

**REPORT TO THE PARTY ACTIVISTS IN TIRANA ON
THE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE 11th
PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ALBANIA**

October 4, 1948

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LETTERS OF THE BOLSHEVIK
PARTY ADDRESSED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF YUGOSLAVIA AND OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE INFORMATION BUREAU

Our whole Party knows about the letters of great historic importance sent by the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia¹. In them the Bolshevik Party draws the attention of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to a series of grave errors of principle they have committed, and censures them for these, advises them in a correct Marxist-Leninist way and indicates how to correct these dangerous errors speedily and radically.

Our entire Party also knows about the Resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia"². This resolution has been

¹ These letters were addressed to the CC of the CPY by the CC of the CP(B) of the Soviet Union on March 27, and May 4 and 22, 1948.

² The Resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Information Bureau, held in Bucharest in June 1948.

discussed by delegates of the Central Committee throughout the Party and in all the organizations of the Democratic Front, and was unanimously approved by all the communists and working people of our country, who expressed their total solidarity with the Bolshevik Party, our great teacher Stalin, the Information Bureau and the Declaration of the Central Committee of our Party³.

Our Central Committee explained extensively to the Party and the broad masses of our people the essence of the great treason of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, their anti-Albanian policy and the importance of the letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, for our Party and for the unity of the socialist camp. Our Central Committee also stressed to the Party and the broad masses of the people the historic importance of the Resolution of the Information Bureau.

The treacherous leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, headed by the nationalist clique of Tito, Kardelj, Rankovich, Gilas, and others, have adopted an anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet position, in opposition to the socialist camp. The Yugoslav leaders have revised Marxism-Leninism and are the true continuators of the opportunist and liquidationist theories of Bernstein, Volmar, Bukharin, and various Mensheviks and Trotskyites. They have taken over the theories of all these traitors to Marxism, demagogically trying to dress them up and to present them as a specific development of Marxism, in conformity with the new conditions created by the Second World War. Deviating from the Marxist-Leninist road, they

³ This refers to the communique of the CC of the CPA of July 1, 1948, which was approved at an extraordinary meeting of the plenum of the CC of the CPA, which studied the Resolution of the Information Bureau "On the Situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia".

have slipped into a position of bourgeois nationalism and unrestrained chauvinism, abandoning and opposing the internationalist traditions of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The nationalist clique of Tito and his cronies has pursued a policy of wild slanders against the Soviet Union, the first home of socialism, the leader of the socialist camp in the world. In slandering the Soviet Union, these traitors aimed to discredit the socialist system, and thus hold back the construction of socialism. At the same time, they tried to spread their views to the other people's democracies in order to ensure support for their treacherous activity, and to increase it further.

The nationalist Trotskyite⁴ clique of Tito has pursued a base and scheming policy towards the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, fabricating monstrous slanders in an underhand way, and proceeding from a right-wing Trotskyite position; they have used the same accusations and slanders which Trotsky used in his time, and against which Lenin and Stalin waged a determined fierce struggle.

The treacherous Belgrade clique has pursued a policy worthy of the imperialists towards the glorious Soviet Army, which played a major role in saving the world and Yugoslavia herself from the terrible slavery of German fascism, and created favourable conditions in Europe for the people's democracies to be set up and consolidated, and to develop along the road of socialist construction. The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, blinded by their nationalism, have tried to deny the liberating role of the Soviet army and have despised its military art.

⁴ The term "Trotskyite" was used at that time to define the revisionist stand of the Yugoslav revisionist leaders, and to qualify all sort of deviations from Marxism-Leninism, and not only the ideological followers of Trotsky.

In their megalomania and arrogance they have tried to claim that the military art of the Yugoslav army was at a much higher level than that of the army of the Soviet Union, claiming that they have "added something new to Marxism-Leninism" in this field. Such an anti-Soviet line was intended to create distrust among the people of Yugoslavia, in the Yugoslav Communist Party and army, towards the Soviet Union and her glorious army. The Anglo-American imperialists and all world reaction are doing the same thing.

These anti-Marxist views have placed the treacherous leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in opposition to the unity of the world socialist camp. They have tried by every means to weaken and destroy this unity, to weaken the socialist camp itself and the anti-imperialist and democratic front of the people in the world.

The leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, with Tito at the head, have allowed their party to adopt forms of organization and methods of work which aimed at and resulted in the elimination of inner party democracy, the suppression of criticism and self-criticism, the introduction of military methods of leadership into the party, the cult of hero-worship according to the Narodnik view, the introduction of a sense of fear into the party, keeping the party in illegality, and parallel with all this, the merger of the party with the Front and its transformation into a party of the bourgeoisie and kulaks. Pursuing an opportunist policy towards the capitalist elements, they have moderated the class struggle in the countryside, according to the Bukharinite theory that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, class struggle is not intensified, but dies down. The aim of all this treacherous activity is to make the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia degenerate into a republic of the bourgeois type, and

the Communist Party of Yugoslavia degenerate into a revisionist party.

The purpose of the letters of the Bolshevik Party addressed to the Central Committee of the CPY has been to make the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia break away from the road that led them to treason, condemn it once and for all, honestly acknowledge their very dangerous errors, and rectify them in the highest interests of their party and people, and in the interests of the socialist camp. The Belgrade Trotskyite traitors, far from acknowledging these undeniable mistakes, shamelessly rejected the criticism as slander on the part of the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin and the other parties, declaring dirty war on them, showing themselves up as avowed traitors to Marxism-Leninism and obedient lackeys of enslaving imperialism.

The treacherous leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, obstinately hostile and consistent in their work, maintain their anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet position in opposition to the socialist camp. Introducing police methods into the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, under the pressure and terror of the Ministry of State Security, they convened their 5th Congress⁵, violating the rules of a party of the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist type, and exercising open terror to break the will of the party and its sound elements, legalized their treason. The Belgrade clique has launched a campaign of unprecedented terror against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, it is mobilizing the nationalist and chauvinist elements around itself, attacking the sound elements within the party, and is trying to turn the people of Yugoslavia against the people's democracies and, in the first place, against the people of the Soviet

⁵ The 5th Congress of the CPY was convened on July 21, 1948.

Union, and the Bolshevik Party. It is resorting to large-scale demagogy to deceive the sound masses of the Yugoslav Communist Party and people who have a sincere and deep love for the Soviet Union, for the Bolshevik Party with comrade Stalin at the head, and for the other fraternal parties. It cunningly tries to conceal its great treachery. Through mistaken and hasty measures it is attempting to create among the people of Yugoslavia the impression that it is correcting its mistakes and following the Marxist-Leninist road. The measures taken by these avowed anti-Marxists only increase the danger and further deepen the abyss into which they are leading the party and the people of Yugoslavia, further deepen their hostility to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. From this nationalist position, the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will degenerate into a country dependent on the US and British imperialism.

The nationalist and anti-Marxist stand of the Yugoslav leadership represented a danger not only to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the people of Yugoslavia and their people's republic, but also to our Party and people, because very close economic and political ties were established between our two countries. The hostile activity of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia would have been reflected here and would undoubtedly have been imposed on our Party and people if our Party and its Central Committee had not vigilantly defended the purity of the party line, if they had not fought very fiercely against the hostile, liquidationist, opportunist, anti-Marxist, anti-Soviet and anti-Albanian tendencies of the Trotskyite leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

After the liberation of the country the situation in our Party, especially in its leadership, was really very

grave and difficult. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia created an extremely unhealthy atmosphere, an atmosphere of strife and distrust, in the ranks of our Central Committee, subjecting it to economic blackmail and causing it to make serious mistakes. The Party was saved from such a situation by its determined resistance to Yugoslav intervention, and by the light shed by the letters of the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union on the situation in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the activity of its leadership. The letters of the Bolshevik Party came at the most critical moment experienced by our Party. They made the grave situation existing in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia fully clear to the Central Committee of our Party, and helped it to discover the true causes of these serious errors, to see the source of the disease which was weakening the leadership of our Party and the Party itself. These historic letters will stand as an example of the principled and internationalist stand taken by the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin to help a fraternal party. They also helped our Party to take an important turning-point in its history, to save itself from the horrible abyss into which the anti-Marxist leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was trying to draw it. Our Party got rid of the dangerous plague with which the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had tried to infect it, it escaped from a nightmare and was able to breathe freely. The letters of the Bolshevik Party helped us to make this sound analysis of our work, to see our mistakes clearly and acknowledge them honestly, to correct them and learn from them, to strengthen our leadership and our Party, and to arm ourselves with a rich experience which will enable us to carry the Party always ahead, and to guard it against the internal and external foes who always try to harm it.

THE BERAT PLENUM AND ITS RESULTS

The Party and its leadership has analysed its work on a number of occasions, especially since the liberation of Albania. These analyses have been made with good intentions: to strengthen the Party and rectify certain mistakes that had been made and could have had dangerous consequences. During the time of existence of our Party, some leading comrades have committed grave errors, have tried to distort its correct line, have deviated from this correct line, and have been duly condemned.

It would be absurd and altogether unjust to say that, during the time of existence of our Party, no mistakes have been made by its leadership or by particular leaders. But the fact is that those mistakes, which were made because of the lack of experience of our men, because of the complications which arose throughout the war period, because of difficulties met in building the new Albania, because of the low ideological level of the rank-and-file party members and of some leaders, were not noticed and not corrected in the correct Marxist-Leninist way. These mistakes were used to create a difficult situation for our Party, and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia used them for definite anti-party and anti-Marxist purposes.

If we are to correctly analyse the mistakes committed in the Party, we cannot separate them from the bad influence exercised by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia; it would be wrong to separate the errors of the leadership of our Party from the hostile intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In our opinion, without the harmful influence exercised over our Party for a long period by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the leadership of our Party would not have committed

grave errors in its work. Without their intervention, our errors, whether slight errors in practice or individual shortcomings, would have been corrected, just as many of them have been corrected, and the Party would have made still greater strides forward. In order to make a truly objective analysis on a Marxist-Leninist basis, we must consider all the stages the Party has passed through, reconsider all the analyses that have been made in our Party, and put things in their proper place. We must clarify which are the real errors, and distinguish them from what were not errors, but were labelled as "serious errors" in obscure circumstances and for a specific purpose. Now it is possible for us to make this analysis from a clear and sound Marxist-Leninist position.

The situation which arose prior to the 11th Plenum has left its mark in the ranks of the Party and its cadres. Unhealthy opinions, prejudices and feelings have been created, and these should be cleared up. The analysis made at the 11th Plenum should serve to put both the Party and its cadres back on the right road. It is time for the party members and cadres to shake off all the mistaken views of the past, and time for them to return to the correct Marxist-Leninist course of our Party.

In order to analyse the different situations which arose in our Party and the errors that have occurred in them, we must first of all analyse the work done in preparation for the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee in Berat in November 1944, and its consequences at the end of 1944 and immediately after the complete liberation of Albania. This should be the starting point of our analysis, because this is the origin of the grave illness, and of the serious errors committed by our leadership, and because the Berat Plenum marks the beginning of the open and hostile interference of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the detriment of our Party.

Was it necessary to convene a Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party on the eve of the liberation of Albania? We think that it was not only necessary, but absolutely essential, for the following reasons:

a) It had to draw up the balance sheet of the forces and achievements of our Party which had undertaken such a great struggle and had liberated the people and country from bondage, it had to consider the tasks of the new stage facing the Party. On the eve of liberation, great tasks lay before the Party, the task of the reconstruction of the war-ravaged country, and of the strengthening of the people's power and the national economy. The Party was the sole leading force of our people. It had to direct the solution of these historic tasks. So the Central Committee of the Party had the task of meeting to lay down the line the Party should follow after liberation.

b) It had to review the work of the Party over the entire period of the war, to make a Marxist analysis of the achievements and the mistakes made in the course of the work, to learn from these mistakes, to correct them in the right way and to take measures to prevent their recurrence, in such a way that the Party and its leading role would be consolidated.

The Plenum of the Central Committee, held in Berat, was in theory called for the purposes I have mentioned, but in reality its correct aims were distorted, and evil aims and dangerous and harmful backstage activities predominated. At Berat, after conspiratorial activity behind the scenes, in the form of an organized faction, unknown to the General Secretary of the Party, and unknown to the great majority of the Central Committee of the Party, an attack was prepared against the correct line implemented by the Party over the whole period of the war, and against the General Secretary of the Party. This activity, which violated all the regulations of our Party, was led

by the delegate extraordinary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and supported by Sejfulla Malëshova, a lackey of the bourgeoisie, and by comrade Nako Spiru, Koji Xoxe, Pandi Kristo and others.

What were the aims the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia wanted to achieve at the Berat Plenum?

a) To combat every correct Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and stand which aimed at safeguarding the independence of our Party.

b) To place our Party completely under the direction of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and have it implementation of the directives of its Central Committee without discussion.

c) To convince our people that the struggle of our Party and people owed much to the guidance and directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that as a consequence, after liberation, too, our Party and people should dedicate their struggle and the results they had achieved to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its "enlightened" leadership.

d) To discredit the leadership of our Party which had led the struggle and had brought the people to victory, by accusing it of a series of mistakes allegedly made during the period of the National Liberation War, to imply that it was incapable of coping with the important tasks facing it after the liberation of Albania.

e) To create a split in the Central Committee of our Party and keep it alive by cunningly exploiting the shortcomings and concessions of the war period, by encouraging ambitious and career-seeking people, and influencing some Party leaders to cause them to slip into the erroneous position of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and play their game. This would make it easier for the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to

impose its will and its unsound views on the Central Committee of our Party, weakened by such hostile activities.

What were the aims of those leaders of our Party who slipped into the position of the Yugoslav leadership at the Berat Plenum?

Sejfulla Malëshova, a sick and ambitious megalomaniac, aspired to emerge as the head of the Party and impose his will upon it through sheer bluff. He aimed to seize the leadership of the Party, without giving any proof that he merited it. Far from meriting to be placed at the head of the Party, he did not deserve even the post he was unjustly appointed to prior to the Berat Plenum, and particularly after the Berat Plenum. In order to achieve his aims, Sejfulla Malëshova adopted the anti-Marxist views of the Yugoslav leaders. He accused our heroic Party, our Party which had never erred in its political line, of being "a non-Marxist party, a party with a wrong political line, a party which was degenerating into a party of bandits and terrorists". Finally, he fiercely attacked the leadership of our Party, accusing it of being incompetent and unfit to lead. With his theory of the "chief of the party", Sejfulla Malëshova did his utmost to discredit the General Secretary of our Party as unworthy of the post the Party had entrusted to him, going so far as to declare behind his back, in order to convince other members of the Central Committee, that "but for the improper time, Enver Hoxha does not deserve to be Secretary of the Party". An outspoken opportunist, Sejfulla Malëshova adopted the opportunist views of the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich, also regarding the line followed by our Party during the National Liberation War and the line it was to follow after the war. The Central Committee of the Party exposed this despicable opportunist long before the appearance of the serious illness which had infected the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia. Here it is appropriate to say that at the Berat Plenum Sejfulla Malëshova not only served the aims of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in attacking our Party, but his opportunist views completely corresponded to the anti-Marxist and liquidationist views of the Yugoslav leadership on the role of the Party and the working class; he was a lackey of the Albanian kulaks, the bourgeoisie and reaction.

What were the aims of Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru?

We think that the Yugoslavs fully exploited the unhealthy ambition of Koçi Xoxe and the dissatisfaction of Nako Spiru for their purposes.

Without any good reason, comrade Nako Spiru appeared as the most dissatisfied at the Berat Plenum, as if he had been deeply wronged and neglected by the other principal leaders of the Party. He was able to some extent to hide this dissatisfaction, which in reality concealed his unhealthy ambition, and to hold back his criticism of the party line at the Berat Plenum.

For his part, Koçi Xoxe spoke about non-existent errors in the line of the Party. He criticised the Party for manifestations of opportunism and organizational distortions. Koçi Xoxe accepted the anti-Marxist aims of the Yugoslav leadership, in order to express his personal dissatisfaction, and because he had mistaken notions about the allegedly opportunist stand of the Party towards the "Balli Kombëtar". In addition, he had no confidence in the General Secretary of the Party, and thus joined the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in their damaging efforts to achieve their anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian ends.

In Berat these comrades did the greater and most harmful part of their work behind the scenes. Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru were the first to make contact with the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Yugoslavia and, together with him, succeeded in turning the Berat Plenum from a regular meeting of the Central Committee into a meeting counter to all party rules, organized to attack the line of the Party and its General Secretary. Our opinion is that Nako Spiru united with the Yugoslav leaders because his wishes coincided with their plans to replace the General Secretary of the Party, who was "persona non grata" to them.

We think that, in fact, the shortcomings and mistakes observed in the Party over the war period were of secondary importance both to Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru and to the Yugoslav leadership, but they used them for particular aims which were to their advantage: to weaken the Party and split its leadership. Nako Spiru and Koçi Xoxe, two of the principal leaders of the Party, were clearly in silent opposition to the General Secretary, motivated chiefly by personal dissatisfaction. Proceeding from this personal dissatisfaction, they made the 2nd Plenum of the Central Committee in Berat serve the interests of the Yugoslav anti-Marxists, and become the starting point of the illness and the errors which were later evident in our Party. These comrades have committed a grave error under the influence of the great intrigue of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and have played its game.

At the Berat Plenum the leadership of our Party was sharply criticised for the grave mistakes it was alleged to have made. What were these mistakes? Were there political or organizational errors in its line? We say that throughout the period of the National Liberation War the political line of our Party was a correct one. Its organizational line, too, was generally correct.

Our Party has not erred politically. It was correct in its stand towards the invader, the "Balli Kombëtar", "Legaliteti", and the quislings. At that time there was a danger of opportunism and wavering in the stand of the

Party towards the so-called nationalist elements. But there was no such wavering in the line of the Central Committee. The opportunist manifestations that were evident during the period of the National Liberation War, such as the compromise with the Germans at Berat, the Mukje affair, and some temporary and sporadic opportunist stands in Gjirokastra, were not mistakes of the Party and of its Central Committee, but mistakes made by particular individuals. These mistakes have been severely condemned by the Central Committee.

The Berat compromise does not stem from our party line. This was a grave and impermissible error committed by an individual leader, but not by the Central Committee of the Party. Likewise, Mukje was the personal work of the opportunist Ymer Dishnica, who had pronounced opportunist views, and was a megalomaniac convinced of his "cleverness", a man of the upper strata of the bourgeoisie; it was not a mistake of the Central Committee of the Party. Sejfulla Malëshova tried at the Berat Plenum to attribute Ymer Dishnica's grave error to the Central Committee and to the allegedly mistaken line of our Party. This was a slanderous and hopeless effort. The Central Committee had advised Ymer Dishnica to act otherwise, and as soon as it was informed of his treason, it immediately and vehemently condemned this act.

At the Berat Plenum Nako Spiru said that "the Party and the Central Committee were caught unawares by the founding of the 'Balli Kombëtar' and did not understand that the 'Balli Kombëtar' emerged as a reaction to the National Liberation Front". This is untrue. The creation of the "Balli Kombëtar" was no surprise to our Party. Our Central Committee never for a single moment doubted the existence of the reaction in our country, a reaction made up of the quislings in the first place, the big landowners (beys), the rich bourgeoisie, the big merchants who were

linked with the invaders, and treacherous politicians. It foresaw that the reaction would inevitably rally, and therefore prepared itself for the struggle against them. So, our Central Committee was informed of the creation of the "Balli Kombëtar" organization. But it is also true that the influence of our Party was not very strong at that time. The Party had just been formed, and its work with the masses of the people was still weak. The party men did not yet have great experience, while the elements who were to head the "Balli Kombëtar" were still maintaining an equivocal stand, and had not come out into the open. They considered our Party and the national liberation movement as something sporadic, the creation of fanciful children which would soon be swept away by the forces of the invader. But facts proved the opposite. Our movement was neither accidental nor sporadic. Our Party was a sound organization which was to give determined leadership to this movement.

After the Peza conference the occupiers and the local reaction sharpened their weapons against our Party and set up a sort of organization, the "Balli Kombëtar". The "Balli Kombëtar" was a heterogeneous organization, without well-defined organizational forms, but with a demagogical program which aimed to deceive as many wavering people as possible, especially the middle and petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry, or to neutralize them, if it was unable to urge them into open struggle against us. The so-called units of "Balli Kombëtar" waited to see what would happen before deciding whether to attack the occupiers or link themselves closely with them against the national liberation movement. Our tactics of detaching wavering elements from this newly formed organization and bringing the "Balli Kombëtar" units into our struggle and actions was completely correct. The question of the struggle and actions was our primary concern, and the

basis of our first discussions with the "Balli Kombëtar" organization, or rather, with its hypothetical chieftains. On no other basis did our Central Committee conduct talks with them. The problem was to expose the "Balli Kombëtar" at its weakest point, over its attitude towards the struggle against the occupiers. Right from the first discussion the "Balli Kombëtar" was asked whether or not it would fight against the occupiers. It was precisely on this question that it had to be exposed.

At the beginning an agreement was reached on the creation of commissions to co-ordinate activities, commissions which remained a dead letter, because the "Balli Kombëtar" and its bands would never be persuaded to fight against the occupiers and the quislings. The aim of the Party was to draw the "Balli Kombëtar" bands into the struggle against the occupiers. At that time, when some elements of the "Balli Kombëtar" exercised an undeserved influence over the strata of the peasantry, especially in some regions, this tactic of the Party was quite correct. The Party's call to struggle and actions exposed the demagogy of the "Balli Kombëtar", which aimed chiefly at turning the people away from the liberation struggle. So, initially, the "Balli Kombëtar" accepted in principle the idea of forming commissions to co-ordinate activities, in order to sabotage the people's struggle. Through these commissions it was to try, in the place of the real struggle and actions, to have endless talks and discussions, until the occupiers got word about the aim of an action and the place where it was to be carried out. But our Central Committee always kept this in mind and never left the outcome of the actions in the hands of these commissions. In the commissions, the representatives of our Party would propose carrying out an action, but if their proposal was not accepted by the "Balli Kombëtar", we would carry out the action by ourselves. As we said,

those commissions remained only on paper, the "Balli Kombëtar" bands never went to war, and the commissions did not even meet. This was the character and role of the commissions to co-ordinate actions, which caused up to be accused at the Berat Plenum of having slipped into an "opportunist position towards the 'Balli Kombëtar'". This accusation is unjust. There has been no opportunism in our stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar". The Party's tactics have been correct. It would have been harmful and opportunist if the creation of those commissions had inhibited the national liberation movement, but this was not and could not be the case.

The Yugoslav Vukmanovich Tempo alleged at the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that we adopted an "opportunist position towards the 'Balli Kombëtar' and did not expose and fight this organization". Vukmanovich Tempo also voiced these opinions during the war, at the time when he came to our General Staff. His opinions were supported by Koçi Xoxe, but they received even greater support from Sejfulla Malëshova. Sejfulla's aims are now known to one and all. As soon as he set foot in Albania, he sought everyone's support in order to manifest his opposition to the General Secretary of the Party, and to replace him. We opposed Vukmanovich's view as incorrect right from that time. We have never been against the exposure of the "Balli Kombëtar". Vukmanovich Tempo considered incorrect that the "Balli Kombëtar" was not exposed on a broad scale right from the beginning. This was an ex-cathedra judgment by a man who did not know the situation and the circumstances in Albania. On the basis of our concrete conditions, we considered that the "Balli Kombëtar" could not be exposed on a broad scale right from the beginning, but should be exposed gradually. But the fact is that our Party has never compromised with the "Balli Kombëtar", and has never

taken an opportunist stand towards it. We have always been at war with the "Balli Kombëtar". However, procrastination on our part cannot be excluded in some cases, nor was it possible in such action to define precisely the day when the exposure should take place, as Tempo wanted to do. The accusations of Vukmanovich Tempo and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, as was made clear at their recent congress, had the aim of discrediting our Central Committee and the leaders of our Party as if our stand towards the "Balli Kombëtar" was an opportunist one.

Meanwhile the Yugoslav delegate at the Berat Plenum considered the convening of the Labinot Conference, which condemned the Mukje agreement, to be a sectarian action by our Party. But this delegate insisted that, although a mistake had been made at Mukje (this mistake was not ours, but Ymer Dishnica's, and our Central Committee condemned it as soon as it was informed of his treason), we should not turn down Ali Këlcyra's invitation to take part in a meeting of the "Committee for the Salvation of Albania" which was set up at Mukje, but should go there to continue the talks and expose the "Balli Kombëtar" chieftains from that platform. Our stand on this question was a correct one, while the views of the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were totally opportunist. Had we gone to that meeting, which was decided on at Mukje, we would have disorientated the Party. It would have been a concession made by the Central Committee of our Party to the "Balli Kombëtar", for it would have meant recognition of the incorrect and adverse decisions taken at Mukje. The continuation of talks on the basis of the Mukje platform would have been a grave error for the Central Committee of our Party, but it did not make this mistake. Precisely for this reason, our Central Committee was accused by the delegate of the

Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and by Sejfulla Malëshova, of having slipped into a sectarian position.

Sejfulla Malëshova, supported by the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, accused the party line, the Central Committee and, above all, the General Secretary, of some practical errors committed by Liri Gega and some other comrades in the North, and blamed them for the reprisals taken against a number of "Balli Kombëtar" adherents on the eve of the liberation of Tirana. Sejfulla Malëshova labelled them as grave sectarian errors in the party line and declared that the Party was being transformed into a terrorist party. They were base accusations brought against the Party by a defender of the Ballist opposition. This was the prelude to the opportunist and hostile views and activities of Sejfulla Malëshova against the line of our Party. The delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia also accused us of unauthorized and extremely sectarian actions. In reality the actions undertaken in the North and during the battle of Tirana could, in some cases, be considered hasty and, to a certain degree, unwise; our comrades could have been more moderate in some cases, but at that moment such happenings could not have been completely prevented. To Sejfulla Malëshova, the denunciation and elimination of foreign agents were sectarian and condemnable actions.

These were in general the accusations brought against the party line by the Yugoslav delegate and his supporters at the Berat Plenum.

We may say that some errors occurred in the organizational line during the period of the war. The main error, in our opinion, was not the creation of the Provisional Central Committee of the Party, as they have alleged. Considering the time and the conditions in which the Party

was founded, nothing more could have been done. The solution has been proved correct. The Party was formed and consolidated, it fought against factionalists and suppressed them. Party organizations were formed in many districts.

An organizational error was committed in the method and procedure of electing the Central Committee at the 1st Conference of the Communist Party of Albania. The Conference proceeded in an orderly fashion, the delegates were properly elected in spite of the difficult circumstances, but the Central Committee was elected in an excessively conspiratorial manner, which influenced its later failure to function regularly, and the failure of some members of the Central Committee to carry out correctly and responsibly the tasks the Party had charged them with at the Conference. We know how the Central Committee and the Political Bureau were elected, how secretaries were appointed, and how the Central Committee began functioning. We have made an analysis of this, and I think that it was correct. We admitted that mistakes were made in carrying out those actions of such importance to our Party. We may blame ourselves for these mistakes, we may blame Miladin Popovich, but we think that the main culprit is Blazho Iovanovich. He came as a delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to help us precisely in this work. We may say openly that we lacked experience in organizing conferences and congresses, and elections to such organs as the Central Committee. But comrade Miladin Popovich also lacked such experience; he was also a young cadre, with a fairly broad experience of directing a regional party committee in conditions of illegality.

But Miladin Popovich's fault was that prior to the conference he did not have sufficient confidence in the cadres of our Party, he did not correctly estimate them,

and hesitated in decisions and judgements regarding them. At the beginning, this was justifiable, but later on, when our comrades had proved themselves and were formed as cadres, more control of party work should have been entrusted to them; but Miladin Popovich was hesitant about this. He had a sense of responsibility, and this was one of his positive features, a sound feature of an internationalist Marxist. But he should have thought more deeply and understood that the main responsibility towards the Party, the people and the Comintern fell on us.

The elections to the Central Committee should have been carried out on this basis, in such a way that every elected comrade assumed full responsibility for the direction of the affairs of the Party. In organizational questions, too, Miladin Popovich retained restricted forms of work suited to a regional committee, but not to a main, leading instance of the Party.

A narrow understanding of organizational questions, the lack of experience on our part and that of comrade Miladin, as well as the difficult circumstances of the war, allowed some mistakes to arise in matters relating to the organizing of the Party and the functioning of its organs. But it would also be wrong if we still viewed these mistakes in the distorted light of the accusations brought against us at Berat by the Yugoslav leaders, whose aims were supported by Sejfulla Malëshova and other comrades, some of whom, like Koçi Xoxe and others, continued even later to uphold the mistaken conclusions reached in Berat.

First, it is completely mistaken and altogether unjust to say that our Party was led by Miladin Popovich, as if the Central Committee and the General Secretary of the Party had stood by with folded arms. Although the Yugoslavs tried to present the matter in this way in order to discredit our Central Committee and the General Secretary of our Party, they were in personal contradictions with

Miladin Popovich. Such a thesis is hostile and directed against our Party, but the bad thing is that at Berat it was adopted; if not overtly, at least tacitly. Our Party and our National Liberation War have been directed by our Central Committee, whereas Miladin Popovich, who should be considered as a comrade of our Party, has merely given his help, just as the other comrades of the Central Committee have also helped individually.

The General Secretary of our Party has played his role as a leader and director of the Party, and has fulfilled his task. He has tried successfully to guide the Party and the movement, to orientate them in the correct way, giving them valuable organizational and political directives, relying on the experience of the Party and the great help given by other members of the Central Committee, who led the grass-roots party organizations and the National Liberation War throughout Albania. It is in place to say here that Miladin Popovich grew up together with us. Our Party raised him, just as it raised all of us. He was a truly internationalist comrade who deeply loved Albania and the Albanian people and always took a correct communist, internationalist stand in defence of the interests and correct stands of our country and Party. Miladin was a very courageous communist militant. Often, in our presence, he opposed the views of the other representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia such as Dushan Mugosha, Vukmanovich Tempo, Blazho Iovanovich, Velimir Stoinich, etc. For these reasons he was not well regarded by the Yugoslav leadership and on the eve of liberation, before the Berat Plenum, he was ordered out of Albania. (As is known, he was later treacherously assassinated by the OZNA⁶ agents in March 1945.)

⁶ OZNA — Yugoslav secret service.

In Berat, the intervention of the Yugoslav leadership and its representative created the impression that our Central Committee had not led the Party as it should, and that Miladin Popovich had not worked to create a genuine leadership. This is untrue. To rely on the conclusions of the Berat Plenum means to make a great mistake. Our Central Committee was strengthened and tempered and gave leadership in the struggle. The comrades of the Central Committee organized the Party throughout Albania, directed the National Liberation War, and headed the partisan units. Without the existence of the Central Committee, without the leadership of the Party, we would not have had the Party as it is today, and would not have achieved these victories. Our victories cannot be attributed to two or three individuals, and could not have been ensured by a party whose Central Committee was extremely weak or did not even exist.

It is correct to say that meetings of the Central Committee could have been held more regularly, but we should not think that during those three years, in the difficult conditions of the war, many meetings could have been convened. Nevertheless, meetings were held, if not full ones, and various comrades met with the General Secretary of the Party, discussed problems and took decisions. The Central Committee assumed a clear-cut stand on every political development, and every important event. The documents of the Party indicate this. Thus at various times, the Central Committee has held full or partial meetings, we have held discussions, defined our stand and taken decisions which have been communicated to the Party. All this was done under the difficult circumstances of the war, and not in time of peace, and thus we should acknowledge the shortcomings against the background of these conditions and difficulties.

There have also been cases of underestimation of members of the Central Committee, or their removal from responsible posts. During the activity of the Central Committee of our young Party irregular forms of work have sometimes been evident. The responsibility of the organizational secretary, for example, should have been more clearly defined. The fault here lies in the first place with Miladin Popovich, and then with me, but at the same time part of the blame lies with all the circumstances which contributed to such an incorrect situation. Neither I, nor, I am sure, Miladin, had any ulterior aims or were against Koçi's holding the post he was appointed to by the 1st National Conference. I refute what was said at Berat, that we concealed from Koçi his appointment by the conference as organizational secretary, and that we did not entrust this task to him. I had my own views about Koçi's work, which was none too good. He was vacillating and narrow-minded in his opinion on various issues and problems, he had little confidence in his own opinions and was easily swayed. But it is a fact that Koçi did not take his task as seriously as he should have.

Liri Gega also exerted her influence in this matter. With fixed aims and resorting to intrigues, she tried to hold important leading positions in the Central Committee, and to replace Koçi Xoxe. Miladin has been wrongly accused of supporting Liri Gega in these aims, but on the contrary, he spoke of her with contempt, while it was Dushan Mugosha who fostered her megalomania and arrogance. Liri Gega was intriguing to form her own rotten circle of supporters. Her work was very sectarian and individualistic. At Berat she tried to get herself appointed as "chief of cadres", and given the highest grade in the army. I have criticized some of Liri Gega's mistakes to impose her views on the question of cadres. But it cannot be denied that it was only at Berat that her errors were

severely criticized. Nako and Koçi may have seen Liri Gega in a different light, they may have detected many shortcomings in her, but it is a fact that there was no serious criticism of her, nor was the matter raised as a very important question, as was done at Berat. Liri Gega deserved sound criticism. But the Yugoslav leaders used this criticism for their own purposes.

In Berat matters were not viewed from the correct viewpoint of the Party, and in their criticism Koçi and Nako were governed by personal interest. But the worst thing was that the intentions of the Yugoslav leadership were not understood, and therefore their accusations and "advice" were accepted. Nor did our comrades look deeply into the aims of Sejfulla Malëshova and of the others involved in underhand activities. This, I think, occurred because things were not analysed in a healthy spirit of criticism and self-criticism, but in a very narrow and irregular way. This was a great shortcoming which cropped up later and which made it impossible to guard against excessive criticism in judging problems requiring solution. There was a lack of objectivity, sang-froid, and profound and all-round assessment of issues.

The main aim of the intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia at the Berat Plenum, in our opinion, was not to correct our alleged mistakes, or to strengthen our Central Committee, or to settle the question of the cadres who had allegedly been underestimated. The intervention was premeditated. The representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich, had come with pre-arranged decisions in his pocket. The main aim of the Yugoslav leadership was to attack the independence of our Party. They had to make our Party and its Central Committee submit to the line and directives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and make

our country orientate itself fully and exclusively towards Yugoslavia. To achieve these aims, an extremely unhealthy situation had to be created in our Party, and it was necessary to create the opinion that, without Yugoslavia, there could be no party, no struggle and no liberation. The Yugoslavs thought that the Albanian Party and people had a high regard for Yugoslavia, but that their esteem was not as great as the Yugoslavs would have liked it to be.

During the National Liberation War, Yugoslavia was a neighbour, ally and dear friend of our Party. Our whole Party felt love and sympathy for the Communist Party and people of Yugoslavia. But Yugoslavia had its place. To our Party, the first place belonged to the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and Stalin. In saving the world from fascism, they had made an enormous contribution to the triumph of our people. This is pointed out by our leaflets, from the first to the most recent. It is a fact that Tito's name was unknown to our Party, but our people knew about, and correctly assessed the struggle of the people of Yugoslavia. It encouraged us and eased the burden of our struggle. But only this much. We had neither direct links with, nor direct help from, the Yugoslav National Liberation army.

Of course, our Central Committee has gained something from their experience of struggle and the experience of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, through radio "Free Yugoslavia" and through the occasional pamphlets which have reached us. These were our only links with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, apart from the visits of the Yugoslav delegates we mentioned before, who have done more harm than good, and the visit of a delegation of our youth to Tito's General Staff, a delegation which returned almost at the end of the war.

But the way in which the Berat Plenum proceeded, led to a situation which gave the impression that we owed everything to Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. At Berat, instead of emphasizing the achievements of our struggle (which were evaluated in the way the delegate of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia wished), the line of our Party came under severe criticism and its leadership was attacked in an unjust and unworthy manner. The aim of the Yugoslavs was to attack and eliminate the General Secretary of the Party, for they considered him as the real obstacle to the realization of their plans.

Comrade Miladin Popovich was basely forced back to Yugoslavia, and was not even allowed to make any self-criticism or criticism, although he had something to say. He was ordered out of Albania by the Yugoslavs. I did not agree with the Yugoslav delegate on this matter. But the important thing was to remove Miladin Popovich from the scene, for he would have spoilt things for them. Otherwise, there was no reason to organize the Berat Plenum behind my back, in a surreptitious way.

When the issues were brought up, I found some of them reasonable, such as the criticism of Liri Gega and the shortcomings observed in the work. But at the Berat meeting only the gross "errors" of the principal comrades leading the work were mentioned, such as the well-known passivity of Sejfulla Malëshova, or the restricted scope of Koçi Xoxe's activity, and nothing was said about the mistakes committed by others. Why was Miladin Popovich attacked so fiercely and unjustly, to the point where the Yugoslav delegate, seeing that the criticism of him would indirectly affect the Communist Party of Yugoslavia itself and lower confidence in it, cut short the criticism of the Yugoslav comrades in the middle of the meeting? This was certainly done with ulterior motives, to attack the General

Secretary of the Party. Not a good word was spoken at Berat about the General Secretary, who had fought and carried out his task to the best of his ability, but on the contrary, he was accused of things he had not done, and errors he had not committed, and thus a climate of mistrust arose around him. It is easy to understand that after such a situation was created for the General Secretary of the Party, there could be no unity and harmony in the Political Bureau, either. All the Bureau members would try to pull in different directions, and there would be no one to harmonize their actions. The opinions voiced by the General Secretary would be viewed with suspicion, the career-seekers who had worked to bring about such a situation would try to achieve their aims, if not in law, at least in fact. Everything would degenerate into individualistic work, with intrigues, quarrels, misunderstandings, prejudices, formalism and many serious mistakes predominating, to the point where the Central Committee and the Political Bureau would be threatened. And, for a time, this was what happened. These evils were brought upon our Party by the Berat Plenum which not only encouraged the unhealthy ambitions of some of our comrades and opened the way for them to develop further, not only completely accorded with the wishes of the Yugoslav representative and the Yugoslav leadership, but also allowed opportunism to infiltrate into the line of our Party. Not only did Velimir Stoinich neither intervene nor attempt to moderate the quite misplaced criticism directed at the General Secretary of our Party, but on the contrary, he was pleased when Sejfulla Malëshova, Koçi Xoxe and Nako Spiru came out with the theory of the "chief of the party", exalted Tito and attributed to the General Secretary all the errors committed during the period of the National Liberation War.

The Yugoslav delegate was also ignorant on matters of party organization, and unable to find his bearings in political situations. He knew nothing, literally nothing, about the situation in our country. He knew our country only from the information he had been given by his Central Committee, but this was erroneous. He had been only a divisional commissar; he had a set of stock phrases in his head, and nothing more. He gave us some circulars on the organization of the Party and the state power, which could not be called the last word on the issue. Through them he tried to impose on us many distortions of our Marxist-Leninist line, which compounded the errors that began at Berat. The question of the National Liberation Front is typical. At this man's request, we brought into the Front Cen Elezi and some other bandits who, but for his suggestion, we might have hanged ten times over. A week later, on listening to radio Belgrade, he told us that the Front should have a closed membership and other such nonsense. On the other hand, as his position was an opportunist one, he tried to influence us to approach people who had never supported us and who later were to become avowed enemies of the Party, the movement and our state power.

The Berat Plenum would have been a milestone in the history of our Party, if it had discussed the problems for which it was convened, and if it had proceeded in a sound party spirit.

At Berat there was fierce criticism of the leadership, its methods of work, the lack of unity and sincerity, and the narrowly individualistic and sectarian work. All this criticism, had it been sound, should have given the good results expected, whereas the Berat Plenum had the opposite effect, and this is further proof that criticism and self-criticism were not made in a communist spirit. The aim of the Central Committee of the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia at the Berat Plenum was to attack, discredit, and if possible, eliminate the Central Committee of our Party, in order to highlight the role of the aid the CC of the CPY had allegedly given our Party during the war and which had allegedly led it to victory.

But we must not think that the criticism of shortcomings and concessions made at Berat was totally unjust. The criticism of Liri Gega, as later events showed, was wholly correct, but the Berat Plenum did our Party more harm than good. We must come to understand that the help given by the CC of the CPY and its delegate was nil, or rather extremely negative.

It is true that after the Berat Plenum, the state power was set up, the apparatus of the Central Committee was organized, etc., but we did all this work ourselves, and feel no obligation to the delegate of the CC of the CPY. The situation created after the liberation of Albania undoubtedly helped to regulate many things.

If matters had been correctly dealt with at Berat we would be in a better position, and would have advanced further. Could we have done this without the delegate Stoinich? I think we could, with shortcomings, of course, but not with the great errors of principle which occurred.

With all the ill effects of the Berat Plenum, there was one positive effect, if we can call it that ; all the proceedings of this plenum were confined to the leadership of the Party, and were not discussed by the Party as a whole. Had this happened, then the confusion would have been still greater. The Berat plague affected the Bureau and the Central Committee. After the Berat Plenum, the members of the Central Committee were not clear, they lacked conviction, and they were overwhelmed by the subsequent events. The tone of the Berat Plenum influenced the entire work of the Central Committee in various ways.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its delegate to the Berat Plenum scored a victory. They succeeded in destroying the unity of our Central Committee, attacking the leadership of the Party, shaking its self-confidence, creating distrust on the part of some comrades of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee towards the General Secretary of the Party, and wrecking the collective method of work in the Political Bureau and Central Committee. It was a success, however insufficient, for the Yugoslav leaders. Their aim was the total submission of our Central Committee to the orders of their envoy. But they hit a snag.

After the Berat Plenum, the Yugoslav delegate tried to intervene everywhere, but without success. He knocked at the General Secretary's door, but it did not open, he knocked at Nako Spiru's door, and it remained closed, too. He and several of his other Yugoslav comrades began to rally some members of our Central Committee; they held discussions with them, and complained that they were not being kept informed; at the same time they tried to influence these comrades and have them oppose the Political Bureau of the Party. The Yugoslav delegate demanded the appointment of cadres of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to our youth organization. We refused this. He demanded that the reports of the party committees to the Central Committee be handed on to him, but this too was refused. He recruited Liri Gega as his agent, and although he had agreed with her condemnation at Berat, proposed with no shame or hesitation, that we re-admit her into the Central Committee. But here, too, he met with a categorical refusal. Through his anti-Marxist activity to implement the recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Velimir Stoinich was exposed and became useless to the Yugoslavs. The CC of the CPY had to change its tactics and its men,

and therefore, sent to our country in his stead Josip Djer-dja, the OZNA-man for Albania, to "put right the matters Velimir had made a mess of".

THE SITUATION AFTER THE BERAT PLENUM AND THE
THESES OF THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE PARTY
FOR ITS REVISION

It is necessary to make some analysis of the situation created after the Berat Plenum and the grave consequences that ensued. In the first place, our Central Committee and its Political Bureau were not sufficiently armed, organized and united as one body to face the situation and to solve the grave problems which lay before the country following liberation. The Berat Plenum did not give either the Central Committee or the Political Bureau the necessary unity or a correct understanding of their activity as an organized general staff, qualities which they were criticized for lacking at the Berat Plenum. The members of the Central Committee did not place themselves at the head of the work as they should have done, did not clearly define the responsibility they had to undertake, and their functions were assigned at random without thorough study. This occurred because the Political Bureau itself was not in a position to make a correct division of the work.

The Berat Plenum created a privileged position for the organizational secretary of the Party, gave Koçi Xoxe the opportunity to monopolize the work, while on the other hand, it weakened all the other positions, and in the first place, the position and functions of the General Secretary of the Party. The authority of the General Secretary was attacked and shaken. Many comrades of the Political Bureau did not have due confidence in him. To claim otherwise would be wrong, for that was the reality. The

attitude and mistakes of some comrades cannot be understood otherwise. In the first place, it was the task of the General Secretary to specify, direct and check up the work of the members of the Bureau and Central Committee, and to supervise and control their activities. But this could not be done by force, especially after the situation created by the Berat Plenum. To ask, "Why did the General Secretary permit this state of affairs?" would not be at all objective.

At the Berat Plenum and after it, the personality of Nako Spiru was brought to the fore, but it was not the General Secretary who did this; on the contrary, it was done to his disadvantage. It was the duty of the other members of the Bureau to put things right if they noticed that Nako was going too far. In the first place, it was Koçi's task, but he did not carry it out. Why? At first, he kept silent because Nako's stand and activity, encouraged by the Yugoslav delegates, weakened the position of the General Secretary, which was in accordance with Koçi Xoxe's wishes and future plans. Had things been otherwise, it would have been logical for Koçi Xoxe, as the organizational secretary, after the Berat Plenum, to collaborate closely with the General Secretary and to see that Nako Spiru's activity was affecting the unity in the leadership of the Party and restricting the role of the General Secretary. But when the Yugoslavs saw that they could not manipulate Nako to their liking, they began to give support and encouragement to Koçi Xoxe, and to promote him. Then the worsening of Nako's relations with the Yugoslavs and Koçi Xoxe became apparent. At that time, Nako apparently realized his mistakes and drew closer to the General Secretary, while Koçi Xoxe, who saw this rapprochement as a threat to himself and did not consider the Party's need to strengthen its unity, encouraged by the Yugoslavs, began his struggle against Nako Spiru. The Berat Plenum had convinced Koçi Xoxe that many pro-

blems could be solved without asking the General Secretary or consulting his opinion, and had created in Koçi Xoxe an exaggerated sense of self-confidence. This contributed to the creation of the situation I have spoken about.

While comrade Nako Spiru changed his ways and drew the General Secretary into his confidence, Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo persisted in their mistaken line, lacking the necessary trust in the General Secretary, and misunderstanding and misusing the weapon of criticism and self-criticism and the struggle of contradictions within the Party, which they viewed in a personal light and as though they were engineered by Nako Spiru. This has caused them both to commit grave political and organizational errors.

I felt the need to collaborate with the comrades of the Political Bureau, and therefore saw nothing wrong in Nako's rapprochement. Personally, I had a high opinion of Nako and liked him despite all his shortcomings, although I did not approve of the stand he took at Berat. I criticized him openly for it at the time. I remained ignorant of Nako's backstage activity for a long time after the Berat Plenum. I was informed of it later by other comrades. So, there was no reason for me to suspect that his intentions were not good. No criticism had been made of Nako's work, on the contrary, he was a comrade to whom everyone listened attentively. He criticized with great courage. What harm could I see in Nako's approach to me? On the contrary, I wanted this contact, and not for personal reasons. Nako may have had certain tendencies in his work, and may have made mistakes, but the others made mistakes too.

We discussed, debated and criticized shortcomings and mistakes as far as we were able. But it is a fact that between Nako and Koçi, Nako and Sejfulla, Bedri and Koçi, Sejfulla and Koçi, these discussions and criticisms

were viewed in a personal light and carried on accordingly. The opinion of the General Secretary and his mediation did not have the desired effect on the atmosphere of tension that had been created in varying degrees among these comrades. This stemmed from the lack of unity and co-ordination in the activity of the Bureau. Some of these comrades accused the General Secretary of leniency towards Koçi Xoxe, while Koçi and Pandi Kristo had formed the idea that he was under the influence of Nako, or of one comrade or another. At no time has any factually based, serious criticism been directed at me to prove that I was adversely influenced by these comrades. I cannot be held responsible for other people's faults and mistakes.

In fact, I was never influenced by Nako's mistaken views, I criticized them, and from the time of the National Liberation War I considered the erroneous tendencies of Nako Spiru and Liri Belishova in regard to the work with the youth⁷ as a danger. Nor did I agree with some other erroneous views held by Nako, especially on the question of cadres.

Such an interpretation of matters created a rift in our Bureau, of which both Sejfulla Malëshova and the Yugoslavs took advantage in order to achieve their hostile aims, while Koçi Xoxe took the opportunity to take control of everything, neglecting the role of the General Secretary in the leadership, which encouraged the development of Nako Spiru's unhealthy ambition. In this

⁷ Despite the efforts of Nako Spiru to strengthen the organization of the youth, he could not see from a correct standpoint some of its problems, in particular the tendency of the work of the organization of the youth to develop in a somewhat independent manner from the Party, and thus he went so far as to counterpose the cadres of the youth to those of the Party, by making incorrect comparisons between the youth organization and the party organization. These tendencies were deepened by Liri Belishova.

whole situation the General Secretary had his views, which appear to have been correct. He had not lost his sense of responsibility; Berat had not subdued his courage or will-power, and he was pretty well aware of the difficult situation developing in our Political Bureau, he saw the harm caused at Berat, and the hostile activity of Velimir Stoinich. All this led the General Secretary to the conclusion that the Berat Plenum was the main disease which had caused the lack of unity in the Political Bureau, that the source of all this was the interference of Velimir Stoinich, that the line of the Party during the National Liberation War, and also the General Secretary, had been unjustly criticised, that in organizational matters there had been practical errors which needed correction, that there had been a shift of responsibilities in the leadership, that a duality of Party and state power had been created, and other grave errors.

I had become convinced of all this, and therefore decided to put before the Political Bureau the theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum and the correction of errors. The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum were an important document in which problems were raised tactfully and mistakes criticized in accordance with the degree of danger they appeared to pose, without exaggerations or any sign of bias. But my theses and my good intentions were not correctly understood and were not accepted by either party, by Koçi and Pandi, or by Nako. Nako's errors were not alarming at the time when I presented my theses to the Political Bureau, nor were Koçi Xoxe's organizational mistakes. Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunism, which was most dangerous, was eliminated.

The main question was the Berat Plenum, the errors arising from it, the lack of unity in the Bureau, and the harm done to the work of the Party. But neither side tried to put this matter right. And the reason is clear.

Neither Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, nor Nako Spiru showed readiness to make self-criticism about their activity at Berat, to reveal to the Party the Berat backstage plot, or to admit and condemn their errors in the spirit of Bolshevik self-criticism. On the contrary, they defended their "work" at Berat, thus again harming the Party by making their mistakes worse and deepening the split in the Bureau. Sound self-criticism on their part would have helped to expose the hostile anti-party activity of Velimir Stoinich, would have exposed the activity behind the scenes at Berat with all its harmful actions entailing negative consequences both for the political and organizational line, would have helped get rid of the existing distrust towards the party leadership and especially towards the General Secretary, and thus would have made possible the revision of the decisions of the Berat Plenum. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo regarded the theses for the revision of the Berat Plenum as if they had originated from Nako Spiru, and I had put them forward under his influence. They thought that these theses were aimed only against Koçi as an individual. This was a grave error on their part, it was not objective and showed extremely narrow judgement. Nako Spiru took great care to avoid discussion of the main issues raised in these theses, for a basic discussion would have brought undesirable things into the open. We should mention here that on the question of Berat, silence and reservations were maintained to the end. Meanwhile Pandi Kristo tried to avoid discussion on these theses by raising the question of why I had maintained reservations since the Berat Plenum. In principle, this was true, but it was not a bad thing, on the contrary, it was to the benefit of the Party, and therefore, positive, that I brought up this question after a certain time, when many circumstances made my reservations still stronger.

I did not know what had happened behind the scenes at Berat, and I did not know the role some comrades had played. From the time of Berat I opposed their stands, though unaware of all the backstage activity, I opposed them openly, and finding Velimir Stoinich's activity mistaken, I criticized it openly and to his face. The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum were in fact against those who carried out the backstage activities, and were to the benefit of the Party and its normal work. If Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, on the one hand, and Nako Spiru, on the other, had viewed those theses correctly and had acknowledged their errors with sound self-criticism, matters would have been put right. But both sides kept their cards under the table.

Why did Nako Spiru, and also Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, not view these theses correctly? I think that the sole explanation is that they did not want their errors uncovered.

My theses did not bring any improvement in the situation. The discussion was diverted into practical questions and the previous positions were maintained. Far from the unity in the Political Bureau being strengthened, the split became even deeper. I was convinced that the problem was not solved. My task, I think, was not to concentrate on the deadlock the matter had reached, but to find another solution. A good solution would have been for me to bring up the question with the Central Committee, but I did not do this, and it was a mistake. I thought the question could be solved by adding new members to enlarge the Political Bureau. This would have been a just solution.

Not only was there no unity in the Political Bureau, but all matters were dealt with by three people, Sejfulla, Nako and Koçi, who were joined by Pandi Kristo. In fact the other comrades were considered as having nothing

to do with the questions under discussion. These comrades were criticized for inactivity, lack of initiative or of definite opinions, for wavering and being easily influenced; they were criticized for sometimes taking incorrect stands, etc., but we, in our responsible positions, have forgotten to criticize ourselves for not activating them, for not keeping them informed, and for not appointing them to tasks in conformity with their responsibility. In the first place, the Berat Plenum brought about this state of affairs by creating the illusion that it had found the correct solution to the problem of the cadres of the Central Committee and its functioning, while in reality it did nothing to solve this problem. In addition, the lack of unity in the Bureau, mutual distrust, individualistic work and other shortcomings and errors in its work, prevented those comrades from taking an active and lively part in solving problems and directing affairs.

People were beginning to think that there were only three people controlling affairs in the Political Bureau, and that there was no unity among them. Therefore I thought that there should be an end to such a situation. I thought that the Political Bureau should be enlarged to include not only old comrades, but also young ones.

As far as I am concerned, both old and young comrades have always had their place. I thought, and I do not think I was mistaken, that in the Central Committee, apart from the loyal and capable older comrades, there should also be younger ones who, though not having the experience of the former, had proved through their work in the Party that they would make good leaders. Of the three comrades I proposed, one was comrade Mehmet Shehu and the two others were younger. Mehmet was our age, he had fought in Spain, he had fought and shown his ability in directing the struggle and leading our National Liberation Army, and was continuing to advance

his military knowledge. As far as the two younger ones were concerned, it is true that Nako influenced the proposal to include them, but we should not forget that, for my part, I had heard nothing bad about those two comrades, not from Nako, of course, but not from Koçi either, or from anyone else. They may have had their shortcomings, but all the comrades have shortcomings, and at that time the real or alleged shortcomings of those two comrades, which were to emerge later, were unknown and were not evident. The three comrades whom I proposed for membership of the Bureau were rejected by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. It should be stressed here that they did not reject them for political reasons. The reasons they put forward were that they allegedly had personal shortcomings and, being young, should continue their probation period.

Even after my theses were presented, and after the enlargement of the Bureau was proposed, we were unable to improve the situation in the leadership, and especially in our Political Bureau. But we must acknowledge that in spite of all these shortcomings, and in spite of the situation, our work had made progress. This shows that we could also have solved those problems which seemed to us insoluble, if we had only had more good will and less impetuosity, and if genuine and open Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism had existed.

In order to maintain an unhealthy situation in the Political Bureau throughout this period and after the signing of the agreement with Yugoslavia⁸, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia carried

⁸ This refers to the Treaty on the Coordination of Economic Plans, Customs Union and Financial Parity between the PR of Albania and the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia signed in November 27, 1946.

on intrigues to an extraordinary extent, and also used the delegates it had here for this purpose. They blatantly intervened in our internal affairs. Up to a certain point, we were also to blame for having permitted it, but this came about chiefly as a result of the trust we had placed in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav leaders attentively followed all the situations which arose in our country, and kept themselves well informed; they had detailed knowledge of our activities in the Political Bureau, of the spirit predominating there, and of the measures we were taking or thinking of taking. They were also informed of the theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum. The delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia apparently told Koçi Xoxe that Nako had informed them about it and had told him "the Commander⁹ thinks ill of the Yugoslavs and of the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia." We cannot believe this and other such allegations, for the Yugoslavs said these things when comrade Nako was no longer among us. I think they are outright slanders. The Yugoslav Trotskyites were capable of any slander. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav leadership has been fully informed of the situation within our Party and our country. During this period they tried to strengthen their position and, on the surface, followed a "benevolent policy" towards all the members of our leadership in order to curry favour with them. They suited their word to the hearer, and incited one against the other with the aim of maintaining and fostering a tense situation, for only in this way could they later impose their views on us, and at the same time create the impression that only they were in a position to put things in order in our country and within our

⁹ Enver Hoxha.

Party. The economic relations established just at that time gave a boost to the hostile activity of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia against our Party and country.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND OUR COUNTRY

Undoubtedly, our country needed aid to reconstruct its economy destroyed by the war. We were to receive this aid from the Soviet Union and from Yugoslavia, and also from other people's democracies. In the beginning, the principal aid came from Yugoslavia. But it should be explained here that this also included the aid given by the Soviet Union. Molotov made this clear to us in Paris¹⁰, in the presence of Kardelj, Moshaj Pijade and me. He set forth the view of the Soviet leadership on the way in which the relations between our two republics should develop. When it came to economic matters, Molotov said, "the Soviet Union will unsparingly help the Albanian people to rebuild their economy, but this help will be given through Yugoslavia, purely for reasons of foreign policy." Comrade Stalin repeated this to us when we went to Moscow¹¹. Not only that, but comrade Stalin and the Soviet government met all our requests. They wholeheartedly granted us credits of great advantage to us. We do not know how the Soviet assistance that came to us through Yugoslavia was arranged, but the fact is that the Soviet Union has given Yugoslavia great economic and military assistance. The aid Yugoslavia gave us has no

10 In the course of the proceedings of the Paris Peace Conference (August 29 — October 15, 1946).

11 During the visit to the Soviet Union by a delegation of the PRA, headed by comrade Enver Hoxha in July 1947.

doubt been minimal in comparison with the aid it received from the Soviet Union. If we compare the direct economic and military aid given us by the Soviet Union when we went to Moscow, and what it is giving us this year, we can safely say that it is two or three times greater than the aid Yugoslavia gave us.

The Economic Convention¹² was a continuation of the alliance we had entered into with Yugoslavia¹³. This convention was accompanied by protocols on the co-ordination of planning, the unification of prices, parity of currency, joint companies, etc. Here it is only correct to say that we accepted and signed those protocols. But at the same time, we made several suggestions, for example, on parity of currency and the unification of prices; experience showed that our suggestions were right, but at the time they were contemptuously and menacingly turned down by the Yugoslavs, who described them as obstruction on our part. Our suggestions were confined only to practical questions, and not matters of principle. We did not discuss as we should have the true meaning of coordination of planning, parity of currency, the unification of prices, the abolition of customs barriers, and the methods of activity of joint companies, nor did we properly define the question of credits. We had full trust in them, whereas the Yugoslavs had specific aims as far as the nature and development of economic relations were concerned. The aims of the policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards our country were anti-Marxist, exploitative and colonialist; in short, they were to the detriment of our people.

12 The Economic Convention between the PRA and the PFRY was signed in November 1946.

13 This refers to the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid between the PRA and the PFRY, signed in July 1946.

The demand for coordinated economic plans served the anti-Marxist aims of the Yugoslav leadership. Plans for particular projects could have been coordinated between our two republics in the common interest of the two countries. But the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia aimed, through the coordination of planning, to have our economy develop in the framework of the Yugoslav economy, conditioned by and dependent on it. Our economy "should not develop independently, but should be placed in dependence on the Yugoslav economy". That was the aim of the parity of currency, the unification of prices, the abolition of customs and the creation of joint companies. Yugoslavia, without making any genuine effort to help to bring these companies fully and properly into operation, claimed the exclusive right to operate them, or rather not to operate them.

In 1946 trade relations were also established between our two republics. In practice a new situation was created in which our country was isolated from the Soviet Union and the people's democracies as far as economic relations were concerned. This situation was created by the Yugoslavs, who tried to suppress any of our initiatives in this respect. We had signed a minor trade agreement with the Soviet Union, which helped us immediately after liberation, with grain and other items. As we owed the Soviet Union oil etc., the Yugoslavs tried in a thousand ways to prevent us from meeting this obligation towards the Soviet Union and to prevent the repetition of such an agreement.

In 1946 we set up the Planning Commission, headed by Nako Spiru. On our request, Soviet advisers were appointed to the Planning Commission and other departments, and right from the beginning they helped our young cadres to shoulder their tasks and to work with

confidence in the future. The Yugoslavs also brought in a number of specialists and engineers who, far from being of any great help to us, engaged in intrigues and sabotage activities. The only directive they had received was to throw a spanner into the works, to slow down as much as possible the general development of our economy, and in particular the carrying out of the plan. They insisted that we must listen to them, and that they should have the last word, arguing that it was Yugoslavia which was giving us the aid.

The 1946 plan was drawn up under these conditions and with men who were new to that work, but very active and confident in their forces. They also had the help of the Soviet advisers. The Yugoslav leaders and specialists tried at every moment to belittle our cadres and their efforts, and to hamper the work, inventing great theories on every question, proposing study after study in order to slow down the formulation of plans and later to give our side the blame, alleging that we "had not drawn up the plan in time, and had not handed it over to Belgrade in time", and that "the plan had not been studied in depth, and should have gone over with them." Their intention was to delay the delivery of goods, to postpone investments, in a word, to prevent us receiving the credit promised, as in fact happened.

During that period, besides these obstacles, the Yugoslavs also openly robbed our economy, but we tried to resist this. For example, on the question of accumulation, in spite of our opposition, the Yugoslavs arbitrarily decided against us. Thus they plundered our country of colossal sums, amounting to several million leks. Similarly, the turnover tax, which should have been a measure assisting our government to carry out its prices policy and to regulate our accumulation, was arbitrarily determined in favour of the Yugoslavs. Here, too, they have

robbed us of millions, seriously weakening our economy. All the plunder was concealed and justified with pseudo-Marxist slogans, but especially with economic blackmail and threats, with the pressure of delay in granting credit.

We witnessed many suspicious dealings by the Yugoslavs, such as the question of specifying the investments in the joint companies¹⁴, and of determining credit. We pointed this out to them in order to clarify matters and put them right. But they never wanted to clarify these questions and accused us of lacking confidence. They were on a wrong, anti-Marxist road.

The realization of a credit of two billion dinars was the main problem preoccupying us, for the fulfilment of our plan greatly depended on it. Observing the trade agreement and making investments were the most complicated problems. The Yugoslavs deliberately caused obstructions in order to be in position to exert pressure on us later. In all the sectors of plan the Yugoslavs sabotaged right and left. Not only was the total credit not forthcoming, but what consumer goods or investments that did come were never dispatched on time.

Throughout this period of our work, the Yugoslavs, in order to divert the concern and attention of our cadres from implementing the plan, and in order to justify their serious failures, did not give our cadres a moment's respite, and prevented them from setting to work and carrying out the planned tasks as they ought to. None of the proposed studies was completed, or could have been completed. Their aims, and the methods they resorted to, prevented our cadres from drawing practical benefit in order to develop and advance. But in spite of these ob-

14 The joint Albanian-Yugoslav companies were set up after the signing of the Economic Convention between the PRA and PFRY.

stacles, through the efforts of our Party and government, through the great selflessness of the working masses, and using the material available locally, much work was done to improve the living conditions of our people.

Through their activity, the Yugoslav leaders aimed at many-sided objectives: to impede the development of our economy and to place it under their complete dependence, to discredit the Party before the broad masses of the people as "a party incapable of running the country and of guiding the destiny of the people", to discredit the leadership of the Party as incapable of coping with the situations, and to fight against all those leaders who had become an obstacle to the realization of their plans. Their next aim was to shake the faith and love of our Party for the Soviet Union, and in fact to weaken our confidence in the Soviet advisers, to discredit these advisers, and to force us into demanding their departure. This would bring about the isolation of our country and Party from the Soviet Union and from the socialist camp.

The activity of the Yugoslav leadership created particular situations with a definite purpose. In order to achieve their aims, the Yugoslav leaders undertook a series of monstrous actions against our Party, our government, our economy, our plan, and our people. They came out with the thesis alleging that a second anti-Yugoslav line was becoming apparent in our Party, and made our leadership responsible to the people for such a situation. This was the first accusation they made against our Central Committee¹⁵. The Political Bureau refuted this accusation, although not all its members were convinced about

¹⁵ This accusation was brought against the CC of the CPA in June 1947 in a provocative letter sent by the CC of the CPY to the CC of the CPA.

this decision. The decision of the Bureau was a correct one, and our reply to the representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was completely correct.

In the attack on our Party and its leadership, the question of the draft five-year plan recommended by the Yugoslav government for our People's Republic was raised. In fact, the question of the draft-plan was only a bluff. All the facts prove this, as does the admission of Savo Zlatich, who revealed that in the Yugoslav budget not only was there no provision for a large credit to finance our five-year plan, but there was not even any provision for a further credit of two billion dinars which was to be granted to us for 1948. This credit was to be drawn from the supposed reserve funds of the Yugoslav budget. The Yugoslav government had told us that we would be granted a sum of 20 to 21 billion dinars for the five-year plan. The Yugoslav leaders denied saying this, just as they denied all their low-down actions, but the fact remains that this was the basis on which our draft five-year plan was drawn up. It was formulated by our comrades with the help of Soviet specialists. This draft-plan was drawn up hastily, and our cadres were exhausted by the task, because this work was beyond our capabilities, and the Yugoslavs wanted it finished in record time. They had given us the general outlines of one of their draft five-year plans, on which to rely in formulating our own, which was Yugoslav-orientated. It was claimed that Nako Spiru concealed this draft-plan. But Nako Spiru did not invent the matter of the 20 to 21 billion dinars out of his own head; the Yugoslavs officially told Kiço Ngjela¹⁶ about it. And this is the truth. We believe our

¹⁶ At that time vice-president of the State Planning Commission.

comrade Kiço Ngjela, and not the Yugoslav Trotskyites who are trying to dig our country's grave. Therefore, that plan could and did serve as guideline. Certainly the Yugoslavs used many ruses; here are the facts: one would say ten billion, and would give this as his own approximate opinion; the delegate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Savo Zlatich, mentioned the figure of 21 billion to Kiço, while the tentative draft of the Yugoslav five-year plan gave a figure of 13 to 15 billion, and this was justified with the assertion that previous estimates might have been mistaken. All these manoeuvres aimed to mislead us and showed bias and lack of seriousness.

The guidelines set down by the Yugoslavs for our five-year plan were anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian. The essence of these guidelines was to enable them to exploit our country. We were expected to produce for the Yugoslavs all the raw materials which they needed. These raw materials were to be exported to the metropolis Yugoslavia to be processed there in Yugoslav factories. The same applied to the production of cotton and other industrial crops, as well as oil, bitumen, asphalt, chrome, etc. Yugoslavia would supply its "colony", Albania, with exorbitantly priced consumer goods, including even such items as needles and thread, and would provide us with petrol and oil, as well as glass for the lamps in which we would burn the fuel extracted from our subsoil, processed in Yugoslavia, and sold to us at high prices. This is precisely the policy of the US capitalist and monopoly trusts. The aim of the Yugoslavs was, therefore, to prevent our country from developing either its industry or its working class, and to make it forever dependent on Yugoslavia. The few factories or workshops which were to be given to our country, and were anticipated in the Yugoslav draft-

plan, were not only laughable, but never eventuated. Not only that, but the Yugoslav leaders and their representatives here even dismantled what more or less efficient machinery we had, and sent it to Yugoslavia. They even robbed us of the machinery we had received as war reparations.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia described the draft five-year plan which we formulated as "autarchic", "unrealistic", etc. Such an evaluation was not correct. Our draft-plan was neither autarchic, nor unrealistic; it was based on the credit promised by the Yugoslavs themselves. Our Central Committee was not wrong in approving the draft five-year plan, nor were the General Secretary of the Party, or comrade Nako Spiru. The independent economic development of the country and the construction of socialism in Albania with the assistance of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, especially of Yugoslavia, was described as autarchic by the Yugoslav Trotskyites. This was a trick and baseless slander directed against the correct orientation of the development of our country's economy. In that draft-plan there were some inaccurate formulations and some exaggerations, but this was not the essence of the problem. We blamed Nako Spiru for these exaggerations, but this is not just, either. We too studied and approved this hastily formulated draft-plan, and if there are mistakes in it, it is the fault of all of us, and not of comrade Nako alone.

The draft-plan provided for our country to develop industrial crops, primarily cotton, at the expense of cereals and especially of maize. Here we fell into the trap set by the Yugoslav leadership, who told us, "Do not worry about bread, the Banat plain produces enough for you and for us". In view of what the Yugoslav Trotskyites had

in mind for our country, this meant that, by keeping the solution of the bread problem in their hands, they would use it like Damocles' sword over the heads of our people to deprive them of their independence and turn them into slaves.

The question of bread is one of the biggest and most difficult problems facing our country, all the more so if we take into account the great difficulties, which would face us in planning agricultural production under the conditions of the existence of small-scale private property in the countryside. This problem has been of great concern to our people, and they have quite correctly concentrated their main efforts on ensuring bread. The problem of bread is a question of principle. It is a mistake to be dependent on a foreign country for such a prime necessity, for we should be prepared to cope with the unexpected. That does not mean that our country should concentrate only on the production of maize and wheat. No. We should encourage the peasantry to cultivate and develop industrial crops as well, but this should be done after investigation, and as much new land as possible should be opened up.

As for the development of industry and the local processing of raw materials, we think that our estimate was both correct and modest.

All of us were fully confident that the draft-plan we had drawn up was correct in its general outline, and we were not at all wrong in this. That draft-plan, like all drafts, had to be discussed, corrected, and then approved. We never considered it to be final. Nor was it sent to Belgrade to be reviewed; only the principal guidelines were sent. We waited for reply, which was delayed (I will speak of this later), and when it came, it was in the form of a serious and base accusation against our Central

Committee¹⁷ by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was preparing its attack against our Party, in order to subjugate both our Party and country, it was preparing its attack against the socialist camp in the sector of Albania. The principal guidelines of our draft five-year plan were taken to Belgrade by Zlatic, not with the purpose of helping our country, but in order to have them as a springboard for the attack against our Party. As the issue of the draft-plan was not a sufficient motive for such an attack, the Yugoslav leaders concocted other base accusations to aggravate the situation still further. They used the question of the railway¹⁸, the construction of which the Party had entrusted to the youth. It was at the railway construction site that the great drive of our working youth, their heroism and their determination were best displayed. The youth were the first in work and effort, and were a great support for our Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia tried to attack and discourage this creative force of our people and Party. The Yugoslavs' attack on the railway construction site was at the same time a blow at our Party and government. The failure to complete the railway construction work would have been a grave economic and political setback for us. The Party had understood this well, and had thoroughly informed the youth of this, and the youth kept their word to the Party. The railway construction site was the scene of a broad confrontation be-

17 This accusation was brought against the CC of the CPA by the CC of the CPY in November 1947.

18 In the building of the railway, many Yugoslavs came to Albania allegedly to render internationalist aid; but they tried to hamper and sabotage work. Due to their activity, the Albanian youth began to look askance at them.

tween our men and the Yugoslavs. Our youth, the cadres of the Party and the youth organization who worked on the railway and directed the work there, carried out their task with heroism and great selflessness, with deep love for our Party and people. The railway was finished according to schedule only through the determination of our youth, led by the Party. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and all the men it had sent to the railway construction site — engineers, surveyors, etc. — sabotaged the railway work. To the Yugoslavs, the construction of this project was an opportunity for sabotage to create a difficult situation, and to concoct slanders against our Party. This is fully proved by all the documents held by our Party and state about this great action. The Yugoslavs working at the railway construction site, ranging from the director to the man in charge of Party matters, were nothing but anti-Marxists, OZNA-men and ustashi¹⁹, indoctrinated with exploitative and colonialist attitudes towards our country. The Yugoslavs at the railway opposed, despised and slandered our cadres, and accused them of many base actions. The Yugoslavs acted towards the Albanians at the work-site like bosses from the metropolis who set the natives to build railways in their African colonies. Our Party people and our Youth Organization never reconciled themselves to this situation. And they were right. Certainly in such an important action some small incidents did occur, but the Yugoslavs inflated them and came to the conclusion that "the Albanians have set up an anti-Yugoslav front which reached its height at the railway construction site". This was not a question of the insignificant mistakes some young person might have made, but a question

19 Members of the reactionary bands of Ante Pavelich in the so-called "Independent Croatian State" during the Second World War.

of big political issues. The Yugoslavs accused us of having viewed the question more from the practical angle, while neglecting the political angle. This is totally untrue. It is they who had neglected the political angle, or rather, had considered the question in a politically distorted, anti-Marxist, colonialist manner.

In order to further reinforce the thesis of the "anti-Yugoslav front being created within our Party and country", the Yugoslavs, from the official representatives of the government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the specialists, began to spread other slanders. They spread the rumour that the Yugoslav technicians were looked down on, that they were not given good accommodation, etc.

But their arrogance went still further. They even used the visit of a delegation of our Party and government to the Soviet Union to further their ends. This visit caused great concern to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. We signed an economic agreement with the Soviet Union, according to which it undertook to give us considerable aid to develop our economy. This aid was a serious blow to the aims of the Yugoslav leaders, who wanted to turn our country into their colony, which would work to provide the Yugoslav metropolis with raw materials. With the factories the Soviet Union was to give us, we would set up industry in our country, raw materials would be processed locally, and our people would not be forced to buy many manufactured articles abroad. With the setting up of industry, our working class, our Party and state would be strengthened. The Soviet Union granted us credits and gave us a number of threshing machines and tractors of great importance to the development of our agriculture.

Our Party informed the people of this help given us by the Soviet Union. But the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia labelled this correct action as an "anti-Yugoslav policy". This was stated openly by the official representative of the Yugoslav government. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, for us to establish political and economic relations with another socialist country was tantamount to being "anti-Yugoslav"! The Yugoslavs deeply resented our Party's efforts to strengthen our friendship with the Soviet Union. The Yugoslav officials accused those working towards this end of non-existent crimes, sometimes directly and sometimes in a roundabout way, alleging that they "were not popularizing Yugoslavia as they should", which, in other words, meant, "the Soviet Union is being popularized to an excessive degree"; at other times they accused our men and our Party of being orientated towards the West, towards France and Italy, in the commercial or cultural field. These were base slanders. Our Party has never been orientated towards the West, either in its policy, trade, or cultural relations. There is no need to explain why such an accusation was made. The Yugoslav leaders wanted us to be orientated towards their country in every field. People who did not act in this way had to be attacked and replaced. This was their intention.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia prepared the ground by slandering our Party and people high and low in order to find support for their base accusations which led to our mistaken analysis at the 8th Plenum²⁰ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania. They accused our Central Committee of following an anti-Yugoslav policy, and of allowing the creation of an anti-Yugoslav front; they claimed that the

20 At the 8th Plenum, held in February 1948, the hostile activity of the Yugoslavs and of their agency headed by Koçi Xoxe against the CPA reached its climax.

policy of our government towards Yugoslavia was diametrically opposed to the aspirations and views of our people. They claimed that the Central Committee of our Party had followed a policy of breaking away from Yugoslavia in the economic field, that the orientation of our economy was mistaken, and that this was shown by our draft-plan, which was unrealistic and autarchic, and did not in the least comply with the decisions of the central committees of our two parties. Such a mistaken orientation, they said, was also apparent in other sectors of our country's activity, such as culture, education, railways, mining, etc.

Finally, particular accusations were levelled at Nako Spiru, who held special responsibility for the economic problems of our country, as one of the authors of this situation, and he was accused of playing a suspicious role in this matter, and the Central Committee of our Party was asked to see whether there was any enemy interference to cause the relations between the two countries to reach such a low ebb. Other names were also mentioned in these accusations. They said that, before entering any agreement with another country, Albania should ask for Yugoslavia's approval. This thesis was openly directed against the economic agreement which our government had signed with the Soviet government some months earlier.

These, in a few words, were the accusations against the Central Committee of our Party. These accusations were the basis of the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee and the resolution which emerged from it. We shall speak later about the analysis and the mistakes committed there. Here we shall continue to discuss the aims of the Yugoslav charges, and the actions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia after our analysis.

The main aim of the criticism was to turn our country into the seventh republic of Yugoslavia, to make it submit to orders and directives from Belgrade, to transform our country into a Yugoslav colony with only formal independence, concealed and masked with the formulae of bourgeois pseudo-independence. The criticism aimed to separate Albania from the socialist camp, to turn it into an enemy of the Soviet Union and to divert our Party into an anti-Marxist road. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, Albania was the small state of the socialist camp in which they would make their first experiment in implementing their treacherous line against the socialist camp. They had long worked in this direction, but the resistance of our Party was far from being extinguished. Our Party possessed great strength, and the Yugoslav leaders had to work hard to suppress that strength.

To achieve their ends, first of all, they had to subdue the will of our Central Committee and the General Secretary of our Party, in whom they saw a great obstacle. The base accusations of the Yugoslav Trotskyite leadership against the Central Committee of our Party, which were previously directed against Nako Spiru, were now levelled against the General Secretary of the Party, for he bore the principal responsibility for the "erroneous policy" of the Central Committee. They were well acquainted with the situation in the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of our Party, they were aware of the divergencies that existed among the members of the Bureau, such as those between Nako and Koçi, and of the situation which had arisen between Koçi and me. They also knew that Nako's opinions on relations with Yugoslavia, on all the points in which they were correct, accorded with mine. They knew well that Nako did nothing in this matter without asking advice and obtaining my approval. The Yugoslavs had based their calculations on

the situation that existed in our Political Bureau, a situation which was brought about, in the first place, by their base intrigues. The Yugoslav Trotskyites were also greatly helped by the gravest error committed by Nako Spiru, his suicide. The analysis of the 8th Plenum was a great triumph for the Yugoslavs. They succeeded in creating within our Party the situation they wanted.

After the analysis, the situation grew very complicated. Through pressure, blackmail and psychological warfare, they managed to ensure the approval of their first proposals. It was accepted that the plan was unrealistic and autarchic, it was accepted that "our political and economic line, as well as our military line, were mistaken and endangered our People's Republic and our Party". The draft five-year plan was buried. It was agreed that a plan for the year 1948 alone should be drawn up. The trade agreement between our two countries was abolished. A commission to co-ordinate the plans was set up along the lines the Yugoslavs wanted, and it started work. But matters did not stop there; they were to go still further. The plan was not fulfilled. The Yugoslav pledges to provide us with consumer goods, materials and investments were not carried out. All these matters were submerged under the weight of bureaucracy and endless socio-economic studies. They imposed mistaken methods on us in order to wipe out the achievements of the people's power in the implementation of land reform and other matters. The forms of organization of our enterprises were criticized and new forms were proposed with the aim of removing all obstacles in the way of the union of Albania with Yugoslavia on an anti-Marxist basis. The underestimation of our cadres reached its peak.

The Co-ordinating Commission, which was set up in order to help the fulfilment of our plans, to approach the Yugoslav government asking for faster delivery of mate-

rials and investments, and to help in the implementation of the plan, actually pursued other diametrically opposed aims. It was assuming the form of a *de facto* Yugoslav government in Albania. No action could be taken by our ministries without the approval of the Co-ordinating Commission, or better said, without the approval of the head of this commission, Kraiger. Matters reached the stage where he demanded that our ministers should come to report to him and take orders from him. That would have meant the liquidation of our government.

The Yugoslavs suggested that all the joint companies be disbanded and turned into enterprises under the direct control of the Co-ordinating Commission and Kraiger. These joint companies which should have been directed by the Albanian government, and towards which the Yugoslavs had never fulfilled their obligations, would from now on have to sever completely even those weak links they maintained with various departments of our government.

Our State Planning Commission began gradually to lose its functions and to become an appendix without any competence. The principal officials of the Planning Commission were kept busy in endless discussions with Kraiger and endless studies on the future development of our socialist economy, seen from the Yugoslav viewpoint.

A kind of control commission which came from Yugoslavia, without any right to do so, inspected the joint companies and issued a "monumental" report, one of the most shocking anti-Albanian documents, the sole document they put their signature to, in which the Albanian government and, consequently, our Central Committee were accused of many outrageous things. Grave responsibility for this falls on Pandi Kristo in particular. With unprecedented cynicism worthy only of the enemies and the USA and British imperialists, we were given the blame

for the non-delivery of materials by the Yugoslavs, and their failure to carry out investments. There was no difference between this blackmail and that of the British missions during the war. Six months had passed, and instead of about one billion eight hundred million leks of the credit which should have materialized, only about 200 million leks were forthcoming. Pressure and blackmail were exerted with specific aims in a very important sector of the country's life, that of the economy. The Yugoslavs were preparing the ground in order to eliminate the existing forms of organization, to unify our economy fully with that of Yugoslavia, to remove all obstacles in the international field, and afterwards to present the great issue of unification as a "fait accompli", carried out with the full agreement of our Party and, therefore, of our people.

In such a situation, with all the negative consequences of the analysis of the 8th Plenum, there were open disagreements between us and the Yugoslavs, and serious clashes and misunderstandings.

The Yugoslavs demanded that we request the withdrawal of the Soviet advisers. We were never convinced on the question of the departure of the Soviet advisers, but under Yugoslav pressure, we gave in on this issue, and we were mistaken. Our mistake was that we accepted the opinion of the Yugoslavs to some extent, we reached a compromise with them and asked the Soviet government to withdraw some advisers, for the alleged reason that, with the way our economy was developing, we could well do without them; but we needed the Soviet technicians. This was a rotten "modus vivendi".

The situation which arose in the economy after the 8th Plenum harmed us greatly. The cost of living rose, inflation increased, supplies were scarce, plans were not fulfilled, the procurement of maize and all other agricul-

tural products became difficult, and prices went up from day to day. The Yugoslavs shamelessly demanded that we fulfil all our obligations towards them, while not fulfilling any of their obligations towards us. This is a brief description of the economic situation which was created at that time.

In other sectors, too, an equally dangerous situation was deliberately being created by the Yugoslavs.

At this time the Yugoslav leadership asked to send a Yugoslav division into the Korça zone. The history of the sending of this division is well known. The Yugoslavs had various aims : first, they wanted to create in our country, and at the head of our Party, a phobia of imminent war and the idea that a great danger was threatening Albania from the South. The Yugoslavs presented the matter as if we were about to be attacked by the Anglo-Americans and the Greek monarcho-fascists, and alleged that they had reliable information. This was done to make our Central Committee devote serious concern to this problem and forget everything else, and to create the impression in our Party that in such a "critical situation" Yugoslavia was a vigilant ally, ready to give immediate help.

At the time when the Yugoslavs raised the question of the division, the situation in Greece was confused, the offensive of the democratic forces had begun, and there was therefore no strong reason to justify the Yugoslav alarm. To send a division at that time, and to proclaim the Korça zone a Yugoslav area, as the Yugoslavs requested, would have been an unprecedented act which might have created an international incident. It might have been used by imperialism as a threat of war on our part, for such an act would have gone beyond the bounds of self-defence, and in this case, the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid would have come into effect. If a Yugoslav division had

been sent, and Korça proclaimed a Yugoslav area, this would have had serious repercussions among our people, causing them excessive and needless alarm, and bringing about very grave political and economic consequences.

The Soviet government had no knowledge of the Yugoslav proposal. Only when we informed it of the proposal, did it learn what was being done and expressed the opinion that there was no reason why such a proposal should be accepted. The wise advice of the Soviet government strengthened our determination not to permit the sending of the division. The Yugoslav criticized us, and especially me, as I had informed the Soviet government and was not convinced about the stationing of a Yugoslav division in Korça.

The Yugoslavs intended to use the stationing of their division in Korça for other purposes. Their relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated, and they tried to foster enmity between us and the Soviet Union. General Kupreshanin, avowedly anti-Soviet, went so far as to make the monstrous statement that "the Soviet Union will sacrifice Albania to the imperialists". Kupreshanin, loyal to the Belgrade Trotskyites, identified the just policy of the Soviet Union with the policy of the men who brought about the Munich capitulation. The Trotskyite representatives of Belgrade, from Savo Zlatich and Josip Djerdja to Spiro Sergentich, spoke in the same disgraceful anti-Soviet way. The stationing of a Yugoslav division in Korça and the dispatch of other divisions, allegedly to defend the independence and integrity of our country, would have served the Yugoslav leaders as a lever to impose their opinions and to suppress by force any resistance of our Party.

After the failure of their plan to send a division, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and Tito himself tried to maintain the war phobia in

Albania. The Yugoslav representative to Albania tried to convince our Central Committee and General Staff that they should take extraordinary military measures, saying that they should "change the character and organization of the army, build new bridges, and widen the existing ones to allow the passage of heavy tanks coming from Yugoslavia to cope with the situation"; they should "build many kilometres of military and strategic roads, erect new telegraph lines, mobilize a further 10,000 young men and bring in a great number of mules for the army", and many other such measures. And all this had to be completed within 2-3 months, because the threat was imminent.

As well as this, the military representative of the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shamelessly tried to argue that our army "was very weak and could hold out for only 10 days against a monarcho-fascist attack". This being the case, they claimed that "South Albania would be endangered because of the failure to station a Yugoslav division in the Korça district, for which the General Secretary of the Party was to blame". The Belgrade representative declared that "Yugoslavia would be unable to come to the aid of Albania, as it would take 15 days for its forces in Montenegro and Kosova to reach the Shkumbini river, and by then it would be all over, and the monarcho-fascists and the Anglo-Americans would have occupied South Albania". He alleged that "the issue would assume an international character, there would be intervention by special commissions of the UN, and under these conditions it would be difficult for Yugoslavia to enter the war". The Yugoslavs, in order to intimidate us, cast doubts on the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Aid itself. At the same time, they obstinately insisted that we ask the Soviet government to change its opinion on the stationing of a Yugoslav division in the Korça district, and demanded that "if it did not change its opi-

nion, we should insist and stubbornly demand the reasons". The aim of all this was to make us act on this important question without the approval of the Soviet government, and to set us at loggerheads with the Soviet Union. This was a base action worthy of the Trotskyites.

We disagreed with the Yugoslavs on all these questions; we judged them quite differently, with the exception of comrade Shule²¹.

For a long time Kristo Themelko transmitted the mistaken views of the Yugoslavs; he agreed with them, and his confidence in the Commander was greatly shaken. Those were very grave errors on comrade Shule's part, but it would be a mistake if we were to consider them in isolation from the accompanying circumstances. Comrade Shule honestly acknowledged his errors, made a sound, correct and open self-criticism, and severely condemned the mistaken road the Yugoslavs had led him into. There is no other way to explain Shule's mistakes, which do not comply with his class background, with his revolutionary past, and with his determined struggle for the people and the Party, other than the great influence exerted by the Yugoslavs, the deep trust he had placed in them, and the situation created in our Party. These are circumstances which mitigate Shule's errors.

Being fully under the influence of the Yugoslavs, Kristo Themelko thought completely as they did, and considered all their theses correct. We were not in agreement with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, from the time of its intervention in our military affairs to the time when they wanted to station a Yugoslav division in Korça. We thought we had taken all

21 Kristo Themelko, at that time director of the Political Department of the Army, made self-criticism and later worked according to the line of the Party.

the necessary military measures they suggested but, on their insistence, agreed to build the bridges and the roads, to install new telephone lines, etc., besides mobilizing 10,000 men and pack animals, to be done outside our plan and using special credits granted by the Yugoslav budget. Still we were fully convinced that none of these measures could be carried out.

Why did the Yugoslav leaders present the situation in such alarming terms and propose such far-reaching measures when even a child would have quite easily seen that not only was it impossible to carry out such actions within two months, but that there was no serious reason for carrying them out. The proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia were presented initially through comrade Shule and later directly by Savo Zlatich. Comrade Shule, very much under Yugoslav influence, brought up two or three times in the Political Bureau the problem that all the proposed measures in the military field could not be implemented under the existing constitutional forms, and that therefore the union of our people with the people of Yugoslavia had to be carried out, and this should be done quickly. According to them, conditions were ripe, and there was no need to wait any longer. The Yugoslavs asked Shule my opinion about their proposals, but advised him that, if I did not agree with them, he should present them as his own proposals. It was apparent that their suspicion of me was deepening.

Finally, Savo Zlatich himself suggested that we should ask the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia for the union of Albania with Yugoslavia. We gave the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia a written reply on all these questions. These letters are important documents of our Party. We disagreed with the views of the Central Committee of the

Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which was unable to achieve what it wanted from us, that is, our approval for the union of Albania with Yugoslavia.

At that time, first through Shule and then directly through Tito's military representative in Albania, General Kupreshanin, the Yugoslavs raised the question of creating a unified command. Through Shule, when he went to Belgrade, it was first suggested and then decided that the General Staff should change its structure. There should be a deputy minister for war, who would be responsible for all the sectors of the army. The General Staff was also included within these sectors. This proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which threatened to expose their aims, was later altered, after the suggestions made to Shule. The Yugoslavs aimed to remove the General Commander from the leadership of our army command. This meant to "cross out the name of the General Commander", as Comrade Mehmet Shehu rightly told Pëllumb Dishnica²² who supported the Yugoslav proposal. After our replies in the letters mentioned previously, all these proposals were suspended.

We should stress that all these proposals and measures which the Yugoslavs wanted to implement were made with great haste. They were afraid that the exposure of their treason by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union would foil their plan, so they hastily tried to lead us on to their anti-Marxist road, in order to create a bloc against the socialist camp.

We were fully aware that the actions of the Yugoslavs were not correct, but not knowing of their treason, we had to be careful and proceed very slowly. At the same

²² Former cadre of the Political Department of the Army. He was expelled from the army on account of his hostile activity.

time, under these circumstances the Yugoslavs created in our Bureau an atmosphere of doubt about whether we should ask the advice of the Soviet comrades on these matters or not, whether we should keep them informed or not. It was wrong to pose the question that way. We put our view to Savo Zlatich, saying that such a stand towards the Soviet people and the Soviet government was incorrect. He tried to justify it, saying that these were our internal affairs, and therefore we could not inform the Soviet comrades about them without first discussing them ourselves. They wanted to confront the Soviet Union with *a fait accompli* created through intrigues and anti-Marxist dealings. We put an end to this situation.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, after receiving our letters and seeing the failure of their plans, sent Savo Zlatich back to us with new suggestions. He proposed the indirect union of Albania with Yugoslavia through economic measures which would in fact mean actual union. These measures were the same as those mentioned previously which were resorted to after our last analysis²³. Then they proposed the alternative: either we maintain the existing situation, strengthening the existing links (but this meant, in their view, "to take a step backwards, which was no good"), or we sever relations. All these proposals were put forward as coming from Savo Zlatich and adopted in principle by the Central Committee of the CPY. We were to study and discuss them, while the conclusions of our discussions and our suggestions were to be presented to the Central Committee of the CPY. The aim of this was, on the one hand, to protect the Central Committee of the CPY from having to take any responsibility upon itself, letting responsibility lie

23 This refers to the 8th Plenum.

with a certain Savo Zlatich, and on the other hand, to find out our opinions, and in particular to find out whether we were aware of the conflict which existed between the Bolshevik Party of the Soviet Union and the CPY, and to ascertain our stand on this question.

A few days after these proposals were presented to us we were informed of the first letter of the Bolshevik Party to Tito and the other members of the Central Committee of the CPY. The letter of the Bolshevik Party helped us to understand correctly the hostile anti-Albanian plot of the Central Committee of the CPY. We immediately cancelled the departure of the Soviet advisers. The Yugoslavs, seeing that the departure of the Soviet advisers from Albania, an event which they were impatiently waiting for as the days went by, was not taking place, sensed that all their manoeuvres had miscarried, and immediately began spreading base slanders, and delivering open threats and ultimatums. Savo Zlatich, Josip Djerdja and General Kupreshanin left our country in a hostile and abrupt manner. Tito addressed a disgraceful letter to our Central Committee, accusing it and the General Secretary of our Party of things they had not done. He tried to sow discord in our Political Bureau and create within our Party another difficult situation like that created on the eve of the 8th Plenum, but all their shameful actions against our country, against our Party and people, were of no avail. The letters of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party had helped our Party to save itself from the clutches of the Yugoslav Trotskyites, and at the same time to save our people and country from the catastrophe these traitors wanted to lead them into.

Before considering the mistakes committed in the analysis of the 8th Plenum it is necessary also to consider our relations with the Soviet Union.

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE
STAND OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADERSHIP
TOWARDS THEM

Our Party and Central Committee have not been wrong in the stand they have taken towards the Bolshevik Party and the Soviet Union. The heroic war of the Soviet Union against fascism was one of the main factors which accelerated the formation of our Party. The Hitlerite attack on the Soviet Union was also a blow for all the communists of the various communist groups, because they saw in the Soviet Union the glorious homeland of socialism, the great force which defended peace, defended the enslaved nations, the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, and all progressive mankind. The Soviet Union was the sole support and helper of all the progressive peoples of the world. It gave us the hope and strength to combat the slavery of the parasitical capitalists and landowners, and the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin were to the Albanian communists and all the oppressed people of Albania a shining beacon that threw light on their path. Our Party linked the struggle of our people with the struggle of the Soviet Union. From its first leaflet up till the end of the National Liberation War, our Central Committee taught the Party to love the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party and comrade Stalin. The Party explained to the people from the beginning of the struggle that victory would be ours, because we were linked with the Soviet Union, that fascist Germany would be smashed, while the Soviet Union was invincible. Our people understood clearly that their victory was indissolubly linked with the victories of the people of the Soviet Union. Every day our Party organizations kept our people and our army informed of the struggle waged by the Soviet Union, and of its successes, and thus the love of our people for the Soviet

Union, the Red Army, and comrade Stalin grew from day to day. And all this was due to the Party and its correct line.

During the first months after liberation, when the Party and our young state were laying the foundations of foreign policy and taking their first step towards reconstruction, the Soviet Union gave us direct help. At every international conference it defended our people. Everywhere the powerful voice of the Soviet Union rose in defence of the rights of our people and their freedom against the Anglo-Americans, in defence of the independence and territorial integrity of the country against the greed of the Anglo-Americans and their satellites, the Greek monarcho-fascists. Those were difficult moments which were surmounted through the resolute resistance of our Party and people, but this resistance also owes much to the existence and support of the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances our people linked themselves still more closely with the Soviet Union. This was due to the correct political line pursued by our Party and its Central Committee. The Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party were unsparing in their aid to our Party. Besides their great moral support, economic assistance, too, was not lacking.

But our Party's great love for the Soviet Union, the Bolshevik Party, comrade Stalin, and the Soviet people who were in Albania, and its great confidence in them, were viewed unfavourably by the Trotskyite Yugoslav leaders. The Central Committee of the CPY considered Albania as a country which should be under its tutelage. According to the Yugoslav leaders, we were a small state, incapable of either defending ourselves or developing without the aid of Yugoslavia. According to them, the Soviet Union "was far away, and was a great powerful state which could not be directly interested in Albania". The

Yugoslavs took advantage of the fact that the economic aid of the Soviet Union came to us via Yugoslavia, and gave to understand that the CC of the CPY and Tito had agreed with the Soviet Union that Yugoslavia should look after Albania. This was the attitude they adopted towards us, while they used demagoguery in their efforts to hide what they were doing from the Soviet Union.

The stand of the Soviet Union towards other peoples was quite different to that of Yugoslavia. Stalin, at a dinner he gave in honour of the delegates of the Finnish government after the signing of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty, said among other things:

"Many people do not believe that relations of equality can exist between a great nation and a small one. But we, the Soviet people, think that such relations can and should exist. The Soviet people think that every nation, great or small, has its own individual qualities, its own specific features, which belong to it alone and distinguish it from other nations. These features make up the contribution that every nation brings to the great treasury of world culture, which it completes and enriches. In this sense all nations, great or small, occupy a position of equality, and every nation is the equal of every other nation".*

The Soviet people have viewed relations with our country in this light, as Stalin teaches us. Not for a moment did we lose the confidence we had placed in them. The Yugoslav Trotskyites attacked us with their whole arsenal to shake our Party's confidence in the Soviet Union, in the Bolshevik Party, and the Soviet people in Albania. They openly displayed their dissatisfaction. Tito himself and his closest comrades complained that the

* "Pravda", nr. 104 (10845), April 13, 1948.

Albanians received aid from the Yugoslavs, but never renounced their links with the Soviet Union.

The attack of the Yugoslav Trotskyites against the correct line of our Party was a frontal one and extended to all key sectors: the general political orientation of the Party and government, the economy and the army.

The Yugoslav Trotskyites achieved no success in changing the political orientation of the Party; in the economic field, where they could exert some pressure, they managed to shake to some extent the confidence of our Central Committee and Party about the usefulness of the presence of the Soviet advisers in our country. After the analysis of the 8th Plenum, after the pressures and blackmail applied by the Yugoslav leaders, we accepted their thesis that we had no need for Soviet advisers, but only for technicians. But the question of advisers could not be separated from that of technicians ; the Soviet advisers and technicians made up one whole. Although we accepted the thesis, we were not at all convinced that this was the right thing.

At the same time the Yugoslav Trotskyites also attacked us on the front of the army, but achieved nothing. Persistently resorting to all-out blackmail, they tried to expel the Soviet military advisers from the army. The presence of Soviet advisers in our army foiled their anti-Soviet and anti-Marxist plans. They wanted our army to accept and adopt the views of the Central Committee of the CPY on military art and organization. Attacks by the Trotskyites against our army had also been apparent before the analysis of the 8th Plenum. These attacks were made indirectly at the beginning, by criticizing and attacking the chief of our General Staff, comrade Mehmet Shehu. This stand was gradually hardening, not only against comrade Mehmet, but also against me. The attack was not yet openly directed against me, but indirectly that

was what it amounted to, for I supported comrade Mehmet's stand, it was I who recommended Mehmet for membership of the Political Bureau, and I was the General Commander of the Army.

The Yugoslavs succeeded in influencing a number of comrades of the Political Directorate of our army. The first was Pëllumb Dishnica, who put forward in concrete terms his opinion on changing the orientation of the army, and put forward theses for its reorganization. Pëllumb Dishnica's theses were in fact the theses of the Yugoslavs. Comrade Mehmet Shehu gave me a verbal report on this question, and I found his view correct. Pëllumb Dishnica's theses were wrong in principle. It was not a question of gaining experience from the Yugoslav army, but of changing the political orientation of our army, abandoning the experience of the Soviet army. I sensed this threat at once, and that was why I sent for Pëllumb Dishnica to clear things up. The directives in the army are decided upon by the Central Committee, I told Pëllumb Dishnica, they could not be played around with, and I would not permit them to be put in question. Pëllumb, after hearing my advice, said that that was clear to him, whereas at the 8th Plenum he said that in fact it was not clear. He even asked General Shule about this problem in a provocative manner, and after seeing that their opinions coincided, added: "But the Commander thinks differently from us".

The Yugoslav leaders heavily influenced our men in the Political Directorate against the correct direction of the Party in the army and, what was still more dangerous, shook their confidence in the General Commander. This was the starting-point which led the men of the Political Directorate into grave errors. Later comrade Shule and Pëllumb Dishnica, becoming mouthpieces of the Yugoslav leadership, insistently demanded the departure of the Soviet advisers from our army.

After the 8th Plenum the situation became still more aggravated. The Yugoslavs thought the moment had come to change the situation in the army. They considered our army, the army of an independent nation, as a Yugoslav army corps, and the comrades of our Political Directorate worked as if our army was but a corps among the other corps of the Yugoslav army. During a visit he paid to our Political Directorate, Vukmanovich Tempo openly criticized the leaders of our army, as if the Yugoslavs were its real commanders.

After the 8th Plenum the popularization of the Soviet Union was relegated to second place, and Yugoslavia was placed first in our propaganda. Soviet instructors were shamelessly despised and made a laughing stock by the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslavs resorted to the basest anti-Soviet slanders. They considered the Soviet advisers as an obstacle in their work, and this was in fact the case. They openly expressed their view that "the work in the army could not go well as long as the Soviet advisers were retained, because it was impossible to work with two sorts of advisers". They underestimated the Soviet advisers, and in their arrogance and conceit, did all they could to make them a target of scorn. They tried to spread this spirit among our people. They tried to convince us that we were not capable of utilizing the Soviet experience, that the Soviet experience had been taken by the Yugoslavs, who had worked on it in detail and adapted it to the conditions of our countries and armies. Therefore, they claimed, there was nothing left for us, but to adopt the Yugoslav military art and apply it, for it was better suited to our army. But our Central Committee did not waver, and the efforts of the Yugoslavs failed. The Yugoslavs waited impatiently for the departure of the Soviets, and when they saw that none of the Soviet advisers were leaving, they started a disgraceful campaign

against us. The rage of the Titoite clique and the Yugoslav delegates in Albania reached its peak. On a false pretext, they severed the relations that existed between our two armies.

THE ANALYSIS OF THE 8th PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
ALBANIA AND OUR GRAVE ERRORS

The analysis at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, which we may call the gravest error our Central Committee has committed during its whole existence, was made under the direct instigation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It was based on the groundless, anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian accusations of the Trotskyite Yugoslav leadership, and on the difficult situation that existed in our Political Bureau and in our leadership in general. The intention of the Yugoslav Trotskyites was to liquidate the sound leadership of the Party and, in the first place, its General Secretary, followed by comrades Nako Spiru and Mehmet Shehu, as people considered undesirable by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. They hoped through such a blow to suppress any serious resistance which might prevent them from achieving their aims. The main points of the Yugoslav criticism, which gave rise to the analysis made at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, were:

1. — An anti-Yugoslav front had been created in Albania.
2. — The draft five-year plan compiled by the Albanians was autarchic and unrealistic.
3. — Albania should not enter any agreement with other states without the permission of Yugoslavia.

4. — The policy of the Albanian government was in flagrant opposition to the aspirations of the Albanian people, and was to blame for the fact that the relations between Albania and Yugoslavia had sunk to an all time low.

5. — In all this hostile activity Nako Spiru had played a mysterious role. Other comrades, too, were in the same position.

6. — The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania should investigate carefully to see whether the enemy were involved in this situation.

These principal points, which were the basis of the Yugoslav criticism, should be analysed carefully, because they were the essence of all the anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian intentions of the Yugoslav leadership.

The accusation that our country had "broken away" from Yugoslavia, as we understand it, that is to say, that it had abandoned collaboration, is completely groundless and slanderous. There has been no action by the Central Committee of our Party in this direction, and no isolated action by any individual Party member. Our Central Committee has always correctly assessed the question of collaboration with Yugoslavia, while the Yugoslavs developed these relations in a distorted way, with definite anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist aims. Had we wanted to "break away" from Yugoslavia and proceed in a distorted way, we would have renounced Yugoslav assistance and orientated ourselves towards the West, or the Marshall Plan. Neither our Party, nor its Central Committee, nor any member of our Party have worked towards this end.

Then what was the basis of their accusations against us? The Yugoslavs were worried by the correct policy of our Party in the economic development of the country, relying not only on Yugoslavia, but also on the Soviet Union. They considered this policy as a break-away from

Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs knew fairly well what a favourable and enthusiastic attitude our Party had created among the Albanian popular masses towards the new Yugoslavia, but that was not enough for them, they wanted Albania's total subjugation to Yugoslavia. As an argument to prove their thesis they used the question of the draft five-year plan. But this argument could not be borne out. Let us imagine for a moment that our draft five-year plan was autarchic, unrealistic, inflated, etc., etc. Where would such an inflated, etc., etc., plan lead Albania? If that plan was unrealistic and caused Albania to break away from Yugoslavia, then it must lead it elsewhere, and link it with another country. There was no evidence that our Party was trying to link our country with the Western states, for such a view had never existed in our Party. There remained only the link with the Soviet Union. But how was this to be interpreted, when the Soviet Union and Stalin had advised us on how we should conduct our relations with the Yugoslavs, and the Yugoslavs with us? If our great wish to have economic relations with the Soviet Union, too, had been excessive, then the Soviet Union and comrade Stalin would have advised us, as they gave us wise advice on how to conduct our relations with Yugoslavia. And we listened to comrade Stalin's advice, and carried it out with the greatest determination. Therefore it was not wrong to have relations with the Soviet Union. But even if our five-year plan had been autarchic or unrealistic, as the Yugoslavs said, this would give no reason to suspect that we wanted to develop our relations with the Soviet Union to the detriment of Yugoslavia. Only the Yugoslavs could say such a ridiculous and monstrous thing. They were cunning slanders. If our draft-plan was mistaken, it should have been corrected, and nothing more.

Why was this draft-plan linked with political issues, and used to attack our line and call it mistaken? We think that a state, provided it has time and qualified people, can draw up as many as five plans, reject four of them and retain only the best one. We were not given the possibility of studying even the one we had, to see whether it was good or bad, and to correct what was not good in it. But the problem was not the plan. The pretext of the draft-plan was used to attack the line of our Party, the Central Committee and its leaders, and worse still, the Soviet Union, the Soviet advisers, and their correct orientation. For this purpose — why go on further about this — the Yugoslavs had not anticipated even the smallest credit for our country in the budget of their five-year plan. They thought, if they achieved their aims, and united Albania with Yugoslavia by their methods, then the problems of the five-year plan could easily be dealt with; if their plans failed, then there was no reason why Yugoslavia should bother about helping Albania, for the situation which now exists was bound to be created.

I explained earlier that, to us, our plan was neither unrealistic nor autarchic, and even if there were some excesses, they could have been put right, for they were not particularly grave. Nako was accused of these exaggerations as if he had committed a grave crime. This was not right. First, if there were such excesses, it was not only Nako's fault, but the fault of the whole Central Committee, which did not correct them. But even if we let Nako be blamed for those exaggerations, they were not dangerous errors in our line. Who can claim that no mistakes are made in the process of work? Many others have committed still graver errors, and the Party has corrected them, quite apart from those unimportant errors. I want to say here that, as far as the five-year plan was concerned, our proposals were quite correct, not only in the political

and economic fields, but also in the cultural and social ones. We proposed that our country, as an independent republic of the democratic camp, would build socialism with the help of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and the other people's democracies, mobilizing all the vital forces of its people under the leadership of its Communist Party. Our plan opposed any spirit of exploitation and imperialist colonization, and its aim was to build industry and supply electric power to the country, to increase and consolidate the working class of Albania, to develop and modernize our agriculture on the correct road of socialism. The Yugoslavs advocated the opposite. According to them, Albania should not develop its industry, but its raw materials should go to Yugoslavia for processing. Agriculture, according to them, should develop in such a way that Albania would become a huge estate of Yugoslavia, and our peasants should provide Yugoslavia with raw materials to be processed there. Albania would receive all manufactured goods from Yugoslavia, even its bread. This would have meant complete dependence in the colonialist and imperialist manner.

The idea that we should draw up a five-year plan was raised by the Yugoslavs in order to strike a blow at us and at the Soviet planning specialists who helped us to draw up this correct draft-plan. In attacking this draft-plan, the Yugoslavs were not concerned about one or two factories too many, but had political aims. It was not their intention for a five-year plan to be worked out for Albania, but they wanted to further the ends already mentioned. If the Yugoslavs had confined themselves only to accusations and slanders concerning our five-year plan, their criticism would have been weak and lacking in substance. But they used slanders to bolster their case.

The Yugoslavs criticized us and warned us that, before entering any agreement with any other state, we

should obtain the approval of the Yugoslav government. This clearly shows how Yugoslavia regarded our country. But we had not entered an agreement with any state, with the exception of a credit agreement with the Soviet Union. Was that an error? Was the credit the Soviet Union granted us to the detriment of our country and of our relations with Yugoslavia? We need not even answer this question. But it is a fact that the Yugoslavs did not like this at all, for it foiled their anti-Marxist plans. They wanted to keep our country completely isolated and do what they wanted with it. Our people were rightly grateful to the Soviet Union for the great help it was giving them, but the Yugoslav leaders did not like this. You know about the shocking actions of the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, who exerted hostile pressure on our minister, demanding to be told what economic agreements Nako Spiru had signed when he went to Moscow. Far from signing any agreement, comrade Nako Spiru did not meet any Soviet official except the VOKS²⁴ people.

The strengthening of our country's ties with the Soviet Union greatly preoccupied the Yugoslav Trotskyite leaders. After the return of our government delegation from Moscow, Kosmerl²⁵ officially stated to comrade Hysni Kapo that "after General Hoxha's return from Moscow the policy of the Albanian government towards Yugoslavia has changed." These are openly hostile, anti-Albanian and anti-Soviet actions which do not need lengthy explanations to make them clear. According to them, our government, headed by the General Secretary of the Party and the Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Alba-

24 VOKS (Vsesoyuznoe Obshchestvo Kulturnoi Sviasi s Zagranicej — the Soviet Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries).

25 Adviser at the Yugoslav Legation in Tirana.

nia, was conducting an anti-Yugoslav policy. They also said this in their later accusations.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and its stooge Savo Zlatich supported their criticism about the creation of an "anti-Yugoslav front in Albania" with slanders against our people at the railway construction site. The Central Committee of the CPY had raised this question previously, but we rejected their slanders. We found all of them groundless, and we demonstrated this. The Party is in possession of the report of the Control Commission, and the reports of the party organizations at the railway construction site, which demonstrate that the Yugoslav charges were false, and prove the very real and important fact that the Yugoslavs were saboteurs, provocateurs, and enemies of our state power, our youth and our Party. The party comrades and those of the Youth Organization at the railway construction site have shown themselves to be very loyal and vigilant in defending the work and achievements of our people and Party, have shown maturity despite their youth.

In raising issues like this one, the Yugoslavs had many aims. They wanted to dampen the drive of our youth and its leaders, to connect people like Nako Spiru, and indirectly the Prime Minister²⁶ with this issue, and to discredit the government in this great undertaking. They claimed that at the railway construction site we and the youth had neglected a politically important question, the alliance with Yugoslavia. If there was anyone who correctly assessed this question, it was we and the people of the Youth Organization at the railway construction site, whereas the Yugoslavs did all they could to foster animosities among our youth, to suppress their initiative, their

²⁶ On top of the task as General Secretary of the Party, comrade Enver Hoxha was also Prime Minister of the Government of the PRA.

drive, enthusiasm and abilities. Admittedly trifling misunderstandings may occur in such a great action. But the Yugoslavs did not admit a single mistake, while their sabotage activity was blatant. The Yugoslavs did not have a serious attitude towards the projects which were being built in our country. This quite understandably irritated our people, but they never lost their patience and their sense of proportion. Our people defended the alliance with Yugoslavia, so they too made concessions which cannot be considered as opportunist but as an expression of good faith, or rather of excessive faith.

The Yugoslavs would never have completely achieved their aims through the slanders they spread to "prove" that an "anti-Yugoslav front" had been created in Albania. Their main aim was to attack the leadership of the Party and government in the person of Enver Hoxha, who was responsible to the Party for the correct implementation of its line, for the coordination of work and the supervision of the comrades in their work. And this is what the Yugoslavs did.

The policy of the Albanian government, the Yugoslavs claimed, was diametrically opposed to the sentiments of the people. In plain words, this meant that the government was anti-popular, and some responsible persons should be condemned for this, the main culprits being, clearly, the Prime Minister, then Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and "the entire clique" which, on the basis of these "accusations", was condemned at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania. In his latest letter Tito directly accuses the General Secretary of the Party of this. But at that time a direct attack against the General Secretary of our Party would have been very difficult for the Yugoslavs, because they had no support for such a move. They had to attack him indirectly in order to succeed. Nako Spiru was more open to

attack, not because he had erred in his stand towards the Yugoslavs, but because there was discord in the Bureau, there was hostility towards Nako Spiru and, indirectly, towards the Commander. The split in our Political Bureau, which they not only knew about but had themselves caused and continued to keep alive, created a possibility of success of the Yugoslav manoeuvre. But even this was not enough to achieve success, they had to accuse Nako and other comrades and, indirectly, the Commander himself with the basest slanders and threats, such as the allegation of "enemy activity" within our Party. This implied just what Pandi Kristo said with conviction at a Central Committee meeting, that Nako Spiru was a spy. Thus it is clear what kind of a situation was created, and what was the target of this manoeuvring. After comrade Nako's suicide, Zlatich advised our comrades to take care, for such things had also happened in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and its General Secretary Gorkich had been exposed as a traitor and a spy. Against whom were these accusations directed? Certainly, against the General Secretary of our Party. Comrade Mehmet Shehu was placed in the same position. This difficult situation was created by the Yugoslavs with ulterior motives, and was directed against the line of our Party and against particular people. They attacked the correct line and principles which inspired and guided our Party.

As I mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav leaders made another criticism against the Central Committee of our Party, claiming that two lines were emerging distinctly within our Party, one of them mistaken. The blame for this second mistaken line, according to the Yugoslavs, lay with our entire Central Committee. We rejected this first criticism. In the Political Bureau we were of one mind, at least formally, for afterwards it was said that some comrades of the Political Bureau in reality disagreed with

the decision that was taken. The document I compiled as an answer to Zlatich was later severely criticized by some people as expressing distrust towards the Yugoslavs and embodying a wrong stand, but it was extremely correct. We have correctly assessed the situation, pointing out both our mistakes and those of the Yugoslavs in a correct Marxist-Leninist way, and quite correctly underlining the omissions and delays of the Yugoslavs in delivering materials which were vital for the fulfilment of our plan and many other things.

After this first criticism by the Yugoslavs, why did our Central Committee and its Political Bureau not react instantly, and why did matters not develop as they did after the second accusation? We must analyse this situation, because it is very important. The first criticism by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was, so to say, a trial run to study its effect and the strength of our forces, and to see how far their arguments, although baseless, would succeed. This criticism was unsuccessful. Our Political Bureau rejected the accusations as groundless. They were unable through such charges to create the situation they wanted in the Political Bureau, even though it lacked unity. It is a fact that, in face of such accusations, despite the waverings of some members, we came out with a unanimous decision. And this was not to the liking of the Yugoslavs.

Therefore, in their second accusation, the Yugoslavs added new charges to their first accusation, this time mentioning names as well. This would, and did, arouse a reaction in our Political Bureau. The Yugoslavs used the divergencies within the Bureau as their main weapon to help them mount a successful offensive against the line of our Party. The Yugoslavs now resorted to the tactic of suggesting to Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo that "your struggle against Nako Spiru and the Commander is justi-

fied: the enemy is involved here, Nako Spiru is playing a suspicious role, and Enver Hoxha is backing him up one hundred per cent; the way is open for you, strike now!" The implication of the Yugoslavs was evident: they brought serious accusations against some of the comrades of the Political Bureau, and at the same time encouraged others to take up the struggle against them. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo were predisposed and ready to enter the impasse into which the Yugoslavs had led them. They had come to the conclusion that "the situation was so tense that before long there would be fighting in the Political Bureau", and were waiting for "a heavy blow to fall from outside". The blow fell, and they had to act. And they acted in the way the Yugoslavs wanted, in a most mistaken way.

Here the responsibilities of each individual should be singled out, for this was the crossroad where tempers, prejudices, animosities, and errors clashed, and the principal Party cadres were, rightly or wrongly, attacked, and accused of things they had and had not done. And what is more important, the Party line was attacked and shaken, unity in the Bureau was undermined, the General Secretary of the Party was attacked for things he had not done, and not only that, but he was attacked on matters in which he had been correct. The fact is that Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo set the tone of the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee. Some followed suit and others were influenced by them in varying degrees. Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo came out before all the comrades as though they alone had correctly assessed all the issues raised. Under the strong influence of the mistaken policy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, they seriously erred. Both of them considered the matter mainly in relation to individuals, and

in doing so, they saw things in a false light, and not objectively.

The criticism by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia shocked us all, especially me. But the truth is that, when Savo Zlatich expounded his views, I was fully convinced that they were incorrect. I disagreed with them, I even intervened in the middle of Zlatich's report to ask him: "Is what you are saying to us the opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and does the Central Committee of the CPY rely on these arguments?" Savo Zlatich retorted: "Not only are all these the views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, but they have also been studied and approved by Tito." At the end of his report I asked him to give these views in written form, but he in fact refused.

After Zlatich's report my view was that we too should assemble our arguments in reply to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs' assessment of Nako seemed to me very strange, and I said to Koçi: "This is serious accusation". I said this to Koçi because, logically, the attack would have made far less impression on him than on me, because his opinion on Nako was quite different from mine. Therefore, my view right from the start was that the matter should be brought up in the Bureau, after we too had assembled this opinion, and that is what we did. We informed the comrades individually of the criticism by the Yugoslav leadership, and also informed Nako Spiru, without telling him of the serious direct accusation brought against him by the Yugoslavs. It seems to me that this stand towards comrade Nako was not correct on our part. We should have told Nako everything. I have always been of the opinion that internal matters of the Bureau should be solved correctly. The conflicts between Koçi and Pandi, on the one hand,

and Nako, on the other, were an old illness which had been greatly aggravated (as I have already said) to the point where the two considered every action of mine to be dictated and influenced by Nako. This was not a correct judgement.

It is true that at the meeting of the Political Bureau we put as the first item on the agenda the question of the criticism in the economic field. But many mistakes were made in holding this meeting of the Bureau on such an important problem. Some members and candidate members were not called to that meeting, including some comrades who had been unjustly accused, and would be criticized at the meeting. The way the question of Nako was taken up in the Bureau and put on the agenda of the meeting was not as had been intended. We considered this procedure correct, while we disagreed with Nako's request, on learning of the grave accusation made against him, for some time to prepare an answer; this request seemed to us to have sinister implications.

But let us assess that situation in the light of the present. The Yugoslavs accused Nako of having links with the enemy. Could this be considered as a minor matter? We gave Nako one day to think it over and prepare his reply. This was quite wrong, because it was not a simple matter. We have been working on this analysis for six months, and only now are we able to raise these important matters in the Party. We did not give Nako even five days to think things over, to prepare, or to explain himself. Even a criminal is granted time to think things over, let alone a comrade like Nako Spiru. As soon as Nako asked for time for his answer, some comrades of the Political Bureau, such as Koçi, Pandi, etc., rose against him in a savage and hostile manner. At that moment we ought to have realized our mistake, that the discussion was not centred on economic questions on which the Yu-

goslav criticism apparently relied. This was totally forgotten, and the struggle against Nako predominated. The problem was shifted to where the Yugoslavs wanted, and as Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo wished. Comrade Nako Spiru, undoubtedly thinking that he had no other way out of that situation, shot himself. This was the gravest error Nako committed in his revolutionary life, but responsibility also lies with the Political Bureau. Nako Spiru did not think as a strong-willed communist ought to, although his situation was very grave. However grave the situation may be for a communist, he should never commit suicide, but face the situation, accept criticism, and condemnation if he is guilty, and always trust in the justice of the Party.

Nako's suicide helped to bring about the total acceptance of the base accusation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The atmosphere created after Nako's suicide was such that things could only develop the way they did. The criticism by the Yugoslavs was accepted without any discussion. Not only that but the correct efforts and opinions of myself, Nako, and other comrades were all turned against us and used to underline our distrust of the "correct line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia". The theses on the revision of the Berat Plenum and my answer to Savo Zlatich over his first criticism were all studied and used to demonstrate that both Nako and I had long distrusted Yugoslavia. The actions of the youth at the railway building site were condemned as hostile actions against the Yugoslavs and against the line of our Party, and were mainly blamed on Nako. All the reports of the Control Commission and of the party comrades at the railway building site were rejected as if they were mere trifles. The very things that today prove the accuracy of the correct opinions of our people at the railway building

site were at that time collected in detail to prove the opposite, in the way the Yugoslavs wished. Nako was classified as a spy and a traitor to the Party. His case was closed once and for all.

Comrade Mehmet Shehu was likewise accused "of having carried out a typically individualistic policy, leading the army towards a break with Yugoslavia and seeking to develop it in an independent way"; it was alleged that "Mehmet Shehu's plans for the army were exceedingly inflated, and corresponded with Nako's five-year plan; Mehmet Shehu was against the Yugoslavs; and therefore Mehmet Shehu was in league with Nako", so he, too, was included in the list of the "enemies".

But what about the question of the Soviet advisers amidst all this? They were never openly attacked, but this whole campaign was at the same time directed against the Soviets. The Yugoslavs said that "the Soviets were mistaken and wrongly orientated, deceived by Nako and the others. The Soviets wore their hearts on their sleeves, they were very sincere and acted accordingly, and enemies like Nako took advantage of this quality of the Soviets." Wittingly or unwittingly, these things were tantamount to an attack against the Soviets. Such opinions prevailed throughout the entire analysis. Matters reached the point where the correct pro-Soviet views of Nako, Mehmet and others, and the great and correct work done in this matter, were presented in a completely distorted and unobjective light.

But how was the question of the General Secretary of the Party raised? It is common knowledge in what an unjust and unfavourable position he was placed. The General Secretary was fiercely attacked, in the first place, by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo. Of course, he could not be labelled like Nako and the others, but it was he who emerged as the main culprit, for all those condemned

acted under his protection, and rightly or wrongly, used his authority. Nako emerged from the analysis as the main person responsible for the discord existing in the Bureau, but the Commander, allegedly "being under his influence, was also greatly at fault, and the one who caused such a situation." This was the aim the Yugoslavs wanted to achieve, and they succeeded in achieving it.

Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo went from one mistake to another. Koçi raised the question of the existence of a dangerous grouping, with all the features of a faction, at the head of the Party. The analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee gave all the comrades the impression that the Party had been saved from this dangerous faction by Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo, who had "correctly" assessed all these questions right from the beginning, while the others, with the Commander at their head, had grossly erred. After the 8th Plenum a resolution was passed and the matters were taken up in the Party, in the same way as they were raised in the Central Committee of the Party, with a small exception, namely, that the General Secretary was not mentioned. But, whether consciously or not, the effect of all this was to achieve the aim of the Yugoslavs. To the Yugoslav Trotskyites, this was a most desirable solution, while to our Party it was a most distorted and dangerous solution. Therefore, it is urgent for us to correct these grave mistakes, to put things right with the true sense of justice that characterizes our Party, to appear before the Party without fear or hesitation, to make a sound Bolshevik self-criticism and learn many things from these mistakes, and to help the Party to learn from the mistakes of its leadership, to avoid errors in the future.

What conclusions should be drawn from our new assessment of the former analysis made at the 8th Plenum and of its resolution?

The analysis of the 8th Plenum, motivated by the Yugoslavs to further their hostile, anti-party, anti-Albanian, anti-Marxist, and anti-Soviet aims, could not be a correct Marxist-Leninist analysis. It was mistaken, and thus the resolution which resulted from it could not be otherwise. The analysis and the resolution of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee led our Party into an anti-Marxist position and into a position of solidarity with Tito's Trotskyite group. The work which went on at this Plenum and the decisions taken there have gravely harmed our Party, because they attacked its correct line, attacked the unity of our leadership, attacked, condemned and discredited leading comrades for mistakes which they did not commit, groundlessly attacked the General Secretary of the Party, and shook his position in the eyes of the members of the Central Committee of the Party. This has seriously affected the unity of the leadership, and its authority.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum attacked democratic centralism and inner-party democracy, stifled criticism and self-criticism, introduced military methods into the leadership, violated the organizational principles of the Party, intensified the control of the State Security organs over the Party, and were pushing us in the direction of a police state.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum created within the Party an un-Marxist bias against the communist intellectuals who were regarded with suspicion, which caused the Party to pursue a wrong policy in the sector of cadres.

The analysis and resolution of the 8th Plenum were a triumph for the Yugoslav Trotskyites, because they made our Central Committee slip into an erroneous position and adopt forms of economic organization which would lead

to the liquidation of our government, and our country's increasing colonization by the Yugoslav Trotskyites.

The line of our Party has been correct, and its orientation has been correct. At no time have we erred with regard to our friendship and alliance with Yugoslavia. We viewed our economic relations with Yugoslavia correctly, and we had great, even excessive, confidence in the Yugoslavs. Our criticism of the activity of the Yugoslavs in Albania was correct and to the point. Here I am referring to the accusations the Yugoslavs brought against us, because the mistake of some young man at the railway construction site can in no way prove that our Central Committee had an incorrect line.

All the accusations by the Yugoslavs do not stand up; they are nothing but slanders fabricated for particular aims, which we have already explained. The charges against Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and other comrades, accusing them of damaging the Party line in regard to Yugoslavia, do not hold water. These comrades did not deviate from the party line, they have followed the correct line and fought to have it implemented.

The question of comrade Nako Spiru. Comrade Nako Spiru was neither a spy nor a traitor to the Party; there is absolutely no proof of this. The case against him was a base slander by the Yugoslavs. Comrade Nako had his positive and negative sides, as a revolutionary, a party member and a leader of the Party. Nako fought for the Party and people from the creation of the Party to the day he killed himself, and never wavered in the struggle. But in his work he also made mistakes, which must be gone into. Nako Spiru was a man of immoderate ambition, and naturally such a shortcoming in a leader greatly affects his work. Could such a dangerous shortcoming have been rectified? We think it could. Our Party moves mountains, not to speak of correcting people's shortcom-

ings and errors. But was the necessary effort made to help comrade Nako correct this shortcoming which was to influence his mistakes? We think not, on the contrary, this shortcoming was encouraged and reinforced by the whole situation which was created. Nako carried out his activity in difficult circumstances, and these circumstances should be taken into account in judging his shortcomings and errors. The Yugoslavs encouraged Nako's unhealthy ambition for their own ends, and it was fostered by the Berat Plenum and the activity which followed that Plenum and by his exaggerated confidence in his own ability. He was wrong in this, but others, too, made the same mistake.

The General Secretary of the Party at no time allowed Nako to use his ambition to the detriment of the Party and his comrades. When Nako spoke of the cadres, he had his own opinion on this question, and indirectly hinted that this problem could not be solved through the stand Koçi was taking. I fought against his mistaken views and said to him: "I will never permit a repetition of what happened at Berat. The question of cadres should be solved in a Marxist way, through sound criticism and self-criticism". I think the other comrades of the Political Bureau were not sufficiently objective towards Nako Spiru. He was not satisfied with the post he held. The comrades who had noticed this tendency in Nako, especially at the Berat Plenum and after it, did not criticize his unhealthy ambition.

Later some comrades accused him of getting closer to me in order to take the place of Koçi Xoxe. He may have had such an intention, but I did not encourage it; on the contrary, I fought every tendency on his part to underestimate other comrades. I think the other comrades did not act with equal objectivity in this case.

Nako was a very pessimistic and highly-strung comrade, two weaknesses of character which are dangerous in a leader. But, worse still, Nako was even more pessimistic about the work of others. In this way he aggravated the errors of his comrades. As we said, Nako Spiru had enormous confidence in himself and his work, and his own abilities, which often led him to underestimate others. He did his best to draw attention to his ability and his personal activity. Without denying his ability and qualities, for Nako did have qualities, his attitude was an unhealthy one. And all this was closely connected with his ambition.

Another grave mistake of Nako's was his incorrect assessment of the question of the youth. Nako Spiru worked to consolidate the Youth Organization, but right from the start he had the tendency to carry out the work with the youth somewhat independently of the Party. Since the time of the war, I have often attacked this tendency. After the Berat Plenum this tendency became more pronounced in him, and it was carried on by Liri Belishova and some other comrades in the leadership of the Youth Organization. Even after he left the Youth Organization, Nako continued to consider the work with the youth as his own sector of activity. All the leaders should concern themselves with the youth, no one can deny that, but Nako was not on the right road so far as this question was concerned. We know what the youth are to our Party, but Nako Spiru did not consider this question from the position of the Party, but from a personal position, often going so far as to put the cadres of the Youth Organization in opposition to those of the Party, and to make quite improper comparisons between the Youth Organization and the Party. Nako did not look at the question of the cadres of the Youth Organization correctly, from the position of the Party. He considered the Youth Organiza-

tion as his own army, in the sense that he had a strong position there and could speak from that platform. This was an erroneous view held by Nako Spiru.

It would be wrong to take the old stand and say that Nako Spiru was against the working class. Comrade Nako was not against the working class. He made some mistakes in his instructions on the question of cadres. Nako had a preference for intellectuals, for educated people, to whom he gave greater support. But he never supported intellectual saboteurs, as the Yugoslavs accused him of doing, and as was the general opinion at the time of the analysis of the 8th Plenum. It's not right to say this. There may have been cases where Nako underestimated worker comrades, and conclusions may be drawn from such a stand, but at the time of the analysis at the 8th Plenum of the CC, the speakers pieced together many unconnected things, and reached the erroneous conclusion that Nako Spiru was an enemy of the working class. Whoever is an enemy of the working class, is also an enemy of our Party, of our people and of Marxism-Leninism.

Our Political Bureau held countless meetings on the question of cadres, there were thorough discussions about people, comrades were criticized, but it never entered anyone's mind to accuse Nako Spiru of being against the working class, or to criticize him fiercely for this deviation. This did not occur. It is a fact that at the meetings of the Bureau, Nako Spiru and Koçi Xoxe did not mince their words. The conclusion that Nako Spiru was against the working class was reached only in the analysis made at the 8th Plenum. And such a conclusion was not just.

After the Berat Plenum Nako made mistakes in his leading work, which was detrimental to the unity of the Bureau. But again we must consider Nako's mistaken and harmful work in the context of an unhealthy situa-

tion, and of the other errors committed in our Party after the Berat Plenum, and we must take into account the errors made by other comrades, their attitude, and the intrigues and wide-scale hostile activity of the Yugoslavs. If we were to consider Nako's errors in isolation from these things, we would condemn him unjustly.

Comrade Nako Spiru loved the Soviet Union and had great confidence in it. The claims of some comrades that he had said that in the Soviet Union he had seen people walking about barefooted, or that the Soviets had got them blind drunk in a kolkhoz so as they might not be able to see anything, etc., may well be true. If they are, it was improper of him to speak like this, but it does not prove that Nako was anti-Soviet. There are other more important activities which demonstrate that Nako was a friend of the Soviet Union.

Nako's animosity towards Koçi Xoxe and his activity was exaggerated and harmful. But the same can be said of Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo towards Nako. Both sides were in the wrong. Neither made any concession to the other, and this was harmful to the Party. The matter should have been cleared up through a sound criticism and bolshevik self-criticism by both sides. But this was not done. Because of this Koçi Xoxe and Pandi Kristo have accused me of serious faults. But what did Nako's mistaken influence on me amount to, and where are my great mistakes? This question deserves a brief clarification.

My views on the question of cadres were not wrong, and I have never been influenced by Nako's errors. Nor were my views on the Youth Organization wrong, and I was never influenced by Nako's errors in this field. I never encouraged Nako's ambition, on the contrary, I always criticized it, and criticized his individualistic style of work, his arrogance and his and other comrades' laxity

whenever I was informed of these shortcomings. I valued Nako and helped him in his work, just as I helped the others. Nako often came to me, and I saw no harm in this, on the contrary, he kept me informed on all questions, he asked me questions and sought my advice. But I was very concerned about Nako's pessimism and his view of the question of cadres. I had my own opinions on that question, and I do not think they were mistaken. Nako did not accept in the right way my views on the proposals for the solution of the question of cadres and the overcoming of his errors. There was bias on his part, but for my part I have neither been unduly influenced nor committed great errors, although of course some small mistakes were inevitable.

Koçi Xoxe is chiefly responsible for the organizational errors that have occurred in our Party. As a result of the way he acted, the suspicions he held, the animosities which existed among the members of the Bureau, and the underestimation of the role of the General Secretary of the Party, the great organizational questions of the Party were left outside the control and help of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee. The reports occasionally submitted by Koçi Xoxe were purely formal and superficial. The monopolization of the work in the hands of the organizational secretary and the elimination of the true role of the General Secretary greatly harmed the Party, and were great mistakes on the part of Koçi Xoxe. A mistaken and dangerous opinion arose within the Party, the idea that the Party had two leaders, Enver Hoxha and Koçi Xoxe, and that the first led the state, and the second led the Party. This was a totally wrong concept which has nothing to do with building our Party. These viewpoints later gave rise to many errors, such as the failure to render account, which means violation of democratic centralism, violation of inner-party democracy, and viola-

tion and stifling of criticism and self-criticism. This led to the violation of the principle of collective leadership, which is established only through criticism and self-criticism and the struggle of contradictions. Stalin teaches us:

*"To think that these contradictions can be avoided is self-deception. Engels was right when he said that in the long run it is impossible to slur over contradictions within the party, that they must be fought out."**

Stalin also says:

". . . the source of the contradictions within the proletarian parties lies in two circumstances. . .

They are, firstly, the pressure exerted by the bourgeoisie and bourgeois ideology. . .

*They are, secondly, the heterogeneity of the working class. . ."***

Koçi Xoxe did not abide by this great principle and erred in this respect. He considered the contradictions and clashes of opinions in the leadership on a personal plane, as criticism directed against his person and activity, while he regarded himself as faultless and beyond criticism. And here Koçi Xoxe suffered from egoism and conceit.

If we judge matters in this light, did Nako Spiru deserve our condemnation? He condemned himself through his suicide, and this harmed our Party. If it were not for the base anti-Marxist and anti-Albanian intervention of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and if our activity had been submitted to a serious and bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, we would have been healed of the plague that afflicted us, and Nako Spiru would still be among us. Today, seeing and analys-

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 9, p. 12 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 9, p. 9-10 (Alb. ed.).

ing the situation in this way, clearly and in an unbiased way, we must consider Nako Spiru as a victim of the base intrigues resorted to by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the detriment of our Party, we must consider him as a victim who condemned himself to suicide, overwhelmed by the hostile aims of Tito's Trotskyite clique. And this, I think, is a just judgement on Nako Spiru.

The question of Comrade Mehmet Shehu appears to me to be simpler than that of Nako Spiru. He was accused of wrong views on army matters, of inflated plans, of moving away from Yugoslavia and, hence, of collaborating with Nako Spiru to attack and distort the party line, etc. These accusations do not bear scrutiny. The accusations against him implied total acceptance of the Yugoslav anti-Marxist theses which were directed against our army, the Soviet army, and the Soviet advisers in Albania. They aimed to attack the correct line of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania in military affairs, and to unify our army with that of Yugoslavia. Mehmet Shehu gave the Yugoslavs no guarantee that their line would be implemented, and therefore they had long been preparing the ground for an attack on him. The matter of his disagreements with the Political Directorate, etc., is a consequence of the hostile policy of the Yugoslavs. Possible shortcomings cannot be ruled out, but the most dangerous thing was that the Political Directorate, with Kristo Themelko and Pëllumb Dishnica at its head, was under the direct influence of the Yugoslavs.

We cannot rule out the possibility that the work of some comrades of the General Staff, and their attitude to Mehmet, were influenced by the views of the Political Directorate. Mehmet has been accused of lack of cooperation with the General Staff, of monopolizing the work, etc. Under the conditions that existed, we cannot exclude the

possibility of some manifestation of this kind, but not to the extent suggested in the analysis of the 8th Plenum, or in the spirit implied in that analysis. Comrade Mehmet Shehu deserved neither the accusations brought against him nor the condemnation he received. They were out of place. Comrade Mehmet Shehu is an exacting comrade, and the prattlers and intriguers called this a monopolization of the work. Mehmet Shehu is a comrade who has fought well. We say this, for in the analysis of the 8th Plenum efforts were made to obscure this very positive aspect of his. Mehmet has military ability, and has made a valuable contribution to the struggle, and to the organization and modernizing of our army. Comrade Mehmet Shehu has defended both the general line of the Party and our correct line in the army with determination worthy of a member of the Central Committee. I want us to act correctly, to acknowledge the positive aspects of comrade Mehmet's activity, and to correctly assess his shortcomings in his work without detaching them from their circumstances and from the errors of other comrades. To act otherwise would not be objective, and would lead to wrong conclusions.

The question of the other lower ranking cadres who were attacked in the analysis of the 8th Plenum should also be viewed from this correct standpoint, so that we can rectify the measures taken against them, rehabilitate them, and appoint them to appropriate posts.

THE QUESTION OF THE "FACTION AT THE HEAD OF THE PARTY"

There has not been a faction at the head of the Party. This totally wrong definition was made by Koçi Xoxe. Our present analysis refutes this erroneous thesis. Practice in

no way corresponds to the theoretical definition of a faction. A faction is something organized, with definite anti-party political and organizational aims, against the political and organizational line laid down by the Congress of the Party and the Central Committee. A faction organized within the Party would mean the organization of an ideological struggle, backed up by actions, against the Marxist-Leninist principles which constitute the foundations of our Party and by which it is guided. Neither such an organization nor such purposes have existed.

It is correct to say that Nako Spiru committed errors in his work, but these errors could degenerate into anti-party and factionalist activity only if we had let them become worse. This can occur when the Party fails to see the errors committed by one person or another, or if it conceals them and does not correct them. But if we label these errors as a faction at the head of the Party, what name should we use for the gross errors committed in the analysis of the 8th Plenum, which would have led to the most dangerous faction our Party had ever seen, and would have led our Party and people into an abyss, as Tito, Gilas, Kardelj, Rankovich and others are doing with Yugoslavia? In the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee there were errors of principle, and there were attacks on the unity of the Party, the correct line and orientation of the Party, the unity of the socialist camp, and the Soviet Union. And these attacks were extremely well organized, and were actually under the direct supervision of the Belgrade Trotskyite clique. The Party cannot help comparing these two situations, and the Central Committee should make this comparison, for it is very important, and the people who organized the 8th Plenum bear great responsibility.

We think that if we understand this situation properly, if we are deeply aware of these errors and conscien-

tiously acknowledge them, then our Party will be greatly strengthened and safeguarded from future dangers. If these matters are not correctly understood, then the Party will suffer in the future, and will be in a dangerous situation. These important party matters should be considered from the position of the Party, and not from a personal position. The prestige of an individual, whoever he may be, whether the General Secretary or a rank-and-file party member, can in no way be placed above the prestige of the Party. If we do not have the courage to bring up matters before the Party in a correct way, if we do not have the courage to speak openly before the Party about the errors we have committed and make a deep and not a superficial analysis of these bitter mistakes, then we will have gravely harmed our Party.

Through the resolution of the 8th Plenum the Party has been told many incorrect things, it has been said that there were deviations, that there was a faction at the head of the Party, that Nako Spiru was a spy, etc. In a speech he delivered last December on the occasion of the opening of the Party School, Koçi Xoxe, speaking about relations with Yugoslavia, said among other things, "These relations are our main support in building our society and safeguarding our existence; they were born and have been strengthened in common struggle, and today more than ever it is in the interests of our people for them to become still stronger and sounder, but they (Here he meant those who were to be condemned by the analysis, such as Nako Spiru, etc.) want to present them in a different light, painting them with the black hues of imperialist relations. To deny those correct relations and to consider them on the same level as imperialist relations, or to sow doubts and suspicions about them, means to be totally disorientated, detached from the party line and from Marxism-Leninism, or otherwise, to encourage the dark aims of the enemy."

Now we must acknowledge how wrong these views of Koçi Xoxe were, and what difficulties they were leading our Party into. Koçi Xoxe's speech prepared the ground for an erroneous anti-Albanian and anti-Marxist line. The situation was not as he presented it, he was preparing the ground for the 8th Plenum.

In this speech, pointing out the danger that allegedly threatened the Party from such people as Nako Spiru, Koçi Xoxe said: ". . . these people play down the role of Federal Yugoslavia in the Balkans and in international politics . . ." Such a view led to very wrong and dangerous anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet orientations. We must admit that it was the great trust we had placed in Yugoslavia which led us to commit these errors. This is the truth, and now, in the light of this new analysis, it is evident how gravely we were mistaken. The Yugoslavs had pronounced chauvinistic and great-power tendencies. They wanted all the people's democracies in the Balkans, as well as the other people's democracies elsewhere, to align themselves with Yugoslavia, so that Yugoslavia would become "the epicentre and head" of the socialist camp. This meant to attack the Soviet Union and to uncrown the first homeland of socialism.

The purpose of our analysis is not to tell the Party that Nako Spiru or anyone else has not erred, or that they have erred only in minor matters; this should be emphasized. The most important thing for our Party is to draw correct conclusions from the whole analysis of our work, in order to arm the Party, to enable it to combat erroneous manifestations in the future.

The Party does not for a moment forget the leading role of the Soviet Union in the socialist camp. All the Yugoslav Trotskyites and the other rightwing nationalist deviationists have tried not only to obscure this reality, but also to oppose and attack the Soviet Union. The aim

of these enemies of socialism was the same as that of imperialism. They wanted to find a hold for their opportunist and revisionist viewpoints in their parties, to liquidate their communist parties and to make the people's democracies degenerate into bourgeois democracies. This means creating favourable ground for capitalism in the new people's democracies, and setting up blocs hostile to socialism within the democratic and anti-imperialist camp. So our Party should be very vigilant; it should defend Marxism-Leninism, the genuine ideology of our Party, mercilessly fight against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois views within the Party, and persevere in its defence of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp.

Now let us go back and tell the Party the truth, that we emerge from this analysis convinced of the serious mistakes we have made, for otherwise, if we are not convinced ourselves, we cannot convince anyone in the Party. To act otherwise would mean grave danger, we would remain in the old mistaken position, we would cover our mistakes lightly, the Party would be disorientated and the ground would be prepared for future dangers, because the struggle of our Party cannot end there. It is necessary to hate the enemy in order to fight him properly, and it is essential to know errors well in order to be able to fight and overcome them correctly. We must be vigilant towards the errors of the others, but at the same time we must keep a watch on ourselves, observe our mistakes and correct them. Mistakes in the leadership are the most dangerous, because the Party develops through the example of its leadership, and the leadership develops through the work of the Party. These two things are inseparable and identical.

The question of class struggle. Our Party has not been influenced by the great deviation of the Yugoslav Party on the question of class struggle. We have not made this

mistake, but the letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the CPY are a great lesson to us, and a formidable weapon to guard our Party against these dangers. The letter of the Bolshevik Party addressed to Tito and company says: "In the Communist Party of Yugoslavia the spirit of class struggle is lacking. There is a rapid growth of the capitalist elements in the countryside and in the towns, while the leadership of the party is taking no measures to restrain the capitalist elements. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia is being lulled to sleep with the rotten opportunist theory of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Volmar and Bukharin". Our Party has made no concessions of this kind; on the contrary, it has intensified the class struggle in town and countryside from day to day, it has struck mercilessly at the kulaks, the big landowners, the big merchants, speculators, money-lenders and other such people; the Party has disarmed them, not permitting them to raise their head in town or countryside. But if the Party slackens the class struggle, the danger of their revival always exists, for as the letters of the Bolshevik Party teach us, we must not draw the conclusion that there is no longer a danger of the capitalist elements becoming stronger. In 1920 Lenin said:

*"While we live in a small peasant country, there is a firmer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. . . ."**

*". . . and small-scale production engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale."***

Our Party should never become drunk with success, it should not be carried away by the far-reaching social

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 516.

** V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 24.

reforms it has carried out in our country, or by its achievements; it must not neglect or slacken the class struggle. Our Party must always keep in mind the lessons of the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which says:

"Nobody can deny the depth and the radical character of the social transformations carried out in the Soviet Union as a result of the October Socialist Revolution. But the CPSU(B) has never let this fact lead it to the conclusion that class struggle in our country is weakening, or that there is no danger of the capitalist elements gaining strength ... It is common knowledge that for 15 years after the October Revolution the question, first, of measures to restrict the capitalist elements in the countryside, and then, of the liquidation of the kulaks as the last capitalist class, was never taken off the agenda. The underestimation of this experience of the CPSU(B) on the question of ensuring the fundamental conditions for the construction of socialism in Yugoslavia, is fraught with grave political dangers and is impermissible for Marxists, because socialism cannot be built only in the cities, or only in industry, but must also be built in the countryside, in agriculture".

Grave dangers may threaten us, Albanian communists, if we do not always keep in mind these great principles of Leninism, because Albania is an agricultural country where small private peasant property predominates, the peasant is at a very low level of development, and the old mentality, ignorance, and fanaticism exist. We must beware of the danger which might lead us to the mistaken opinion that, having reduced the kulaks of our villages to the same level as the poor or middle peasants as far as their land and economic situation is concerned, we have eliminated them as kulaks, as the last capitalist class, and can in future forget about class differentiation in the

countryside, regard the peasantry as one whole, and neglect the mobilization of the Party in order to overcome the difficulties arising from the growth of the exploiting elements in the countryside. The kulaks are engaged in large-scale activities in our villages, sabotaging our work in all aspects of agricultural economy, and in political matters as well. The kulaks try to sow discontent in the countryside, and to get into the state organs, from which they can manage affairs to their liking; they try to carry out sabotage actions, and to worm their way into the mass organizations in the countryside and even in the agricultural cooperatives.

We should make a thorough survey of the agricultural work cooperatives, for errors of principle were committed in the way they were set up and organized, and thus their general purpose has been distorted. Through the various laws and regulations they have imposed on us, the Yugoslavs have tried to misdirect us on the question of the countryside. There is no doubt that the economic situation of our peasantry has greatly improved. But while we implemented the land reform, which was a historic achievement of our Party, and expropriated the big plots of land of the kulaks, at the same time, the tax laws allowed the kulaks and part of the middle peasantry with a petty capitalist mentality to enrich themselves, while they had no obligation towards the state and made no contribution to the construction of the joint popular economy. In our law on agricultural taxation the tariff itself, although based on progressive principles, i.e. on taxation according to income, favours the rich peasants and is to the disadvantage of the poorer strata of the peasant population. According to this law, a peasant household with an income of 90,000 to 100,000 leks a year would be taxed with 15,000 leks plus 43 per cent, while another peasant household with an income of over 100,000

leks would be taxed at the rate of 20 per cent. This law is from every point of view a law along the correct lines, but the Yugoslavs have imposed on us through the rate an anti-Marxist error which favours the enrichment of the kulaks, which is a feature of the anti-Marxist view of the Yugoslav leadership. This and the other erroneous forms we have mentioned are the source of our country's economic difficulties, and what is even more dangerous, of slackening of the class struggle in the countryside, which could harm us immeasurably. We should not hesitate to fight against these shortcomings, but should set our agricultural work cooperatives on a correct basis, create as many producer and consumer cooperatives as possible, teach the peasant to bring his produce to them, turn him away from speculation and the black market, strike at the speculators in the countryside, and place the agricultural cooperatives on a correct basis, giving them greater help to enable them to become models for the peasants of the surrounding area.

We should always keep in mind Lenin's teachings on the agricultural cooperatives. He says:

*"It would be absolutely absurd to attempt to reshape these farms in any rapid way, by issuing an order or bringing pressure to bear from without."**

Lenin says:

*". . . the peasants are far too practical and cling far too tenaciously to the old methods of farming to consent to any serious change merely on the basis of advice and book instructions."***

Lenin teaches us that the agricultural work cooperative should help the peasants of the surrounding villages.

*V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 196.

** Ibid.

On no account should the agricultural cooperative set itself apart from the peasant population, but it should attract it by giving concrete help and showing by example that life in the cooperative is improved through collective work itself, even without state financial help. The communists should not forget Lenin's teachings, for in our work with the cooperatives we have committed some of the mistakes he mentions; we must be careful. Our state should use agricultural credits correctly to help the agricultural work cooperatives, the poor peasants and then the middle peasants. But Lenin says that we should ensure that the peasant correctly understands state assistance, because:

*"He has been accustomed for centuries to expect only oppression from the state, and he is therefore in the habit of regarding everything that comes from the state with suspicion."**

When we carried out the land reform, we did not state explicitly that the land was nationalized, but the law on land reform states that nobody has the right to buy or sell land. This is a question of principle, and will be the basis of the future collectivization of agriculture. We must act correctly and not be misled by the view that our peasants, in the "specific" conditions of their backwardness, would consider this as something harmful.

Lenin also teaches us that:

*". . . private property in land must be abolished altogether i.e., all the land shall belong to the nation as a whole, and its disposal shall be placed in the hands of the local democratic institutions"**.*

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 30, p. 197.

** V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 24, p. 483.

On the question of the peasantry, we must proceed with the greatest care, as comrade Stalin advised us during our stay in Moscow, and we should not overwhelm them with the maximum program of our Party. In correctly following comrade Stalin's invaluable advice on this question, we must proceed with sure and measured steps in our relations with the peasantry, we should be well acquainted with the conditions of our peasants and their mentality, and the line of our Party should not waver for a moment from the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Work in the countryside is very difficult for our Party; it should make us stronger and able to overcome all difficulties. The letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia says:

"In the conditions of Yugoslavia where the nationalization of land has not been carried out, where the private ownership, sale and purchase of land still exist, where large tracts of land are accumulated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is still used, etc., the party cannot be educated with the belief that class struggle is dying out and that class contradictions are being reconciled, without thereby being disarmed in the face of the main difficulties involved in the construction of socialism".

We must draw a lesson from these important remarks of the letter of the Bolshevik Party, to enable us to fight still more fiercely against any laxity or errors that may occur. Our country is an agricultural country, and the peasantry makes up the majority of the population, therefore we must take great care to remain clear about the question of the leading role of the working class. The letters of the Bolshevik Party teach us:

"Marxism-Leninism considers that in Europe, including the people's democracies, the working class, and not the peasantry, is the vanguard class which remains

revolutionary to the end. As for the peasantry, the majority, that is the poor and middle peasantry, can be or actually are in alliance with the working class, while the leading role in this alliance belongs to the working class”.

This is where the Yugoslav leaders have deviated. The poor and middle peasants of our country have the greatest confidence in our Party, for it was the Party that gave them land, and under its correct leadership their economic situation has improved beyond measure. Our peasantry loves the Party and acknowledges its leading role. This means that the poor and middle peasantry have embraced the alliance with the working class and acknowledged its leading role in this alliance. But our Party is faced with the great task of consolidating this alliance. It will achieve this by implementing the lofty principles of Marxism-Leninism wisely and with determination, by fiercely combating the rotten opportunist theories of the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism, by not considering the construction of socialism in the cities in isolation from the construction of socialism in the countryside.

The Party and the Front organization. Our Party had adopted many organizational forms from the Yugoslav Front, but the Party, and not the Front, has been considered as the main force leading the struggle and all aspects of the life of the country. The Yugoslav Trotskyites deviated completely on this very important matter. The Yugoslav leaders considered the Popular Front as the main leading force, and tried to merge the Party with the Front, because Tito and company claimed that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could not have a program separate from that of the Popular Front.

In our country the Front has been and is an organization of the broad masses of the people led by the Party. In our statements we have always emphasized that the

Party is at the head of the Front, that the Party is the backbone of the Front. The broad masses of our people often did not mention the name of the Front, but spoke of the Party. They said: "The Party has ordered this", "When the Party came to power", and similar things. We can say that in this respect the role of the Front has been neglected and it has not been soundly organized. In our Front there has been no other party but ours and there has been some control over membership; we can even say that we have been somewhat sectarian in this respect. In our Front there was a continual process of differentiation, and in every period the representatives of the reaction have been exposed and expelled. At one time, precisely at the time of the Berat Plenum, on the insistence of the Yugoslav delegate, we admitted to the Front some enemies who had no place in this organization. Sejfulla Malëshova's opportunist policy and our concessions over a short period enabled some disguised elements to remain in the Front and hold leading posts in it during the war. They were detected, exposed and eliminated.

Our great mistake was that, apart from the organizational forms borrowed from the Yugoslavs, we kept our Party in semi-illegality, following their mistaken example. Since the liberation of Albania, our Party has been in power, but we have not yet legalized this fact. During this period, willingly or unwillingly, we have hidden the flag of our Party under the mask of the Front. If we fully and correctly understood the leading role of the Party, why did we make this great mistake? Doubtlessly, Yugoslav influence has caused us to make mistakes, but our Party recognizes and appreciates the gravity of this error, which is illustrated by the letters of the Bolshevik Party, which say:

"Lenin says that the Party is the most important weapon in the hands of the working class. The task of the

leaders is to keep this weapon on military alert. But as long as the Yugoslav comrades hide the flag of the party and refuse to make the leading role of the party clear to the people, they weaken this weapon of the working class, detract from the role of the party, and disarm the working class. It is ridiculous to think that, because of a petty subterfuge by the Yugoslav comrades, the enemy would renounce the struggle. This is precisely why the Party should be kept on military alert for the struggle against the enemy, and not fall asleep, its flag should not be hidden, and it should not be lulled into inactivity with the thought that the enemy, if he is not provoked, will cease the struggle, and stop the legal or illegal organization of his forces".

We can illustrate the great truth of the words of the Bolshevik Party with many actions from the life of our Party and our Front, which show how they understood their mutual relations. We were always afraid that, in correctly stating the role of the Party in the Front, we would frighten away the camouflaged reactionary elements. Not only did we conceal our party membership, but we considered it correct that some ministers who were party members, but not known as such by the broad masses of the Front, continued to keep the secret of their party membership. This was done in order to avoid giving our government or the People's Assembly its true face as a communist government or a People's Assembly in which the communists predominated. This was a mistake on our part. We did this allegedly to make the camouflaged enemy elements think that there was no need for them to organize, either legally or illegally, because people who were not communists were taking part in the government and other organs. But these methods did not prevent the reactionary elements from organizing within and outside the Front. This was demonstrated by the hostile activity

of some deputies and other enemies who had wormed their way into the Front.

We hid all the party functions behind those of the Front, and the party member hid his party membership, which is a source of pride and great honour to him, under the guise of the front membership.

The Bolshevik Party's censure of the errors of the Yugoslav leadership applied equally to us. The letter of the Bolshevik Party says:

" . . . the Communist Party in Yugoslavia has remained in a semi-legal position, without taking account of the fact that it came to power three and a half years ago; within the party there is no democracy, no elections, no criticism and self-criticism, and the CC of the CPY has a majority not of elected members, but of co-opted ones."

If we study the question of the functioning of our Central Committee, we will observe the same errors that have occurred in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. Not only were there many shortcomings in the way the elections to the Central Committee were held at the 1st National Conference of the CP of Albania, but we continued to co-opt a series of people outside the party regulations. These people were co-opted right after our incorrect analyses at the 2nd Plenum in Berat and at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. They were not co-opted by the conferences, but by the Central Committee. We now have a Central Committee consisting of 25 people, of whom 16 are members and 9 alternate members. Only 8 of them were elected by the 1st National Conference of the CPA, while all the others, both members and alternate members, 17 in all, were co-opted. This is neither regular nor correct. The members of the local party committees and all the secretaries were nominated by the higher instances. No elections were carried out either in

the higher or lower instances of the Party. All the party meetings and conferences were held in secret, just as in the time of greatest illegality. The decisions of the Party were not made public, and the masses of the people were informed about them only indirectly, through the Front and in the name of the Front. A year ago, Stalin told us, and I quote: "It is incomprehensible that a party which is in power should not be made legal". We have not yet made our Party legal or convened a party congress. This is an error of principle which should be quickly put right, for this is the source of many other mistakes.

From what we have just mentioned, it appears that our Party suffers from a lack of genuine internal democracy, and lacks sound Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism, from the leadership down to the cells. Party members are afraid to speak out of fear that this will be taken the wrong way.

"It is fully understandable," says the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the CPY, "that while such conditions prevail in the party, while there are no elections for the leading organs, but only appointments from above, it is not possible to speak of inner party democracy . . . the party members are afraid of expressing their opinions, and afraid to criticize the party regulations; they prefer to keep quiet to avoid being subjected to repression."

There are many typical examples of these unhealthy manifestations in our Party. The analysis we have been making bears out fully the just criticism of the Bolshevik Party. There are examples of secretaries of party cells and party committees who, in order to safeguard their personal prestige and to cover up their mistakes with the authority of the Party, have used their authority to stifle criticism and self-criticism in those forums, even going to the extent of expelling from the cell the party member who dared

oppose their views. This has happened at the grass root level, but is also a reflection of the work at the centre.

Whether a rank-and-file party member or a Central Committee member, everyone has his place, all of us are party members, charged with particular functions and responsibilities and should serve only the Party, not individuals. All of us have the right to criticize and be criticized, without any exception. Of course, criticism must be sound, and it has its proper place. Every party member knows where he should criticize, and he should criticize forcefully and without fear. Nobody should react resentfully if he is the subject of sound criticism; on the contrary, he should be glad, for it has an educative aim. Likewise, if he makes a mistake, the party member should make an open Bolshevik self-criticism, fearlessly and without thinking that his dignity is lowered by it. On the contrary, whoever uses criticism and self-criticism properly, as Lenin and Stalin teach us, will recover and gain fresh energies and advance with new determination on the correct road of our Party.

The lack of criticism and self-criticism in the leadership and in the Party as a whole has caused the great harm which we have spoken of in this report. It has damaged the unity of the leadership, which is of vital importance to our Party. These errors have resulted in the first dangerous manifestations of odious military methods in our Party. The activity of the Berat Plenum, the tendencies noticed at the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, the erroneous attitude adopted towards Nako Spiru, and the failure to call to meetings of the Political Bureau or Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania, those members or alternate members of these organs who were to be criticized, in order to give them the opportunity to have their say, to criticize and be criticized ; all these and

other things show that we did not make a proper and correct use of a sound weapon of the Party, criticism and self-criticism. These were odious manifestations of arbitrariness in our Party, showing that we had allowed the introduction of military methods, and distorted forms of party organization borrowed from the Yugoslav Trotskyites.

Our actions in the analysis of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Albania may be compared with the erroneous views of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. In the way of acting and judging, and in the condemnation of Nako Spiru, Mehmet Shehu and other comrades, we find analogies with the actions and decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia towards comrade Zhuyovich and Hebrang. In the analysis of the 8th Plenum, which was instigated by the Yugoslav Trotskyites, we cannot but find the reflection of the anti-Marxist and anti-Soviet views of the Yugoslavs, and their opposition to our Party. The letter of the Bolshevik Party says:

"It was sufficient for Comrade Zhuyovich at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to express his disapproval of the draft answer of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union(B), to be immediately expelled from the Central Committee. Apparently the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia does not consider the party as an organism which can act on its own initiative and has the right to express its opinions, but as a partisan detachment, whose members have no right to discuss various questions, but are obliged to carry out without discussion all the desires of their "chief". This

is what we call the cultivation of military methods in the party, something which is totally irreconcilable with the principles of inner party democracy in a Marxist party. Trotsky too once attempted to implant military methods of leadership in the Bolshevik Party, but he was exposed and condemned by the party, with Lenin at its head, the military methods were done away with and inner party democracy was preserved as the most important principle of party building."

Another danger which existed in the Party was the fact that the cadre secretary of the Central Committee was at the same time minister of internal affairs. In this connection the letter of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia says:

"It should be noted that the cadre secretary of the Central Committee of the party is at the same time minister of State Security. In other words, the party cadres are in fact put under the supervision of the minister of State Security. According to Marxist theory, the party should control all the state organs of the country, including the ministry of State Security, whereas in Yugoslavia things are the other way round, and the party is in fact controlled by the ministry of State Security. This explains why the initiative of the masses of the party members in Yugoslavia is not as great as it should be.

Clearly this way of organizing a communist party cannot be considered as Marxist-Leninist and Bolshevik."

The adoption of such an organizational form has done great harm to our Party. Without going into details and giving examples, of which there are many, it should be accepted that all the errors of which I spoke in my report are dialectically linked with the fact that the organizational secretary is also minister of internal affairs. This grave mistake should be fully acknowledged, because much harm stemmed from it, such as the suppression of criticism and

self-criticism, the lack of inner party democracy, the introduction of military methods, and other evils. We should acknowledge this and understand it correctly, for otherwise the same danger may threaten us in the future. We can give plenty of examples to illustrate the errors committed in this regard. For instance, it has been alleged that the party members who work in the State Security organs are the most loyal to the Party. But it is quite wrong to put the matter in this way. Why was it raised in such a way? I think that this originates in the organizational mistake we have spoken of. Undoubtedly, the comrades who work in the State Security organs are loyal to the Party, and they must carry out their task faithfully, but this does not mean in the least that other party members who work in other sectors are any less loyal. The State Security is a very important sector of our Party, but this does not mean that since people loyal to the Party are appointed to work in this sector, they should oversee the Party and other people who are as loyal to the Party as they are. It is the Party alone which controls them all. This is how everyone should understand the question; there is no other way.

At a meeting of the Bureau, comrade Nesti Kerenxhi said that the Ministry of Internal Affairs had issued a circular recommending to all the organs of the State Security that they supervise all the activity of Party members, and their private life, their connections, the quarrels among them or within their families, their economic situation, whether their wages were sufficient or not, whether financial necessity drove them to take money from the reactionaries and become tools of the enemy, etc. Such a very wrong directive, for which Koçi Xoxe bears a great responsibility, in fact placed the party members under the supervision and control of the Ministry of

Internal Affairs. These examples are sufficient to demonstrate the incorrect line in this respect.

But there are also many other activities which Koçi Xoxe, in his capacity as cadre secretary of the Party, has allowed to go on in this very mistaken way. The meetings of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is a cell just like those of all the other ministries, could be attended only by someone appointed by the Party Committee for the Ministries, someone whose function was connected with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As the Party Committee for the Ministries could not supervise the activity of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it is clear that the Party was not able to control its activity in this ministry. Why did this happen? It happened because the meeting of the party cell of this department was not a meeting where the party problems of the department were taken up. The meetings of the party cell in the Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt only with security matters. The reports it sent to the Party Committee for the Ministries, or the Central Committee, were not party reports in which the work of the Party in this particular department was reflected, but reports on individuals. In a case where a party district committee member was not in a sound party position, but had taken the stand of the enemy, in reply to the persistent demands of the Cadre Section of the Central Committee to investigate the matter more closely, the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied that that section of the Central Committee needed not concern itself with these problems, as the security department had undertaken to deal with them. How could such a thing be permitted, that the Party, or more exactly, the Central Committee, should not be concerned about a district committee in which things were going badly, in which there were irregularities, abuses, or even hostile activity? The Party should do its work thoroughly, just

as the State Security organs do the work the Party has entrusted them with in a thorough way. Both these activities should be co-ordinated and meet at the same point, in the Central Committee of the Party. It is the Party which should give the State Security its directions, supervise it; it should not be the State Security which imposes its will and views on the Party. It is impermissible for the State Security to investigate the question of an enemy element who has infiltrated into the Party, while the Party continues to consider him as one of its sound members. If circumstances demand that secrecy be maintained for a time in order to broaden the investigations and discover the broader circles of this enemy infiltrated into the Party, the State Security cannot act without informing the party leadership, which should take all the measures it considers reasonable to co-ordinate the activities in this respect. The State Security can never act in isolation from the Party and its sure leadership.

Typical cases are those which have occurred in Shkodra and Berat, where the security chiefs went to control the offices of the party committees to see what state they were in, and how the party records were kept. Also typical are the reports which came to the State Security from the security chiefs of the districts, dealing with the activity of the party committee members of these districts.

We can easily imagine what kind of criticism and self-criticism and what internal democracy could exist in our Party when such a grave situation existed within the Party, created by these impermissible and anti-Marxist acts. We must have no illusions about this, or be defensive and hide something that cannot be hidden. In our Party people have been afraid to speak openly, to criticize fearlessly, or to make correct self-criticism, for often self-criticism, instead of leading to the rehabilitation of the erring comrade, caused him to be even more strongly condemned,

because it was turned into a weapon to strike arbitrarily at the one who made self-criticism. So people kept quiet, mistakes were covered up, suspicion was created towards the comrades and even towards the justice of the Party. Old communist comrades, with tears in their eyes, asked to be relieved of the posts assigned to them by the state, because they saw that unjust acts were being committed. They addressed themselves to the highest organs of the Party, but even there they were not attentively listened to. This is an alarming situation which should make us wake up and sound the alarm in the Party in order to combat these anti-Marxist tendencies. And we must fight them by putting in the hands of the Party the sure weapon of sound criticism and self-criticism, as great Stalin teaches us.

Some comrades confuse the role of the Party with that of security, and see nothing wrong in actions which are nothing but police activities. The Party must be vigilant and check on the activity of all its members in order to defend its ranks, but its great educative role must never be forgotten. We know that there are good party members, but there are also weak ones who may swerve from the party line. It is the task of the Party to carry out intensive educational work, showing particular care for the progress of the cadres, as Stalin teaches us ; we should look after the cadres like a good gardener who lovingly tends the plants : waters, prunes and rears them ; we should make every effort to reform those party members, and exclude them from the Party only when they are beyond remedy and are of absolutely no use to the Party.

In our Party, as in all the other parties, there are party members who have been condemned for committing serious errors, but who have not been given the maximum penalty of expulsion from the Party. Those members are like people who have survived a serious illness, and the doctor's task is to do the utmost to help them recover, to

restore their health and energy. This is how the Party should act with those people, it should help them to recover, and not kick them out. The Party, as long as it has not expelled them from its ranks, always has hopes for them. Stalin teaches us that people can be corrected, and we see this in the history of political parties. But we have not acted in this way, according to the correct party line. People who have been condemned for errors have been despised and isolated, and orders have even been given that they should be closely watched, to see what they do and whom they meet. Those are out-and-out police methods, which have nothing to do with the educational role and sound vigilance of the Party. If we do not understand this question correctly, then the party committees and cells will be transformed purely and simply into police and security offices.

We must be well aware that the introduction of such methods into the Party leads to an open attack on the Marxist-Leninist principles of party building. But we must also be well aware of the role and the tasks of the State Security organs. These organs are directed by the Party, just like any other state organ; they are organs charged with the important task of defending the achievements of our struggle, defending our People's Republic, and defending the People's Power against internal and external enemies. They should be seen and appreciated in this light and assisted in their activity to deprive the enemy of any opportunity to harm us. This is everybody's task. The arm of State Security is a very valuable and beloved arm of our Party, and its achievements in carrying out the tasks entrusted to it since its founding should be assessed correctly. That is how the entire Party must understand this problem.

The letters of the Bolshevik Party to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia are impor-

tant documents which our Party and all its members from the leadership to the rank-and-file members, should read and study, and draw conclusions related to our past and future activity. Our party members, armed with the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, should examine their work and defend the party line, correcting their mistakes and preventing future mistakes. We must properly implement the teachings of great Lenin and Stalin, for it is only in this way that our Party will advance with certainty, and the Party and its members will become bolshevized. Lenin says:

*"A political party's attitude towards its own mistakes is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how earnest the party is and how it fulfils in practice its obligations towards its class and the working people. Frankly acknowledging a mistake, ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the conditions that have led up to it, and thrashing out the means of rectification — that is the hallmark of a serious party; that is how it should perform its duties, and how it should educate its class, and then the masses."**

We should never forget Lenin's golden words:

*"All the revolutionary parties that have perished so far, perished because they became conceited, because they failed to see the source of their strength and feared to discuss their weaknesses. We, however, shall not perish, because we are not afraid to discuss our weaknesses and will learn to overcome them."***

Our Party, its leaders and all its members should faithfully follow the invaluable teachings of the glorious

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 31, p. 57.

**V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 33, p. 311.

teachers of our Party, Lenin and Stalin. Our Party and its leadership will not be afraid to face their mistakes, to acknowledge them honestly and mercilessly fight them, making their repetition impossible, for the good of our Party and people.

Comrades,

Our analysis of the activity of our Party is based on the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, and draws on the insight of the historic letters of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

On the basis of this broad and exhaustive analysis of the activity of the Party, the 11th Plenum of the Central Committee has taken decisions which are of very great importance to our Party. The Plenum found it necessary to lay particular stress on the need to mobilize all the forces of the Party to correctly implement its decisions as soon as possible. The letters of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union should be studied in all the party organizations and should help to improve the way in which the decisions of the 11th Plenum are implemented.

The whole Party should be mobilized to explain to the working masses and to all our people the truly great role of the Soviet Union, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and of great comrade Stalin, both like yesterday in the war and today in peace. The whole Party should learn from the teachings of the Bolshevik Communist Party and of comrade Stalin, the beloved friend of our people, and should profit in all ways from the invaluable experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and put this experience into practice, in accordance with our conditions, in the construction of socialism.

Confronting the democratic and anti-imperialist camp which is fighting for peace and genuine democracy, with

the Soviet Union at its head, stands the imperialist and anti-democratic camp, led by the United States and the other imperialist powers, which follows an aggressive policy against the people's democracies, against peace and freedom, with the intention of establishing its hegemony over the entire world, and enslaving and plundering the nations. The imperialists make aggressive plans, they press for war against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies, they are preparing a new butchery, like Hitler yesterday, in order to enslave the nations. Against this camp, at the head of the democratic forces, fights the Soviet Union, the land of socialism.

Therefore, all the party members and organizations should always be prepared to explain the development of international events to the working masses, to increase their hatred towards the enemy of mankind, the great enemy of our country, US and British imperialism, Hitler's faithful successors, who are attempting to enslave the world.

Tito's Trotskyite group deviated from Marxism-Leninism, and, in a hostile manner, refused the help and advice of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (B) and of the other fraternal parties; it betrayed the cause of socialism, and proletarian internationalism, and threw itself into the arms of the imperialists, and rose in shameful and dirty opposition to the Soviet Union, the glorious Bolshevik Party, and the entire socialist camp.

The Yugoslav Trotskyites have also tried to draw our Party onto their anti-Marxist road. Through their diabolical and disgraceful activity they have tried to impose their will on our Party and country, to abolish the independence of the Party and Albanian people, and turn our country into their colony. But all their efforts have met with the firm resistance of the Central Committee of our Party which, with the help of the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union (B), definitively thwarted these ignoble efforts and escaped from the clutches of Tito's renegade group.

Our whole Party must be mobilized and must gain a clear understanding of the great treachery of Tito's Trotskyite group to the cause of proletarian internationalism and to the cause of the socialist camp, so that the Party can explain this clearly to our working masses; it must understand the great help given us by the Bolshevik Party and great Stalin to save our country and Party from the abyss which Tito's treacherous group was leading us towards, and to enable us to find the road of Marxism-Leninism.

In view of the low ideological level of the masses of our party members, we must take immediate appropriate measures, doing organized and systematic work to consolidate the Marxist-Leninist education of the party cadres, and to raise their ideological level. We must always keep in mind the great and meaningful definition of Lenin in all its magnificence that :

"The role of vanguard fighter can be fulfilled only by a party that is guided by the most advanced theory".*

and we should take all necessary measures to solve this important problem.

The truth is that the concrete tasks of the post-liberation years, and the tendency towards practical work, have caused us to neglect our work to raise the ideological level of the cadres. The failure to do systematic and continuous work has grave consequences for our party. Comrade Stalin, emphasizing the danger of such a situation, says:

". . . if our party propaganda begins to flag, if the work for the Marxist-Leninist education of our cadres

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 5, p. 370.

starts to slacken, if our work to raise the political and theoretical level of these cadres weakens and, as a result, the cadres themselves are no longer interested in our prospects and our progress, no longer appreciate the justice of our cause, and turn into practitioners without a sense of perspective. . . then the whole activity of the state and the party will inevitably be weakened. It must be admitted as an axiom that, the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist awareness of the cadres of every sector of state and party work, the better and more effective are the results of work, the better and more fruitful work is, and vice-versa, the lower the political level and the Marxist-Leninist awareness of the cadres, the greater the likelihood of errors and failures in work. . ."*

Our Party is greatly affected by this shortcoming and has a great and urgent need to improve the work to raise the ideological level of cadres, and to develop this work to a higher stage.

Comrade Stalin has continually emphasized the urgent need for cadres to assimilate Marxist-Leninist science and study Marxist-Leninist theory. At the 18th Congress of the Bolshevik Communist Party, he states:

*". . . if we were able to carry out the ideological training and political tempering of the cadres in every sector in such a way that they were fully conversant with the internal and international situation, if we could succeed in turning them into fully mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving the problems of running the country without serious mistakes, then we would be fully entitled to say that nine-tenths of all our problems were solved."***

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 14, pp. 246-247 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 14, p. 247 (Alb. ed.).

This shows even more forcefully how urgent it is for our Party to understand fully the great importance of the study of Marxist-Leninist theory, which is the main weapon of a revolutionary party.

We should take measures to strengthen the Party School and to create courses in other centres which the party members can attend in order to arm themselves with the Marxist-Leninist science. It should be set as a main task of party members, and they should be encouraged and helped, to study the Marxist-Leninist science individually, in the first place the History of the CPSU (B), the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, the Constitution and Program of the Party, and the fundamental laws of the transition from capitalism to socialism in our country.

All party members have an obligation to study in order to broaden their general knowledge, to develop their minds, and alongside the work they are assigned to, they should attend school as well.

The Party should also publish as many theoretical Marxist-Leninist books as possible, and put these in the hands of its members.

The main task of our Party is to assimilate the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, for without such preparation, the activity of the Party would be hindered, and its road obscured, which would lead to grave mistakes that would cost the Party and the country dear. So we must put all our energies into studying the Marxist-Leninist theory which illuminates the road of our Party, and spread it as widely as possible among the masses of party members, using every available means.

The party publications are very important here, and should play a major role in providing the masses of party members with the necessary theoretical material, and in spreading the propaganda more widely among the ranks of the communists.

"Zëri i Popullit", which will recommence daily publication in accordance with a decision of the Central Committee, should be turned into a sound and powerful weapon in the hands of the Party, helping to bring the party line to the masses, to strengthen the party organizations, and to equip the Party with the necessary experience to carry out successfully the great tasks which lie before it, as well as helping to raise the political level of the party members.

Based on the party line, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory, the struggle against bourgeois and anti-Marxist views should be broadened and intensified everywhere in our country, particularly in the schools. Our schools, under the guidance of our people's power, and under the leadership of the Party, should become in every way centres for the formation of the future cadres, educated on the sound basis of Marxist-Leninist theory. Such cadres are what our country greatly needs. So we must struggle to eliminate everything which hampers the progress of our schools towards this goal. We should take steps to get rid of obsolete text-books and replace them with new ones, on the basis of the experience of the Soviet Union, adapted to our conditions.

The development of our party propaganda to the necessary level, and the work to raise the ideological level of the party cadres, are the greatest and the most important tasks of the Party.

Alongside these tasks, the Party must solve one of its most important problems: it must make a study of the current situation of the country on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, and sum up the necessary experience for its further development on the road of socialist construction.

We must also further strengthen our propaganda work and agitation among the masses. Our working masses and the people as a whole should be informed about the prob-

lems of the country and about international problems; they should understand the situation, know what work has to be done, and mobilize themselves to carry it out. It is the task of the party organizations and of every party member to transmit the party line to the broad masses of the people, to enhance their consciousness and mobilize them to implement the party line.

All the party organizations should carry out broad and systematic propaganda and agitational activity, explaining to the masses the importance of the decisions of the government, and in the first place, the importance of the state plan, mobilizing them to fulfil and overfulfil it. The party members should set an example in all this great activity, and be better at organizing the work to carry out and overfulfil the state plan.

Our Party should immediately be made legal as the party which leads and directs all the affairs of the country at the head of the working masses, and at the head of all the mass organizations, in the construction of socialism. Up till now, the Party has remained in a state of semi-illegality, this harmed it, weakened its influence, and hindered its further development and the strengthening of its authority and its links with the masses. It is clear that in a situation where the political role of the Party is reduced, as happened here, through its being hidden behind the Democratic Front, although the Party is in power, favourable conditions are created for the emergence of anti-party tendencies which gravely harm the Party.

It is vitally urgent for the very existence and consolidation of the Party that we immediately eliminate all the alien, anti-Marxist and anti-party views which have penetrated into our Party. With regard to the building of inner party democracy, the Marxist-Leninist principles of party building and inner party democracy should be re-

established. To achieve this, the Central Committee has in the first place taken the decision to convoke the 1st Congress of the Party, at which we will analyse its whole activity, approve its Constitution and Program, and democratically elect the Central Committee, then democratic elections will be held in all the party organizations.

The Central Committee has taken measures to end a situation in which the organizational secretary of the Party was also minister of internal affairs, for this is totally alien to our principles and has gravely harmed the Party. It must be made quite clear that the function of minister of internal affairs should be considered as a state function which, like all other functions, is under the direction and control of the Party, and should never be permitted to control the Party, as happened in our country.

Organizationally, the Party should be strengthened on the basis of the Leninist principles of party building.

The main principle, on which a revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist party is built, is the principle of democratic centralism. Democratic centralism means:

1. — All the leading organs of the Party should be elected democratically, from below up, and they should not be appointed or co-opted.
2. — It is the duty of the leading organs to render account periodically on their activity to the members who have elected them, and create all the possibilities for them to participate freely in discussions and decision-making.
3. — Steel-like but conscious discipline, with the minority submitting to the majority, is absolutely essential for democratic centralism. Steel-like discipline calls for discussions, and the struggle of opinions.

"But after a conflict of opinion has been closed", comrade Stalin says, "after criticism has been ex-

*hausted and a decision arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all party members are the necessary conditions without which neither party unity nor iron discipline in the party is conceivable.”**

4. — The decisions of the higher party organs are binding on the lower organs.

We must particularly emphasize the need to take measures to eliminate all the anti-democratic, military and police methods, and the anti-Marxist and anti-party views, which have penetrated into our Party, and inner party democracy should be established, as Lenin and Stalin teach us.

Inner party democracy is a necessary condition for the existence and consolidation of the Party. It strengthens party discipline, but is opposed to military and police methods.

The party member should feel at home in the Party, and all his rights should be respected.

All problems in the Party should be solved on the basis of criticism and self-criticism. The party member has the right to have his say, to criticize anyone, and on no account should moral reprisals be taken against him for his just criticism. The lively participation of the party members, the confrontation of opinions, free discussion, and the implementation of the decisions taken; this is the essence of the inner-party democracy.

Comrade Stalin, explaining the essence of inner-party democracy, says:

"Genuine democracy means that the party masses are active in the party organizations, the party masses solve both questions of the party and questions of general practical significance, and the party masses

* J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 6, p. 186 (Alb. ed.).

*take decisions and set the party organizations the task of implementing them.”**

Inner party democracy strengthens the unity of the Party, its ideological unity, its conscious discipline and centralism.

The principle of inner party democracy calls for sound Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism. Without criticism and self-criticism, the Leninist-Stalinist organizational principles of party building cannot be implemented. Self-criticism is a law of development of a Marxist-Leninist party. It is a sound weapon in the hands of the party, which strengthens and enables it to overcome difficulties and forge ahead.

Comrade Stalin says:

*"Only parties which are departing into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear the light and fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor the other, we do not fear them because we are a party that is in the ascendent, that is marching to victory. That is why self-criticism. . . is a sign of our party's immense strength, and not of its weakness, it is a means of consolidating and not of disintegrating the party"****

Our whole Party, and all the party members should be educated in this method, which is the method of educating the cadres in a revolutionary spirit. Any other stand towards criticism and self-criticism is anti-Marxist and unworthy of a communist. Not to accept criticism and not to make self-criticism means to be afraid, to be on one's guard against the Party, or to be unwilling to acknowledge

* Questions of the Building of the Party (Book One), Tirana, 1948, p. 57 (Alb. ed.).

** J. V. Stalin, Works, vol. 7, p. 124 (Alb. ed.).

mistakes. In either case, this is a stand harmful to the Party. Our Party should be educated in a revolutionary spirit, as Lenin and Stalin teach us.

Without broadly developing criticism and self-criticism in the party organizations, it is impossible to judge matters correctly, it is impossible to make progress, or to strengthen the Party. If criticism and self-criticism are lacking, the way is opened for the penetration of alien and anti-Marxist methods into the Party, which weaken and erode it from within.

There should be an end to all the non-Marxist methods of work in the Party on the matter of the assessment of cadres. The party cadres should be evaluated and judged according to their work, according to the results of their work, and the way they defend the party line, and not according to personal opinions derived from backward and petty-bourgeois prejudices.

We must stress the necessity for our Party to establish unity and the method of collective work in all its organizations, from the highest to the lowest. We cannot allow a situation where party problems are not raised or are raised only superficially for the sake of supplying some information, and solved in an individualistic and unconnected way.

Party questions should be dealt with on the basis of the party norms, on the basis of the great principle of democratic centralism. It is only on this basis that party questions can be correctly solved, otherwise room is left for grave errors to occur in the Party, as a consequence of individual work isolated from the Party, viewed and assessed not according to the line and interests of the Party, but according to personal prejudices and ulterior motives.

Assessing questions in a personal light is a primitive method of work for our Party, and does not at all comply with the principles of a Marxist-Leninist party; it is often

the result of the great conceit that stems from the over-estimation of oneself, and from the flagrant violation of democratic centralism. This method eliminates the participation of the Party in broad and free discussion of problems, and does away with the struggle of opinions, criticism and self-criticism, which should be the method of work of a revolutionary party. Such individualistic work, for removed from the fundamental principles of a Marxist-Leninist party, based on personal opinion, petty-bourgeois prejudices and narrowly personal and egoistic motives, cannot be allowed in our Party, for such a method is anti-Marxist and spells death to the Party.

The elimination of such a method of work and the establishment of collective work in the party organs will safeguard and strengthen the unity of the leading organs of the Party and of all its organizations.

We must also understand more clearly and consider in a more profound way the question of the personal responsibility which each party member, and especially each leader, should feel towards the tasks entrusted to him. Collective work and the observance of Marxist-Leninist principles in the work of the Party should lead every party cadre to be more aware of his responsibility, and carry out his tasks better on the basis of the decisions and line of the Party.

Revolutionary vigilance in the Party should be heightened in order to safeguard the party line, to guard the Party against distortions of its line, and to defend the Party against the attacks of internal and external enemies. The Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin has given a brilliant example of the way the unity and the line of the Party should be defended at any time against the avowed enemies of the Party and the proletariat. We must follow the example of the Bolshevik Party, and strengthen revolutionary vigilance in our Party.

We should eliminate as soon as possible police methods of supervision which limit vigilance and in fact cannot properly defend the Party. Information within the Party should also be understood in this way, that is, it should not be information of a police nature, but information which gives the Party every opportunity to have a clear understanding of how to implement its line, to uncover distortions and mistakes, and to take the necessary measures in time. To be vigilant means to detect distortions in the party line, to detect hostile and anti-party activity. The Party should teach every one of its members that the Party is defended by preserving the purity of its Marxist-Leninist line.

The links of the Party with the masses should be strengthened. This is one of the main tasks of the Party, and an indispensable condition for its very existence. This means, primarily that the party members should not only be among the working masses, teaching and guiding them, but should always be ready to listen to what they say, to their suggestions, and their opinions, should know how to learn from them, understand their needs, and respond to them appropriately.

In the period of the socialist construction of our country, particular importance should be attached to the question of developing criticism and self-criticism on a large scale among the working masses, to the question of control from below, to the question of teaching them to discover shortcomings and mistakes in work, and to take an active part in rectifying them. The party members should have a good grasp of this very important task, otherwise there can be no progress in socialist construction.

In order to strengthen the links of the Party with the masses, all the party members should educate the masses politically and mobilize them to implement the party line. They should take the party line to the working masses.

In the first place, the party organizations should be firmer and more unhesitating in waging class struggle, struggle against the enemies of our course. It must be clear that in this period of socialist construction, in this period of transition from capitalism to socialism, class struggle does not slacken. The enemies of socialism, the privileged classes of the past, which have been affected and are continually being affected by our reforms, will never for a moment give up their struggle against our line, against socialist construction. The internal and external enemies are still further stepping up their struggle and efforts to block our road to socialism, to attack and overthrow our people's power, and to re-establish their hated capitalist regime.

The party members should be among the working masses, as outstanding fighters against the enemies of the working class, against the enemies of socialism, and should teach and lead the masses in the struggle to build socialism.

The party members should gain the sympathy of the masses, and win their confidence. But in order to do this, the party members must divest themselves of all petty-bourgeois vestiges, of all the shortcomings they may have, such as ambition, egotism and conceit, and should become an example of simplicity. If you act conceitedly with the masses, if you put your nose in the air and look down on them, you cannot become their leader, you cannot lead the masses along the party line, you cannot teach them, and even less can you learn from them. In this way the links of the Party with the masses are severed, and the Party heads towards its liquidation, its annihilation.

The party organizations should strengthen their activity to unite the broad working masses, the workers, the poor and middle peasants and the patriotic intellectuals around the Democratic Front, and take particular care to see that the alliance of the working class with the poor

and middle peasantry, under the leadership of the working class, is continuously strengthened in the struggle to implement the party line and to make the transition to socialism.

We must strengthen and increase the deep love and respect which the popular masses should feel for our army, the defender and guarantor of our borders, and of the independence of the country, the loyal guard of the socialist achievements and the interests of our people.

The Central Committee of the Party, as a result of the whole analysis made at the 11th Plenum, has taken many important decisions which refute all the unjust decisions and measures taken under unhealthy circumstances; these new decisions aim at strengthening the leadership of the Party, at healing the Party, at enlivening its activity and at setting its work on a correct Marxist-Leninist basis.

It is the duty of all the party organizations and of all the party members to exert all their efforts and in the spirit of this analysis, to carry out these decisions as soon as possible and as well as possible.