Chairman Neurath: Before proceeding with the vote I am obliged to make the following statement on behalf of the Presidium:

Comrade Sturz said in the course of his statement that the Czechoslovakian question was not examined carefully enough. I wish to say that this assertion is not correct. The Opposition has, of course the right to make statements but we cannot accept the assertion that the Czechoslovakian question was not sufficiently examined.

The vote will now be taken. Is anyone against the resolution moved by the Commission?—I declare the resolution carried with one dissentient. (A voice—Bravo).

Comrades, this ends our labours for to-day. It is too late to deal to-day with the report on the American question. I want to remind you that a Conference of all the women delegates will be held to-morrow at 11 a.m. The delegations are also invited to hand in, not later than to-morrow afternoon, to Comrade Humbers Droz nominations for the Executive.

The next Session will be held to-morrow morning.

The Session adjourned at 4.50 p.m.

Errata.


Speech by Comrade Lin-Yen-Chen:

"First was the downfall of the Southem..." should read: "First let me speak of the downfall..."

Also, line 47, "Before they had conquered Kwantung in 1920 they established..." should read: "Before they conquered Kwantung and established a government in 1920...."

Pado 5, Col. 2, line 11: "The Peking-Mukden railway strike..." should read: "Peking-Hankow railway strike..."

Also, line 12, etc., "the centre of China..." should read: "Central China..."

Also line 14 "Hongkong..." should read: "Hankow..."
workers, we must, in addition to political activity, strive also for the maximum of economic help from the world proletariat.

Every factory, every workshop, which Russia can start without capitalist credits and with the support of the working class, is an effective support to Soviet Russia in its struggle against the imperialists. Everywhere and everywhere, in every province and every region, the working class must become active, must take part in the political and economic life of the country, must help to weaken the support of the bourgeoisie.

The Fourth Congress of the Communist International therefore regards it as its duty to organize workers' party and organization, and especially of the Communist Parties, to render practical support to Soviet Russia through economic relief action for the reconstruction of its industry in addition to the political revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie.

3) The most important task of the proletarian economic relief outside of Russia consists in the gathering of means of production — machines, raw materials, etc. — for Soviet Russia. Besides the old methods of collections, gifts, subscriptions, etc., new methods should be adopted, such as the subscription to workers' loan for Soviet Russia by Party groups, trade unions, co-operatives, and other organizations of the working class.

The propaganda for proletarian economic relief at the same time furnishes the best opportunity for agitation in favour of Soviet Russia. It is therefore to be carried out in close connection with the national sections in the various countries.

Since this problem of the economic support of Soviet Russia is of great importance for the working class as a whole, it is necessary to create committees consisting of delegates from the various working class organizations, similarly to the workers' committees for Russian Famine Relief, to organize and lead this action. The task of these committees or corporations is to interest the largest possible masses of the workers in economic relief. These committees are subordinated to the Communist International.

4) The employment of funds collected by these committees or corporations must take place in close cooperation with the existing Russian or economic bodies, be it those of the State or of the workers' organizations.

5) A mass immigration of foreign workers from Russia at the present time does not add to, but rather detract from, the reconstruction of Russia and must not be advocated in any case. The immigration of foreign workers into Russia must be limited to individuals which are especially necessary in certain enterprises. But even in individual cases, this should take place only with the understanding and agreement of the Russian Trade Unions.

6) The proletarian economic relief must combine harmoniously our aspirations towards the ideal aim of concentrating the International solidarity of the workers upon the relief for the first proletarian country in the world, and the desire to produce concrete economic results.

7) In accordance with the principles of socialist co-operation, and industrial management, the surplus produce must be used only to enlarge the field of activity of the economic relief association.

Felix Kon: We will proceed with the vote on the resolution which has been accepted by the Commission and the Presidium together with all amendments.

Is anybody against the present form of the resolution as read by Comrade Munzenberg? No! The resolution is unanimously accepted.

The next point on the agenda is the report on the work of the Jugo-Slavian Commission. Comrade Felix Kon has the floor.

Felix Kon: Esteemed comrades, in commencing my report on the Jugo-Slavian Party, on behalf of the Commission appointed for that purpose by the Congress, permit me to make reference to a speech by Comrade Zinoviev. "We were born in the Second International and inherited many of its traditions which cannot be eradicated in one day, but if that day should last several years, we must insist that the process of eradication be accelerated." This fully applies to the Jugo-Slavian Party.

In reporting to the Congress about this Party one must start from the standpoint that the great force of communism consists in its ability to tell the truth even when it is bitter to do so. Unfortunately, in speaking of the Jugo-Slavian Party, we must utter this most bitter truth.

The Jugo-Slavian Party arose in the period of 1919-20, when the communist slogan attracted the masses, when the wave of the workers' movement — exemplified by the Italian movement — created in every country the possibility of the widest development for the Party. We saw how the Jugo-Slavian Party, hitherto very insignificant and only recently purged of the reformist elements, became suddenly one of the mightiest parties, capturing many central municipal councils and seizing parliament 59 deputies. On the whole it appeared to be a big force.

This Party being strong in numbers, in view of the rapid growth and of the easy victory, did not realize for a long time that it was not yet a Communist Party, merely adopting the communist label without passing through the hard test of the struggle. It did not realize the defects which it retained from the old social-democratic party; it remained a party of resolutions, a party which ascribed the greatest importance to its participation in parliament, which hoped in this way to be able to influence the bourgeoisie and defend the working class, nor realizing the fact that the militancy of the masses which caused the growth of the Communist Party would also arouse the vigilance of the enemy of the proletariat and prompt the bourgeoisie to take measures to crush the proletarian movement.

In this respect the Party of the Jugo-Slavian Party is one of the — happily — few parties that did not publish the 21 conditions of admission to the International.

The Party did not even publish the resolution of the Comintern or its attitude to parliamentarism, as though afraid lest it might weaken its parliamentary position. During the whole of this time, in spite of the quite clear indications that any easy victory may end in a similarly easy defeat, the Party took no measures to form an illegal organisation in preparation for fighting not by means of resolutions, but by action. When the notorious Decree of the Realm decree was promulgated, the decree was in force only for six months, yet to be approved by parliament to become law. Instead of at once starting the fight, the Party hoped that parliament would refuse to approve the law and prevent it becoming law. Meanwhile the central and municipality councils were dissolved, and the communist deputies were thrown out of parliament.

All this took place under circumstances which were unheard of in other countries. No appeal was made to the masses, no sign of life and protest, no attempt was made in Jugo-Slavia to fight in the usual communist way. The victory scored by the anti-proletarian class without a fight and without resistance came as a surprise even the victors themselves by the ease with which it had been achieved. Repressive measures were undertaken against the working class. The reactionaries began to suspend newspapers, to dissolve trade unions and to hand over their property to the reformist organizations. People were thrown out of theagraphy which did not manifest even the least hint at the fight against the raging counterrevolution. This was accompanied by repressive measures against the Party, resulting in a state of affairs that is strange, since the Party had carried out underground activity. The major part of the active comrades had to flee abroad to escape imprisonment.

Emigration set in, with all its characteristic features. This was a new experience to the Jugo-Slavian organisation, and the parties that had passed decades underground it was nothing new. The leaders, detached from direct activity and direct contact with the proletarian masses, were musing in exile over the causes of their defeat, and as a result, bearing the blame from the outside. There was no Marinetti's analysis of the events that had occurred in Jugo-Slavia. Instead of this, the emigrants indulged in fruitless squabbles. Regardless of the absence of any differences of principle, there were quarrels that resulted from the general mistrust, as one group differed from the other in the interpretation of the common
experience. There were no tactical differences, but the mistrust of one group of leaders towards the political act and ability of the other group. This was lamentably manifested during the Vienna Conference.

Comrades, I now come to a question which cannot be approached by old experienced revolutionaries otherwise than with a sense of shame—before themselves and before their comrades—that they should have to talk of such questions. The Jugo-Slavian Party, during the period of its legality, had worked out certain statutes of organisation. Since then everything went by the board. Where there seemed to be all the indications for the development of the struggle, only smouldering ruins remained. It was necessary at all costs to create something (no matter what it be called), a conference, a congress, anything else to get together the active comrades for a discussion of the way out of the predicament and of the way to revive the organisation that had been smashed to pieces. It is clear that under such circumstances it may not be possible to study the statutes framed under legal conditions and to determine by time whether it was proper, on the basis of this or that article of the Statutes, to call a conference. One would think that the life of the Party and the interests of the working class should have been placed above such considerations. We also have to point out that the Vienna Conference under the circumstances, was called with all the possible regard for these articles of the statutes; but there were still a number of articles that had admittedly not been observed. On the other hand, if in order to observe these articles, the conference should not have been called, those guilty of not calling the conference would have been subject to trial by the Third International.

Population congress was called. In this connection it is quite true that at that conference they worked out certain political and organisational resolutions which obtained the sanction of the Executive of the Comintern, and it should also be stated that these resolutions did not cause any difference of opinion on either side. Comrades, when the Commission has to examine the affairs of the Jugo-Slavian Party under such conditions, when it sees the active comrades of that Party divided into two camps, it has—without doubt—all their protests that there are no differences to pause and ponder whether there are not such differences that have not yet come on the surface. The Commission resolved to analyse, in the presence of the comrades, all the political questions which usually cause differences among other parties: the question of the political situation, the question of the future of the trade unions; the question which is of paramount importance to such a Party, the question of the Jugo-Slavian Party, namely, the national question, the question of the relation between the legal and illegal organisations and of the subordination of the legal organisation to the directives of the illegal organisation. All these questions were taken up and duly discussed in the Commission, and we must declare, comrades, that upon all these questions there are no differences between the groups. One naturally asks, what is the cause of all this turmoil. Well, it is the usual thing in the squabbles among political exiles.

I must not forget to consider the situation quite seriously. Since there are no political differences, there is need to prevent the comrades from working out those organisational methods which will enable them to work together, and by working together forget all the sentiments of mutual distrust. For this purpose, the Commission worked out a series of proposals of an organisational character which have been submitted to the Executive Committee of the Comintern. In view of the fact that we have to deal here with a party that has done to a considerable part of its work in a clandestine and illegal manner, it stands to reason that all the questions of an organisational character should not be discussed here, even in the Plenum, but be handed over to the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

With regard to the political position of the Party, I will read to you the resolution elaborated by the Commission and expressing at the same time not only the hope, but the profound conviction that this moment is the highest authority of the Party—the Fourth Congress—and I will say its final word, all the comrades of the Jugo-Slavian Party will not only take notice of it—as was their usual practice in this respect hitherto—but will take all the steps necessary to fulfill the decision of this Congress. The thorough study which awaits for working, I am convinced that at our next Congress we will have a united and militant Party in Jugo-Slavia that will lead great masses of the organised proletariat.

I will now read the resolution. It may appear to the comrades to be somewhat longer than the usual resolutions, but the Commission deemed it necessary. In this resolution (which is subject to publication)—to dot every "i" and cross the "t"—so that there should be no room for misunderstanding or misinterpretation.

The resolution reads as follows:

The Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia was formed out of the organisations of the former Social-Democratic Party in those provinces which now constitute Jugo-Slavia, by expelling the Right, and later also the Communist elements, and by affiliating the Party with the Communist International (the Vukovara Congress of 1920). The growth of the Communist Party was greatly promoted by the general revolutionary ferment which spread over Central Europe at that time (The Polish Army's march on Warsaw, the seizure of the metallurgical factories in Italy, the strike wave in Jugo-Slavia). In a short space of time the Party grew into a mass organisation, wielding tremendous influence over the large masses of workers and peasants. This was demonstrated in the municipal elections results, in which the Party captured many municipalities including Belgrade as well as by the subsequent elections for the Constituent Assembly, in which the Party elected 59 deputies. The ominous growth of the influence of the Communist Party caused alarm among the dominant military and financial oligarchy, forcing the latter to start a systematic campaign for the purpose of destroying the Communist movement. After the violent suppression of the railwaymen's General Strike in April 1920, the militant oligarchy dissolved by force the Municipal Councils at Agarin (in June of the same year), and on the 6th of September a decree was published dissolving all the Communist and trade union organisations; the Communist newspaper was suppressed, and the Communist clubs were closed by orders of the social patriots. In the month of June, the Defence of the Realm Decree was promulgated, which outlawed the Communist Party and drove it out of its last refuge—the parliament and the municipalities.

In addition to the above reasons arising out of the general situation in the country, the destruction of the Communist Party of Jugo-Slavia is greatly due to its own internal weakness: its outward growth did not go hand in hand with the development and the consolidation of the organisation, or to the level of the communist consciousness of the party members. The Party had not time to prepare its evolution towards communism. It is perfectly clear now that the leading organ of the party committed a number of serious errors and blunders, owing to a wrong interpretation of the methods of struggle laid down by the Comintern. The blunders made the task of the counter-revolution very easy. While the working masses showed energy and revolutionary will in a series of strikes, the Party revealed no revolutionary initiative. Thus, when in 1920 the policy prohibited the May Day demonstration in Belgrade, the Central Committee of the Party made not the slightest attempt to arouse the masses to protest. The same thing happened in the following year. Neither did the Party organize any mass action in defence of the municipal councilors who were forcibly ejected from the Belgrade municipality which was wrested from the communists. The passivity of the Party encouraged the government to go to the very extreme. In fact, the government, taking advantage of the miners' strike which broke out at the end of December, dissolved the Party, which at the elections had returned 59 members to parliament, did not organise any mass action.

This passivity of the Party, in the face of the fierce attacks of the reactionaries, was the result of the Party not being firm in its communist convictions. The Party was still burdened with the old social democratic conceptions.

Although the Party had enthusiastically
joined the Communist International, which showed the readiness of the masses for struggle, the leading organ was not yet quite familiar with the new path. Thus, for instance, it did not dare to publish the 21 conditions adopted by the Second Congress; nor did it publish the “Thesis on the Question of the Inevitability of Party Parlia-
mentarianism.” Thus it lost the Party and the masses which were following it in complete ignorance of the demands which the Communist International had put before the parties which wanted to be real communist parties. At the same time the leading organ of the Party did not take any serious steps for the ed-
ucation of the Party and of the masses for the struggle on all fields against the reaction which was threatening them. It concentrated its attention chiefly on its electoral victories, and took care not to alarm the petty bourgeois elements by showing them what the communist party meant and what its methods of struggle were. At a time when the financial and military oligarchy in Belgrade was getting ready to conduct a savage and decisive struggle against the revolutionary working class movement, the Central Committee of the Jugo-Slavian Communist Party was concentrating its attention and spending its energies on such secondary questions as parliamentarianism, leaving the rear of the Party undefended and unorganised. This was its fundamental mistake.

The Jugo-Slavian Party proved itself absolutely powerless and incapable of protecting itself against the White Terror. It had no underground organisation which could have enabled it to act under the new conditions and to remain in contact with the masses. Until the dissolution of the parliamentary group the communist deputies were the only link between the centre and the province. This link was severed with the dissolution. The arrest of the leading comrades in the centre and in the provinces left the movement without a lead. Owing to these arrests the Party almost ceased to exist. The same fate overtook the local organisations of the Party, and the danger arose of the workers’ organisations, which were entirely to themselves, becoming completely disrupted. The social-democrats, with the assistance of the police, endeavoured to make use of these circumstances which were favourable to them, but they failed.

Under the reign of terror the central organ of the Party, the only very slowly acquired the organisational forms and methods of struggle dictated by the new conditions. For a long time it remained passive, hoping that as a consequence of the internal differences within the working class, this regrouping would soon pass away without the active intervention of the Party. It was only when all hopes of an amnesty for the communists, who were being tried before the tribunal, were dashed to the ground that the Central Committee of the Party began the work of reorganisation in order to call the Party again into life. It was only in July, 1922, that the first Enlarged Plenum of the Party Committee took place in Vienna. The Vienna Conference deserves warm commendation as the first step to re-establish the Party, notwithstanding the defects of its composition and of the viewpoint of the Party statutes. The conditions of the country at that time, the changes, the composition of the Party as a result of the same and of the treachery of some of the Party members, and of the passivity of the Party for eighteen months, precluded all possibility of convening a legal plenum which could really represent the Party. The Executive of the Communist International did right, therefore, in declining the Enlarged Plenum a sufficient competent representative of the Jugo-Slavian Communist Party, and in endorsing its resolution with some extremely rational amendments concerning the composition of the newly elected Central Committee. For the same reason the attempt of several Jugo-Slavian comrades to sabotage the Conference by leaving the Session on the 16th day, regardless of their good intentions must be condemned as objectively injurious to the Party.

The resolution of the Vienna Conference on the question of the general situation in Jugo-Slovia and the immediate task of the Communist Party, on the trade union movement and reorganisation of the Party, and the resolutions on the Third Balkan Communist Conference, endorsed as the Comintern Executive, stand by the Comintern Executive, did not arouse any differences of opinion among the representatives of the majority and the minority within the Party. This unanimity on questions which are of the greatest importance to the Party in the present period, is the best proof that there is no justification whatever for dividing the Jugo-Slavian Party into majority and minority factions, and that the split among the leaders which occurred at the Vienna Conference was entirely due to reasons of a personal character. At the moment of its revival, the Jugo-

This unity must also be preserved in the future. In the face of the capitalist and social-democratic reaction, which is now raging, nothing would be more damaging for the Party and the revolutionary movement in Jugo-Slovia than factionism. Therefore, it is the duty of the new Central Committee of the Party to do its utmost, and to take all the necessary steps, in order to set the minds within the Party at rest, to remove all suspicion, to re-establish mutual confidence within the Party and to rally under its banner all the active workers who have remained at their posts throughout the counter-revolutionary Terror.

In order to achieve this aim it is essential, on the one hand, to carry out the decisions of the Vienna Conference on the purging of the Party from the compromised element, and on the other, to bring into the responsible work of the Party comrades from the ranks of the Vienna Conference minority. The Jugo-Slavian Party can receive valuable assistance in this respect from the Balkan Communist Federation. In order to do this, the Jugo-Slavian Party must follow the example of the other Balkan Communist Parties, and must send without delay its representative into the Executive Committee of the Balkan Federation. The Comintern must give substantial assistance in the matter of the re-establishment and the inner consolidation of the Jugo-Slavian Party. The Executive must maintain a closer connection with the C.C. of the Party than formerly. However, the future of the Party depends chiefly on those party comrades who are active and politically and morally sound. The Comintern depends on these comrades, and calls upon them to do their duty. The resuscitated Party, having profited by the harsh lessons of the recent past, and animated by faith in the ultimate triumph of the World Revolution, will be able to rally to its banner the proletarian elements which were left without a lead, and to organise and consolidate the Jugo-Slovia section of the Balkan Communist Federation.

The Congress authorises the Executive of the Comintern to take any drastic measures which circumstances might demand.

Comrades, for the purpose of greater authority, for the purpose of enabling this resolution to exercise the maximum of influence in Jugo-Slovia which needs our decision, we ask you to accept this resolution unanimously. (Cheers.) I may add that the organisational measures elaborated by the Commission have already been submitted to the Executive.

Chairman Neurata: Two comrades have demanded the floor to report on the work of the Jugo-Slovia Commission. Comrade Stanitch has the floor to make a declaration on this question.

Stanitch: “In the name of the above-mentioned minority, that is, of the Left Wing of the Communist Party of Jugo-Slovia, I declare that we are in full agreement with the resolution of the Commission, i.e., with the criticism of the activity
of the opportunists and of the mistakes
committed by the Communist Party of
Jugo-Slavia during the last two years.
The resolution corroborates our criticism
of the Commission and the measures
by which it proposes to settle the inner
conflicts of the Party. For it leaves
the leadership of the Party to those comrades
who have had the support of the opportu-
nists since the Vienna Conference.

We have demanded, and again demand,
equal representation in the leadership
of the Party, in spite of the fact that we
have a right to claim the majority, since
the majority is on our side in this con-
fusion, and our attitude is anti-opportunist.
We ask, therefore, that which has already
been granted to the French Party."

Comrade Raditch has also asked for the
floor for a declaration.

Raditch: In the name of three out
of the four members of the Jugo-Slavian
Delegation, I wish to make the following
declaration:

"Although we take into considera-
tion the fact that the last enlarged
conference of the Party Council in
Vienna had full power to formulate
final decisions on all questions in-
cluding the election of a new Execu-
tive, and that this has been approved
by the Executive of the Comintern
as well as by the Commission to the
Jugo-Slavian question, nevertheless,
in order to remove all misunderstand-
ings and consolidate all the forces
of the Party, we accept the decision
of this Commission, we will apply
ourselves to its execution with all
our energy, and vote for the Revolu-
tion!" (Applause.)

Chairman Neurath: There is still
a third declaration to be made by Comrade
Marynko.

Marynko: Comrades, the delegation
from the Communist Youth Federation
of Jugo-Slavia agrees in all points with
the declaration of Comrade Kon, and
declares that the Communist Youth of Jugo-
Slavia will not only accept the political
and organisational resolutions, but will
set all its energy to their execution, all
the more so since the previous activity
of the Federation agrees with the present
resolution. (Applause.)

Chairman Neurath: We will now
proceed to vote on the resolution presented
by the Jugo-Slavian Commission. Is any
one against the resolution? No. Does
anyone abstain from voting? No.

The resolution is unanimously adopted.
We will now pass over to the Report
of the Norwegian Commission. Comrade
Bukharin has the floor.

Bukharin (greeted with applause):
Comrades, as you all know, the Norwegian
Workers Party is passing through a severe
crisis. This crisis is expressed by the
existence of two factions. These two
factions fight each other, and one of them
stands in rather strained relations with the
Executive, at least there are certain facts
before us which may be taken as a symp-
tom of a crisis in the relations between
the Norwegian Workers’ Party and the
Executive.

First of all, I would like to characterise
briefly the two Norwegian factions. The
existence of these factions has deep his-
torical roots and can be understood only
by knowing the history of the Norwegian
Party. The first tendency, forming the
majority in the Norwegian Party, is
partly syndicalist and partly reformist.
The existence of these tendencies in the
Norwegian Workers’ Party finds expression
in certain minor phenomena. First in

federalism, which is a result of syndicalist
traditions. Formerly, when the comrades
of this group fought against the social-
democracy, this syndicalist federalism was
the instrument for the disruption of the
old social-democratic organisation. There
existed the centralised social-democrats
and the centralised trade unions, and
further, the revolutionary opposition,
especially in the trade unions. This op-
position was based upon federalist prin-
ciples. We might say that some of the
leaders of the trade union opposition
were the disciples of the American I.W.W.,
a revolutionary federalistic organisation.
They have transplanted the principles of
the I.W.W. into Norway, and at that time
we cannot say that these principles were
bad. Quite the opposite. It was a good
instrument to disrupt the old organisation
and conquer important strategic posi-
tions in the Norwegian trade union move-
ment.

But these federalist tendencies still
maintain their influence to-day, when the
majority belong to our party, having come
under the influence of the revolutionary
movement and when the social-democracy
had been fully conquered and destroyed.
Naturally, at the present time, these
federalistic principles have turned into
their opposite and have become faulty.
A certain group in the Party is guilty of
this error. The second characteristic of
this tendency is seen in the laying of par-
ticular emphasis on the economic strug-
gle and on the trade unions in general.
We can also easily understand why this
is the case. The greatest part of the
Party originated from this trade union
opposition. Our strength grew from this
group, and it is natural now that the
trade unions be assigned a place of pri-
mary importance.

This is the theoretical point of view
of these comrades. This explains the speci-
fic and original structure of the Party. Until
very recently, and even now our Norwegian
brother-party has been having its basis
in the trade unions. The trade unions
had entered the Party en bloc, and this
produces the peculiar situation that there
are no communists in the Communist
Party. This finds its expression in the
whole history of the Norwegian move-
ment.

The third political tendency which is
characteristic of this group is a separation
of politics from economics, and of politics
in general from parliamentary politics.
This can also be easily understood from
the standpoint of the historical develop-
ment of the Party. When the primary inter-
est lies in the trade union struggle, when the
trade unions are regarded as the most
important organisations, such a tendency
naturally results, and the idea prevails
more or less that economics and politics
are two wholly different fields.

This standpoint is absolutely incorrect.
We all know that politics are only a
concentrated expression of economics.
But such a tendency does exist within
this group.

Another characteristic of this tendency
is its incapacity to manoeuvre. This inca-
pacity is usually being theoretically based
upon high-sounding revolutionary
phrases. For instance, they say that we must
maintain a rigid line of proletarian action.
No compromises are necessary—ours is a
straight line to revolution. We need not
make use of the conflicting forces within the bourgeoisie, etc.

This sounds very revolutionary. In reality, however, it can be explained as follows. The above group considers the capitalist system as something basic and unchanging. Within this system they represent the specific interests of a certain class of workers and do not take into consideration any other classes which might be used as auxiliary groups for the overthrow of capitalism. And this original view, which at first seems very revolutionary, is based upon a reformist idea of revolution. Naturally, I do not mean to say that these thoughts are actually present in the minds of the comrades of the above groups. But the analysis of all these phenomena together with that of other problems and other questions of tactics supports my contention.

The second group of the Party, the second faction, finds its basis historically considered, in the development of the Youth movement. While the first group originated from the old trade unions, and more especially from the trade union opposition, this group grew up from the Youth movement. During the war the Youth movement developed rapidly into an extremely revolutionary movement. The characteristic of this group, as opposed to the first, is the greater insistence upon the necessity for political struggle. While the first tendency shows a sort of anti-political policy, the second advances the importance of politics and the conquest of political power. From a Marxian standpoint, we can say that the second faction is more orthodox, more imbued with the Marxian principles. Until now neither tendency held the leadership in our par-

lametary group. For various reasons, especially because revolutionary parliamentarianism is something quite new to Norway, this second group has been guilty of a great many mistakes in its parliamentary activity. These mistakes have been sharply criticised by the Executive and cannot be ignored.

This then is the general situation of the Party. In the first faction we have various elements, some with syndicalist, some with reformist tendencies. The third tendency in this group combines peculiarly the reformist element with a syndicalist cover.

Neither is the second faction quite homogeneous. There are certain comrades who are very good Marxians, but there are also opportunist elements and so it often happens that the first tendency opposes this second group from a reformist standpoint and nevertheless with revolutionary phraseology. The whole complex of tendencies, movements, groups and subgroups within the Norwegian Party is therefore, rather difficult to picture in a few words. This is, I believe, the whole difficulty of the problem. But in general, this is the relation of the two factions. The first faction now controls the majority of the Party and of the Executive, and many tactical and theoretical mistakes of the Party are causing difficulties in leadership.

I would like to say a few words upon the concrete mistakes of the Party. First the question of federalism. This federalism appears most crassly in the attitude of the Party towards the Comintern. We are developing towards over-increasing centralisation. Our Congress has adopted a resolution on the question of organisation, which shows clearly our tendency to stricter centralisation. This is also the opinion of the most delegations of the majority Party. But it is not the view of the Norwegian Party.

During one of the conflicts between the Norwegian Party and the Executive, published an official announcement to represent the standpoint of the Central Executive of the Party, to state clearly the relation of the national sections of the Comintern to the whole International.

This declaration contained certain crude phrases which enlightened us upon the attitude of the Norwegian Party towards the Comintern. During the conflict the central organ of the Norwegian Party "Sozialdemokraten" wrote literally as follows: "It is regrettable that an international organisation should interfere in an internal conflict of a party as the Comintern has done in the present case".

What does this mean? It means that the Norwegian Party considers it a regrettable procedure when the Executive of the Comintern interferes in the internal affairs of the Party. This formula is as crude as any formula could be. This is another section of this same article.

"A certain faction has attempted to get the Executive to interfere in the inner Party affairs of Norway, and as a result the authority of the International has been undermined".

Which is to say that it is a regrettable fact when a faction of the Party appeals to the International. This is then a clear point of view, which may be formulated like this: The Communist International may adopt various resolutions. The Congress may express its view on these resolutions etc., but the Comintern must not interfere with the internal business of a Party. This is the application of the purest federalism to our International organisation, and this federalism will suffer no criticism. We all must resist sharply against this.

There is still another case. Our Congress has often invited the Norwegian comrades putting various questions to them. Within the scope of this problem, we inquired very distinctly into the relations between the Norwegian Party and the Communist International and certain Norwegian comrades working with more or less reserve. Doubt has been expressed as to whether the International should interfere in the internal affairs of a national section with such "brutality" so to say.

Then we have a case which is much to be regretted, in connection with this very Congress. That is the so-called Traanæl case. We already have various misunderstandings and minor conflicts between the International and the Executive previous to this. We therefore asked that the most prominent representative of the majority in the Norwegian Executive be sent to the Congress. Three times we asked this of the Norwegian Party. First, Zinoviev sent a telegram; then the Executive sent a telegram, and then another one, after the Norwegians had arrived here. The majority of the Executive, and even Traanæl personally, refused to attend the Congress despite the fact that the Executive Committee of the Communist International officially requested them to do so. There were many reasons for this, technical grounds, grounds of internal policy and many others. We looked upon this case at the time as absolutely irregular. We also had a precedent to this case in our relations with the French Communist Party. As you know, one of the leaders of the majority of the French Communist Party, Comrade Cachin, did come recently to attend the Congress, after all. The Traanæl case was however, unlike many others, the many letters of the Executive asking, urging and commanding that the most prominent representative of the Party be sent here, were not complied with, which made the situation much worse. All this has its cause in general matter of principle. Of course it was not just the personal fault of Comrade Traanæl, but an expression of the entire political atmosphere which until now unfortunately existed among the majority of the Norwegian Party. This, perhaps, is not the case as far as the mass of the Norwegian Party is concerned, but it exists quite definitely among the officials. It was the expression of the fed-
The capitalist tradition is so deeply rooted that the problem; and it is precisely because this federalist is so difficult. Therefore, we should seek to overcome this tendency.

This same lack of desire to work harmoniously with the Communist International showed itself also in the nonfulfillment of the commissions of the Communist International, or rather the delaying of such fulfillment. We next come to the question of the organization of the Party. In this regard it is quite evident, as I have already remarked, that we must reorganize the Party. Under the present circumstances it is necessary to have a completely unified Party; and a Party is not unified when it has non-Communists among its members, who were automatically drawn into the Party with the rest of the Comrades. When Comrade Zinoviev was for the first time in Helsinki as a representative of the Executive of the Communist International, an agreement was entered into with Comrade Tranmæl personally that the Party must be reorganized. A long time has elapsed since then and the reorganization of the Norwegian Party is proceeded but very slowly. So far this task has not been accomplished. It is being claimed naturally that there are great difficulties in the way. The Norwegian transport communications are very bad; the financial position of the Norwegian Party is bad. It is hampered by the strength of old traditions, and so on. We recognize all these difficulties, but we put to our Norwegian comrades two significant dates from the life of the Russian Party: 1) the purification of the Party; and 2) the reorganization of our Trade Unions. And we carried out both of these tasks within a few months. We excluded 170,000 members from our Party. This was a very great task, extending over wide areas of Soviet Russia. But, we carried out this work within the limits of a very brief period. Then came the reorganizations of Trade Unions. After the new economic policy had been introduced, we realized that the former conditions when all workers in any given factory automatically became members of the Unions—have become absolutely impossible, for it is quite clear that the new economic policy involving the growth of privately owned factories requires not the mere mechanical inclusion of all workers in a Union, but a close and conscious foundation of the ranks of Labor. And this great organizational task, which meant the placing of our work on an entirely new basis, and their complete within a few months. It must be remembered in this connection, that our unions contain several million members. And we also had a completely shattered system of transportation at that time, unfavorable financial conditions, famished, and other tasks of reorganization in a short time. Therefore we ask of our Norwegian comrades: Why cannot you accelerate your work on these lines, why cannot you carry out more quickly this undeniably essential work, which is being opposed by nobody? In the course of several sharp debates we characterized this slowness of the Norwegian comrades as a kind of unconsidered sabotage of the resolutions of the Communist International. I will not use such sharp terms here, but it is clear that this matter has been delayed so long that we are compelled to include in our resolution the demand that the Norwegian Party accomplishes the organization of their Party in the shortest possible time.

Then comes the question of the name of the Party. It sounds almost ridiculous that the majority of the Party—which is tied with Syndicalism—should have postponed this question for so long a time. Furthermore, it may be said formally as follows: At the Second Congress of the Communist International it was resolved that in all cases the world Social-Democratic should be stricken out. Since then we have written several letters to the Norwegian Party, but about two years have already elapsed, and the old name remained. You have heard, comrades, Comrade Meyer stating from this rostrum that the question of the name was only a trifle. But how do we deal with this matter? We have had a series of precedents: I remember the Italian case, the French case, and now the Vella case within the Italian Party. And we know quite well how important this question of the name of the Party is, and our enemies know it too. I will read you the following quotation from an article which appeared on September 8th of this year, in the “Social-Democrat of Norway,” the organ of the Right Social-Democrats of Norway. “Social-Democrat,” dette blad hyvs nava allerede er nok til at forvize forveve vigen innt i det komunistiske parti i Norge.

That “Social-Democrat” is the expression of the confusion within the Communist Party of Norway.

Thus the Right Social Democrat quite rightly characterize the use of the world “Social-Democrat” as a sign of the confusion existing within the Norwegian Party. The Commission proposes therefore that the name be altered in the shortest possible time, as this is for us not a trifle but an important matter.

I shall now proceed to the question of general tactics. As I have already remarked, there is a difference of opinion between two factions. The antagonism between those two factions may be described somewhat in the following manner. The first faction, the majority faction, says: We must create a real proletarian Party, and must carry a class struggle against the entire bourgeoisie. We are against all manoeuvring, etc. The other faction, the minority, represented by Comrade Scheflo, says: We must fight of course, against the whole capitalist system, but we shall not tire of winning the various sections of the bourgeoisie; and especially must we distinguish between the large capitalists and the large landowners on the one hand and the peasants and its various groupings on the other. The Executive has supported the second tendency; consequently I shall defend it now.

We formulated our resolution in this manner, because this question is fairly important in Norway. If we assume that it is our business only to protect the craft interests of the workers without taking care of the large masses of the labor reserves of the people whom we will have to draw upon during the revolution. Then the attitude of the first tendency is perfectly justified. But this is not the case in Norway, where the first beginnings of fascism are already noticeable. We demand that our Party shall set its goal on the social revolution. There is a vast amount of antagonism between the various elements of the bourgeoisie. Part of the peasantry are already voting for us, another part are dominated by the bourgeois-radical party. It is absolutely necessary for us to steadily broaden our basis. This does not mean that we should draw these peasants into our Party, but that we should use them in our maneuvering against the entire capitalist system. We should never be contented only with these elements that are already with us, but we should strive to break up the radical-bourgeois peasant Party and attract to our side those elements of the peasantry which are really desiring of protecting the interests of the peasantry as a class. This is our duty, and it is no transgression against Marxism, but the practical application of the Marxian doctrine to the present situation in Norway.

This question plays a fairly important role. In our discussions with the Norwegian comrades in the Commission we learned that this question plays a really big political part in Norway; it should therefore be properly fixed in our resolution.

On the other hand, we must once again tell our comrades of the Scheflo tendency, that in their parliamentary activity, based on the whole upon a proper political orientation, they nevertheless committed several grave mistakes. Their biggest mistake consisted in supporting the compulsory arbitration law. Our comrades voted in parliament in support of compulsory arbitration in case of conflicts between workers and employers.

The great power, the power in the hands of the capitalist class, was thus sanctioned by our comrades. There were various reasons for this. The state of things was indeed complicated. The comrades thought that perhaps these things would ameliorate the condition of the workers. Yet, objectively speaking, it was a great mistake. The mistake was particularly great, because there is an old tradition in Norway to fight only with these things. I recall, for instance, that several years ago there was even a general strike a Christiania against the introduction of compulsory arbitration. We must therefore repeat that it was a mistake that cannot be denied.
But at the same time we must say that it is absolutely Marxian and Communist to take advantage of the antagonism between the contending bourgeois forces.

I now come to the question of the “Møt Tid” magazine. This subject was already handled by Comrade Zinoviev, and so I will content myself with a few remarks concerning the action to the effect, on another subject. It is a group of Communist and, fairly exclusive one. It is dominated by a faction which, in our opinion, maintains a wrong and tactical position. We ought to seek for some way out. The sins of this group, from the point of view of the group itself, consist in the fact that this group is an exclusive one. It means that a new member cannot be admitted only upon the consent of the existing members of the group. And we know that such groups always join the germs of new factions. In view of the wrong tactical orientation of this embryonic faction, the Congress and the Communist International should combat this false tendency and take the necessary organisational measures in this respect.

The Congress arrived at a unanimous decision on this question to the effect that the group must cease to exist as an exclusive group, which obviously means that there should be no academic group as such, but it should become an open group to which every Communist student may belong, and which, so to speak, would be an open Communist nucleus of students.

With regard to the magazine published by this group, we resolved that it should not continue to exist as an organ independent of the Party. In the Congress we quoted various articles from this review, e.g., an article by the editor of the review in which he designated our entire German Party as an intellectual clique. Naturally this ought not to be tolerated, and the spreading of such “false reports” about our two Communist parties should not be tolerated.

In the first draft we outlined two possible solutions. Either to discontinue this review, or to convert it into a party organ. Our Norwegian comrades declared themselves in favour of the second solution, and we have acceded to their desire.

We will merely say the following. The Norwegian comrades must carry out the decisions of the previous Congresses of the Communist International and, in their Party Press and their central organ. Even at the very first glance the appearance of the “Sozialdemokraten” makes it possible to draw conclusions. As to its contents, it discusses all sorts of things, but it contains nothing to indicate a definite political course. It has discussions about the attitude to the International, it discusses the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party, it discusses all questions, it is always rife with discussion. Discussion is a good thing, but it should not be carried to extremes. The Party organisation must carry out a definite and strictly defined policy. Of this we find no place in the central organ of our Party. We must, therefore, emphasise, that in regard to our Norwegian press and its central organ, it is high time to carry out the decisions of the Communist International and of the past Congress.

We now have two “personal” matters.

There are two comrades in Norway whose behaviour has been something to be desired in the Party, as well as at the meeting of our Commission that we attended by the Norwegian comrades. We concern the comrades Karl Johansen and Halvard Olsen.

The case of the first comrade is as follows. Karl Johansen is quite a new Party member, who was formerly a bourgeois journalist. Subsequently he became a member of the Party, and as such he immediately started an offensive against the Communist International. We have thus a peculiar situation where a bourgeois journalist is one of the most active collaborators of the central organ of our brother party. He was on the whole directed against the Communist International. We look upon this gentleman as an agency of the bourgeois against our Norwegian brother party. Already once before we decided to expel this gentleman, and the Executive endorsed our decision. But made his expulsion dependent on certain conditions. They were met, and we are asking the Congress to now, we are asking the Congress to decide upon. However, comrades, taking into consideration the whole situation, we discovered in various decisions many dangerous tendencies which are all the more dangerous as they are of a nature of bourgeois agencies within our own ranks. We have already noticed the connection between our Norwegian comrades. Basing ourselves on our past experience, we ask you to expel this fellow.

The Halvard Olsen case is of a different nature. He is an old worker and Party official. Hitherto he has been a true and faithful comrade, but he has committed very great mistakes. At the Congress of the metal workers’ unions in Norway he committed a serious breach of discipline. He voted against the(window诏, if you cannot see the entire image)

Resolution on the Norwegian Question.

After having heard the Report of the Norwegian Commission, the Congress resolved as follows:

1) It is necessary to inform the Executive of the Norwegian Party of the necessity of a more exact fulfilment of all the decisions of the International and its Commissions, as well as of its own organs. In the Party organs, as well as in the decisions and resolutions of the directing committees of the Party, there should be no doubt whatever expressed of the possibility of their application to all eventualities which may occur in the life of the Party.

2) The Congress orders the carrying out of Party reorganisation on the basis of individual membership within one year, at most, after the next national conference of the Party. The Executive must report, once every two months, on the practical measures taken in the carrying out of this work, and their results.

3) With regard to the contents of the Party press, the Party is obliged to comply immediately with the decisions of the previous World Congress as well as those contained in the letter from the International Executive of 23rd of last September. The social democratic names of the Party papers must be altered within three months from the date of the closing of this International Congress.

4) The Congress supports the standpoint of the Executive in its references to the parliamentary mistakes of the representatives of the Norwegian Party. The Congress is of the opinion that the Commissions, as parliamentary representatives of the Party, must submit to the control of the Party and the criticism of the Party press. This criticism must, however, always be well founded and of a logically correct nature.

5) The Congress believes it to be quite admissible, even necessary, to use the antagonism between various sections of the struggle against the whole bourgeois. This applies especially to the anti-
gonism between the representatives of large-scale industry and the landed proprietors on the one hand, and the peasants on the other hand. The struggle to win the peasantry must be one of the special tasks of the Norwegian Party.

6) The Congress states once again that the parliamentary group, as well as the Party press, must unconditionally submit to the control of the Central Committee in every detail.

7) The group "Not Dag", which is an independent organisation, must be dissolved. We must by all means encourage the formation of a Communist student group, which shall be open to every Communist and under the full control of the Party Executive. The review "Not Dag" may become a Party organ on condition that its editor be chosen by the Central Committee of the Norwegian Party, in agreement with the Executive of the Communist International.

8) The Congress sustains the appeal of Comrade H. Olsen, and as he is an old and faithful comrade and was a most active worker and official in the Party, the Congress reinstates him in his rights as a Party member. At the same time the Congress definitely states that his conduct at the Congress of the Metal Workers Union was incorrect.

9) This Congress resolves to expel Karl Johannsen from the Communist International and the Norwegian Party.

10) With the object of bringing about a closer co-operation between the Norwegian Party and the International Executive, and to help overcome the present conflicts with as little friction as possible, this Congress instructs the future Executive to send its plenipotentiary representative to the next National Conference of the Norwegian Party.

11) This Congress entrusts the Executive with the task of drawing up a letter to the Norwegian Party elucidating this resolution.

12) The above resolution and the letter of the Executive shall be published in all Party organs, and shall be communicated to all branch organisations of the Party, before the delegates to the next Party Conference are elected.

This is our resolution and I ask you all to support it. (Loud applause.)

Chairman Neurath: The session stands adjourned till six p.m. to-day. (Adjournment at 3.35 p.m.).

The session was opened by Chairman Neurath at 6 p.m.

Chairman (Neurath). The session is now open.

Comrade Meyer now has the floor for a statement on the Report of the Norwegian Commission.

Haakon Meyer. The majority of the Norwegian Delegation states that it is not satisfied with the submitted resolution. A number of the clauses do not express our point of view. In certain cases we are of the opinion that the Commission has dealt with concrete facts in too abstract a manner. This applies, for example, in the case of Halvard Olsen and in the case of Karl Johannsen.

With regard to this last point, a proposal was made by the Delegation calling for a different wording, but it was defeated by the Commission. In other cases, it seems to us that the resolution is not objective enough. This applies to the point dealing with "Not Dag", which group we do not consider to be an isolated group, and to point 4, containing the criticism...