ECCI

RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD ECCI PLENUM ON

THE ITALIAN QUESTION

 

[ EXTRACTS ]

 

23 June 1923 Inprekorr, iii, 113, p. 994, 5 July 1923

 


The resolution of the fourth world congress on the Italian question stipulated the fusion of the CPI with the majority of the SPI who at the Rome congress had voted for the Third International, and called for the utmost unity of all revolutionary workers against the threat of fascism. Events have shown that this resolution was and remains correct. While reaffirming it, the enlarged Executive notes with deep regret that the wishes of the fourth congress have not yet been realized.


The chief reasons for this failure are:


1.

The fascist white terror, the persecution of the working class, the unpunished murder of revolutionary workers, the countless arrests have temporarily driven the workers' movement into illegality and caused some degree of demoralization. Since the heaviest blows have fallen on communists, it is understandable that at the moment the more irresolute socialists are reluctant to amalgamate with the communists. . . .


2.

The right wing of the SPI . . . conducted a systematic campaign against amalgamation with the communists, exploiting the unfavourable conditions in which the advocates of fusion found themselves.

To some extent the failure was due also to the incorrect tactics of the majority of the CC of the CPI. Hypnotized by the previous struggle against Serrati's group, and suffering from extreme dogmatism, the CC majority failed completely to take into account that the situation in the labour movement had changed radically. . . . Not only did they not campaign for fusion with the SPI; they actually frustrated the execution of the fourth world congress decision.


The enlarged Executive decides:


A. In regard to the CP:


1.

The International demands of the CC of the CPI, not merely formal acknowledgement, but practical execution of this decision. . . .




3.

The CP must use united front tactics adapted to Italian conditions, i.e. it must make proposals to the SP leaders in a form consistent with CI decisions.


4.

The composition of the Executive of the CP must be such as to guarantee the carrying out of these measures.


 

 

 

B. In regard to the SP:


1.

The enlarged Executive notes that the present SP leadership relies on the votes of a doubtful majority. The Milan congress was convened during the white terror which reduced the membership from 32,000 to 9,000. Nevertheless more than 40 per cent were in favour of amalgamation with the communists...



4.

The Executive notes that at a moment when there is a crisis in the Amsterdam International and the most class-conscious left among the workers are drawing nearer to the RILU, the CG of the SPI found it appropriate to rejoin the Amsterdam International.


5.

The Executive must conclude from the above that up to now the SP leadership has acted in a fashion hostile to the CI.


6.

The Executive regards the Milan congress and the present situation in the SP as a temporary episode...


7.

The Executive wishes to leave nothing undone which can accelerate the coming together of all revolutionary forces in Italy, and believes it is meeting the wishes of the majority of workers in the SP by welcoming the desire to draw closer to the CI expressed in the letter of 10 June, despite the hostile actions referred to above.


8.

To give practical form to this rapprochement, the Executive proposes that the CC of the SP form a working alliance with the CP. . . .


9.

In proof of its solidarity with the SP workers . . . the Executive requests the Executive of the SP to send a delegation to Moscow to effect adherence to the Comintern.





 

Comintern

III. International