.*
useful hints; he had a hand in the management of almost every paper in London. The mismanagement of the war brought on that emergency in which he intended to rise great, unattained and unattainable, upon the ruins of the Coalition. In this decisive moment he procured the unreserved support of The Times. How he managed to bring this about, what contract he made with Mr. Delane, of course we cannot tell. Thus, the day after the vote, the whole daily press of London, The Herald only excepted, with one voice cried out for Palmerston as Premier; and we suppose he thought he had obtained the object of his wishes. Unfortunately, the Queen has seen too much of the truly English Minister, and will not submit to him, if she can help it.

Written on February 2, 1855
Signed: Karl Marx

Reproduced from the New-York Daily Tribune
London, February 3. On December 16, 1852 the first point of Disraeli’s budget—extension of direct taxation, initially house duty, was defeated by a majority of 19 votes. The Tory Government resigned. After ten days of intrigues the Coalition Government was formed. It consisted of a section of the Whig oligarchy—the Grey clan was excluded this time—of the Peelite bureaucracy, an admixture of so-called Mayfair Radicals, such as Molesworth and Osborne, and finally the brokers of the Irish Brigade who had decided the issue on December 16—Sadleir, Keogh, Monsell—and were accommodated in subordinate ministerial posts. The Ministry described itself as the “Cabinet of All the Talents”. And in fact it did include nearly all the talents that had been relieving one another in government for thirty years and more. The Times proclaimed the “Cabinet of All the Talents” with the words: We have “now arrived at the commencement of the political millennium.” The “political millennium” had in fact dawned for the ruling classes the moment they discovered that their party formations had dissolved, that their internal contradictions were only due to personal whims and vanities, and that their reciprocal frictions could no longer grip the nation’s interest. The Coalition Government represented no particular faction. It represented “all the Talents” of the class that has hitherto ruled England. It is therefore important to cast a glance in retrospect at its achievements.

After the fall of the Derby ministry Parliament adjourned for the Christmas recess. It then adjourned again for the Easter recess. Not until then did the real session of 1853 commence,
almost completely taken up with the debates on Gladstone's budget, Sir Charles Wood's Bill on India and Young's Bill regulating the relations between landlords and tenant-farmers in Ireland.

Before introducing his budget Gladstone announced major operations to reduce the national debt—both floating and consolidated debts. The operation regarding the former consisted in a lowering of interest on Exchequer Bills from 1½d. to 1d. per day, and that at a time when the market rate of interest was rising. The result was that first he had to redeem 3 million Exchequer Bills, and then he had to reissue them at a higher rate of interest. Even more significant was his experiment with that monster, the consolidated national debt. The ostensible aim was its reduction. He acted so skilfully that at the end of the financial year he had to buy back 8 million South Sea notes at par, though at the current stock exchange price they were only worth 85 per cent. At the same time he launched on to the stock exchange a new security invented by himself—Exchequer bonds. He had got Parliament to authorise him to issue £30 million worth of these securities. With some difficulty he got rid of £400,000 worth. In a word: his operations to reduce the national debt resulted in an increase of the capital of the consolidated debt, and an increase in the rate of interest of the floating debt.

His budget, the pride of the Coalition, consists of various heterogeneous elements. Parts of it, such as the reduction of tea tax, of excise duty (except that he reduced it on soap, and Disraeli on malt) and the increase in direct taxation, have been borrowed from the budget of his predecessor. The other and most important provisions such as imposition of death duty on land, the abolition of tax on newspaper advertisements, etc., were forced on him since he twice failed to get his counter-proposals approved by the House. Other constituents of his plan, such as the new regulation of the licensing system, he was obliged to withdraw entirely. What he brought to the House as an encyclopaedic system emerged as a mish-mash of heterogeneous and contradictory items. His only remaining original contribution is the passage in the budget in which *The Times* is exempted from paying £30,000-40,000 p.a. as a result of the abolition of stamp duty on the supplements that *The Times* is the only one of the newspapers to publish. He insisted all the more firmly—and thus gained the goodwill of *The Times* to that it will not want to miss him in a new Administration either—one on the retention of stamp duty for the main part of the newspaper. Those were Gladstone's masterpieces
from which the Coalition derived its sustenance throughout the whole of the 1853 session.

The charter of the *East India Company* expired on April 30, 1854. England's relations with India thus had to be regulated anew. The Coalition intended renewing the charter of the East India Company for another 20 years. It failed. India is not to be "leased out" to the Company again for decades. It now exists only by "proclamation", which Parliament can send it any day. This, the only significant feature of the India Bill, was passed *despite* the Government. With the exception of a few marginal reforms in the Indian judiciary and the opening of civil posts and scientific military posts to all qualified applicants, the actual kernel of the India Bill may be summarised as follows: the salary of the minister governing India from London (President of the Board of Control\(^a\)) has been raised from £1,200 to £5,000 p.a. Of the 18 directors the government will henceforth elect six, and the meeting of share-holders of the East India Company only twelve. The salary of these directors has been raised from £300 to £900 and that of their two managers from £400 to £1,000. Moreover, the office of Governor of Bengal (together with his board of control) is in future to be separate from that of Governor General of India; a new President, plus board, is likewise to be created for the Indus district itself. The Indian reform of the Cabinet of All the Talents is limited to this raising of salaries and creating of new sinecures.

The Bills concerning relations between landlords and tenants in Ireland had been taken over by the Coalition Government from its Tory predecessors. It was not to be outdone by them. It adopted the Bills and carried them through the House of Commons shortly before the end of the session after a ten-month debate, or to be more accurate, allowed them to pass. In the House of Lords, on the other hand, Aberdeen consented to the rejection of the very same Bills—on the pretext of scrutinising them more closely and taking them up again in the next session.

The ministerial Bills for parliamentary reform, education, legal and judicial reforms were postponed by request of the Cabinet until the next session. The great work of "all the Talents"—the Bill regulating the cab-drivers of London—actually became law, but had scarcely crossed the threshold of Parliament before it had to return again to be refashioned. It had proved to be impracticable.

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\(^a\) Marx used the English term.— *Ed.*
Finally on August 20 Parliament adjourned. Palmerston summarised the foreign policy of the Ministry during this session when he dismissed Parliament with the words: It could adjourn without anxiety. He had full confidence in the honour and character of the Russian Emperor, who, he said, would evacuate the Danubian Principalities voluntarily.

Palmerston's public intervention in foreign policy was limited in the 1853 session to this declaration; to a parliamentary speech a few days before the adjournment of the House of Commons in which he treated the blocking of the Sulina estuary of the Danube by the Russians as a bad joke; and finally to the admission extracted from him in the sitting of April 15, 1853—on the occasion of the so-called Kossuth Powder Plot—that on behalf of continental courts he was employing the English police for the surveillance of political refugees.

Written on February 3, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung, No. 63, February 7, 1855
Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
London, February 5. The duration of the present ministerial crisis is more or less normal, as such crises last on average nine to ten days in England. It is astonishing that in his famous work *The Abilities of Man,*\(^a\) Quetelet manages to demonstrate that the annual total of accidents, crimes, etc., in civilised countries can be determined in advance with almost mathematical accuracy.\(^b\) The normal duration of English ministerial crises in different periods of the nineteenth century is, on the other hand, nothing amazing, for—as is well known—there are always a given circle of combinations to be traversed, a given number of posts to be disposed of, and a given sum of intrigues have to paralyse one another. The only extraordinary thing is the character of the combinations which the dissolution of the old parties necessitates this time. The fact of this dissolution made the formation of the fallen Coalition Ministry possible and inevitable. The governing caste, which in England is by no means the same as the ruling class, will be driven from one coalition to another, until the proof is furnished exhaustively that it has lost its calling to govern. The Derbyites, it will be remembered, had objected most vehemently to the Coalition. The first step of Lord Derby, as soon as the Queen had charged him to form a new Cabinet, was to attempt a coalition, not only with Palmerston—to whom Disraeli had expressly declared during the Roebuck debate that the proposed vote of censure was no more directed against the Duke of

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\(^a\) A. Quetelet. *Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés, ou Essai de physique sociale.*—*Ed.*

\(^b\) For details see present edition. Vol. 11, p. 497.—*Ed.*
Newcastle or Aberdeen than against him—but also with Gladstone and Sidney Herbert, that is with the Peelites, who are persecuted by the Tories with especial hatred as the immediate instruments of the disintegration of their party. When Russell in his turn is requested to form a Cabinet he attempts a coalition with the very same Peelites whose presence in the old Ministry he had taken as the pretext for his resignation, and who had given the lie to him in all the solemnity of a parliamentary sitting. Finally Palmerston, if he manages to form his Ministry, will merely present a second, little changed edition of the old Coalition Ministry. The Grey clan of Whigs will perhaps replace the Russell clan of Whigs, etc. The old parliamentary parties that had been entrusted with a monopoly of government now exist merely in the form of coteries; but the same causes that deprived these coteries of the strength to form parties, to differ from one another, deprive them of the strength to unite. No epoch in English parliamentary history, therefore, shows such disintegration into a mass of insignificant and fortuitous cliques as precisely the epoch of the Coalition Ministry. Only two of these cliques are numerically significant, the Derbyites and Russellites. In their train follows a highly ramified group of powerful old families with a numerous clientele. But it is precisely this numerical strength that constitutes the weakness both of the Derbyites and the Russellites. Too small to command an independent parliamentary majority, they are too large and have too many place-hunters to sustain in their own ranks to be able to buy sufficient support from outside by giving away important posts. The numerically weaker cliques of the Peelites, Greyites, Palmerstonians, etc., are therefore more suitable for forming coalition ministries. But the factor that enables them to form ministries—the weakness of each of these cliques—turns their parliamentary majority into a matter of chance, liable to be lost any day of the week whether by a combination of Derbyites and Russellites, or by a combination of the Manchester school, etc., with the Derbyites.

From another point of view the recently attempted combinations of Ministers are just as interesting. All of them contained members of the old Cabinet. The last is headed by the most important member of that Cabinet. And did not the House of Commons, in passing the Roebuck motion against all members of the old Coalition—as Palmerston himself declared in his reply to Disraeli—not only announce a vote of censure but also a committee

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a Palmerston.—Ed.
of inquiry? The committee is not yet appointed, the inquiry not yet opened, and the accused are again taking over the helm of State. But if Parliament possesses the power to topple the Ministry, the Ministry possesses the power to dissolve Parliament. What effect the prospect of dissolving the present Parliament must have may be gathered from the statement made by Sir John Trollope in the House of Commons on March 1, 1853:

"There are," he observed, "already 14 committees sitting which the House has created out of its Members to investigate the cases of bribery which occurred at the last parliamentary elections. If we continue in the same fashion, the whole of Parliament will disintegrate into committees of inquiry. And furthermore, the number of Members accused is so overwhelming that the unsullied remainder will not suffice to try them, or even inquire into their misdemeanours."

It would be hard to lose the seats bought so dearly right at the beginning of the third legislature—out of patriotism.

Written on February 5, 1855
First published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*, No. 65, February 8, 1855
Printed according to the newspaper
London, February 6. Public opinion is at present absorbed by two crises: the crisis of the Crimean army and the ministerial crisis. The former occupies the people; the latter, the clubs and drawing-rooms. According to the latest letters from the Crimea, which paint a gloomy picture, the English forces have shrunk from 14,000 to 12,000 men and the early relief of the siege of Sevastopol may be expected. In the meanwhile the drawing-room intrigue is being debated in the House of Commons. Lord [John] Russell and Mr. Gladstone\(^a\) once more fill a whole sitting with lengthy discourses on, for and against the resignation of the great Russell from a Cabinet that has ceased to exist. No new facts are advanced by either side but the old ones are ventilated. Lord John is his own advocate, Gladstone the advocate of the Duke of Newcastle. The profound probings into the fitness of the latter as Secretary of State for War are endowed with new lustre\(^b\) by the circumstance of there being no more army needing to be administered. Even the House of Commons, however, gave vent to its displeasure with its well-known, traditional grunting when at the end of his well-turned speech Gladstone let fall the words: “he wished that the whole misunderstanding (between Russell and Newcastle) could be revoked”.

Hence it was not the vote of no confidence in the House, even less the destruction of an English army that caused the ministerial

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\(^{a}\) The speeches of Lord John Russell and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons on February 5, 1855 were published in The Times, No. 21970, February 6, 1855.— Ed.

\(^{b}\) Marx used the English word.— Ed.
crisis, but it simply amounts to a "misunderstanding" between an old lord and a young duke. The Crimea is merely an excuse for the drawing-room intrigue. The misunderstanding between Ministry and Commons does not even merit the honour of a mention. That was too strong even for this House of Commons. Russell was a flop, Gladstone was a flop, the whole sitting was a flop.

Both Houses were notified that Lord Palmerston had been charged with the formation of a Ministry. But he encountered unexpected obstacles. Lord Grey refused to assume the management of a war of which he disapproved from the outset and still disapproved. A stroke of luck, this, for the army, whose discipline he most surely would have broken, just as he had broken the discipline of the colonies in his time. But Gladstone, Sidney Herbert and Graham also proved to be intractable. They demanded the restoration of the Peelites, lock, stock and barrel. These statesmen are aware that they form only a small clique commanding about 32 votes in the Commons. Only if its "great" talents keep together can this little clique hope to preserve its independence. A section of the leading Peelites in the Cabinet and another outside of it—this would be synonymous with the disappearance of this excellent club for statesmen. In the meantime Palmerston is trying his hardest to dictate to Parliament, in which he has no party, in the same way that he dictated to the Queen. His Cabinet is still not formed and he is already threatening in The Morning Post to appeal from the legislature to the people.3 He threatens to dissolve the House should it dare "not to bestow on him the esteem which he enjoys outside the Palace of Westminster, amongst the public". This "public" is restricted to the journals half or wholly belonging to him. Wherever the people has recently made itself heard, e.g. at the meeting in Newcastle-upon-Tyne—whence petitions were addressed to Parliament to impeach the Ministry—Palmerston was denounced most vehemently as the secret leader of the late Coalition.

Now some additional information to complete the obituary of the "Cabinet of All the Talents". On November 30, 1853 occurred the incident at Sinope; on December 3 it became known in Constantinople; on December 12 the representatives [of the Four Powers] handed the Porte a note demanding greater concessions to Russia than the notorious Vienna note. On December 14 the British Government telegraphed to Vienna that Sinope should not

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3 The Morning Post, No. 25303, February 6, 1855, leader.—Ed.
interrupt the Vienna peace conference. Lord Palmerston attended the Cabinet meeting at which this was decided. He approved this decision but resigned from the Cabinet the following day on the pretext that the Reform Bill proposed by Russell conflicted with his conservative views. The real point was to wash his hands of the Sinope incident in front of the public. As soon as he had achieved this end he readily rejoined the Cabinet.

At the beginning of February 1854 Parliament is re-opened. The diplomatic documents on the Eastern troubles are ostensibly submitted to it. The most important papers are missing. Instead of receiving them from the British Ministers Parliament receives them from Tsar Nicholas via Petersburg. The "Secret and Confidential Correspondence" published there makes it as clear as day to an astonished Parliament that its Ministers have deliberately duped it over foreign policy throughout the entire sessions of 1853 and 1854. It [the Correspondence] compels the Ministers on March 27 to make a declaration of war. On February 6 Palmerston had announced that he would be introducing a Bill calling up the militia in Scotland and Ireland. But as soon as war is declared he postpones his Bill and does not introduce it until the end of June. On February 13 Russell introduces his Reform Bill, postpones the second reading until the end of April, withdraws it in March sobbing passionately and—hitherto having neither department nor salary—is rewarded for this sacrifice by his colleagues with a ministerial sinecure carrying a salary, being made Lord President of the Council, a minister extraordinary so to speak. On March 6 the great financier Gladstone presents his budget. He contents himself with doubling income tax for six months. He requests "only a sum which would be necessary to bring back the 25,000 men about to leave the British shores".

He has now been relieved of this worry by his colleague Newcastle. By May 8 he is already forced to present a second budget. On April 11 he declares himself opposed to any form of government loan; on April 21 he asks the House to sanction a loan of £6 million to meet the cost of his unfortunate conversion experiment with the national debt. On April 7 Lord Grey makes his speech on the shortcomings of the English war administration. On June 2 the Ministry uses the proposed reform—just as it had used the Reform of India and the Cholera Reform—in order to create a new post. The War Office is separated from the Colonial Office. All else remains as before. The legislative achievements of

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a The Times, No. 21722, April 22, 1854.—Ed.
the Ministry in this session may be summarised in this way: it introduces seven important Bills. It fails with three of them: the Settlement Bill, and the Bills for education in Scotland and for the alteration of the parliamentary oath. It withdraws three of them: the Bills for the prevention of electoral bribes, for the complete re-organisation of the Civil Service, and for the reform of Parliament. One Bill is passed, that for the reform of the University of Oxford, but so plastered with amendments that its original shape is no longer recognisable. The great diplomatic and military feats are fresh in everyone's memory. That was the "Cabinet of All the Talents".

Written on February 6, 1855
First published in the Neue Oder-Zeitung,
No. 67, February 9, 1855

Printed according to the newspaper
Published in English for the first time
FROM THE PREPARATORY MATERIALS
Madrid having been evacuated by the French, it was to be expected that Napoleon would soon re-appear at the head of a more powerful army. Measures of common defence became then inevitable, and it was generally felt that the Polyarchy of the Provincial Juntas, whose dissensions grew even more clamorous after the success at Beylen, must give way to some sort of Central Government. The juntas, however, anxious to retain their hold upon Power, resolved, upon the proposal of the Junta of Sevilla, to select each from their own body two deputies the reunion of whom was to constitute the Central Government, while the Provincial Juntas remained invested with the internal government of their respective government. Thus a Central Junta, composed of 34 deputies from the Provincial Juntas, met on September 26, 1808, at Aranjuez and remained at the head of affairs till January 29, 1810. This Central Junta was driven by the Invader from Madrid to Sevilla and from Sevilla to Cadiz. While they waged a war of edicts from the Royal Palace of Aranjuez, the pass of Samosierra was forced by the French, and while they amused the people with vigorous proclamations from Sevilla, the passes of the Sierra Morena were lost and Soult's army inundated Andalusia.

During the reign of the Central Junta, the Spanish armies disappeared from the soil, ignominious defeats overset each other, and the disastrous battle at Ocaña (November 19, 1809) was the last pitched battle which the Spaniards fought, from that time confining themselves to a Guerrilla warfare.

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a Here Marx made a note in the manuscript "(January 1809, Florida Blanca)." — Ed.
When "His Majesty"—this was the title assumed by the Junta—fled from Sevilla, Cadiz offered the only asylum, and if the Duke of Albuquerque, instead of marching his corps upon Cadiz, had in obedience to their orders proceeded to Cordova, his own army would have been cut off, Cadiz must have surrendered to the French, and there would have been an end of any Central Power in Spain. Where heroic resistance is exceptionally met with, it is not the regular armies, in the open field, but only on the part of assiéged towns as at Saragossa and Gerona.

These few reminiscences from the Spanish war of Independence suffice to characterise the Central Junta. The expulsion of the French army from the Spanish soil was the great object of their installation and in that object they signally failed. Under revolutionary still more than under ordinary circumstances the successes [of] armies reflect the character of the Central Government. The mere fact of the abandonment of the regular warfare for Guerrilla exploits proves the disappearance of the national centre before the local centres of resistance. Whence this failure of the National government?

The very composition of the Central Junta certainly not suited the task imposed upon them. Being for a dictatorial power too many and too fortuitously mixed together, they were too few to pretend to the authority of a National Convention. The mere fact of their power being delegated from the Provincial Juntas, incapacitated them to overcome the self-governing propensities, the bad will, and the capricious egotism of these Juntas. The two most marked members of the Central Junta: Florida Blanca—the octogenarian minister of the enlightened despotism of Charles III—and Jovellanos, a well-intentioned reformer who from overconscientious scruples as to the means never dared to accomplish an end—were certainly no match for the terrible crisis the country was placed in.

The sense of their own weakness and the unstable tenure of their power with respect to the people kept them in constant fear and suspicion of the generals to whom they were obliged to entrust the military commands. General Morla, himself a member of the Central Junta, went over into the Bonapartist Camp, after he had surrendered Madrid to Napoleon. Cuesta, [who] had begun with arresting the Leonese Deputies to the Central Junta and with forging plans for the restoration of the old authority of the Captains General and the royal audiencias, also seemed

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a Supreme Courts of Appeal in Spain and Latin America.—Ed.
afterwards to win the confidence of the Government in the same measure as he lost the battles of the country. Their distrust in Generals la Romana and Castaños, the victor of Beylen, proved well founded by the open hostility the former shew them in his address to the nation, d[e] d[ato]: Sevilla, on October 4, 1809, and the other by his conduct towards them when he became a member of the Regency. The Duke of Albuquerque, who of all the Spanish generals of that epoch was perhaps the only man to conduct a great war, seemed to be singularly gifted with all the dangerous qualities of a military dictator, a reason quite sufficient to remove him from all important commands. We may then give full credit to the Duke of Wellington writing to his brother, the Marquis of Wellesley, on September 1, 1809:

“I am much afraid, from what I have seen of the proceedings of the Central Junta, that in the distribution of their forces they did not consider military defence, and military operations, so much, as they do political intrigue, and the attainment of trifling political objects.”

The first popular government of Spain seemed overawed by a presentiment of the prominent part military men were destined to act in internal commotions. Devoid as they were of all truly revolutionary force by their very composition, the Central Junta could not but resort to petty intrigues in order to check the ascendancy of their own generals. On the other hand, incapable to resist the pressure of popular clamour, they often forced the generals into precipitate actions where the success could only be expected from most cautious and protracting stay upon the defensive.

Written between September 5 and 22, 1854

Reprinted from the manuscript 1854

... banner of revolution, the army of Ballesteros, which, since the capitulation of his chief [was] still concentrated at Priego, 10 leagues north of Malaga. On this his second Cadiz expedition he was made prisoner by one of General Molitor's corps, surrendered to the apostolical band, and sent to Madrid there to be executed, on the 7th November, four days before Ferdinand's return to the capital.

"Non por su culpa cayó Riego:
Por traición
De un vil Borbón."

("Not by his fault fell Riego but by the treason of a vile Bourbon.")

When Ferdinand on his arrival at Madrid was waited upon and congratulated by the officers of the bands of the Foi they having withdrawn, he exclaimed in the midst of his court: "It is the same dogs but with different collars".

The number of friars who in 1822 had mustered 16,310, amounted in 1830 to 61,727, being an increase of 45,417 in the course of 8 years. From the Madrid Gaceta we see that in the single month from the 24th August to the 24th September 1824, 1,200 persons were shot, hanged, and quartered, and then the barbarous decree against Comuneros, Freemasons, etc., had not

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a Riego.— Ed.
b Here the words "professional beggars" are crossed out in the manuscript.— Ed.
Original of unpublished extract from Marx's *Revolutionary Spain*
yet been divulged. The University of Sevilla was closed for years, but in its stead a governmental school of bullfighting was established.

Frederick the Great, conversing with his War Minister, asked him, which country in Europe he thought most difficult to ruin? Perceiving the minister to be rather embarrassed, he answered for him:

"It is Spain: as its own government has for many years endeavoured to ruin it—but all in vain."

Frederick the Great seems to have prognosticated the reign of Ferdinand VII.

The failure of the Revolution of 1820-1823 is easily accounted for. It was a middle class revolution and, more especially, a town revolution, while the country, ignorant, lazy, wedded to the pompous ceremonies of the church, remained passive observers of the party strife they did hardly understand. In the few provinces where they exceptionally took an active share in the struggle, it was rather on the side of the counter-revolution,—a fact not to be wondered at in Spain, "that storehouse of ancient customs, that repository of all, elsewhere forgotten and past by", a country where, during the war of independence peasants were seen using spurs taken from the armoury of the Alhambra and armed with halberds and pikes of curious and ancient workmanship, which had been wielded in the wars of the 15th century. Besides it was a feature peculiar to Spain that every peasant who had a noble ensign cut in stone over the door of his miserable cabin, considered himself a nobleman and that thus the country people, generally, if poor and plundered, did never groan under that consciousness of abject degradation which exasperated them in the rest of feudal Europe. That the revolutionary party did not know how to link the interests of the peasantry to the town movement, is avowed by two men, both of whom acted a principal part in the Revolution, by General Morillo and by San Miguel. Morillo, who cannot be suspected of revolutionary sympathies, wrote from Galicia to the Duke of Angoulême:

"If the Cortes had sanctioned the bill on the seignorial rights, and thus despoiled the grandees of their properties in favour of the multitude, Your Highness would

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a Examen critique des la révolutions d'Espagne. The decree mentioned by Marx was adopted on October 12, 1824.— Ed.

b John Bramsen, Remark of the North of Spain, p. 52.— Ed.
have encountered numerous, patriotic and formidable armies, which would have organized themselves, as they did in France, under similar circumstances”.

On the other hand San Miguel (see his Civil War of Spain, Madrid. 1836) tells us:

“The greatest error of the liberals consisted in their not considering that by far the majority of the nation were indifferent or hostile to the new laws. The numerous decrees published by the Cortes with a view to ameliorating the material condition of the people, were unable to produce so immediate results as were required by the circumstances. Neither the abolition of half the tithes, nor the sale of the monastic estates, contributed to ameliorating the material condition of the lower agricultural classes. The last measure, on the contrary, by throwing the land out of the hands of the indulgent monks into those of calculating capitalists, impaired the position of the old farmers by causing higher rents to be imposed upon them, so that the superstition of this numerous class, already wounded by the alienation of sanctified patrimony, became exaggerated by the suggestions of material interests”.

The revolutionary town population thus estranged from the mass of the nation, were therefore forced, in their struggle with the Grandees, the rural clergy, the monastic power, and the crown which represented all these antiquated elements of society, to depend altogether on the army and its chiefs. The very position thus usurped by the army in the revolutionary camp, together with its isolation from the masses, made it an instrument dangerous for the hands that wielded it, but inoffensive to the enemy it was to strike. Finally, the upper rank of the middle-class, the so-called Moderados, became soon lukewarm and then traitors to the Cause of the Revolution, lulling themselves, as they did, into the hope of getting their reign established by means of a French intervention and thus enjoying the fruits of a new society without painstaking and without admitting the plebeians to participate in them.

The positive result of the Revolution of 1820-1823 was not limited to the great fermentation which expanded the minds and renewed the character of some large classes of the nation. The second restoration, in which the antiquated elements of society assumed such shapes as to become insupportable to, and incompatible with the national existence of Spain, was itself a product of the Revolution. Its principal work was to whet the antagonism to such a point as to make all compromises impossible and a war to the knife inevitable. According to Lord Liverpool himself, there never was an extensive political change attended with less violence or bloodshed than the Spanish Revolution.
during 1820-1823.\(^a\) When we behold, therefore, the civil war of 1833-1843\(^b\) exterminating the antiquated elements of Spanish society,\(^b\) with fire and sword and disgracing itself by acts of cannibalism, we must not attribute the savage inexorableness of that epoch to the peculiar character of the Spanish race, but to the same force of circumstances that imposed upon France the reign of terrorism. While the French centralised and, therefore, abbreviated the reign of terrorism, the Spaniards, true to their traditions, decentralised and, consequently, procrastinated it. Conforming to Spanish tradition, the revolutionary party was not likely to prove victorious by subverting the throne. With them, to be successful, the Revolution itself needed to appear as a competitor for the throne. The struggle of the two societies ought to assume the form of a struggle of opposite dynastic interests. The Spain of the 19th century did her revolution with ease; when she was allowed to give it the form of the civil wars of the XIVth century. It was Ferdinand the Seventh who gave to the Revolution a royal name—that of Isabella, while he leagued to the counter-revolution the Don Quixote of the Auto-da-fé, Don Carlos. Ferdinand VII proved true to his character to the [end].\(^c\) If, during his whole life, he had cheated the liberals by false promises, should he not indulge the sport [when ch]eating the serviles on his death-bed?\(^463\) As to religious matters, he had always been a sceptic. He was unable to [con]vince himself that any one—even the Holy Ghost—should be so silly as to speak the truth.

Written between November 14 and 21, 1854

Reproduced from the manuscript 1854


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\(^b\) The words “the feudal and monastic power” are crossed out here.—*Ed.*

\(^c\) Here and below the manuscript is damaged. The words in square brackets are restored by the editors.—*Ed.*
APPENDIX
And as regards the journeyman of all descriptions, in what relation does he stand to his employer? All know with what opposition the employers met the "Ten Hours" bill. The Tories, out of spite for the recent loss of the Corn Laws, helped the working class to get it; but when passed, the reports of the district supervisors show with what shameless cunning and petty underhand treacheries it was evaded. Every subsequent attempt in Parliament to subject Labor to more humane conditions has been met by the middle class representatives with the catch-cry of Communism! Mr. Cobden has acted thus a score of times. Within the workshops for years the aim of the employers has been to prolong the hours of labor beyond human endurance, and by an unprincipl ed use of the contract system, by pitting one man against another, to cut down the earning of the skilled to that of the unskilled laborer. It was this system that at last drove the Amalgamated Engineers to revolt, and the brutality of the expressions that passed current among the masters at that time showed how little of refined or humane feeling was to be looked for from them. Their boorish ignorance was further displayed in the employment by the Masters' Association of a certain third-rate littérateur, Sidney Smith, to undertake their defense in the public press and to carry on the war of words with their revolted hands. The style of their hired writer well fitted the task he had to perform, and when the battle was over, the Masters, having no more need of literature or the press, gave their hireling his congé. Although the middle class do not aim at the learning of the old school, they do not for that cultivate either modern science or literature. The ledger, the desk, business, that is education
sufficient. Their daughters, when expensively educated, are superficially endowed with a few "accomplishments;" but the real education of the mind and the storing it with knowledge is not even dreamed of.

The present splendid brotherhood of fiction-writers in England, whose graphic and eloquent pages have issued to the world more political and social truths than have been uttered by all the professional politicians, publicists and moralists put together, have described every section of the middle class from the "highly genteel" annuitant and Fundholder who looks upon all sorts of business as vulgar, to the little shopkeeper and lawyer's clerk. And how have Dickens and Thackeray, Miss Brontë and Mrs. Gaskell painted them? As full of presumption, affectation, petty tyranny and ignorance; and the civilized world has confirmed their verdict with the damning epigram that it has fixed to this class that "they are servile to those above, and tyrannical to those beneath them."

The cramped and narrow sphere in which they move is to a certain degree due to the social system of which they form a part. As the Russian nobility live uneasily betwixt the oppression of the Czar above them and the dread of the enslaved masses below them, so the English middle class are hemmed in by the aristocracy on the one hand and the working classes on the other. Since the peace of 1815, whenever the middle class have wished to take action against the aristocracy, they have told the working classes that their grievances were attributable to some aristocratic privilege and monopoly. By this means the middle class roused the working classes to help them in 1832 when they wanted the Reform Bill, and, having got a Reform Bill for themselves, have ever since refused one to the working classes—nay, in 1848, actually stood arrayed against them armed with special constable staves. Next, it was the repeal of the Corn Laws that would be the panacea for the working classes. Well, this was won from the aristocracy, but the "good time" was not yet come, and last year, as if to take away the last possibility of a similar policy for the future, the aristocracy were compelled to accede to a tax on the succession to real estate—a tax which the same aristocracy had selfishly exempted themselves from in 1793, while they imposed it on the succession to personal estate. With this rag of a grievance vanished the last chance of gulling the working classes into the belief that their hard lot was due solely to aristocratic legislation. The eyes of the working classes are now fully opened: they begin to cry: "Our St. Petersburg is at Preston!" Indeed, the last eight
months have seen a strange spectacle in the town—a standing army of 14,000 men and women subsidized by the trades unions and workshops of all parts of the United Kingdom, to fight out a grand social battle for mastery with the capitalists, and the capitalists of Preston, on their side, held up by the capitalists of Lancashire.

Whatever other shapes this social struggle may hereafter assume, we have seen only the beginning of it. It seems destined to nationalize itself and present phases never before seen in history; for it must be borne in mind that though temporary defeat may await the working classes, great social and economical laws are in operation which must eventually insure their triumph. The same industrial wave which has borne the middle class up against the aristocracy, is now assisted as it is and will be by emigration bearing the working classes up against the middle classes. Just as the middle class inflict blows upon the aristocracy, so will they receive them from the working classes. It is the instinctive perception of this fact that already fetters the action of that class against the aristocracy. The recent political agitations of the working classes have taught the middle class to hate and fear overt political movements. In their cant, "respectable men don't join them, Sir". The higher middle classes ape the aristocracy in their modes of life, and endeavor to connect themselves with it. The consequence is that the feudalism of England will not perish beneath the scarcely perceptible dissolving processes of the middle class; the honor of such a victory is reserved for the working classes. When the time shall be ripe for their recognized entry upon the stage of political action, there will be within the lists three powerful classes confronting each other—the first representing the land; the second, money; the third, labor. And as the second is triumphing over the first, so, in its turn, it must yield before its successor in the field of political and social conflict.

First published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4145, August 1, 1854 as a leader

Reproduced from the newspaper
NOTES
AND
INDEXES
When determining the authorship and the date of writing of the majority of the articles by Marx and Engels published in the *New-York Tribune* between February 13, 1854 and February 6, 1855 (which make up the bulk of this volume), great use was made of Marx's Notebook for 1850-54 and the letters of Marx and Engels to each other and to third persons. Important additional information was also obtained from the study of sources used by Marx and Engels for their reports, the schedules of transatlantic ships, and other indirect data.

Marx's wife, Jenny, and sometimes Marx himself entered in the Notebook the dates on which the articles were sent from London to New York—usually on Tuesdays and Fridays. This was necessary for the accounts with the *Tribune* and was done in the form of lists, each with its own numbering. There are eight lists in all for the period covered by this volume, and each includes eight to fourteen articles. Unfortunately, such entries were only made up to December 22, 1854 and there are none for the next two years (1855 and 1856). Apart from the dates, these entries often contained summaries of the articles. Usually Marx dictated his articles to his wife Jenny or to Wilhelm Pieper (a participant in the 1848-49 revolution and a Communist League member) on the day of their dispatch, and Engels used to write his the day before. Sometimes Marx added to the articles received from Engels the latest information from English and French morning newspapers on the day of their dispatch to America. From June 1854 Engels was too busy with office work and could write articles only on Saturday and Wednesday evenings. The study of the sources he used suggests that as early as September 1854 he resumed his previous custom of writing the articles on Mondays and Thursdays, on the eve of their dispatch to London.

The editors of the *Tribune* treated the articles at their discretion, dividing them and publishing the most important items as leaders in their own name. Marx repeatedly protested against such practice but his financial dependence on the newspaper compelled him in the end to comply with the editors' terms. From the middle of 1855 all Marx's and Engels' articles were published unsigned. As a rule, the editors reprinted these articles from the *New-York Daily Tribune* in the *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, generally using the same matrix. All such instances are indicated in this volume at the end of the articles.
Notes to some articles also indicate instances when they were reprinted in the collection: K. Marx, *The Eastern Question. A Reprint of Letters written 1853-1856 dealing with the events of the Crimean War*, edited by Eleanor Marx-Aveling and Edward Aveling, London, 1897.

The article “The War Question in Europe” was written by Engels at Marx’s request and sent from Manchester to London on February 13. The article started with the words: “In the meantime, the armaments prepared...” (fourth paragraph). On February 14, Marx added to it an analysis of Napoleon III’s letter to the Russian Tsar and also some information which he had probably received from Urquhart (see Note 4).

In the Notebook the dispatch of the article was entered as “Dienstag. 14. Februar. Rüstungen”. The beginning of the first sentence, “Though the arrival of the Nashville puts us in possession of no decisive news from the seat of war” was inserted by the editors of the *Tribune*.

2 Napoleon III’s letter (January 29, 1854) was published by the editors in the same issue of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. They inserted the words “which we copy in another place”.

3 In 1853 and 1854 the Ambassadors of Britain, France and Prussia and the Austrian Foreign Minister Buol held a number of conferences in Vienna. The first, in July 1853, to which the Russian Ambassador was also invited but which he refused to attend, was officially aimed at mediation between Russia and Turkey in view of the worsening relations between them. The words “first Vienna Note” refer to the draft agreement between Russia and Turkey drawn up by Buol and concluded at the end of July 1853. It obliged the Sultan to abide by the Kuchuk-Kainardji (1774) (see Note 17) and the Adrianople (1829) (see Note 176) treaties on the rights and privileges of the Orthodox Church in the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Sultan Abdul Mejid agreed to sign the Note but demanded a number of changes and reservations, which the Russian Government found unacceptable.

4 Probably Marx heard about this letter from David Urquhart with whom he had a meeting at the time (see Marx’s letter to Engels of February 9, 1854, present edition, Vol. 39).

5 The phrase “by the steamer now due here, or at furthest within a few days” was inserted in Engels’ text by the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. They also added the following paragraph at the end of the article: “Our London correspondent in another column intimates his unwillingness to believe in such treachery, but facts are stubborn things, and the mind must at last be affected by their force. After having gone the desperate lengths they have avowedly done to avoid war, it is hard to think of anything they would shrink from.” This is an allusion to an article by F. A. Pulszky, who was also a London correspondent of the newspaper at the time and signed his reports “A.P.C.”. His article was published on p. 5 of the same issue of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.

6 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 17. Februar. Germany News”. Eleanor Marx included it under the title “Count Orloff’s Proposals” in *The Eastern Question*, in which the first paragraph was mistakenly ascribed to the editors of the *New-York Daily Tribune*.

8 The *German Confederation*—a union of German states formed by the Vienna Congress (see Note 112) on June 8, 1815. It initially included 34 absolutist feudal states and 4 free cities. The Confederation sanctioned the political and economic dismemberment of Germany and hindered the country's development. p. 8

9 The Kingdom of Sardinia, which existed from 1720 to 1861 and played a considerable role in the unification of Italy, consisted of Piedmont, Sardinia, Savoy, Nice and Liguria (including Genoa). p. 8

10 The article "Debates in Parliament" is dated February 21, 1854, which coincides with the date of its dispatch from London to New York entered in the Notebook.

   Eleanor Marx included this article in an abridged form in *The Eastern Question*. p. 11

11 The *British East India Company* was founded at the beginning of the seventeenth century. It enjoyed a monopoly of trade with the East Indies and played a decisive part in the establishment of the British colonial empire. p. 11

12 In accordance with the procedure adopted in the British Parliament, when certain important questions are to be discussed the House of Commons declares itself a Committee of the whole House, which is tantamount to a closed sitting. The Chairman of the Committee at such sittings is one of a list of chairmen, and is specially appointed by the Speaker for the given sitting; when discussing important questions covering state expenditures the House of Commons assembles as the Committee of Ways and Means. p. 11

13 In 1844, on the order of Sir James Graham, the British Home Secretary, the letters of the Bandiera brothers to Mazzini containing the plan of their expedition to Calabria were opened. The participants in the expedition were arrested, and the Bandieras executed. p. 13

14 In May 1851 the French Ambassador Lavalette arrived in Constantinople and delivered to the Sultan the demands of the French President Louis Napoleon that all the rights and privileges of the Catholic Church in Jerusalem be observed. By his firman (edict) of February 9, 1852 the Sultan recognised France's rights to protect the Catholic Church as defined in a number of previous Franco-Turkish treaties. p. 13

15 The *battle of Navarino* took place on October 20, 1827 between the Turko-Egyptian fleet and the British, French and Russian squadrons, under the English Vice-Admiral Edward Codrington, which were sent to the Greek waters by the European powers for the purpose of armed mediation in the war between Turkey and the Greek insurgents. The battle began when the Turkish command refused to stop the massacre of the Greek population; it ended in the...
defeat of the Turko-Egyptian fleet and hastened the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, in which Russia was victorious.

16 The reference is to John Aberdeen’s Coalition Ministry of 1852-55 (the Cabinet of All the Talents), which consisted of Whigs, Peelites and representatives of a faction of Irish Members.

17 The treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji was concluded between Russia and Turkey on July 21, 1774. Russia got territories on the northern shore of the Black Sea between the South Bug and the Dnieper with the fortress of Kinburn, and also Azov, Kerch and Yenikale and secured recognition of the Crimea’s independence. Russian merchantmen were granted the right of free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The treaty obliged the Sultan to grant a number of privileges to the Orthodox Church; Article 14 in particular provided for the building of an Orthodox Church in Constantinople.


19 Disraeli’s speech contained several inaccuracies, viz.: Count Nesselrode’s dispatch to Brunnov was dated June 1 (May 20) and not June 20, 1853, its contents were communicated to Lord Clarendon on June 8; the quotation only partly coincides with the dispatch, and the end of it was apparently taken by Disraeli from Clarendon’s letter to the English Ambassador to Vienna, the Earl of Westmorland, of July 4, 1853 (see Correspondence..., Part I, pp. 321-22).

20 The reference is to Lord Clarendon’s letters to the Earl of Westmorland of July 4 and to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe of July 28 (The Times mistakenly gives July 18), 1853. This quotation, from Disraeli’s speech, which The Times of February 21, 1854 gave as an extract from Lord Clarendon’s letter to Stratford de Redcliffe, was Disraeli’s own conclusion (Correspondence..., Part I, pp. 320-21, 399-400).

21 This refers to the battle between the Russian and Turkish troops at Oltenita on the left bank of the Danube on November 4, 1853 (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 516-22).

22 This article is dated February 24, 1854 which coincides with the date of its dispatch from London to New York as entered in the Notebook (“Freitag, 24. Februar. Pozzo di Borgo”). It was included in abridged form by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “Kossuth.—Disraeli and Hume.—United States.—France and England.—Greece”.

23 The Crimean war aroused hopes among European emigrants for a new upsurge of revolutionary liberation activity in Poland, Italy and Hungary. Preparations for such action were made by Mazzini, Garibaldi and Kossuth. In the winter of 1853-54, Kossuth negotiated—unsuccessfully—with the USA and France for aid in arms and money for the Hungarian emigrants who wished to fight against Tsarist Russia on the side of Turkey. Kossuth hoped to organise a Hungarian Legion expecting that its arrival at the Danubian theatre of war.
would spark off an uprising against Austrian rule in Hungary, where, on the basis of information received from his agents, he reckoned on the support of 130,000 Honveds. In the summer of 1853, Kossuth addressed a memorandum on the subject to the Turkish Government, but the latter, not wishing to enter into conflict with Austria, disapproved of all Kossuth's attempts to form a Hungarian Legion and only separate individuals got permission to enlist in the Turkish army on condition that they would embrace Islam. On January 7, 1854 Kossuth wrote to Gál, his agent in Constantinople, that Turkey had rejected the Hungarian proposal on the grounds that “as long as Turkey was on friendly terms with Austria contacts with the Hungarian emigrants were out of the question”.

On the formation of the Polish Legion see Note 122. p. 26

24 See Note 16. p. 26

25 This refers to the secret agreement between Denmark and Sweden to observe neutrality in the event of a war in Europe. King Oskar of Sweden informed his Parliament of this on December 27, 1853. The text of the treaty was brought to the knowledge of the European governments by a special note. p. 28

26 This refers to the dispatch of the Russian Ambassador in France Pozzo di Borgo to Chancellor Count Nesselrode dated October 16 (4), 1825 in reply to the latter's circular of August 18 (6), 1825 drawn up on instructions from Alexander I. The circular asked for the opinion of Russian Ambassadors abroad concerning the attitude of the Western powers to Russia in connection with the Eastern question and about the policy to be followed by Russia. Pozzo di Borgo recommended that Russia should resort to direct military action against Turkey. The dispatch was included in Recueil des documents pour la plupart secrets et inédits et d'autres pièces historiques utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle (juillet 1853) published in Paris. Marx used the second edition of this book (1854). p. 28

27 Карамзинъ, История Государства Российскаго, Т. XI, Спб., 1824, стр. 28 (Karamzin, The History of the Russian State, Vol. XI, St. Petersburg, 1824, p. 28). Where Marx took this quotation from is not established. p. 29

28 In 1839 war broke out between Turkey and Egypt, aggravating the Eastern problem and the conflict between the Great Powers. The Western states were afraid that Russia would intervene separately in the Turko-Egyptian war and sent a collective note to the Sultan suggesting their collaboration. However, the struggle between Britain and France for spheres of influence in the Middle East, in Egypt in particular, led to the signing of the London Convention of July 15, 1840 on measures of military aid to the Sultan by Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia without France. The last-named, relying on Mehemet Ali, was soon compelled to yield and leave Egypt to its fate. On July 13, 1841 the London Convention on the Black Sea Straits was signed by Russia, Britain, France, Austria and Prussia, on the one hand, and Turkey, on the other. The convention laid down that in peacetime the Bosphorus and Dardanelles would be closed to warships of all powers. Marx called this convention the treaty of the Dardanelles. p. 30

29 Marx has in mind the following passages from James Graham's speech in the House of Commons on February 17, 1854: “We have also succeeded in
combining Austria and Prussia with us in many most important transactions” and from Lord John Russell’s speech on the same occasion: “My belief is, therefore, although we have no engagement with them,—and I state it plainly to the House, that they are not bound to us to resist in any manner the acts of aggression on the part of Russia...” (The Times, No. 21668, February 18, 1854).

30 Apparently Marx got this information and the data given below from Urquhart or his associates (see Note 4).

31 The insurrection of the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire which started in January 1854 with the support of the Greek troops was suppressed by the Turkish Government with the aid of Britain and France in June of the same year.

32 When Marx wrote this article, he obtained his information on the contents of these dispatches from Cobden’s speech in the House of Commons on February 20, 1854, published in The Times on February 21, 1854. In March 1854 Marx acquainted himself with the authentic documents relating to the origin of the Eastern conflict of 1853 and devoted two special articles to their analysis (see this volume, pp. 73-99).

33 During the Austro-Turkish war of 1788-90 Austrian troops occupied Serbia (1789). In 1791, under pressure from Britain and Prussia, Austria concluded a peace treaty with Turkey on condition of restoring the status quo ante bellum. Austria got only Old Orsova without the right to fortify it.

34 The article “English and French War Plans.—Greek Insurrection.—Spain.—China” was compiled by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune from two articles written by Marx on February 28 and March 3, 1854; the editors took the first six paragraphs, up to the words “The Anglo-French expedition may be set down...”, from the article written by Marx on March 3 (the second half of this article was published as a leader, without Marx’s signature, under the title “Austrian Bankruptcy”, see Note 43). In the Notebook the second part of the article is entered: “Dienstag. 28. Februar. Etwas Militaria. Spain. Dost Mohammed etc., etc., etc.”. It is probable that “Militaria” in this article was written by Engels, but there are no direct proofs of this.

The article “English and French War Plans.—Greek Insurrection.—Spain.—China” was included in abridged form by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “France and England.—The Greek Rising.—Asia”. p. 35

35 Here Marx has in mind his article written on February 28 (see Note 34), but the paragraph he mentions about Charles Napier was probably arbitrarily omitted by the editors of the Tribune.

On events of 1840, see Note 28.

36 Marx used Bonaparte’s opening speech at a joint sitting of the Corps Legislatif and the Senate on March 2, 1854 as published in Le Moniteur universel, March 3, 1854.

The term Entente cordiale was used in the nineteenth century to denote the rapprochement between France and Britain after the July revolution of 1830, which was formalised by the Quadruple Alliance in April 1834 (see Note 39).
37 The reference is to Clause 2 of the treaty signed in Constantinople later, on March 12, and ratified on May 8, 1854 by Britain and France, on the one hand, and the Ottoman Empire, on the other. Marx's main source of information on this question were periodical publications. p. 36

38 In January 1854 it was announced in Constantinople that the police had discovered a conspiracy of the Greeks, and a Greek priest named Athanasius had been arrested in Vidin. According to the Western press, the conspiracy was headed by Baron Oelsner, ex-adjutant of General Lüders, and its aim was to incite the Greeks and Slavs living in Turkey to revolt. p. 36

39 The reference is to the Quadruple Alliance concluded in April 1834 between Britain, France, Spain and Portugal (see Note 36). Even at the time the treaty was concluded conflicts of interests appeared between Britain and France which later aggravated relations between the two countries. This treaty was formally directed against the absolutist "Northern powers" (Russia, Prussia and Austria), but in actual fact allowed Britain to strengthen her position in Spain and Portugal, under the pretext of rendering military assistance to both governments in their struggle against the pretenders to the throne, Don Carlos in Spain and Dom Miguel in Portugal (see notes 227 and 253). p. 40

40 The reference is to the marriage of Queen Isabella II of Spain to Don Francisco de Asis in 1846 (contrary to the wishes of the British ruling circles—see Note 277), and that of Infanta Maria Luisa Fernanda to the Duke of Montpensier, son of King Louis Philippe of France. If Isabella had no direct heirs, the Duke of Montpensier would have become one of the first pretenders to the Spanish throne. This victory of French diplomacy caused great dissatisfaction in Britain. p. 40

41 Here Marx refers to events of the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42 in which the English army was defeated. p. 41

42 In 1850 popular disturbances occurred in a number of southern provinces of China and developed into a big peasant war. The rebels established a state of their own over a considerable part of China's territory. Its leaders put forward a utopian programme of transforming the Chinese feudal social system into a militarised patriarchal one based on the egalitarian principle in production and consumption. The movement, which was also anti-colonial, was weakened by inner dissensions and the rise of a local aristocracy among the Taipings. The rebellion was suppressed in 1864, mainly due to intervention by Britain, the USA and France. p. 41

43 In the Notebook the dispatch of this article under the title "Oesterreichs Finanzen" is dated March 3. The article dealt not only with the state of Austrian finances, but analysed Napoleon III's speech of March 2 and contained some other material which the Tribune editors arbitrarily combined with Marx's previous report (see Note 34). The article on Austrian finances was published as a leader. As the editors were wont to pass off his articles for their own, Marx wrote to Engels on April 22, 1854: "Of late the Tribune has again been appropriating all my articles for its leaders and putting my name to nothing but rubbish. It has appropriated, for example, a detailed account of Austrian finances, articles on the Greek insurrection, etc. Not to speak of their
'congenital' habit of making a splash with your military stuff” (see present edition, Vol. 39).  

44 The reference is to the Société générale du Crédit Mobilier—a big French joint-stock bank founded in 1852 by the Péreire brothers. The bank was closely connected with the Government of Napoleon III and, protected by it, engaged in speculation. It went bankrupt in 1867 and was liquidated in 1871.  

45 This patent, the instructions of the Austrian Government in the sphere of finances mentioned below as also the information on the Austrian budget are given by Marx according to Der gegenwärtige Stand der Finanzen und des Geldumlaufs in Oesterreich. Von einem Unbeteiligten, Leipzig, 1853. Marx was obviously also conversant with the books by Josef Ritter von Hauer, Beiträge zur Geschichte der österreichischen Finanzen, Vienna, 1848 and Ueber Oesterreichs Staatsausgaben und Verwaltung in Hauptumrissen dargestellt, Vienna, 1849, and other sources.  

46 In February and March 1846, simultaneously with the national liberation insurrection in the free city of Cracow which had been under the joint control of Austria, Prussia and Russia since 1815, a big peasant uprising flared up in Galicia. Taking advantage of class contradictions, the Austrian authorities provoked clashes between insurgent Galician peasants and the Polish lesser nobility (szlachta) who strove to support Cracow. Having overwhelmed the insurgent szlachta, the Austrian Government also suppressed the peasant movement in Galicia.  

47 The peace treaty between Austria and the Kingdom of Sardinia (Piedmont) (see Note 9) of August 6, 1849 obliged Piedmont to pay Austria an indemnity of 75 million florins.  

In 1853 the Austrian Government confiscated in Lombardy and Venice the property of participants in the 1848-49 revolution who had subsequently emigrated.  

The decree of the Austrian Imperial Diet dated August 31, 1848 abolished serfdom in Austria; after approval by the emperor on September 9 it acquired the force of law.  

48 Military Frontier (or Border)—in the sixteenth-nineteenth centuries the southern regions of the Austrian Empire bordering on Turkey and having a military administration; their inhabitants (borderers) were allotted land in return for military service in the border regiments.  

49 In 1789 a national rebellion, called the Brabant revolution, against Austrian rule took place in the Austrian Netherlands (Belgium). It was suppressed by Austrian troops in 1790 after the death of Joseph II.  

50 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 7. March. Labour Parliament. Gladstone”.  

51 In 1853, with the growth of a massive strike movement of the English proletariat, a group of Chartists headed by Ernest Jones proposed to create a broad workers' organisation, The Mass Movement, which was to unite trade unions and unorganised workers with the primary aim of coordinating strikes in the various districts of the country. The organisation was to be headed by a regularly convened Labour Parliament consisting of delegates elected at
meetings of both unorganised workers and of the trade unions associated with The Mass Movement. The Labour Parliament assembled in Manchester on March 6, 1854 and was in session till March 18, 1854. It discussed and adopted the programme of The Mass Movement and set up an Executive of five members. Marx, elected honorary delegate to the Parliament, sent a letter to it (see this volume, pp. 57-59).

The attempt to found The Mass Movement failed, because the majority of the trade union leaders did not approve of associating the trade unions with the political struggle and did not support the idea of creating a single mass workers’ organisation. By the summer of 1854 the strike movement had abated and this also cut short the participation of broad masses of workers in the movement. After March 1854 the Labour Parliament never met again.

The reference is to the Government Commission on the Workers’ Question which met at the Palais du Luxembourg and was presided over by Louis Blanc. The Commission was set up on February 28, 1848 by the Provisional Government of the French Republic under pressure from workers who demanded a Ministry of Labour. The Commission consisted of workers and employers and acted as mediator in labour conflicts, often taking the side of the employers. On the very next day after the mass actions of May 15, 1848, the Government disbanded the Luxembourg Commission.

Organisation of labour, organisers of labour—an allusion to the utopian socialists (in particular Fourier and his followers) who put forward a plan for the peaceful transformation of society by means of association, that is by “organisation of labour”, which they opposed to the anarchy of production under capitalism.

Some of these ideas were used by the French petty-bourgeois socialist Louis Blanc in his book Organisation du travail (Paris, 1839) in which he proposed that the bourgeois state should transform contemporary society into a socialist society.

The National Charter Association was founded in July 1840. It was the first mass workers’ organisation in the history of the working-class movement and counted up to 50,000 members when Chartism was at its peak. Its Executive—the leading body—was elected at congresses and conferences of delegates. After the defeat of the Chartists in 1848 and the ensuing split in their ranks, the Association lost its mass character. Nevertheless, in 1851 and 1852, led by Ernest Jones and other revolutionary Chartists, it fought for the revival of Chartism on a revolutionary basis, for the implementation of the People’s Charter and the socialist principles proclaimed by the Chartist Convention in 1851. The Association ceased its activities in 1858.

Marx quotes Article 14 of the law on the French Budget for 1854 passed in 1853 (Loi, portant fixation du budget...). However, he changes the figure 150 million to 250 million in accordance with a special decree of 1854 (Décret imperial...), which he quotes below (see Collection complète des lois, decrets, règlements et avis du Conseil d'Etat. Publiée sur les éditions officielles par J. B. Duvergier, tome 53, Année 1853, p. 232; tome 54, Année 1854, p. 45). Marx probably obtained his information on the financial measures of the French Government from the Paris letter mentioned below and a report in Le Moniteur universel of March 7, 1854.
An allusion to the participants in the Bonapartist coup d'état in France on December 2, 1851. p. 52

This refers to the manifesto of Nicholas I of February 21 (9), 1854 breaking off diplomatic relations with France and Britain; in a letter to Napoleon III of February 9 (January 28), 1854 Nicholas I refused to compromise on the Eastern question. These documents were published in *The Times* of March 6, 1854 under the titles "Manifesto of the Emperor Nicholas" and "The Emperor of Russia and the Emperor Napoleon". p. 52

The *South Sea Company* was founded in England about 1712, officially for trade with South America and the Pacific islands. The Company received from the Government a number of privileges and monopoly rights, in particular the right to issue securities, and plunged into large-scale speculation which led to its bankruptcy in 1720 and the growth of the national debt. In compliance with the draft financial reform of 1853 Gladstone proposed to reduce the interest on the Company's stocks from 3 to $2^{3/4}$ per cent. p. 56

Marx's letter to the Labour Parliament was read out by Jones at the evening sitting on March 10. Jones also declared that he was expecting Marx to come to Manchester the following week, obviously basing himself on Marx's promise given in a private letter to Jones (which has not been found). p. 57

On Marx's election as an honorary delegate to the Labour Parliament, see Note 51. p. 57

This article is entered in the Notebook as: "Freitag. 10 March. Labour Parliament". p. 61

The plan of action for the Labour Parliament given below was published in *The People's Paper* only on March 11, 1854. When writing this article Marx presumably made use of a leaflet or a manuscript copy of the programme which had been sent to him together with an invitation to take part in the work of the Parliament (see Note 51). p. 62

Engels wrote the article "Retreat of the Russians from Kalafat" on March 13 on Marx's request and it was mailed to New York on March 14, as is testified by the entry in the Notebook: "Dienstag. 14 March. Militâria. Kalafat." Before sending it off Marx added a review of Greek events (see Note 65) and other information taken from *The Times* of March 14, 1854. On March 18 Marx published this article in the Chartist *People's Paper*. The *New-York Daily Tribune* and the *New-York Weekly Tribune* carried it under the title "The Russian Retreat". It was included by Eleanor Marx in *The Eastern Question* under the same heading. In this edition the text is reproduced from *The People's Paper* and checked with that of the *New-York Daily Tribune*. Substantially different readings are given in footnotes. p. 65

The camp at *Bunzelwitz* was fortified on the order of Frederick II of Prussia in 1761 during the Seven Years' War.

*The fortifications at Torres-Vedras* (in Portugal, between the Tagus River and the Atlantic coast) were built in 1810 on the order of Wellington to protect Lisbon from the French forces.

*Entrenchments behind Verona* were built not far from the town by the troops
of the Archduke Charles of Austria during the war of the third coalition (1805) against Napoleonic France.

In all three instances the fortifications were not captured by the enemy.

p. 67

The mailing of the article "The Greek Insurrection" to New York is not registered in the Notebook, but the fact that it is by Marx is established by his letters to Engels of April 22 (see Note 43) and May 3, 1854. This article, published by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune as a leader, was presumably a part of the article mailed by Marx to New York on March 14 (see Note 63). It could not have been written before March 14 because it expounded Milnes' speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 13th and published in The Times on March 14, 1854.

p. 70

In the spring of 1821 a national liberation movement started in Greece which ended after a long struggle in Greece winning independence. As a result of Russia's victory in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, Turkey recognised Greece as an independent state. Forced by public pressure to give military aid to Greece, the ruling circles of the European powers imposed, however, a monarchist form of government on the country after its liberation. The final status of the Kingdom of Greece and its territory were determined by the protocols of March 22, 1829, February 3, 1830 and May 7, 1832 of the London Conference (1827-32). Greece included Morea, the Cyclades and the southern part of Greek mainland, between the mouths of the Spercheios and the Aspropotamo rivers.

p. 70

This article, dated March 21, 1854, is entered in the Notebook under the same date. It was reprinted by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question. In this and the next article "The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence" (see this volume, pp. 84-99) Marx analyses the secret correspondence (and other documents) of the British Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Hamilton Seymour, and the British Foreign Secretary concerning the negotiations between Seymour and Nicholas I on the Turkish question at the beginning of 1853, according to Correspondence...

(Parts V and VI).

p. 73

This refers to the article published in the Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg of February 18 (March 2), 1854 in connection with Lord Russell's speech in the House of Commons on February 17, 1854 (see this volume, pp. 13, 19 and 24). The article alluded to the existence of a conspiracy between the Russian and British governments on the Turkish question, and proved it from Hamilton Seymour's correspondence of 1853 and the memorandum of 1844.

p. 73

In the articles published in the New-York Daily Tribune ("Russian Policy Against Turkey.—Chartism", "War in Burma.—The Russian Question.—Curious Diplomatic Correspondence", "Financial Failure of Government.—Cabs.—Ireland.—The Russian Question"—present edition, Vol. 12; "Parliamentary Debates of February 22.—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch.—The Policy of the Western Powers"—this volume, pp. 28-29) Marx repeatedly quoted Pozzo di Borgo's dispatches, but did not mention this statement by Nicholas I.

p. 78

Marx takes the French expression "de leur échapper" (to escape from them) from Seymour's previous report of January 11, 1853 (Correspondence..., Part V,
The treaty on the partition of the Spanish succession was signed by Louis XIV, King of the French, and William III, King of England, on March 3, 1700. It envisaged that, in the event of King of Spain Charles II of Habsburg dying childless, Spain, her colonies and the Spanish Netherlands would go to Archduke Charles, second son of Emperor Leopold I. For a number of reasons Charles II refused to accept the terms of this treaty and on October 2, 1700 made a will by which all the Spanish possessions went to the grandson of Louis XIV, Philip, Duke of Anjou. On November 1, 1701 Charles II died and Philip, Duke of Anjou, became King Philip V. By the will of Charles II, Philip V was independent of France, but Louis XIV violated this condition by making him his heir in 1701 and thus the danger arose that power in both Spain and France would be concentrated in the hands of one King. This led to the long war of the Spanish succession (1701-14) (referred to below) between France, on the one hand, and Britain, Holland and the Habsburg Empire, on the other.

The reference is to the family pact of 1731 concluded between King Philip V of Spain and the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Gian Gastone. It provided for the Duchy to go to the Spanish heir, Prince Charles (future King Charles III of Spain), after the death of the childless Gian Gastone.


This is the continuation of the previous one (see Note 68) and is entered in the Notebook as “24. März. Blue Books. Secret Correspondence. 2. Teil.” The article was reprinted abridged in The Eastern Question.

In the New-York Daily Tribune this article is erroneously datelined “London, Friday, March 24, 1854”, the correct date was established on the basis of Marx's Notebook: “28. März. Geschichte des Protektors” and the sources of information used in the article.

Under the legislation in force in England from 1662 paupers who changed their place of residence or applied to a parish for alms could be returned to their former place of residence by court decision. On February 10, 1854 a Settlement and Removal Bill was introduced in the House of Commons envisaging prohibition of forced settlement of paupers in England and Wales. It was rejected by Parliament.
On March 12, 1854 a treaty was concluded in Constantinople between France, Britain and Turkey. The Allies pledged to help Turkey with their naval and land forces, and Turkey pledged not to enter into peace negotiations with Russia and to conclude no peace without the consent of Britain and France.

Ulemas—the highest social estate of theologians and jurists in the Moslem countries who kept in their hands the administration of justice and the management of all religious establishments and schools; the ulemas exerted a great influence on the political life of the Ottoman Empire.

Fetwa—decision of the supreme Moslem priest in Oriental countries on the conformity of a measure or action to the norms of Islam.

This refers to the dissensions among the Turkish ruling circles caused by the treaty of March 12, 1854 (see Note 79). Sheik ul-Islam Arif Hikmet Bey and the President of the State Council of Justice, Rifaat Pasha, opposed any compromise on the status of Christians in Turkey and were dismissed from their posts.

The Berber States—the name used in the nineteenth century for the Moslem states in North Africa on the shore of the Mediterranean (Algeria, Tunis and Morocco).

On the Kainardji treaty, see Note 17. The treaty between France and Turkey, referred to in the text, ended the Egyptian expedition of the French army (1798-1801). It was concluded on October 8, 1801 and finally signed in Paris on June 25, 1802.

The manuscript “The Fortress of Kronstadt” is one of Engels’ military articles intended for the London Daily News (see Note 95), but it was not published in his lifetime. Sometimes the figures which Engels gives for the artillery in Kronstadt differ from those of the Russian command. This is explained by the lack of information to which Engels himself pointed.


The only available photocopy of the newspaper is very poor.

The reference is to Gladstone’s proposal to double the rate of income tax for six months in view of Britain’s forthcoming entry into the Crimean war. On March 27, 1854 Britain declared war on Russia, and on March 30, after the third reading, the Income Tax Bill was passed.

For a detailed description of the budget proposed by Gladstone on April 18, 1853 see Marx’s articles “Feargus O’Connor.—Ministerial Defeats.—The Budget”, “L.S.D., or Class Budgets, and Who’s Relieved by Them”, “Riot at Constantinople.—German Table Moving.—The Budget”, “Soap for the People, a Sop for The Times.—The Coalition Budget” (present edition, Vol. 12).
Marx refers to Gladstone who adhered to Puseyism—a trend in the Anglican Church from the 1830s to the 1860s named after one of its founders, Edward Pusey, an Oxford University theologian. He advocated the restoration of Catholic rites and certain dogmas in the Anglican Church. Stressing Gladstone's sanctimoniousness and hypocrisy, Marx often called him “unctuous” (see, for instance, present edition, Vol. 12, p. 72). Below Marx quotes Gladstone according to Pakington (The Times of March 31, 1854). p. 117

Marx plays on the name “Doctor Subtilis” given to the medieval scholastic philosopher Duns Scotus. p. 118

See Note 58.

This refers to an event during one of the biggest strikes of English workers at the time. In August 1853 the weavers and spinners at the cotton mills in Preston and its environs went on strike demanding a 10 per cent wage increase. They were supported by workers of other trades. The Associated Masters responded with a lock-out in September 1853. About 25,000 out of the 30,000 Preston workers were out of work, but assistance by workers of other towns allowed the Preston workers to hold out for more than 36 weeks. The lock-out ended in February 1854, but the strike continued. To frustrate it the Associated Masters brought in workers from Ireland and from English workhouses. On the course and importance of the strike see present edition, Vol. 12, and this volume, pp. 200 and 664-65.

The strike ended in May 1854. p. 120

The Associated Masters of Preston binds each of its members by a bond to obey all orders passed by a majority of its members, failing in which an offending master is liable to a penalty of £5,000. p. 120

Special constables—volunteers who perform police duties in their spare time. p. 120

The Riot Act—an act for preventing tumults and riotous assemblies, and for the more speedy and effectual punishing of the rioters. If an unlawful assembly of twelve or more persons was ordered by a magistrate to disperse and did not do so within one hour, the magistrate could give the order to open fire. It was introduced in Parliament in 1714 and passed in 1715. p. 121

With the outbreak of the Crimean war Engels offered his services as military commentator to the liberal London Daily News and sent to the editors his article “The Fortress of Kronstadt” (see Note 84) on March 30, and after April 3, 1854, on the request of the editors, the article “The Russian Army” which was to open a series of articles on the Russian land and naval forces. The article was set and Engels probably received the proofs on April 12, 1854 together with a letter by the editor H. J. Lincoln, who asked Engels about his terms. Engels pinned great hopes on this collaboration, believing that permanent work on the newspaper would enable him to give up his commercial activity and move to London. However, as can be judged from Engels’ letter to Marx of April 20, 1854, Lincoln cancelled the previous contract when he found out about Engels’ political views. Some of the propositions formulated in the article “The Russian Army” were elaborated in “The Military Power of Russia” (this volume, pp. 498-504) and “The Armies in Europe” (present edition, Vol. 14) published in the New-York Daily Tribune and Putnam’s Monthly. p. 123
The proposal to partition Poland was made by Heinrich of Prussia in 1770 during a visit to St. Petersburg. Initially the tsarist government, wishing to retain its influence over the whole of Poland, opposed this plan, but when Prussia and Austria drew closer to each other, Catherine II was compelled in 1772 to conclude a convention with them on the partition of part of Polish territory between the three powers (the first partition of Poland).

This refers to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.

This article by Marx and Engels was initially a part of “The War Debate in Parliament” (see Note 101) sent by Marx to New York on April 4, 1854. The editors of the Tribune extracted three paragraphs of this article and published them separately as a leader. The editors’ interference with the original text of Marx and Engels can be easily traced:

The beginning of the article, up to the words “but this report our well-informed London correspondent pronounces a mere stock-jobbing invention”, belongs to the editors. The greater part of the first paragraph, from the words “In fact, it seems perfectly clear...” up to the end, was written by Engels; textually it coincides with Engels’ letter to Marx of April 3, 1854 (present edition, Vol. 39). The rest of the paragraph was written by Marx.

The editors similarly dealt with Marx’s second paragraph as can be seen by comparing it with the fourth and fifth paragraphs of “The War Debate in Parliament”; it is more difficult to establish the degree of their interference here, though it is almost beyond doubt in the sentence: “Had these terms been openly proffered sooner they might have greatly diminished the chances of the war, as there is no doubt that the allies mean to procure just such an emancipation.” The last sentence “on that head we shall doubtless have full information by the next steamer” also belongs to the editors.

The contents of the third paragraph in the main coincide with Marx’s articles “The Greek Insurrection”, “Declaration of War.—On the History of the Eastern Question” and also “Greece and Turkey.—Turkey and the Western Powers.—Falling Off in Wheat Sales in England” written later (see this volume, pp. 70-72, 100-08 and 159-62).

In March 1854 Frederick William IV of Prussia requested Nicholas I to withdraw his troops from the Danubian Principalities to avoid a conflict. Nicholas I consented on condition that the Western powers would guarantee emancipation of the Christians in Turkey and withdraw their fleets from the Black Sea. Marx got the information about these negotiations from material published in The Times, No. 21706, April 4, 1854.

See Note 81.
Marx included it in abridged form in *The Eastern Question* under the title “The War with Russia”.

102 See Note 16.

103 Marx made a detailed analysis of Lord Palmerston’s foreign policy in his pamphlet *Lord Palmerston* written between October and early December 1853 (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 341-406).

104 This article is entered in Marx’s Notebook as “Freitag, 7. April. Notenwechsel. Oesterreich und Preussen. Kölnische Zeitung”. In the abbreviated version of the article published by the *Tribune* the editors omitted the part on the *Kölnische Zeitung*. A fragment of the article was included in the leader published in the same issue of the newspaper. Here is this fragment: “Our correspondent at Vienna announces the conclusion of an alliance between the German powers, by which the entire Confederation, including Austria and Prussia of course, undertakes to maintain neutrality through the war. Whether they can succeed in keeping out of the quarrel for so long a time is a question on which a positive opinion cannot be formed at present. The new complications which may arise, and the new interests which may be developed in the course of the struggle, may very easily render nugatory the most exact calculations that can now be made. Certain it is that but for dread of revolution, against which Russia is supposed to offer a protection, the German powers, and especially the German people, must all desire the humiliation of the Czar, whose preponderant influence they hate, and whose aggrandizement they spontaneously incline to resist. But on the other side, such is their pecuniary weakness, and so entire is their doubt of the loyalty of their subjects, that they must regard the risk of permanent Russian supremacy as far less formidable than that of engaging in a universal war with the revolution lying in ambush behind the eventualities of the contest. So they will remain neutral as long as they can, and will hold themselves ready, when they finally decide to go into the fight, to embrace whichever side offers them the greater advantages. We do not believe they will be led either way by any other motives than regard for their own interest. All the gratitude Austria owes Russia will indeed only prove a reason for her to attack the Czar, should other causes seem to render it the more profitable course; and the same is true of all Germany as well.”

The article was reprinted in the *New-York Weekly Tribune*, No. 659, April 29, 1854, but the first and last paragraphs and also Marx’s signature were omitted. The article was published in *The Eastern Question* under the title “Russia and the German Powers”.

105 When forming his Coalition Ministry (see Note 16) in December 1852 the Prime Minister Lord Aberdeen gave ministerial posts to three members of the Irish Brigade (see Note 441), Keogh, Sadleir and Monsell, thus provoking a strong protest on the part of several Irish deputies which led to a split in the Brigade. The pro-Government Irish deputies were backed by the higher Catholic clergy, Irish bourgeoisie and landlords, who feared the growing national liberation movement in Ireland. The other part of the Brigade (the so-called Independent opposition) headed by Duffy relied on a section of rich Irish leaseholders who wanted the Government to pass a new lease law in Ireland.

106 The reference is to one of the stages in the work of the Vienna conferences (see Note 3). The conferences dealt with in this article ended with the signing of a protocol between England, France, Austria and Prussia on April 9, 1854. It
demanded that Russia immediately evacuate the Danubian Principalities and
guaranteed the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

107 The article “Position of the Armies in Turkey” was written and sent by Engels
to Marx in London on April 13; in the Notebook it is entered as “Freitag.
14. April. Militaria”.

108 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 18. April. Note Reschid
Pasches. Italienische Zeitung benutzt”. The article was included in abridged
form by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “Turkey and
Greece.—Italy”.

109 See Note 15.

110 At the beginning of 1853 the Austrian Government expelled from Lombardy
over 5,000 natives of the Ticino Canton (Switzerland) on the ground that the
uprising in Milan in February 1853 had been prepared by Italian revolutionary
emigrants residing in Ticino. Only in March 1855, after long diplomatic
negotiations, did the Austrian Government permit the expelled Ticinese to
return.

111 Here Marx has in mind the Liberal Party (the so-called moderatti) headed by
Cavour; this party voiced the interests of liberal-monarchist big bourgeoisie and
bourgeoisified nobility who strove to unite Italy from above, under the aegis of
the Savoy dynasty; fearing the mass revolutionary movement, they based their
tactics on use of the favourable international situation and assistance from
other states. In 1853-54 this party tried to bring Piedmont into the Crimean
war on the side of Britain and France, hoping in this way to secure the support
of these powers for the unification of Italy. Piedmont entered the war in 1855.

112 The reference is to a system of treaties concluded by the participants in the
Vienna Congress of the European monarchs and their Ministers (September
1814-June 1815). It established the boundaries and status of the European
states after the victory over Napoleonic France, sanctioned the reshaping of the
political map of Europe and the restoration of the “legitimate” dynasties,
overthrown as a result of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars.

113 See Note 17.

114 This refers to the treaty of March 12, 1854 (see Note 79).

115 On the formation of the Kingdom of Greece see Note 66.

The conquest of Algeria, which in the eighteenth century was already a
military feudal state independent of the Ottoman Empire, began in 1830. It
met fierce armed resistance on the part of the Algerian population. By 1842
most of Algeria was conquered, but the Algerian people continued their
struggle for independence.

A half-independence of Egypt—the so-called Egyptian crises (1831-33 and
1839-41)—conflicts between Mehemet Ali of Egypt and the Ottoman Empire,
with the European powers actively interfering. They ended with the
introduction of a new statute for Egypt which remained dependent on the
Turkish Sultan.

Aden was seized by England in 1839 and turned into a military naval base.
The Englishmen who covet Egypt—the reference is to the concession which the English obtained for the construction of the railway line from Alexandria to Suez and Cairo and to the plans for building the Suez canal (opened for navigation in 1869).

This article was entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 21. April. Allerlei. Mark Lane”.

It was included by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question abridged under the title “Austria and Servia.—Greece and Turkey.—Turkey and the Western Powers”.

Pera—a district in Istanbul (Constantinople).

By the treaty of Ninfeo (1261) between the Nicean Empire and Genoa, the latter obtained strongholds in Asia Minor, on the Straits and in the Crimea, thus establishing its domination on the shores of the Aegean and Black seas.

This article was written by Engels on April 24, 1854. The authorship is established on the basis of Engels’ letter to Marx of April 21, 1854 (see present edition, Vol. 39 and the entry in the Notebook on its dispatch to New York: “Dienstag. 25. April. Militaria”). It was sent by the steamer Washington which left Southampton on April 26 and arrived in New York with considerable delay on May 14. The newspaper editors interested in Engels’ military reviews published the material as a leader. At the same time they made it appear to have been written on the basis of later information received with the Atlantic, which left Europe a week later, on May 3, 1854. For this purpose they added the first paragraph with a survey of the news of the bombardment of Odessa by the allied fleet, published in the same issue of the New-York Daily Tribune in the section “The War”. The ironical appraisal of Admiral Dundas’ bravery may have been taken by the Tribune editors from Marx’s article “The Bombardment of Odessa.—Greece.—Proclamation of Prince Daniel of Montenegro.—Manteuffel’s Speech” published in the same issue (this volume, pp. 173-80). The first paragraph was as follows:

“The Atlantic arrived yesterday, bringing intelligence of the first actual attack on the Russians by the British and French fleet in the Black Sea. It seems that the British war-steamer Furious went to Odessa with a flag of truce to bring away the British and French Consuls, from that place, and that after having got them on board, she was fired at from the shore. The British represent this act as a wanton violation of the rights of the flag of truce, for which summary vengeance must be taken. The Russians on the other hand say that after the Consuls were embarked, the ship remained in the harbor to enable the officers to take sketches of the fortifications, and that she was fired at simply to put an end to such impropriety. However this may be, the British and French Admirals agreed that something must be done, and accordingly a large force was sent to bombard the place. This operation does not seem to have been accomplished in a very brilliant way, for though the official details have not yet reached us, there is a report that several British ships were badly damaged in process of silencing the shore batteries, burning a few merchant ships in port, and knocking to pieces a palace belonging to Prince Woronzoff, not far from the water’s edge. The town of Odessa they did not harm, as it is situated on the top of a hill comparatively out of the way. Having thus taken vengeance, they sailed away again. Admiral Dundas has apparently adopted for his rule of action the advice of a letter from one of his officers, which has been
published at London, and means to take anything easy, but to leave difficult
and dangerous enterprises alone.”

120 The reference is to the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.

121 The Notebook gives only the date when this article was mailed (“Freitag, 28.
April”) but does not disclose its contents. Judging by the reference to Le
Moniteur universel of April 26, 1854, Marx started to write the article on April 27
and finished it on the day of its dispatch to New York, April 28, 1854. It was
included in abridged form in The Eastern Question under the title “The Greek
Insurrection.—Alliance Between Prussia and Austria.—Russian Armaments”.

122 General Zamoiski was permitted to form the Polish Legion at the beginning of
1854. It included supporters of Prince Czartoryski; General Wysocki, protected
by Joseph Charles Paul Bonaparte (1822-1891), tried to form a legion of Polish
democratic emigrants. But by the summer of 1854 it became clear that his plan
had failed and Wysocki left Istanbul. During the Crimean war the Polish
emigrants also fought in the ranks of the Cossack formations of Sadyk Pasha
(Chaikovsky).

123 See notes 3 and 106.

124 This article was entered in the Notebook as “2. Mai. Dienstag. Militaria”. It was
sent from Liverpool on May 3 by the steamer Atlantic. Before mailing it to
Liverpool in the morning of May 3, Marx added information from the
morning issue of The Times for May 3. It was included by Eleanor Marx in The
Eastern Question abridged under the title “Bombardment of Odessa.—Austria
and Russia.—The Greek Insurrection.—Montenegro.—Manteuffel”.

125 During the events described here the acting Governor-General of Novorossia
and Bessarabia, P. I. Fyodorov, left for the Caucasus (in March), and
N. N. Annenkov, appointed to replace him, arrived in Odessa only on the
night of April 9 (21), 1854. During that time the defence of Odessa was led by
D. Y. Osten-Sacken.

126 Probably Marx drew this information from a number of papers, in particular
The Times of April 26, 1854, which published all sorts of rumours about the
Russian Government buying back grain from foreign merchants in Odessa.

127 The editors of this edition are not in possession of this issue of La Presse. The
passage quoted by Marx was obviously published in the newspaper on May 2,
for Marx wrote to Engels on May 3: “Metaxas, who was Greek Ambassador in
Constantinople where he engaged in plotting—the Paris Presse published a
pretty account of this Russo-Greek Bangyanade—was the principal tool of the
infamous Capodistria” (see present edition, Vol. 39). Probably Marx read about
this in L’Indépendance belge, No. 123, May 3, 1854.

128 Representatives of Prussia and Austria and the Russian Ambassador to Vienna,
Meyendorff, acting as a mediator, met in Olmütz on November 29, 1850. The
meeting ended with the signing of an agreement by which Prussia consented to
restore the German Confederation (see Note 8) and to give Austrian troops
passage to Hesse-Cassel and Holstein in order to suppress revolutionary
movements there.
The Olmütz agreement was the last victory scored by Austrian diplomacy in the struggle against Prussia.

The reference is to the decisions of the London Conference of 1827-32 (see Note 66). The material from the Nouvelliste de Marseille is given as published in L'Indépendance belge, No. 121, May 1, 1854.

The reference is to the national liberation struggle of the German people against French domination which started after the defeat of Napoleon's army in Russia. The ruling circles and governing dynasties tried to use the popular struggle for consolidating the reactionary feudal system in Germany.

Treubund (the Union of the Loyal)—a Prussian monarchist society founded in Berlin at the end of 1848. Late in 1849 it split into ultra-royalists and constitutional monarchists.

The authorship of this article was established on the basis of Engels' letters to Marx of May 1, 6 and 9, 1854, the entry in the Notebook ("5. Mai. Freitag. Militaria") and comparison of its text with the reports in The Times which Engels used as a source for describing military operations on the Danube front. There are signs of the Tribune editors' interference with Engels' text.

Engels' doubts as to the authenticity of the information about "a decisive victory" gained by Omer Pasha at Chernavoda were fully confirmed. On May 9, 1854, The Times carried an article by its own Vienna correspondent who regarded this event as an ordinary encounter with enemy troops and the data on Russian casualties as highly exaggerated.

This sentence was inserted in Engels' text by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune.

These words are added to Engels' text by the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune and refer to the article "The Greek Insurrection" printed in the same issue of the newspaper.

See Note 38.

Engels refers to Marx's articles "Parliamentary Debates of February 22.—Pozzo di Borgo's Dispatch.—The Policy of the Western Powers", "English and French War Plans.—Greek Insurrection.—Spain.—China", "The Secret Diplomatic Correspondence" (this volume, pp. 26-34, 35-42 and 84-99) and in part to his own article "The Turkish Question" (present edition, Vol. 12). This reference corresponds to Engels' intention about which he wrote to Marx on May 1, 1854: "It is time we harked back to our first articles on the subject, including the political aspect. Here, too, we have been splendidly vindicated by circumstances" (present edition, Vol. 39).

The article "British Finances" is entered in the Notebook as "9. Mai. Dienstag. Financial". The material was also used for a leader in the New-York Times, as is seen from a letter of Cluss to Marx, dated May 25, 1854.

Whitehall—a street in London named after the Whitehall Palace where in the mid-nineteenth century the following government offices were located: the Admiralty, the Treasury, the Home Office, the Foreign Office, etc.

Somerset House—a palace near the Strand (London) built by the Duke of Somerset in 1549. After its reconstruction in 1776-86, it accommodated such
government offices as the Office of the Inspector General of Naval Hospitals and Fleets, the Office of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages, and the Audit Office.

The reference is to agreements signed by Russia, Britain and the Netherlands in London on May 19 (7), 1815 to defray Russia's war expenses incurred in driving out Napoleon's army from the Dutch and Belgian provinces. The governments of Britain and the Netherlands undertook to pay in compensation part of Russian debts to the Dutch bankers Hope and Co. (25 million Dutch guilders each). A special article of the agreement stipulated that payments would be suspended if the Belgian provinces separated from the Netherlands. After the revolution of 1830, when an independent Belgian state was formed, the Netherlands Government ceased payments. Palmerston signed, on behalf of the British Government, a new agreement with Russia on November 16 (4), 1831 confirming Britain's former financial obligations.

This article was written by Engels on May 15, 1854 at Jenny Marx's request. Its dispatch was entered in the Notebook on May 16 under the title "Militaria". The appraisal of the Odessa events here is completely identical with that given by Engels in his letter to Marx of May 9, 1854 (see present edition, Vol. 39).

Engels is inaccurate here. It was the same Russian general, Dmitry Yerofeyevich Osten-Sacken, who from December 1853 commanded the troops on the Black Sea coast from the Bug to the Danube, and his headquarters was in Odessa.

See Note 125.

The battle at Eckernförde on April 5, 1849—an operation during the Schleswig-Holstein war between Denmark and Prussia in 1848-50.

Engels may have obtained the information about the battle from the Imperial ukase conferring the Order of St. Andrew on Osten-Sacken, which was reprinted by The Times on May 15, 1854 from the Russky Invalid of May 5, 1854.

As a source for this article Marx used the article "Barbarians in Briton" by Ernest Jones published in The People's Paper on May 13, 1854. It is entered in the Notebook as "19. Mai. Freitag. Auszug aus Jones". The first paragraph, which bears signs of interference by the Tribune editors, was presumably either written entirely by Engels or drawn up by Marx on the basis of Engels' views expressed in "A Famous Victory" (this volume, p. 195).

See Note 94.

On the Preston strike see Note 91. Marx took the material on the attempt to close the case against the abuses on the part of the Preston magistrates from "Abandonment of the Preston Prosecution", published in The People's Paper on May 13, 1854.

This article was written by Engels and published by Marx in The People's Paper, and also in the New-York Daily Tribune under the title "The Exploits in the Baltic and Black Seas.—Anglo-French System of Operations". In the Notebook the date of mailing to New York and the fact of its being printed in The People's
In *The People's Paper* the article was preceded by an editorial text: "In order to make room for the following able letter, written by a celebrated continental politician, now in England, we are compelled to withdraw our usual summary."

The article was included by Eleanor Marx in *The Eastern Question* under the title "The Exploits in the Baltic and Black Seas.—Anglo-French System of Operations".

In this volume the article is reproduced from *The People's Paper*; readings differing from the *New-York Daily Tribune* are given in footnotes.

Engels presumably alludes to the victory of the English squadron under Nelson over the Franco-Spanish squadron at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805. The battle was fought when a superior Franco-Spanish squadron attempted to break through the blockade by Nelson's ships in Cadiz harbour.

On the fulfilment of Marx's intention see notes 165 and 169.

This article was written by Engels on May 25, 1854 at the request of Marx and his wife in view of Marx's illness. The article was mailed to New York on May 26, 1854 as is testified by the entry in the Notebook: "26. Mai. Freitag. Abuses in the Army. Wellington." The *New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune* reprinted it without any title.

*Horse Guards*—an old building in London erected in the mid-eighteenth century in the district of government offices between St. James' Park and Whitehall; general headquarters of the English army at that time.

The reference is to the army camp and military manoeuvres at Chobham, near London, from June 21 to August 20, 1853 in connection with preparations for the war against Russia.

Inaccuracy in the text: from 1852 to 1858 Ralph Bernal Osborne was Secretary of the Admiralty first in the Aberdeen Coalition Ministry and then in the Palmerston Ministry.

*The Mayfair Radicals*, nickname given to a section of English aristocracy (Molesworth, Bernal Osborne, and others) who made advances to democratic circles. Mayfair is a former aristocratic district east of Hyde Park.

The mailing of this article to New York was registered in the Notebook in Marx's own hand as "30. Mai. Dienstag. Russische Seemacht in Baltic. Disraeli und Russell. Quadruprotokoll".

See Note 56.

The reference is to the protocol of the current Vienna conference (see notes 3 and 106) signed on May 23, 1854.

Here Marx cites the treaty of April 20, 1854 between Austria and Prussia according to Blackett's speech, which does not coincide with the authentic text of the treaty analysed by Marx in his article "The Greek Insurrection.—The Polish Emigration.—The Austro-Prussian Treaty.—Russian Documents" (this volume, p. 168).
The reference is to Russell’s motion for “the removal of some disabilities of Her Majesty’s Jewish subjects” made in the House of Commons in February 1853 with a view to admitting Jews to the Commons. Russell’s Bill was adopted in the House of Commons, but was not passed by the House of Lords. Marx describes this Bill in the article “Parliamentary Debates.—The Clergy Against Socialism.—Starvation” (present edition, Vol. 11). p. 218

The mailing of this article is entered in the Notebook as “2. Juni. Kriegsplan in Varna. (Times), Fabel aus der ‘Biene’. Mark Lane. Gladstone and Archangel”, which fits in with the following lines in Marx’s letter to Engels dated June 3, 1854: “I wrote an article yesterday deriding the plan of campaign published in Thursday’s Times” (see present edition, Vol. 39).

The article was published in abridged form by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “Delay on the Danube”. p. 220

Presumably Marx has in mind information contained in one of Engels’ letters to him which is not available (Engels’ letters to Marx written between May 9 and June 10, 1854 have not been found). p. 225

Sir James Graham made this statement not on Monday, May 29, 1854 as erroneously stated in the text, but on Thursday, June 1. It was published in The Times on June 2, 1854. p. 226


The reference is to the rout of the Turkish army at Vienna on September 12, 1683 by Austrian, German and Polish troops, with the Polish army under Jan Sobieski playing the decisive role. This battle stopped the advance of the Turks into Central Europe. p. 227

The Peelites—a group of moderate Tories who rallied around Sir Robert Peel and supported his policy of concessions to the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie in the economic sphere while preserving the political domination of the big landlords and financiers. In 1846, in the interests of the industrial bourgeoisie, Peel repealed the Corn Laws. This caused great dissatisfaction among the Tory protectionists, led to a split in the Tory party and the secession of the Peelites. After Peel’s death in 1850, the Peelites formed a political group without any definite programme, they participated in the Aberdeen Coalition Ministry (1852-55) and merged with the Liberal Party in the late 1850s and early 1860s. p. 228

The reference is to the demands for the immediate evacuation of the Danubian Principalities and other territories occupied by the Russian troops made by Austria and Prussia to Chancellor Nesselrode after the signing of the treaty on April 20, 1854 (on the treaty, see this volume, p. 168). p. 228

The first half of the article about Saint-Arnaud was written by Marx on June 6, 1854 as entered in the Notebook: “6. Juni. St. Arnaud.” The article has not been found in the issues of the New-York Daily Tribune, the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, and the New-York Weekly Tribune available to the editors of this edition. p. 230
This refers to the July 1830 bourgeois revolution in France. p. 230

Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera (Help yourself, heaven will help you)—a political society of a moderate liberal trend formed in France in 1827 with the help of a few future members of the July monarchy (Guizot, Barrot, Lafayette, etc.). It also included a group of bourgeois republicans (Flocon, Godefroy Cavaignac and others).

The society “dix-mille” (“ten thousand”—an ironical name given by Marx to the secret Bonapartist Society of December 10. It was formed in 1849 and included mainly declassed elements. Marx described this society in detail in his The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (present edition, Vol. 11, pp. 148-51).

The words “ten thousand” (ten thousand Persian archers) belong to Agesilaus II, King of Sparta. In 394 B.C., during the Corinthian war (395-387 B.C.) between the Peloponnesian Alliance headed by Sparta and the coalition of Greek states headed by Athens, Agesilaus II had to interrupt his successful military operations against Persia in Asia Minor and return to Greece. He declared that he had been driven from Asia by “ten thousand Persian archers” thus hinting that Persia was subsidising Athens in this war (archers were depicted on Persian gold coins). p. 230

In calling the famous improviser Eugène de Pradel the teacher of Saint-Arnaud, Marx alludes to an episode in the life of the Commander-in-Chief of the French army in the Crimea: during the Restoration Jacques Leroy (Saint-Arnaud) played in the Paris theatre Gaiétè under the stage name of Florival. p. 251

In 1832, when the royalist coup against Louis Philippe failed, the Duchess of Berry, mother of the Duke of Chambord who was a legitimist pretender to the French throne, was imprisoned in the castle of Blaye, and in 1833 sent to Italy to Duke Luccher-Palli to whom she had been secretly married. p. 231

The mailing of this article to New York written by Engels in the evening of June 10 is entered in the Notebook as “13. Juni. Belagerung von Silistria”. p. 234

The reference is to an episode in the Danish-Prussian war of 1848-50. p. 237

The peace treaty of Adrianople was concluded by Turkey and Russia in September 1829, at the end of the war of 1828-29. Under it Russia obtained the islands in the mouth of the Danube and a considerable part of the eastern coast of the Black Sea south of the Kuban estuary. Turkey was obliged to recognise the autonomy of the Danubian Principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia and grant them the right to elect hospodars (rulers) independently. Russia was to guarantee this autonomy, which was tantamount to establishing a Russian protectorate over the Principalities. The Turkish Government also pledged to guarantee the autonomy of Greece and Serbia. p. 240

Bashi Buzouks—irregular detachments of the Turkish army in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; the name was also given to troops noted for cruelty, plunder and lack of discipline. p. 243

This information did not prove true. Count Nikolai Alexeyevich Orlov, who stormed Silistria, remained alive. p. 243

The article “State of the Russian War” by Marx and Engels, and the one following it, “The Russian Retreat”, were arbitrarily compiled by the Tribune
editors from two works: Marx's article dispatched to New York on June 16 (it is
Einfluss der Verteidigung von Silistria auf den Kriegsplan v.d. Times (sich. 9")
and Engels' and Marx's article written on June 19 and 23 respectively (this joint
article is entered in the Notebook as "23. Juni. Freitag"). The first article was
probably delivered to New York by the steamer Washington on July 5, and the
second to Halifax by the America on July 5, 1854. The editors omitted from
the first article the passage concerning Saint-Arnaud and Denmark and added
from the second article some details about military operations at Silistra.

The article "State of the Russian War" was included by Eleanor Marx in The
Eastern Question. The first paragraph was left out.

180 The reference is to the Austro-Turkish treaty signed in Constantinople on June
14, 1854. It provided for immediate occupation of the Danubian Principalities
by Austria, after the withdrawal of the Russian troops.

181 Paskievich's official report on the siege of Silistra by the Russian troops was
published in The Times on June 24, 1854; Marx may have used some other
source.

182 An allusion to the participation of Tsarist troops in suppressing the Hungarian
revolution of 1849.

183 Marx presumably refers to a number of reports from Wallachia and one from
Dobrudja which were published anonymously in the Wiener medizinische
Wochenschrift in the first half of 1854.

184 The words "of which we give a full report in this paper" were inserted in
Marx's and Engels' text by the Tribune editors, and the words "a full report" refer to Marx's article "The War.—Debate in Parliament" (this volume, pp.
258-66).

185 The date on which this article was written is corroborated by the entry in the
Eleanor Marx published an abridged version of this article in The Eastern
Question.

186 Presumably a misprint. Marx had in mind the following report in Le Moniteur
universel, No. 177, June 26, 1854.

"Report from Belgrade, June 25, noon. According to a telegraphic dispatch
of June 23 from Bucharest, the siege of Silistra has been lifted by order of
superior command, the Russians have evacuated Giurjevo and the whole army
of the Muscovites will withdraw beyond the Pruth."

187 The third edition of The Times is not available; the material from it was partly
published on the next day in the morning issue of the newspaper (No. 21778,
June 27, 1854).

188 Marx quotes this document according to a copy of a dispatch from Prince
Lieven and Count Matuszewicz to Count Nesselrode, dated London 1st (13th)
June, 1829, published by David Urquhart in: The Portfolio. Diplomatic Review.

189 On the Adrianople treaty, see Note 176.

The Unkiar-Skelessi treaty of defensive alliance was concluded by Russia and
Turkey on July 8 (June 26), 1833. It provided for mutual aid in the event of
war with a third power. A secret article of the treaty freed Turkey from the obligation to give military aid to Russia in return for an undertaking to close the Straits to all foreign warships on Russia’s demand.

The reference is to the conference of the Turkish Foreign Minister Pertev Pasha, the English Ambassador Gordon, the French Ambassador Guilleminot and the Prussian envoy Royer on September 7, 1829. They discussed the Russian project of a treaty and drew up Turkish proposals. The Ambassadors promised Pertev Pasha to mediate in the negotiations with the Russians.

This article is registered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 4. Juli. Moldau und Walachien”. It was published in abridged form by Eleanor Marx in *The Eastern Question* under the title “Russia, Austria, Turkey, Wallachia, and Redcliffe”.

This refers to a military coup (*pronunciamento*) in Madrid on June 28, 1854. Since the spring of 1854 the Spanish people’s dissatisfaction with their great economic hardships and with their reactionary government had been growing stronger; it intensified especially after the dissolution of the Cortes which tried to oppose the government decree that taxes must be paid six months in advance. The leaders of the *pronunciamento*, generals O’Donnell and Dulce, who pursued personal aims in the overthow of the Sartorius dictatorship in Spain, were compelled to promise certain bourgeois tax reforms. They also promised to do away with the camarilla, to convene the Cortes, form a national militia and introduce other changes. Participation of the popular masses in the struggle led to the bourgeois revolution of 1854-56, which in 1854 again brought to power the Progresista Party headed by Espartero (see Note 210). Frightened by the activity of the broad masses, however, the bourgeois sided with the counter-revolution, and in 1856 extreme reactionaries returned to power.

Marx presumably has in mind the revolt of the Saragossa garrison in February 1854.

The *remarkable affair at Bronzell*—an ironical description of an insignificant clash between Prussian and Austrian detachments on November 8, 1850 in the electorate of Hesse-Cassel (Kurhessen). Prussia and Austria, contending for supremacy in Germany, claimed the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Hesse-Cassel to suppress the mounting constitutional movement against the elector Frederick William I and his reactionary ministers. In this conflict with Austria, which received diplomatic support from the Russian Emperor, Nicholas I, Prussia had to yield and allow Austria to carry out a punitive expedition in Hesse-Cassel (see also Note 266).

Marx quotes the treaty of 1393 according to D. Bratiano’s *Documents Concerning the Question of the Danubian Principalities*; the text of the treaty is also given by Marx in the synopsis of the anonymous book, *The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia*, London, 1849, which he made in September 1853. Marx may have used this synopsis too when writing this article. Marx’s notebook with excerpts, dated January-April and July 1854, contains an outline of part of this article on Moldavia and Wallachia.
Marx may here be quoting the treaty of 1460 between Wallachia and Turkey according to D. Bratiano's *Documents Concerning the Question of the Danubian Principalities.* p. 271

On the Adrianople treaty, see Note 176.

Article V of the treaty is given by Marx according to *The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia.* p. 272

The revolutionary events of 1848 in Moldavia and Wallachia are described by Marx mainly on the basis of the books: *The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia* (see Note 197) and J. Héliade Radulesco's *Mémoires sur l'Histoire de la Régénération roumaine ou sur les Événements de 1848 accomplis en Valachie,* Paris, 1851. The author of the second book, J. Héliade Radulesco, took part in the events, was a member of the provisional government known for his pro-Turkish leanings, and during the revolution pursued a compromise policy in respect of the Turkish Government and the Wallachian boyars. p. 272

Under Article V of the Adrianople treaty (see Note 199) Moldavia and Wallachia were to be occupied by the Russian troops until Turkey paid indemnities (the troops were withdrawn in 1834). Turkey pledged to recognise the autonomy of the Danubian Principalities and grant them the right to elect hospodars (rulers) independently. In 1831-32, on the basis of a project drafted by the Tsarist Government, the assemblies of boyars and clergy in Wallachia and Moldavia adopted "organic regulations" which granted legislative powers in each principality to an assembly elected by big landowners and executive powers to hospodars elected for life by representatives of the landowners, clergy and towns. The "regulations" planned a number of bourgeois reforms: annulled internal customs, introduced free trade, separated judiciary from administrative power, allowed the transfer of peasants to new owners, and prohibited torture. But the preservation of the former feudal order, including serfdom, and the concentration of political power in the Principalities in the hands of the big landowners and boyars, led the progressive sections to regard the "regulations" as a symbol of feudal stagnation. p. 273

In speaking about the Constitution, Marx had in mind the Ižlaz programme, Point 13 of which provided for the abolition of feudal duties of the peasants. The programme was adopted in the village of Ižlaz on June 9 (21), 1848. In the book by Radulesco it was entitled "Au nom du Peuple roumain". p. 273

Marx obtained this information from *The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia;* the reference is presumably to "Circulaire adressée par le comte de Nesselrode, ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, aux Missions de Russie près les cours d'Europe. En date de St.-Pétersbourg 19 juillet/1 août 1848." p. 273

The *Balta Liman treaty* (convention) was concluded by Russia and Turkey on May 1 (April 19), 1849 in view of the presence of their troops in Moldavia and Wallachia where they had been sent to suppress the revolutionary movement. According to the Convention the occupying regime was to continue until the danger of revolution was completely removed (foreign troops were withdrawn from the Principalities in 1851); provisionally hospodars were to be appointed by the Sultan in concert with the Tsar, and a number of measures were envisaged in the event of a new revolution. "Organic regulations" were re-introduced (see Note 201). p. 274
On September 28 (October 10), 1848, on the occasion of the Wallachian revolutionary troops being disbanded, their commander Georgiú Magheru (Maghiero) wrote three documents: Réponse à la lettre du consul anglais; Protestation de Maghiero adressée aux représentants des puissances de l'Europe; La Lettre à Fuad-Effendi. The texts of these documents are given in the book by Radulesco; the quotation cited by Marx partly conveys their contents.

Marx received this article from Engels on July 7 and sent it off to New York on July 11, 1854, as is seen from his entry in the Notebook: “Dienstag, 11. Juli. Belagerung von Silistria (Schluß).” Before dispatching the article to New York he made several additions to it from the latest issues of newspapers. The article was published in The Eastern Question with some abbreviations, under the title “The Siege of Silistria”.

The words “having received by the Pacific” were inserted in Engels’ text by the Tribune editors.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 7. Juli (Spanische Revolution)”; part of the article under the title “Austria” was reproduced by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question.

This refers to the old royal palace Buen Retiro built in the seventeenth century for Philip IV. It was turned into artillery barracks in the nineteenth century. The palace was situated in the Retiro Park, in which there were some other government buildings, palaces, an art gallery, observatory, etc.

The liberal-bourgeois Progresista party was formed in the 1830s. The Progresistas found support among the urban middle and petty bourgeoisie, intellectuals and some officers. Their principal demand was restriction of the power of the monarchy (see also Note 193).

The reference is to the Spanish government decree of May 19, 1854 on payment of land and industrial taxes six months in advance.


There are inaccuracies in the appraisal of the proclamations of O'Donnell (the so-called Manzanares Manifesto adopted in Manzanares, La Mancha, on July 7, 1854) and of Duque. This is presumably because Marx did not have the texts of the proclamations when he wrote the article. The proclamations were published in the Journal des Débats only on July 17, 1854 (see this volume, p. 305).

On June 18, 1837, during the Spanish revolution of 1834-43, a new Constitution was adopted. Being a compromise between some bourgeois liberals and the liberal nobility, the 1837 Constitution gave the Cortes the right of free convocation, the king retaining the right to veto and dissolve the Cortes. Qualifications for election to the Lower Chamber were reduced; its deputies were elected by direct vote, the Senate was appointed by the king from a list
submitted to him by special electoral collegiums. Catholicism was recognised as the state religion. The 1837 Constitution remained in force till 1845. p. 294

214 This refers to Count Nesselrode’s dispatch to Prince Gorchakov, the Russian representative in Vienna, of June 29 (17), 1854, which contained the Russian Government’s reply to Austria’s categorical demand for the Russian evacuation of the Danubian Principalities, which were to be occupied by Austrian troops under the treaty concluded by Austria and Turkey on June 14, 1854. Marx used a report on the dispatch (which had not yet been published) which appeared in L’Indépendance belge on July 11, 1854.

215 See Note 106. p. 295

216 See Note 195. p. 296

217 On the German Confederation, see Note 8. Besides the German states the Confederation included the duchies of Holstein, which belonged to the Danish Crown, and of Luxemburg, a possession of the King of the Netherlands. The King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, and the King of the Netherlands, as the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, were members of the Federal Diet of the Confederation. p. 298

218 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 18. Juli. Österreich. Türkei. Spanien. Ministerkrisis. Peithman”. The analysis of the sources used in the article allows us to assume that it was heavily edited by the Tribune editors who presumably arbitrarily combined the material of this article and of the subsequent one: “The Spanish Revolution.—Greece and Turkey”. Both articles, dispatched to America by the steamships Alps and Canada on July 19 and 22 respectively, arrived in New York almost at the same time and were published on August 3 and 4, 1854. The article “A Congress at Vienna” was included by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question. p. 301

219 See notes 3, 106 and 158. p. 301

220 Marx has in mind representatives of several German states (Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau) which met at a conference at Bamberg in May-June 1854 and decided to adhere to the Austro-Prussian treaty of April 20, 1854 (see this volume, pp. 167-68). p. 301

221 See Note 106. p. 301

222 Peterhof—summer residence of the Russian emperors. p. 302

223 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 21 July. Spain”. Presumably, part of the material of this article was included by the editors of the Tribune in the preceding one (see Note 218). p. 309

224 The pronunciamientos of 1843—a counter-revolutionary military mutiny organised in May by generals Narváez, Concha and others against the dictatorship of Espartero, leader of the Progresistas (see Note 210). Some of the Progresistas, dissatisfied with the dictator’s policy, supported the mutiny. On July 30, 1843, Espartero fled from the country, General Narváez, a leader of the Moderados, who found support among the big landowners, became the dictator. Thus the
third Spanish revolution (1834-43) came to an end and reaction set in till the fourth revolution (1854-56).

225 The Peninsular war or Spanish war (1808-14) — a war fought by Britain against France on Spanish and Portuguese territory. Simultaneously with it, the Spanish and Portuguese peoples waged a war of independence against France (see this volume, pp. 400-23).

226 Marx has in mind the 1812 Cadiz Constitution adopted during the first Spanish bourgeois revolution (see this volume, pp. 424-33) and events of the second Spanish bourgeois revolution (1820-23) which reached its peak in 1822. After the defeat of the monarchist conspiracy in the summer of 1822, representatives of the Left wing of the revolutionary movement — the exaltados, with Riego as one of their leaders, came to power. They were supported by democratic officers, urban middle and petty bourgeoisie, artisans and workers.

227 The Carlists — a reactionary clerico-absolutist group in Spain consisting of adherents of the pretender to the Spanish throne Don Carlos, the brother of Ferdinand VII. Relying on the military and the Catholic clergy, and also making use of the support of the backward peasants in some regions of Spain, the Carlists launched in 1833 a civil war which in fact turned into a struggle between the feudal-Catholic and liberal-bourgeois elements and led to the third bourgeois revolution (1834-43).

228 On the Progresistas, see Note 210. On the Constitution of 1837, see Note 213.

229 On December 2, 1851 Louis Bonaparte made a coup d'état by dissolving the Legislative Assembly; “the hands of the Second of December” means Napoleon III's Government.

230 In March 1848 the Provisional Government of the French Republic, in which the party of moderate bourgeois republicans grouped around the newspaper Le National played the leading part, organised national workshops in Paris in the hope of using those employed there in their own struggle against the revolutionary proletariat. This attempt to split the working class was a failure; the workers of these workshops formed the core of the June 1848 insurrection.

231 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 25 July. Debatte”. It was reprinted by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “Another War Debate”.

232 See Note 176.

233 See notes 3, 106 and 158.

234 See Note 106.

235 This refers to the battle of Sinope, between Russian and Turkish naval squadrons on November 30 (18), 1853, during the Crimean war. It ended in a defeat for the Turks.

236 The words in parentheses were inserted by the Tribune editors. The text of Disraeli’s speech was printed on p. 7 of the same issue of the Tribune in the section “Great Britain. The War Debate in the Commons.”
This article was entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 28 July. Treaty vom 14. Juni. Oesterreich. Walachei. Serbien. Italien. Sitzung Parl. Montag, Dienstag, Mittwoch, Dr. Feithman”. It was included in abridged form by Eleanor Marx in *The Eastern Question*. p. 323

As a result of the uprisings of 1804-13 and 1815 and support by Russia, Serbia under the treaty of Akkerman of 1826, subsequently confirmed by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829 (see Note 176), was proclaimed an autonomous principality under Turkish supremacy. The Serbs were granted the right to maintain their own army, courts and schools. p. 325

Marx, who was present at the debates on the war and the military budget in the House of Commons on July 24 and 25, gives an account of the speech by Lord John Russell on July 24, 1854. In the text of John Russell’s speech published by *The Times*, No. 21802 on July 25, 1854 the most glaring contradictions and false assertions about the capture of Sevastopol by the Allies were omitted. p. 326

The British steam frigate *Tiger* ran aground near Odessa on May 12, 1854; it was bombarded by an artillery battery and seriously damaged; the crew was compelled to surrender, and the frigate was burnt. p. 328

The reference is to an unsuccessful attempt by the British to capture some Russian ships in the Baltic which ended in the loss of a British ship. p. 328

An allusion to Palmerston’s position in the Anglo-Greek conflict of 1850 concerning the Portuguese merchant Pacifico, who was a British subject. Using as a pretext the setting on fire of the latter’s house in Athens, Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, presented Greece with an ultimatum and sent ships there. In his speech in Parliament Palmerston justified his actions by the need to safeguard the prestige of British subjects and drew an analogy between them and Roman citizens (*The Times*, No. 20525, June 26, 1850). The Latin “civis romanus sum” (I am a Roman citizen) meant the high status and privileges of Roman citizenship. p. 332

Thomas Paine’s book: *Rights of Man, being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution*, London, 1791-92, in which the author defended the French Revolution, was prohibited in Britain; Paine was persecuted and was compelled to emigrate to France. p. 332

See Note 139. p. 333

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 1. August. Krieg gegen Spain”. It was reprinted by Eleanor Marx in *The Eastern Question*. Engels’ authorship is also confirmed by Marx’s letter to Engels of July 27, 1854. p. 334

See Note 115. p. 337

The Sikhs—a religious sect which appeared in the Punjab (North-West India) in the sixteenth century. Their teaching on equality of people was used by the peasants who fought against the Hindu feudal lords and the Afghan invaders at the end of the seventeenth century. Subsequently a local aristocracy emerged among the Sikhs and its representatives ruled the Sikh state, which in the early nineteenth century included the Punjab and some border regions. In 1845-46
and 1848-49 Britain waged aggressive wars against the Sikhs which ended with the subjugation of the Punjab. The conquest of the Punjab completed the British colonisation of India.

The Kaffirs—an obsolete name of the South-African people (Xhosas) against whom Britain waged wars in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kaffir wars). Under the 1853 treaty the Xhosas were compelled to cede part of their lands to Britain.


The reference is to the uprising of the Paris proletariat of June 23-26, 1848, which was brutally suppressed by the French bourgeoisie. The defeat of the June uprising was a signal for a counter-revolutionary offensive in European countries.

This article is entered in the Notebook as "Freitag. 5. August. Espartero" (actually the first Friday of August 1854 was August 4). The article was heavily edited by the newspaper editors as is seen from Marx's letter to Engels of October 10, 1854: "By the by, they [the Tribune editors—Ed.] had deleted every one of my jokes about constitutional heroes en général, suspecting that, lurking behind the 'Monk-Lafayette-Espartero' trio, were certain sarcasms aimed at the noble 'Washington'" (see present edition, Vol. 39). Besides, the editors added the following sentence at the end: "Our readers can judge whether the Spanish Revolution is likely to have any useful result or not." Marx described this sentence as "silly".

See Note 210.

The battle at Ayacucho (Peru)—the last major battle in the war of the Spanish colonies in America for independence (1810-26) took place on December 9, 1824.

On the Carlist war, see Note 227.

On August 31, 1839 an agreement was signed in Vergara between the Carlist General Maroto and Espartero, the commander of the royal army, ending the civil war in Spain. The Carlist forces were disbanded and Don Carlos emigrated to France on September 14, 1839. General Cabrera's attempt to continue the struggle ended in the utter defeat of the Carlists in July 1840.

Marx has in mind Señor de Marliani's book: Historia política de la España moderna, Barcelona, 1849. In the summer of 1854 (presumably in July) Marx started making notes from this edition of Marliani's book. Further excerpts from it were contained in three other notebooks for 1854.

Moderados—a party advocating a constitutional monarchy and representing the interests of the big bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, was organised at the beginning of the bourgeois revolution of 1820-23. In the 1840s and 1850s one of its leaders was General Narváez—an organiser of the counter-revolutionary mutiny in 1843 (see Note 224)—who later became virtual dictator over Spain. During the fourth bourgeois revolution (1854-56) the Moderados opposed all bourgeois reforms and entered into agreement with the most reactionary forces.

[M. A. Príncipe, R. Giron, R. Satorres, A. Ribot,] Espartero: su pasado, su
The reference is to the divorce case in 1820 between George IV of England and Queen Caroline. The king accused the queen of adultery.  

This article by Engels was included by Marx, as is seen from his letter to Engels of August 8, 1854, in his own article: "Evacuation of the Danubian Principalities.—The Events in Spain.—A New Danish Constitution.—The Chartists" (see this volume, pp. 350-56). This composite article was entered in the Notebook as "Dienstag. 8. August. Sebastopol. Alandinseln. Russian Retreat—Espartero Recit—Danish coup d’état—Jones Rede in Bacup". The Tribune editors cut up Engels' war review and published it as a leader. Marx's article was published in the same issue of the newspaper. The title of Engels' article, "The Attack on the Russian Forts", was presumably given by the Tribune editors.

This sentence was added by the Tribune editors.

This article is part of Marx and Engels' joint article (see Note 258). The first section of the article, devoted to the movement of troops in the Danubian Principalities, was written by Marx with Engels' assistance, as can be seen from Marx's letter to Engels of July 22, 1854. Part of the article was included in The Eastern Question under the title "The Russian Retreat.—Denmark."  

The reference is to the Pacheco Ministry (March-August 1847), one of the numerous ministries during the reactionary dictatorship of General Narváez (1843-54).

In the article cited by Marx below Ernest Jones developed the ideas on cooperation he had expounded earlier in his articles on cooperation written with the direct participation of Marx (see present edition, Vol. 11, Appendices).

This article is entered in the Notebook as "Freitag. 11. August. Oesterreich, Walachei. Russischer Rückzug. Weisser See. Sulina. Sebastopol Expedition. Polen. Dänemark—Wladimir—Vertagung des Parlaments—Spanien". The article was included in abridged form in The Eastern Question under the title "The Evacuation".

The "potato war"—an ironical name given to the Austro-Prussian war of the Bavarian succession (1778-79). Here Marx alludes to a conflict which arose between Austria and Prussia in the autumn of 1850 (see notes 195 and 266).

In May and October 1850 conferences in which Austria, Prussia and Russia took part were held in Warsaw on the initiative of the Russian Emperor. They were called in connection with the growing tension in the struggle between Austria and Prussia over supremacy in Germany. Acting as arbiter, the Russian Emperor made Prussia renounce her intention of achieving political unification of the German states under her aegis. The protocol mentioned by Marx is: "Procès-verbal des conférences tenues à Varsovie entre les ministres présidents d'Autriche et de Prusse pour arriver à l'amiable à une solution de la question
de la constitution allemande. Signé à Varsovie, le 28 octobre 1850.” In 1851 this protocol was published by the Prussian Government in the pamphlet Von Warschau bis Olmütz.

Early in August 1854 the Russian warship Vladimir, on its way from Sevastopol to the Bosphorus, attacked the British Cyclops, sank several Turkish ships, and returned unharmed to Sevastopol without meeting any resistance from the Anglo French fleet.

The Kingdom of Poland—the name given to the part of Poland which was ceded to Russia by decision of the 1815 Vienna Congress and given the status of a constitutional monarchy united to Russia in the person of the emperor. After the suppression of the 1830-31 insurrection the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland was abolished. The “organic statute” of 1832 was not implemented.

Marx has in mind Russia's Declaration of armed neutrality of March 11 (February 28), 1780. It was directed against Britain, whose ships attacked ships of neutral states during the American War of Independence (1775-83). The declaration proclaimed the right of neutral states to trade with the belligerent powers; goods of the belligerent states carried by neutral ships were declared inviolable; a port was considered blockaded if its approaches were guarded by ships of the attacking power. This declaration provided a basis for agreements between Russia and Denmark (June 28, 1780) and between Russia and Sweden (July 21, 1780). In 1780-83 they were joined by Holland, Prussia, Austria, Portugal and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

In 1845 the Cortes adopted a law revising the Constitution of 1837 (see Note 213). The new law raised the electoral qualifications, gave the king the exclusive right to appoint senators, abolished the right of the Cortes to convene without special permission of the monarch, and reserved to the Crown the right to define the range of questions for discussion by the Cortes.

The concordat between Pope Pius IX and Queen Isabella II of Spain was concluded on March 16, 1851 and approved by the Cortes in October 1851. Under it the Spanish Crown was obliged to pay the Catholic Church from the treasury, to stop confiscating church lands and to return to the monasteries the land confiscated during the third bourgeois revolution (1834-43) which had not yet been sold.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 15. August. Dänemark und U.St.—Bundestags Gesetz-[gebung]—Serbische Antwort an die Pforte wegen der Entwaffnung [illegible] Österreichs [illegible] Frage der Wiener Konferenz—Clarendons Revelation in H[ouse] etc.—Spanien”. The first part of the article under the title “Servia—England, France and Constantinople” was published in The Eastern Question.

The so-called “Berlin revolutionist conspiracy” was a police provocation (see present edition, Vol. 12, pp. 28-31).

The Cologne Communist Trial (October 4-November 12, 1852) was a trial of a group of Communist League members charged with “conspiracy bearing the character of high treason”. The trial was rigged by the Prussian police on the basis of forged documents and fabricated evidence, which were used not only against the accused but also to discredit the whole proletarian organisation.
Such evidence included, for instance, the “Genuine Minute-book” of the Communist League Central Authority meetings and other documents forged by police agents, as well as genuine documents of the adventurist Willich-Schapper faction which was responsible for the split in the Communist League. Seven of the twelve accused were sentenced to imprisonment for terms of three to six years. Marx directed the defence from London, sending material revealing the provocative methods of the prosecution, and after the trial he exposed its organisers (see Marx’s pamphlet *Revelations Concerning the Communist Trial in Cologne* and Engels’ article “The Late Trial at Cologne”, published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*, present edition, Vol. 11). p. 365

275 See notes 3, 106 and 158. p. 365

276 The reference is to the London Convention on the Black Sea Straits of July 13, 1841 (see Note 28). The convention annulled the Umkia-Skelessi treaty which had been very advantageous for Russia (see Note 189). p. 366

277 An allusion to the marriage planned in 1845 of Prince Leopold Saxe-Coburg-Gotha—a cousin of the English Queen’s husband, Prince Albert, and Queen Isabella II of Spain which would have led to a strengthening of Britain’s position in the Peninsula. Palmerston, who became Foreign Secretary in 1846, vigorously supported this plan. It was not put into effect (see Note 40). p. 367

278 The *Congress of Verona* of the Holy Alliance was held from October to December 1822. It adopted the decision on France’s armed intervention against revolutionary Spain, and on continuance of Austria’s occupation of the kingdoms of Naples and Sardinia, and condemned the national liberation uprising of the Greek people against the Turkish yoke. p. 367

279 Marx alludes to the editorial of *The Times* of August 14 which contained the following passage: “It is notorious that on the occurrence of this revolution—and, indeed, for some time before—the signal had been given throughout Europe for the disbanded soldiers of sedition to repair to Madrid, and that several hundred of the disciples of the French Red Republic are at present in that capital, assisting the insurrection, teaching the noble art of street fighting, and endeavouring to exasperate the Spanish people to the last extremities against the Court.”

*Insurrectionists of June*—participants in the June 1848 uprising of the Paris proletariat. p. 368

280 The Manchester textile manufacturer Richard Cobden was one of the Free Trade leaders who demanded, in the interests of English industrial bourgeoisie, a reduction in expenses on the state administration. Among these they listed expenses connected with conquest of colonies and their administration. Cobden, Bright and others considered that Britain, being the most developed industrial power, could conquer any market, ousting her rivals by means of cheaper industrial goods. The centre of Free Trade agitation was Manchester, hence the name of the Manchester School, denoting the Free Trade trend in English economic thinking. p. 369

281 Under the Cadiz Constitution of 1812 (see this volume, pp. 424-33) the population of the Spanish colonies, excluding the Negroes, received Spanish citizenship and equal political rights with the population of Spain proper,
including the right to elect their representatives to the Cortes. By creating a semblance of equality between colonies and the mother country the Spanish liberals who drafted the Constitution tried to prevent the war for independence which was developing at the time in the Spanish colonies in America.

282 See notes 213 and 270.

283 On the exaltados, see Note 226. Marx used this term to characterise the Spanish republicans during the fourth revolution in Spain (1854-56).

284 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 18. August. Spanien—Aland.—Schweden—Preussen, Anatolien—Dänemark—[illegible] Omer Pasha. Refugees. Austria. Prussia”. When it was published in the Tribune it was mistakenly dated August 21 (London, Friday, August 21, 1854). The last part of the article was included by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question under the title “The Capture of Bomarsund”.

285 The Union Club—one of more democratic of the organisations which appeared at the beginning of the 1854-56 bourgeois revolution in Spain. Its members included republicans and also the utopian socialists Figueras, Pi y Margall, Orense and others. The organisation demanded universal suffrage, freedom of conscience, of the press, assembly and petition, abolition of indirect taxes and capital punishment, and also the arming of the people. At the same time it completely ignored the agrarian question. The club was closed at the end of 1854 (see this volume, p. 448).

286 See Note 213.

287 On April 7, 1823, in accordance with the decision of the Congress of Verona (see Note 278), the French army invaded Spain to suppress the Spanish revolution of 1820-23; the “royalists”, who advocated restoration of the absolute monarchy, actively assisted the intervention.

In the course of the war the Carlists (see Note 227) resorted to guerrilla tactics.

288 During the 1820-23 bourgeois revolution, besides democratic clubs, numerous secret societies were formed in Spain. They were connected with Left-wing freemasons and included urban bourgeoisie, officers and representatives of the lower urban sections. Being organised with great secrecy and having branches in different regions of the country, these societies had a considerable influence on the policy of the government and of the Cortes. Most prominent among their leaders were Riego, San Miguel and Alpuente.

289 The Coburg-Braganza (more correctly Braganza-Coburg)—the junior branch of the Braganza royal dynasty in Portugal.

By the Unionist party are meant the adherents of a united monarchy in the Iberian Peninsula.

290 See Note 211.

291 This refers to the declaration of neutrality by Sweden and Denmark in 1853 which reflected their hostile attitude towards Russia. Simultaneously, Sweden started negotiations with Britain and France on entering the war on the Allies’ side. The negotiations broke down and Sweden did not take part in the Crimean war.
292 The two articles by Engels on the capture of Bomarsund which were published in the New-York Daily Tribune as leaders are directly connected with the previous one, "The Revolution in Spain.—Bomarsund" written by Marx. The first article is entered in the Notebook as "Dienstag. 22. August. Bomarsund". Both articles were published under the same title. Subtitles were provided by the editors of the present edition.

293 This article is a continuation of Engels' first article on Bomarsund and only partly corresponds to the entry in the Notebook: "Dienstag. 29. August. Bomarsund. Einvriicken der Oesterreicher in die Walachei. Zustand des Heeres zu Varna." The second part of the article dispatched to New York on August 29, 1854, was written by Marx. The article was heavily edited by the newspaper editors, who published the part concerning Bomarsund as a leader. From the rest of the article they took several sentences concerning the entry of the Austrian troops into Wallachia and included them in the review of the news brought by the steamboat St. Louis: "From the war there is nothing of great moment except it be the continued entry of the Austrians into the Principalities. We do not hear, however, that the Russians have ceased diplomatic relations at Vienna, though warlike preparations continue there on a large scale." It may also be assumed that material from the item "Zustand des Heeres zu Varna" was included as a separate paragraph in Pulszky's article published in the same number: "The news from the seat of war is very unsatisfactory. The cholera at the camp of Varna has demoralized the Anglo-French army, and though the sailing of the expedition to the Crimea or some other point was to have taken place on the 15th, it has been postponed—first to the 20th and then to the beginning of September. The French do not like the plan of the campaign, which was devised by the English, but still they have accepted it. As to the Turkish defeat at Kars, or according to other Petersburg dispatches at Bayazid we have now reliable information of a late date from the Turkish camp, and can positively assure you that no battle had taken place in July nor in the first days of August, and that, therefore, the defeat over and over reported in The Times is a fabrication in order to influence the exchange; indeed, the Turkish scrip, which was already at 7 per cent premium declined to six in consequence of the rumour, and even the English funds were heavy for a day. General Klapka is said to have been sent to the army of Kars; if such be the case, he will soon be in opposition with Guyon." It is not only the above-mentioned entry in the Notebook which gives ground to assume that this paragraph belonged to Marx, but also Marx's letter to Engels of September 2, 1854: "I am in a fix because in one of my latest articles I stated that the report of the Turkish defeat at Kars was an invention of Vienna." (The telegramme on the defeat of the Turkish army at Kars published in The Times on August 25, 1854 was dated from Vienna.) See also Marx's letter to Engels of August 26, 1854: "So far as I can gather from the papers, the Polish and Hungarian émigrés in the Turkish Asiatic army do nothing but engage in mischief, place-seeking and intrigues" (present edition, Vol. 39). It is impossible to ascertain to what extent the Tribune editors interfered with Marx's original text of these two paragraphs as the manuscript is not extant.

294 The series of articles Revolutionary Spain was written by Marx for the New-York Daily Tribune between August and November 1854. Marx observed all the symptoms of the revolutionary movement in Europe and paid much attention to the revolutionary events in the summer of 1854 in Spain. He held that the
revolutionary struggle there could provide a stimulus for the development of the revolutionary movement in other European countries. In 1854 Marx made a thorough study of the events of the Spanish revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century so as to improve his understanding of the specific character and features of the new Spanish revolution; Marx's five notebooks of excerpts from the English, French and Spanish authors are extant. We can judge from Marx's Notebook that he sent nine articles to the New-York Daily Tribune related to the first (1808-14), second (1820-23) and partly third (1834-43) Spanish bourgeois revolutions, of which only the first six were published (the articles of September 29 and October 20 were printed in four issues of the newspaper)—thus eight articles in all. The remaining three were not published and the manuscripts have not been found (see Note 457). It is possible that the ninth article did not complete the series, because the extant extract of the manuscript on the causes of the second bourgeois revolution and the nature of the Carlist wars (see this volume, pp. 654-59) exceeds the range of the ninth article as outlined by Marx in his Notebook ("Freitag, 8. December, Spain—1833").

When the editors of the New-York Daily Tribune published Marx's articles they treated them arbitrarily.

The first article of the series was published in the newspaper under the title: "Spanish Revolutions", the rest under the title "Revolutionary Spain". Articles were published in part also in the New-York Semi-Weekly Tribune, Nos. 970, 975, 984, 986, 996, September 12 and 29, October 31, November 7 and December 12 respectively and in the New-York Weekly Tribune, Nos. 679, 682, 685, 686, 687, September 16, October 7 and 28, November 4 and 11, 1854.

Marx's series of articles "Revolutionary Spain" was reproduced in English in 1939 by Lawrence & Wishart Ltd. and also by the International Publishers: Marx and Engels, Revolution in Spain. p. 389

This sentence was presumably written entirely by the Tribune editors who mention in it the article by their London correspondent Pulszky of August 25, 1854 published in the New-York Daily Tribune, No. 4178, September 8, 1854 in the column "The State of Europe". p. 391

An allusion to the 1848 February revolution.  p. 391

From 1581 to 1640 Portugal was ruled by the Spanish kings who appointed viceroys to administer it. The arbitrary rule of vice-queen Margaret of Savoy and her favourite Miguel de Vasconcellos led to an uprising in 1640 as a result of which Spanish rule was overthrown and the Braganza dynasty came to power (see Note 289). p. 392

The war of the Holy League—an insurrection of the Castilian towns (comuneros) in 1520-22 against the absolute power of Charles I. p. 392

Ayuntamientos—organs of local government in Spain which played a great political role in the period of the Reconquest, or struggle for Spain's liberation from the Arab yoke (eight-fifteenth centuries). After the suppression of the comunero uprising in the sixteenth century which is described in this article, the Ayuntamientos were in the main liquidated. Re-establishment of the Ayuntamientos was one of the democratic demands made during the bourgeois revolutions at the beginning of the nineteenth century. p. 393
States-General—a body representing the estates in medieval France. It consisted of representatives of the clergy, nobles and burghers. It met in May 1789, after a 175-year interval, at the time of the maturing bourgeois revolution, and on June 17 was transformed by a decision of the deputies of the third estate into the National Assembly, which proclaimed itself the Constituent Assembly on July 9 and became the supreme organ of revolutionary France. p. 393

The reference is to the Castile Cortes which met in Valladolid in January-February 1518 with the purpose of taking the oath of allegiance to King Charles I and to receive his oath to observe the fueros (see Note 321).

There is a slip on Marx's part here; the Cortes met before Charles I of Spain was made Holy Roman Emperor (1519) and before he went to Germany for coronation (1520). p. 394

The Holy Brotherhood, or the Santa Hermandad, was a union of Spanish towns formed at the end of the fifteenth century with the approbation of the King, who sought to make use of the bourgeoisie in the struggle between absolutism and the big feudal lords. From the mid-sixteenth century the armed forces of the Santa Hermandad performed police functions. p. 394

Auto-da-fé (in Spanish and Portuguese, literally an act of faith)—the solemn announcement of sentences by the High Court of Inquisition in Spain, Portugal and their colonies, the name was also given to the burning of the victims at the stake. The last auto-da-fé took place in Valencia in 1826. p. 395

The term “civil society” (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) is used by Marx and Engels in two different senses: 1) to denote the economic system of class society irrespective of the historical stage of development, the sum total of material relations which determine the political institutions and ideological forms and 2) to denote the material relations of bourgeois society (or society as a whole) under capitalism. p. 395

The Constitution worked out by Napoleon I for Spain was adopted at the conference of the Spanish nobles in the French town of Bayonne (the Bayonne Cortes) in July 1808. It vested the King (Joseph Bonaparte) with almost unrestricted power. He appointed nobles to the Senate which was to be established and about half of the deputies to the Cortes. The Constitution introduced public legal proceedings, abolished torture and did away with inland customs. The Catholic religion became the only state religion. p. 399

There is one more sentence in the New-York Daily Tribune here (“Let us hope that the additions now being made to their annals by the Spanish people may prove neither unworthy nor fruitless of good to themselves and to the world”) which was inserted by the newspaper editors judging from Marx's letter to Engels of October 10, 1854 (see present edition, Vol. 39). p. 399

Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph, T. I-X, Paris, 1853-54. The text of a secret treaty allegedly concluded between Alexander I and Napoleon I in Tilsit is given in the comments to the fourth volume of the memoirs (pp. 246-48), purportedly according to the Madrid Gaceta of August 25, 1812. The author of the comments was the publisher of the memoirs A. du Casse, aide-de-camp of Joseph Bonaparte. This text was reproduced by Marx in the summary of the memoirs he made in August 1854 during his work on the series of articles "Revolutionary Spain".
There is no mention of such points either in the Tilsit treaty signed by Russia and France on July 7 (June 25), 1807 or in the secret convention supplementing the treaty.  

308 An allusion to Spain's participation in the first coalition against republican France (1793-97). After temporary success in 1793 the Spanish troops were utterly defeated, and Spain was compelled to conclude a separate peace with France in Basle in July 1795.

309 A popular insurrection in Bilbao against the French invaders took place in August 1808. It was brutally suppressed by General Merlin whose troops stormed the town.

310 The negotiations between Napoleon I and Alexander I took place in Erfurt from September 27 to October 14, 1808. Festivities which accompanied the event were attended by the kings of Bavaria, Saxony and Württemberg and by a number of other German princes.

311 Marx has in mind a representative assembly similar to the National Convention formed during the French revolution as a result of the popular uprising of August 10, 1792.

312 The Jesuits were expelled from Spain in 1767; this was done at the suggestion of Floridablanca, then prosecutor of the Royal Council of Spain.

313 Reference to the reign of the Castilian kings in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries: Enrique II (1369-79), Juan I (1379-90), Enrique III (1390-1406) and Juan II (1406-54).

314 Marx has in mind a regulation in Las Siete Partidas—Spanish code of laws—drawn up in the kingdom of Castile and León in the thirteenth century but actually introduced only after 1348. The Partidas functioned parallel with the fueros (see Note 321) and gradually became predominant in the legal proceedings only in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

315 *Le Comité du salut public* (The Committee of Public Safety) established by the Convention on April 6, 1793 during the Jacobin dictatorship (June 2, 1793-July 27, 1794) was the leading revolutionary government body in France. It lasted till October 26, 1795.

316 At Covadonga (in the Asturian mountains) the Spanish troops defeated the Arabs in 718. This victory promoted the establishment of a small independent state in the mountainous regions of Asturia which became a bulwark of struggle against the Arab invaders (the beginning of the Reconquest).

Another centre of resistance to the Arab invaders arose somewhat later in Sobrarbe, a small territory in Northern Aragon.


318 See Note 299.

319 *Mita*—here the compulsory assignment of Indians, by drawing lots, to work in the gold and silver mines, at manufactories and construction sites in Spanish colonies in America.
Repartimiento—here the right of a white person to employ as many aliens on his land as he is able to feed. p. 429

The Constitution of 1791, approved by the Constituent Assembly, established a constitutional monarchy in France, giving the king full executive powers and the right of veto. This Constitution was annulled as a result of the popular uprising of August 10, 1792, which brought about the fall of the monarchy. After the Girondist government (the Girondists were the party of the big bourgeoisie) had been overthrown by the uprising of May 31-June 2, 1793 and the revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobins established, the National Convention adopted a new democratic Constitution of the French Republic. p. 429

Fueros here means the charters which, in medieval Spain, established the rights, privileges and duties of townspeople and members of village communities in matters of local government, jurisdiction, taxation, military service, etc. p. 429

This refers to one of the main principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen), a preamble to the Constitution adopted by the French Convention in 1793 during the revolutionary dictatorship of the Jacobins. The last article, the 35th, of the Declaration reads: “When the government violates the rights of the people, insurrection is the imprescriptible right and irremissible duty of the people as a whole and of each of its sections.” p. 429

Serviles—the name given to a reactionary clerico-absolutist group during the first bourgeois revolution in Spain (1808-14); later the serviles formed the Court camarilla of Ferdinand VII, and during the last years of his life pinned their hopes on his brother Don Carlos.

Liberales, who expressed the interests of the bourgeoisie and liberal nobility, put forward as their programme the 1812 Constitution.

Americanos—the name given to small group in the Cortes representing the Spaniards living in the Spanish colonies in Latin America. They played no significant role. p. 435

The Council of Trent was a general council held by the Catholic Church in Tridentum (Trient) and Bologna from 1545 to 1563. It condemned Protestantism and adopted a number of decisions concerning the Catholic Church; in particular, it proclaimed the Pope's authority over the councils and strengthened the power of bishops. The main result of the Council of Trent was the persecution of heretics and free-thinkers, and intensification of Church censorship. From 1559 the Index librorum prohibitorum was published regularly and in 1571 the Congregation of the Index (an office in Vatican dealing with censorship) was set up; it remained till 1917. p. 435

Lazzaroni—the name of declassed, lumpenproletarian elements in Italy; they were repeatedly used by the reactionary monarchist circles in their struggle against the liberal and democratic movement. p. 437

Marx is presumably quoting from W. Walton, The Revolutions of Spain, from 1808 to the end of 1836, London, 1837 (Vol. I, p. 221), a summary of which he made during his work on the series of articles “Revolutionary Spain”. During that time Marx also read San Miguel’s De la guerra civil en España, Madrid, 1856 and Memoria Sucinda sobre 10. Acaecido en la columna Movil de las Tropas Nacionales al Mando del comandante General de la Primera División Don Rafael del
Riejo, desde su Salida de la Ciudad de San Fernando el 20 de Enero de 1820, hasta su total Disolucion en Bienvenida el 11 de Marzo del mismo año. Madrid, 1820; he made excerpts from the former in August, and from the latter in October 1854.


After the return of Ferdinand VII, from May 1814 onwards reaction set in in Spain, destroying all the gains of the bourgeois revolution of 1808-14; the revolutionary leaders were imprisoned, some of them executed.

Marx polemises against the following works: *Last Days of Spain. By an Eye-Witness*, London, 1823; *The Holy Alliance versus Spain, etc. By a Constitutionalist*, London, 1823; Walton, *The Revolutions of Spain, from 1808 to the end of 1836*, and D. Urquhart, *Progress of Russia*. In the excerpts from these books he made in October 1854, Marx stressed the facts concerning Tatishchev's activity in Madrid.

On July 20 (8), 1812 the Russian Government and the representatives of the Cadiz Cortes concluded in Velikiye Luki a treaty establishing friendly relations between Russia and Spain in the war against Napoleonic France, and also reviving and developing trade between the two states. By signing this treaty Russia recognised the Cadiz Cortes and the Constitution drawn up by them. Marx cites this fact from Manuel de Marlianí's *Historia politico de la España Moderna*, Barcelona, 1849, and also from *The Holy Alliance versus Spain; or, Notes and Declarations of the Allied Powers* published in the *Edinburgh Review* (v. XXXVIII for 1823, pp. 243-44), excerpts from which are in Marx's notebook of excerpts for November 1854.

Presumably a slip of the pen in the manuscript or a misprint in the newspaper; it should be 1814-20, the period between the first and the second Spanish bourgeois revolutions, and not 1808-14.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 1. September. Spanien Revolution. Constitutientwurf [?].” Marx seems to have finished the article in the morning of September 2, as he used information published in the September 2 morning issue of *The Times* and *Le Moniteur universel* of the same date. The title was probably supplied by the *Tribune* editors.

The press law promulgated in Spain on March 22, 1837 abolished preliminary censorship, but imposed high caution money and stipulated strict responsibility of authors and editors for the material published. Later several supplementary laws were passed making the prescriptions of the 1837 law more rigid; the most severe of them was the law of 1852, which reintroduced preliminary censorship. The reference is presumably to this law and not that of 1842.
334 See Note 285.

335 The *Prince of Asturias*—a title bestowed on the Crown prince in Spain since 1850. If there were no male heirs the title was conferred on the eldest princess who lost it if a male heir was born. Here the reference is to Isabel Francisca de Asis de Borbón, Isabella II's eldest daughter.

336 The reference is to the 45-centime tax—an addition to the four direct taxes on landowners (land tax, real estate tax, window and door tax, patent dues) the burden of which fell mostly on the peasants. The decree introducing this addition was issued by the Provisional Government of the French Republic on March 16, 1848.

337 *Octrois*—tolls levied by a city on imported consumer goods, existed in France from the thirteenth century. It was repealed in 1791 during the French Revolution, but later reintroduced on some foodstuffs (salt, wine, fish, etc.).

The *conscription*—here a military tax on persons freed from military service.

338 The *captain-generalcies*—administrative areas established in Spain in the sixteenth century in which the supreme military and administrative authority belonged to captain-generals.

339 This article was entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 12. September. Spain. [illegible]”.

340 The confiscation of the estates of the House of Orleans was decreed by Louis Bonaparte on January 22, 1852.

341 See Note 333.

342 By the age of the Philips, Marx means the reign of the Spanish kings Philip II (1556-98), Philip III (1598-1621) and Philip IV (1621-65).

343 Here a derogatory nickname for generals who supported Napoleon III. Marx informed Engels about this evidence of the growth of anti-Bonapartist sentiment in the French army on September 13, 1854. He wrote in greater detail about this on September 25 of the same year in his article for the *New-York Daily Tribune* (see this volume, p. 473).

344 This article is entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 15. September. Sebastopol Bomarsund Expedition Moldau und [illegible] Oesterreicher in die Walachei. [illegible] Spain. Exports”.

345 See Note 172.

346 This presumably refers to Marx’s article, not yet found, which was entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 8 September. Turkey. Russians Refusal. Prussia. Spain”. Part of the material from Marx’s article, particularly that concerning Spain, may have been included by the *Tribune* editors in Pulszky’s report published in the newspaper on September 22, 1854.

347 The tariff reform of 1842 lowered customs duties on corn and other imported goods, but introduced income tax as a compensation for the treasury.

348 Engels wrote this article on September 25, drawing on the first reports of the allied landing at Eupatoria and at the Old Fort in the Crimea which were...
published in The Times on September 21-25, 1854. The article was entered in Marx's Notebook as "Dienstag. 26. September", then followed the word "Cars" which was changed to "Sev[astopol]". Marx presumably made this correction because he had mailed Engels' article on military actions in the Caucasus to New York on September 19. It was entered in Marx's Notebook as "Dienstag. 19. September". Marx's letter to Engels of September 22 shows that Engels wrote such an article and that Marx had received it by Tuesday, September 19, 1854. In the entry in his Notebook Marx at first mistakenly wrote "Cars" in reference to a latter article and then changed it to Sev[astopol]. Engels' article on Cars written on September 19 has been lost, as the steamship Arctic which carried it sank in the Atlantic on September 27, 1854.

The article "The Attack on Sevastopol" was published by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question, p. 470

349 This sentence was changed by the Tribune editors. The reports on the movement of the allied troops to Sevastopol were printed on p. 6 of the same issue of the New-York Daily Tribune. p. 470

350 On June 16, 1815 a battle between Napoleon's army and the Prussian forces commanded by Field Marshal Blücher took place at Ligny. Despite the defeat of the Prussians, Blücher escaped with his army from pursuit by the French and joined the Anglo-Dutch armies at Waterloo, where they fought the main body of the French army. The French were defeated after the arrival of the Prussian troops.

351 On the night of December 1, 1851 a battalion from General Espinasse's regiment was ordered to guard the National Assembly; on December 2, General Espinasse, bribed by the Bonapartists, occupied with his troops the building where the Assembly was sitting, thus promoting the success of Louis Bonaparte's coup d'état.

352 Lower Empire—a term used in historical literature to denote the Byzantine Empire, and also the Roman Empire during its decline; it came to be used to describe a state at the period of its decline and disintegration. p. 472

353 See Note 343. p. 473

354 This refers to Louis Bonaparte's attempted coup d'état on August 6, 1840. Profiting by a certain revival of pro-Bonapartist sentiments in France, Louis Bonaparte landed with a handful of conspirators at Boulogne and tried to raise a mutiny among the local garrison. His attempt failed. He was sentenced to life imprisonment but escaped to England in 1846.

355 The reference is to the expedition of the English fleet to the Scheldt estuary in 1809 during the war of the fifth coalition against Napoleonic France. Though the English captured the isle of Walcheren, they did not develop military operations and were obliged to abandon the island after losing about ten thousand men out of the forty-thousand-strong force through famine and disease.

356 This article is entered in the Notebook as "Dienstag. 3. Oktober. Sevastopol". When Marx prepared it for mailing to New York he added some facts from the reports published in the morning papers of October 3. The first sentence of the article bears signs of interference by the Tribune editors. p. 477

357 The words "which will be found in another column" were added by the Tribune editors and refer to the item entitled "The News of the Victory"
published in the same number. This item contained Napoleon III's address to
the soldiers at the camp of Boulogne in connection with the news of the
capture of Sevastopol by the allies, which later proved to be false. p. 480

In 1806-07, during the reign of Selim III, the French ambassador Sebastiani
succeeded in gaining exceptional influence over the Turkish Government.
Napoleon I hoped to use the Turkish army as an ally in the war against Russia.
However, in May 1807, there was a mutiny in Constantinople of Janissaries
opposing the reforms being carried out in Turkey at the time, and on May 29,
1807, Selim III was dethroned. p. 481

The first two sentences of this paragraph were added by the Tribune editors.
There are signs of interference also in the fourth sentence. p. 481

The article "The Sevastopol Hoax" and the following one, "The Sevastopol
Hoax.—General News", were sent by Marx to New York as one article which
was entered in the Notebook as "Freitag, 6. October. Renommage über
Sebastopol". The editors divided it in two, and published them both in the same
issue on October 21, 1854, one as a leader, the other unsigned but with the
note usual for signed items: "Correspondence of the New-York Tribune". The
beginning of the article "The Sevastopol Hoax" was reprinted in the New-York
Semi-Weekly Tribune, No. 685, October 28, 1854. p. 483

The words "and copied in our columns this morning" were added by the
Tribune editors. This refers to the reprint: "From the London Gazette
Extraordinary. War Department, Oct. 5" published in the New-York Daily
Tribune on October 21, 1854. Reports on the events in the Crimea published in
the same issue of the Gazette are analysed by Marx and Engels below. p. 485

Events in Malaga are not mentioned in Marx's article published in the Tribune.
Marx presumably refers to his article written on September 8, 1854 which was
not published by the Tribune editors (see Note 346). If this material was
contained in some other article, the Tribune editors omitted it. p. 489

The reference is to the London Protocol of May 8, 1852 recognising the
integrity of the Danish monarchy, signed by Austria, Britain, France, Denmark,
Prussia, Russia and Sweden. It established the indivisibility of the lands
belonging to the Danish Crown, including the Duchy of Schleswig-Holstein.
The Protocol mentioned the Russian Emperor among the lawful claimants to
the Danish throne (as a descendant of Duke Charles Peter Ulrich of
Holstein-Gottorp, who reigned in Russia as Peter III), who waived their rights
in favour of Duke Christian of Glücksburg-Gottorp, who was proclaimed
successor to King Frederick VII. p. 489

The reference is to Napoleon III's order of October 3, 1854, by which Armand
Barbès, sentenced to life imprisonment for participation in revolutionary
actions of the Paris workers on May 15, 1848, was released from prison
unconditionally. This order followed the interception of a private letter written
by Barbès on September 18, 1854, in which he welcomed the war with Russia
and wished the French troops success in "the name of civilisation". The order
and an excerpt from the letter were published in Le Moniteur universel on
October 5, 1854. After his release, on October 11, Barbès wrote a letter to the
editors of the Moniteur acknowledging the authenticity of the letter and stating
that "the greatness of France had always been his religion" but that he had
always been and remained an enemy of the Bonapartist regime. The letter was

Marx has in mind the events of June 13, 1849 when a peaceful anti-government demonstration organised by the Montagnards was dispersed; the editorial offices of democratic and socialist papers were raided and the principal ones among them were banned.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 10. Oktober. Schlacht bei Alma”. On that day Marx wrote to Engels: “First my compliments on your most glorious and sound criticism. It is pity that this *fait d'armes* [feat of arms] could not appear in the London press. Your position in this field would have been assured through such a move” (present edition, Vol. 39).

The words: “and the dispatches of the commanders, the reports of English journalists who were present, and of several naval officers, are given at great length in our columns this morning” were added by the *Tribune* editors.

The *British Legion in Spain* was a force recruited in England to support the Government of Maria Cristina during the Carlist war (see Note 227). This force of 10,000 men commanded by General Evans took part in military operations in 1835-37.

This refers to a battle between the Piedmontese army and the Austrian troops in Northern Italy during the Austro-Italian war of 1848-49.

The words “as our readers will see in our extracts from the English papers” were added by the *Tribune* editors.

The *battle of Lützen* (Saxony) between Napoleon I’s army and the Russian and Prussian forces took place on May 2, 1813; the battle between the allied army and the French at Bautzen (Saxony) took place on May 20-21 of the same year. In both cases Napoleon forced the allied troops to retreat though he sustained great losses; in both cases also the retreat was an orderly one.

The *battle of the Katzbach* between the French army and the allied troops took place on August 26, 1813. A successful manoeuvre allowed Blücher to inflict a serious defeat on the French.

The words “as appears almost certain from our dispatch by the *Niagara*, received last night by telegraph from Halifax”, and lower: “though our Halifax dispatch does not mention their arrival” were added by the *Tribune* editors.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 17. Oktober. Russische Kriegsmacht en général.—Belagerung von Sebastopol”. Apparently, the *Tribune* editors omitted the part on the siege of Sevastopol.

John Bull and Jacques Bonhomme were nicknames given to the English and French.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 31. Oktober, Belagerung von Sebastopol”. Eleanor Marx included it in *The Eastern Question*.

This sentence shows signs of interference by the *Tribune* editors.

This sentence shows signs of interference by the *Tribune* editors.
378 See Note 152.

379 Lancaster—an eight-inch gun with an oval rifled bore named after its inventor and first used by the British during the Crimean war.

380 Engels' article, which was entered in the Notebook as "Freitag. 10. November. Übersicht der Crimean Campaign", was mailed to New York on November 11, 1854 by the Canada. It arrived in New York with delay because the Canada collided with another ship off the American coast, so the Tribune editors changed two first paragraphs in it using the November European press later reports.

381 Engels enumerates battles in which the Russian troops showed great courage and staunchness.

The battle of Zorndorf, which took place on August 25, 1758 between the Russian and the Prussian armies was one of the major battles in the Seven Years' War (1756-63). Repeated Prussian attacks were repulsed with great valour by the Russians who inflicted severe losses on the enemy by counter-attacks and artillery fire.

The battle of Preussisch-Eylau (Eastern Prussia) on February 7-8, 1807 between the French and Russian troops was one of the bloodiest during the war of the fourth coalition against France. Despite heavy losses Napoleon's army failed to achieve a decisive victory.

The battle of Borodino on September 7, 1812 was a major engagement in the Patriotic war against Napoleon in which the Russian troops displayed high fighting qualities and inflicted heavy losses on the French. The outcome of the battle changed the course of the war in Russia's favour and led to the defeat of Napoleon's army despite the forced but expedient evacuation of Moscow by the Russians.

382 This article was entered in the Notebook as "Freitag. 17. November. Schlacht vom 25. Oktober (Liprandi)." The Tribune published it under the title "The War in the East".

383 The first and second sentences and the reference to quotations from The Times were inserted by the Tribune editors. The material from The Times was printed in the Tribune under the heading "From The London Times of November 17".

384 See Note 371.

385 This article by Engels was entered in the Notebook as "Dienstag. 28. November. Schlacht von Inkerman". When he dispatched his article to London, Engels appears to have forgotten the first two pages of the article (see Marx's letter to Engels of November 30, 1854): "By some oversight the first two pages were omitted from your splendid article of Tuesday's date. However the substance was contained in the 5 following ones, so all that suffered was the style" (see present edition, Vol. 39). That is probably why the first introductory paragraph of the article was written by Marx; however, it was heavily edited by the Tribune editors.

386 This refers to the battle of Jena and Auerstadt fought by the French against Prussia and Saxony on October 14, 1806 during the war between Russia and Prussia on the one hand and France on the other (1806-07).
The battle of Albuera took place on May 16, 1811 between the allied army of Britain, Spain and Portugal, commanded by Beresford, which laid siege to the fortress of Badojos occupied by the French, and the French army under Marshal Soult marching to relieve the fortress.

The reference is to an incident during the Egyptian expedition of the French army in 1798-1801.

This sentence was inserted by the Tribune editors.

This article is entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 5. Dezember. Schlacht bei Inkerman. Relative Position der aliieraten Armeen und der russischen bei Sebastopol. Der Seesturm und das Undergeln des Transports vom 13. Novemb. Der s.g. Vertrag von Oesterreich vom 2. Dezember und die Eröffnung des Parlaments”. The last part of the article may have been abridged by the Tribune editors, as only one paragraph of it was left.

The words “all of which we have published” were added by the Tribune editors.

The battle of Narva—the first major battle during the Northern war (1700-21) fought by the Russian army of Peter the Great and the Swedish forces of Charles XII on November 30, 1700.

The battle of Austerlitz, which took place on December 2, 1805 between the Russian and Austrian armies (third coalition) on the one hand and the French on the other, was won by Napoleon I.

The battle of Preussisch-Eylau—see Note 381.

The reference is to a treaty concluded by Britain, France and Austria on December 2, 1854 undertaking to abstain from separate negotiations with Russia and prevent occupation of the Danubian Principalities by the Russians. Negotiations with Russia were to be conducted on the basis of the famous Four Points (see this volume, pp. 579-84).

This article was entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 15. December. Strategisch-politische Betrachtungen über European War against Russia”. The article was included by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question.

December 2, 1854 was the third anniversary of Louis Bonaparte’s coup d’état and the second anniversary of his proclamation as Emperor, and also the anniversary of Napoleon Bonaparte’s proclamation as Emperor of the French (December 2, 1804) and the battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805).

The words “which we receive by the Atlantic” were added by the Tribune editors.

See notes 3, 106 and 158.

This article was entered in the Notebook as “Freitag. 22. December. Oesterreich. Militärkraft”.

Grenzers—inhabitants of the Military Border area (see Note 48).

This article was Marx’s first contribution to the German democratic daily newspaper Neue Oder-Zeitung published in Breslau (Wroclaw) from 1849 to 1855.
The paper was founded in March 1849 as a result of the split in the editorial board of the Catholic oppositional Allgemeine Oder-Zeitung which had been published since 1846. In the 1850s the Neue Oder-Zeitung was considered the most radical German newspaper and was persecuted by the government.

At that time the bourgeois democrats Temme, Stein and Elsner headed the editorial board. Its publisher, the German journalist Max Friedländer, Ferdinand Lassalle's cousin, invited Marx to contribute at the end of 1854. In 1855 Marx was the paper's London correspondent. He sent two or three articles a week, which were published unsigned, but marked “×”. As there was practically no workers' press during the years of reaction, Marx and Engels considered it extremely important to use the bourgeois-democratic press for the struggle against reactionary forces. Marx's contributing to the Neue Oder-Zeitung made it possible to maintain ties with Germany and keep the German readers informed on the vital problems of international and domestic politics, the working-class and democratic movement, and economic development in the capitalist countries, primarily Britain and France. Marx regularly sent articles on military operations in the Crimean war, and often made use of entire reports by Engels for the New-York Daily Tribune, translating them into German; he also sent to the Neue Oder-Zeitung abridged versions of Engels' articles, with occasional changes and additions.

This volume contains fifteen articles written by Marx and Engels for the Neue Oder-Zeitung, but most are published in Volume 14 of this edition.

The article “In Retrospect” published in two issues of the Neue Oder-Zeitung presents a retrospective review of the events in the Crimean war in which Marx sums up his own views and those of Engels as set forth in their articles for the New-York Daily Tribune.

401 See Note 393.
402 After the Four Points (see Note 414) had been accepted by the tsarist government in November 1854, negotiations of the representatives of Britain, France, Austria and Russia (the so-called Vienna Conference, see notes 3, 106 and 158) were resumed in December that year.
403 The bear—a person who sells stocks and securities for future delivery in expectation of a fall in the market. The bull—a person who endeavours to raise the market price of stocks. The bears and bulls (the Neue Oder-Zeitung erroneously has bulldogs) of the Stock Exchange, whose interest it is, the one to depress, and the other to raise prices, are now said to be so called in allusion to the bear's habit of pulling down, and the bull's of tossing up.
404 The Enlistment of Foreigners Bill was introduced in Parliament by the War Secretary Newcastle with the aim of reinforcing the British army in the Crimea. The Bill was passed on December 22, 1854. However, a foreign legion was not formed because of the rising protest against the use of foreign mercenaries in the war.
405 See Note 386.
406 See Note 388.
407 In the battle of Rocroi (a French fortress near the Belgian frontier) during the Thirty Years' War (1618-48) the Spanish troops besieging the fortress were utterly defeated on May 19, 1643. The defeat of the Spanish infantry hitherto considered invincible marked a turn in the war.
The reference is to the Anglo-Afghan war of 1838-42 in which the British forces were utterly defeated. p. 562

The reference is to the London Convention of July 15, 1840 between Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia on supporting the Turkish Sultan against the Egyptian ruler Mehmet Ali (see Note 28). France, who supported Mehmet Ali, did not participate. The threat of an anti-French coalition made France give up her support of the Egyptian ruler. p. 562

The authorship of the article "British Disaster in the Crimea" has been established on the basis of the coincidence of its main points with those in other articles by Engels. It was also translated by Marx into German for the Neue Oder-Zeitung and published in that newspaper as two separate articles on January 8 and 9, 1855 under the same title "Zum englischen Militärwesen". Marx rearranged the material in the article, abridged it and gave a new version of one paragraph which is given in this volume in the footnote.

The article "British Disaster in the Crimea" was published by Eleanor Marx in The Eastern Question. p. 564

The four articles of the series published below had the following titles in the original: 1— "Geschäfts-Krise"; 2— "Die Zunahme des englischen Handels und der englischen Industrie in den Zeitraum von 1849 bis 1850"; 3 and 4— "Zur Handels-Krise". p. 571

The reference is to the Crimean war of 1853-56. p. 572

The Peace Society—a pacifist organisation founded in London in 1816 by the Quakers. It was actively supported by the Free Traders (see Note 280), who maintained that in peacetime Free Trade would allow England to make fuller use of her industrial supremacy and gain economic and political domination. p. 574

The reference is to demands presented by the Western powers to Russia in a Note of August 8, 1854 as preliminary conditions for peace negotiations. Russia was to give up her protectorate of Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, which was to be replaced by a European guarantee; to allow free passage of ships on the Danube; to consent to the revision of the 1841 London Convention on the Straits (see Note 28) and to give up protection of Christian subjects in Turkey. At first the tsarist government rejected these Four Points but in November 1854 it was compelled to accept them as the basis of future peace negotiations. p. 579

See Note 3. p. 579

During the 1830-31 insurrection Polish revolutionaries captured in Warsaw the archives of Grand Duke Constantine which contained secret diplomatic documents of the Tsarist Government. The reference here is presumably to a dispatch sent by Pozzo di Borgo on October 16 (4), 1825 and published in Recueil de documents relatifs à la Russie pour la plupart secrets et inédits utiles à consulter dans la crise actuelle, Paris, 1854. p. 580

This presumably refers to Dispatch from Prince Lieven and Count Matuszewicz, addressed to Count Nesselrode, dated London, 1st (13th) June, 1829 written on the occasion of the treaty of Adrianople (see Note 176): "It is in the midst of our camp that peace must be signed, and it is when it shall have been concluded
that Europe must know its conditions. Remonstrances will then be too late, and it will then patiently suffer what it can no longer prevent” (*Portfolio, Diplomatic Review (New Series)*, London, 1843, Vol. I, No. 1, p. 24). p. 580

418 See Note 13. p. 582

419 See notes 17 and 176. p. 583

420 Under Article V of the London Convention signed by Britain, France and Russia on July 6, 1827 in connection with the Greek war of liberation against the Turkish yoke, the contracting parties agreed not to seek expansion of their territories, exclusive influence or advantage in trade unless the same was granted to the other two parties.

Under the treaty of Adrianople of 1829 (see Note 176) Russia got islands in the Danube estuary, and free navigation on the Danube was guaranteed.

On March 2 (February 19), 1836 by a Tsarist government decree a quarantine post was set up at the Sulina mouth of the Danube which actually performed customs functions. p. 584

421 See Note 28. p. 584

422 Marx’s article “The Commercial Crisis in Britain” is a variant of the article written by him in January 1855 for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* (see this volume, pp. 571-78). The authorship and date of writing of the article “The Commercial Crisis in Britain” are also established on the basis of Marx’s letter to Engels of January 12, 1855 and a rough draft of the article in one of Marx’s notebooks of excerpts. p. 585

423 The Corn Laws were repealed in June 1846. The Corn Laws, introduced in the interests of the landowners, imposed high duties on imported corn with the aim of maintaining high prices on it on the home market. The repeal of the Corn Laws marked the victory of the industrial bourgeoisie whose motto was Free Trade. p. 585

424 A rough draft has here the following text which was not included in the final version: “It so happens that this time the greatest literary authority of English free-trade, the *London Economist*, quite untrue to his traditions, and in open contradiction to the Manchester school, not only avows that ‘the war had little or no connection with the high price of grain’, but also that the prosperity of 1853 was ‘convulsive’, that ‘in 1853 there was a fever which has left to 1854 some of the debility consequent on disease’, and that ‘whether war had come or not, a commercial revulsion was at hand’.” p. 587

425 This phrase was changed by the *Tribune* editors. p. 589

426 See Note 42. p. 589

427 This article by Engels is a German version of the article originally written for the *New-York Daily Tribune* (see Note 429). The translation was probably made by Marx. p. 593

428 The reference is to a decision adopted by the French Legislative Corps on December 30, 1854 to issue a loan of 500 million francs for the purpose of covering the cost of the war. p. 594
This article was written by Engels for the *New-York Daily Tribune* at Marx's request (see Marx's letters to Engels of January 12, 17 and 19, 1855).

The first paragraph and the first sentence of the second were added by the *New-York Daily Tribune*. They read as follows:

"A more gloomy picture of disaster and suffering, consequent on blundering and imbecile mismanagement, was never presented than in the letter of our correspondent at Constantinople, published in this morning's paper. It is true his account of the condition of the British army in the Crimea communicates no general facts with which we were not before acquainted, but some of his details are as new as they are painful, while he expresses the feelings of the army thus decimated, and of the English at Constantinople, with a freedom and vividness equalled by few English writers. The indignation at the Government and its agents, at the Field-Marshal commanding, the Commissariat, and the system under which affairs are thus frightfully misconducted, must, indeed, be deep and ardent. We are confident that it is not in the least exaggerated by our correspondent; as our readers will learn from one of our London letters, this feeling is shared by the people of England.

"We yesterday quoted The London Times to the effect that the British cavalry before Sevastopol had ceased to exist as a force."

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429 See Note 393.

430 See Note 393.

431 The reference is to the Brabant revolution of 1789-90 (see Note 49). p. 599

432 On August 2, 216 B.C. a major battle of the Second Punic War took place at Cannae (south-eastern Italy), in which forty-eight thousand Romans were killed and ten thousand taken prisoner. p. 601

433 *Fidawis*—literally a man who sacrifices himself for an idea; in Persia, Syria and Lebanon—members of a secret order of Assassins (late eleventh-thirteenth centuries) founded to fight the Seljuk Turks and the Crusaders. p. 603

434 On the basis of telegraphic dispatches from London the editors of the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* added at the end of Marx's article the following paragraph omitted in the present edition:

"According to telegraphic dispatches from London dated January 26 and 27, Lord John Russell, in connection with the explanation given to Parliament on the causes of his resignation, submitted among other things correspondence exchanged between him and Lord Aberdeen in which he urges a change in the management of the affair. In his view the lamentable situation of the army before Sevastopol cannot be disputed and notwithstanding all his experience in the matter it is impossible for him to establish the causes of the misfortune. Lord Palmerston criticised the motives of John Russell's resignation, but nevertheless admitted that the war must be pursued with the greatest energy. He maintains that all the ships have been used as they should have been: to transport troops, clothing and provisions to the Crimea, and requested a formal vote of confidence or no confidence in the Government. Roebuck's speech was, despite the fact that the speaker was visibly suffering, repeatedly interrupted by applause from all parts of the House. In the Upper House the Earl of Aberdeen stated that the Ministers considered it their duty, despite the resignation of their influential colleague, to oppose the request for the appointment of a commission of inquiry."

435 See Note 88.
The system of sale and purchase of officers' commissions in the British army originated at the end of the seventeenth century. Lasting till 1871 it secured predominance of the aristocracy in the army. For details see Marx's article: "The Buying of Commissions.—News from Australia" (present edition, Vol. 14). p. 608

The authorship of this article was established on the basis of complete coincidence of a number of its propositions with those expounded in the article "From Parliament.—From the Theatre of War" (see this volume, pp. 615-19) published in the *Neue Oder-Zeitung* and marked with Marx's correspondent's sign. In the latter article the report on the parliamentary debate was written by Marx and "Militaria" was compiled and translated by Marx from this article written by Engels. p. 609

*Tractarianism* (Puseyism)—a system of High Anglican principles set forth in a series of ninety pamphlets issued at Oxford between 1833 and 1841 and called *Tracts for the Times*. (See also Note 88) p. 616

See Note 355. p. 617

This article was written by Engels on the basis of Marx's letter of January 31, 1855 and earlier articles by Marx on Gladstone's budget published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*. Marx received Engels' article in London not later than Friday, February 2. He also used the material of this article in writing two short articles for the *Neue Oder-Zeitung*: “On the Ministerial Crisis” and “The Defeated Government” (see this volume, pp. 627-30 and 638-41). p. 620

The *Irish Brigade*—the Irish faction in the British Parliament from the 1830s to the 1850s. It was led until 1847 by Daniel O'Connell, who used the tactics of parliamentary manoeuvring to obtain concessions from the British Government to the Irish top bourgeoisie. In the early 1850s some MPs belonging to this faction entered into an alliance with the radical Irish Tenant-Right League and formed in the House of Commons the so-called Independent Opposition. However, the leaders of the Irish Brigade soon entered into an agreement with the British ruling circles and refused to support the League's demands. This led to the demoralisation and final dissolution of the Independent Opposition in 1859. p. 620

Marx describes as a Gunpowder plot (by analogy with the Gunpowder plot of the Catholics against James I in 1605) the accusation of conspiracy made by the British authorities in April 1853 against the owners of a rocket factory in Rotherhithe, with a view to start repressions against Kossuth and other political emigrants in England. On this see Marx's articles in Volume 12, pp. 82-84, 107. p. 621

See Note 58. p. 623

On Irish Landlords and Tenants' Bills introduced in Parliament in November 1852, see Marx's articles in Volume 12, pp. 157-62 and Volume 14, "From the Houses of Parliament.—Bulwer's Motion.—The Irish Question". p. 623

The *Transportation Bill*, which abolished deportation of criminals to penal colonies, was passed on August 12, 1853. After the preliminary detention the accused were given release certificates granting them the right to reside in Britain under police surveillance and they were used as cheaper labour for
public works. Marx assessed this Bill in his article: “The War Question.—British Population and Trade Returns.—Doings of Parliament” (see Vol. 12).

446 See Note 3.

447 See Note 78.

448 Under the law in force in England since the early eighteenth century newly elected MPs were to take an “oath of abdication” denying the right of any heirs of James II to the throne; the oath contained expressions of loyalty to Christianity. Refusal to take the oath deprived an MP of the right of active participation in the work of Parliament.

449 Marx alludes here to the confusion of historical facts by Herbert, who ascribed to the Directory, which was established in 1795, the actions which took place in 1793. On April 2, 1793 while revolutionary France was at war with the European Coalition, commissars of the Convention and the War Minister were sent to the headquarters of the commander-in-chief of the Northern Army, General Dumouriez, with an order for him to present himself before the Convention for interrogation on a charge of treason to the revolution. General Dumouriez refused to obey, and instead arrested the commissars and the War Minister and handed them over to the Austrians. Soon after he openly deserted to the Austrians. The editors of the Neue Oder-Zeitung apparently changed the text to tone down Marx’s irony (cf. a similar passage in the article “Fall of the Aberdeen Ministry”, this volume, p. 633).

450 By the minorities Marx understood various small factions and groups in the British Parliament. Marx characterised the parliamentary factions and groups in his article “The Parties and Cliques” (see this volume, pp. 642-44).

451 See Note 152.

452 See Note 242.

453 This article was first published in English in Surveys from Exile Political Writings, Vol. 2. Edited and Introduced by David Fernbach, Penguin Books Ltd., London, pp. 279-81.

454 See Note 69.

455 This draft is apparently the initial version of the third article in the Revolutionary Spain series (see this volume, pp. 407-12). It contains many deletions which are not reproduced in this publication. The title of the draft belongs to Marx.

456 See Note 338.

457 As can be judged from Marx’s Notebook, he wrote and mailed to New York three articles more of the Revolutionary Spain series which were entered in the Notebook as “Dienstag. 14. November. Spain 1820-Juli 1822”; “Dienstag. 21. November. Spain. [illegible] Intervention”; “Freitag. 8. December. Spain—1833”. None of the articles were printed in the newspaper; their manuscripts have not been discovered. The rough draft published in this volume is apparently part of the article mailed on November 21, 1854. The manuscript contains many deletions only some of which are reproduced in this publication.
By the *second Cadiz expedition* Marx means Riego’s campaign in 1823. In August 1823 Riego arrived in Malaga from Cadiz besieged by the French and tried to break through to Catalonia where General Mina was then engaged in fierce fighting with the interventionists. Riego’s attempt to gain support from Ballesteros’ army, which had ceased resistance, failed, and at the head of a small detachment he marched in the direction of Cartagena. At Jerez his detachment was defeated; on September 15, Riego was captured.

The *first Cadiz expedition* was Riego’s campaign of 1820, which was the starting point of the revolution (see this volume, pp. 442-43).

Reference to the *army of faith*—the name of detachments formed by the Catholic absolutist group. In 1822 these detachments staged a mutiny against the revolutionary government in Catalonia, Navarre and Biscay; in 1823 they fought on the side of the French interventionists.

*Comuneros*—members of a secret political association, the Confederation of the Spanish *comuneros*, founded during the 1820-23 bourgeois revolution. The *comuneros* voiced the interests of the most democratic sections of the urban population: artisans, workers, sections of intellectuals and officers and the petty bourgeoisie. They numbered seventy thousand and most resolutely opposed the counter-revolution. After the suppression of the revolution the *comuneros* were severely persecuted and ceased their activities.

The reference is to the restoration in Spain of the absolutist regime of Ferdinand VII as a result of suppression of the 1820-23 revolution. The first restoration of Ferdinand VII was in 1814, after Napoleon’s defeat.

The reference is to the Carlist war of 1833-40 and the bourgeois revolution in Spain (1834-43). See also notes 224, 227.

In September 1832, Ferdinand VII, then gravely ill, annulled his decree of 1830, by which his daughter Isabella, an infant at the time, was made heiress to the throne; when he recovered Ferdinand reinstated her, thus disappointing the hopes of the *serviles* (see Note 323) who supported his brother Don Carlos.

The material published in the Appendix to this volume contains the second part of the article published in the *New-York Daily Tribune* under the title “The English Middle Class”. This part is based on Marx’s text, the beginning of the article was written by the editors and is not reproduced in this volume.
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Brenier, Anatole, baron de la Renaudière (1807-1885)—French diplomat, Foreign Minister (1851), envoy to Naples (1855-56, 1859-60).—8

Bright, John (1811-1889)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League.—14, 141, 217, 219, 387, 576

Brontë, Charlotte (1816-1855)—English writer.—664

Brougham and Vaux, Henry Peter, Baron (1778-1868)—British statesman, lawyer and writer, Whig.—133, 266

Brown, Sir George (1790-1865)—English general, commanded a division on the Danube and in the Crimea in 1854 and 1855.—332, 360, 493, 494

Brual, Armand Joseph (1796-1855)—French admiral, commanded a squadron in 1854; naval commander-in-chief in the Black Sea in 1855.—304, 360
Brück, Karl Ludwig, Baron von (1798-1860)—Austrian big manufacturer, statesman and diplomat; Minister of Commerce, Industry and Public Works (1848-51); envoy to Constantinople (1853-55), Minister of Finance (1855-60).—324

Brunnow, Filipp Ivanovich, Baron von, from 1871 Count (1797-1875)—Russian diplomat, envoy (1840-54, 1858-60) and ambassador (1860-70, 1870-74) to London and Paris (1870).—3, 20, 23, 80, 135, 295

Brutus (Marcus Junius Brutus) (c. 85-42 B.C.)—Roman politician, republican, an organiser of the conspiracy against Julius Caesar.—608

Buceta—Spanish colonel, moderate liberal, participant in the revolution of 1854-56.—306, 313

Budberg, Alexander Ivanovich, Baron (1798-1876)—Russian general; commissioner extraordinary in the Danubian Principalities in 1853 and 1854.—270, 291, 324, 351, 463, 464

Budberg, Andrei Fyodorovich, Baron (1817-1881) —Russian diplomat, envoy to Berlin (1852-56, 1858-62) and Vienna (1856-58), ambassador to Paris (1862-68).—145

Bugeaud de la Piconnerie, Thomas Robert (1784-1849)—Marshal of France, Orleanist; participated in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, commander-in-chief of the army in the Alps (1848-49); deputy to the Legislative Assembly.—231, 232

Bunsen, Christian Karl Josias, Baron von (1791-1860)—Russian diplomat, journalist and theologian, envoy to London (1842-54).—83, 159

Buol-Schauenstein, Karl Ferdinand, Count von (1797-1865)—Austrian statesman and diplomat, envoy to St. Petersburg (1848-50) and to London (1851-52), Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1852-59).—94, 176, 294, 301, 357, 365, 480, 554, 602

Burger, Friedrich, Baron von—head of the Austrian administration in Lombardy in 1853-54.—326

Burgoyne, Sir John Fox, Baronet (1782-1871)—British general, military engineer, principal engineer adviser to the English commander during the first part of the siege of Sevastopol.—366

Butler, James Armar (1827-1854)—British army officer, an organiser of the defence of Silistria in 1854.—329, 334

Butt, Isaac (1813-1879)—Irish lawyer and politician, M.P.—18, 332, 333

Buturlin, Dmitry Petrovich (1790-1849)—Russian military historian, Senator, participant in the Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812; from 1848 member of a Special Press Censorship Committee.—123

Byron, George Gordon Noël, Lord (1788-1824)—English romantic poet.—628

C

Caesar (Gaius Julius Caesar) (c. 100-44 B.C.)—Roman soldier and statesman.—68, 310

Calderón de la Barca, Pedro (1600-1681)—Spanish playwright and poet.—411

Calleja del Rey, Félix María, conde de Calderón (1750-1820)—Spanish general, commander of Spanish forces and Viceroy of Mexico in 1813-16, captain general of Andalusia in 1819.—441

Calvo de Rosas, Lorenzo—Spanish politician, participant in the revolutions of 1808-14 and 1820-23; an organiser of the defence of Saragossa in 1808; member of the Central Junta, an initiator of the convocation of the Cadiz Cortes.—410

Cambridge, George William Frederick Charles, Duke of (1819-1904)—British general, in 1854 commanded a division in the Crimea; British commander-in-chief (1856-95).—183, 332, 493, 494, 524

Cammarano, Salvatore (1801-1852)—Italian playwright, author of several opera librettos.—170
Campomanes, Pedro Rodríguez, conde de (1723-1803) — Spanish statesman, historian, economist, advocate of enlightened absolutism; Finance Minister (1763-89); President of the Royal Council in Castile (1789-91), State Secretary (1791-98).—432

Campuzano, Francisco — Spanish general, commanded Madrid garrison in 1854.—284

Canedo, Alonso — Spanish priest, deputy to the Cadiz Cortes (1810-13).—425

Canning, George (1770-1827) — British statesman and diplomat, Tory; Foreign Secretary (1807-09, 1822-27), Prime Minister (1827).—80, 262

Canrobert, François Certain (1809-1895) — French general, marshal from 1856, Bonapartist; commanded a division in the Crimea in 1854; commander-in-chief of the Crimean army (September 1854-May 1855).—360, 507, 528, 543

Capo d'Istria, Giovanni Antonio (Joannes), Count (1776-1831) — Greek statesman; from 1809 to 1827 (actually till 1822) was in the Russian service, Second Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Russia (1815-22); President of Greece from 1827 to 1831.—459

Caradoc, Sir John Hobart, Baron Howden (1799-1873) — British diplomat, envoy to Madrid (1850-58).—314, 367, 369

Cardigan, James Thomas Brudenell, Earl of (1797-1868) — English general; commanded a cavalry brigade in the Crimea in 1854.—332, 472, 524

Cardwell, Edward Cardwell, Viscount (1813-1886) — British statesman, a Peelite leader, later Liberal; President of the Board of Trade (1852-55), Secretary for Ireland (1859-61), Secretary for the Colonies (1864-66) and Secretary for War (1868-74).—190

Carlos María Isidro de Borbón (Don Carlos) (1788-1855) — brother of Ferdinand VII, pretender to the Spanish throne under the name of Charles V, head of the feudal clerical party (Carlists) which fomented a civil war in Spain (1833-40).—341, 444, 659

Carriero, José Clemente — Spanish writer of the early nineteenth century, author of several works on the history of Spain.—404

Caro, José Ventura (1742-1809) — Spanish general, participated in the war of independence (1808-14).—416

Caroline Amelia Elizabeth (1768-1821) — Queen of George IV of Great Britain.—346

Carrasco, Agustín — Minister of Finance in the Narváez Government (1844-46).—370

Castaños y Aragonés, Francisco Javier, duque de Bailén (1758-1852) — Spanish general, participant in the war of independence (1808-14), commanded the Spanish forces at the battle of Bailén.—406, 407, 423, 653

Castelbajac, Barthélemy Dominique Jacques Armand, marquis de (1787-1864) — French general, Legitimist; envoy to St. Petersburg from 1850 to 1854; Senator of the Second Empire from 1856.—3

Castro — see Pérez de Castro, Evaristo

Cathcart, Sir George (1794-1854) — English general, commanded a division in the Crimea in 1854.—493, 512, 524

Catherine II (1729-1796) — Empress of Russia (1762-96).—38, 78, 276

Cavaignac, Louis Eugène (1802-1857) — French general and politician, moderate republican; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; War Minister of France from May 1848, directed the suppression of the uprising of Paris workers in June 1848; head of the executive (June-December 1848).—473

Cavour, Camillo Benso, conte di (1810-1861) — Italian statesman, head of the Sardinian Government (1852-59, 1860-61), pursued a policy of unifying Italy under the supremacy of the Savoy dynasty relying on the support of Napoleon III; headed the first government of united Italy in 1861.—8
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de (1547-1616)—Spanish writer.—457
Chads, Sir Henry Ducie (1788-1868)—English admiral, took part in the operations of the English fleet in the Baltic in 1854 and 1855.—330
Chambers, Sir Thomas (1814-1891)—British lawyer, M.P., Liberal.—119
Changarnier, Nicolas Anne Théodule (1793-1877)—French general and politician, monarchist; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies (1848-51); banished from France after the coup d’état of December 2, 1851.—473
Charles—see Charles Louis
Charles (Carlos) I—see Charles V
Charles I (1600-1649)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1625-49), executed during the English revolution.—555
Charles (Carlos) II (1661-1700)—King of Spain (1665-1700).—81, 392
Charles (Carlos) III (1716-1788)—King of Spain (1759-88).—409, 439, 652
Charles (Carlos) IV (1748-1819)—King of Spain (1788-1808).—392, 399, 409, 444
Charles V (1500-1558)—Holy Roman Emperor (1519-56), King of Spain under the name of Charles (Carlos) I (1516-56).—392-95, 403, 431
Charles VI (1685-1740)—Holy Roman Emperor (1711-40).—48
Charles X (1757-1836)—King of France (1824-30).—262, 368
Charles XII (1682-1718)—King of Sweden (1697-1718).—548
Charles Louis (Karl Ludwig) (1771-1847)—Archduke of Austria, field marshal; commander-in-chief during the wars with France (1796, 1799, 1805 and 1809), War Minister (1805-09).—67
Chartras, Jean Baptiste Adolphe (1810-1865)—French military expert, politician, moderate republican; took part in suppressing the uprising of Paris workers in June 1848; deputy to the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies under the Second Republic (1848-51), opposed Louis Bonaparte; banished from France after the coup d’état of December 2, 1851.—352
Chateaubriand, François René, vicomte de (1768-1848)—French writer and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1822-24).—40, 367
Chéodayeff (Cheodayev), Mikhail Ivanovich (d. 1859)—Russian general, took part in the Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812, commanded a corps and the infantry reserve during the Crimean war.—66, 68, 69, 129, 611, 618
Cincinnatus (Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus) (5th cent. B.C.)—Roman patrician; politician and soldier, considered a model of valour and modesty.—344
Clanricarde, Ulick John de Burgh, Marquis and Earl of (1802-1874)—British politician and diplomat, Whig; ambassador to St. Petersburg (1838-41).—260, 264, 265, 317, 318, 591, 592
Clarendon, George William Frederick Villiers, Earl of, Baron Hyde (1800-1870)—British statesman, Whig, later Liberal; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1847-52), Foreign Secretary (February 1853 to 1858, 1865-66, 1868-70).—14, 15, 21-24, 33, 38, 39, 52, 84, 88, 94-98, 132, 133, 136, 137, 140, 143, 306, 318, 357, 358, 366, 607, 621, 627, 629
Cobett, William (1769-1855)—English politician and radical writer.—133, 219, 577, 630
Cobden, Richard (1804-1865)—English manufacturer and politician, a leader of the Free Traders and founder of the Anti-Corn Law League, M.P.—13-17, 19, 141, 321, 369, 577, 584, 663
Coburgs—a family of German dukes, belonging to or connected with the royal dynasties of Belgium, Portugal, Britain and other European countries.—40, 332
Coburg-Coburg-Braganza—see Braganza-Coburg Collado, José Manuel—Spanish politi-
cian, banker, member of the Progresista Party, Minister of Finance in the Espartero Ministry (August 1854-January 1855).—285, 367, 449

Colloredo-Waldsee (Wallsee), Franz, Count von (1799-1859)—Austrian diplomat, ambassador to St. Petersburg in 1843-47, minister at London in 1852-56.—480

Colquhoun, Robert Guilmour—British consul general in Bucharest in the 1840s and 1850s.—275, 489

Concha—see Gutiérrez de la Concha, José and Gutiérrez de la Concha, Manuel

Constantine Nikolayevich (1827-1892)—Russian Grand Duke, Nicholas I’s second son; was in charge of the defence of the Baltic coast in 1854-55; Naval Minister (1855-81); took part in the preparations for the abolition of serfdom; President of the Council of State (1865-81).—171, 172, 243

Coronini-Cronberg, Johann Baptist Alexis, Count von (1794-1880)—Austrian general, commanded the Austrian forces on the Danube during the Crimean war.—268, 301

Corradi, Fernando (1808-1885)—Spanish politician and journalist, editor-in-chief of El Clamor Público.—448

Cortés, Hernán (1485-1547)—Spanish conqueror of Mexico.—395

Cowell, George—English worker, Chartist, a leader of the Preston strike in 1853-54.—120, 200

Cowley, Henry Wellesley, Earl (1804-1884)—British diplomat, ambassador to Paris (1852-67).—21, 22

Cranworth, Robert Monsey Rolfe, Baron (1790-1868)—British statesman and lawyer, Whig; Lord Chancellor (1852-58, 1865-66).—121

Cromwell, Oliver (1599-1658)—leader of the English revolution; Lord Protector of England, Scotland and Ireland from 1653.—583

Cuesta—see García de la Cuesta

Cunningham, C.—British consul in Galatz in 1853.—185, 190

Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, Prince (1770-1861)—Polish magnate; friend of Alexander 1; Russian Foreign Minister (1804-06); President of the Polish Government during the insurrection of 1830-31, later leader of Polish monarchist émigrés in Paris.—26, 167

D

Danilo I Petrović Njegoš (1826-1860)—Prince of Montenegro (1852-60).—178, 179

Dannenberg, Pjotr Andreyevich (1792-1872)—Russian general, commanded a corps on the Danube and in the Crimea in 1853-54.—66, 302, 533, 544, 545

Delane, John Thaddeus (1817-1879)—editor-in-chief of The Times (1841-77).—637

Delmas—French emigrant in Spain.—363

Derby, Edward Geoffrey Smith Stanley, Earl of (1799-1869)—British statesman, Tory leader, Prime Minister (1852, 1858-59 and 1866-68).—101, 132, 134-36, 219, 546, 620, 623, 628, 636, 638, 642

Derzhavin, Gavrila Romanovich (1743-1816)—Russian poet.—276

Deval—interpreter in the French Embassy at Constantinople in the mid-eighteenth century.—104

Diaz Portier, Juan (1775-1815)—Spanish general, liberal, commander of a guerrilla detachment during the war of independence (1808-14); executed for attempting to raise a revolt against the absolute power of Ferdinand VII.—423, 439, 445

Dickens, Charles John Huffam (1812-1870)—English novelist.—664

Diebich-Zabalkansky, Ivan Ivanovich (Diebitsch, Hans Karl Friedrich Anton), Count (1785-1831)—Russian field marshal general, commander-in-chief (1829) during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.—89, 164, 237, 239, 264

Disraeli, Benjamin, Earl of Beaconsfield (1804-1881)—British politician and
writer, a Tory leader; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852, 1858-59, 1866-68); Prime Minister (1868, 1874-80).—13, 19, 21, 24, 26, 56, 137, 138, 142, 184, 218, 219, 265, 316, 321, 322, 326, 331, 484, 546, 584, 600, 608, 620, 623, 624, 635, 638, 639, 642, 643

Dohna-Schlobitten, Karl Friedrich Emil, Count zu (1784-1859)—Prussian general, fought in the wars against Napoleon I, served in the Russian army in 1812-15, commanded a Prussian corps in Königsberg in 1842-54.—178

Don Carlos—see Carlos María Isidro de Borbón

Donizetti, Gaetano (1797-1848)—Italian composer.—170

Dost Mohammed Khan (1793-1863)—Afghan Emir (1826-39 and 1842-63).—41

Douglas, Sir Howard, Baronet (1776-1861)—English general and author of works on artillery and fortification.—385, 593, 615

Drouyn de Lhuys, Édouard (1805-1881)—French diplomat and politician; Orleanist in the 1840s, Bonapartist after 1851; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1848-49, 1851, 1852-55, 1862-66).—366

Druey, Henri (1799-1855)—Swiss radical statesman, lawyer; Minister of Justice and Police in 1848; member of the Federal Council (1848-55); President of the Swiss Confederation (1850).—455

Drummond, Henry (1786-1860)—English politician, Tory M.P., member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—17, 616

Ducos, Théodore (1801-1855)—French politician, moderate monarchist, sided with the Bonapartists during the Second Republic; Minister of the Marine (1851-55).—173, 202

Dufour, Guillaume Henri (1787-1875)—Swiss general and liberal politician; commander of the Federal army which defeated the Sonderbund troops (1847); author of a number of works on fortification, artillery and tactics.—479

DulhameII, Alexander Osipovich (1801-1880)—Russian general and diplomat; minister plenipotentiary at Teheran in 1838-41, was sent on a special mission to the Danubian Principalities in 1848.—274

Dulce y Garay, Domingo, Marquis of Castelflorit (1808-1869)—Spanish general, close to the Moderado Party; headed an uprising in Madrid in 1854 which sparked off the revolution of 1854-56.—267, 282, 294, 305, 367, 369, 375, 458

Dumouriez, Charles François (1739-1823)—French general, commanded the northern revolutionary army in 1792-93; was close to the Girondists, betrayed the revolution in March 1793.—627, 633

Duncombe, Thomas Slingsby (1796-1861)—English radical politician; Chartist in the 1840s, M.P.—119, 200

Dundas, Sir James Whitley Deans (1785-1862)—English admiral, commander-in-chief of the British Mediterranean fleet from 1852 to January 1855.—18, 32, 174, 193, 195, 221, 251, 361, 514, 581

Dunkellin, Ulick Canning, Baron (b. 1827)—English army officer, fought in the Crimean war; later M.P.—591

Duns Scotus, John (called Doctor Subtilis) (c. 1265-1308)—Scottish scholastic philosopher.—118

Dupont de l'Étang, Pierre Antoine, comte (1765-1840)—French general; capitulated with his division at Bailén during the war in Spain in 1808.—407

E

Echagüe, Rafael, conde del Serrallo (1815-1887)—Spanish general, participant in the revolution of 1854-56, belonged to the Moderado Party.—283, 369
Elio, Francisco Javier (1767-1822)—Spanish general, fought in the war of independence (1808-14); helped to establish the absolute power of Ferdinand VII in 1814; was executed during the revolution of 1820-23 for organising a counter-revolutionary coup.—423, 439

Ellenborough, Edward Law, Earl of (1790-1871)—British statesman, Tory, Governor-General of India (1842-44), First Lord of the Admiralty (1846), President of the Board of Control for India (1858).—317, 600

Empecinado, Juan Martín Díaz, el (1775-1825)—Spanish peasant, guerrilla leader during the war of independence (1808-14); promoted to the rank of general by the Cortes; active participant in the revolution of 1820-23; executed for an attempted revolt against the absolute power of Ferdinand VII.—423

Engels, Frederick (1820-1895).—202, 209, 210

England, Sir Richard (1793-1883)—English general, commanded a division in the Crimea in 1854-55.—493

Enrique María Fernando de Borbón (1823-1870)—Spanish infant, sided with the republicans in the revolution of 1854-56.—489

Eroles, Joaquín Ibáñez, barón de (1785-1825)—Spanish general, commander of guerrilla detachments during the war of independence (1808-14); royalist leader during the revolution of 1820-23.—423

Esparteto, Baldomero, duque de la Vittoria (1793-1879)—Spanish general and politician, leader of the Progresista Party; Regent of Spain (1841-43), head of government (1854-56).—310, 312-13, 340-45, 351, 352, 362, 369, 370, 372, 447-49, 456-58, 489

Espinasse, Charles Marie Esprit (1815-1839)—French general, Bonapartist; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s, actively participated in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; fought in the Crimean war.—472, 473

Espoz y Mina, Francisco (1781-1836)—Spanish general, a guerrilla leader during the war of independence (1808-14); active participant in the revolution of 1820-23, fought against the Carlists in 1833-36.—423

Esterházy von Galántha, Valentín Ladislaus (Bálint László), Count (1814-1858)—Austrian diplomat, envoy to Russia in 1854-58.—176

Evans, Sir George de Lacy (1787-1870)—British general, liberal politician, M.P.; commanded a division in the Crimea in 1854.—493

F.

Fallmerayer, Jakob Philipp (1790-1861)—German historian and traveller; author of works on the history of Greece and Byzantium.—72

Famin, Stanislas Marie César (1799-1853)—French writer and diplomat.—102, 107, 108

Ferdinand I (1793-1875)—Emperor of Austria (1835-48).—49

Ferdinand II (1810-1859)—King of the Two Sicilies (1830-59), nicknamed King Bomba for the bombardment of Messina in 1848.—292, 352, 367, 484

Ferdinand IV (1285-1312)—King of Castile and León (1295-1312).—430

Ferdinand V (the Catholic) (1452-1516)—King of Aragon under the name of Ferdinand II (1479-1516); his marriage to Isabella, future Queen of Castile, in 1469 completed the unification of Spain.—393-95

Ferdinand VII (1784-1833)—King of Spain (1808 and 1814-33).—345, 374, 392, 399, 401, 402, 404, 417, 423, 425, 429, 436, 439-46, 654, 657, 659

Fiéron—French army officer, fought in the Crimean war.—290

Filder (b. 1790)—English general, chief of the army commissariat in the Crimea in 1854-55.—327

Finlen, James—Chartist, member of the Executive of the National Charter
Association in 1852-58.—51, 64
Fitzherbert, Alleyne, Baron St. Helens (1753-1839)—British diplomat, envoy to St. Petersburg in 1783-87.—17
Flemming—Count, Prussian diplomat, secretary of the Embassy in Vienna (1854-59).—301
Flórez, José Segundo (b. 1789)—Spanish historian and journalist, author of a book on Espartero.—341
Floridablanca (Florida Blanca), José Moñino, conde de (1728-1808)—Spanish statesman and diplomat, champion of enlightened absolutism; Prime Minister (1777-92), implemented a number of progressive reforms; opposed the French Revolution; President of the Central Junta in 1808, tried to prevent the development of revolution in Spain in 1808.—409, 410, 415, 432, 652
Forey, Elie Frédéric (1804-1872)—French general, later marshal; Bonapartist; took an active part in the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; commanded a force in the Crimea in 1854-55.—196, 494
Fortescue, Hugh, Earl of (1783-1861)—English statesman, Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1839-41.—300
Fox, Charles James (1749-1806)—British politician, Whig leader; Foreign Secretary (1782, 1783, 1806).—606
Francis I (1494-1547)—King of France (1515-47).—104, 416
Francis I (1768-1835)—Emperor of Austria (1804-35), the last emperor of the Holy Roman Empire under the name of Francis II (1792-1806).—48, 49
Francis Joseph I (1830-1916)—Emperor of Austria (1848-1916).—44, 49, 94, 177, 183, 253, 269, 270, 286, 336, 367, 480, 488, 490
Francisco de Asís, María Fernando (1822-1902)—husband of Isabella II of Spain.—449, 489
Frederick II (the Great) (1712-1786)—King of Prussia (1740-86).—38, 67, 314, 409, 657
Frederick VII (1808-1863)—King of Denmark (1848-63).—362, 378, 489
Frederick William IV (1795-1861)—King of Prussia (1840-61).—9, 83, 144, 148, 286, 287
Fuad Pasha, Mehmed (1814-1869)—Turkish statesman, commissioner in the Danubian Principalities in 1848; repeatedly held the posts of Grand Vizier and Foreign Minister in the 1850s and 1860s.—273, 274, 275

G

Galakhoff (Galakhov), Alexander Pavlovich (1802-1869)—Russian general, chief of the police in St. Petersburg (1852-56).—171
García de la Cuesta, Gregorio (1740-1812)—Spanish general, fought in the war of independence (1808-14), captain general of Castile from 1808.—408, 422, 652
Garrigó, Antonio María—Spanish army officer, took part in the revolution of 1854-56.—283, 456
Gaskell, Elizabeth Cleghorn (1810-1865)—English novelist.—664
Gaspari—official at the French Embassy in Athens.—177
George I (1660-1727)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1714-27).—555
George II (1683-1760)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1727-60).—555
George III (1738-1820)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1760-1820).—299
George IV (1762-1830)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1820-30).—367
George Petrović Njegoš—Montenegrin voivode, uncle of Danilo I Petrović Njegoš.—178
Gheca, Grigore Alexandru, Prince (1807-1857)—hospodar of Moldavia (1849-53, 1854-56).—324, 325
Gian, Gastone (1671-1737)—the last Grand Duke of Tuscany from the Medici family.—81

Giron—Spanish journalist.—345

Gladstone, William Ewart (1809-1898)—British statesman, Tory, then Peelite, leader of the Liberal Party in the latter half of the nineteenth century; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1852-55, 1859-66); Prime Minister (1868-74, 1880-85, 1886, 1892-94).—24, 53-56, 117, 118, 144, 185-87, 190, 226, 466, 563, 575, 607, 608, 623, 625, 627, 634, 635, 639, 643, 645-47

Godfrey of Bouillon (Godofroy de Bouillon) (c. 1060-1100)—Duke of Lower Lorraine (1089-1100), a leader of the first crusade (1096-99).—17

Godoy, Manuel de, Duke of Alcudia, Prince of Peace (1767-1851)—First Minister of the Spanish King Charles IV, virtual ruler of Spain (1792-98, 1801-08); helped French occupation of Spain; was overthrown in 1808 as a result of a popular uprising.—392, 399, 402, 409, 410, 430, 451

Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von (1749-1832)—German poet.—576, 616

González Bravo, Luis (1811-1871)—Spanish statesman, a leader of the Moderado Party, head of government (1843-44, 1868).—345, 346, 370, 450

Gorchakov (Gorchakov), Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince (1798-1883)—Russian statesman and diplomat; envoy to Vienna (1854-56); Foreign Minister (1856-82); State Chancellor (1867-82).—176, 286, 294, 295, 301, 357, 365, 554, 581, 582, 601, 602

Gorchakov (Gorchakov), Mikhail Dmitrievich, Prince (1793-1861)—Russian general, commander-in-chief on the Danube (1853-54), of the Southern army (September 1854-February 1855), then of the army in the Crimea (from February to December 1855).—7, 66, 69, 129, 247, 292, 301-03, 324, 350, 351, 618

Gordon, Sir Robert (1791-1847)—British diplomat, brother of Lord Aberdeen; envoy to Turkey in 1828-31.—264

Grach, Friedrich (1812-1854)—Prussian colonel, served in the Turkish army from 1841, commanded the defence of Siliistra in 1854.—240, 241

Graham, Sir James Robert George (1792-1861)—British statesman, Whig, then Peelite; Home Secretary (1841-46), First Lord of the Admiralty (1830-34, 1852-55).—12, 19, 25, 27, 31, 39, 53, 109, 142, 225, 365, 582, 621, 627, 646

Grant, James (1802-1879)—English radical journalist and writer, editor of The Morning Advertiser (1850-71).—590

Granville, George Leveson-Gower, Earl of (1815-1891)—British statesman, Whig, then Liberal; Foreign Secretary (1851-52, 1870-74, 1880-85), Lord President of the Council (1852-54).—134, 135, 581

Grey, Sir George (1799-1882)—British Whig statesman; Home Secretary (1846-52, 1855-58, 1861-66) and Colonial Secretary (1854-55).—133, 625, 646, 647

Grey, Sir Henry George, Earl (1802-1894)—British Whig statesman; Secretary at War (1835-39) and Colonial Secretary (1846-52).—228, 607, 638, 643

Gribbe—Russian general, fought in the Crimean war.—522

Grimsdaw, Mortimer (born c. 1827)—Chartist, a leader of the Preston strike in 1853-54.—200

Grivas, Theodorakis (1796-1862)—Greek politician, a leader of the 1854 national uprising in Epirus against the Turkish rule.—166, 167

Guillemotin, Armand Charles, comte de (1774-1840)—French general and diplomat, ambassador to Constantinople in 1824-30.—264

Gutiérrez de la Concha, José (1796-1862)—Spanish general, governor of Cuba (1850-52 and 1854-59).—369

Gutiérrez de la Concha, Manuel, marqués del Duero (1808-1874)—Spanish general, belonged to the Moderado Party; follower of Narváez in 1843;
President of the military junta in 1854.—342, 375, 458

H

Habsburgs (or Hapsburgs)—a dynasty of emperors of the Holy Roman Empire from 1273 to 1806 (with intervals), Spanish kings (1516-1700), Austrian emperors (1804-67) and Austro-Hungarian emperors (1867-1918).—246, 255, 256, 395

Hale, William—owner of a rocket factory in the London suburbs in the early 1850s.—621

Hall, Sir Benjamin (1802-1867)—British liberal statesman (belonged to the Mayfair Radicals); President of the Board of Health (August 1854-July 1855), First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings (1855-58).—600, 601

Halton—English worker.—591

Hamelin, François Alphonse (1796-1864)—French admiral, commander-in-chief of the French fleet in the Mediterranean and Black Sea (1853-54), Minister of the Marine (1855-60).—22, 32, 173, 193, 195, 204, 221, 224, 492, 515, 581

Hammer-Purgstall, Joseph, Baron von (1774-1856)—Austrian historian, Orientalist, author of works on the history of Turkey; a diplomat in the Middle East from 1796 to 1835.—227

Hardinge, Sir Henry, Viscount (1785-1856)—British general and statesman, Tory, field marshal from 1855, Secretary at War (1828-30 and 1841-44), Governor-General of India (1844-January 1848), commander-in-chief of the British army (1852-56).—566, 633

Hardwicke, Charles Philip Yorke, Earl of (1799-1873)—English admiral, Tory politician.—133, 817, 600

Hartlet—British consul at Memel.—377

Hasan-i Sabbāh (1056-1124)—founder of a Musulman sect of assassins who fought against the Seljuk Turks and crusaders in the twelfth-thirteenth centuries.—603

Haynau, Julius Jakob, Baron von (1786-1853)—Austrian general, brutally suppressed revolutionary movements in Italy and Hungary in 1848 and 1849.—465

Hayter, Sir William Goodenough (1792-1878)—British lawyer, Whig, then Liberal, M.P.—604

Hayward, Abraham (1801-1884)—British lawyer and journalist, Tory at the beginning of his career, later Peelite; appointed Secretary of the Poor Law Board in 1854.—624

Heathcote—British naval officer, captain of the corvette Archer.—377

Heeckeren, Jakob, Baron van—Dutch diplomat, envoy to St. Petersburg in the 1830s, envoy to Vienna from 1842 to 1876.—301

Heiden, Loghin Petrovich (Lodewijk Sigismund Vincent Gustaaf), Count van (1773-1850)—admiral of the Russian fleet, Dutch by birth; commander-in-chief of the Russian Mediterranean Fleet during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.—260

Heine, Heinrich (1797-1856)—German revolutionary poet.—83

Henley, Joseph Warner (1793-1884)—British statesman, Tory; President of the Board of Trade (1852, 1858-59).—332

Henry IV (1553-1610)—King of France (1589-1610).—104

Henry (Enrique) IV (1454-1474)—King of Castile (1454-65, 1468-74).—391, 392

Hentze, A.—German army officer, Communist League member; belonged to the Willich-Schapper sectarian group, witness for the prosecution at the Cologne Communist trial (1852).—364

Herbert, Sidney, Baron of Lea (1810-1861)—British statesman, first Tory, subsequently Peelite; Secretary at War (1845-46 and 1852-55) and Secretary for War (1859-60).—18-20,
Herod (73-4 B.C.)—King of Judaea (40-4 B.C.)—577

Herreros, Manuel García—Spanish liberal politician, deputy to the Cadiz Cortes, Minister of Justice during the war of independence (1808-14) and in 1820.—443

Hess, Heinrich Hermann Josef, Baron von (1788-1870)—Austrian general, subsequently field marshal, took an active part in crushing the 1848-49 revolution in Italy; commander-in-chief in Hungary, Galicia and the Danubian Principalities in 1854 and 1855.—146, 287, 358, 465

Hildyard, Robert Charles—English Tory M.P.—330

Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679)—English philosopher.—213

Horsfall, Thomas Berry (b. 1805)—English mine-owner, Tory M.P.—28

Horsman, Edward (1807-1876)—British politician, liberal M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland (1855-57).—16

Howden, Baron—see Caradoc, Sir John Hobart, Baron Howden

Hsien Fêng (c. 1831-1861)—Emperor of China (1850-61).—41

Hübner, Joseph Alexander, Baron von (1811-1892)—Austrian diplomat, envoy (1849-56) and ambassador (1856-59) to Paris.—480

Hughes, T. M.—English writer in the first half of the nineteenth century, lived in Spain for several years.—341, 343, 346, 450

Hume, Joseph (1777-1855)—English politician, a radical leader, M.P.—26, 27, 321

Hung Hsiu-chüan (1814-1864)—leader and ideologist of the Taiping rebellion in China (1851-64), head of the Taiping state, proclaimed himself Tien-wang (the Heavenly Prince).—41

Hussein Bey—Turkish general, crushed the Greek insurrection in 1854.—39

Hussein Pasha—Turkish general, commanded the defence of Silistria in 1854.—279

I

Infantado, Pedro Alcántara de Toledo, duque del (1773-1841)—Spanish general and politician, President of the Council of Regency (1823), head of government (1824).—400

Isabel Francisca de Asís de Borbón, Princess of Asturias (1851-1931)—Spanish infanta, eldest daughter of Isabella II.—449

Isabella (the Catholic) (1451-1504)—Queen of Castile (1474-1504), her marriage to Ferdinand V, future King of Aragon, in 1469 completed the unification of Spain.—393

Isabella II (1830-1904)—Queen of Spain (1833-68).—40, 52, 282, 285, 294, 305, 309, 310, 312, 343-46, 367, 369, 372, 447, 451, 489, 659

Iskander Bey (Alexander Iliński, Iliński) (1810-1861)—Polish-born Turkish general; participated in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated to Turkey after its defeat; commanded the Turkish forces on the Danube (1853-54), in the Crimea (1855) and the Caucasus (1855-56).—359

Ismail Pasha (1805-1861)—Turkish general, Circassian by birth; in 1853-54 commanded the forces on the Danube.—66, 67

Istúriz, Francisco Javier de (1790-1864)—Spanish liberal politician, head of government (1856, 1846, 1858).—306

Izzet Pasha (Hadschi Izzet Pasha)—Turkish military governor of Belgrade in 1854.—297, 365

J

Jerrold, Douglas William (1803-1857)—English author, playwright and humourist.—591

Jocelyn, Robert, Viscount (1816-1854)—English army officer, M.P., Secretary of the Board of Control for India in 1845-46.—13

John (Juan) II (1405-1454)—King of Castile and León (1406-54).—391
Joly—French police commissary.—232
Jones, Ernest Charles (1819-1869)—leading figure in the English labour movement, proletarian poet and journalist, Left Chartist leader; friend of Marx and Engels; editor of *The Northern Star, Notes to the People* and *The People's Paper*; initiator of the Labour Parliament convened in Manchester in 1854.—50, 51, 64, 354, 356
Jones, Sir Harry David (1791-1866)—English general, military engineer; fought in the Peninsular war against Napoleon in 1810-13; commander of an expeditionary force in the Baltic (1854) and of army engineers in the Crimea (1855).—382, 387, 462
Joseph II (1741-1790)—Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1765-90).—48, 49, 409, 599
Jovellanos y Ramirez, Gaspar Melchor de (1744-1811)—Spanish statesman, writer, lawyer and economist; follower of the French philosophers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment; opposed the clerical and feudal regime in Spain; Minister of Justice (1797-98); leader of the Left minority in the Central Junta in 1808-10.—403, 409, 410, 415, 432, 652
Julían—see Sánchez, Julián

K
Kalergis, Demetrios (1803-1867)—Greek general and politician; took part in the liberation struggle of the Greek people against Turkish rule (1821-29); War Minister (1854-55).—459
Kalik, Anton (b. 1818)—Austrian army officer, was sent on a special mission to the Danubian Principalities in the summer of 1854.—365
Karamzin, Nikolai Mikhailovich (1766-1826)—Russian historian and writer.—29
Keogh, William Nicholas (1817-1878)—Irish lawyer and politician, a leader of the Irish Brigade in the British Parliament; repeatedly held high judicial posts in Ireland.—638
Khrulev, Stepan Alexandrovich (1807-1870)—Russian general, army commander on the Danube and in the Crimea during the Crimean war; took part in the defence of Sevastopol.—304
Kisseleff (Kiselyev), Nikolai Dmitrievich (1800-1869)—Russian diplomat, held high posts in the Russian embassy in Paris from 1841 onwards, envoy to Paris in 1853 and 1854.—3, 174
Kisseleff (Kiselyev), Pavel Dmitrievich, Count (1788-1872)—Russian statesman; fought in the Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812; Minister of the Imperial Domains from 1837 to 1856; subsequently ambassador to Paris (1856-62).—171, 172
Knight, Frederick Winn (b. 1812)—English politician, M.P.—321
Kock, Charles Paul de (1793-1871)—French novelist and playwright.—92
Kossuth, Lajos (1802-1894)—leader of the Hungarian national liberation movement, head of the bourgeois democrats during the revolution of 1848-49 and of the Hungarian revolutionary government; emigrated to Turkey after the defeat of the revolution and later to England and America.—26, 90, 167, 227, 321, 621, 641
Kotzebue—Russian consul in Bucharest in 1848.—272
Kovalevsky, Yegor Petrovich (1811-1868)—Russian army officer, traveler, writer and diplomat; commissioner in Montenegro in 1853, then served at army headquarters on the Danube (1853-54) and in the Crimea (1854).—179
Krusenstern, Nikolai Ivanovich—Russian general, military governor of Odessa during the Crimean war.—463
Kurakin, Alexander Borisovich, Prince (1752-1818)—Russian diplomat, Vice-Chancellor (1796-98, 1801-02); took part in the signing of the Tilsit treaty between Russia and France in 1807; ambassador to Paris (1808-12).—400
L

Labazora, baron de—took part in the war of independence in Spain (1808-14); member of the Central Junta.—416

La Bisbal, Enrique José O'Donnel, conde de (1769-1834)—Spanish general, took part in the war of independence (1808-14); known for extreme lack of principles; sent to suppress the Riego uprising in 1820, sided with the revolutionaries and tried to use the uprising for his own aims.—423, 440, 441, 443

Lacy, Luis de (1775-1817)—Spanish general, took part in the war of independence (1808-14), was executed after attempting to incite a revolt in Catalonia against the absolute power of Ferdinand VII.—423, 439, 445

La Fayette (Lafayette), Marie Joseph Paul Yves Roch Gilbert du Motier, marquis de (1757-1834)—French general, prominent figure in the American War of Independence (1775-83) and the French Revolution; a leader of moderate constitutionalists (Feuillants); participated in the July revolution of 1830.—440

Lally-Tollendal, Trophime Gérard, marquis de (1751-1830)—French politician, moderate royalist during the French Revolution.—410

La Marmora (Lamarmora), Alfonso Ferrero, marchese de (1804-1878)—Italian general and politician, War Minister of Piedmont (1848, 1849-55, 1856-59); commanded a Sardinian corps in the Crimea in 1855; subsequently Prime Minister.—292

Lamoricière, Christophe Léon Louis Juchault de (1806-1865)—French general and politician, moderate republican; took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s-40s and in the suppression of the uprising of Paris workers in June 1848; was banished after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—473

Lancaster, Charles William (1820-1878)—an English gunmaker, improver of rifles and cannon.—508

Lansdowne, Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, Marquis of (1780-1863)—English statesman, Whig; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1806-07), President of the Council (1830-41, 1846-52); in the cabinet without office (1852-63).—133

Lara, Juan—Spanish general, War Minister (1851-55); in 1854 captain general of New Castile.—282, 283, 313

La Rocha, Ramon—Spanish general, captain general of Catalonia.—312

Las Cases, Emmanuel Augustin Dieudonné, comte de (1766-1842)—French historian; accompanied Napoleon to St. Helena (1815-16), subsequently published Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène.—96

Lavalette (La Valette), Charles Jean Marie Félix, marquis de (1806-1881)—French statesman, Bonapartist; ambassador to Constantinople (1851-53); Minister of the Interior (1865-67); Foreign Minister (1868-69).—13

Lawley, Francis Charles (1825-1901)—British journalist, Gladstone's personal secretary (1852-54); the Times correspondent in the USA (1854-65).—624

Layard, Sir Austen Henry (1817-1894)—English archaeologist and politician, radical, subsequently liberal, M.P., member of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the British Army in the Crimea (1855).—11, 12, 101, 137, 138, 259, 321, 601, 605, 634

Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Charles (1773-1822)—French general, participated in Napoleon I's campaigns and the Peninsular war in 1808.—406

Leiningen-Westerburg, Christian Franz Seraphin Vincenz, Count (1812-1856)—Austrian general, was sent on an extraordinary mission to Constantinople in 1853.—140

Leopold II (1747-1792)—Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire (1790-92).—49
Leopold II (1797-1870)—Grand Duke of Tuscany (1824-59).—484
Lieven, Darya (Dorothea) Khristoforovna, Princess (1785-1857)—wife of the Russian diplomat K. A. Lieven; was hostess of political salons in London and Paris.—562
Lieven, Kristofor Andreyevich, Prince (1774-1839)—Russian diplomat, envoy to Berlin (1810-12), ambassador to London (1812-34).—260-61
Ligier, Alphonse—French consul at Cartagena (Spain) in 1854.—311
Ligne, Charles Joseph, Prince de (1735-1814)—Austrian general, diplomat and writer, participant in the Seven Years’ War (1756-63).—599
Linage, Francisco (1795-1847)—Spanish general, member of the Progressista Party, close friend of Espartero and his secretary from 1835; inspector general of infantry and militia in 1843; when the dictatorship of Espartero was overthrown, emigrated together with the latter to Britain.—342
Liprandi, Pavel Petrovich (1796-1864)—Russian general, commanded a division on the Danube (1853-54) and in the Crimea (1854-55).—268, 481, 511, 517, 522, 524, 526, 545
Liverpool, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Earl of (1770-1828)—English statesman, a Tory leader, held a number of ministerial posts, Prime Minister (1812-27).—658
López, Joaquín María (1798-1855)—Spanish lawyer, man of letters and politician, a Progressista Party leader, head of government in 1843.—342, 345
López Baños, Miguel—Spanish army officer, participated in the war of independence (1808-14) and the revolution of 1820-23.—440
Louis XI (1423-1483)—King of France (1461-83).—392
Louis XIV (1638-1715)—King of France (1643-1715).—81, 104
Louis Napoleon—see Napoleon III
Lozano de Torres, Juan Esteban—Spanish politician, Minister of Justice (1817-19).—417
Lucan, George Charles Bingham, Earl of (1790-1874)—Russian general, commanded a corps on the Danube (1853-54) and the Southern army (1855).—66, 129, 181, 247, 268, 292, 541
Lucullus (Lucius Licinius Lucullus) (c. 117-c. 56 B.C.)—Roman soldier, famous for his wealth and sumptuous banquets.—43
Lüders, Alexander Nikolayevich, Count (1790-1874)—Russian general, commanded a corps on the Danube (1853-54) and the Southern army (1855).—66, 129, 181, 247, 268, 292, 541
Luján, Francisco (1798-1867)—Spanish general, writer and scientist, a founder of the Spanish Academy of Sciences; a Cortes deputy from 1836, sided with the Moderado Party; Minister of Public Works (1854).—351, 375
Lukianovich, Nikolai Andreyevich (c.1806-d. after 1855)—Russian army officer and military historian, took part in the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29, and in suppressing the Decembrists’ uprising (1825) and the Polish insurrection of 1830-31.—123
Luna, Alvaro de (1388-1453)—First Minister of Juan II, King of Castile and León.—391
Lynnhurst, John Singleton Copley, Baron of (1772-1863)—English statesman, lawyer, Tory; Lord Chancellor (1827-30, 1834-35 and 1841-46).—259, 262, 591, 604
Lyons, Edmund, Baron (1790-1858)—English admiral, minister at Athens (1835-49); second in command of the British fleet in the Black Sea under Admiral Dundas (1854).—35, 204, 304, 485, 515

M

Mackenzie, Foma Fomich (Thomas) (d.1786)—Russian admiral, Scot by
birth; commanded a squadron of the Black Sea fleet from 1783 to 1786.—513

Madvig, Johan Nicolai (1804-1886)—Danish philologist and statesman, Minister of Public Worship (1848-51), President of the Rigsråd (1856-63).—378

Magheru, Georgiu (1804-1880)—member of the Provisional Government and commander of the revolutionary army in Wallachia in 1848.—275

Mahmud II (1785-1839)—Turkish sultan (1808-39).—240

Malik-Shah (1055-1092)—ruler (sultan) of the Seljuk state (1072-92).—603

Malmesbury, James Howard Harris, Earl of (1807-1889)—British statesman, Tory, subsequently Conservative; Foreign Secretary (1852, 1858-59).—133-35

Manners, John James Robert, Duke of Rutland (1818-1906)—British statesman, Tory, subsequently Conservative; member of the Young England group in the 1840s, M.P., held ministerial posts.—15

Mansbach, Carl, von und zu (1790-1867)—Swedish general and diplomat, envoy to Vienna (1852-55) and Berlin (1855-59).—301

Manteuffel, Otto Theodor, Baron von (1805-1882)—Prussian statesman, Minister of the Interior (1848-50), Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (1850-58).—9, 83, 147, 149, 168, 170, 179, 180, 286

Marchesi y Oleaga, José María (1801-1879)—Spanish general, member of the Moderado Party, military governor of Barcelona (1853-54), War Minister (1864).—312

Margaret of Savoy, Duchess of Mantua (1589-1655)—Vice-Queen of Portugal prior to the 1640 insurrection after which Portugal won independence and ceded from Spain.—392

Maria Alexandronva (1824-1880)—wife of Alexander II of Russia (from 1841).—87

María Anna of Neuburg (1667-1740)—Queen of Charles II of Spain (from 1689).—392

María Cristina de Borbón, senior (1806-1878)—Queen of Ferdinand VII of Spain; regent for her daughter Isabella II (1833-40); after the death of Ferdinand VII she secretly married Muñoz, who later received the title of Duke of Ríánsares.—285, 305, 309, 312, 341, 342, 345, 351, 363, 370, 448, 449, 451, 456, 457

María Luisa Fernanda (1832-1897)—infanta of Spain, Isabella II’s sister, wife of Duke of Montpensier.—52

María Luisa of Parma (1751-1819)—Queen of Charles IV of Spain (from 1788).—392, 399

María Teresa de Borbón, condesa de Chinchón—wife of Manuel de Godoy and Charles IV’s cousin.—451

María Theresa (1717-1780)—Archduchess of Austria (1740-80), wife of the Holy Roman Emperor Francis I (1745-80).—45, 46

Marie Amélie Therese (1782-1866)—Queen of Louis Philippe, King of the French, (from 1809).—314

Marliani, Manuel de (d. 1873)—Spanish politician and historian, adherent of Espartero; lived in Spain up to 1859, then emigrated to Italy.—341, 368, 435

Marmon, Auguste Frédéric Louis Viesse de (1774-1852)—Marshal of France, took part in Napoleon I’s campaigns; in April 1814 sided with the Bourbons, commanded Charles X’s troops during the July 1830 revolution.—37

Maroto, Rafael (1783-1847)—Spanish general, appointed commander-in-chief of the Carlist army by Don Carlos in 1838.—341

Martignac, Jean Baptiste Sylvère Gay, vicomte de (1778-1832)—French lawyer and politician, royalist; in 1823 took part in suppressing the Spanish revolution; in 1828-29 Minister of the Interior, virtual head of the cabinet.—445, 446

Martínez de la Rosa Berdejo Gómez y Arroyo, Francisco de Paula (1787-1862)—Spanish writer and politician,
a leader of the Moderados, head of government (1834-35).—306
Matuszewicz, Andrzej (Adam Faddeyevich), Count (1796-1842) — Russian diplomat, took part in the congresses of Troppau (1820) and Verona (1822) and in the London conference of 1830.—260
Maurocordatos, Alexander, Prince (1791-1865) — Greek statesman and diplomat; Prime Minister (1844, 1854-55).—217
Maurocordatos, Nicolas — hetman in Moldavia (1854).—464
Mazarin, Jules (Mazarini, Giulio) (1602-1661) — Italian-born French cardinal and statesman; Minister from 1643; virtual ruler of France till Louis XIV's maturity.—107
Mazarredo, Manuel de (1807-1857) — Spanish general, War Minister (1847), captain general of the Basque provinces (1852-54).—312
Mazzini, Giuseppe (1805-1872) — Italian revolutionary, a leader of the national liberation movement in Italy; head of the Provisional Government of the Roman Republic in 1849; an organiser of the Central Committee of European Democracy in London in 1850; sought support among the Bonapartists in the early '1850s, but later opposed them.—90, 167, 321, 455, 621
Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Georg, Duke of (1824-1876) — German aristocrat, general in the service of Russia.—144
Mekhemet Ali Pasha (1807-1868) — Turkish statesman; Grand Vizier from 1852 to May 1853; subsequently War Minister (1853-January 1854).—32
Mekhemet Kebresli Pasha (c. 1810-1871) — Turkish soldier and statesman; Capudan-Pasha (Minister of Marine) from January to May 1854; Grand Vizier from May to November 1854.—32
Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount (1779-1848) — British Whig statesman, Home Secretary (1830-34), Prime Minister (1834, 1835-41).—562
Melgar, Juan Tomás Enríquez Cabrera, conde de (1652-1708) — First Minister of King Charles II of Spain (1693-99); exiled from Spain after the 1699 popular uprising.—392
Menchikoff (Menshikov), Alexander Sergeyevich, Prince (1787-1869) — Russian general and statesman; was sent on an extraordinary mission to Constantinople (February to May 1853); commander-in-chief of the army and navy in the Crimea (1853-February 1855).—15, 21-23, 31, 87, 92, 94, 98, 99, 117, 139, 140, 475, 477, 478, 480, 481, 486, 489, 494-97, 507, 510-13, 517, 528, 531, 533, 536, 537, 539, 558, 611, 618
Mensdorff-Pouilly, Alexander, Count (1813-1871) — Austrian statesman, general; envoy to St. Petersburg (1852-54), minister of the Imperial Court and Foreign Minister (1864-66).—176
Merlin, Christophe Antoine, comte (1771-1839) — general of the French occupation army in Spain in 1808-14.—407
Merson — Austrian consul in Belgrade in 1854.—159
Messina, Felix Maria de — Spanish general.—283
Metaxas, Andreas, Count (1786-1860) — Greek statesman and diplomat, Prime Minister (1843-44), ambassador to Constantinople (1850-54).—155, 159
Mettternich-Winneburg, Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince von (1773-1859) — Austrian statesman and diplomat; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1809-21); Chancellor (1821-48); an organiser of the Holy Alliance.—29, 246, 259, 264
Meyendorff(f), Pyotr Kazimirovich, Baron von (1796-1863) — Russian diplomat,
envoy to Berlin (1839-50) and to Vienna (1850-54).—94, 176
Meza, Christian Julius de (1792-1865)—Danish general, commander-in-chief of the Danish artillery in 1849; inspector general for artillery (1856-58).—362
Mikhail Nikolaevich (1832-1909)—Russian Grand Duke, fourth son of Emperor Nicholas I of Russia.—91
Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, Alexander Ivanovich (1790-1848)—Russian general, took part in the Patriotic war against Napoleon in 1812, military historian.—123.
Milnes, Richard Monckton, Baron Houghton (1809-1885)—English author and politician, at first Tory, in the second half of the nineteenth century Liberal, M.P.—71, 217
Mina (senior)—see Espoz y Mina, Francisco
Mina, Francisco Javier (1789-1817)—Spanish general, a guerrilla leader during the war of independence (1808-14); after an abortive attempt at an uprising against Ferdinand VII in 1814 he left for Mexico, where he fell fighting for its independence.—421, 423, 445
Minié, Claude Étienne (1804-1879)—French army officer, inventor of a new type of rifle used in the French army from 1852.—211, 213, 515, 532, 534
Miraflorés, Manuel de Pando, marqués de (1792-1872)—Spanish diplomat and statesman, author of a number of works on Spanish history.—445
Mircea the Old (d. 1418)—hospodar of Wallachia (1386-1418); fought against the Turkish invasion.—271
Mislin, Jacques (d. 1847)—French abbot, traveller, author of several books on the Middle East.—107
Mohammed (Muhammad, Mahomet) (c. 570-632)—founder of Islam.—344, 355
Mohammed II (the Conqueror) (1432-1481)—Turkish sultan (1451-81); in 1453 captured Constantinople and made it capital of the Ottoman Empire.—33, 81, 271
Mohammed IV (1641-1691)—Turkish sultan (1648-87).—104
Molesworth, Sir William, Baronet (1810-1855)—British liberal statesman (belonged to the Mayfair Radicals), M.P.; First Commissioner of Works and Public Buildings (1853), Colonial Secretary (1855).—53, 213, 601, 638
Molière (real name Jean Baptiste Poquelin) (1622-1673)—French dramatist.—418
Moltke, Helmuth Karl Bernhard, Count von (1800-1891)—Prussian army officer, subsequently field marshal general, author, an ideologist of Prussian militarism; served in the Turkish army in 1835-39.—241
Mon, Alejandro (1801-1882)—Spanish politician, liberal, Minister of Finance (1837, 1844-46); head of government (1864).—285, 370
Monroe, James (1758-1831)—US statesman, Republican, President of the USA (1817-25).—367, 445
Monsell, William, Baron Emly (1812-1894)—Irish liberal politician, a leader of the Irish Brigade in the British Parliament; clerk of the Ordnance from 1852 to 1857.—638
Montalembert, Marc René, marquis de (1714-1800)—French general, military engineer; elaborated a new fortification system largely used in the nineteenth century.—113, 347, 380, 381, 475, 515
Montemolin, Carlos Luis María Fernando de Borbón, comte de (1818-1861)—Spanish infante, eldest son of Don Carlos; pretender to the Spanish throne as Charles VI in the 1850s.—52, 306
Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat, Baron de la Brède et de (1689-1755)—French philosopher, economist and writer of the Enlightenment.—410
Montijo, Fernandez de Cordova, conde de (d. 1839)—Spanish army officer, fought on the side of Napoleon’s troops during the war of independence in Spain (1808-14).—422

Montpensier, Antoine Marie Philippe Louis d’Orléans, duc de (1824-1890)—son of King of the French Louis Philippe, husband of the Spanish infanta María Luisa Fernanda; from 1868 to 1869 pretender to the Spanish throne.—40, 52

Mooney, James—Chartist, participated in the labour movement.—356

Moore, George Henry (1811-1870)—Irish politician, a leader of the tenant-right movement, M.P.—143

Moreno, Antonio Guillermo—Spanish banker and politician.—285

Morillo, Pablo, conde de Cartagena y marqués de la Puerta (1778-1837)—Spanish general, took part in the war of independence (1808-14); from 1815 to 1820 commanded Spanish troops sent to put an end to the national liberation war of the Spanish colonies in South America; opponent of the 1820-23 revolution in Spain.—341, 657

Morla, Tomás de (1752-1820)—Spanish general, member of the Central Junta; in 1808 went over to the French occupation army, Minister of War and Navy in Joseph Bonaparte’s Government.—422, 652

Mounier, Jean Joseph (1758-1806)—French politician; moderate royalist during the French Revolution.—410

Münnich, Christofor Antonovich (Burkhard Christoph), Count (1683-1767)—Russian field marshal general, fortification engineer; during the Russo-Turkish war of 1735-39 commanded the army in the Crimea and Basharabia.—397

Muñoz, Agustín Fernando, duque de Ríánsore (c. 1808-1873)—sergeant of the royal guards, husband of Queen-Regent María Cristina of Spain.—451, 457

Muñoz Benavente, José (Pucheta) (1820-1856)—Spanish bullfighter; active participant in the 1854-56 revolution; a leader of popular masses in Madrid; was killed at the barricades.—363, 370

Muñoz Torrero, Diego (1761-1829)—Spanish priest, rector at Salamanca University; one of the most radical deputies to the Cadiz Cortes (1810-13); took part in the 1820-23 revolution.—435

Muntz, George Frederick (1794-1857)—British politician, armaments manufacturer, radical M.P.—213

Murat, Joachim (1767-1815)—Marshal of France; participated in Napoleon I’s campaigns; commander-in-chief of the French troops in Spain in 1808; King of Naples (1808-15).—399

Murat, Napoleon Lucien Charles, Prince (1803-1878)—French politician, Bonapartist; son of Joachim Murat and cousin of Napoleon III.—352

Mussa Pasha (c. 1810-1854)—Turkish general, commanded the Turkish forces in Silistria in 1853-54.—243, 277

Mustapha Pasha—Pasha of Scutari, commanded the Albanian forces during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.—264

N

Nadaud, Martin (1815-1898)—French bricklayer, journalist, follower of Proudhon; from 1849 to 1851 deputy to the Legislative Assembly, adherent of the Mountain; after the coup d’état of December 2, 1851 was exiled from France, lived in England up to 1859.—50

Napier, Sir Charles (1786-1860)—English admiral, participant in the wars in Portugal (1810 and 1833-34) and Syria (1840); commanded the British fleet in the Baltic in 1854, M.P.—5, 35, 53, 109, 125, 130, 182, 201-03, 251, 290, 291, 330, 331, 361, 386, 387, 484

Napier, Sir Joseph (1804-1882)—English politician, Tory, M.P.; Attorney-
General for Ireland (1852); Lord Chancellor for Ireland (1858-59).—623

Napier, Sir William Francis Patrick (1785-1860)—English general and military historian; fought in the Peninsular war against Napoleon I from 1808 to 1814.—124, 419

Napoleon the Little—see Napoleon III

Napoleon I Bonaparte (1769-1821)—Emperor of the French (1804-14 and 1815).—33, 95, 96, 105, 126, 204, 208, 215, 217, 227, 228, 368, 392, 396, 401, 402, 404, 407, 408, 414, 415, 419, 420, 432, 437, 479-82, 503, 504, 506, 528, 530, 533, 534, 541, 547-48, 551, 558, 569, 651, 652

Napoleon III (Charles Louis Napoleon Bonaparte) (1808-1873)—Napoleon I's nephew, President of the Second Republic (December 1848 to 1851); Emperor of the French (1852-70).—3, 8, 9, 13, 17, 30, 33, 35, 37, 40, 51, 52, 85, 100, 202, 206, 212, 217, 230, 298, 305, 306, 314, 320, 328, 333, 352, 456, 462, 472, 473, 480-82, 484, 488, 491, 507, 627

Napoleon, Prince—see Bonaparte, Napoleon Joseph Charles Paul


Nasmyth, Charles (1826-1861)—English army officer; war correspondent of The Times at Omer Pasha's headquarters on the Danube (1854).—242, 277, 278, 329, 334

Navarro (d. 1817)—Spanish revolutionary, executed for an attempt to promulgate the Constitution of 1812 in Valencia.—445

Nesselrode, Karl Vasilyevich, Count (1780-1862)—Russian statesman and diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1816-56); from 1845 State Chancellor.—20-23, 28, 73, 77, 82, 92, 95, 134, 140, 146-47, 168, 176-77

Nesset Bey—Turkish statesman, chargé d'affaires in Athens (1853-54).—155

Newcastle, Henry Pelham Fiennes Pelham Clinton, Duke of (1811-1864)—British statesman, Peelite; Secretary for War and the Colonies (1852-54); Secretary for War (1854-55) and Colonial Secretary (1859-64).—144, 220, 228, 259, 306, 307, 486, 561, 563, 600, 604, 606, 607, 627-29, 632, 633, 642, 645, 647

Ney, Michel, duc d'Elchingen (1769-1815)—Marshal of France, participant in Napoleon I's campaigns; fought in the war in Spain from 1808 to 1811.—416


Normanby, Constantine Henry Phipps, Earl of Mulgrave, Marquis of (1797-1863)—British statesman, Whig; Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1835-39); Secretary for War and the Colonies (1839); Home Secretary (1839-41); ambassador to Paris (1846-52).—299, 300

Notaras, Lucas (d. 1453)—Byzantine statesman; naval commander; opposed union with Roman Catholic Church; was killed on Mohammed II's order after the capture of Constantinople by the Turks.—33

O

O'Daly, Pedro—Spanish army officer, participant in the war of independence (1808-14) and the 1820-23 revolution.—440

O'Donnell y Jorris, Leopoldo, conde de Lucena y duque de Tetuán (1809-—
1867)—Spanish general and politician, a leader of the Moderado Party; made attempts to use revolutionary crisis in the country to establish military dictatorship in 1854; as War Minister directed the suppression of the 1854-56 revolution; head of government (1856, 1858-63, 1865-66).—267, 282-84, 294, 305, 306, 310, 313, 342, 351, 362, 367, 375, 440, 451, 457, 458

O’Flaherty, Edmond—British Treasury official in charge of collecting taxes in Ireland in 1854.—624

Olozaga, Salustiano (1805-1873)—Spanish statesman and diplomat, a leader of the Progresista Party; head of government (1843); minister to Paris (1840-43 and 1854); participant in the 1854-56 revolution.—342, 345, 346, 370

Oltra—Spanish army officer, participant in the 1820-23 revolution.—422


Orléans—royal dynasty in France (1830-48).—40, 456

Orofesa, Emanuel Joaquín, conde de (1642-c. 1707)—head of the Spanish Government under Charles II (1685-91 and 1698-99); banished from Spain after the popular uprising of 1699.—392

Orozco—Spanish army officer, participant in the 1854-56 revolution in Spain.—294

Oscar I (1799-1859)—King of Sweden and Norway (1844-59).—144, 362, 377, 387

Osten-Sacken, Dmitry Yerofeyevich, Count (1789-1881)—Russian general; during the Crimean war commander of a corps in the South of Russia (1853-54), and of the Sevastopol garrison (end of 1854 and 1855).—66, 192, 193, 464, 533

O’Sullivan de Grass, Alphonse Albert Henri, comte (1798-1866)—Belgian diplomat, envoy to Vienna from 1837 to 1866.—301

Otto I (1815-1867)—King of Greece (1832-62), member of the Bavarian ruling family of Wittelsbach.—31, 39, 130, 177, 196, 217, 459

Otway, Sir Arthur John, Baronet (1822-1912)—British M.P.; in the 1850s, Tory.—298, 307, 392

Oushakoff (Ushakov), Alexander Kleonakovich (1803-1877)—Russian general, commanded the Russian forces on the Danube in 1854 and in the Crimea in 1855.—129, 292

Pacheco, Juan, marqués de Villena (1419-1474)—Spanish statesman, favourite of King Henry IV of Castile.—391, 392

Pacheco y Gutiérrez Calderón, Joaquin Francisco (1808-1865) — Spanish lawyer, writer and politician; belonged to the Moderado Party; participant in the 1854-56 revolution, Foreign Minister (1854).—351

Pacifico, David (1784-1854)—British trader of Portuguese origin in Athens.—635

Padilla, Juan Lopez de (c. 1490-1521)—Spanish nobleman, a leader of the uprising of Castilian towns (Com-
uneros) in 1520-22; executed after the defeat at Villalar.—394

Paikos, A.—Greek statesman, Foreign Minister (1851-54).—178

Paine, Thomas (1737-1809)—English-born American writer, Republican, participant in the American War of Independence (1775-83) and the French Revolution (1789-94).—392

Paixhans, Henri Joseph (1783-1854)—French general, military engineer and inventor, author of a number of works on artillery.—330

Pakington, Sir John Somerset (1799-1880)—British statesman, Tory, subsequently Conservative, M.P. from 1832; Secretary for War and the Colonies (1852), First Lord of the Admiralty (1858-59, 1866-67) and Secretary for War (1867-68).—117, 307

Palafox y Melci, Francisco de (b. 1774)—Spanish politician, member of the Central Junta (1808-09), was expelled from it for opposing the convocation of the Cortes.—422

Palafox y Melci, José de Rebolledo, duque de Saragossa (1776-1847)—Spanish general, participant in the war of independence (1808-14); directed the defence of Saragossa in 1808-09.—405


Panyutin, Fyodor Sergeyevich (1790-1865)—Russian general, commanded a corps at the beginning of the Crimean war and a reserve army in the south-west of Russia in 1855 and 1856.—268, 280, 598, 611, 618

Parque Castrillo, Diego de Cañas y Portocarrero, duque del (1755-1832)—Spanish general, participant in the war of independence (1808-14) and the 1820-23 revolution; President of the Cortes in 1820.—401

Parseval-Deschênes, Alexandre Ferdinand (1790-1860)—French admiral, a squadron commander in the Baltic in 1854.—387

Paskievich (Paskiewitsch), Ivan Fyodorovich, Prince (1782-1856)—Russian field marshal general; commanded the Russian forces in the Caucasus during the 1826-27 Russo-Persian war; governor of the Caucasus from March 1827; directed the suppression of the Polish insurrection in 1831; Lieutenant of the Kingdom of Poland from 1832; commander-in-chief on the western and southern borders of Russia in April-June 1854.—164, 167, 221, 244, 245, 247, 255, 268, 278, 291, 337

Pastor Díaz, Nicomedes (1811-1863)—Spanish politician and writer, member of the Moderado Party, ambassador to Turin (1854).—370

Pedro V (1837-1861)—King of Portugal (1853-61).—305

Peel, Sir Robert, Baronet (1788-1850)—British statesman, moderate Tory; Home Secretary (1822-27, 1828-30), Prime Minister (1834-35, 1841-46); repealed the Corn Laws in 1846.—13, 75, 134, 135, 562

Peitman—German professor, resided in England for a long time.—298-300, 307, 332

Pelham, Frederick Thomas (1808-1861)—English naval officer; participated in the expedition to the Baltic in 1854, rear-admiral from 1858.—385

Pérez de Castro, Evaristo (1778-1848)—Spanish politician, liberal, deputy to the Cadiz Cortes (1812); participant in the 1820-23 revolution; Foreign Minister in the first constitutional government.—443

Perowsky (Perovsky), Lev Alexeyevich, Count (1792-1856)—Russian statesman, general, participant in the Pa-
triotic war against Napoleon in 1812; Minister of the Interior (1841-52), Minister of Apanages (1852-56).—171, 172

Pertev Pasha—Turkish statesman, Foreign Minister during the Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29.—264

Peter I (The Great) (1672-1725)—Russian Tzar from 1682; Emperor of Russia from 1721.—109, 113, 537, 559, 613

Peto, John—British general, politician, and art collector.—109

Peter III (1744-1762) —Empress of Russia, 1762-62.—310

Peter the Great (1672-1725) —Russian Tzar from 1682; Emperor of Russia from 1721.—109, 113, 537, 559, 613

Peter the Great (1672-1725) —Russian Tzar from 1682; Emperor of Russia from 1721.—109, 113, 537, 559, 613

Peter the Great (1672-1725) —Russian Tzar from 1682; Emperor of Russia from 1721.—109, 113, 537, 559, 613

Phillippescu—officer of the Rouman militia.—463-64

Philippes—See Dufour de Pradt

Phipps, Sir Charles Beaumont (1801-1866)—British colonel, steward of the vice-regal household (1835-39), royal equerry (1846), private secretary of Prince Albert (from 1847).—299, 300

Pidal, Pedro José, marqués de (1800-1865)—Spanish politician, belonged to the Moderno Party, President of the Cortes (1843).—285

Pius IX (Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti) (1792-1878)—Pope (1846-78).—17, 133

Pizarro, Francisco (between 1471 and 1475-1541)—Spanish conqueror of Peru.—395

Pombal, Sebastián José Carvalho y Mello, marqués de (1699-1782)—Portuguese statesman, adherent of enlightened absolutism, virtual ruler of Portugal (1756-77).—409

Pompey (Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus) (106-48 B.C.)—Roman general and statesman.—310

Ponsonby, Sir John, Viscount (c. 1770-1855)—British diplomat, envoy to Naples (1832), ambassador to Constantinople (1832-41) and to Vienna (1846-50).—101

Popovitch (Popović), Timotheus, von (1795-1867)—Austrian general, military governor of Bucharest during the Austrian occupation of the Danubian Principalities in 1854.—465

Porcher, Henry Herbert, Baron (1741-1811)—British M.P., Whig.—616

Porchier—see Diaz Porlier

Pozzo di Borgo, Karl Osipovich, Count (1764-1842)—Russian diplomat, Corsican by birth; envoy (1814-21) and ambassador (1821-35) to Paris, ambassador to London (1835-39).—29, 78, 580

Pradel, Pierre Marie Michel Eugène Courtray de (1790-1857)—French poet and improviser.—230

Pradt, Dominique Dufour de (1759-1837)—French priest, diplomat, journalist and historian.—408, 418, 421, 429

Prim y Prats, Juan, conde de Reus (1814-1870)—Spanish general and politician; brutally suppressed an uprising of the republicans and Left-wing Progresistas in Catalonia (1843-44).—466

Príncipe y Vidaud, Miguel Agustín (1811-1866)—Spanish writer; author of a number of works on Spanish history and literature; Progresista Party member.—344, 345

Pritchett, Robert Taylor (1828-1907)—British gunsmith, perfected Minié’s rifle.—211

Pucheta—see Muñoz Benavente, José

Puig, Louis (1827-1861)—French journalist, Blanquist, participant in the June 1848 insurrection in France and in revolutionary events in Spain in 1854.—363

Pulskys, Francis (Ferenc) Aurelius (1814-1897)—Polish-born Hungarian politician, writer and archaeologist; participated in the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; emigrated after its defeat; contributed to the New-York Daily Tribune in the 1850s, returned to Hungary in 1867 after the amnesty.—391
Quesada y Matheus, Jenaro, marqués de Miravalles (1818-1889)—Spanish general and statesman, military governor of Madrid in 1854.—283
Quetelet, Lambert Adolphe Jacques (1796-1874)—Belgian statistician, mathematician and astronomer.—642
Quintaña, Manuel José (1772-1857)—Spanish poet and politician, follower of the French writers of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, participant in the revolutions of 1808-14 and 1820-23; member of the Central Junta (1808-10).—411, 420
Quiroga, Antonio (1784-1841)—Spanish army officer, liberal, participant in the revolutions of 1808-14 and 1820-23.—440-42
Radin, Abraham—Chartist of the 1850s.—64
Radowitzky, Josef, Count of Radetz (1766-1858)—Austrian field marshal; commanded the Austrian forces in Northern Italy from 1831; suppressed the national liberation movement in Italy in 1848-49; governor-general of the Kingdom of Lombardy and Venice (1850-56).—152, 164, 287, 299, 455, 532
Raglan, Lord Fitzroy James Henry Somerset, Baron (1788-1855)—British general, field marshal from November 1854; Master-General of the Ordnance; commanded the British forces in the Crimea (1854-55).—182, 221, 247, 249, 327, 332, 335, 337, 360, 366, 472, 474, 477, 486, 505, 507-09, 513, 515, 518, 525, 526, 528, 531, 536, 557, 561, 562, 564, 569, 627, 629
Reshid Pasha, Mustafa Mehemed (1802-1858)—Turkish statesman, repeatedly held the post of Grand Vizier; Foreign Minister from May 1853 to May 1855 (with an interval).—32, 155, 167, 289, 291, 318, 323-25
Ribot, A.—Spanish journalist.—345
Richard, Vicente (d. 1816)—Spanish revolutionary, executed after an abortive attempt at an uprising against Ferdinand VII.—445
Richmond, Charles Gordon-Lennox, Duke of (1791-1860)—British Tory politician, protectionist.—600
Riego y Núñez, Rafael del (1785-1823)—Spanish army officer, participant in the war of independence (1808-14); prominent figure during the revolution of 1820-23; executed after its defeat.—423, 441-43, 657
Rifaat Pasha, Sadik (1798-1855)—Turkish statesman, Foreign Minister (from March to May 1853), President of the State Council of Justice (from May 1853 to March 1854).—130
Ríos y Rosas, Antonio de los (1812-1873)—Spanish politician, belonged to the Moderado Party, deputy to the Cortes, Minister of the Interior (1854 and 1856).—370, 448
Riza Pasha (1809-1859)—Turkish general and statesman, Capudan Pasha (Naval Minister) from December 1853 to January 1854, Seraskier (War Minister) from January 1854 to June 1855.—32, 221
Robinson, Abraham—Chartist of the 1850s.—64
Robinson, Frederick John, Viscount Goderich, Earl of Ripon (1782-1859)—English statesman, Tory; Chancellor of the Exchequer (1823-27) and Prime Minister (1827-28).—577
Roebuck, John Arthur (1801-1879)—British politician and journalist, radical M.P.; in 1855 Chairman of the Select Committee of Inquiry into the Condition of the Army in the Crimea.—13, 602-08, 615, 626, 627; 630-33, 634, 635, 642
Romana, Pedro Caro y Sureda, marqués de la (1761-1811)—Spanish general, participant in the war of independence (1808-14); commissioner of the Central Junta in Asturia.—406, 415, 416, 422, 653
Romerías—see Romana, Pedro Caro y Sureda
Ros de Olano, Antonio (1808-1886)—Spanish general and politician, be-
longed to the Moderado Party, participant in the revolution of 1854-56.—284

Rose, Hugh Henry, Baron Strathnairn (1801-1885)—British army officer, from 1854 general, later field marshal; chargé d'affaires in Constantinople (1852-53); during the Crimean war British representative at the headquarters of the French army in the Crimea; an organiser of the suppression of an uprising for national liberation in India (1857-59).—22, 23, 117, 185, 190

Rouen (Forth-Rouen), baron—French diplomat, envoy to Athens (1851-55).—177, 304

Royer, von—Prussian diplomat, envoy to Constantinople in 1829.—565

Rüdiger, Fyodor Vasilyevich, Count (1784-1856)—Russian general, in 1854 acted as Lieutenant of the Kingdom of Poland and commanded the forces on the western border of Russia.—362

Rullière, Joseph Marcellin de (1787-1863)—French general and politician, took part in the conquest of Algeria in the 1830s; member of the Constituent and Legislative Assemblies and War Minister in 1848-49; resigned after the coup d'état of December 2, 1851.—233

Russell, John Russell, Earl (1792-1878)—British statesman, Whig leader; Prime Minister (1846-52, 1865-66); Foreign Secretary (1852-53, 1859-65), President of the Council (1854-55).—13, 19, 21, 24, 30, 31, 33, 39, 52, 53, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84-89, 93, 94, 100, 137, 139, 140, 143, 157, 190, 215-19, 228, 258, 260, 266, 307, 316, 319-22, 326, 327, 330, 331, 484, 546, 547, 563, 584, 601-08, 621, 622, 624-26, 628-30, 631, 633, 635, 643, 645-47.

Sadleir, John (1814-1856)—Irish banker and politician, a leader of the Irish Brigade in the British Parliament; Junior Lord of the Treasury in 1853.—624, 638

Saffi, Aurelio (1819-1890)—Italian writer and member of national liberation movement, Mazzini's companion-in-arms, participant in the revolution of 1848-49 in Italy; emigrated to England in 1851.—455

Sagasti (Zagasti), Manuel—Spanish general, supported Espartero's dictatorship, Governor of Madrid (1843, 1854-55).—375, 448

Sahib Effendi (d. 1854)—Turkish mufti.—459

Said Pasha—Turkish general, commanded the Turkish forces on the Danube in 1854.—303

St.-Albin, A. de—French journalist.—372

Saint-Arnaud, Armand Jacques Achille Leroy de (1801-1854)—Marshal of France, Bonapartist; an organiser of the coup d'état of December 2, 1851; War Minister (1851-54); commander-in-chief of the French army in the Crimea (1854).—4, 182, 206, 212, 220, 230-33, 247, 250, 292, 332, 335, 337, 360, 366, 462, 472-74, 477, 478, 479, 486, 495, 513

St. Helens—see Fitzherbert, Alleyne, Baron St. Helens

Salamanca y Mayol, José de (1811-1883)—Spanish politician, banker, belonged to the Moderado Party, Minister of Finance (1847).—375, 457

Salazar—see Allende Salazar, José

Sami Pasha—Turkish statesman, Governor of Vidin (1852-54).—279

Sánchez, Julián—a guerrilla leader during the war of independence in Spain (1808-14).—421

San Fernando, Joaquín José Melgarejo, duque de (d. 1835)—Spanish politician, head of government on the eve of the 1820 revolution.—441, 444

San Luis, Luis José Sartorius, conde de (1820-1871)—Spanish statesman and journalist, a leader of the Moderado
Party; Minister of the Interior (1847-51); head of government (1853-54).—282, 285, 309, 313, 343, 345, 351, 375, 392, 448-50, 457, 458
San Miguel y Valledor, Evaristo, duque de (1785-1862)—Spanish general, writer and politician, participant in the war of independence (1808-14) and the 1820-23 revolution; head of the liberal ministry (1822); War Minister (1840-42, 1854); deputy to the Cortes (1854-57).—285, 440-42, 447, 458, 657, 658
San Roman—Spanish general, Deputy War Minister in 1853-54. —293
Santa Coloma, Dalmacio de Queralt, conde de (d. 1640)—Spanish statesman, captain general of Catalonia; killed during the popular uprising in Barcelona.—392
Santa Cruz y Pacheco, Francisco, marqués de (1802-1883)—Spanish politician, Minister of the Interior (1854-55) and Minister of Finance (1856).—345, 351, 373, 375, 448
Sartorius—see San Luis, Luis José Sartorius
Satorres—Spanish journalist.—345
Saunders, Romulus Mitchell (1791-1867)—American politician and diplomat, ambassador to Spain (1846-49).—457
Scarlett, Sir James Yorke (1799-1871)—British general, commanded the cavalry brigade (1854-beginning of 1855), later the British cavalry in the Crimea (1855-56).—525
Schilder, Karl Andreyevich (1785-1854)—Russian general, military engineer and inventor; directed fortification works on the Danube during the wars against Turkey (1828-29, 1854).—5, 68, 240, 245, 247, 278, 337
Sébastiani, Horace François Bastien, comte (1772-1851)—Marshal of France, diplomat, Orleánsit; Minister of Foreign Affairs (1830-32), ambassador to Constantinople (1806-07) and to London (1855-40).—481
Selim Pasha—Turkish general, commanded a corps in the Caucasus in 1853-54.—251
Selvan (d. 1854)—Russian general, commanded the Russian forces on the Danube in 1854.—243
Seoane, Juan Antonio—Spanish general, supported Espartero’s dictatorship; sided with the Moderados after 1843.—343
Serrano y Domínguez, Francisco, conde de San Antonio, duque de la Torre (1810-1885)—Spanish general and statesman, Minister of War (1843); in 1854 sided with the insurgents, subsequently became a reactionary and in 1856 participated in the coup d’état.—293, 310, 314, 370
Sevillano, Sijora Juan, marqués de Fuentes de Duero—Spanish politician, follower of Narváez.—285
Seymour, George Hamilton (1797-1880)—British diplomat; envoy to St. Petersburg (1851-54).—3, 21-23, 39, 76-80, 84-95, 97, 99, 139, 140, 177, 185, 623
Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of (1801-1885)—British politician, head of parliamentary group of the Tory philanthropists in the 1840s: from 1847 a Whig.—71
Shakespeare, William (1564-1616)—English dramatist and poet.—26, 86, 132, 213, 302, 561, 591, 632
Shamyl (c. 1798-1871)—leader of the mountaineers of Daghestan and Chechnya in the struggle against the Tsarist colonisers in the 1830s-50s.—204, 255, 315, 463
Shaw, John—a Chartist leader in the 1850s, member of the Executive of the National Charter Association.—51
Shaw-Lefèvre, Charles, Viscount Eversley (1794-1888)—British politician, M.P., Speaker of the House of Commons (1839-57), supported the Whig government.—11
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley Butler (1751-1816)—English dramatist and politician.—346
Shoesmith—participant in the democratic movement in England in the 1850s.—356
Sidney—Lord Mayor of London in 1854.—479, 488
Sievers, Vladimir Karlovich, Count (1790-1862)—Russian general, commanded the Russian forces in the Baltic provinces in 1854-55.—611, 618
Sismondi, Jean Charles Léonard Simon de (1773-1842)—Swiss economist, representative of economic romanticism.—405, 628
Smith, Adam (1723-1790)—Scottish classical economist.—600
Smith, Robert Vernon, Baron Lyveden (1800-1885)—English statesman, Whig, Secretary at War (1852), President of the Board of Control (1855-58).—616
Smitt, Fyodor Ivanovich (c. 1787-1865)—Russian military historian.—123, 124
Sobieski, John (Jan) (1624-1696)—King of Poland (1674-96); in 1683 commanded the Polish and Austro-German forces and defeated the Turkish army at Vienna.—227
Soimonoff (Soymonov), Fyodor Ivanovich (1800-1854)—Russian general, commanded the Russian forces on the Danube and in the Crimea during the Crimean war; was killed in the battle of Inkerman.—350
Sola, Juan Maria (d. 1819)—Spanish army officer, revolutionary; executed for participation in the Valencia uprising against the absolute power of Ferdinand VII.—445
Soledad, Francisco Benito de la—Spanish monk and writer in the first half of the eighteenth century, supporter of enlightened absolutism.—413
Soliman I (Suleiman) (the Magnificent) (1494-1566)—Turkish sultan (1520-66).—104
Soliman Pasha—minister plenipotentiary of the Turkish Government in Wallachia from July to September 1848.—273
Soliman Pasha—Turkish general, commanded the irregular forces on the Danube in 1854.—39
Soule, Pierre (1801-1870)—American lawyer and politician, minister to Madrid (1853-54); tried to get the Spanish Government to cede Cuba to the USA.—369, 457
Soul, Nicolas Jean de Dieu, duc de Dalmatie (1769-1851)—Marshal of France and statesman, commanded the French forces in Spain from 1808 to 1814; War Minister (1830-34, 1840-45) and Prime Minister (1832-34, 1839-40, 1840-47).—416, 651
Southey, Robert (1774-1843)—English poet and writer, Tory.—402, 408, 415, 417, 432
Stafford, Augustus O'Brien (1811-1857)—British M.P., Tory.—634
Stirbey, Barbu Demetrius Bibesco, Prince (1799-1869)—hospodar of Wallachia (1849-53, 1854-56), brother of George Bibesco.—289, 290, 324, 325
Stonor, Henry—British official, judge in the State of Victoria (Australia).—144
Stratford de Redcliffe, Stratford Canning, Viscount (1786-1880)—British diplomat, envoy. to Constantinople (1810-12, 1825-28, 1841-58).—14, 21-23, 32, 33, 35, 39, 65, 84, 97, 98, 144, 155, 156, 167, 274, 275, 358, 459, 485, 489
Sturdza, Michael (1795-1884)—hospodar of Moldavia (1834-49).—272
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Thackeray, William Makepeace (1811-1863)—English writer.—664

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Thiers, Louis Adolphe (1797-1877)—French historian and statesman; Prime Minister (1836, 1840); deputy to the Constituent Assembly in 1848; head of the Orleanists after 1848; suppressed the Paris Commune (1871); President of the Republic (1871-73).—231

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Tolstoi, Yakov Nikolayevich (1791-1867)—Russian man of letters; emigrated to Paris in 1823; from 1837 correspondent of the Ministry of Public Education and secret agent of the 3rd Department (a political police department set up under Nicholas I).—123, 124

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Toreno, José María Queipo de Llano, conde de (1786-1843)—Spanish politician of liberal leanings and historian, participant in the revolutions of 1808-14 and 1820-23; deputy to the Cadiz Cortes, Minister of Finance (1834) and Prime Minister (1835); lived in emigration from 1814 to 1820, 1823 to 1833 and from 1835.—409, 415, 418

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Urquhart, David (1805-1877)—British diplomat, journalist and politician, Turkophile; went with diplomatic missions to Turkey in the 1830s; M.P. from 1847 to 1852, Tory.—101, 220, 228, 325, 359, 445, 489, 590

Urquijo, Mariano Luis, de (1768-1817)—Spanish writer and politician, made Minister of State by King Joseph Bonaparte; emigrated to France in 1813.—408
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an Halen, Antonio, conde de Peracamps (d. 1858)—Spanish general, member of the Progresista Party, participant in the war of independence (1808-14) and the revolutions of 1820-23 and 1834-43; was in emigration together with Espartero (1843-47).—343

Vasconcellos, Miguel de (d. 1640)—minister of Margaret of Savoy, vice-queen of Portugal; killed during a popular uprising against the Spanish rule.—391

Vauban, Sébastien Le Prêtre (Prestre) de (1633-1707)—Marshal of France, military engineer, author of a number of books on fortification and siege-works.—382, 514

Vedel, Dominique Honoré Marie Antoine, comte (1771-1848)—French general, capitulated with his division at Bailén during the war in Spain in 1808.—406

Victor Emmanuel (Vittorio Emanuele) II (1820-1878)—King of Piedmont (1849-61); King of Italy (1861-78).—8


Vidal, Joaquín (d. 1819)—Spanish army officer, liberal; headed an uprising in Valencia against the absolute power of Ferdinand VII in 1819; was executed after its defeat.—445

Villacampa, Pedro (1776-1845)—Spanish general, commanded a guerrilla detachment during the war of independence in Spain (1808-14); participant in the revolution of 1820-23; subsequently held command posts in the army.—423

Villal, marqués de—Spanish aristocrat, member of the Central Junta during the 1808-14 revolution in Spain.—417

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Vista Hermosa, Ángel García Loygorri y García de Fejada, conde de (d. 1887)—Spanish general, commanded government contingents which attempted to squash the revolution in Spain in 1854, was defeated and fled the country.—284, 293

Vlad V (Vlad Tepe§)—hospodar of Wallachia (1456-62, 1476-79, according to some sources 1474-76).—271

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Walker, Sir Baldwin Wake (1802-1876)—British admiral, Surveyor of the Navy (1848-60).—330

Walpole, Spencer Horatio (Horace) (1806-1898)—British statesman, Tory, Home Secretary (1852, 1858-59, 1866-67).—635

Walsh, Sir John Benn, Lord Ormathwaite (1798-1881)—British politician and journalist; Tory, subsequently Conservative, M.P.—31

Wellesley, Richard Colley, Marquis (1760-1842)—British statesman, Governor-General of India (1797-1805), ambassador to Spain (1809), Foreign Sec-
retary (1809-12), Lord Lieutenant of Ireland (1821-28, 1833-34).—419, 570, 653

Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of (1769-1852)—British soldier and statesman, Tory; commanded the British forces in the wars against Napoleon I from 1808 to 1814 and in 1815; commander-in-chief (1827-28, 1842-52); Prime Minister (1828-30); Foreign Secretary (1834-35).—75, 79, 134, 135, 208, 209, 212, 215, 234, 262, 327, 337, 344, 417, 419, 474, 569, 570, 653

Wendtland—private secretary of King Otto I of Greece in 1854.—301

Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of (1784-1859)—British diplomat, envoy to Berlin (1841-51) and to Vienna (1851-55).—357, 554, 602

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William I (1797-1888)—Prince of Prussia, King of Prussia (1861-88) and Emperor of Germany (1871-88).—9

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William IV (1765-1837)—King of Great Britain and Ireland (1830-37).—208

Williams, James—Chartist in the 1850s.—50, 64

Wilson, James (1805-1860)—British economist and politician, Free Trader, founder and editor of The Economist; Secretary to the Treasury (1853-58).—333, 466, 490, 576

Wilson-Patten, John, Baron Winmarleigh (1802-1892)—British politician, Tory, subsequently Conservative, M.P.—591

Wood, Sir Charles, Viscount Halifax (1800-1885)—English statesman, Whig, Chancellor of the Exchequer (1846-52); President of the Board of Control for India (1852-55); First Lord of the Admiralty (1855-58).—622, 639

Woronoff (Vorontsov), Mikhail Semyonovich, Prince (1782-1856)—Russian statesman, field marshal general; commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in the Caucasus and Governor of the Caucasus (1844-March 1854).—252, 254, 255, 258, 327, 328, 331

Wyse, Sir Thomas (1791-1862)—British diplomat, envoy to Athens (1849-62).—39, 177, 304

Wysoki, Józef (1809-1873)—Polish politician, general and military writer, participant in the insurrections of 1830-31 and 1863-64 in Poland and the 1848-49 revolution in Hungary; tried to form a Polish Legion to fight against Russia during the Crimean war.—167

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Zabala y de la Puente, Juan de (1804-1879)—Spanish general, belonged to the Moderado Party, participant in the revolution of 1854-56.—311, 313

Zamoiski (Zamoyski), Ladislas (Władysław), Count (1803-1868)—Polish magnate, participated in the 1830-31 insurrection, leader of Polish conservative-monarchist emigrants in Paris after its suppression; tried to form a Polish Legion to fight against Russia during the Crimean war.—167

Zurbano, Martín (1788-1845)—Spanish general, a guerrilla leader during the war of independence (1808-14), executed for an attempt to proclaim the Constitution of 1837.—342, 343
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Cassandra (Gr. Myth.)—daughter of Priam, king of Troy (Homer’s Iliad), a prophetess whose prophecies nobody believed though they always came true; a character in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida.—86

Cerberus (Gr. Myth.)—the three-headed dog guarding the entrance to the lower world.—27

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Floripes—a character from Calderón’s La puente de Mantible.—411

Hercules (Heracles) (Gr. and Rom. Myth.)—son of Zeus.—355, 561, 562

Jacques le Bonhomme (Jack the Simpleton)—ironic nickname of the French peasant.—498

John Bull—the title character in John Arbuthnot’s The History of John Bull (1712); his name is used to personify England.—498, 567, 625, 631, 636

Mars (Rom. Myth.)—god of war.—341

Martine—wife of Sganarelle in Molière’s Le Médecin malgré lui.—418

Nestor—a character in Homer’s Iliad, the oldest and wisest hero in the Trojan war; a character in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida.—302

Noah (Bib.)—a patriarch; said to have built an ark in which he and his family were saved from the Deluge.—355

Pandora (Gr. Myth.)—a woman who, out of curiosity, opened a box which contained all human evils and let them out.—135

Pantalone (Ital. Pantalone)—a character in the old Italian popular comedy; said to represent a rich and foolish old Venetian merchant.—192

Rodomonte—a character in Ariosto’s L’Orlando furioso, a boastful knight.—326, 481

Sancho Panza—a character in Cervantes’ Don Quixote.—457

Sibyls—women in antiquity believed to possess prophetic power. The best known was Sibyl from the Italian town of Cumae.—333

Sindbad the Sailor—a hero in the Arabian Thousand and One Nights.—340

Snug—a character in Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream.—26

Squeers, Wackford—a character in Dickens’ The Life and Adventures of Nicholas Nickleby.—307

Tantalus (Gr. Myth.)—King of Lydia, was condemned to eternal torture in the lower world for insult of the gods.—568

Thersites—a character in Homer’s Iliad, a Greek warrior in the Trojan war; personification of querulousness and abusiveness in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida.—602

Tom Thumb—a very small boy in a fairy tale.—591

Ulysses (or Odysseus)—a character in Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey; king of Ithaca, noted for his eloquence, sagacity and prudence; a character in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida.—302, 602
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El Clamor Público—a Progresista Party daily newspaper published in Madrid from 1844 to 1864.—285, 370, 371, 448

Le Constitutionnel—a daily newspaper published in Paris from 1815 to 1870; during the 1848 revolution it voiced the views of the monarchist bourgeoisie (the Thiers party), after the 1851 coup d'état those of the Bonapartists.—462

Il Corriere Italiano—an Austrian government newspaper published in Vienna from 1850 to 1857.—268
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The Daily News—a liberal daily of the British industrial bourgeoisie published in London from 1846 to 1930.—123, 144, 220, 465, 561-63, 580, 636

El Diario Español—a daily published in Madrid from 1852 to 1870; in the mid-1850s it was a Liberal Union newspaper.—285, 371

Düsseldorfer Zeitung—a daily published from 1826 to 1926; in the 1840s and 1850s it voiced liberal views.—362

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Examiner and Times—a liberal newspaper founded in 1848 as a result of a merger of the Manchester Times and the Manchester Examiner; in the 1840s and 1850s it supported the Free Traders; appeared under various titles till 1894.—576

Frankfurter Journal—a daily published in Frankfurt am Main from the seventeenth century to 1903; in the 1840s and 1850s it voiced liberal views.—489

Frankfurter Postzeitung—a newspaper published in Frankfurt am Main from 1619 to 1866, appeared under this title from 1852; in the 1850s it was the mouthpiece of the Federal Diet.—287


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La Gazette du Midi—a royalist daily published in Marseilles from 1830 onwards.—360

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The Globe and Traveller—a daily published in London from 1803 to 1921; up to 1866 a Whig newspaper, subsequently a Conservative.—223, 228, 288, 332, 599
*El Guardia Nacional*—a newspaper published in Madrid in 1854.—371

*El Guirigay*—a satirical newspaper close to the Progresista Party, published in Madrid in 1839.—370

*Hamburger Correspondent*—see *Staats und Gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen unparteiischen Correspondenten*

*Hannoversche Zeitung*—a Hanover government daily newspaper founded in 1832.—168

*Herald*—see *The Morning Herald*

*El Heraldo*—a daily evening Moderado Party newspaper published in Madrid from 1842 to 1854.—371

*La Iberia*, subsequently *La Nueva Iberia*—a daily newspaper published in Madrid from 1854 to 1870, voicing the views of the Progresista Party.—371


*La Independencia*—a newspaper published in Madrid in 1854.—371

*Journal de Constantinople*—a French-language Turkish newspaper published from 1848; subsidised by the Turkish Government it was at the same time a vehicle of French influence; came out six times a month.—32, 155, 459

*Journal de Progrès*—a newspaper published in Lisbon in 1854.—375

*Journal de Saint-Pétersbourg*—a newspaper of the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, published in Petersburg from 1825 to 1914.—73, 93, 99, 171, 175, 218, 224

*Journal des Débats politiques et littéraires*—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1944; after the 1851 coup d'état, it was a newspaper of the moderate Orleanist opposition.—268, 287-88, 303-05, 312, 314, 360, 372, 456

*Kölnische Zeitung*—a daily published in Cologne from 1802 to 1945; in 1848 and 1849 it expressed anti-revolutionary views and fought the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*; in the 1850s it voiced the interests of the Prussian liberal bourgeoisie.—286, 364, 457

*The Leader*—a liberal weekly founded in London in 1850.—307, 583

*El Liberal*—a democratic daily published in Madrid in 1854 and distributed gratis.—371

*Der Lloyd*—an Austrian conservative newspaper published in Vienna from December 1848 to 1854.—166, 287-88, 309

*Lloyd's Weekly London Newspaper*—a liberal newspaper founded in 1842; published under this title from 1843 to 1918.—591

*The London Gazette*—a British government newspaper published twice a week since 1666.—100, 161, 485, 577, 581, 601

*Manchester Examiner*—see *Examiner and Times*

*The Manchester Guardian*—a daily newspaper of the Free Traders, founded in
Manchester in 1821, from the mid-nineteenth century a Liberal Party newspaper.—225

*The Mark Lane Express*—an agricultural newspaper published in London from 1832 to 1924.—162, 225, 230

*El Mensajero*—a daily published in Madrid in 1853 and 1854.—371

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*El Miliciano*—a democratic daily published in Madrid in 1854.—371

*Le Moniteur de l'Armée*—a French War Ministry newspaper published in Paris from 1840 to 1883.—350

*Le Moniteur universel*—a daily published in Paris from 1789 to 1901; from 1799 to 1869 it was an official government newspaper; it appeared under this title from 1811.—3, 30-31, 100, 166, 167, 172, 174, 202, 204, 216, 222, 232, 267, 268, 280, 285, 291-93, 295, 298, 303, 311-14, 333, 351-53, 357, 387, 405, 449, 451, 458, 461, 480, 482, 491, 507, 536, 543, 544

*The Morning Advertiser*—a daily published in London from 1794 to 1934; in the 1850s it was a newspaper of the radical bourgeoisie.—53, 189, 223, 260, 299, 308, 580, 590-91, 615

*The Morning Chronicle*—a daily published in London from 1770 to 1862; in the 1840s the newspaper of the Whigs, in the early 1850s of the Peelites and then of the Conservatives.—216, 220, 222, 224, 229, 247, 267, 268, 293, 295, 302, 351, 561, 563, 579, 599

*The Morning Herald*—a conservative daily published in London from 1780 to 1869.—220, 226, 259, 307, 361, 528, 561, 637

*The Morning Post*—a daily published in London from 1772 to 1937; in the mid-nineteenth century it was the paper of the Right-wing Whigs supporting Palmerston.—28, 120, 144, 161, 162, 166, 228, 229, 325, 362, 554, 561, 562, 579-82, 636, 646

*La Nación*—a daily published in Madrid from 1849 to 1856 and voicing the views of the Progresista Party.—285, 371

*Le National*—a daily published in Paris from 1830 to 1851; in the 1840s it was a moderate republican newspaper.—313

*National-Zeitung*—a daily published in Berlin from 1848 to 1915; in the 1850s it expressed liberal views.—182

*Neue Oder-Zeitung*—a German democratic daily published in Breslau (Wroclaw) from 1849 to 1855. In the 1850s it was the most radical newspaper in Germany and was persecuted by the government. In 1855 Marx was its London correspondent.—559, 563, 569, 578, 584, 592, 595, 599, 602, 604, 606, 619, 630, 641, 644, 651

*Neue Preußische Zeitung*—a conservative daily published in Berlin from June 1848 to 1939; a newspaper of Prussian junkers and Court circles, it was also called *Kreuz-Zeitung* because the heading contained a cross and the slogan "Forward with God for King and Fatherland".—302, 368

*Neue Rheinische Zeitung, Organ der Demokratie*—a daily newspaper of the German revolutionary-proletarian democrats during the 1848-49 German revolution; it was published in Cologne under Marx's editorship from June 1, 1848 to May 19,
1849 with an interval between September 27 and October 12, 1848; Engels was also one of the editors.—331


*The Northern Ensign*—a Scottish liberal weekly published in Wick from 1850 to 1925.—197

*Nouvelliste de Marseille*—a newspaper published in Marseilles in 1854.—177

*Las Novedades*—a daily published in Madrid between 1850 and 1872 with intervals and voicing the views of the Progresista Party.—371

*L'Observateur d'Athènes*—an official Greek government newspaper.—154

*The Observer*—a conservative weekly published in London from 1791.—302

*Oesterreichische Correspondenz*—a semi-official Austrian government lithographed newspaper published in Vienna from 1850 to 1863.—296, 301

*Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*—a military journal published in Vienna once or twice monthly from 1808 to 1870 (with intervals).—420

*Oesterreichischer Soldatenfreund*—a military newspaper published in Vienna two or three times weekly from 1848 to 1854.—287

*Ost-Deutsche Post*—an Austrian moderate liberal daily published in Vienna from 1848 to 1866.—268

*Le Pays. Journal de L'Empire*—a daily founded in Paris in 1849; from 1852 to 1870 it was a semi-official newspaper of Napoleon III's Government.—574

*The People's Paper*—a Chartist weekly, founded in London in May 1852 by Ernest Jones and published from 1852 to 1858; from October 1852 to December 1856 Marx and Engels contributed to it and also helped to edit it. Apart from articles written by Marx and Engels specially for *The People's Paper* it also reprinted some of their articles published in the *New-York Daily Tribune*.—60, 69, 120, 122, 207, 354, 356

*The Press*—a Tory weekly published in London from 1853 to 1866.—133, 142, 554
Die Presse—a liberal daily published in Vienna from 1848 to 1896.—178, 268, 361
La Presse—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1866; in the 1850s it was in opposition to the regime of the Second Empire, later—a Bonapartist newspaper.—175, 463
Preussische Lithographische Correspondenz—a semi-official daily newspaper of the Prussian Cabinet published in Berlin from 1849 to 1865.—159
Punch, or the London Charivari—a humoristic liberal weekly founded in London in 1841.—370, 601

Русский инвалид (Russian Invalid)—a military newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1813 to 1917. Initially the revenue from it was intended for the relief to war victims; from 1862 it was a War Ministry official newspaper.—536

Северная пчела (Northern Bee)—a semi-official government political and literary newspaper published in St. Petersburg from 1825 to 1864.—224

Le Siècle—a daily published in Paris from 1836 to 1939; in the 1850s it was a newspaper of moderate republicans.—289, 377
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