published on occasion of the 175th Birthday

of Vyacheslav Molotov


July 1947


Enver Hoxha



(collection of quotations - arranged by Wolfgang Eggers)


"Revisionism is

the idea and action which leads the turning of a country from socialism back to capitalism, the turning of a communist party into a fascist party, it is the inspirer of ideological chaos, confusion, corruption, repression, arbitrarily, instability and putting the homeland up for auction."

"Thus, after this forlorn attempt, these former co-fighters of Stalin's, who had associated themselves with the slanders made against his glorious work, were described as an «anti-party group» and received the final blow from the Khrushchevites. No one wept over them, no one pitied them. They had lost the revolutionary spirit, were no longer Marxist-Leninists, but corpses of Bolshevism. They had united with Khrushchev and allowed mud to be thrown at Stalin and his work"

(Enver Hoxha - "The Krushchevites")




Quotation from

"The Krushchevites"

One day after Stalin's death on March 6, 1953, the Central Committee of the party, the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were summoned to an urgent joint meeting. On occasions of great losses, such as the death of Stalin, urgent meetings are necessary and indispensable. However, the many important changes which were announced in the press one day later, showed that this urgent meeting had been held for no other reason but... the sharing out of posts! Stalin had only just died, his body had not yet been placed in the hall where the final homage was to be paid, the program for the organization of paying homage and the funeral ceremony was still not worked out, the Soviet communists and the Soviet people were weeping over their great loss, while the top Soviet leadership found the time to share out the portfolios! Malenkov became premier, Beria became first deputy premier and minister of internal affairs, and Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov shared the other posts. Major changes were made in all the top organs in the party and the state within that day. The Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party were merged into a single organ, new secretaries of the Central Committee of the party were elected, a number of ministries were amalgamated or united, changes were made in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, etc.



* * *

The lack of unity in the Presidium of the Central Committee was made quite obvious at Stalin's funeral, too, when there was strife among the members over who would take pride of place and who would speak first. Instead of displaying unity at a time of misfortune before the peoples of the Soviet Union and all the communists of the world, who were deeply shocked and immensely grieved by the sudden death of Stalin, the «comrades» were competing for the limelight. Khrushchev opened the funeral ceremony, and Malenkov, Beria and Molotov spoke before Lenin Mausoleum. The conspirators behaved hypocritically over Stalin's coffin and rushed to get the funeral ceremony over as quickly as possible in order to shut themselves up in the Kremlin again to continue the process of the division and redivision of the posts.

We, and many like us, thought that Molotov, Stalin's closest collaborator, the oldest and the most mature bolshevik, with the greatest experience and best known inside and outside the Soviet Union, would be elected first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But it did not turn out so. Malenkov was placed at the head, with Beria in second place. Behind them in those days, a little more in the shade, stood a «panther» which was preparing itself to gobble up and liquidate the former two. This was Nikita Khrushchev.



* * *

Such actions did not please us at all, although they were not our responsibility. We were disillusioned in our opinions about the stability of the top Soviet leadership, but we explained this with our being totally uninformed about the situation developing in the party and the leadership of the Soviet Union. In the contacts which I had had with Stalin himself, with Malenkov, Molotov, Khrushchev, Beria, Mikoyan, Suslov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, and other main leaders, I had not seen even the smallest division or discord amongst them.



* * *

At the 19th Congress Malenkov delivered the report on behalf of the Central Committee of the party. He was one of the relatively new cadres who came into the leadership and who were liquidated later by the disguised revisionist Khrushchev and his associates. But now he was at the head of the table, holding the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Beside him stood Beria, with his eyes glittering behind glasses and his hands never still. After him came Molotov, quiet, good-looking, one of the most serious and most honoured comrades for us, because he was an old bolshevik from the time of Lenin and a close comrade of Stalin's. We still thought of Molotov in this way even after Stalin's death.



* * *


Molotov was leaning on the table. He said something about Albania's relations with its neighbours, but he never raised his eyes. Malenkov and Beria seemed to be the two «cocks of the walk», while Mikoyan who was cold and bitter, did not say much, but when he did speak, it was only to make some vicious and venomous remark. From the way they spoke, the way they interrupted one another, the arrogant tone in which they gave *,advice», the signs of discord among them were quite clear.



* * *

From this meeting I observed also that there was no unity in the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union : Malenkov and Beria were predominant, Molotov hardly spoke, Mikoyan seemed to be on the outer and spouted venom, while what Bulganin said was bullshit.



* * *

[Enver Hoxha quotes Suslow:]

«A number of mistakes have been made, but they must be examined carefully,» said Suslov, and started to list a series of -arguments» to convince me that the Yugoslav leaders were allegedly not on a wrong road. Naturally he also tried to lay the blame on Beria and Djilas and the efforts of imperialism -to attach Yugoslavia to itself ».

«Molotov, too, has maintained a very sectarian stand on this problem,» continued Suslov. «He personally made mistakes in state relations with Yugoslavia while insisting that it was the Yugoslav comrades that made the mistakes. However, the Central Committee demanded that Molotov proved where the Yugoslavs had been wrong, and we criticized him severely for his stand. Finally he, too, expressed his solidarity with the Central Committee».

("The Krushchevites", 4. THE TOUCH-STONE)

* * *


Khrushchev and Mikoyan began to liquidate, one by one, and finally all together, those members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party whom they were to describe as an «anti-party group». After they brought down Malenkov, replacing him temporarily with Bulganin; Molotov's turn came. This took place on June 2, 1956. That day the newspaper «Pravda» carried a huge photograph of Tito on the front page and the dobro pozhalovat!* *( welcome (Russian in the original).) to the head of the Belgrade clique arriving in Moscow, and page four ended a report of daily events with the «news» about the removal of Molotov from the post of foreign minister of the Soviet Union. The report said that Molotov had been released from this position «at his own request», but in fact he was released because this was a condition laid down by Tito for his coming to the Soviet Union for the first time since the breaking off of relations in 1948-1949. And Khrushchev and company immediately fulfilled the condition set by Belgrade for Tito's satisfaction, since Molotov, together with Stalin, had signed the letters which the Soviet leadership had sent the Yugoslav leadership in 1948.

The positions of the revisionist reactionaries were becoming stronger and their opponents in the Presidium, Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov and others, now began to see more clearly the revisionist intrigue and the diabolical plans which Khrushchev hatched up against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat. At a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the party in the Kremlin, in the swnmer of 1957, after many criticisms, Khrushchev was left in the minority, and, as Polyansky told us from his own mouth, Khrushchev was dismissed from the task of the first secretary and was appointed minister of agriculture, since he was an «expert on kukuruza»*. *(maize (Russian in the original) However, this situation did not last more than a few hours. Khrushchev and his supporters secretly gave the alarm, the marshals surrounded the Kremlin with tanks and soldiers and gave orders that not even a fly was to leave the Kremlin. On the other hand, aircraft were sent to the four corners of the Soviet Union to gather up the members of the Plenum of the CC of the CPSU. «Then,» said Polyansky, this product of Khrushchev, «we entered the Kremlin and demanded admission to the meeting. Voroshilov came out and asked what we wanted. When we told him that we wanted to enter the meeting, he cut us short. When we threatened to use force he said: 'What does all this mean?' But we warned him: 'Mind your words, otherwise we shall arrest you.' We entered the meeting and changed the situation.» Khrushchev was restored to power.

Thus, after this forlorn attempt, these former co-fighters of Stalin's, who had associated themselves with the slanders made against his glorious work, were described as an «anti-party group» and received the final blow from the Khrushchevites. No one wept over them, no one pitied them. They had lost the revolutionary spirit, were no longer Marxist-Leninists, but corpses of Bolshevism. They had united with Khrushchev and allowed mud to be thrown at Stalin and his work; they tried to do something, but not on the party road, because for them, too, the party did not exist.


* * *


In April 1957, when the «anti-party group» of Malenkov, Molotov, etc., had still not been liquidated, I was in Moscow with a delegation of our Party and Government. After a non-official dinner in the Kremlin, in Yekaterinsky Zal, we sat down in a corner to take coffee with Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Bulganin, etc. In the course of the conversation Molotov turned to me and, as if joking, said:

«Tomorrow Mikoyan is going to Vienna, to try to cook up the ,same broth as he did in Budapest.»

To keep the conversation going I asked him:

«Did Mikoyan prepare that broth?»

«Who else?» said Molotov.

«Then Mikoyan can't go back to Budapest again,» I said.

«If Mikoyan goes there again, they will hang him,» Molotov continued.

Khrushchev had dropped his eyes and was stirring his coffee. Mikoyan frowned, ground his teeth and then said with a cynical smile

«Why should I not go to Budapest? If they hang me, they will hang Kadar, too, because we prepared that broth together.»

The role of the Khrushchevites in the Hungarian tragedy was clear to me.

("The Krushchevites", 9. THE «DEMONS» ESCAPE FROM CONTROL)


* * *

The Soviets were worried and frightened about the events in Poland, because they saw that the «new course», which they themselves proclaimed, was taking the Polish leaders further than they desired and that Poland was in danger of escaping from their influence. During the days in which the plenum, that was to restore Gomulka to power, was held, Khrushchev, Molotov , Kaganovich and Mikoyan went urgently to Poland. At the airport Khrushchev shouted angrily at the Polish leaders: «We have shed our blood to liberate this country, while you want to give it to the Americans.» The concern of the Russians was increased, because the Soviet Marshal Rokossowsky, who was of Polish origin, and other members of the Political Bureau who were considered pro-Soviet, like Minc, etc., were being squeezed out and in fact they were expelled from the Political Bureau. However, the Poles did not submit either to the pressure of the Soviet leaders or to the movement of Russian tanks; they did not even invite them to the plenum. Talks were held, at which Gomulka was present, but nevertheless for the time being Khrushchev and company were left biting their fingers. Pressure was exerted, an article was published in «Pravda» to which the Poles gave an arrogant reply, but, in the end, Khrushchev gave Gomulka his blessing and, after he made a «pilgrimage» to Moscow, Gomulka received credits and spoke about the Soviet-Polish «Leninist friendship».

("The Krushchevites", 9. THE «DEMONS» ESCAPE FROM CONTROL)


* * *

Among many others I remember that Molotov, too, proposed a toast:

"I belong to that category of people who have not given much importance to Albania and have not become acquainted with it,» he said. «Now our people are proud that they have such a loyal, resolute and militant friend. The Soviet Union has many friends, but they are not all the lame. Albania is our best friend. Let us drink this toast wishing that the Soviet Union will have friends as loyal as Albania !"

("The Krushchevites", 9. THE «DEMONS» ESCAPE FROM CONTROL)


* * *


The 20th Congress elected Brezhnev an alternate member of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and about a year later, the Plenum of June 1957 of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which condemned and purged «the anti-party Molotov-Malenkov group», promoted Brezhnev from alternate to full membership of the Presidium. Apparently he was rewarded for the «merits» which he must have displayed in the elimination of Molotov, Malenkov and others from the leadership of the party.

("The Krushchevites", 9. THE «DEMONS» ESCAPE FROM CONTROL)


* * *

Replying to our complaint that we had not been informed about the development of events in Hungary, Suslov said that the events took place without warning and there was no time for consultations.

«No consultations were held with the other parties, either. Only when we intervened for the second time we consulted the Chinese, while Khrushchev, Malenkov and Molotov went to Rumania and Czechoslovakia,» he said.

«How was time found to consult Tito over the appointment of Kadar, while we were not informed about anything?» I asked.

«We did not consult Tito about Kadar,» he said. "We simply told him that there was no longer any place for Nagy's government.»

«These are issues of principle,» I stressed. «It is essential to hold consultations, but they are not being held. The Consultative Political Council of the Warsaw Treaty, for example, has not met for a year.»

("The Krushchevites", 9. THE «DEMONS» ESCAPE FROM CONTROL)



* * *




Quotations from

"With Stalin"

The ground was prepared for the destruction of socialism in the Soviet Union, for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the establishment of a state of the «entire people» which in fact would be nothing but a dictatorial state of the fascist type, as it is now.

All this villainy emerged soon after the death, or to be more precise, after the murder of Stalin. I say after the murder of Stalin, because Mikoyan himself told me and Comrade Mehmet Shehu that they, together with Khrushchev and their associates. had decided to carry out a «pokushenie», i. e., to make an attempt on Stalin’s life, but later, as Mikoyan told us, they gave up this plan. It is a known fact that the Khrushchevites could hardly wait for Stalin to die. The circumstances of his death are not clear.

[At Red Square, on the May-Day-celebrations in 1953, it is said that Beria allegedly confessed confidentially to Molotov: "I've done it! I have saved all of you! " - remark W. Eggers ]

You never find in Stalin’s actions such Mafia-like methods as you find in the actions of the Soviet revisionist chiefs.

It is the Khrushchevites who, in conspiratorial and mysterious ways, «tried» and condemned not only the Soviet revolutionaries but also many persons from other countries. In my notes I have written of a meeting with the Soviet leaders, at which Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and some others were present. As Mikoyan was to go to Austria, Molotov turned to him and said half- jokingly: «Be careful not to make a ’mess’ in Austria, as you did in Hungary». I immediately asked Molotov: «Why, was it Mikoyan who made the ’mess’ in Hungary?» He replied: «Yes», and went on to say, «if Mikoyan goes back there again, they will hang him». Mikoyan, this covert anti-Marxist cosmopolitan answered: «If they hang me, they will hang Kadar, too». But even if those two were hanged, intrigues and villainy still remain immoral.

(page 34)

* * *

Stalin had said to them that they would "sell out the Soviet Union to imperialism". And this is what happened in fact. What he said has proved true.

(page 37)

* * *

Although Comrade Stalin must undoubtedly have been informed by Comrades Molotov, Vyshinsky and others, I mentioned the savage and despicable stands of the British and American imperialists towards Albania, stressing the brutal, unscrupulous and hostile stands they maintained towards us at the Paris Conference. I emphasized also that the situation between us and the Anglo- Americans had not altered in the least, that we considered their stand a constant threat.

(page 68)

* * *

With Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov we talked in detail about the problems of the reconstruction of our country ravaged by the war and the construction of the new Albania.

(page 73 - 74)

* * *

Stalin and Enver Hoxha, Moscow, July 1947

( airbrushed out Beria and Molotov )

A few days after our arrival in Moscow, together with Comrade Stalin and other leaders of the Party and Soviet state I attended an all-Soviet physical-culture display at the Central Stadium of Moscow. With what keen interest Stalin watched this activity! For over two hours he followed the activities of the participants with rapt attention, and although it began to rain near the end of the display and Molotov entreated him several times to leave the stadium, he continued to watch the activities attentively to the end, to make jokes, to wave his hand.

(page 78 - 79)

Stalin Enver

at the central stadium, July 1947

* * *

Now and then he turned to Molotov and Mikoyan and sought their opinion.

(page 82)

* * *


Raising his glass time and again, Molotov urged me to drink more and, when he saw that I was not fulfilling his desire, asked:

«Why so little?! Last night you drank more!»

«Ah, last night! Last night was another matter,» I said, laughing.

Then Molotov turned to Comrade Stalin:

«Last night,» he said, «I dined with Comrade Enver at Vyshinsky’s.

[Note: later on, Stalin replaced Molotov from the post of foreign minister by Vyshinsky - W. Eggers]

The news reached us that yesterday, March 31, a son was born to Enver Hoxha in Tirana. In our rejoicing, we drank a bit more.»

«Congratulations!» said Stalin immediately, raising his glass to me: «Let us drink this to the health of your little son and your wife!»

I thanked Comrade Stalin wishing him good health and a long life for the good of the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet State, for the good of the revolution and Marxism-Leninism.

(page 123)

* * *

Sukhumi, in November 1949, he asked me when we could meet the representatives of the Greek Communist Party to clear up the disagreements of principle between us and the leaders of that party. We were agreed on January, and after the Greek comrades agreed to this, the meeting took place in the beginning of January 1950 in Moscow, in the Kremlin. From the Soviet side the meeting was attended by Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Malenkov and a number of functionaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. From our Party it was Comrade Mehmet Shehu and I, while from the Greek Communist Party Nicos Zachariades and Mitsos Partsalides. The meeting was held in Stalin’s office.

(page 163 - 164)

* * *

When we all were about to leave, Molotov intervened saying to Nicos Zachariades:

«I have something to say to you, Comrade Nicos. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has received a letter from a comrade of yours, in which he writes that ’Nicos Zachariades is an agent of the British’. It is not up to us to solve this question, but we cannot keep it a secret without informing you about its content, especially when accusations against a leading comrade of the Greek Communist Party are made in it. Here is the letter. What can you say about this?»

«I can explain this matter,» replied Nicos Zachariades, and said: «When the Soviet troops released us from the concentration camp, I reported to the Soviet command with a request to be sent to Athens as soon as possible, because my place was there. Those were decisive moments and I had to be in Greece. At that time, however, your command had no means to transport me. So I was obliged to go to the British command where I asked them to send me to my homeland. The British put me on an aircraft, and that is how I returned to Greece. This comrade considers my return home with the help of the British command as though I have become an agent of the British, which is untrue.»

Stalin intervened and said:

«That’s clear. This question is settled, too. The meeting is over!»

Stalin got up, shook hands with all of us in turn and we started to leave. The room was a long one and when we reached the exit door, Stalin called to us:

«Wait a moment, comrades! Embrace each other, Comrade Hoxha and Comrade Zachariades!»

(page 198 - 199)

* * *

The last meeting I had with Comrade Stalin took place in Moscow, in the evening of April 2, 1951, at 10.30 Moscow time. Molotov, Malenkov, Beria and Bulganin also took part in this meeting.

(page 201)





Quotes from

(Discussion at the meeting of the Politburo
of the Central Committee of the PLA
June 22, 1966)

Enver Hoxha, Volume 33, page 81

[translated by the Comintern (SH) from the Albanian original text]

There are some extremely symptomatic indications that underline the high vigilance of Stalin in the last phase of his life. Of course, we can only deduce this from the documents of the revisionists who keep the truth under wraps. Mikoyan, himself, told us that he and Khrushchev wanted to kill Stalin in the last few years before he died.
It was assumed that anarchist agents were preparing an assassination attempt. From this fact we derive our knowledge that Stalin had increased his vigilance. He was always prepared for possible murder plans, such as those of Mikoyan and Khrushchev.

He also criticized Molotov, Voroshilov and others. This means that Stalin was constantly on the alert.
Life confirmed that the doubts of Stalin were reasonable.
When Khrushchev held the power in his hands, Molotov and all the other comrades did not re-act like revolutionaries who defend the line of Stalin. They scare stiff in face of bureaucracy just like in face of a snake.

Once they fought so bravely and consistently against the Trotskyites, Zinoviev and against many other enemies, but - after aging - they did not fight any more against Khrushchev and his cohorts. This shows the loss of the once so revolutionary dynamics of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

* * *





Talks with Tschou En Lai


June 24, 1966

(Albanian text)




Ne mendojmë se ka pasur kontradikta, ka pasur
fërkime në udhëheqjen e Bashkimit Sovjetik dhe nuk
mund të pranojmë tezën absurde të hrushovianëve se
asnjë udhëheqës nuk mund të hapte gojën për të thënë mendimin e, tij, pse kishte frikë nga Stalini. Por, nga sa kemi marrë vesh, Stalini edhe Hrushovin e ka quajtur narodnik, edhe Voroshilovin e ka kritikuar, po kështu edhe Molotovin e të tjerë. Pra, nga një anë duhet të konkludojmë se Stalini nuk ishte miop politik, por, nga ana tjetër, nuk përdorte gjithmonë plumbin dhe terrorin, siç pretendojnë armiqtë, përkundrazi bindjen dhe rrahjen e mendimeve.


(Enver Hoxha, Volume 33, page 94)




Molotovi dhe shokët e tij ishin revolucionarë të vjetër, komunistë të ndershëm, por ishin përfaqësuesit tipikë të asaj rutine burokratike, të atij «legaliteti» burokratik dhe, kur ata deshën në mënyrë të zbehtë ta përdornin atë kundër komplotit evident të hrushovianëve, puna kishte marrë fund me kohë. Burokracia dhe «legaliteti» burokratik u përdorën nga tradhtarët, të cilët me këtë «legalitet» mbuluan komplotin e pallatit dhe manovruan nëpërmjet rrjetit të tyre gjithë shtresës së burokratëve me origjinë proletare dhe jo me origjinë kulake ose kapitaliste, feudale, për të marrë në dorë frenat e partisë dhe të organeve të pushtetit.


(Enver Hoxha, Volume 33, page 100)

* * *




"May the revolutionary storm burst forth powerful!"

- Zëri i Popullit, May 17, 1968 -

In the struggle for power revisionist cliques shall not fail to evaluate the traditions of the CPSU against the fractionists and deviators. Under this mask Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites prepared the terrain ideologically-politically and organizationally against Stalin and Leninism and then attacked the "Molotov-group" as enemy of the party. Then Khrushchev and his followers, themselves were disempowered.

But, today, still exist profound divergences in the Soviet leadership and the entire party in which active groups are fighting for supremacy. Those who come temporarily to the helm try to weaken and neutralize the other opposing groups. And if they become too dangerous they are eliminated by the label of a "party hostile group". The so-called party is currently the most important tool to deceive the masses of the Soviet Union who are accustomed to the tradition. Moreover, the cliques, which take the helm, base on the weapons of the former dictatorship of the proletariat, the forces of national security and the army.

* * *





The people and the army are clearly politically

- October 30, 1964

(Enver Hoxha, Volume 28, page 77)

(Albanian text)

Në kongreset e 20-të dhe të 22-të ka disa çështje që
duhen goditur, në mënyrë të veçantë si çështja e qëndrimit ndaj Stalinit që është kryesore, nga më kryesoret, është strumbullari. Hrushovi, njeriu që bëri gjithë ato poshtërsi e krime në BRSS dhe në lëvizjen komuniste ndërkombëtare, s'la gjë pa thënë edhe kundër Stalinit.
Por tani mendja e njerëzve punon, çdo njeri arsyeton
dhe thotë: Hrushovit, këtij njeriu të poshtër, që ka
bërë gjithë këto veprime revizioniste, që ka thënë gjithë ato gjëra kundër Stalinit, po i dalin qëllimet antimarksiste, prandaj gjersa është kështu, atëherë edhe ato që ai ka thënë kundër Stahnit nuk mund të jenë të drejta.
Pra, mendja e njerëzve punon dhe do të punojë, ky është një proces që do ca kohë.
Kur të vijë çështja, për shembull, që të publikohet
se ka qenë gabim hapja e tokave të reja, të tjerët do
të thonë: Atëherë, përse e rrëzuan Molotovin që ishte njeriu më i afërt i Stalinit, kur ai kundërshtoi qysh atëherë hapjen e këtyre tokave? Kjo do të thotë që ai kishte pasur të drejtë. Pra, mendimet e njerëzve do të ndjekin procesin e vet dialektik. Kjo nuk duhet harruar.
Bashkekzistenca paqësore duhet të zgjidhet vetëm
në bazë të parimeve leniniste. Këtë e thonë edhe revizionistët.
Por ne nuk gënjehemi nga demagogjia e tyre
mbi bashkekzistencën, por kundrejt armikut më të madh të komunizmit, imperializmit, mbajmë qëndrimin që na mëson marksizmi. Në marrëdhëniet me imperializmin
duhet të ndreqen qëndrimet thellësisht oportuniste të Hrushovit. Ai ishte një tradhtar, një agjent i borgjezisë, që i bëri lëshime serioze imperializmit amerikan. Këto lëshime janë bërë, prandaj duhen pranuar hapur nga udhëheqësit e sotëm revizionistë sovjetikë. Partia jonë i ka mirë parasysh këto gjëra, ka parasysh gjithashtu edhe të gjitha komplotet që ka organizuar Hrushovi me imperialistët kundër socializmit dhe paqes.


* * *




(Albanian text)



Fjala e mbylljes në Plenumin IV të përbashkët
të KQ të PPSH dhe të KQ të BRPSIII
26 shtator 1961


Grupi revizionist i Hrushovit ka goditur gjithashtu
edhe të gjithë udhëheqësit e vjetër sovjetikë që kishin mbetur pas Stalinit, si Molotovin me shokë. Që Hrushovi t'i kishte duart të lira duhej të pastroheshin këta nga rruga e tij. Në fillim ai thoshte se në Komitetin Qendror ka mjaft nuanca në pikëpamjet e udhëheqësve dhe kuptohet se atëherë ai pregatiste likuidimin e këtyre udhëheqësve. Nuk mendohej që këta shokë bolshevikë Me tradita dhe eksperiencë të madhe revolucionare dhe që gëzonin respektin dhe përkrahjen e gjithë partive dhe të popullit sovjetik, të tregoheshin kaq naivë ndaj veprimeve të N. Hrushovit, pavarësisht se ndonjëri mund të kishte bërë ndonjë gabim.


* * *





(Albanian text)

21 gusht 1946


Shqipëria u bë kështjellë e luftës për liri e demokraci. Lufta jonë çlirimtare u njoh shpejt edhe jashtë.
Në dhjetor 1942, zotërinjtë Iden, Hull dhe Mollotov i drejtonin përgëzime popullit shqiptar për rezistencën e tij që i siguronte indipendencën dhe që ndihmonte luftën e përbashkët.



* * *

(Albanian text)

10 mars 1946


Në gjithë botën përparimtare dhe antifashiste është bërë dallimi i kuislingëve nga
populli. Në Shqipërinë tonë ky dallim u bë që më 7 prill, u bë me armë dhe me luftë të pamëshirshme, të paprerë e pa kompromis. Greqisë nuk ja deklaroi luftën
populli shqiptar, por Italia fashiste dhe kuislingu Shefqet Vërlaci me shokët e tij. Se qysh e filloi dhe e mbaroi luftën e tij heroike populli shqiptar kundër Italisë fashiste, zoti Rendis dhe shokët e tij le të informohen më mirë, le të këqyrin më së afërmi përpjekjet e përgjakshme të popullit tonë, le të studjojnë më mirë deklaratat që kanë bërë ministrat e jashtëm të aleatëve të mëdhenj Mollotov, Hull dhe Iden, le të studjojnë deklaratat e oficerëve aleatë kur ndodheshin në vendin tonë gjatë kësaj lufte.
Se ç'përfaqësonin kuislingët në vendin tonë dhe ç'dënim u dha këtyre populli, pseudodemokrati Rendis, po të interesohet t'i mësojë, do t'i copëtohet zemra për fatin që pësuan këta tradhëtarë.


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July 1947

Molotov and Enver Hoxha



Enver Hoxha