4 May 1928 Inprekorr, viii, 55, p. 1005, 8 June 1928; 56, p. 1022, 12 June 1928


Government proceedings against the Japanese Communist Party became more marked towards the end of 1927, as the JGP extended its activities, particularly in preparation for the elections to the Diet which were to be held, for the first time under a universal male franchise, in February 1928. Itself illegal, it worked through the Rodonominto, or Workers' and Peasants' Party, whose list of candidates included ten communists In March the police rounded up a number of suspects, raided union offices, etc. The leading communists escaped arrest. The Workers' and Peasants' Party and a number of other labour organizations were dissolved by government order, as well as radical students' bodies.


The growth of the broad mass movement of the Japanese workers and peasants, as shown in the recent elections and in the increasing resistance to attacks by the Government, opens a new page in the history of the class struggle in Japan.

(. . .)

The greatest success of the Japanese communists was the re-establishment of the communist party itself. The party succeeded in taking an active, indeed a leading, part in mobilizing and organizing the vanguard of the awakening masses. Despite threats and brutal suppression the party is continuing this activity and thus giving the most effective answer to the reactionary imperialist Government of Japan.


Everything that happened before and after the election campaign completely confirmed the basic ideas of the Comintern resolution of 15 July 1927, namely, that in Japan as elsewhere, notwithstanding the special circumstances of the class struggle in that country, a communist party can develop only by fighting socialdemocracy.

(. . .)


In the light of recent events it is clear that the communist party committed a serious mistake is not opposing the proposals for an unconditional amalgamation of the Rodonominto, the Nichiroto, and the Sakai Minsuto (social-democrats). An amalgamation plan of that kind should not have been regarded as a form of united front tactics at all. The purpose of united front tactics is to mobilize for the struggle against capitalism and reformism and thus to strengthen the revolutionary organizations of the working class.

(. . .)


In order to be able to accomplish its new, great, and responsible tasks, the young communist party must strain every nerve to strengthen itself numerically and ideologically. Particular efforts must be made to strengthen and improve the illegal apparatus, in order to counter govern merit action through the police and the judiciary to annihilate the communist party and all other revolutionary organizations. The party must take steps to improve its machinery, and at the same time let no legal opportunity slip for establishing contact with the masses as a means of extending and utilizing its ideological and organizational influence among the workers and poor peasants.


The creation of an illegal party journal, appearing regularly, is urgently necessary, to enable the party to expand and strengthen its organization.

(. . .)


The communist party is called on to lead the struggle for the re-establishment of the revolutionary mass organizations—the Rodono-minto, the Hyogikai (leftwing trade union organization), and the Seinen Domei (youth league) dissolved by the Government.

(. . .)


The party must fight vigorously against any move, open or concealed, to abandon the struggle for these organizations, and against the mood of retreat in general.

Particular attention must be paid to defending the Hyogikai. To leave the leftwing unions and enter the centrist unions would mean more than open surrender by the working class; it would encourage the Government in its terrorist policy and the reformist leaders in their treachery. Special measures must be taken to prevent members of the Hyogikai from transferring to the centrist unions.

(. . .)

At the same time our party must retain the initiative in the struggle to re-establish the unity of the unions, split by force and intrigue by the reformists.

(. . .)


The communist party must conduct agitation among the workers to induce them to influence the Rodonominto to pursue the following parliamentary tactics:

The small Rodonominto party should not merge with the general bloc of so-called workers' organizations, which includes the social-democrats.


It is the imperative duty of the Rodonominto deputies to take an active part in the workers' and peasants' struggle and to use the parliamentary tribune for this purpose. This does not exclude the possibility and necessity, in certain circumstances, of maintaining contact by means of joint conferences with deputies representing social-democratic and centrist organizations, in order to influence their parliamentary tactics.

(. . .)


The communist party must make it clear to the workers that the Rodonominto group in parliament, because of their extreme numerical weakness, will be able to play an independent part only if they conduct an energetic struggle (supported by the communist party and the masses) against imperialism, for the demands of the workers and peasants, for strengthening the revolutionary organizations. Regardless of the difficulties they will encounter, the Rodonominto deputies must speak out against the robber war being waged by Japanese imperialism in China, and must force the reformist deputies to join in the campaign or reveal themselves as avowed allies of the government's robber policy.



III. International